

sciences and psychoanalysis, a psychobiosocial system. The psychobiological concepts of the Freudian system have been drawn on heavily with some oversight on the part of many of the broad social implications of his ego-superego concepts. As the social sciences and psychiatry now come together and contribute to social work, this book may have the historical perspective value of showing the early integrations from which current ones derive. Professional scholars could well be aware of the old in the new for comparative study of current schools of thought in which leaders profess difference.

CHARLOTTE TOWLE

Leviathan and Natural Law. By F. LYMAN WINDOLPH. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951. Pp. ix+147. \$2.50.

The author of this small and highly condensed book is a practicing lawyer and erudite student of legal and political science. He deals with the age-old controversy between the philosophy known as positivism, or utilitarianism, and the theory of natural law and natural justice. He wastes no words, is rigorously logical, and takes little for granted. The argument is clear and cogent, and only the final chapter strikes one as too brief and the conclusion as rather abrupt. There seems to be a missing link in the chain. Significantly enough, neither Mill nor Spencer is quoted or even referred to, though both discussed the State, law, government, and liberty at considerable length, and not superficially.

The book shows that "there is some historical basis for believing that if liberty on the planet survives, the common law of mankind, like the English common law, will work itself pure." The author believes that the universe is rational, that there is such a thing as moral liberty, and that our ideas of good and evil rest on foundations more substantial than human opinion. If, he says, these beliefs are illusory, democratic (or republican) government will surely perish. Democracy, as a political system, needs an ethical system to support it, as Jefferson recognized in the Declaration of Independence. If there is no natural justice, law is tyranny, caprice, or accident. Men must have basic principles to live by and work or fight for, and these principles are still developing in the most civilized countries.

Classes on government, law, and politics will do well to put this book on their lists of recommended reading, and debate it in seminars and panels. Too few educated Americans realize that we have not solved all our constitutional and political problems and that nullification and secession are by no means things of a dead past. There is dynamite in such issues as segregation, race prejudice, lynching, and denial of justice to minorities.

V. S. Y.

Spinoza Dictionary. Edited by DAGOBERT D. RUNES, with a Foreword by ALBERT EINSTEIN. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. xiv+309. \$5.00.

According to Whitehead, Plato is the greatest of philosophers, and everything written on philosophy since his day is "commentary." This is not true, of course. Spinoza, at any rate, was original and great, and we are told by Bertrand Russell that he is the most beloved of modern philosophers. His psychology and his ethics are remarkably modern. He has many followers today among the agnostics and rationalists. The "dictionary" under notice is therefore timely and welcome. Spinoza was a difficult writer, and his admiring biographers are not quite sure that they understand his theology or cosmology. One called him a deist, and another said he was a complete and unqualified pantheist—quite a difference!

This volume will enable the thoughtful and serious student of science and philosophy to ascertain and ponder the essence of Spinoza's teachings—religious, civic, ethical, and political. He can look up definitions of terms and phrases, read and reread paragraphs and pages. The Foreword by Albert Einstein should provide aid and guidance. Spinoza always struggled for clarity, says Einstein, but "did not always reach full perfection." In addition, Spinoza rigidly adhered to the geometric form of argumentation, believing that to be an insurance against fallacies, jumps, and arbitrary assumptions. In this he was no doubt mistaken. He demands close attention as well as a marked natural capacity for straight, logical thinking.

Whatever the net result, the intellectual effort required is itself rewarding, and many points of the Spinozist system will have been assimilated and grasped. It is just as important to know what Spinoza positively contributed to philosophy and theology as what he rejected in Judaism and Christianity—and why. If he was not "God-intoxicated," he was certainly never guilty of "cosmic impiety," a charge that has been made by some critics against John Dewey after the publication of his agnostic *A Common Faith*.

V. S. Y.

The Ellen Knauff Story. By ELLEN RAPHAEL KNAUFF. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1952. Pp. 242+Appendix 21 pp. \$3.50.

In this book Ellen Knauff tells about her almost three years' detention at Ellis Island and the difficulties she encountered in gaining admission to the United States. She is a native of Germany, of the Jewish race, and now about thirty-six years of age. She became a citizen of Czechoslovakia in 1934 through marriage, a marriage, however, which ended in divorce a few years later. She lived in Prague from 1934 until the Germans took possession of Czecho-

slovakia in 1941, when she sought refuge in England. She worked at various occupations in that country, finally serving in the Woman's Auxiliary Air Force. In 1946 she returned to Germany to look for her relatives, most of whom reportedly had been killed in an extermination camp. She found work with the American Military Government, chiefly in the Civil Censorship Division in Frankfurt. In February, 1948, she married Kurt Knauff, a native of Germany but American citizen through naturalization and a veteran of World War II. In August, 1948, she sailed for the United States, seeking entry under the so-called "War Brides Act," which extended a number of immigration privileges to the brides of G.I.'s.

Her references from employers in England were excellent, and those from the American Military Government were also very good. Before being allowed to embark for the United States, she had, as was customary, been thoroughly "screened" by our Armed Forces. Nevertheless, owing to secret information forwarded to the American authorities, she was detained on arrival in New York and sent to Ellis Island, where she was destined to spend almost three years. Shortly after arrival at Ellis Island she was questioned extensively by an immigration inspector—judging by her account, an unusually unkind and unhelpful inspector. On the basis of the secret information referred to above and information secured by this inspector, the Attorney General ordered her excluded from the United States. Early in World War II Congress gave the Attorney General power to exclude an alien in time of war or "national emergency" if he deems the alien's admission prejudicial to this country's interests and security; he can exclude him without a formal hearing and is not required to make known either to the alien or anyone else the nature of the confidential information on the basis of which he is acting. Although the "shooting war" is over, this authority has not been revoked; precautions against espionage are, of course, still greatly needed.

Before Ellen Knauff could be deported to the country from which she came, she had the "miraculous luck," as Arthur Garfield Hays terms it in the book's Preface, to enlist the interest and help of Gunther Jacobson, "not a big-time lawyer but a big-hearted lawyer, a lawyer with a passion not for fees but for justice." Although a sick man—he died of cancer before her case was settled—he fought most ably in her behalf for the next two years or so. He took her case into court, but the lower courts and subsequently the Supreme Court—with three justices dissenting—held that the right of the Attorney General, in view of the above-mentioned authority, to exclude her was final and conclusive and that the courts had no power to "retry" his determination. He got a private bill authorizing her admission to the United States, introduced in Congress; it passed the House unanimously but was held up in the Senate. When at this juncture an attempt was made to deport her to Germany by plane, he secured a stay-of-

deportation order from the Supreme Court, just twenty minutes before take-off time.

Meanwhile, the newspapers had given much publicity to the Knauff case; the *St. Louis Post Dispatch* and *New York Post* were especially active in her behalf. Somehow the Attorney General was prevailed upon to reopen her case and to accord her an open hearing before a Board of Special Inquiry. At this hearing the charges against her were for the first time made public; up until then not even the courts or Congress had known what they were. Two Czechoslovak officials and an American official who had been stationed in Frankfurt, where Mrs. Knauff worked, testified that she had transmitted secret and confidential information to the Czechoslovak Mission in that city, thereby acting contrary to the interests of the United States. The Board of Special Inquiry reaffirmed the Attorney General's order of exclusion. By routine procedure in cases where a decision adverse to the alien petitioner is reached, the Knauff case thereupon was brought before the Board of Immigration Appeals. That Board, pointing out that none of the three witnesses were able to offer any direct evidence linking Mrs. Knauff with espionage; that none had personal knowledge to that effect; that their charges admittedly were based on hearsay and, being without any corroborating evidence, did not measure up to the Supreme Court's requirements as to evidence; that Czechoslovakia in 1947 and 1948, when this espionage was supposed to have occurred, was a friendly power; that, anyway, the nature of the work in which Mrs. Knauff was engaged was not of a confidential or classified nature; and that Mrs. Knauff's superiors, both British and American, spoke well of her, held that an adequate premise had not been established to warrant the inference that, if admitted to the United States, she would be a threat to national security. It therefore ordered that she be admitted; and on November 2, 1951, a little more than three years after her arrival in New York, the Attorney General confirmed the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the Knauff case was settled.

The Knauff case has puzzling aspects. The charges brought against her before the Board of Special Inquiry, as discussed and analyzed by the Board of Immigration Appeals in its decision certainly do not seem very convincing. On the other hand, early in the case, a friend of Ellen Knauff's persuaded the Attorney General—then Tom Clark—to look into the matter once more; subsequently the Attorney General wrote this friend: "I can see no alternative to excluding her. . . . The *Federal Bureau of Investigation* feels she would be a hazard to national security." Under the circumstances, would not the Immigration Service, *under oath* to enforce the different provisions of the immigration law as *written* and *enacted* by Congress—not as others, and possibly the Service itself, think they should have been written and enacted—have failed to do its duty if it had admitted her when she first arrived in New York? Most readers will undoubtedly be glad that the out-

come of her case and feel confident she will prove loyal to the United States. That there are some who will never be convinced she should have been admitted is, however, equally true. As she herself points out at the end of the book, "Once you're defamed, a shadow of doubt will always remain in the minds of some people."

MARIAN SCHIBSBY

The Decline of Laissez-Faire, 1895-1917. By HAROLD U. FAULKNER. New York: Rinehart & Co., 1951. Pp. xiv+433. \$4.50.

This is the seventh volume of the "Economic History of the United States," a series of nine volumes, designed to offer to students as well as to general readers of intelligence "an integrated, full-length and authoritative treatment of the country's economic history." The style is popular but not unduly so. There are some illustrations—not of the cheap or sensational and commercial sort. Throughout the author bears in mind that economic science and history deal with human beings, not with abstractions.

Two themes are central in the story. The growing size and concentration of industry, trade, and finance is one, and the other the steady trend toward the extension of government regulation and control of business. Professor Faulkner holds that the first two decades of the present century had brought no marked departure from the traditional American system of "rugged individualism" or the "let-alone" doctrine of the classical economists, but that since then the total picture has undergone a radical change. The Wilson New Freedom and the Roosevelt New Deal may be regarded as the most dramatic scenes in a national drama which is not yet over, though the reform era has had its ups and downs. Congress has been dominated by a bipartisan conservative coalition for several years, and much proposed progressive legislation has been frozen.

The public memory is notoriously short, and the work under notice is valuable and on the whole reassuring. Abuses have been corrected, the so-called "muckrakers" played an important part in the process, and some complex problems have been clarified and at least advanced somewhat toward a sound and just solution. Antitrust laws have not exactly failed, as some affirm, but incontestably the results achieved by litigation and compromise consent decrees under the Sherman, Clayton, and other acts have been distinctly disappointing. Socialism has made little, if any progress in the country, but neither of the two major parties is now opposed in principle to the Welfare State. We are, as a nation, applying a new philosophy in our economic affairs and relations. We have escaped revolution but not evolution. The so-called "economic royalists and Tories" have been forced to make many significant concessions to organized labor, organized

agriculture, and unorganized but dynamic liberalism. More are likely, if not certain.

V. S. Y.

Legal Aid in the United States. By EMERY A. BROWNELL. Rochester: Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., 1951. Pp. xxiv+333. \$4.50.

This study was undertaken in 1947 as part of the Survey on the Legal Profession conducted under the auspices of the American Bar Association. Its completion marks the first attempt to appraise legal aid services since 1936, when Bradway and Smith's *Growth of Legal Aid Work in the United States* appeared, and the second such attempt since the publication of Reginald Heber Smith's historic *Justice and the Poor* in 1919. Mr. Brownell's book thus offers the reader recent data on the availability of legal services to those persons unable to pay for them.

The study may be said to be divided into three parts: first, a definition and short historical summary of legal aid; second, a description of existing services; and, finally, a proposal for the extension and improvement of the current program. It is to a description of existing services that the bulk of the book is devoted. In dealing with this subject the author has grouped his material into chapters on the need for service, the organization of legal aid offices for civil cases and for criminal cases, the National Legal Aid Association, current services, legal aid personnel, and the incidence of cost of these services.

This is a valuable reference book for social workers. It not only contains the general information on legal aid services which should interest the lawyer and nonlawyer alike, but it also contains sufficient data to enable the social worker to judge of the quality and need for improvement in the services available in her community. If no such services exist, then Mr. Brownell's full treatment of the various alternative methods of offering services will suggest possibilities for remedying the lack. The study is weakened, in the reviewer's opinion, by the author's heavy use of tables throughout the text (some of which, by their length, deserve inclusion in an appendix) and by a needlessly diffuse presentation of material. A more closely knit arrangement of topics would have been desirable. Nevertheless, the book is valuable as a broad and up-to-date survey of the legal aid field, and as such it deserves the attention of social workers. Securing justice for all is not the task of the lawyer alone, and it is a goal which the social worker has actively pursued. It is the reviewer's opinion that increased familiarity with the nature and extent of legal aid services will enable the social worker to make an even greater contribution. Equipped with this information, the worker is in the unique position to appraise, at close range, the need for service and the adequacy of that which is rendered and she can then join with the lawyer in action for an effective program of legal aid.

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