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U.S. v. Sierra
Pacific Industries, E.D.Cal., April 17, 2015
10 F.3d 338
United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.
John DEMJANJUK, Petitioner–Appellant,
v.
Joseph PETROVSKY, et al., Respondents–Appellees.
No. 85–3435.
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Argued Sept. 3, 1993.
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Decided Nov. 17, 1993.
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Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied
Feb. 24, 1994.
Alleged Nazi war criminal, certified as extraditable to
stand trial on capital charges in State of Israel, petitioned for writ of
habeas corpus. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, Frank J. Battisti, Chief Judge, 612 F.Supp. 571,
denied petition, and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, 776 F.2d 571,
affirmed. After detainee’s acquittal of charges in Israel, the Court of
Appeals, Lively,
Senior Circuit Judge, reopened case and held that government attorneys engaged
in prosecutorial misconduct by failing to disclose to courts and to detainee
exculpatory information in their possession.
Judgment vacated.
West Headnotes (6)
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Federal Civil
Procedure |
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Court is required to accept special
master’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 53(e)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 1 Cases that
cite this headnote |
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Federal Civil
Procedure |
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“Fraud on the court” consists of conduct:
(1) on part of officer of the court, (2) that is directed to judicial
machinery itself, (3) that is intentionally false, willfully blind to the
truth, or is in reckless disregard for the truth, that is positive averment
or is concealment when one is under duty to disclose, that deceives court. 151 Cases that
cite this headnote |
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Aliens,
Immigration, and Citizenship Extradition
and Detainers |
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Government attorneys engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct by failing to disclose to courts and to detainee
exculpatory information in their possession during denaturalization and
extradition proceedings, which led to detainee’s forced departure from United
States and trial on capital charges in State of Israel; though attorneys
acted in good faith, they recklessly disregarded their obligation to provide
information specifically requested by detainee, the withholding of which
almost certainly misled his counsel and endangered his ability to mount
defense. 28 Cases that
cite this headnote |
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Federal Civil
Procedure |
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Only misconduct that actually subverts
judicial process can be basis for upsetting otherwise settled decree. 7 Cases that
cite this headnote |
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Constitutional
Law Constitutional
Law |
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Brady rule, that suppression by prosecution of material
evidence favorable to accused upon request violates due process irrespective
of prosecution’s good faith, applies to denaturalization and extradition
cases where government seeks to denaturalize or extradite based on proof of
alleged criminal activities of party proceeded against. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5. 29 Cases that
cite this headnote |
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Aliens,
Immigration, and Citizenship Extradition
and Detainers |
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Fraud on court in obtaining
denaturalization and extradition of alleged Nazi war criminal was not
rendered moot by his acquittal and release by a foreign tribunal; collateral
consequences of being found by court to be war criminal required vacation of
judgment. 27 Cases that
cite this headnote |
*339 Edward Marek,
Fed. Public Defender (briefed), Federal Public Defender’s Office, Cleveland,
OH, Michael E. Tigar
(argued and briefed), University of Texas Law School, Austin, TX, for
petitioner-appellant.
Patty Merkamp Stemler (argued and briefed),
Dept. of Justice, Crim. Div., Appellate Section, Washington, DC, for
respondents-appellees.
Before: MERRITT,
Chief Judge; KEITH,
Circuit Judge; and LIVELY,
Senior Circuit Judge.
LIVELY,
Senior Circuit Judge.
The question before the court is whether attorneys in the
Office of Special Investigations (OSI), a unit within the Criminal Division of
the Department of Justice, engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by failing to
disclose to the courts and to the petitioner exculpatory information in their
possession during litigation culminating in extradition proceedings, which led
to the petitioner’s forced departure from the United States and trial on
capital charges in the State of Israel. For the reasons stated herein we
conclude that OSI did so engage in prosecutorial misconduct that seriously
misled the court.
I.
A.
This matter is before the court on its own motion,
pursuant to an order entered on June 5, 1992. In the June 5 order we stated
that information had come to the attention of the court which required us to
determine whether this court’s affirmance of the district court’s denial of
John Demjanjuk’s petition for habeas corpus relief from an extradition warrant
was improvident. See Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016,
106 S.Ct. 1198, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986).
The order directed the respondents to address certain
questions related to the identification of Demjanjuk as the notorious Ukrainian
guard at the Nazi extermination camp near Treblinka, Poland called by Jewish
inmates “Ivan the Terrible” (Ivan Grozny). The order also set the matter for
oral argument on August 11, 1992. The Department of Justice appeared for the
respondents.
Following briefing and oral argument, the court entered
an order on August 17, 1992, appointing a Special Master pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
53(c). The Special Master was directed to take testimony and prepare
a report on the issue of whether failure of government attorneys to disclose
exculpatory information in their possession constituted prosecutorial
misconduct or fraud upon the court that misled the court into allowing
Demjanjuk to be extradited. Pursuant to the government’s motion, a clarifying
order was entered on August 31, 1992. Copies of the June 5 and August 17 orders
are annexed to this opinion as Appendix 1 and Appendix 2, respectively.
B.
The Special Master, United States District Judge Thomas
A. Wiseman, Jr. of the Middle District of Tennessee, conducted extensive
hearings over a period of approximately six months and received other evidence
by deposition. After closing proceedings following oral arguments on April 30,
1993, Judge Wiseman prepared a comprehensive report (S.M. Report), which he
filed with this court on June 30, 1993.
Because the district court’s extradition order had been
based primarily on the record of earlier denaturalization proceedings against
Demjanjuk, the master included within the scope of his inquiry actions of
government attorneys in the 1981 denaturalization case and later deportation
proceedings as well as in the extradition case. Chief Judge Frank Battisti
conducted both the denaturalization and the extradition proceedings. The
district court’s opinion in the denaturalization proceedings is reported at 518 F.Supp. 1362
(N.D.Ohio 1981) aff’d per curiam, 680 F.2d 32 (6th
Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036,
103 S.Ct. 447, 74 L.Ed.2d 602 (1982). The district court’s opinions
in the extradition proceeding are reported at 612 F.Supp. 544
and 612 F.Supp. 571
(N.D.Ohio 1985).
*340 Demjanjuk’s claims of misconduct consisted of the
government’s failure to disclose information that pointed to another Ukrainian
guard at Treblinka, Ivan Marchenko, as “Ivan the Terrible.” Demjanjuk’s
denaturalization and deportation orders were based on his alleged
misrepresentations concerning his wartime whereabouts and activities at the
time he applied for entry into the United States as a displaced person and in
his application for citizenship. These orders were based primarily, although
not exclusively, on Demjanjuk’s failure to disclose his alleged wartime
activities as “Ivan the Terrible” at Treblinka. The extradition order was based
solely upon the district court’s finding that Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible.1 This was the charge on which Israel sought his
extradition, and on which he was ultimately tried and convicted by an Israeli
trial court. As the Supreme Court of Israel stated, “the fact the appellant
[Demjanjuk] was a guardsman at the Trawniki unit” and similar background
evidence “was not the main matter which was set before the authorities in the
United States and before the court in Israel, but it was part of the collection
of factual information.” (Translation of the final section of the decision of
the Supreme Court of Israel in Demjanjuk’s appeal at 21). The “main matter”
before the courts in both countries in all the proceedings, as the Supreme
Court of Israel observes, and the records of proceedings in the United States
establish, was the “Ivan the Terrible” charge.
We directed the parties to file briefs setting forth
their views and arguments respecting the Special Master’s report and set the
matter for oral argument on September 3, 1993. Following full briefing and
extended oral argument the matter was submitted for decision.
II.
[1] The master made findings of fact, largely
based on credibility determinations, which absolved the government attorneys of
deliberately and intentionally failing to disclose information that they
considered exculpatory. Judge Wiseman also found that the various proceedings
against Demjanjuk were not affected by political pressures from congressional
sources and various Jewish groups in the United States. S.M. Report at 27–28.
We are required to accept the master’s findings of fact unless clearly
erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P.
53(e)(2).
A.
The master considered six specific claims by Demjanjuk
that acts and omissions of OSI attorneys described therein constituted
prosecutorial misconduct or fraud on the court. These claims related to
statements of various witnesses and a report of a Polish investigation that had
come into OSI’s possession. In each case the master found that government
attorneys had failed to disclose or produce documents or other materials that
should have been subject to disclosure or production under outstanding
discovery requests and Fed.R.Civ.P.
26(e). In each instance, however, the master exonerated the
government attorneys on one or more of the following findings: either that the
attorneys did not believe the materials were within the scope of outstanding
discovery requests; that they believed in good faith that the materials did not
relate to Demjanjuk; or that a particular attorney then responsible for
complying with requests was not aware of the existence of specified materials
even though other attorneys who worked on the Demjanjuk cases did know of and
had seen the materials.
In making these determinations, the master considered
each of the six claims in light of the successive sets of interrogatories filed
by Demjanjuk during the denaturalization proceedings. At the time he filed the
first set of interrogatories Demjanjuk filed a request for production of
documents and stated *341 that both
were to be treated as of a continuing nature. Question 2 of the first set of
interrogatories asked whether a statement had been obtained from any person
whose name and address had been sought in Question 1. The respondents argued
that they had complied fully by providing names of persons who claimed to have
any knowledge of Demjanjuk’s alleged activities at Treblinka as requested in
Question 1 of the first set. The master refused to accept the OSI attorneys’
arguments, stating:
Thus, the defendant specifically asked for
the names of all witnesses to the defendant’s alleged actions, and whether
statements had been obtained from those people. When read in conjunction with
Mr. Demjanjuk’s first request for production, he clearly had requested all
witness statements.
S.M. Report at 165. Similarly, the master found that the
government never supplied the names of several witnesses whose identity was
required to be disclosed by Question 1.
Another set of interrogatories asked specifically about
foreign government reports concerning activities of Ivan the Terrible at
Treblinka. The previously described materials from the Polish investigation of
the Treblinka atrocities were in the government’s possession in 1979, but were
not produced until 1982, after the conclusion of the denaturalization
proceedings. This failure was an “oversight,” according to one government
attorney. S.M. Report at 171. Finally, and most significantly, as early as 1978
or 1979 the government had information from official sources within the Soviet
Union indicating that there were two Ukrainian operators of the gas chambers at
Treblinka—Ivan and Nikolai—and that “Ivan Grozny” was a man named Ivan
Marchenko, not Ivan Demjanjuk.
B.
The master found some of the respondents’ failures “excusable,”
some “inadvertent,” and most to have resulted from the government attorneys’
mistaken understanding of the scope of their duty of production under the
discovery requests made by Demjanjuk. Judge Wiseman stated:
[A]
careful reading of Mr. Demjanjuk’s discovery requests demonstrates that he
asked for virtually every piece of evidence that is at issue in these
proceedings. As demonstrated, the government did not provide the evidence
because it believed that it was under no duty to do so. The heart of the
discovery problems, therefore, was a tragic misunderstanding.
S.M. Report at 204. Noting that no fewer than eight
government attorneys worked on the Demjanjuk denaturalization case, the master
blamed the misunderstanding with respect to the duty to disclose and produce
materials on “the unstable and fractious character” of the prosecution team.
The difficulties resulting from rivalries between OSI and the United States
Attorney’s office in Cleveland, and the frequent changes of attorneys assigned
to the case were compounded, the master found, by the attitude of the
government trial attorneys that “at times bordered on gamesmanship.” S.M.
Report at 205.
The master found that, in interpreting Demjanjuk’s
requests and interrogatories so narrowly, the government attorneys were “playing
hardball.” S.M. Report at 172. Judge Wiseman pointed out that when questions
arose as to whether the later of two requests for information from foreign
governments was redundant or inconsistent with the first request, the
government attorneys had several options. They could have complied with the
requests; they could have sought a protective order if they felt the requests
were redundant or oppressive; or they could have contacted defense counsel by
telephone for a clarification. As the master stated:
Each of these options would have had the
advantage of providing the defense either with the requested information, or
with notice of the misunderstanding. Although I believe that the consequences
were unintended, the course they took—silently imposing a limitation on the
earlier interrogatory—almost certainly misled [defense *342 counsel] and endangered Mr.
Demjanjuk’s ability to mount a defense.
S.M. Report at 175.
III.
The Special Master was disturbed by the fact that the
government attorneys continued to be less than forthcoming with materials from
foreign sources after agreeing at a pretrial hearing in the denaturalization
case that the government had superior access to such materials and should make
every effort to obtain them and furnish them to the defense.
A.
Undisclosed materials from the former Soviet Union and Poland
form the principal basis for Demjanjuk’s contention that OSI attorneys engaged
in misconduct that amounted to fraud. The Supreme Court of Israel reversed
Demjanjuk’s conviction as Ivan the Terrible and acquitted him based largely on
statements of Ukrainian guards at Treblinka who clearly identified Ivan
Marchenko as Ivan the Terrible. The Israeli Supreme Court found that these
statements raised a reasonable doubt as to Demjanjuk’s guilt even though
eighteen Jewish survivors of Treblinka and one German guard there had
identified him as “Ivan the Terrible” from photographs made in 1942 and 1951.
The government did not have all of the statements relied
upon by the Israeli Supreme Court in its possession during the various
proceedings against Demjanjuk in this country. Some of the statements came from
Russian and Ukrainian sources after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Demjanjuk
maintains, however, that during its investigation prior to the denaturalization
trial the government did obtain from official sources in the Soviet Union and
Poland documents and statements that should have raised doubts about
Demjanjuk’s identity as Ivan the Terrible, and some of which named Marchenko as
the wanted “Ivan.” Because the OSI attorneys consistently followed an unjustifiedly
narrow view of the scope of their duty to disclose, and compartmentalized their
information in a way that resulted in no investigation of apparently
contradictory evidence, Demjanjuk and the court were deprived of information
and materials that were critical to building the defense.
B.
We briefly describe the claims related to five of these
undisclosed documents and groups of documents, indicating with parentheses the
date each came into the possession of one or more attorneys at OSI:
1. The Fedorenko Protocols (1978)
This evidence consists of statements received
from the former Soviet Union including the statements of two former Treblinka
guards, Malagon and Leleko, who discussed the presence of a gas chamber
motorist named Marchenko. Both the Leleko and Malagon statements are by Treblinka
guards who demonstrate great familiarity with the operations and the operators
of the gas chambers of Treblinka. They both name a man other than the accused
as the notoriously cruel “Ivan the Terrible” who ran the motors of the gas
chambers. Excerpts from the Leleko and Malagon statements are annexed to this
opinion as Appendices 3, 4 and 4–A respectively. Also accompanying this
evidence was a list of guards transferred out of the Trawniki, Poland training
camp on which Demjanjuk’s name did not appear. The survivors identified Ivan
the Terrible as one of the Ukrainian operators of the Treblinka gas chambers (“motorist”),
who was especially cruel and committed atrocities upon the Jewish victims as he
herded them into the lethal chambers.
2. The Danilchenko Protocols (1979)
This evidence consists of statements received
from the former Soviet Union including a second statement from the former
Treblinka guard Malagon who stated that an “Ivan Demedyuk or Ivan Dem’yanyuk”
worked at Treblinka as a cook, that a guard named Marchenko operated the gas
chambers, and who stated that the man he knew as “Ivan Demedyuk or Ivan
Dem’yanyuk” was not pictured in the photospread shown to him. Jt.App. 178, 179.
Danilchenko, a guard at the Sobibor, Poland death *343
camp, stated that Demjanjuk was a fellow guard at Sobibor and that they were
transferred from Sobibor to Flossenburg, Germany together. Respondent’s
Appendix 221–22. Although these statements are inculpatory to the extent they
place Demjanjuk at the Sobibor and Flossenburg concentration camps, Demjanjuk
contended that he was entitled to have them produced because they were
exculpatory with respect to the Treblinka “Ivan” claims and would permit him to
refute the claim that he was at Sobibor and Flossenburg.
3. The Dorofeev Protocols (1980)
This evidence received from the former Soviet
Union consists of statements of five Soviets who served at the Trawniki, Poland
training camp for guards. Only one individual recalled the name Demjanjuk and
although he identified two of Demjanjuk’s photos in a three-photograph
photospread, he qualified his identification by stating that his recollection
of Demjanjuk was poor. Three of the others stated that transfers between camps
were routed through Trawniki which served as a distribution center. Jt.App.
155. Again, this evidence has both inculpatory and exculpatory elements, but
Demjanjuk argued that he was entitled to the statements demonstrating that four
of the five Trawniki witnesses were unable to identify him and that the fifth
was very tentative.
4. “Polish Main Commission” List (1979)
This evidence consists of an article
published by the Polish Main Commission, a government body, which partially
lists names of known guards at Treblinka. The name Ivan Marchenko appears on
the list. Demjanjuk’s name does not appear on the list. The Commission
conducted an official investigation of the activities carried on at Treblinka
in connection with a more extensive investigation of Nazi war crimes in Poland.
Jt.App. 502, 556. At the time OSI received this list of more than 70 names
containing Marchenko’s name, but not that of Demjanjuk, it already had Leleko’s
statement identifying “Nikolai” and Marchenko as two different people who
operated the gas chambers. (Nikolai was identified in documents later received
from former Soviet sources as Nikolai Shalayev, who gave a statement in 1950
that he and Marchenko were the two gas chamber operators. This evidence was
admitted by the Israeli Supreme Court.) Demjanjuk contended that any attorney
considering the Polish list in combination with the Leleko statement would have
realized that information from foreign governments pointed to Marchenko, not
Demjanjuk, as Ivan the Terrible and should have produced them in response to
Questions 1 and 2.
An OSI attorney, George Parker, who was lead
counsel in the denaturalization case prior to his resignation in 1980, prepared
extensive notes describing and commenting on the evidence in that case sometime
before the trial. Jt.App. 152, 167. In those notes he stated that Leleko had
named “Nickolay” and Marchenko as motorists and that Marchenko had sword-cut
women’s breasts, one of the atrocities charged against Demjanjuk as Ivan the
Terrible. Before the Special Master, Parker testified that he did not make the
connection, because Malagon’s statement indicated that Nikolai or Nickolay was
Marchenko’s first name. Thus, the other guard was Ivan, and, he believed,
Demjanjuk. Transcript, Nov. 12, 1992, at 80.
5. Otto Horn Interview Memoranda (1979)
This evidence consists of “Reports of
Interview” from an OSI investigator, Bernard Dougherty, and a historian, George
Garand, written in 1979 contemporaneously with an interview of Otto Horn, a
former SS guard at Treblinka, at which Horn identified Demjanjuk as a Treblinka
guard. Although Horn identified Demjanjuk in a photospread, the investigator
and historian both wrote in separate memoranda that this identification
occurred only after Horn noted that Demjanjuk’s photo appeared in both of the two
photospreads and while Demjanjuk’s photo from the first photospread *344 lay facing up during his examination
of the second photospread. Horn later testified that the photo in the first
spread was not visible to him when he made the identification from the second.
These memoranda were addressed to Arthur
Sinai, Deputy Director of OSI. A routing slip from Sinai directed “Stacey” to
make two copies of one of these reports and forward one to Norman Moscowitz.
Jt.App. 586. At that time Moscowitz was working with Parker on the Demjanjuk
denaturalization case. He became lead counsel following Parker’s resignation,
and actually tried the case.
The statements were not produced to Demjanjuk
or disclosed to the district court in the denaturalization proceedings when
that court received a videotaped deposition of Horn taken some time after the
initial identification from the two photospreads. In the videotaped deposition
Horn stated that he did not see the two photospreads at the same time—that the
first one was put away out of his sight before he examined the second one. The
district court stated that it found “no aberrations in the conduct of these
identifications which may be said to detract from the identifications Horn
made.” 518 F.Supp. at
1372.
Moscowitz testified before the Special Master
that he did not read the investigator and historian’s reports prior to the
denaturalization trial, although he did not deny receiving them. Transcript,
Jan. 14, 1993, at 91–93. Demjanjuk claims that the OSI attorneys committed
misconduct and fraud on the court in presenting Horn’s videotaped
identification testimony without producing the reports that detailed a highly
suggestive identification procedure. Relevant portions of the Dougherty and
Garand reports are annexed to this opinion as Appendices 5 and 6, respectively.
C.
There is a further consideration with respect to the
Fedorenko Protocols. Following the district court’s judgment in the
denaturalization case, Norman Moscowitz who was then chief trial counsel in
that case, wrote a letter to Demjanjuk’s counsel, John Martin, with a copy to
the trial judge. Jt.App. 147. In this letter Moscowitz stated that documents
had been received from the Soviet Union (the Dorofeev Protocols) just before
trial and that OSI, for various reasons, had not disclosed or produced them to
Demjanjuk’s counsel. The letter characterized these materials as “further
incriminatory information and support for the government’s case.” The letter
also stated that Demjanjuk was being advised of the existence of these documents
in order to make “the record of discovery complete.”
Demjanjuk filed a motion for a mistrial, which the
district court treated as a motion for a new trial. The district court held a
hearing on the motion on May 4, 1981. Demjanjuk’s attorneys argued that the
Dorofeev information would have been valuable to the defense, that four of the
five former Trawniki guards had failed to identify Demjanjuk while only one had
identified him. Counsel asserted that it would have been important for the
defense to contact these men, particularly to learn if they had been issued
identification badges like the “Trawniki card” relied upon by the government.
The expert witness at the trial who had testified that the card appeared to be
authentic had stated that the one exhibited there was the only one he had ever
seen, though he was a Holocaust historian.
The government argued that it had no agreement or duty to
supplement answers to interrogatories and requests. Even if there was a duty to
produce the documents, the government asserted, Demjanjuk was not prejudiced by
this oversight. During the government’s argument, attorney Moscowitz told the
court that he was perfectly willing to give the defense the witness’ statements
“as everything else.” At this time Demjanjuk’s counsel only had the letter
describing the contents of the statements, not the Dorofeev statements
themselves.
Chief Judge Battisti ruled that the government had a duty
to provide the names of the five witnesses before or during the trial. He then
ordered government counsel to turn *345
over copies of the statements to the defendant and to the court, and recessed
the hearing until Demjanjuk’s counsel and the court had an opportunity to
review them. Following the recess, the district court heard further argument
and then asked for briefs from the parties before adjourning the hearing.
Jt.App. 767. The court ultimately ruled that the Dorofeev materials were
cumulative and in fact supported the government’s arguments that Demjanjuk had
been at Trawniki and that Trawniki was a training center for guards assigned to
all of the extermination camps, including Sobibor as well as Treblinka. 518 F.Supp. at
1384–86.
Demjanjuk argues that, given the district court’s ruling
that the government had a duty to disclose and produce the Dorofeev Protocols, Moscowitz
should have realized that the same duty applied to the Fedorenko Protocols,
which also came from the Soviet Union. Though Moscowitz represented that his
post-trial letter disclosing the existence of the Dorofeev Protocols was
written in order to make the record of discovery complete, he still did not
disclose or produce the Fedorenko documents, which had been in OSI’s possession
since 1978.
In his testimony before the Special Master, Moscowitz
admitted reading the Fedorenko documents prior to the denaturalization
proceedings. Neither he nor Parker, who also read them, felt that they supplied
any help in the Demjanjuk cases. According to the master, these documents
disappeared in the winter of 1981 after the denaturalization trial and only
resurfaced in 1991 in response to a Freedom of Information Act case by
Congressman James Traficant of Ohio. At oral argument before this court,
government counsel stated the Fedorenko documents didn’t actually disappear: “They
were just put back in the Fedorenko files. They came with the Fedorenko case
and when the Demjanjuk case was over, they went back to their Fedorenko file.”
It is hard to credit this explanation. The Fedorenko
file, particularly the Leleko and Malagon statements, contain significant
evidence tending to show that a person other than Demjanjuk was in fact “Ivan
the Terrible of Treblinka.” The record contains copies of a letter dated
October 23, 1978, from the General Counsel to Martin Mendelsohn, chief of
litigation in the “Special Litigation Unit” (SLU) of the Department of Justice,
predecessor to OSI. Jt.App. 215–17. The letter discusses the necessity of
winning the Demjanjuk case, and has as attachments all of the SLU’s memoranda
on Demjanjuk. Among these memoranda is one from Parker and Moscowitz to the
State Department requesting assistance in obtaining further information from
the Soviet Union. The memorandum notes that the Soviets had sent materials in
June 1978 relating to the investigation of Fedorenko (the Fedorenko Protocols),
and continues: “Please thank the [Soviet] Ministry for sending these materials
which have been very useful.” Jt.App. 218. The October 23, 1978 letter shows
that a copy was placed in the Demjanjuk file. It seems clear that even if the
Fedorenko documents were “just put back in the Fedorenko files,” anyone working
with the Demjanjuk files had the substance of those documents, if not the
documents themselves, available.
There were clear signals that the Fedorenko documents
were significant in the Demjanjuk investigation. As we have noted, the
Fedorenko Protocols contained, inter alia, the statements of Soviet citizens
Malagon and Leleko, both guards at Treblinka, who identified Marchenko as an
operator of the gas chamber. Leleko’s statement clearly said that there were
two Ukrainian operators of the gas chambers, “Marchenko and Nikolay” and
identified Marchenko as the “motorist” who committed some of the very
atrocities with which Demjanjuk was charged. Leleko said that Marchenko
mutilated Jewish victims, cutting off breasts of women. Demjanjuk argues that
this evidence provided the strongest possible support for their basic
contention in all the proceedings that Demjanjuk was the victim of
misidentification. Though the Treblinka survivors who identified Demjanjuk as Ivan
the Terrible probably believed they recognized him from the two photographs
exhibited to them, it had been 30 to 40 years since any of them had their last
opportunity to observe the Ukrainian guard Ivan Grozny. On the other hand,
Leleko’s statement was made immediately *346
after the war. The Israeli Supreme Court considered more eyewitness survivor
identifications than the American courts; yet, it found that statements made to
Soviet authorities identifying Marchenko as “Ivan” raised sufficient doubt
about the identification of Demjanjuk to require reversal of Demjanjuk’s
conviction and his release. It seems clear that the American courts considering
Demjanjuk’s fate should have had those documents that were in OSI’s possession
in 1981 that pointed to Ivan Marchenko as Ivan the Terrible.
IV.
After working on the Demjanjuk case for several years,
OSI attorney George Parker became convinced that OSI lacked sufficient evidence
that Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka. On February 28, 1980, Parker
wrote a memorandum entitled “Demjanjuk—A Reappraisal,” addressed to Walter
Rockler, Director, and Allan Ryan, Deputy Director of OSI, setting forth his
doubts. He urged the addressees to read the memorandum and be prepared to make
a decision about how to proceed with Demjanjuk (the denaturalization
case had been pending for more than two years and was nearing trial) in the
near future. This memorandum is annexed hereto as Appendix 7.
A.
Parker’s memorandum discussed the background of the
Demjanjuk investigation, which began when attorneys in the SLU became aware of
a brief reference to Demjanjuk at Sobibor in a book called Lest We Forget.
The book also referred to a document later denominated the “Trawniki Card,”
containing a photograph identified as being that of Ivan Demjanjuk. It was only
after Treblinka survivors who were interrogated by Israeli police identified the
person pictured on the card as a guard at Treblinka rather than at Sobibor that
the SLU shifted its focus and began preparing a case against Demjanjuk as Ivan
the Terrible. All other evidence, including the statements of Danilchenko and
two other Ukrainian guards questioned by Soviet authorities, identified
Demjanjuk as a guard at Sobibor and Flossenburg, but not at Treblinka.
Furthermore, Parker’s memo pointed out, both the Polish
and Soviet governments had compiled lists of guards at Treblinka, and Demjanjuk’s
name appeared on neither one, though “[t]he two Ukrainians who incessantly
worked at the gas chambers were well known.” This portion of the memorandum
concludes: “Given these circumstances it is disturbing, as Norman Moscowitz has
pointed out repeatedly, that Demjanjuk’s name does not appear on either list.”
After reviewing the available admissible evidence and the
“flaws” with the Treblinka evidence, the memorandum sets forth Parker’s views
of “Strategic Options; Ethical Responsibilities” of OSI as he sees them. This
section of the memorandum begins with these words:
We have little admissible evidence that
defendant was at Sobibor yet serious doubts as to whether he was at Treblinka.
Even if we may be comforted that we may have the right man for the wrong act,
the ethical cannons [sic] probably require us to alter our present position.
The memorandum then sets forth four options and Parker’s
recommendation as to each.
Option 1 would be to maintain the status quo, that is, to
“[p]roceed with the Treblinka case as presently plead.” (The denaturalization
complaint did not mention Sobibor or Trawniki, only Treblinka.) Assuming canons
of ethics that caution against prosecutors going forward in a criminal case in
which they have serious doubts apply to the denaturalization case, Parker “strongly
recommended” against this option. Parker recognized that a denaturalization
proceeding is technically a civil rather than a criminal action, but expressed
the view that the consequence to a defendant who loses such a case—deprivation
of citizenship—is so severe that this stricture of the canons should be
followed.
Option 2 would be to strike claims that Demjanjuk was at
Treblinka and substitute claims that he was at Trawniki and Sobibor. Parker
described this course of action as *347
“tactically suicidal” and “a strategic blunder,” primarily because it placed
too much reliance on the Trawniki Card.
Option 3 would be to dismiss the case—at least
temporarily—and attempt to beef up the Sobibor evidence. The memorandum
recommended against this option because of “largely political” negative
factors, and the possibility that the court might not permit refiling.
Option 4 would be to amend the pleadings to add
allegations that Demjanjuk served at Sobibor and Trawniki in addition to the
allegation that he was Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka. This would shift the
focus from testimony of Treblinka survivors describing the heinous crimes of
Ivan the Terrible to a mere showing that Demjanjuk was a Russian POW trained by
the Germans as a guard, who served as a guard at an extermination camp. Parker
did not make a recommendation with respect to Option 4, but repeated his
opinion that a change in course was absolutely required by ethical
considerations.
Parker’s superiors eventually decided to amend the
pleadings to add allegations about Sobibor and Trawniki, but to proceed with
the case on the basis of proving that Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible and to
rely principally on photo identifications by Treblinka survivors. Parker
resigned from the Department of Justice before the denaturalization trial and
Norman Moscowitz took over as lead attorney for OSI.
B.
The Special Master found that the Parker memorandum is “authentic.”
S.M. Report at 100–01. This was an issue, because no one in OSI could locate
it; Parker produced a copy of the memorandum and cover letter on October 8,
1992, in proceedings before the master.
Rockler testified that he could not remember receiving
the memorandum. Ryan testified that he could not have received it, or he would
have done something about it. The master stated that Ryan’s testimony should be
taken “with a grain of salt,” and we agree with this assessment. Moscowitz
testified that he did not receive the memorandum, but was aware of Parker’s
doubts about the identifications of Demjanjuk by survivors of Treblinka. The
master found that there was a meeting shortly after the memorandum was written
at which the question of amending the pleadings in the Demjanjuk case was
discussed. Although there was considerable inconsistency in the testimony of
the attorneys who attended the meeting, the master found that all were telling
the truth to the extent they remembered the meeting at all. The master further
concluded that Rockler found no irreconcilable discrepancies in the Demjanjuk
evidence and that the evidence in hand was sufficient to go forward. On that
basis, Parker’s views were rejected by Parker’s colleagues within OSI. S.M.
Report at 103–09.
The master absolved Moscowitz of blame for not sharing
Parker’s ethical concerns and proceeding to prosecute the denaturalization case
with the Ivan the Terrible allegations as its centerpiece. Moscowitz testified
that he had concluded that while Demjanjuk’s primary duties were at Treblinka,
the Trawniki training camp was also a transfer point for guards. Thus, it was
not impossible for Demjanjuk to have been at Treblinka at times the survivors
claimed they saw him operating the gas chambers and committing other atrocities
there, and to have served at Sobibor at other times. S.M. Report at 113–18.
The “most striking aspect” of the Parker memorandum,
according to the master, “is its complete silence regarding the references [in
the Fedorenko documents] to a man named Marchenko at the gas chambers.” S.M.
Report at 112. Parker’s doubts were based on the apparent impossibility of
Demjanjuk’s having been a guard at both Sobibor and Treblinka during the
relatively brief time both were in operation, and his uneasiness about the
survivor identifications so long after the events. Parker did not make the
Marchenko connection. Moscowitz testified that when he became aware of the
evidence identifying Marchenko as Ivan the Terrible, he assumed that Demjanjuk
had adopted Marchenko (a common Ukrainian name, and Demjanjuk’s mother’s maiden
name) as an alias. The problem with this *348
explanation is that Moscowitz also relied on the Trawniki card containing
Demjanjuk’s name and photograph as significant evidence that he was Ivan the
Terrible of Treblinka. It is hard to understand how he could have been sent
from Trawniki to Treblinka as Demjanjuk and then assumed the name Marchenko
while working there. Surely the meticulous Germans in charge at Treblinka would
have noticed the discrepancy.
In his memorandum, Parker wrote that adopting Option 4,
amending the pleadings to add Sobibor and Trawniki allegations, would be “simply
a ruse to avoid the ethical problems” identified in Option 1. The master found
that amending in this way was not a ruse because Moscowitz and others believed
in good faith that transfers did take place through Trawniki between camps and
that Demjanjuk had served at both Treblinka and Sobibor. S.M. Report at 123.
While recognizing the significance of the Parker
memorandum as a document which raised important questions about the handling of
the Demjanjuk case, the Special Master concluded that it was not a “smoking gun”
insofar as his inquiry was concerned. The master held that because OSI
attorneys acted on the basis of good faith belief in Demjanjuk’s guilt as Ivan
the Terrible their disagreements with Parker’s conclusions were irrelevant with
respect to the issue of fraud on the court. S.M. Report at 117. While we agree
that the Parker memo alone would not be a sufficient basis for a finding of
fraud on the court, it raised a clear warning that there were ethical perils in
continuing to prosecute Demjanjuk as Ivan the Terrible. When his superiors and
colleagues at OSI refused to heed his warning, Parker resigned.
V.
A.
The government argued in its brief to the Special Master
that mere nondisclosure can never be fraud on the court. The master rejected
the argument as a misinterpretation of this court’s statement in H.K. Porter Co.
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115, 1118 (6th Cir.1976),
that “[a]llegations of nondisclosure during pretrial discovery are not
sufficient to support an action for fraud on the court.” The government quoted
this statement out of context. When the context is examined, it is clear that
the court in Porter was concerned with a claim of fraud based on an
attorney’s failure to disclose documents not requested by opposing parties that
pertained to confidential disclosures from a client. The master stated,
correctly we believe, that it would be error “to exclude from the definition of
fraud on the court intentional, fraudulent nondisclosure during discovery.”
S.M. Report at 187–88.
[2] The Special Master set forth the elements
of fraud upon the court as consisting of conduct:
1. On the part of an officer of the court;
2. That is directed to the “judicial
machinery” itself;
3. That is intentionally false, wilfully
blind to the truth, or is in reckless disregard for the truth;
4. That is a positive averment or is
concealment when one is under a duty to disclose;
5. That deceives the court.
As shown by his description of the third element, and
repeated in his opinion, the master held that the intent requirement “is
satisfied by proof of actual intent to defraud, of wilful blindness to the
truth, or of a reckless disregard for the truth.” S.M. Report at 185–86,
190 (emphasis added).
B.
We have trouble squaring this definition with the
master’s ultimate conclusion. The master stated that “a careful reading of Mr.
Demjanjuk’s discovery requests demonstrates that he asked for virtually every
piece of evidence that is at issue in these proceedings,” but the government
did not provide the evidence because it believed it was under no duty to do so.
S.M. Report at 204. The government attorneys had the same obligation as the
master to give these requests a “careful reading.” The master also faulted
Demjanjuk’s attorneys for failing to pursue every lead provided by the
responses that the government did make. That may be a *349 correct assessment as to some leads,
but Demjanjuk’s attorneys were depending on government attorneys to root out
information in the possession of foreign nations and to provide it. This was so
because only the government has the contacts and resources necessary to obtain
information from foreign governments, and because a government attorney agreed
to do just that at a pretrial hearing before a magistrate. S.M. Report at 157.
This case involves more than discovery obligations,
however. Ryan testified that he had stated many times that OSI had a policy and
practice of turning over exculpatory information even if it had not been
requested in discovery. Transcript, Jan. 29, 1993, at 32–40. The other OSI
attorneys testified that they knew of no such policy.
While the denaturalization case was before the Supreme
Court on Demjanjuk’s petition for certiorari, Demjanjuk received from private
sources a copy of the August 1979 letter from a Polish official to Martin
Mendelsohn concerning the report of the Polish Main Commission. Demjanjuk
requested information about the Polish report. Moscowitz responded and sent a
part of the Commission materials. John Martin, Demjanjuk’s attorney,
immediately wrote to Allan Ryan, then director of OSI, requesting copies of the
document described in the letter. OSI attorney Bruce Einhorn drafted a response
and sent it to Ryan for approval. This second response stated that “all
relevant and discoverable documents in the Government’s possession have been
provided to you under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” The letter went on
to decline the request for “further discovery.” The master found that this
letter was sent to Martin with a copy to Judge Battisti, apparently with Ryan’s
approval. S.M. Report at 135–36. These responses do not square with Ryan’s
professed policy. The OSI letter is couched in terms of the requirements of the
discovery rules and limiting production to documents specifically requested,
not one of disclosing all exculpatory information.
C.
The Special Master based his ultimate conclusion that
Demjanjuk failed to prove fraud on the court almost exclusively on his finding
that the OSI attorneys acted in good faith. While he stated that they were not
reckless, he did not discuss this finding at all. Instead, he emphasized his
finding that “[t]hey did not intend to violate the Rules or their ethical
obligations.... they did not misstate facts or the law as they understood them,
and did not make statements in ignorance while aware of their ignorance.
Although they were blinded to what we may now perceive to be the truth, they
were not wilfully blind.” S.M. Report at 206.
The quoted findings are based largely on credibility
determinations. Although we might not agree with each finding, giving them the
required deference, we cannot find them clearly erroneous. The conclusion that
the OSI attorneys were not reckless, however, stands on a different footing.
Given the Special Master’s finding of no deliberate or wilful failure to
disclose information arising from an evil motive, we believe the type of
reckless disregard to be examined in this case is the second type described in
the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 500, comment (a):
Recklessness may consist of either of two
different types of conduct ... In [the second type], the actor has ...
knowledge, or reason to know, of the facts, but does not realize or appreciate
the high degree of risk involved, although a reasonable man in his position
would do so. An objective standard is applied to him, and he is held to the
realization of the aggravated risk which a reasonable man in his place would
have, although he does not himself have it.
Such recklessness can and should be determined from an
objective examination of the actions of the parties in a particular set of
circumstances. We will undertake such an objective examination, accepting as
true that no OSI attorney deliberately withheld from Demjanjuk or the court
information that he believed he had a duty to disclose even though the
withholding itself was deliberate.
VI.
A.
[3] The attitude of the OSI attorneys toward
disclosing information to Demjanjuk’s *350
counsel was not consistent with the government’s obligation to work for justice
rather than for a result that favors its attorneys’ preconceived ideas of what
the outcome of legal proceedings should be. The master found that the OSI
attorneys operated on the premise that Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible and that
this belief caused them to be “inadequately skeptical” of their case when confronted
with evidence pointing to Marchenko as Ivan Grozny. S.M. Report at 202–03. We
do not believe their personal conviction that they had the right man provided
an excuse for recklessly disregarding their obligation to provide information
specifically requested by Demjanjuk (as found by the master) the withholding of
which almost certainly misled his counsel and endangered his ability to mount a
defense (as found by the master).
B.
The OSI attorneys acted with reckless disregard for their
duty to the court and their discovery obligations in failing to disclose at
least three sets of documents in their possession before the proceedings
against Demjanjuk ever reached trial.
1. The Fedorenko Protocols should have been disclosed.
They consisted of information provided by a foreign government that supplied
some support to Demjanjuk’s basic claim from the beginning—that he was a victim
of misidentification. The statements of the two former guards at Treblinka
identified one of the Ukrainians who operated the gas chambers as “Marchenko.”
In his statement, taken in 1945 near the end of World War II, the guard Leleko
named Nikolai and Marchenko as the “motorists” and stated that Marchenko had
cut women’s breasts with his sword. In addition, the protocols contained the
transcription of a detailed taped interrogation of Fedorenko conducted in 1973
by Soviet officials. Fedorenko stated that he remembered two guards at the gas
chambers, Nikolay and Ivan. Two Jewish survivors, Rosenberg and Epstein, had
also described two operators of the gas chambers called Nikolai and Ivan.
Marchenko’s given name was Ivan.
The guard Malagon also identified Marchenko as a motorist
in a 1978 statement. He referred to him, however, as “Marchenko, Nickolay,”
providing support for the OSI theory that Marchenko was the Nikolai described
by some survivors and Demjanjuk was the notorious Ivan. This theory was
weakened, however, by the fact that Marchenko’s name appeared on the list of
Treblinka personnel furnished by the Soviet government and Demjanjuk’s name did
not appear. This same witness, Malagon, identified Demjanjuk’s photograph as
that of a cook at Treblinka, not as Ivan the Terrible when he was interrogated
on October 2, 1979.
The information in the Fedorenko Protocols would have
bolstered Demjanjuk’s contention that he was not Ivan Grozny of Treblinka, and
would have provided information pointing toward Marchenko as the notorious
Ukrainian. The information would have assisted the district court as well. The
court heard no evidence in support of Demjanjuk’s claim of misidentification
beyond his own denial. This information would have shown the court that there
was evidentiary support available, and in the government’s possession, that
supported that denial.
2. The list of Ukrainian guards at Treblinka furnished to
OSI by the Polish government was certainly exculpatory. In 1982 Demjanjuk’s
attorney advised OSI Director Allan Ryan that he had learned of 1979
correspondence between the director of the Polish Main Commission Investigating
Nazi Crimes in Poland and OSI attorney Martin Mendelsohn and requested copies “[p]ursuant
to discovery motions and interrogatories....” Jt.App. 149. Attorney Moscowitz
responded on August 17, 1992, enclosing copies of the reports from Poland.
Moscowitz advised that OSI was furnishing the material “as a matter of courtesy
and not under any obligations of discovery, which ended long ago.” Jt.App. 150.
Demjanjuk’s attorney persisted, asking for copies of any
other documents received from foreign governments (a duty to furnish such
documents existed from the time of Demjanjuk’s first set of interrogatories,
the master found). Attorney Bruce Einhorn replied for OSI that “all relevant
and discoverable documents in the Government’s possession have *351 been provided to you under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” The letter also advised that OSI had
undertaken no inquiry to determine whether other documents being sought had
already been provided “or indeed whether such documents even exist.” Jt.App.
152.
The 1979 letter from the Polish Main Commission advised
that the Commission had no data concerning Demjanjuk. Jt.App. 502. Among the
documents forwarded with the director’s letter was a list of known Ukrainian
guards who had worked at Treblinka. Both Fedorenko and Marchenko’s names
appeared on the list. Demjanjuk’s name did not appear.
Both Parker and Moscowitz, the two OSI attorneys most involved
in preparing the Demjanjuk denaturalization case, saw the material from the
Polish Main Commission. Parker testified that he thought the material had no
value in the Demjanjuk case, and that he did not notice Marchenko’s name.
Moscowitz testified he thought it did not relate to the Demjanjuk case. This
was a strange conclusion, given the fact that the director of the Commission
sent the material in response to a request from OSI for information concerning
Demjanjuk and two other individuals. Jt.App. 502.
The Polish Main Commission material would not have
established conclusively that Demjanjuk was not a guard or motorist at
Treblinka. There were approximately 100 Ukrainians there at one time or
another. Nevertheless, the defense could have argued from the absence of
Demjanjuk’s name that surely the Polish investigation would have turned up the
name of Treblinka’s most notorious guard and included that person’s name on the
list. If Allan Ryan’s proclaimed policy of furnishing everything had been followed,
it is clear that the Polish documents would have been furnished in 1979, before
the denaturalization trial, not three years later.
3. Otto Horn’s identification of Demjanjuk as Ivan Grozny
from photo spreads was extremely important government evidence at the
denaturalization trial. Horn was a German guard who had been stationed at
Treblinka. He was tried for war crimes in 1964 or 1965 and acquitted. His
evidence was presented in the denaturalization proceedings in the form of a
videotaped deposition taken in Berlin on February 26, 1980.
Demjanjuk’s counsel objected to testimony on the
videotape concerning the identification from photographs on the specific ground
that OSI personnel had visited Horn three months earlier, in November 1979, and
conducted a photo identification procedure in the absence of Demjanjuk’s
attorneys. Moscowitz responded that Demjanjuk’s counsel had full opportunity to
cross-examine Horn when the deposition was taken in 1980.
What neither Judge Battisti nor Demjanjuk’s counsel knew
was that the contemporaneous reports of the 1979 Horn interview by the OSI
investigator and historian directly conflicted with Horn’s testimony at the
deposition that when he finally identified Demjanjuk’s photograph in the second
spread he could not see the first set of pictures. Yet, the reports both stated
that Horn was unable to identify Demjanjuk’s photo in the first spread and only
did so while examining the second spread and noticing the resemblance between
the Demjanjuk photo in that set and the Demjanjuk photo in the first spread,
which was lying face-up where Horn could see it as he examined the second set.
As we have noted, Chief Judge Battisti overruled
Demjanjuk’s objections to the Horn video deposition and found that there were “no
aberrations” in the process by which Horn identified a photograph of Demjanjuk
as Ivan. We believe that if Demjanjuk’s attorneys had had the investigator and
historian’s reports of the first session, with their strong indication of a
suggestive identification procedure, they could have conducted a
cross-examination of Horn at the videotaped deposition that would have raised
serious questions about the witness’ identification.
Both the district court and Demjanjuk’s counsel were
entitled to have these reports produced. Moscowitz, who was the lead attorney
at the denaturalization trial, testified before the Special Master that he
never read the Dougherty and Garand reports before the trial. This, despite the
fact that Sinai, to *352 whom the
reports were addressed, clearly directed that a copy be made and sent to
Moscowitz. If Moscowitz did not read the reports, knowing he planned to
introduce the video deposition at the trial, this failure constituted “reckless
disregard for the truth.”
OSI was not a large office. We can find no excuse for
such casual treatment of information that could cast doubt on the validity of
important testimony. Moscowitz was present at the first session with Horn, but
testified that he looked away during the actual identification, leaving that to
the investigator and historian. He did this, he said, in order to avoid the
possibility of being called as a witness at the denaturalization trial when the
deposition to be taken a few months later would be introduced. Not having
witnessed the identification himself, we can find no reasonable explanation in
this immense record for his failure to read and acknowledge the importance of
the contemporaneous reports of the trained investigator and historian, nor can
we understand how Sinai determined that two reports addressed to him should be
routed to Moscowitz without even reading them.
VII.
We consider whether the conduct outlined herein
constitutes fraud on the court or attorney misconduct sufficiently serious to
require corrective action on our part.
A.
[4] Fraud on the court is a somewhat nebulous
concept usually discussed in civil cases. No court system can function without
safeguards against actions that interfere with its administration of justice.
This concern must be balanced against the necessity for finality of court
judgments; thus, only actions that actually subvert the judicial process can be
the basis for upsetting otherwise settled decrees.
Professor Moore’s definition is frequently cited:
Fraud upon the court should ... embrace only
that species of fraud which does or attempts to, subvert the integrity of the
court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the
judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of
adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication, and relief should be
denied in the absence of such conduct.
7 Moore’s Federal Practice and Procedure ¶ 60.33.
Cases dealing with fraud on the court often turn on whether the improper
actions are those of parties alone, or if the attorneys in the case are
involved. As an officer of the court, every attorney has a duty to be
completely honest in conducting litigation. Professor Moore emphasizes this
element of fraud in his treatise:
[W]hile an attorney should represent his
client with singular loyalty, that loyalty obviously does not demand that he
act dishonestly or fraudulently; on the contrary his loyalty to the court, as
an officer thereof, demands integrity and honest dealing with the court. And
when he departs from that standard in the conduct of a case he perpetrates
fraud upon a court.
Id. The
author cites two Supreme Court decisions that illustrate the role of attorney
actions in the fraud on the court analysis. Moore distinguishes between Hazel–Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed.
1250 (1944), in which the Supreme Court did find fraud, and U.S. v.
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93 (1878), in which the
Court did not find fraud. While the actions taken in both cases were similar—false
documents were put before the court—the attorney was implicated in Hazel–Atlas
as one of the perpetrators, while the attorney in Throckmorton was not.
7 Moore’s Federal Practice at 60–358–59. See also Serzysko v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.1972), where the
court of appeals as part of its finding of no fraud on the court, pointed out
that none of the offending party’s attorneys were involved in the alleged
fraud. 461 F.2d at 702
n. 1.
When the party is the United States, acting through the
Department of Justice, the distinction between client and attorney actions
becomes meaningless. The Department acts only through its attorneys. Although
there are cases holding that a “plan or scheme” must exist in order to find
fraud *353 on the court, we agree with
Judge Wiseman that a scheme, based on a subjective intent to commit fraud, is
not required in a case such as this. Reckless disregard for the truth is
sufficient.
B.
The respondents complain that Demjanjuk seeks to hold
them to the constitutional standard in criminal cases enunciated in Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), even
though all proceedings against Demjanjuk have been civil actions. The Supreme
Court held in Brady that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87.
The Special Master stated that he believed the Brady rule should govern,
but confined his analysis to fraud on the court in a civil context, because the
Supreme Court had never stated that the Brady rule applies in civil
cases.
(1)
[5] We believe Brady should be extended
to cover denaturalization and extradition cases where the government seeks
denaturalization or extradition based on proof of alleged criminal activities
of the party proceeded against. If the government had sought to denaturalize
Demjanjuk only on the basis of his misrepresentations at the time he sought
admission to the United States and subsequently when he applied for
citizenship, it would have been only a civil action. The government did not
rest on those misrepresentations, however. Instead, the respondents presented
their case as showing that Demjanjuk was guilty of mass murder.
The OSI prosecutors knew that Brady requires
disclosure of exculpatory information in criminal cases. The Director of OSI,
Mr. Ryan, testified that it is “fundamentally unfair” not to follow the Brady
principle in OSI cases and that he intended for the office to follow this
principle of full disclosure of exculpatory material. (Ryan Tr. at 37.) It is
not sufficient to say, as the Special Master concludes, that no prosecutorial
misconduct occurred under the Brady principle because no particular
individual at OSI has been proved to have acted in “bad faith” with the express
intent of suppressing exculpatory evidence.
In Brady itself, the Court stated that the failure
to disclose material information is a due process violation “irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
Otherwise, the prosecutor can proclaim that his heart is innocent and his
failures inadvertent, a claim hard to disprove, while at the same time
completely disregarding his duty to disclose.
The Court has also made plain that the prosecution cannot
escape its disclosure obligation by compartmentalizing information or failing
to inform others in the office of relevant information. In Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), the
government made the same “the-right-hand-did-not-know-what-the-left-hand-was-doing”
argument as it makes here. The Court was quick to reject this excuse as a
justification for withholding exculpatory material. The Court pointed out that “the
prosecutor’s office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the
government.” The Court held that the prosecutor’s office—here OSI—is
responsible as a corporate entity for disclosure.2
The record is replete with evidence that Allan Ryan was
considering extradition of Nazi war criminals to Israel even before Demjanjuk’s
denaturalization become final. When that event occurred, the government did not
deport Demjanjuk; instead, it sought his extradition for trial as Ivan the
Terrible pursuant to Israel’s request.
The consequences of denaturalization and extradition
equal or exceed those of most criminal convictions. In this case, Demjanjuk was
extradited for trial on a charge that carried the death penalty. OSI is part of
the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. The OSI attorneys team with
local United States Attorneys in seeking denaturalization and extradition, and
they approach these cases as prosecutions. In fact, in correspondence and
memoranda several of the respondents refer to their role in the Demjanjuk case
as prosecutors. We believe the OSI attorneys had a constitutional duty to
produce “all evidence favorable to an accused [Demjanjuk],” which the Special
Master found he had requested and that was “material ... to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87,
83 S.Ct. at 1196.
Thus, we hold that the OSI attorneys acted with reckless
disregard for the truth and for the government’s obligation to take no steps
that prevent an adversary from presenting his case fully and fairly. This was
fraud on the court in the circumstances of this case where, by recklessly
assuming Demjanjuk’s guilt, they failed to observe their obligation to produce
exculpatory materials requested by Demjanjuk.
VIII.
Several other factors revealed by this record require
brief discussion.
A.
Although the Special Master found that pressures from
outside OSI did not influence the respondents’ failure to disclose required
information, the presence of such pressure cannot be gainsaid. In August of
1978 Congressman Eilberg, the Chairman of an important committee, wrote then
Attorney General Bell a letter insisting that Demjanjuk be prosecuted hard
because “we cannot afford the risk of losing” the case.3 The trial attorney then in charge of the case, Mr.
Parker, wrote in his 1980 memorandum that the denaturalization case could not
be dismissed because of factors “largely political and obviously considerable.”
Other lawyers in OSI wrote memos discussing this case as a political “hot
potato” that if lost “will raise political problems for us all including the
Attorney General.” (Mendelsohn, then the Director of the office, to Crosland,
September 26, 1978, Pet.Exh. 113.) Mr. Ryan, Director of the office, wrote the
Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division in 1980 that OSI had “secured
the support in Congress, Jewish *355
community organizations, public at large for OSI—press coverage has been
substantially favorable and support from Jewish organizations is now secure,”
but he went on to say that “this support can’t be taken for granted and must be
reinforced at every opportunity.” (Ryan Tr. at 88.) Mr. Ryan also testified
that “in 1986, which was the year before the [Israeli] trial [of Demjanjuk], I
went to Israel for about 10 days on a lecture tour that was sponsored by the
Antidefamation League....” (Ryan Tr. at 90.) It is obvious from the record that
the prevailing mindset at OSI was that the office must try to please and
maintain very close relationships with various interest groups because their
continued existence depended upon it.
B.
The “win at any cost” attitude displayed by some of these
record documents and statements contrasts sharply with the attitude and actions
of the Israeli prosecutors, who were under domestic political pressures
themselves. But for the actions of the Israeli prosecutors, the death sentence
against Demjanjuk probably would have been carried out by now. He would have
been executed on a charge for which he has now been acquitted.
The Israeli prosecutors did not learn of the exculpatory
evidence from Russia until after the accused was found guilty and sentenced to
death in the Israel trial court. They had prosecuted the case over many months
and obtained the conviction and death sentence. The Israeli prosecutors then
learned that there was Russian information suggesting that the charges against
the accused may be false. Instead of withholding the information, the
prosecutors travelled to Russia to investigate the matter thoroughly. They
marshalled the exculpatory evidence, brought it back to Israel; and in the face
of extremely strong popular feelings against the accused, publicly turned it
over to the Supreme Court of Israel. Basically, the Israeli prosecutors
confessed error in the face of intense political pressure to get a conviction.
Relying on this newly discovered exculpatory evidence developed by the
prosecutors, the Supreme Court of Israel reversed the conviction which those
same prosecutors had obtained five years earlier.
IX.
[6] We have considered the possibility of
treating Demjanjuk’s claims as moot in view of the fact that he has now been
acquitted and ordered released by the Supreme Court of Israel. Upon reflection,
however, we are convinced that the collateral consequences of being found by
the district court to be Ivan the Terrible require corrective action.
The petitioner was extradited in 1986 on the basis of
evidence in the denaturalization case that led to a finding that he was the
notorious Ivan. After a lengthy trial followed by conviction and a death
sentence, he spent more than seven years in an Israeli prison. Although he was
treated humanely there, he was under a sentence of death until the Israeli
Supreme Court in 1993 ordered his acquittal and eventual release.
The United States Supreme Court dealt with the collateral
consequences of a judgment in a criminal case with similarities to the present
case in Fiswick v.
United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222, 67 S.Ct. 224, 230, 91 L.Ed. 196 (1946).
In Fiswick, the Court held that an appeal was not moot even though the
defendant had completed his prison sentence before the appeal reached the High
Court. The case involved an alien convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United
States for concealing his membership in the Nazi party when registering with
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Although Fiswick was released
before his case could be heard, the Supreme Court held that the harmful effects
flowing from the conviction precluded mootness. The Court reasoned that a
conviction for lying about Nazi involvement “stands as ominous proof that
[Fiswick] did what was charged and puts beyond his reach any showing of
ameliorating circumstances or explanatory matter that might remove part or all
of the curse.” 329 U.S. at 222,
67 S.Ct. at 230. If a conviction for merely “lying about Nazi
involvement” causes such collateral consequences, surely being found by a court
and convicted for being one of the most notorious perpetrators of Holocaust
atrocities deserves the same consideration. *356
The Supreme Court has found collateral consequences sufficient to overcome
suggestions of mootness in many other cases. E.g., Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 633 n. 2, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1277, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968);
Pollard v.
United States, 352 U.S. 354, 77 S.Ct. 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957).
See also York v. Tate, 858 F.2d 322
(6th Cir.1988) (habeas corpus petition not mooted by prisoner’s
release).
CONCLUSION
We attempt to mitigate the collateral consequences of the
extradition order only. As did the Special Master, however, we have considered
the actions of the OSI attorneys in the denaturalization case. The extradition
order was based largely on the district court’s finding in the denaturalization
case that Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible.
This court has not considered charges against Demjanjuk
other than those related to the claim that he was Ivan the Terrible of
Treblinka. Neither have we considered Demjanjuk’s contention that the other
grounds for denaturalization and deportation should be reconsidered because the
“Ivan” charges overshadowed all the proof in the two earlier proceedings.
Acting pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(b)(6) and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651,
we reopened the habeas corpus case in which we denied relief from the
extradition order to determine whether that proceeding had been tainted by
fraud on the court or prosecutorial misconduct that required our intervention.
See Harris v.
Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299–300, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1090–1091, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969).
We also acted pursuant to our inherent power to protect the integrity of the judicial
process within this Circuit. The Supreme Court has recognized a court’s
inherent power to grant relief, for “after-discovered fraud,” from an earlier
judgment “regardless of the term of [its] entry.” Hazel–Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244, 64 S.Ct. 997,
1000, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944). See also Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, ––––, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2132, 115 L.Ed.2d 27
(1991). Rule 60(b)
recognizes this authority as well in noting that “[t]his rule does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from
a judgment, order, or proceeding, ... or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon
the court.”
Our sole concern in these proceedings, which began with
entry of our order of June 5, 1992, has been to determine whether any acts or
omissions of Department of Justice attorneys resulted in the district court and
this court improvidently approving extradition of Demjanjuk to Israel in this
habeas corpus action. We express no view with respect to charges that have been
made, but not adjudicated, to the effect that Demjanjuk engaged in other
activities during the Nazi period that are proscribed by the criminal laws of
any nation.
For the reasons set out herein we vacate the judgment of
the district court and the judgment of this court in the extradition
proceedings on the ground that the judgments were wrongly procured as a result
of prosecutorial misconduct that constituted fraud on the court.
APPENDIX 1
No. 85–3435
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
John Demjanjuk, Petitioner–Appellant,
v.
Joseph Petrovsky, et al., Respondents–Appellees.
ORDER
Before: MERRITT, Chief Judge; KEITH, Circuit
Judge; and LIVELY, Senior Circuit Judge.
The petitioner-appellant, John Demjanjuk, was extradited to
the State of Israel for trial of a capital offense, the commission of war
crimes during World War II. In a previous decision of this court in this case, 776 F.2d 571
(6th Cir.1985), we declined to stop the extradition by issuing a
writ of habeas corpus. Our previous study of the record and *357 numerous recent press reports and
articles in the United States indicate that the extradition warrant by the
Executive Branch may have been improvidently issued because it was based on
erroneous information. Consideration should be given to its validity and to
whether this court’s refusal to grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus
was erroneous.
In our previous decision we said that the
extradition should be limited:
The district court clearly certified that
Demjanjuk was subject to extradition solely on the charge of murder. Though
some of the acts which Demjanjuk is charged with may also constitute other
offenses listed in the treaty, he may be tried in Israel only on that charge.
Pursuant to the authority stated in rule 40,
Fed.R.App.Proc., pertaining to the rehearing of causes previously
heard and Rule 60(b)(6),
Fed.R.Civ.P., pertaining to relief from judgments previously
entered, the Court, upon its own motion, makes the following orders with
respect to the prior proceedings concerning the extradition warrant heretofore
issued in this case under Chapter 209,
Title 18 (§§ 3181–3195), United States Code:
1. The United States, on or before July 15, 1992, shall
file with the Court a brief describing any items of evidence of any kind, of
which it has knowledge, tending to show that the petitioner-appellant,
Demjanjuk, is not the “Ivan the Terrible” who committed war crimes at the
Treblinka death camp, in particular murder, as described in 776 F.2d 571
(6th Cir.1985), together with a statement of approximately when
agents of the United States first learned of each such item of evidence.
2. On or before July 25, 1992, the petitioner-appellant
shall file a brief describing affidavits, depositions or other statements of
witnesses in his possession (which are not described in the government’s brief
referred to in paragraph 1 above), which tend to show that a man known as Ivan
Marchenko was the “Ivan the Terrible” referred to in paragraph 1.
3. On or before August 1, 1992, the parties should file
simultaneous briefs stating their respective position on the question whether the
Court should reconsider its earlier decision concerning the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus in this case, including the question whether the court should
remand the case to the district court for a further evidentiary hearing
respecting the case.
4. The Federal Public Defender for the Northern District
of Ohio is hereby appointed to represent the defendant, provided the
petitioner-appellant or the members of his immediate family in the United
States do not object to such appointment, and provided further that he is
qualified for such representation under 18 U.S.C. §
3006A.
5. An oral hearing on this matter is set for Tuesday
afternoon, August 11, 1992, at 2:30 P.M.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
Leonard Green, Clerk
APPENDIX 2
No. 85–3435
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
John Demjanjuk, Petitioner–Appellant,
v.
Joseph Petrovsky, et al., Respondents–Appellees.
ORDER
Before: MERRITT, Chief Judge; KEITH, Circuit Judge; and
LIVELY, Senior Circuit Judge.
Pursuant to orders of this court entered on June 5, 1992,
and June 18, 1992, counsel for the parties appeared for oral argument after
having previously filed briefs and appendixes. At the commencement of oral
argument the panel, speaking through Chief Judge Merritt, stated that the
essential issue joined by the parties in their briefs is whether this court
mistakenly affirmed the district court’s denial of John Demjanjuk’s habeas
corpus petition. See *358 Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016,
106 S.Ct. 1198, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986). The Chief Judge then stated
that the court’s inquiry concerns whether lawyers from the Department of
Justice engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by concealing or withholding from
the district court and this court evidence in their possession that John Demjanjuk
was not the notorious Ukrainian guard known as “Ivan the Terrible” who operated
the gas chambers at the Treblinka, Poland Nazi death camp. The “bedrock
question” for the court, Judge Merritt continued, is whether the failure of the
attorneys to disclose such exculpatory information constituted fraud upon the
court that misled this court into allowing Demjanjuk to be extradited.
The case was ably and extensively argued by counsel and,
at the conclusion of oral argument, was taken under submission by the court.
Upon consideration the court concludes that further proceedings are required as
set forth here.
I.
Before outlining the additional proceedings, we dispose
of the Department of Justice’s contention that this court lacks jurisdiction to
conduct the present inquiry. The Department argues that we have no power to
review our 1985 judgment, particularly in view of the fact that Demjanjuk is
now in Israel, having been convicted by an Israeli court for violation of
Israeli law. We disagree. This court is proceeding under its inherent power to
grant relief, for “after-discovered fraud,” from an earlier judgment “regardless
of the term of [its] entry.” Hazel–Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford–Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244, 64 S.Ct. 997,
1000, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944). Furthermore, nothing requires this court
to follow the “cumbersome and dilatory procedure” of sending this issue back to
the district court for decision. Id. at 249.
The fact that a federal court has the inherent power “to
vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated upon the
court” was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court at its 1990 term. See Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, ––––, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2132, 115 L.Ed.2d 27
(1991). The Court warned that, “[b]ecause of their very potency,
inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Id.
Mindful of this admonition, we have determined to make every effort to be
certain that we have as complete a record as possible before acting upon the
serious charges made by the petitioner in this case.
II.
Counsel for the Department of Justice conceded that “mistakes
were made.” This admission was based upon the undisputed fact that the
Department had in its possession prior to the extradition proceedings
statements and documents indicating that John Demjanjuk was not “Ivan the
Terrible,” but that another Ukrainian guard at Treblinka, Ivan Marchenko, was
the operator of the gas chambers whom the prisoners referred to by this
sobriquet.
It is alleged by the petitioner that this information was
known to attorneys within the Department of Justice who were involved in the
Demjanjuk denaturalization, deportation and extradition proceedings, but that
none of the information was produced to Demjanjuk’s counsel in response to
numerous interrogatories and requests, or revealed to the court. The attorneys
so identified at this time are Allan Ryan, Norman Moscovitz, George Parker and
John Horrigan. The first three worked within the Department in its Office of
Special Investigations (or its predecessor), while Horrigan served as an
assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio. All four
attorneys were involved in the proceedings against John Demjanjuk.
III.
In order to procure information that we deem essential
for reaching a decision on the issue before us, the court hereby appoints the
Honorable Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., Judge of the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee, as Special Master of this Court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
53(c). This reference requires the *359
Master to take the testimony of attorneys Ryan, Moscovitz, Parker, and
Horrigan, if available, and to receive such other evidence as he may determine
to be relevant and material to the issue under submission. The Master shall
have all of the powers granted to such officers under Fed.R.Civ.P.
53(c). After completing his duties pursuant to this order of
reference, the Master will prepare a report on the matters covered by this
order. He will file the report with the clerk of this court and serve on each party
notice of the filing and a copy of the report together with a transcript of all
proceedings and of the evidence and any original exhibits as provided in Fed.R.Civ.P.
53(e)(1).
Entered by order of the court.
By: ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Clerk
APPENDIX 3
EXCERPT
From the Record of Interrogation of the Defendant
February 20, 1945. I, Lieutenant EPPEL’,
Investigator of the Fourth Department of the “SMERSH” Directorate of
Counterintelligence of the Second Belorussian front interrogated as defendant—
LELEKO, Pavel Vladimirovich, born in 1922,
native of the village of Chaplinka, Chaplinka district, Nikolayev Region,
Ukrainian, citizen of the USSR.
The interrogation began at 10.10 a.m.
Question: What was
the purpose of the Treblinka camp?
Answer: A camp
is not a quite precise definition of what was there in reality. This was not a
camp, because not counting the servicing crews, nobody was housed there, but it
was an especially equipped factory for the mass extermination of people.
Question: How long
were you in service in the Treblinka camp?
Answer: I was in
service in the Treblinka camp for one year, from September 1942 to September
1943.
Question: What
position did you hold there?
Answer: In the
Treblinka camp I held the position of a guard.
Question: Where
was the Treblinka camp located?
Answer: The
Treblinka camp was located some 500 meters from the Malkinia–Kosow highway,
about two-three km from the Treblinka railroad station, at the edge of a
forest. To the West of the camp, some two km away, there is the village of
Kutaska.
Question: Describe
the exterior appearance of the camp?
Answer: The
Treblinka camp is divided into two parts: Camp no. 1, or as the prisoners
called it, the “death camp”, and the worker’s camp, called Camp no. 2. The
camps were situated at a distance of some 2–3 km from each other.
Question: What did
the “death camp” look like?
Answer: The “death
camp” was located on an area of about 7–8 hectares, which was fenced in by two
rows of barbed wire reaching 3 (three) meters in height. Beyond the barbed wire
stretched a continuous line of metallic anti-tank obstacles enmeshed in barbed
wire. The entire area of the camp, in the shape of an irregular quadrangle, was
divided into three sections by rows of barbed wire. The barbed wire was
intertwined with bushes and branches in order to prevent the possibility of
seeing from one section into the other.
Question: What did
the first section of the “death camp” look like?
Answer: The
first section of the “death camp” contained all the service buildings of the
servicing personnel. There were there four barracks housing the Russian and
Ukrainian guards, three barracks housing the Germans who directed the mass
extermination of the people. The commander of the camp and his secretary lived
in a separate barrack. Right by the barbed wire separating the first section
from the second and the third stood the barrack surrounded by barbed wire in
which were housed some 1000 prisoners condemned to death. They were *360 called the “worker crew” and were
used to service the camp. In addition to the above mentioned barracks there
were also two barracks one of which served as storage area and bakery in which
the prisoners worked, and the other as a dining room for the Russians. A branch
road led from the Malkinia–Kosow highway to the first section of the camp.
Question: What did
the second section of the “death camp” look like?
Answer: The
second section of the “death camp” was the receiving point of the doomed
prisoners. A railroad branch extended here from Treblinka village. Near the
railroad stood two wooden barracks in which the belongings and clothing of the
people to be exterminated were stored. One of the barracks had been given the
appearance of a railroad station. A wooden facsimile of a clock had been nailed
above it. Prior to each arrival of a fresh batch of doomed people, one of the
prisoners climbed on the roof of the barrack and moved the arms of the clock to
make it show the time corresponding approximately to the actual time. A wooden
sign representing a hammer and saw was nailed above the clock. Below the clock
was a small panel on which the sechedule [sic] of departure of trains for
L’vov, Rovno, Dnepropetrovsk, Tarnopol” [sic] and other Ukrainian cities was
written in several languages. Still further down were two small windows above
one of which was a sign that read “cashsinr,” and above the other, another sign
that read “station master”. All this decoration was made in order to delude the
people brought here to die. To complete the illusion, there were also large
posters reading “Palestine waits for you”, “the Ukraine will give you work and
bread” and other slogans and appeals.
* * *
Two more barracks stood about 70–100 meters from the
above mentioned two barracks situated by the railroad branch and serving as
storage space for belongings and clothing of the doomed prisoners. One of these
two barracks served as an undressing place for the women. The men were
undressed near the other barrack, right there on the street, winter and summer.
The food, belonging [sic] and clothing taken from the doomed prisoners were
stored inside this second barrack. Inside the women’s undressing room there was
also a so-called “cashier’s office” where the women were ordered to hand over
their money, jewelry, and valuable [sic] for “safekeeping”. Beyond the “cashier’s
office” booth was a fenced in area where the hair of the women was cut. Men
handed over their valuables and money also in a special “cashier’s office”
situated not far from the second barrack. Both barracks were fenced in by
barbed wire.
A road led from the undressing rooms [sic] the third
section of the “death camp” and terminated at the building where the extermination
of people took place.
Question: What did
the third section of the “death camp” look like?
Answer: The road
from the undressing rooms, fenced on both sides by barbed wire intertwined with
branches led to the gas chamber building where people were exterminated with
gas obtained from running diesel engines. As the people directed to the gas
chambers were told that they were being taken to a bath-house, the outward
appearance of the gas chamber building was also made to resemble a bath house.
It was a single storied brick building, its exterior covered with plaster and
whitewashed. It was about 25 meters long and 15 meters wide. The entrance to
the building was ornate and there were stucco moldings.
Flowers grew right by in long boxes. There was no door at
the entrance. Instead of it there was a heavy hanging made from a rug. Beyond
it started a narrow passage which ended at the opposite wall. To the right and
to the left of the passage there were five doors that closed hermetically and
led into the special chambers where the poisoning took place. The chambers were
about six meters long and as wide, about two to five-three meters high. In the
center of the ceiling there was an electric light bulb in which there was no
wiring and there were two “shower” heads through which poisonous gas was fed
into the chamber.
*361 The walls, floor and ceiling of the chamber were of
cement. On the opposite side to the entrance door there was another, likewise
hermetically closing door, through which the bodies of the poisoned people were
removed. As many as 500 men, women and children were pushed into the chambers
indiscriminately. Eight chambers out of the ten existing in the gas chamber
building were used to poison people. In the two remaining ones, there were two
powerful German engines, about 1.5 meters high—two engines in all. Each engine
fed gas to four death chambers. Some 20 meters from the above mentioned gas
chamber building stood the building of the old gas chambers, which contained
only three gas chambers. This building functioned until 1943. But as it was
unable to handle the enormous number of people brought by the Germans to the “death
camp”, the new, large gas chamber building that I have described above was
built. After it came into use, the old one was no longer utilized. An
incinerator for the burning of bodies was situated about 10 meters beyond the
large gas chamber building. It had the shape of a cement pit about one meter
deep and 20 meters long. A series of furnaces covered on the top with four rows
of rails extended along the entire length of one of the walls of the pit. The
bodies were laid on the rails, caught fire from the flames burning in the
furnaces and burned. About 1000 bodies were burned simultaneously. The burning
process lasted up to five hours. Not far from the gas chamber building, also in
the third section, there was a barrack housing the working-crew composed of
doomed prisoners and which comprised up to 500 persons.
* * *
Question: What was
the system of mass extermination of people in the German death camp of
Treblinka?
Answer: Two to
three trainloads of doomed prisoners arrived daily at the Treblinka railroad
station. Each train consisted of 60 cars. The train was brought in three
installments into the second section of the “death camp”. Twenty cars were
brought in every half hour. As soon as the cars crossed the barbed wire, the
guard was changed. The policemen escorting the train remained outside the camp
and left on the locomotive to fetch the next batch of prisoners. The railroads
[sic] cars brought into the camp were immediately unloaded by the guards. We
started to unload the cars with the help of the so-called “blue crew”
consisting of doomed prisoners wearing a blue armband on the sleeve. Those
arriving were told that they must first go to the bath house and will then be
sent further to the Ukraine. But the sight of the camp, the enormous flaming
pyre burning at one end of the camp, the suffocating stench from decomposing
bodies that spread form some 10 km around and was particularly strong within
the camp itself, made it clear what the place really was. The people chased out
of the cars with whips guessed immediately where they had been brought; some
attempted to climb over the barbed wire of the fencing, got caught in it, and
we opened fire on those who were trying to escape and killed them. We tried to
quiet down the fear-crazed people with heavy clubs. After all those who were
able to walk had been unloaded, only the ailing, the killed and the wounded
remained in the railroad cars. These were carried by the prisoners belonging to
the “blue crew” into the so-called “infirmary”, the name given to the place
where the ailing and the wounded
were shot and the dead were burned. This place became particularly crowded when
the prisoners marked for death who were brought in the railroad cars attempted
to commit suicide. Thus, in March 1943 there arrived a train in which half of
the prisoners cut their throats and hands with razors. While unloading was
going on, the prisoners cut themselves with knives and razors before the eyes
of us, the policemen, saying: “anyhow you will kill us”. The majority of those
who did not die of self-inflicted wounds
were shot. After the unloading, all those who could stand on their feet were
chased toward the undressing place. There the women were separated from the men
and pushed into a special barrack, while the men were told to *362 undress right there outside another
barrack. During the first years of the existence of the camp, women and men
undressed together in the same barrack. But it happened once that the prisoners
attacked the “chief of the working crew” in the undressing barrack. Somehow the
man managed to escape from there. Several policemen and Germans immediately
rushed in. One of the Germans started firing into the crowd from his
sub-machine gun. After they had stopped shooting, the Germans and the policemen
started to beat with clubs and whips those who survived. After this incident,
men were assigned to a special place in the open air in which to undress, by
the barrack, across from the women’s undressing place. Pushed by the clubs of
the Germans and the policemen, the men threw off their clothing, having first
handed their valuables and money to a special “cashier’s office”. The women
were obliged to remove their shoes before entering the undressing place. They
were forced to remove all their clothing under the supervision of German
policemen and prisoners of the so-called “red crew” [sic] Those who resisted
were whipped. Very often the Germans and the policemen tore off and cut off the
clothing of those who did not want to undress or undressed too slowly. Many
women begged to be allowed to keep at least some clothing on their persons, but
the German, [sic] smiling cynically, ordered them to undress “to the end”. The
policemen or the workers threw to the ground and undressed those who refused to
do so. The undressed women were told to hand over all their valuables and money
to the “cashier’s office”. After this the women were driven in groups to
another part of the barrack, where 50 prisoners—“hairdressers” were working.
The women sat on a long bench and the “hairdressers” cut off their hair. The
cut hair were [sic] packed in large bags and sent by trainloads to Germany. One
of the Germans told me that in Germany they are used to fill mattresses, also
for soft upholstery. He said that this hair make [sic] very good mattresses and
the Germans buy them willingly.
After their hair was cut the women were sent in batches
to the third section of the camp, to the “bath house”, but in reality to the
gas chamber to be exterminated there. Before entering the gas chamber building
they passed along a long path bordered on both sides with a high fence made of
barbed wire and branches. Along the edge of the path stood policemen and
Germans. Each one held a whip or a club. I stood repeatedly on the edge of this
path with other policemen and drove along with a whip the women and the men
into the gas chamber building. Many women were not quite sure that they would
not be exterminated and in order to have some means of subsistence in the
future, they hid some valuables on their persons. To prevent this, the Germans
placed special controllers in the center of the path. When they noticed that a
woman walked along the path holding her legs close together, she was stopped at
once and cynically examined, and if anything was found on her, she was beaten almost
to death. The men walked more quietly down this path. Several times I heard how
one, speaking to another, said: “Why are you weeping? Do you believe you can
arouse compassion in those Germans?” Frequently we could hear cries of “Hail
Stalin!”, “Hail the Red Army!” To us Russian guards, they said: “Today you
exterminate us, and tomorrow the Germans will be killing you”.
When the procession of doomed people approached the gas
chamber building, MARCHENKO and Nikolay, the motorists of the gas chambers shouted:
“Walk faster, or the water will become cold!” Each group of women or men was
pushed from behind by some German and very frequently by Franz, the camp
commander himself, escorted by dogs. As they approached the gas chambers, the
people started to recoil in horror, sometimes they tried to retrace their
steps. Then whips and clubs were used. Franz immediate [sic] ordered his dog to
attack the naked people. Being trained for this, it grabbed them by their
genitals. Aside from the motor operators who had dogs with them, there were
five or six Germans near the gas chambers. *363
With whips and clubs they chased people into the passage of the gas chamber
building and then into the gas chambers. The Germans and the motor operators
then competed as to atrocities with regard to the people to be killed.
MARCHENKO for instance, had a sword with which he mutilated people. He cut off
the breasts of women.
When the chamber was filled to capacity, the Germans or
the motorists came to the door and started beating up the naked people with a
rubber whip and at the same time set their dogs against them. The prisoners
shrank away into the depth of the chamber yielding place to more prisoners.
Such a pressing-in occurred several times so that some 700 to 800 people could
be crowded into the not-so-large chambers. When the chambers were filled to the
very limit, the Germans started to throw in the children left by the women
either in the undressing place or more frequently outside the gas chamber
building. As the ceiling of the gas chambers was very low, the children thrown
into the chamber hit the ceiling and then, disfigured, sometimes with broken
heads, fell on the heads of the prisoners.
When loading of the chambers was completed, they were
sealed off by hermetically closing doors. Motorists MARCHENKO and Nikolay
started the motors. The gas produced went through the pipes into the chambers.
The process of suffocation began. Some time after the motor had been started,
the motorists looked into the chambers through special observation portholes
situated near each door, in order to determine how the process of extermination
was going on. When asked what they saw, the motorists answered that the people
were writhing, crushing each other. I also tried to look through the porthole,
but for some reason could see nothing. Gradually the noise in the chambers died
down. Some fifteen minutes later the motors were stopped and there was an
unusual silence.
While extermination of this batch of prisoners went on, a
new bath of condemned people arrived into the camp. The entire process started
all over again.
APPENDIX 4
RECORD
Of Interrogation of Witness
18 March 1978
City of Zaporozh’ye
On instructions from the Procuratorate of the USSR
concerning the request made by organs of Justice of the USA, and in accordance
with the requirements of Article 85, 167 and 170 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of the Ukrainian SSR, Senior Investigator of the Procuratorate of the
Zaporozh’ye Region and Senior Councillor of Justice Litvinenko interrogated as
witness:
MALAGON, Nikolay Petrovich, born in 1919,
native and resident of the village of Novo–Petrovka, Berdyansk district,
Zaporozh’ye Region, citizen of the USSR, Ukrainian, manual worker, married.
The interrogation stated at 3.30 a.m.
* * *
After having completed my training in the
Trawniki camp, I was given the rank of “wachman”. I remained in the Trawniki
camp from October–November 1941 to March 1942 and then, together with ten other
wachmans, we were sent to the small town of Zamoscie, where we guarded the
property of a colonel. After a month we returned to the Trawniki camp, but of
the four companies of guards, nobody was left except the servicing personnel.
As I learned later, part of the guards had been sent to the Treblinka
concentration camp and the rest to the Belsec and Lublin camps. After some time
I was also sent to the Lublin camp where a team of guards (wachman) was being
collected. After about five days some 50 men were assembled and we went to
Warsaw where we took on guard duty for an entire train, the cars of which
contained Jews: men, women and children.... Our team was headed by a certain
Komarkin, the first name and patronymic of whom I do not know, but he spoke
Polish well. We brought the train with the Jews to the Treblinka camp, which
was situated near the station of Treblinka on Polish territory. A one-track
railroad extended from the railroad station to the camp. Some of the *364 train’s cars were driven into the
territory of the camp and part remained at the station. When we arrived to the
camp, other guards were already in the cordon and these began to receive the
Jews we have brought. From this day I started my service in the Treblinka camp.
This camp was created by the Germans with the express purpose of destroying
citizens of Jewish nationality. I saw that trains carrying citizens of Jewish
nationality: men, women, children, old men and women arrived regularly at the
camp. These citizens were driven into a special barrack, where they removed all
their clothing and threw their valuables into specially placed suitcases. Then
they were chased naked to the gas chambers through special passages made of
barbed wire covered with pine branches. Pipes carrying exhaust gas from running
diesel motors were installed in the gas chambers and the people inside
perished. The dead were then thrown into special pits and later burnt on pyres.
This work was performed by special teams composed of individuals of Jewish
nationality. In this camp there was also a so-called “infirmary” which was
situated near the barrack where the people arriving undressed and not far from
the unloading area. The infirmary was in appearance an area fenced in by barbed
wire which was camouflaged with pine branches. In this area there was a pit;
there were no other constructions on the territory of the infirmary. Those
among the newly arrived were placed in the infirmary who could not reach by
themselves the barracks in which they undressed and gave away their valuables.
The principal worker in the infirmary was a man by the last name of Rebeka, I
do not know his first name and patronymic; he resembled a Jew. This was the man
who exterminated in the infirmary the citizens who were ailing and could not
walk without help. Rebeka sometimes boasted that he worked so hard that the
barrel of his sub-machine gun had become red. I did not participate personally
in the shooting of the Jews brought in, but was only in the cordon, took part
in the unloading of the Jews from the train cars, and mostly, together with the
team, prepared pine and fir branches that camouflaged the barbed wires, a
single line of which extended around the entire camp, and the wire of which
were made the passages leading from the barracks to the gas chambers. The
barbed wire around the so-called infirmary was similarly camouflaged with
branches. I remained in the Treblinka camp at least three or four months and
saw that at least one trainload of citizens of Jewish nationality arrived there
every day and were then exterminated in the gas chambers and in the infirmary.
During this time many Jews died there, but I cannot state the exact number.
There were cases when the Jews brought to the camp for extermination made armed
resistance: shot from pistols or threw grenades. There was no rioting among the
prisoners during my time of service in the Treblinka camp. I heard that some
sort of revolt had taken place, but at that time I was no longer employed in the
camp.
* * *
I met guard Fedorenko, I do not recall his first name and
his patronymic, in the Trawniki as well as in the Treblinka camps. I met him
only seldom, because he served in another platoon. I remember well his person
and therefore can identify him on a photograph. In the Trawniki camp Fedorenko
was also trained to be a guard (wachman) and wore a special “SS” uniform. After
he had completed his training in the Trawniki camp, Fedorenko was given the
title of wachman (guard). Each wachman was given 10 marks per month for
tobacco. I cannot easily say how Fedorenko came to be in the Trawniki camp
undergoing training for the duties of a wachman, because I did not speak with
him about this. I did not meet Fedorenko in the Chelm camp and therefore I
cannot say from which camp precisely he was sent to be trained in the Trawniki
camp. I also met Fedorenko in the Treblinka camp, but I cannot at present
remember if he was employed in this camp or brought there [sic] Jewish citizens
for extermination. I remember Fedorenko only with the rank of wachman, and I do
not know whether he was promoted to higher ranks and what was the attitude of
the German authorities toward him. I find it difficult to say whether Fedorenko
participated in the extermination of citizens of Jewish nationality in the
Treblinka camp because I was not present at this. After the Treblinka camp in
1943 I did not meet Fedorenko again and his subsequent fate is unknown to me.
*365 When the prisoners were brought to the Treblinka camp,
the trains were unloaded by Germans and guards with the rank of oberwachman,
zugwachman who chased the prisoners from the cars with whips and pistols, beat
them and shot at them. I hesitate to say whether Fedorenko participated or not
in such actions, because I did not see this. I also did not see Fedorenko shoot
down prisoners in the barracks or near the gas chambers. When the trains
carrying the Jews arrived, the guards were usually in cordon formation, and the
Jews were escorted to the barracks by Germans, while the Jews were exterminated
by the working teams under the supervision of Germans. Near the diesel engines
by the gas chambers there worked a guard (wachman) by the name of Marchenko,
Nikolay, and wachman Rebeka worked in the so-called “infirmary”. I remember
that Marchenko wore a leather jacket and carried a pistol. These two guards did
exterminate prisoners, who else among the guards took part in the extermination
of prisoners I find difficult to say. When one of the prisoners on the unloading
area threw a grenade, one of the guards was killed. The other guards standing
in cordon formation immediately retaliated against the prisoners who had thrown
the grenade, that is they shot them then and there. Who of the guards
participated in this action and was Fedorenko among them I do not know. The
guards with the rank of oberwachman, zugwachman, and rotenwachman were closer
to the Germans, they participated in the unloading of the Jews from the
traincars, and in doing so they threw people out of the train cars and shot
some of them right there. Together with the Germans they also escorted the
prisoners to the barrack where they removed their clothes and handed over their
valuables. I cannot personally say how many prisoners were exterminated daily
in the camp, but the camp had no facilities to accomodate [sic] the prisoners.
All the prisoners who arrived were exterminated on the day of arrival in the
gas chambers. The bodies were thrown into pits and later burned. At least a
trainload of people arrived everyday, but how many doomed persons it contained
I find it difficult to say.
* * *
Interrogation was conducted by
Senior Investigator of the Procuratorate of
the Zaporozh’ye Region, Senior Councillor
of Justice
Ya. V. Litvinenko.
APPENDIX 4A
RECORD OF QUESTIONING OF WITNESS
City of Vinnitsa
October 2, 1979
Senior Assistant Procurator of Vinnitsa Oblast’
Podrutskiy, on instructions from the Procuracy of the USSR in connection with
the request from the organs of justice of the USA for legal aid in the case of Ivan
Dem’yanyuk and in accordance with the requirements of Articles 85, 167 and 170
of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Ukrainian SSR, questioned as a
witness:
Malagon, Nikolai Petrovich, born 1919, native
and resident of the village of Novo–Petrovka, Berdyansk Rayon, Zaporozhe
Oblast’, Ukrainian, citizen of the USSR, laborer.
Questioning began: 9:45 A.M.
* * *
In response to the questioned asked, witness N.P. Malagon
stated:
During the Great Patriotic War, I participated with my
military unit in the defense of the city of Kiev. In August of 1941 I was wounded
in the head and taken prisoner by the Germans together with other soldiers from
my unit.
While a prisoner, I was first held in a POW camp in the
city of Zhitomir. We were later transferred to a camp in the city of Rovno, and
a day later we were transferred in railroad cars to a POW camp in the city of
Chemnitz (Poland).
We were held in this camp for approximately two months.
In roughly October or November of 1941 we, the POWs, were assembled near the
barracks and some man unknown to me wearing civilian clothing began to select
prisoners for work. He selected a total of roughly 60–70 POWs, including
myself. This man did not tell us what kind of work we would be doing or where
we *366 would do it. The selected POWs
and myself were hauled in three trucks to the village of Travniki (Poland) and
we were told that in this training case we could be trained as SS guards....
[W]e were [eventually] awarded the title of SS guards and issued
identification....
A short time later, as part of a group of guards
consisting of 20–25 men whose names I do not remember, I was sent to the Lublin
camp. We worked cleaning up the area at this camp and stayed there 5–6 days.
From the Lublin camp we were sent to the city of Warsaw, where we stayed
approximately three days. During these three days I once guarded the Jewish
ghetto. From Warsaw we, the guards, escorted a train filled with Jewish civilians
to the Treblinka death camp. We were all armed with rifles and live ammunition.
When we arrived at the Treblinka camp together with the prisoners, we handed
them over to the camp guard. When we arrived at the camp, there were other
guards there from the Travniki school.
While at the Treblinka death camp, I met the guard
Nikolai Marchenko, who drove a gas chamber van. I do not know where he is at
present. In the same camp I met the guard Ivan Demedyuk or Ivan Dem’yanyuk (I
do not remember his name precisely). This guard was of average height and heavy
build, spoke Ukrainian and had light brown hair. His speech was pure; he
pronounced everything well. I do not know where he was from, since I did not
talk to him about this. While I was at the Treblinka death camp, he worked
there as a cook, preparing food for the guards.
I could identify the guard whom I have named as Demedyuk
or Dem’yanyuk from photographs.
In February of 1943 approximately 15 of us, the guards,
were transferred to the Belsen camp (Poland). Ivan Demedyuk or Ivan Dem’yanyuk
remained at Treblinka. We were at Belsen for approximately five days and, since
some of the guards escaped, we were once again returned to Travniki, where we
were given special insignia, and then we were sent to the Auschwitz death camp.
I served in this camp from March to April of 1943. Then, we were transferred to
the Buchenwald death camp, where I served as a guard from April of 1943 through
February of 1945. Here, from what other guards (whose names I do not remember)
said, I learned that Ivan Demedyuk of Ivan Dem’yanyuk, who had worked as a cook
at Treblinka, had been transferred to work as a gas chamber van driver. His
later fate is unknown to me. I escaped from the Buchenwald death camp in March
of 1945.
I have read the record of the questioning. My statements
were recorded faithfully. I have no additions or corrections to make. The
questioning was completed at 1:00 P.M.
(Signature) Malagon
Questioned by:
Senior Assistant Procurator,
Vinnitsa Oblast’ (Signature) V.L. Podrutskiy
Copy authentic:
Procurator,
Vinnitsa Oblast’ (Signature) G.S. Tarnavskiy
(OFFICIAL SEAL)
RECORD OF PRESENTATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS FOR IDENTIFICATION
OF AN INDIVIDUAL
City of Vinnitsa
October 2, 1979
Senior Assistant Procurator of Vinnitsa Oblast’
Podrutskiy, on instructions from the Procuracy of the USSR in connection with
the request from the organs of justice of the USA for legal aid in the case of
Ivan Dem’yanyuk, in accordance with the requirements of Articles 85, 174 and
176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Ukrainian SSR and in the presence
of the witnesses:
Shembereva, Valentina Porfir’yevna, residing
at No. 5 Kosmonavtov Street, Apartment No. 37, city of Vinnitsa, and
Voynitskaya, Maria Yakoylevna, residing at
No. 113 Pirogov Street, Apartment No. 15, city of Vinnitsa,
Malagon, Nikolai Petrovich, born 1919, native
and resident of the village of Novo–Petrtovka, Berdyansk Rayon, Zaporozhe
Oblast’,
nine photographs of men for identification.
The photographs were attached to sheets No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3, designated by
numbers and attached to impressions of the official seal of the Procuracy of
Vinnitsa Oblast’.
Sheet of photographs No. 1 contains photographs of three
men in military uniform and headgear. Sheets of photographs No. 2 and No. 3
contain photographs of men in civilian clothing, without hats. The persons
shown in the photographs were not named to the witness.
* * *
After examining the photographs presented to him on
sheets No. 1, No 2 and No. 3, witness N.P. Malagon stated that he could not
identify anyone in the photographs. The guard to whom he had referred during
the questioning and whom he had called by the name of Ivan Demedyuk or Ivan
Dem’yanyuk was not among them.
* * *
The record of the presentation for identification has
been read to us. It was recorded faithfully. We have no observations to make on
the conduct of the identification or the content of the record.
Witness: (Signature) Malagon
Witnesses: (Signature) Shembereva
Witnesses: (Signature) Voynitskaya
Identification conducted and record compiled
by:
Senior Assistant Procurator,
Vinnitsa Oblast’ (Signature) V.L. Podrutskiy
Copy authentic:
Procurator,
Vinnitsa Oblast’ (Signature) G.S. Tarnavskiy
(OFFICIAL SEAL)
* * *
CERTIFICATE
Photograph No. 3 on sheet of photographs No. 1,
photograph No. 1 on sheet of photographs No. 2 and photograph No. 2 on sheet of
photographs No. 3 show:
Dem’yanyuk, Ivan Nikolayevich, born 1920,
native of the village of Duboviye Makharintsy, Kazatin (formerly Samgorodok)
Rayon, Vinnitsa Oblast’.
The persons shown in the other photographs are not
involved in the case.
Senior Assistant Procurator,
Vinnitsa Oblast’ (Signature) V.L. Podrutskiy
October 2, 1979
Copy authentic:
Procurator,
Vinnitsa Oblast’ (Signature) G.S. Tarnavskiy
(OFFICIAL SEAL)
APPENDIX 5
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TO: Arthur Sinai, Deputy Director, OSI
FROM: Bernard J. Dougherty Jr.,
FROM: Criminal Investigator
SUBJ: HORN, Otto—Report of Interview
REF: OSI # 42—DEMJANJUK, Iwan
On November 14, 1979, Otto Horn, German national and
citizen of West Berlin, was interviewed at his residence, Yorck–Strasse 66,
Berlin, Germany, by Norman Moscowitz, Staff Attorney–OSI, and by the reporting
officer. Due to the fact that HORN neither spoke nor understood English, the
entire interview was conducted in his native German language, with George
Garand–OSI and the reporting officer translating. Theinterview [sic] began at
9:04 a.m.
....
During the course of the questioning concerning the operation
of the gas chamber, HORN voluntarily mentioned one “Iwan” (last name unknown),
who was one of two Ukrainians who were responsible for the actual operation of
the engines which provided *368 the gas
for the chambers. HORN was unable to recall the name of the other Ukrainian,
describing him as tall and thin, with blond hair, and being approximately 22–23
years of age. HORN further recalled that the two Ukrainians were immediately
subordinate to a German, known only as “Schmidt.”
HORN described “Iwan” as being of stocky build, black
hair cut short, full rounded face, tall, with no distinguishing marks on his
face. HORN remarked that “Iwan” had some technical ability, since he repaired
and maintained the gas engine and was known by HORN as being able to drive an
automobile (apparently somewhat of a rare [sic] among the Ukrainians at that
time). HORN indicated that he arrived at Treblinka during September, 1942 and
stated that “Iwan” was already working there. HORN added that “Iwan”, Schmidt,
and the other unidentified Ukrainian were the only three individuals who
actually worked at the gas chamber, that is, in the operation of the engine.
HORN stated that for the period September 1942–September 1943, when he was at
Treblinka, “Iwan” worked at the gas chamber every day.
....
[T]he reporting officer advised HORN that there were a
series of 8 photographs of caucasian males, which he was requested to review
carefully and individually. Each of the photographs depicted an individual in
dark clothing. Prior to the interview, care was taken to minimize the amount of
uniforms which would be readily discernable in each photograph. Nevertheless on
a few photos, a portion of a uniform could be seen. Each picture showed the
bust of the subject. The individuals possessed hair of different length,
varying physical buildings, and a variety of ages, ranging from the early
twenties to the forties. One of the photographs was that of Iwan DEMJANJUK,
taken during the early 1940s. HORN studied each of the photographs at length
but was unable to positively identify any of the pictures, although he believed
that he recognized one of them (not DEMJANJUK) but was not able to indicate
where he had met this person or provide his name.
The first series of photographs was then gathered and
placed in a stack, off to the side of the table—with that of DEMJANJUK lying
face up on the top of the pile, facing HORN. The reporting officer then
presented another series of 8 photographs, each depicting the bust of a male
caucasian. These photographs showed the individuals in clothing more similar to
that normally worn by civilians. Among the 8 pictures was one of Iwan
DEMJANJUK, which had been taken during the early 1950’s. This photograph was
much better in quality than that presented to HORN in the first series, and
depicted DEMJANJUK as having a much fuller and more rounded face. HORN studied
this photograph at length, and upon glancing at the earlier picture of
DEMJANJUK, identified them as being the same person. As he continued to study
the picture from the second set, HORN indicated that it certainly resembled the
man that he had known as “Iwan”, although he stated that “Iwan” had had
somewhat more hair. He further mentioned that the second picture, depicting the
fuller face, was much more like that of “Iwan” than the person shown in the
first series. After a few more moments of careful study, HORN positively
identified the photographs of Iwan DEMJANJUK as being the “Iwan” that he knew
at the gas chamber in Treblinka.
....
APPENDIX 6
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TO: Arthur Sinai, Deputy Director, OSI
FROM: George W. Garand, Historian
SUBJECT: HORN, Otto—Report of
SUBJECT: Interview
REF: OSI # 42—DEMJANJUK, Iwan
On the morning of 14 November 1979 Norman Moscowitz,
Staff Attorney, OSI, Bernard J. Dougherty, Jr., Criminal Investigator, and
George W. Garand, Historian, OSI interviewed the German national Otto HORN at
his residence located at 66 Yorkstrasse, West Berlin. The interview began
shortly after 0900 and ended shortly before 1000. Mr. Dougherty and the
undersigned translated during the interview which was conducted in German since
HORN is conversant only in that language.
*369 HORN is 76 years old and lives in a small one-bedroom
apartment by himself. His place of residence was meticulously clean and despite
his advanced years he conveys the impression of being stable with an excellent
recall of events during the time he was stationed at Treblinka. Shown a sketch
of the death camp at the beginning of the interview he identified various
buildings within the camp without hesitation. He was assigned to the camp for
approximately one year, from September 1942 to September 1943, and specifically
to the upper part of the camp which housed the gas chambers.
....
[A] German named SCHMIDT or SCHMITT would
supervise the actual gassing. Two Ukrainians worked directly under Schmidt. One
of these operated the machinery that funneled the lethal gas into the chamber
while the other supervised the inmate work detail that removed the bodies from
the chamber and dumped them into two very large pits that had been dug nearby.
While the Ukrainians at the train unloading platform rotated between there and
the guard towers the two Ukrainians assigned to the gas chamber itself were
invariably present at each gassing. He no longer recalled the name of the
Ukrainian responsible for overseeing the removal of the bodies, but had a good
recall of the one responsible for operating the death machinery. That man’s
first name was Iwan, a tall heavy set individual approximately in his
mid-twenties at the time with shortly cropped hair and full facial features. He
never knew Iwan’s family name since such names were in any case very difficult
to pronounce and the Ukrainians were invariably addressed only by their first
names.
....
Initially shown a series of eight photographs
of Caucasian males, HORN carefully viewed each photograph that depicted an
individual wearing dark clothing. Each one of the photographs showed a frontal
view of the individual down to a few inches below the neck. Hair styles of
these individuals varies, as did length of hair, physical stature and age that
varied from the low twenties into the forties. One of the photographs depicted
IWAN DEMJANJUK as he appeared in the early 1940s. After studying each of the
photographs at length HORN initially could not make positive identification of
any of the individuals though on one or two occasions he felt that one or two
of the individuals shown looked vaguely familiar to him, though he could not
recall where and under what circumstances he had met them. At this point the
first group of photographs was gathered up and placed on one end of the table with
the one depicting DEMJANJUK left facing upward on top of the pile. Mr.
Dougherty thereupon presented a second series of eight photographs to the
interviewee, each showing a second group of male Caucasians clothed in what
would normally be considered closer to civilian attire than the clothing worn
by most members of the first group. One of the photographs in the second group
was that of IWAN DEMJANJUK, taken in the early 1950s and depicted DEMJANJUK
with a fuller and more rounded face and a more receding hairline. HORN studied
this photograph intensively and then, looking at the earlier photograph of
DEMJANJUK, identified that individual on both. Nevertheless, he noted some
minor differences, such as Iwan having had somewhat more hair at the time he
knew him.
....
15 November 1979
/s/ George W. Garand
Historian, OSI
APPENDIX 7
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO: Walter J. Rockler and Allan A. Ryan, Jr.
TO: Director Deputy Director, Litigation
DATE: February 28, 1980
146–2–47–43 SI
FROM: George Parker
FROM: Trial Attorney
SUBJECT: Demjanjuk Memo
I am usually reluctant to reduce to writing
that which I have written in the attached *370
memo. I was convinced, however, that it was imperative to focus your attention
on the issues that have arisen in handling this case which now necessitate a
resolution. The memo obviously needs to be discussed. I am perfectly willing to
wait until Norman and John return from Europe and are able to join the
discussion. I nonetheless urge you to read this before they return and be
prepared to make a decision shortly after they return. I anticipate the judge
will set this case for a final pre-trial as early as March 15, 1980.
Memorandum
TO: Walter J. Rockler and Allan A. Ryan, Jr.
TO Director Deputy Director, Litigation
DATE: February 28, 1980
146–2–47–43 SI
FROM: George Parker
FROM: Trial Attorney
SUBJECT: Demjanjuk—A Reappraisal
Background
In 1977, the U.S. Attorney’s office in
Cleveland, Ohio filed a denaturalization suit alleging in essence that the
defendant should be stripped of his citizenship because he had lacked the
requisite good moral character for citizenship on account of his status and
actions as a guard at the Treblinka extermination camp. No mention was made in
the pleadings of Sobibor or the Trawniki Training Camp. The complaint was filed
on the basis of witness statements received from the Israeli police. The
statements were credible inasmuch as these same individuals had identified the
photograph of Fedorenko as a guard at Treblinka and Fedorenko subsequently
admitted he had been a guard. Moreover, any serious doubt as to the witnesses
sincerity was assuaged by the circumstance that the INS officials had advised
the Israelis that Demjanjuk was thought to have been as [sic] Sobibor. When the
first two Treblinka survivors who identified Demjanjuk’s photo as a guard at
Treblinka were informed by the Israeli investigator that it was believed that
the man was at Sobibor, the witnesses insisted that this man had been at
Treblinka between 1942–1943.
So at the time of filing, the only indication
the government possessed that Demjanjuk was at Sobibor was a brief reference in
a book written by Michael Hanusiak called Lest We Forget. It recited that a man
named Danilchenko met Demjanjuk as a guard at Sobibor in the spring of 1943,
and that subsequently he, along with Demjanjuk was transferred to Flossenburg
where they guarded political prisoners. Despite a specific request to the
Soviets for information pertaining to Demjanjuk, none was forthcoming.
Demjanjuk at Sobibor—Evidence Developed
The initial allegation against Demjanjuk by
Hanusiak included reference to a document—a card issued at the Trawniki
Training Camp bearing a photograph similar to that of Demjanjuk and
biographical information identical to that of the defendant’s. John Horrigan
set out to secure a copy of it. He succeeded in securing a photocopy from
private sources. Still we needed a copy from official sources. In August 1979,
Norman Moscowitz prepared a request for the card, a statement from Danilchenko
and any other witnesses. In January 1980 we received a certified copy of the
card from the Soviets plus statments [sic] from Danilchenko and two other
guards at Sobibor. The card is identical to that which Horrigan had previously
received and which had been published in Hanusiak’s book. The card states that
Demjanjuk was assigned to Sobibor in the spring of 1943. (Attachment A)
The statement of Danilchenko is consistent
with and elaborates upon the information attributed to him by Hanusiak.
(Attachment B) He identifies him by name and photo. Most significant, perhaps,
is Danilchenko’s assertion that at Flossenberg [sic] all the Ukrainian guards
were tattooed on their left arm above the elbow with their blood type. Also noteworthy
is Danilchenko’s claim that Demjanjuk stood taller than six feet.
Demjanjuk has continuously denied being at
either extermination camp. Nevertheless, information he has supplied renders
this denial dubious when read in the context of this case. First, in his
Application for Assistance *371 from
the IRO in 1948, he stated that he had been a farmer at Sobibor from 1937 to
1943. (We received this form within the last 8 months.) Second, at his
deposition taken on February 20, 1980, he admitted that he had been tattooed by
the Germans on his left arm, above his elbow, with his blood type.
The Soviet Union and Poland have each
investigated the crimes committed at Treblinka. Each has compiled lists of
Ukrainian guards known to have worked at Treblinka. The two Ukrainians who
incessantly worked at the gas chambers were well known (Fedorenko refers to
them by first names in his statement to INS officials in February 1976). Given
these circumstances it is disturbing, as Norman Moscowitz has pointed out repeatedly,
that Demjanjuk’s name does not appear on either list.
Admissible Accusatory Evidence
If this case were to be tried in April 1980,
we can reasonably expect to present the following evidence to prove that
Demjanjuk was trained as a guard by the Germans: (1) He was a Russian soldier
attached to the artillery, who received a back injury and was captured by the
Germans at a battle at Kerch on the Crimea in either November 1941 or May 1942.
(2) He was placed in two successive POW camps, Povno and Chelm where living
conditions were horrible and from which the Germans selected POW’s with
mechanical skills and inoffensive political backgrounds to train as camp
guards. (3) He was at Trawniki as indicated by the card received by the
Soviets. At Trawniki the Germans trained Ukrainian POW’s to be ghetto and
extermination camp guards. The POWs did not knowingly volunter [sic] for either
the training camp nor their ultimate camp assignments. The signatures of the
German officials, Teufel and Streibel, whose names appear on the cards will be
authenticted [sic] by Schaefer, a volkdeutsche, who worked at the camp.
Unfortunately, Schaefer cannot say he has ever seen this type of card.
Consequently, the judge may not even admit the card into evidence, but he
probably will. But since we cannot trace its history for the last 38 years, we
cannot expect the court to extend too much weight to the card.
We can reasonable [sic] expect to present the
following direct evidence that Demjanjuk was at Sobibor: The Trawniki card
which is fraught with problems described above. Danilchenko’s statement is
obviously hearsay and is in all probability not even a literal statement.
Demjanjuk’s testimony that his blood type was marked on his arm is of little
significance without the admission of Danilchenko’s testimony.
Finally, we can reasonably expect to present
the following evidence that Demjanjuk was at Treblinka: (1) the testimony of
two or three Israeli’s and one German, each of whom was initially interviewed
by the Israeli Police. Each will identify the defendant as Ivan the Ukrainian
who worked at the gas chambers and brutally beat Jews solely on the basis of
the defendant’s visa photograph taken in 1952. They will state that the
photograph bears a striking resemblance to Ivan—that like the photo he had
protruding ears, short receding hairline, full face, broad shoulders and stood
about 175 cm. (5′8″). The three Israeli witnesses are unwilling to say with
absolute certainty that the photo is of Ivan. These three individuals also
identified Fedorenko and two of them testified at his trial. (2) The testimony
of Otto Horn, a German officer who worked near the gas chambers, who like the
Israelis can identify Demjanjuk only by his photographs. (3) The testimony of
one American survivor whose identification is also based on photos, and whose
statement is considerable [sic] weaker than those of the others. (4) Possibly,
the testimony of a survivor living outside the U.S. and Israel who was
initially interviewed by American consulate officials. (Now being done)
Flaws with Treblinka Evidence
The reliability of the Treblinka evidence is
flawed by the following: (1) Its premised exclusively on the basis of
photographs which may at best closely resemble the facial features of man
witnesses knew. Survivors are more likely to recognize the photograph taken in
1952 than that taken in 1942 at Trawniki as man they knew at Treblinka. (2)
Several Treblinka survivors, including SS officer Suchomil, insist that Ivan
rarely if ever left the camp. Indeed, Suchomil insists that Ivan was at the
camp continuously from July 1942 until November 1943, at which time he *372 departed along with Kurt Franz,
Suchomil and others for Trieste, for the purpose of establishing other camps.
(3) The witnesses fairly consistently, with the exception of Franz, say that
Ivan was one of the taller Ukrainians, about 175 cm. whereas Demjanjuk is now
and was at the time he applied to enter the U.S. closer to 6′1″. (4) The
conflicting Sobibor, Flossenburg, and Regensburg statement from Danilchenko
which cannot be reconciled with information supplied by Suchomil and others.
Strategic Options; Ethical Responsibilities
We have little admissible evidence that
defendant was at Sobibor yet serious doubts as to whether he was at Treblinka. Even
if we may be comforted that we may have the right man for the wrong act, the
ethical cannons [sic] probably require us to alter our present position. I will
now discuss several options theoretically available to us and my recommendation
with respect to each.
A. Maintain Status Quo. Proceed with the Treblinka
case as presently plead. Positive factors: (a) the trial is likely to be
scheduled within the next 100 days so it’s to [sic] late to ask to change our
pleadings. (b) Any attempt to change our pledings [sic] would appear to be a
sign of weakenss [sic] or indecisiveness. (c) We believe our witnesses to be
sincere in their identification and will be credible witnesses, and (d) even if
he was at Sobibor there is some possibility he was also at Treblinka or that he
was committing offensive acts at Sobibor. Negative Factors: (a) We have good
reason to believe he was at Sobibor and as such could not have been at
Treblinka. (b) Canon 7–103,
and Ethical Consideration EC 7–13,14
of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility cautions against a public
prosecutor going forward in a criminal cause with a case with which he has
serious doubts.
Although this is not a a [sic] criminal case
per se, I think the deprivation the defendant will suffer if he loses requires
us to follow this stricture of the code. If this canon does, in fact, apply,
then I must, based upon my knowledge of this case, strongly recommend against
this first option.
B. Amend to Strike Treblinka and Supplement Trawniki
and Sobibor. We submit an extensive alteration to our pleadings. Although
this amendment may most closely parallel what we now believe to be the truth, I
consider it tactically suicidal. The positive factors are: (a) we believe he
was at Sobibor and assisted directly in the persecution of civilians as is
reflected in Danilchenko’s statement recently received along with two other
Soviets who were guards and recall Demjanjuk by name. Their statements dovetail
with the Trawniki card and are circumstantially supported by Demjanjuk’s
assertion to the IRO that he was at Sobibor from 1937 to 1943 and that he was
tattooed by the Germans. The negative factors are: (a) the case is reduced to
the weight the court will give the Trawniki card. Since the card is primarily a
supply card issued to a trainee at Trawniki and only incidentally refers to
Sobibor, we cannot reasonably expect the Court to find him culpable of any more
that [sic] being a trainee of the Germans by no volitional act of his, and his
subsequent failure to report this training to screening officials. I consider
this option to be a strategic blunder. Legally and ethically, our viable
choices (assuming my analysis of my ethical responsibilities is correct) are
reduced to the following two.
C. Dismiss the Case—at Least Temporarily. If we
don’t believe he was at Treblinka and lack the evidence at the present time to
prove that he was at Sobibor as a guard, then dismiss it—at least until the
Soviets make Danilchenko available. The negative factors are largely politicl
[sic] and obviously considerable, and it should be remembered that the judge
may not permit us to dismiss in such a fashion that allows us the possibility
to refile against him at a later time alleging his involvement in Sobibor.
Finally, we do believe that he was a guard at Sobibor and may therefore lose
opportunity to proceed against him entirely.
D. Amend Pleadings—Add Sobibor and Trawniki to Treblinka
Allegations. Move to amend pleadings to give defendant notice that we now
allege that he was at Sobibor as of the spring of 1943 and previously received
training as a camp guard. At trial our focus *373
will be substantially altered from that of showing he was the operator of the
gas chambers who commited [sic] heinous acts. We will instead focus on the fact
that he was a Russian POW who was trained by the Germans as a guard and that he
was a guard at an extermination camp. We will not employ survivors of Treblinka
to describe in excruciating detail what bestial acts he commited [sic] as Ivan
the Terrible. Instead we will simply employ one or two witnesses (preferably
non-Israelis) to testify that they saw him at Treblinka as a guard, the
Trawniki card to prove that he was at Trawniki and Sobibor. Since we will have
no way to account for what he did at Sobibor, we will focus on the fact that he
was a guard and if he had disclosed it to either a displaced persons official
or a vise [sic] consul he would have been rejected without resort to further
investigation. The positive factors are: (a) This approach focuses on what we
believe to be true (that he was an extermination camp guard), and deletes that
which we have reason to think untrue (that he was Ivan the Terrible who worked
the gas chambers at Treblinka), and speaks to that which is legally sufficient
(he lacked the good moral character to be an American citizen because he
illegally entered the country, because he gave false testimony to the vice
consul as to his activities and if he had disclosed them, he would have been
rejected. (b) It keeps us in the case against an individual we reasonably
believe would not have been allowed to enter the country if he had disclosed
the truth. The negative factors are: (a) so long as we cannot prove with clear
and convincing evidence that he was at Sobibor, and do not believe the [sic] he
was at Treblinka, option D is simply a ruse to avoid the ethical problems which
beset option A, even if we do not identify him as Ivan the Terrible at
Treblinka. (b) He disclosed to all officials that he was at Sobibor, and he was
not required nor specifically asked what his activities were at Sobibor at the
visa issuing stage. The pleadings at present state only that he failed to
disclose to the vice consul his activities as a guard.
Opinion
To date, I have opposed arguments that we
amend the pleadings to include references to Sobibor or Trawniki. Further, I
had believed until recently that the Department would not seriously consider
dismissal of the case in its present posture despite our gnawing doubts as to
its veracity. I am now in favor of performing radical surgery on the approach
we take in handling this case. I believe that we must decide no later than one
week after Norman and John return from Europe what course we should take and
then take every step necessary and appropriate to implement that decision. My
belief that a change is necessary is predicated on my assessment that Demjanjuk
could not have been Ivan the Terrible at Treblinka as well as the Demjanjuk
known to Danilchenko at Sobibor. A reading of the Canons of Ethics persuades me
that I cannot pursue this case simply as a Treblinka matter on the premise that
it is tactically shrewd and morally acceptable because we think he was a guard
elsewhere.
10 F.3d 338, 27 Fed.R.Serv.3d 437