

The Eichmann Trial and the Role of Law

The circumstances in which Adolf Eichmann was tried give rise to serious questions which some have seen as a possible challenge to the legality of the trial under the commonly accepted rules of international law and criminal law. Eichmann was kidnapped from another sovereign state and tried under a retroactive law for crimes committed outside the jurisdiction of Israel. There is no clear rule of international law which would have prevented Israel from trying Eichmann in the face of such facts, concludes Mr. Leavy. The result of the trial may be to strengthen the principle that the responsibility for crimes against humanity should lie with those who commit the crimes. If this is true, asserts the author, then the trial may have been a positive good, even if the kidnapping detracted from world law.

by Zad Leavy • of the California Bar (Beverly Hills)

A SENSE OF HISTORY swept over the hundreds of correspondents sitting in the huge courtroom as the Attorney General of Israel, using the language of the Old Testament, began his long and moving opening address to the Jerusalem District Court:

As I stand before you, Judges of Israel, in this court to accuse Adolf Eichmann, I stand not alone. Here with me at this moment are six million accusers. . . .¹

Many of us recalled that not far from this courtroom were the chambers of the seventy-one ancient Judges of Israel who comprised the Sanhedrin, or Supreme Court, which administered the law of the land from the time of Moses until beyond the destruction of the Jewish State, and that much of the law laid down and used by that court found its way through universal usage and acceptance into modern jurisprudence to guide orderly conduct among men.

Again here in Jerusalem, Holy City to three great religions of the world, we watched another eminent court of law proclaim and reaffirm the lofty

precepts which offer hope to mankind in a turbulent age ahead.

The Trial

Israel's primary motive, that of recording a tragic story of her people never before fully told, was reflected in the broad scope of the indictment and in the determination of the prosecution, in the face of the obvious impatience of both newsmen and the court, doggedly to place on the record every stark fact pertinent to the Nazis' Final Solution to the Jewish Problem.²

NOTE: In the interest of saving space, the author has deleted many citations of authority, both to the official record of *Attorney General v. Eichmann* and to outside sources. Interested readers will find most of these in the footnotes to Leavy, *The Eichmann Trial, Report from Jerusalem*, 37 CALIF. B. J. 243 (1962).

1. Transcript 17.4.61 session 6 C1, *Attorney General v. Adolf Eichmann*, Crim. Case 40/61, Jerusalem District Court [hereinafter cited as Transcript].

2. Eichmann was tried before the court of general jurisdiction in Israel, a district court, impaneled with three judges as in capital or other serious felony cases, with one of them a Supreme Court Justice appointed by the President of the Supreme Court to preside over the tribunal. Since the acts charged to Eichmann were not committed in any part of Israel, venue lay in the Central or Jerusalem District.

In furtherance of the tradition under Ottoman and British rule, there are no juries in Israel. The criminal law is essentially English, with thirteen years of Israeli case law strongly influenced by decisions in the United States.

The conduct of the trial was exemplary; dignity and decorum were maintained throughout. The television facilities hardly affected the proceedings. The constant presence of a large crowd provided no more diversion than the audience in any criminal courtroom in the United States. The firm attitude with which Supreme Court Justice Moshe Landau, presiding, constantly maintained a near-absolute silence in the large auditorium, as it were, continuously brought comments of respect from lawyers and journalists alike.

Eichmann was captured in Argentina on May 11, 1960, and taken to Israel. Action was initiated shortly thereafter by Argentina against Israel in the U.N. Security Council, and after Israel's apology the matter was declared closed in a joint communique issued by the two nations on August 3, 1960.

The trial commenced on April 11, 1961, and final arguments were completed on August 14, 1961. Prosecution witnesses totaled 111 and the court admitted 1,434 prosecution exhibits, many of them individually voluminous. Only Eichmann testified in court for the defense, but statements of other defense witnesses were taken in foreign courts; 109 defense exhibits were admitted. Final judgment was handed down throughout the week of December 11, 1961. The accused was found guilty of all fifteen counts in the indictment, but was acquitted of several allegations not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and he was sentenced to die.

Execution of the death penalty in Israel is by hanging. There is no death penalty except for the crimes attributed to Eichmann and treason in wartime. Eichmann's execution was the first in the new state's short history.

Hearsay evidence tending to prove the *corpus delicti* for the most part came in without objection. Indeed, the defense admitted the bulk of the *corpus*, the holocaust itself, but disputed Eichmann's criminal responsibility. Defense counsel seldom cross-examined most witnesses, except when their testimony tended to link the accused to the *corpus*.

Evidence of questionable reliability, and hearsay tending to prove Eichmann's intent and connection with the crimes alleged, e.g., previous statements of other Nazis under oath and not under oath, were on occasion admitted under a special rule adopted at Nuremberg and codified in the statute under which Eichmann was tried, but the court in its judgment weighed such evidence with care and relied upon it only when corroborated by other more trustworthy proof.

The eye-witness evidence was unbelievable. There were not enough words nor adjectives adequately to describe what we saw and heard in the courtroom, and the correspondents' frustration was clearly evident. In the words of the Supreme Court of Israel:

No human pen, no human tongue would ever succeed to describe the merest outline of the suffering of the millions who were killed, massacred and burned in the extermination camps and gas chambers through the murderous tools invented and improved by the "fertile" brain and perverse fantasy of Nazi execration. . . . [B]efore the rise of Hitler's regime in the thirties of the twentieth century, no one has envisaged any such spectacle.³

The Defense and the Answer

Eichmann's contention that he merely followed and transmitted orders from above and exercised no initiative whatsoever, was pleaded both to the indictment and in mitigation of penalty, and was overwhelmingly disproved by the evidence, much of it from the accused himself. He was shown to have exerted great initiative and enthusiasm on the top levels of command which planned and directed the Final Solution.

"My honor is loyalty," he testified.⁴ "I regard the violation of an oath of loyalty as the greatest crime a man can commit. . . . The question of con-

science is a matter for the head of state, not for me." But Eichmann admitted he knew from the inception of the Final Solution that it was contrary to law.

Only in recent generations has the law of nations come firmly to reject the plea of superior orders when the orders were manifestly unlawful, and in cases of high-ranking officers who could have reflected upon the legality of the orders and had available the moral choice not to obey. In this and other post-war trials, an ideology of blind obedience was on trial and was soundly condemned.

Eichmann's counsel argued that only the sovereign should be held liable for the acts of its nationals in carrying out state policy on behalf of the state. He pragmatically stressed the plight of such an individual enmeshed in the mission of his country.

"The basic principle of every state is", said Dr. Robert Servatius, "loyalty to and confidence in the leadership. The deed is dumb and obedience is blind. These are the virtues on which alone a state can build its foundations."⁵

The trial court recognized that this may be true in a totalitarian regime based upon denial of law, as in Hitler's Germany, and that in such a system the criminal is not amenable to justice until the regime falls—

But such arguments are not to be voiced in any state in the world which bases itself on the Rule of Law. The attempt to turn an order for the extermination of millions of innocent people into a political act with the aim of thus exempting from their personal criminal responsibility those who gave and those who carried out the order, is of no avail. And do not let counsel for the defense console us with the promise

of world government to come, when such "acts of state" will become a thing of the past. We do not have to wait for such a radical change in the relations between nations in order to bring a criminal to judgment, according to his own personal responsibility for his acts, which is the basis of criminal judgment all over the world.⁶

Both the District Court and the Supreme Court expressed their final answer through the penalty, and the Judges of Israel declared they had but little choice in the matter. They explained that in the light of the evidence before them, they could do no less than express through the power of the court the greatest possible condemnation of the Nazi ideology and its doctrine of blind obedience, and of genocide, the most horrendous crime yet devised by man, not only as it was perpetrated in World War II but as well in the form it will assume in future holocausts. The trial court ruled:

For the due punishment of the accused and for the deterrence of others, the maximum penalty laid down by the law has to be imposed in this case. . . .

Even had we found that the accused acted out of blind obedience, as he alleges, yet we would have said that one who had participated in crimes of such dimensions for years on end has to undergo the greatest punishment known to the Law, and no order given to him could be a ground even for mitigating his punishment.⁷

The Appeal

Eichmann appealed⁸ from both the conviction and the sentence, and raised basically the same jurisdictional issues and defense pleas that were brought up at the trial. His counsel also requested permission to present further evidence; but after he made his offers of proof the Supreme Court denied his request

3. Appeal Judgment III 2, para. 1. *Adolf Eichmann, appellant v. Attorney General, respondent*, Crim. Appeal 336/61 in the Supreme Court of Israel Sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeal [hereinafter cited as Appeal Judgment].

4. Transcript 13.7.61, session 95 SI. Transcript 7.7.61, session 88 II.

5. Trial Judgment, passage 216, *Attorney General v. Adolf Eichmann*, Crim. Case 40/61, Jerusalem District Court [hereinafter cited as Trial Judgment, with passage number following].

6. Trial Judgment 216.

7. Transcript 15.12.61, session 121 A2.

8. The appeal from the District Court's decisions was filed with the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court of Israel. There is no intermediate court. Unlike in the United States and England, an appeal lies both from the verdict and the sentence. The Court sits with three justices, or in important cases with five or more

of the total of nine justices; five in the Eichmann appeal. The justice who presided at the trial did not sit in judgment at the appellate stage. Further evidence may be taken if the Court chooses not to rely solely on the record, or it may retry the case upon application of the accused or the attorney general. Judges in Israel are appointed for life, and are guaranteed their independence by a statute which provides that they are subject only to the law.

Argument before the Supreme Court commenced March 22, 1962, and continued for about one week. The Court's affirmation of the verdict and sentence was announced May 29, 1962, and Eichmann immediately petitioned the President of Israel for clemency. Clemency was denied and shortly thereafter, at 11:58 P.M. on May 30, 1962, Adolf Eichmann was hanged. Within hours his body had been cremated, pursuant to his own request, and his ashes spread upon the Mediterranean.

and set out its reasons therefor, the final one being that such evidence could not have altered the outcome.

The Supreme Court fully concurred "without hesitation or reserve" in all the conclusions and reasons of the District Court, "because they are fully supported by copious judicial precedents that were cited in the Judgment and by substantial proof culled and abstracted out of the monumental mass of evidence produced to the court".⁹ Nevertheless, the appellate court disposed of each defense contention by either citing the pertinent portion of the District Court Judgment or by setting out its own answer at length.

Jurisdiction

Most interesting to lawyers was probably the question of the legal right of an Israeli court to try Eichmann, but it is often difficult to disengage the legal issues from the thorny question of what Israel should or should not have done as a matter of national policy. The wisdom of Israel's actions, aside from the jurisdictional issues, is itself a lively subject of debate in the light of the effect of these actions upon obedience to the rule of law in the future.

First it must be understood that actually there lay no challenge to jurisdiction, for courts in Israel by and large follow British procedure and precedent and have no power of judicial review as we know it in the United States. The legislature is supreme, and its clear edict providing a trial for one charged under the statute pertaining to the prosecution of Nazis must be obeyed by the courts. Should there arise a conflict between such an edict and the international law, said the District and Supreme Courts, under the English system the law of the forum must prevail. Nonetheless, both courts attempted further to justify their position by seeking to demonstrate that the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law of Israel and its present application "conforms to the best traditions of the law of nations".¹⁰

Controversy over Kidnapping


The forcible abduction of Adolf Eichmann was clearly a violation of positive international law, but was

technically cured by action in the United Nations. Eichmann as an individual had no right to speak in international law, and all nations which had some right to demand his body waived such rights, thus leaving Israel free to pursue the conduct of its own choice within its own territory and within the framework of its own law. Once a prisoner is within the physical control of a particular court and properly charged, according to the law of almost every nation, he may be tried by that court regardless of the manner by which he was brought before it.

There are those who argue that the abduction was justified by the nature and extent of the crimes charged and by the impossibility of extradition of Nazis from Argentina; that in some extreme situations the positive law must yield to the natural and moral law.¹¹ This is akin to the natural law of self-defense. But this question is as difficult to resolve as it is difficult to determine in advance just when and to what extent the positive law shall yield, so as to constitute a reasonably workable rule.

Israel had strong motives in her national interest to obtain Eichmann and have him tried before none but a Jewish court, and clandestine abduction was apparently the only way of obtaining him. Although kidnapping is and has been common practice among nations as the alternative to ineffective or non-existent channels of extradition, this was a blow to the Rule of Law aggravated somewhat by the fact that the violating nation has been traditionally a champion of obedience to law, a nation which now seeks to be the bastion of democracy in the Middle East and whose people have advocated strict adherence to law for thousands of years.

Whatever sympathy lies with Israel for the crimes committed against her people and whatever moral justification there may have been, to those who firmly believe that the future of the world depends upon the ability of men and nations to lay down and follow positive rules for peaceful conduct among themselves, the bad taste of kidnapping, of achieving justice through an unlawful act, still remains.



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Legality Versus Policy

In addition to the question of forcible abduction, the objections to the court's jurisdiction revolved primarily around indictment under the retroactive Israel statute, the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) law of 1950,¹² and the extra-territorial application of this law.

Though neither the District Court nor the Supreme Court, under existing precedent could strike down and disregard the jurisdiction conferred by the Israel Parliament, argument to this question was heard before Eichmann pleaded to the indictment and again on appeal. As discussed *infra*, both courts declared there to be no violation of the law of nations by Israel's assumption of jurisdiction and subsequent trial.

Indeed, this seems to be so.¹³ The case is *sui generis* and the relevant rules are far from settled and in a state of change. Although there was no

9. Appeal Judgment I 2, para. 5.

10. Trial Judgment 11.

11. Among the most eloquent: Silving, *In re Eichmann: A Dilemma of Law and Morality*, 55, *AM. J. INTL. L.* 307 (1961).

12. 4 Israel Laws 154 (5710-1949/50).

13. Leavy, *The Eichmann Trial, Report from Jerusalem*, 37 *CALIF. B. J.* 243, 257, authorities cited at note 75.

rule or precedent directly in point which would allow the trial, neither was there a direct prohibition, and broadly speaking, unless there is a clear rule of international law forbidding a state from pursuing a particular line of conduct, it may exercise jurisdiction within its own territory even in cases involving acts committed abroad.¹⁴

Whether Israel should have gone ahead with the trial is again a question divorced from that of jurisdiction. There was not available any international tribunal for such a trial and the creation of an *ad hoc* international court free of cold war politics and propaganda was highly unlikely. The World Court's jurisdiction does not extend to the trial of criminal cases, and the United Nations has on several occasions attempted without success to establish a permanent international criminal court of justice.

It is doubtful, moreover, that Israel under any circumstances would have given up her power to have Eichmann tried before a Jewish court sitting in the Holy Land.

Retroactive Law

Israeli courts acknowledge that the Nazis Law of 1950 is both retroactive and extraterritorial in nature, but the Eichmann trial court said:

The Israel legislature embodied into domestic law what have long been crimes under the laws of all civilized nations, including the German people, before and after the Nazi regime, while the "law" and criminal decrees of Hitler and his regime *are no laws* and have been set aside with retroactive effect even by the German courts themselves. It cannot be said that the perpetrators of the crimes defined in the law in question "could not have had a *mens rea* because they did not and could not know that what they were doing was a criminal act." On the contrary, the extensive measures taken by the Nazis to efface the traces of their crimes, such as the disinterment of the dead bodies of the murdered and their cremation into ashes, and the destruction of the Gestapo archives before the collapse of the Reich, clearly prove that the Nazis knew well the criminal character of their enormities.¹⁵

The 300-page Eichmann Judgment

traced the origin of the Nazis Law. It contains nearly verbatim the same description of murder, plunder, prevention of birth, uprooting of peoples, and other atrocities as found in the international law definitions of genocide and "crimes against humanity".

The Court also indicated that in the development of law following World War II, several nations affected by the aggression and atrocities of the Third Reich enacted statutes similar to Israel's Nazis Law.

The Hebrew maxim, "No one may be punished unless he was forewarned", and its western counterparts, *nullum crimen sine lege* and the rule against *ex post facto* laws, constitute a generally accepted principle intended to guard against abuses of justice through retroactive legislation. It is seldom expressed as a rule of positive law, however, and is not considered a limitation upon a nation's sovereignty, but a general principle designed to prevent injustice. If no injustice is worked, then there is no violation of the principle.

"Whether or not an injustice is worked would depend on a variety of circumstances," according to Professor Robert Woetzel of Fordham University in his recent *The Nuremberg Trials in International Law*:¹⁶

If the act was a heinous violation of international law; if it was recognizable as such to the individual; if he could reasonably be expected to know that it was punishable; and if he intended to do the thing he did which was in violation of his duties and obligations under international law. If all these conditions are met in a particular case, then it would not only be just to hold the individual criminally responsible for his misdeed, it would be an injustice not to do so. There could be no violation of the maxim *nullum crimen, nulla poena* in such a case.

"There is (not) any taint of *ex post facto-ism* in the law of murder," said the Jerusalem District Court.¹⁷

The Supreme Court pointed to the absence of a positive rule of international law banning criminal legislation with retroactive effect, and maintained there was no moral justification for preventing the application of such legislation to the offenses charged to

Eichmann. The ethical import of the *nulla poena maxim*, ruled the high court, was not violated in this case.¹⁸

Two Sources of Jurisdiction

The State of Israel's right to try and punish Adolf Eichmann derives from two cumulative sources, according to the District Court, and affirmed by the Supreme Court:

A universal source (pertaining to the whole of mankind) which vests the right to prosecute and punish crimes of this order in every state within the family of nations; and a specific or national source which gives the victim nation the right to try any who assault their existence.¹⁹

The trial court noted the World Court's advisory opinion in 1951 that the right to try an individual for a crime against humanity was universal, and could be exercised by any nation in whose custody rested an accused. Universality by its very nature, moreover, implies the extraterritorial application of penal law. The territorial principle, *i.e.*, trial where the acts were committed, is by no means the only basis of jurisdiction; it is but a compulsory minimum.

Citing Coke, Blackstone, and precedent from the Middle Ages, the Jerusalem Court described the most frequent application of the universality principle as the trial and punishment of a pirate by any nation which apprehended him, on the ground that he was *hostes generis humani*, an enemy of the human race. Furthermore, according to the early scholar of international law, Hugo Grotius, the apprehending state had not only a right to try one charged with violating "in extreme form" the law of nature or the law of nations, no matter where committed, but as well had a moral duty to other nations to do so. *A fortiori* with genocide.

Turning to the national source of jurisdiction, the court relied heavily upon an elementary principle expounded in 1625 by Grotius in his *De Jure*

14. The Lotus Case. P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 10, page 18 (*France v. Turkey*, 1927).

15. Trial Judgment 7.

16. Pages 115, 116 (1960).

17. Trial Judgment 27.

18. Appeal Judgment I 4, 5, para. 8.

19. Trial Judgment 30.

Belli ac Pacis, the basic right of the victim to punish his assailant. It is a matter of historical fact, the tribunal said, that the vital interests of Israel, both before and after it achieved its sovereignty, were seriously and adversely affected by the Nazis' attempt to destroy the Jewish people, and there was without question the "linking point" between prosecutor and crime, as required by Grotius.

When defense counsel argued the absence of a linking point between the crimes and Israel, that territoriality was the only true basis of jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction lay only in the countries of Europe where the acts were committed, the trial court in reply began to use stronger and more emotional language, and indicated annoyed impatience with anyone who might fail to see the connection between Israel and the holocaust:

In other words, eighteen nations do have the right to punish the accused for the murder of Jews who resided in their territories, but the nation of those who were murdered has no right to inflict such punishment because those persons were not exterminated on its territory.²⁰

"The connection between the State of Israel and the Jewish people needs no explanation", the court said.²¹ The annihilation of European Jews had no relation to the countries in which they resided, but had as its only basis their historical and ancestral relationship with the Holy Land. And the Land of Israel has endured for thousands of years; there has been but a change of governments.

[T]he people is one and the crime is one. . . . To argue that there is no connection is like cutting away a tree root and branch and saying to its trunk: "I have not hurt you."²²

Thus, the District Court inadvertently announced one of the subtle but compelling motives of the government for holding the trial in Israel, that of asserting a sort of sovereignty, as it were, on behalf of all the Jewish people. Again citing Grotius, the court declared:

The very existence of a people who can be murdered with impunity is in danger, to say nothing of the danger to its honor and authority. This has

been the curse of dispersion and the want of sovereignty of the people of Israel, upon whom any criminal could commit his outrages without fear of being punished by the people outraged.²³

Deterioration of Law

At least as interesting as the question of jurisdiction, and far more startling to me as a lawyer, was the evidence which showed the clear, consistent pattern of deterioration of legal systems and principles in each country occupied by the Nazis, commencing with Germany itself.

First was the enactment of discriminatory laws which arbitrarily deprived certain groups of basic human and property rights, and the ruthless execution of those laws as government policy. Then came the acquiescence and capitulation of the judiciary, which by and large had prostituted itself to the government's wishes. Members of the Bar who would not then co-operate with the new order were disposed of, for there was but small need for attorneys in such a system.

The demise of court-administered justice and an established, orderly legal system signalled the rise of police power, and the pattern was set most clearly in Nazi Germany. Minister of Justice Hugh Bormann reported to Hitler in 1942 that the courts were not handling the "volume of criminals" with sufficient speed and he urged that "the police should be given free rein and thus achieve better results".²⁴

The inattention of lawyers to the criminal courts and to the administration of constitutional law gave needed encouragement to the regime in power. The first encroachments by the government brought not an avalanche of protest from the legal profession, as we would expect in the United States, but instead hardly a trickle.

To a lawyer sitting in the Jerusalem courtroom, having been schooled in the traditions of Anglo-American constitutional law, this evidence and its implications registered with pounding force.

The Law Must Teach

Perhaps, though Eichmann's abduction at present detracted from world law, the trial itself may have been a

noteworthy step toward acceptance of principles which someday may be the basis of peace and order among nations. The Eichmann Court, in a major case some sixteen years after the heat of war and its attendant passions have substantially subsided, reaffirmed that personal responsibility will lie with those who commit war crimes and crimes against humanity under blind obedience and as political acts in the name of national security.

Many quarrel with the soundness of this doctrine in the light of current world affairs. As with most precepts, it is not a perfect rule. It may be "misused" by the "wrong" victor. It cannot be applied against the criminal who has a powerful armed force to protect himself from apprehension; to him and his followers the principle of personal responsibility may presently be no deterrent at all.

It will never be binding upon the minds of all men, to prevent resort to force, until all men accept it as such. This indeed will take a great deal of time, much yielding of sovereignty in the interest of law and order, and constant usage of the doctrine until it is universally accepted as a matter of course.

Sovereign nations are most often reluctant to forgo their own interests in order to strengthen the rule of law, except under pressure of great world opinion, economic sanctions, or the threat of outright force. Achieving stability in law is a painfully long-term process of gradually increasing usage and acceptance. We have seen how long it required for many of the principles once laid down in the Holy Land to become written into the domestic statutes of most nations and accepted as binding upon all.

But law in the modern age must go further than its traditional role of following the mores of the people it serves. It must undertake the role of leadership, and its jurists must continually stress and teach the rules of conduct to which the leaders of nations and all men must bind themselves for the survival of mankind.

20. Trial Judgment 24.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Trial Judgment 35.

23. *Ibid.*

24. Transcript 28.4.61, session W1.

Oliver Wendell Holmes said in 1881, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."²⁵ But the world can ill afford to await experience before accepting as binding the principles laid down at Nuremberg. It is utterly frightening to contemplate that what required Hitler several years of the bloodiest and most intense methods may now be accomplished on an even greater scale in a matter of minutes and in a most simple and unfettered manner—in fact, even by accident.

Nuclear weapons have already been used upon human beings, though probably not with specific intent to destroy an entire people, and genocide by such

means in the future is far from just a remote possibility. Who knows but that it is already upon us, with the effects of radioactive fall-out to be registered in future generations—but of course, lacking the element of specific intent.

Israel, as with several other nations, accepted into her domestic law the principle of personal responsibility and the injunction against genocide. It used these in a trial of great import to the world. The concepts were again tested in the Supreme Court of Israel on appeal by judges schooled in the highest standards of Anglo-American law. And we hope it will not end there; perhaps responsible courts

throughout the world will follow suit in other cases which arise over the decades, thus developing more firmly into law and upon the consciences of all men the principles which offer hope to the future of man. Said the Jerusalem District Court:

Perhaps it is not a vain hope that the more this conviction becomes rooted in the minds of men, the more they will refrain from following criminal leaders, and the Rule of Law and order in the relations between nations will be strengthened accordingly.²⁶

25. THE COMMON LAW, page 1.
26. Trial Judgment 220.

The First Inter-American Conference on Legal Medicine and Forensic Science

The Department of Justice of Puerto Rico and The School of Law of the University of Puerto Rico have announced their sponsorship of the First Inter-American Conference on Legal Medicine and Forensic Science, to be held in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on November 29, 30 and December 1, 1962.

The Conference will present, from the legal point of view, a truly broadly based law-medicine-science meeting, whose emphasis will be upon the importance of interrelated lawyer-doctor-scientist efforts in the administration of civil and criminal justice.

There will be eight conference sessions over the three-day period, consisting of main addresses and round table panel discussions, on the subjects of: presentation of expert medical evidence in court; legal problems of hospitals; psychiatry and the law (criminal responsibility and traumatic neurosis in civil cases); narcotics and the law; the drinking driver and the law; the forensic scientist, the forensic science laboratory and the law; and forensic pathology and the law.

An extraordinary group of legal, medical and scientific experts from the Americas and Europe have been assembled for this meeting.

The registration fee for the Conference, which is open to all interested lawyers, doctors, scientists and law enforcement officials, is \$30.00. The Conference will be conducted in English, and there will be simultaneous translation into Spanish.

All inquiries should be addressed to: Larry Alan Bear, Director, First Inter-American Conference, P. O. Box 12065 University Station, University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico.