What Is Terrorism?

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ABSTRACT *My aim in this paper is not to try to formulate the meaning the word 'terrorism' has in ordinary use; the word is used in so many different, even incompatible ways, that such an enterprise would quickly prove futile. My aim is rather to try for a definition that captures the trait, or traits, of terrorism which cause most of us to view it with moral repugnance. I discuss the following questions: Is the historical connection of terrorism with terror to be preserved on the conceptual level, or relegated to the psychology and sociology of terrorism? Does mere infliction of terror qualify as terrorism, so that we can speak of non-violent terrorism? If terrorism is a type of violence, does it have to be against persons, or should violence against property also count? In what sense can terrorism be described as indiscriminate violence? Should we use the word only in a political context? In such a context, can we speak of 'state terrorism', or should the word be restricted to actions not sanctioned by law? Is the terrorist necessarily oblivious to moral considerations, as those who define terrorism in terms of antinomianism imply? My answers to these questions lead up to the following definition: terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take.*

The phenomenon of terrorism raises numerous questions. Some are theoretical: What are its causes, and what are its various effects? Others are practical: What is to be done about it? Should terrorism be tackled directly, or is the only really promising way of dealing with it to attend to the grievances that give rise to it? Still others are moral: Just what is it that makes terrorism so thoroughly morally repugnant to most of us? Could it be justifiable under certain circumstances, or is it absolutely wrong? Philosophers are likely to be most interested in the last sort of question. This paper is an attempt at a definition of terrorism that will capture the trait, or traits, of terrorism which cause most of us to view it with repugnance.

Obviously, the definition I am after will be rather narrow in comparison to a great many definitions one finds in history and social sciences. There the tendency seems to be to apply the word to political assassination, and sometimes even to political violence of any sort. However, a conception of terrorism that lumps together the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, the *Reichsprotektor* of Bohemia and the burning to death of a woman and her baby riding on an inter-city bus [1], can be of no use in moral thinking.

Terrorism and Violence

Etymologically, 'terrorism' derives from 'terror'. Originally the word meant a system, or regime, of terror: at first that imposed by the Jacobins, who applied the word to themselves without any negative connotations; subsequently it came to be applied to any policy or regime of the sort and to suggest a strongly negative attitude, as it

generally does today. Since I am seeking a definition that will cover both a single act and a policy of terrorism, I suggest we put aside the notions of 'system' and 'regime', but preserve the connection with terror. Terrorism is meant to cause terror (extreme fear) and, when successful, does so. But if someone did something likely to cause terror in others with no further aim, just for the fun of it, I think we would not see that as a case of terrorism. Terrorism is intimidation with a purpose: the terror is meant to cause others to do things they would otherwise not do. Terrorism is coercive intimidation.

This is just the definition offered by Carl Wellman in his paper 'On Terrorism Itself': "the use or attempted use of terror as a means of coercion" [2]. Wellman remarks that violence often enters the picture, as it is one of the most effective ways of causing terror, but hastens to add that "the ethics of terrorism is not a mere footnote to the ethics of violence because violence is not essential to terrorism and, in fact, most acts of terrorism are nonviolent" [3]. I agree that the ethics of terrorism is more than a footnote to the ethics of violence, but not for the reason adduced by Wellman. It seems to me that it would not make much sense to speak of 'non-violent terrorism' (in the sense which also excludes threats of violence). Wellman has three counter-examples, none of which strikes me as convincing. One is a judge who sentences a convicted criminal to death in order to deter potential criminals. I should think that execution is one of the more violent things we can do to a person (except, of course, if one accepts the definition of violence as 'the illegitimate use of force', which I find most unhelpful). Then there is blackmail, in which the fear of exposure is used as a means of intimidation. I think we would need to know just how serious the harm caused by the exposure would be in particular cases. If the harm threatened were great, and if violent actions characteristically inflict great harm in a striking manner, as Wellman rightly says, then to blackmail would indeed be to threaten violence. Finally, Wellman says:

> I must confess I often engage in nonviolent terrorism myself, for I often threaten to flunk any student who hands in his paper after the due date. Anyone who doubts that my acts are genuine instances of terrorism is invited to observe the unwillingness of my students to hand in assigned papers on time in the absence of any such threat and the panic in my classroom when I issue my ultimatum. [4]

This sounds quite fanciful. But if Wellman's students are indeed as given to panic and terror as he suggests, and if to be flunked in his course is indeed such a great and dramatically inflicted harm that their reaction is understandable, then Wellman's threat is a threat of violence after all. It is not terrorism, though; nor is the meting out of the death penalty to a convicted criminal—for the reason to which I now come.

Indiscriminate Violence

It is often said that the most distinctive characteristic of terrorism is that it employs violence indiscriminately. This is certainly not true if construed literally; for the terrorist does not strike blindly and pointlessly, left and right, but rather plans his actions carefully, weighing his options and trying for the course of action that will best promote his objective at the lowest cost to himself. But the claim is true, and of crucial importance, if taken to refer to the terrorist's failure to discriminate between the guilty and the innocent, and to respect the immunity of the latter.

Terrorism has a certain basic structure. It has not one, but two targets: the immediate, direct target, which is of secondary importance, and the indirect target, which is really important. This indirect strategy is a feature of our everyday life, and there is nothing wrong with it as such. But when the indirect, but really important, aim is to force someone to do something they would otherwise not do, when this is to be achieved by intimidation, and when intimidation is effected by using violence against innocent people—by killing, maiming, or otherwise severely harming them—or by threatening to do so, then the indirect strategy is that of terrorism. Usually, the primary and secondary targets are different persons or groups of people, but they may also be the same person or persons, as in blackmail. The person or persons who constitute the primary, but indirect, target of the terrorist, may or may not be innocent themselves; what is essential is that those who are made his secondary, but direct target, are. Thus terrorists may attack a group of civilians with the aim of intimidating the civilian population at large and getting it to leave a certain area. Or they may attack such a group with the purpose of cowing the government into accepting their demands, as is usually the case in airplane hijacking.

What is the sense in which the direct victims of the terrorist are 'innocent'? They have not *done* anything the terrorist could adduce as a justification of what he does to them. They are not attacking him, and thus he cannot justify his action as one of self-defence. They are not engaged in war against him, and therefore he cannot say that he is merely fighting in a war himself. They are not responsible, in any plausible sense of the word, for the (real or alleged) injustice, suffering, deprivation, which is inflicted on him or on those whose cause he has embraced, and which is so enormous that it could justify a violent response. Or, if they are, he is not in a position to know that.

I have said that one can lose one's immunity by being responsible for 'real or alleged' injustice or suffering because I am not speaking of innocence and immunity from a point of view different from, and independent of, that of the terrorist. Adopting such an approach would mean introducing an unacceptable degree of relativity into discussions of terrorism. The killing of Aldo Moro, for instance, would then be seen as terroristic by most of us: for, whatever we might think of Moro's policies, most of us surely do not consider them so extremely unjust and morally intolerable as to make him deserve to die on account of them; that is, most of us think of Moro as innocent in the relevant sense and therefore immune against killing. But the Red Brigades would deny that, and claim that what they did was political assassination, not terrorism; for they judged his policies quite differently. If we adopted this approach, we would have to grant that, to paraphrase *the* cliché about terrorism, one person's terrorist is another person's political assassin. I will not grant that; accordingly, what I am saying is that being responsible for a merely alleged injustice—an injustice that is alleged by the terrorist, but not recognized as such by anyone else—will be enough for losing one's immunity. Just as immunity is lost not only by fighting in an unjust war, but by fighting in any war—this is the grain of truth contained in Napoleon's notorious remark that "soldiers are made to be killed"—so it can be lost not only by holding political office in a gravely unjust government, but by holding such office in any government. As King Umberto I of Italy said after an unsuccessful attempt on his life, this kind of risk is part of the job. Of course, I am talking of 'innocence' and 'immunity' in a very specific, restricted sense: the sense relevant to the question of defining terrorism and distinguishing it from such things as war and political assassination. I am doing this to emphasize that the terrorist's victim is innocent from *the terrorist's own point of view*, i.e. innocent even if we grant the terrorist his assessment

of the policies he supposes. I am not implying that as soon as an opponent of a certain regime has satisfied himself that the regime is utterly and intolerably unjust, he has a moral *carte blanche* to kill and maim its officials, but only that if he does so, his actions will not be terrorism, but political assassination. But nothing stands in the way of our condemning him, if we reject his judgment of the moral standing of the regime. To show that an action is not terrorism but political assassination is neither to justify nor to excuse it.

I have also said that the terrorist's immediate victims are not responsible "in any plausible sense of the word" for the injustice and suffering to which the terrorist objects. Some terrorists are not at all bothered by that. Others are; they sometimes attempt to deny that their victims are innocent. But their arguments are based on a conception of responsibility so wide *and* undifferentiated that it enables them to say—as Emile Henry, a French anarchist who planted a bomb in a Paris café in 1894, did—"There are no innocents!" Such arguments may carry conviction with the terrorists who advance them, but are rightly found preposterous by almost everyone else.

Since terrorism is indiscriminate in the sense specified—since it does not discriminate between the guilty and the innocent—it is also indiscriminate in another sense: it is unpredictable. One can never count on keeping clear of the terrorist by not doing the things the terrorist objects to: for example, by not joining the army or the police, or by avoiding political office. One can never know whether, at any time and in any place, one will become a target of a terrorist attack.

Walter Laqueur objects to this way of defining terrorism:

> ...Many terrorist groups have been quite indiscriminate in the choice of their victims, for they assume that the slaughter of innocents would sow panic, give them publicity and help to destabilize the state and society. However, elsewhere terrorist operations have been quite selective. It can hardly be argued that President Sadat, the Pope, Aldo Moro or Indira Gandhi were arbitrary targets. Therefore, the argument that terrorist violence is by its nature random, and that innocence is the quintessential condition for the choice of victims, cannot be accepted as a general proposition; this would imply that there is a conscious selection process on the part of the terrorist, that they give immunity to the 'guilty' and choose only the innocents [5].

Neither of the two arguments is convincing. To take the latter first, the way Laqueur presents it contains a contradiction: if it is claimed that terrorist violence is *random*, then it cannot be also claimed that it is directed *solely* against the innocent, while the guilty are given immunity. What *is* claimed is that the defining feature of terrorism, and the reason why many of us find it extremely morally repugnant, is its failure to discriminate between the innocent and the guilty, and its consequent failure to respect the immunity of the former and to concentrate exclusively on the latter. The terrorist does not take on the army or the police, nor does he attempt to kill a political official, but chooses, say, to plant a bomb in a city bus, either because that is so much easier or, perhaps, because that will better serve his cause. He knows that his victims are civilians, but that is no good reason for him not to do it. If a couple of soldiers get on the bus along with the civilians and get killed as well, he will not see that as a fly in the ointment, but will either consider it irrelevant, or welcome it as an unexpected bonus. As for Laqueur's first argument, it is predicated either on a definition of terrorism that includes political assassination, and is thus question-begging, or on the assumption that

every act of a terrorist is a terrorist act, which is absurd. The Red Brigades, for instance, were a terrorist organization, for they committed many terrorist acts; but when they abducted and killed Aldo Moro, that was political assassination, not terrorism. A similar confusion was conspicuous in the Israeli media a couple of years ago, when suicide attacks on the Israeli Army carried out by Shiite terrorists were uniformly described as 'terrorist attacks'.

This targeting of the innocent is the essential trait of terrorism, both conceptually and morally. The distinction between guilt and innocence is one of the basic distinctions in the moral experience of most of us. Most of us require that the infliction of serious harm on someone be justified in terms of some free, deliberate action on their part. If this cannot be done, people are innocent in the relevant sense, and thus immune against the infliction of such harm. A paper on the definition of terrorism is not the right context for establishing this claim. But I would not be greatly tempted to try to prove it in any context. The belief that innocence implies a far-reaching (though perhaps not absolute) immunity against the infliction of severe harm is a brute fact of the moral experience of most of us; for those who find it compelling, it is as simple and compelling as anything, and certainly more so than anything that might be brought up as a supporting argument. Accordingly, as Michael Walzer has put it, "the theoretical problem is not to describe how immunity is gained, but how it is lost. We are all immune to start with; our right not to be attacked is a feature of normal human relationships" [6]. One may lose this immunity by attacking someone else, or by enlisting in the army in time of war, or by joining security services, or holding office in a regime or an organization that is resisted by violence because of its unjust, or allegedly unjust, policies. But one who has done none of the above is innocent of anything that might plausibly be brought up as a justification for a violent attack on him, or a threat of such an attack, and is thus immune against it. When he is attacked nevertheless, with the aim of cowing him, or someone else, into a course of action that otherwise would not be undertaken, that is terrorism. Terrorism is different, both conceptually and morally, from violence employed in self-defence, from war in general and guerrilla war in particular, and from political assassination [7].

The next three points are suggested by C. A. J. Coady's definition of a terrorist act as:

> a political act, ordinarily committed by an organized group, which involves the intentional killing or other severe harming of non-combatants or the threat of the same or intentional severe damage to the property of non-combatants or the threat of the same [8].

Violence Against Persons and Against Property

The violence perpetrated by terrorists is typically killing, maiming or otherwise severely harming their victims. Must terrorist violence be directed against persons? According to Coady's definition, it need not. Suppose a terrorist organization decided to stop killing and maiming people, and took to destroying valuable works of art instead. Or suppose it started destroying the crops which were the only source of livelihood of a village. Would that mean giving up terrorism for a non-terrorist struggle, or would it rather be substituting one terrorist method for another? In the latter case, I think, we would still speak of terrrorism—because the destruction of property would threaten people's lives. In the former case, however, the word

'terrorism' might no longer seem appropriate. As Jenny Teichman puts it, "it may indeed be grossly unfair and unjust to destroy the property of non-combatants, but unless that property is needed for life itself it isn't terroristic. For one thing it is not likely to produce terror—only fury" [9].

Terrorism and Terror

While Wellman wants to preserve the connection between terrorism and terror, but to disconnect terrorism from violence, Coady's definition suggests the opposite: terrorism is a type of violence which, indeed, often causes terror, but this is "an insight into the sociology of terrorism" and should not be included in the definition. The connection is merely contingent. After all, all uses of political violence effect some degree of fear [10].

That is true, but I think there is an important difference between the sort of violence most of us would want to call terrorist and other kinds of violence, where the fear caused is either a less important objective, or not an objective at all, but merely a welcome byproduct. In terrorism proper, the causing of fear and coercion through fear is *the* objective. Even if the crucial role of coercion through fear is not important enough from a theoretical point of view to single out this particular type of violence, things look different from a moral point of view. Most of us feel that terrorism is so very wrong primarily, but not solely, because it is violence inflicted on the innocent; the element of intimidation and coercion through intimidation is an *additional* ground for moral condemnation, an insult added to injury [11].

Terrorism: political and non-political, state and anti-state

Terrorism is often defined in various unjustifiably restrictive ways. The identification of terrorism with political terrorism, as in the definition offered by Coady, is quite typical. But the method of coercive intimidation by infliction of violence on innocent persons has often been used in non-political contexts: one can speak of religious terrorism (e.g. that of the Hizb Allah) and criminal terrorism (e.g. that of the Mafia). Even more restrictive are definitions couched in terms of *who* uses terrorism. Terrorism is often presented as a method employed solely by rebels and revolutionaries; state terrorism is thus defined out of existence:

> Throwing a bomb is bad,
> Dropping a bomb is good;
> Terror, no need to add,
> Depends on who's wearing the hood [12].

This may be good propaganda, but it is poor analysis. The word 'terrorism' was originally used to refer to the 'Reign of Terror' set up by the Jacobins, i.e. to a particular case of *state* terrorism. And even the most enlightened, liberal, democratic states have occasionally engaged in terrorism: witness the bombing of Dresden and Hamburg, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In all these cases the targets were neither military nor industrial, but rather major centres of civilian population of enemy countries; the objective was to destroy the morale and break the will of the population and in that way either ensure victory (over Germany) or shorten the war (against Japan). This kind of bombing has come to be known as 'terror bombing'. Furthermore, there is a type of state, the totalitarian state, whose most fundamental principle is permanent,

institutionalized terrorism. For nothing less than such terrorism, exercised by the omnipotent state and, in particular, its secret police in an utterly unpredictable manner, and embodied in "the true central institution of totalitarian organizational power", the concentration camp (Hannah Arendt), would do as a means of an attempt at total domination of society [13].

Amoralism

A number of authors claim that terrorism is essentially amoral. Thus Paul Wilkinson writes:

> What fundamentally distinguishes terrorism from other forms of organised violence is not simply its severity but its features of amorality and antinomianism. Terrorists either profess indifference to existing moral codes or else claim exemption from all such obligations. Political terror, if it is waged consciously and deliberately, is implicitly prepared to sacrifice all moral and humanitarian considerations for the sake of some political end [14].

To be sure, many terrorists seem to be oblivious to the moral aspects of their actions. Some terrorists or fellow-travellers even flaunt their amoralism, as did the nineteenth-century anarchist writer Laurent Tailhade: "What do the victims matter if the gesture is beautiful!" But such attitudes are by no means universal; terrorism of the left, at least, can claim a rich apologetic tradition. Views on terrorism advanced in the writings of Bakunin, Nechaev, Trotsky and Marcuse, were developed in response to moral criticism; they are couched in moral terms, and exhibit the formal traits widely considered to be definitive of moral views: they are action-guiding, universalizable, and of overriding importance to those who hold them. These authors do not reject morality as such, but rather conventional morality; and in the same breath they proclaim 'the interest of the Revolution' to be the supreme *moral* law. Their views may not amount to a convincing moral position (I, for one, am not convinced), but they do amount to *a* moral position. To hold otherwise is to confuse one's own moral outlook with the moral point of view as such [15].

Summing up

The preceding remarks lead up to the following definition of terrorism: the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take.

Let me summarize the most important points about this definition.

1.   Terrorism has a certain structure. It has two targets, the primary and secondary. The latter target is directly hit, but the objective is to get at the former, to intimidate the person or persons who are the primary target into doing things they otherwise would not do. Sometimes the same person or group of persons is both the primary and secondary target; but ordinarily the two targets are different (groups of) people.

2.   The secondary target, which is hit directly, is innocent people. Thus terrorism is distinguished both from war in general, and guerrilla war in particular, in which the innocent (non-combatants, civilians) are not deliberately attacked, and from political assassination, whose victims—political officials and police officers—are responsible for certain policies and their enforcement. This, of course, does not mean that an army

cannot engage in terrorism; many armies have done so. Nor does it mean that political assassination does not often intimidate the government or the public, or is not often meant to do so.

3. The connection of 'terrorism' with 'terror' and 'terrorizing' is preserved.

4. The definition covers both political and non-political (e.g. religious, criminal) terrorism.

5. With regard to political terrorism, it makes it possible to speak both of state and non-state terrorism, of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary terrorism, terrorism of the left and of the right. The definition is politically neutral.

6. It is also morally neutral. I believe it captures what many of us find so repugnant in terrorism. But is is not a definitional *fiat* that begs the moral question at issue (the way the definition of violence as the illegitimate use of force does, for example). It does not make moral condemnation of terrorism analytically true, its moral defence analytically false, or the question about its moral standing a self-answering one.

7. Some are likely to find the definition too restrictive, and to want to apply the word to other sorts of violence. It may well be that, as a matter of fact, the word is used in a wider sense most of the time. But I trust it will be generally (although not universally) agreed that the actions covered by the definition are indeed terroristic. I suspect that most of those likely to deny this will want to define terrorism in terms of who employs it and to what ultimate purpose. If so, I am not worried. Those who claim that who is a terrorist, and who a freedom fighter, depends on who is wearing the hood, or what its colour is, are not promising partners for a serious discussion anyway.

One final remark: the definition of terrorism I have suggested is accurate and helpful with regard to the actions, policies and organizations in the twentieth century which most of us would want to describe as terrorist. Large-scale terrorism in the sense defined is very much a phenomenon of our time. To be sure, the targeting of the innocent as a means of coercive intimidation was occasionally advocated and practised in the nineteenth century as well: advocated, for instance, by the radical democrat Karl Heinzen [16], practised in particular in the last decades of the century by some Irish nationalists and some of the anarchists who believed in the "propaganda by deed". But most of those who were called, and often called themselves, terrorists, throughout the last century—most anarchists, various revolutionary groups in Russia—did not practise terrorism in this sense, but rather engaged in political assassination. Russian revolutionaries in particular were given to constant probing of the moral questions raised by their struggle. They accepted the use of violence only unwillingly, and generally insisted that it be employed sparingly; in the words of P. L. Lavrov, "not one drop of unnecessary blood shall be spilled". They considered assassination of some of the most prominent officials of the oppressive regime as a grave sin that must be committed, but must also be expiated by dying on the gallows. They would never contemplate deliberate killing and maiming of the innocent; if a planned assassination turned out to involve deaths of innocent people as an inevitable side effect, they called off the action, even if that meant taking an extreme risk to themselves [17]. The moral distance between them and present-day terrorists is immense. Accordingly, I think it would be helpful to restrict the word 'terrorist' to the latter, rather than apply it to both and then distinguish between them in some such terms as 'direct' and 'indirect' or 'individual' and 'mass' terrorism [18].

This shift away from assassination of chiefs of state and other high political officials

to indiscriminate attacks on the innocent, which took place at the beginning of our century, can be explained in more than one way. Walter Laqueur points out that "in the twentieth century, human life became cheaper; the belief gained ground that the end justified all means, and that humanity was a bourgeois prejudice" [19]. Edward Hyams offers a different explanation: "chiefs of state are more carefully guarded than they used to be, and revolutionaries have learnt that the elimination of individual leaders is apt to resemble driving out Satan with Beelzebub" [20]. There may be still other causes; but I will not go into this question, for it can be answered only by empirical research. I am mentioning this change only in order to emphasize the limited applicability of the definition of terrorism I have suggested.

Acknowledgement

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NOTES

[1] Cf. W. LAQUEUR (1987) *The Age of Terrorism* (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.), pp. 21, 127.

[2] C. WELLMAN (1979) On terrorism itself, *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 13, p. 250.

[3] Ibid., p. 251.

[4] Ibid., p. 252.

[5] W. LAQUEUR, op. cit., pp. 143–144.

[6] M. WALZER (1980) *Just and Unjust Wars* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books), p. 145 n.

[7] This is, obviously, rather general. When applying the distinction between the guilty and the innocent in these three areas, one will have to make it more specific. What are the criteria for ascribing and apportioning responsibility for the policies of an organization or a regime? Does the distinction, when applied to war, boil down to one between combatants and non-combatants? In the latter context, in particular, numerous borderline cases are likely to arise: Is a soldier on leave from his unit guilty or innocent, a legitimate or an illegitimate target? What of a soldier who has been drafted against his will, who holds the war waged by his country to be wrong, and always shoots above the heads of enemy soldiers? What of a worker in an ammunition factory? What of a civilian whose work is not involved in his country's war effort, but who actively supports that effort by participating in war-mongering rallies, contributing generously to government war loans, etc.? However, I will not go into such matters here, for doing so would no longer be elaborating a definition, but rather engaging in substantive moral thinking. Another reason is that such problems, insofar as they concern war, have been discussed in a very helpful way by T. NAGEL ((1971/2) War and massacre, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 1), J. G. MURPHY ((1973) The killing of the innocent, *The Monist*, 57), M. WALZER (op. cit.) and J. TEICHMAN ((1986) *Pacifism and the Just War* (Oxford, Blackwell)).

[8] C. A. J. COADY (1985) The morality of terrorism, *Philosophy*, 60, p. 52.

[9] J. TEICHMAN, op. cit., p. 92.

[10] C. A. J. COADY, op. cit., p. 53.

[11] This should not be taken to suggest a simplistic, overly rationalistic picture of terrorism: a picture of the terrorist making a clearly specified threat to his primary target, who then rationally considers the matter and comes to the conclusion that it pays to comply. This picture may fit some cases of terrorism, but it certainly does not fit others. For terrorism very often aims at setting off long and complex social processes, involving much irrational behavior, that are meant to disorient the public and destabilize various social arrangements and institutions, if not social life in general (on this, see, e.g. T. P. THORNTON (1964) Terror as a weapon of political agitation, in: H. ECKSTEIN (Ed.) *Internal War* (New York, The Free Press)). However, intimidation plays a central role in such cases as well, while the ultimate aim of the terrorist is, again, to make those who constitute his primary target do things they

would otherwise not do. Thus such cases do not call for a revision of the definition of terrorism as a type of coercion through intimidation.

[12] R. WODDIS, Ethics for Everyman, quoted in C. A. J. COADY, op. cit., p. 47.

[13] See H. ARENDT (1958) *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2nd edn (Cleveland, The World Publication Co.), Ch. 12–13.

[14] P. WILKINSON (1974) *Political Terrorism* (London, Macmillan), pp. 16–17.

[15] I deal with this point in some detail in 'On the Ethics of Terrorism', forthcoming in the *Proceedings of the 14th World Congress in Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy*, Edinburgh, August 17–23, 1989.

[16] See his essay, Murder in: W. LAQUEUR (Ed.) (1978) *The Terrorism Reader* (New York, New American Library).

[17] See, e.g. Z. IVIANSKI (1989), The moral issue: some aspects of individual terror, in: D. C. RAPOPORT & Y. ALEXANDER (Eds), *The Morality of Terrorism*, 2nd edn (New York, Columbia University Press).

[18] The first distinction is advanced, e.g. by E. HYAMS (1974) *Terrorists and Terrorism* (New York, St Martin's Press), pp. 9–11; the second is usually made in marxist literature.

[19] W. LAQUEUR, op. cit., p. 84.

[20] E. HYAMS, op. cit., p. 166