

Emmanuel Karagiannis: *The New Political Islam: Human Rights, Democracy, and Justice*. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018. Pp. xvii, 258.)

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The public visibility of Islam and the popularity of political actors appealing to Muslim values and beliefs have been the subject of intense scholarly inquiry since the last quarter of the twentieth century. While the earlier literature primarily focused on the question of Islam's compatibility with democratic rule and liberal norms, the recent scholarship has been offering more nuanced and sophisticated analyses of the conditions under which Islamist political actors eschew violence, commit to pluralistic politics, develop human-rights-oriented agendas, and contribute to reconciliation and peace-building in postconflict situations. *The New Political Islam* by Emmanuel Karagiannis aims to contribute to this scholarship by offering a comprehensive and cross-national survey of different forms of contemporary Islamist politics.

Karagiannis argues for the recent emergence of a third generation of Islamism that is distinct from the previous two generations, "the Islamist nationalists" and "the Islamist globalists." He calls this new generation "the Islamist communitarians," who transfer global ideas and norms to local Muslim contexts. He suggests that the term "glocalization" best captures their characteristics since they embrace globalization in a way that makes it compatible with parochial values and identities. This generation stands between Islamist nationalists such as the Muslim Brotherhood, revolutionary Islamists in Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Palestine, who struggled against local ruling powers and their external backers in the second half of the twentieth century, and Islamist globalists such as al-Qaeda who developed a post-territorial and transnational identity with a global focus.

According to Karagiannis, Islamist communitarianism, characterized by high levels of adaptability and heterogeneity, has three distinct groups: (1) the activists who subscribe to the master frame of human rights, (2) the politicians who subscribe to the master frame of democracy, and (3) the militants who subscribe to the master frame of justice. Karagiannis selects two examples from each of these groups. First, he discusses how human rights have become central to the discourse of converts who engage in civil society and political activism in non-Muslim-majority countries, as well as to Hizb ut-Tahrir, a transnational organization aiming to unify all Muslims and restore the Islamic caliphate. Regarding the second group, he chooses electoral Islamist parties with mass-mobilization capacity in Muslim-majority countries. These parties come in two different forms. While the AKP in Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and al-Nahda in Tunisia represent "Islam democracy," Salafi-oriented parties in Egypt and Tunisia represent "electoral Salafism." For Karagiannis, the former parties could be Muslim equivalents to the Christian Democrats and facilitate democratization in the

Middle East. The latter parties signify the rise of nonviolent forms of Salafism that are willing to participate in pluralistic politics. Finally, Karagiannis discusses Islamist communitarians who engage in violent politics in the name of defending and seeking justice for the communities they claim to represent. They include Shiite groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Moqtada Sadr's movement in Iraq and Sunni groups such as the self-styled Islamic State and al-Nusra in Syria. A common feature of both Shiite and Sunni groups is their emergence and rise in civil war conditions.

Karagiannis avoids a reductionist approach and explicitly highlights the complexity and fragmented nature of Islamist politics. He offers a balanced view of ambiguities characterizing the current generation of Islamist actors. He also does not fall into the trap of sensationalism by prioritizing violent expressions that have been the focus of mass media and punditry. At the same time, the book misses important opportunities to engage in some of the debates central to the scholarship on Islam and politics. As mentioned earlier, an important line of inquiry regarding Islamist actors is the question of the factors affecting their willingness and ability to develop platforms espousing human rights and conducive to democratization. While Karagiannis rightly observes that many Islamists in both Europe and the Middle East adopt discourses of human rights and democracy, he does not offer a systematic analysis of the impact of this adaptation on the nature of Islamist activism. More specifically, under what conditions does the Islamist embrace of these discourses for instrumental reasons have a self-transformative impact? When, if ever, do Islamists start advocating rights of others and establish resilient coalitions with other actors against broader human-rights violations? These and similar questions that are central to current discussions on Islam and politics remain unaddressed in the book.

Another important issue concerns conceptualization. The categorization of Islamists into three generations is not always compelling. For instance, it is not clear why the Islamic State is a glocalized actor, but al-Qaeda is a global one. The cross-national reach of the former, which attracted tens of thousands of followers from all around the world, is unprecedented; the latter, which was heavily embedded in Afghan and Pakistani politics, confronted not only the Western powers but also local regimes such as the Saudi monarchy. Furthermore, the division of the new generation of Islamists into three types with distinctive master frames is not very neat. For instance, Islamist electoral parties utilize the language of human rights as much as they talk about democracy. An alternative conceptual framework could make distinctions between Islamists' positions on the role of violence in politics, their context (e.g., Muslim-majority versus -minority countries), and their views on secularism.

In terms of empirics, Karagiannis almost exclusively relies on secondary sources in Western languages, primarily in English. While the author utilizes statements, speeches, and interviews produced by Islamists, none of these sources are in primary languages such as Arabic. Furthermore, there are no

personal interviews conducted with these actors. This lack of empirical originality hinders the ability of the author to develop a more in-depth perspective about the question whether Islamists' utilization of three master frames actually results in some transformative changes. An approach based on primary sources and highlighting internal debates and tensions taking place *within* Islamist actors regarding human rights, democracy, and the use of violent means would have made a more significant contribution to the scholarship.

While the book generally provides accurate and well-sourced information, certain observations should be based on research that is more meticulous. For instance, Karagiannis's brief discussion of initial Muslim experiments with democracy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (77) fails to mention such monumental events as the Tunisian constitution of 1861 and Iran's constitutional revolution of 1905–11. In addition, Alevis in Turkey (89) and Alawites in Syria (162) could not be described as Shiite sects given their highly distinctive belief systems and religious practices.

Overall, scholars interested in Islam and politics will find few theoretical insights and novel empirical findings in *The New Political Islam*. For scholars looking for a balanced and well-written textbook providing a general overview of different configurations of Islamist politics, however, Karagiannis's book could be a reliable choice.

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William E. Connolly: *Facing the Planetary: Entangled Humanism and the Politics of Swarming*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017. Pp. 232.)

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William Connolly is probably best known for his work in the 1960s and '70s on the ambiguity and ideological contestation of political concepts. From the 1980s, "postmodernist" preoccupations began to appear in those of his writings that are now identified with "new pluralism," and it is in this idiom that he is now tackling man's relationship with the natural world.

In *Facing the Planetary*, Connolly argues that conventional political theory is "sociocentric": that is, it interprets and explains social processes by reference to other social processes alone (15). In the real world, he says, there are multiple series of temporal, self-organizing "force fields" which "impinge upon each other and human life in numerous ways" (4)—systems that are