Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe: The TWEED Dataset*

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The article presents a regional dataset on internal terrorism, Terrorism in Western Europe: Event Data (TWEED), covering the period 1950 through 2004 for 18 West European countries. As the dataset covers internal terrorism, the distinction between this form of terrorism and international terrorism is discussed. In demarcating international from internal terrorism, the former is usually taken to mean terrorism involving nationals or territory of more than one state. In TWEED, however, terrorism is regarded as internal when terrorists act within their own political systems. Terrorists originating from outside Western Europe, but committing acts of terrorism inside the region, are excluded from TWEED. Next, the article discusses the selection of sources from which the coding is done. With its combination of continuous coverage and good reporting of Western Europe, Keesing’s was chosen as the source for TWEED. The article discusses problems of source coverage related to relying on a single source. Finally, the article presents the structure of the dataset. The coding unit is the event related to terrorism, whether acts of terrorism or government acts directed against terrorists. A total of 11,245 events are recorded in TWEED, of which 86.5% are actions initiated by terrorist groups or non-state agents. TWEED records activities by 214 named terrorist groups. Events are coded for a range of 52 variables falling into two groups: attributes of the action, including basic information such as date and country of the terrorist attack, the agent (group) responsible and the number of deaths and injuries inflicted; and attributes of the agent, which records their ideological profile, regional context and attitude towards the state.

Introduction

Since the attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, increasing attention has been directed to research on terrorism in general and on the threats from the forces behind the 9/11 attacks in particular. However, terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Though levels varied over time, Western Europe was continuously exposed to terrorist attacks throughout the period from the 1950s and through to and beyond the end of the Cold War.

The terrorism that has faced Western Europe may be studied in a variety of ways, with different kinds of sources offering different kinds of data that, in turn, call for different analytical approaches: terrorists themselves may be interviewed; content analysis of terrorist writings may be done; material from police
archives or court transcripts may be used to throw light on terrorist activities; in-depth case studies of specific groups, ideologies, regions or conflicts may provide a broad understanding of terrorists and the contexts they operate in. Another approach is to study a large number of terrorist activities, in many countries, over a long period of time, so as to allow analyses of patterns or statistical analyses into the causes or effects of terrorism.

The purpose of this article is to present a dataset, Terrorism in Western Europe: Event Data (TWEED), which records internal terrorist activities in 18 West European countries from 1950 through the end of 2004. TWEED was constructed and collected for the purpose of analysing patterns of terrorism in Western Europe as related to historical and structural preconditions, but may also be useful for other researchers and purposes. In order for other researchers to better judge the potential of the dataset for their research purposes, this article first devotes attention to what type of terrorism is covered in the TWEED dataset, then describes the source from which the dataset was constructed, followed by a presentation of the key variables that are covered by the dataset.

TWEED: A Dataset on Internal Terrorism in Western Europe

The TWEED dataset differs from other existing datasets on terrorism in two important respects: its selection of type of terrorism and the time period covered by the dataset.

Concerning the first aspect, the type of terrorism recorded in the dataset, TWEED focuses on internal terrorism, that is, terrorism that originated and took place within the political systems of the West European countries. In studies of terrorism in general, and in dealing with data on terrorism in particular, a distinction has conventionally been made between international and internal (or domestic) terrorism. Crelinsten (1998: 398) attributes this to the context of the Cold War when:

internal threats were never taken as seriously as external ones, even to the point of excluding domestic incidents from incident chronologies and data bases. This promoted a kind of blindness to domestic terrorism (and its causes/solutions) that was typical of the Cold War period.

TWEED seeks to avoid this blindness to internal terrorism while at the same time avoiding another pitfall: singular focus on one particular country or subnational region alone.

The emphasis on politically important international threats is evident not only in a policy-driven data source such as Patterns of Global Terrorism, published annually by the US State Department and frequently used as a source for statistics in research on terrorism. According to the report's definition, 'the term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country' (United States Department of State, 2003: xiii). But even research-driven datasets tend to focus on international terrorist threats. Despite this international focus, data on international terrorism have been used to analyse terrorism as an internal aspect of a political system.

ITERATE (or International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) is a comprehensive dataset on international terrorism and probably the best-known data source on terrorism. In the ITERATE dataset, terrorism is conceptually framed as international in that 'the action’s ramifications may transcend national boundaries through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution'...
(Mickolus & Heyman, 1981: 154). The ITERATE dataset covers international terrorism from 1968 onwards for a wide range of up to 144 variables (Mickolus & Heyman, 1981; Sandler & Enders, 2004: 304). The latest update, ITERATE 5, covers international terrorist attacks through 2004. In addition to the data file, ITERATE comes with published chronologies of terrorist attacks that allow researchers to code domestic events alongside the international ones. The most recently published chronologies cover events from 1996 through 2001 (Mickolus & Simmons, 2002) and 2002 through 2004 (Mickolus & Simmons, 2005).

Another much used data source, the RAND Chronology, defines international terrorism as:

incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their victims or targets that have connections with a foreign state (e.g. diplomats, foreign businessmen, offices of foreign corporations) or create international incidents by attacking airline passengers, personnel and equipment. It excludes violence carried out by terrorists within their own country against their own nationals, and terrorism perpetrated by governments against their own citizens. (Hoffman & Hoffman, 1996: 89)

More recently, however, the RAND Chronology, together with data from other sources, has been incorporated into a new data project, the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, in which the scope has been extended so as to incorporate domestic terrorism in addition to international terrorism (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2005a,b). While focusing on ‘significant’ terrorist events in the early years, the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base’s coverage of domestic terrorism runs from 1998 onwards.

In demarcating international from internal terrorism, then, there are mainly two instruments used in selecting events: first, the nationality of the perpetrators (or group) as compared to their arena of operation, and second, the nationality of the victims. In TWEED, internal, or domestic, terrorism is defined solely in terms of the nationality of the acting group. The nationality of victims has not been laid down as defining acts as internal or international in the TWEED dataset. This has been done because, though many acts of terrorism are consciously aimed at people of a nationality different from that of the perpetrator, by their randomness, acts of terrorism may also unintentionally or accidentally kill or injure people of the terrorist’s own nationality. While it may be argued that the victimization constitutes one indicator of the internationality of a terrorist attack, this was not an aspect of interest or importance for the purpose for which TWEED was constructed and the nationality of victims has not been considered instrumental in demarcating internal from international acts of terrorism. The argument in TWEED is that the domestic/international dimension is better framed in terms of whether or not terrorists act within their own political systems – in the case of TWEED, defined as the existing states of Western Europe.

By limiting itself to internal terrorism, then, the TWEED dataset includes only events initiated by agents originating in the West European countries. Attacks carried out in one of the 18 West European countries covered by the TWEED dataset, but perpetrated by groups originating in regions outside the West European countries, such as, for instance,
Palestinian or Algerian groups, to mention a couple of international agents that have been carrying out activities also in Europe, have been excluded from the dataset's coverage. This means that most of what is called international terrorism is not covered by TWEED.

On the other hand, some within-region but nevertheless border-transgressing acts of terrorism are included in TWEED, as, for instance, when Irish Republican groups carried out attacks in continental Europe or when the Basque group ETA carried out attacks in other countries than Spain. In total, however, the percentage of such attacks in the TWEED dataset is low: they amount to 1.5% of events instigated by terrorist agents. Moreover, coding has been done in such a way that it is possible to identify out-of-country attacks, enabling the user of the TWEED dataset to decide whether or not to include these events in their analysis.

In the TWEED dataset, terrorism is understood theoretically as a form of violence that uses targets of violence in an indirect way in order to influence third-party audiences (Engene, 1998: 298; 2004: 5–19). However, when turning to the news sources used to construct datasets, such an abstract definition would be difficult to apply. For selection purposes, the theoretical definition is applied in conjunction with a list of specific kinds of events that may typically be considered potential acts of terrorism, such as bombings, explosions, rocket attacks, abductions, shootings, sieges, armed attacks, arson and similar violent actions. When such actions are judged to be cases of indirect violence employed to influence third parties, they have been selected for inclusion in the dataset.

Time coverage is the second significant difference between the TWEED dataset and other important datasets. The late 1960s and early 1970s have come to be seen as the time of origin for modern terrorism, especially international terrorism. Thus, the data sources mentioned above use 1968 as their starting point of coverage. TWEED, on the other hand, extends its coverage back in time to 1950, offering, as a result, coverage of more than half a century of internal terrorism in Western Europe. This extended time frame allows for inclusion of important terrorist campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s, now largely forgotten, such as the OAS campaign in France or the activities of the BAS connected with the South Tyrol conflict in Italy, and, of course, the activities of the IRA before the onset of the Troubles. By extending coverage in this way, the TWEED dataset demonstrates that terrorism is a far-from-new phenomenon in Western Europe and provides data allowing for the analysis of the development of terrorism over time and between countries, regions, groups or ideologies.

Source of Information

When compiling a dataset for a large number of countries for a time period covering several decades, researchers are faced with the task of identifying sources of information on relevant events that provide sufficient and reliable coverage while at the same time offering a manageable volume of information that proves possible for coders to process. For the project that compiled the TWEED dataset, with a single coder and limited resources available, Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives) stood out as the source offering the necessary coverage, thematically, regionally, and over time.

Keesing's was chosen as the source for its combination of continuous, long-time coverage and good reporting of the West European countries. Keesing's provides continuous coverage of international news since 1931. The publication works from news
sources, mostly newspapers, news magazines and news services, supplemented by information from government or nongovernmental sources, with the editing of reports taking place after the event has unfolded. This gives opportunity for *Keesing's* editors to compare and evaluate the reporting of sources and to present not only condensed summaries of events, but also cross-checked information. The emphasis in the coverage of *Keesing's* is to present essential and factual information on prominent or important political, social and economic developments in all of the world's countries. This includes conventional developments in the political system, such as elections and government changes, and important policy developments, but developments concerning political opposition are also well covered by *Keesing's*. Irregular political participation, such as political violence, is included in the coverage of political opposition activities.

When constructing event datasets, it is important to select sources that are adequate to throw light on the research questions posed and that adequately cover the countries under analysis (Hazlewood & West, 1974: 317). In the light of this, the choice of *Keesing's* as the single source for the dataset may be debated. Two aspects of source selection have typically been discussed: the use of global versus regional sources, and the use of single versus multiple sources. The assumption is that coverage will be more complete, that is, more events will be reported and more information will be available for each event, when using regional and/or multiple sources.

In the debate over global versus regional sources, the distinction is made between sources that aim at reporting events in all the countries of the world and sources that report on a selection of geographically neighbouring countries. The fact that event datasets tended to rely on one large source (frequently the *New York Times* or the *New York Times Index*) has been an important point for much of the discussion on source coverage. This gives rise to the question of how correct a picture of events such a global source will give when studying a specific region. It has then been suggested that event-data collectors either add a source with a specific regional focus in coverage or let the regional source replace the global source altogether. It should be noted, however, that the discussion on source coverage and global versus regional sources developed out of event-data projects that aimed at collecting data for the entire world.

However, a similar line of argument may be applied to the context of Western Europe, and the logic of the source-coverage argument may thus be extended to regional versus national sources, and even further to national versus local sources. It will always be possible to move one step closer to the location where the event took place. In doing so, however, the number of relevant sources increases dramatically, and with it the number of languages involved and ultimately the resources needed for reading, processing and coding sources. In effect, this makes it practically impossible to use national or local sources without reducing the number of countries under study.

Though *Keesing's* offers global coverage, it has nevertheless been judged to be a good regional source for Western Europe. While ideally the preference would be for sources as close as possible to events, that is, national and subnational newspapers offering broader coverage and possibly more detailed information, *Keesing's* was nevertheless judged to be a good regional source offering excellent coverage of Western Europe (Taylor & Jodice, 1983: 13, 182). In practice, for the TWEED project, there was no rival source capable of presenting continuous coverage of all West European countries for the entire post-World War II period.

Nevertheless, we expect that there is some under-reporting, so that fewer events related
to terrorism are selected and reported in Keesing’s than actually took place. This is due to the double selection of newsworthy stories, first by the primary sources relied upon by Keesing’s and then by Keesing’s itself. As a consequence, we expect the TWEED dataset to provide conservative figures on West European terrorism. Despite this, we do not consider under-reporting to be a precarious problem for TWEED. We are dealing with countries in Western Europe, countries that have had well-developed news media systems for the entire period at which we are looking. Thus, Keesing’s has had available good sources to work from and Keesing’s is in turn a good source for researchers to utilize. Keesing’s is attentive to developments in Western Europe and has had a particular interest in reporting political violence for the entire period covered by the dataset.

The discussion over global versus regional sources rapidly develops into a discussion over single versus multiple sources. The arguments are similar: adding more sources will increase the number of reported events and the information available on these events. By adding sources, it will be possible to achieve more complete coverage. Thus, by using multiple sources, it is more likely that the data collected will reflect the correct distribution of events in reality (Jackman & Boyd, 1979: 435). Using more sources will make it possible to clarify what really happened, to sort out ambiguity, and to present and collect complete and corrected information.

Investigations into source coverage have found evidence for differences in coverage. Azar et al. used eight different sources to collect a dataset on events involving Egypt and Israel in the 1955–58 period. They discovered, somewhat surprisingly perhaps, given the assumption that regional sources will report more events than global sources, that the global source (the New York Times Index) did far better than the regional source: it reported twice as many events as the regional source (in this case, the Middle East Journal) (Azar et al., 1972: 380). Moreover, sources did not report the same events, with less than 10% of all recorded events reported in both the global and the regional source (Azar et al., 1972: 381). Azar et al. concluded with a warning against using a single source for collecting event datasets, as the conclusions about the subject matter might be entirely explained by differences in source coverage.

On the other hand, Jackman & Boyd investigated the effect of using different sources in measuring mass political violence in 30 African countries. Information was collected from five sources, and different datasets were compared (Jackman & Boyd, 1979: 439–440). Their conclusions were that datasets collected from different sources, and using different numbers of sources, produce different results. However, they also concluded that these differences cannot be entirely explained by source coverage, as differences in definitions and the procedures for coding events may also have an effect. Jackman & Boyd (1979: 456) warn that the advantages of using multiple sources may easily be overestimated.

Keesing’s is generally judged to be a good source of information with acceptable reliability. Taylor & Jodice describe it as ‘an excellent source of data on domestic or internal conflict as well as on foreign affairs’, and add that Keesing’s is ‘remarkably well organized and is easy to use’ (Taylor & Jodice, 1983: 12). For the purpose of collecting a multicountry dataset like TWEED, Keesing’s was considered a unique source that offered information found nowhere else in a single publication.

In the end, selection of sources, whether one or many, global or regional, is based on a judgement of costs and benefits. What is important is to select the source that produces the best results with the resources available. In the TWEED data project, Keesing's
was judged to be the best source available: a single, reliable source with broad coverage of Western Europe offering continuous volumes of information that was possible to process for a single coder.

Every volume of *Keesing’s* from 1950 to 2004 was examined carefully to uncover relevant events. For all volumes, entries for the countries under investigation have been read, cross references examined and indices checked. Coding, in one main round and several subsequent separate updates, was done by a single coder, the author of this article. *Keesing’s* proved to be a rewarding source for data on terrorism. It has returned more than 11,000 events related to terrorism for the countries under study.

**Tweed Dataset Coverage: Countries, Variables**

The TWEED dataset covers 18 West European countries. As shown in Table I, 16 of these returned events, while two countries did not. These two countries, Finland and Iceland, are thus considered as unaffected by terrorism throughout the period covered by TWEED.

Among events covered by the TWEED dataset, we find notable terrorist acts such as the kidnappings and killings of Hanns Martin Schleyer by the Red Army Faction in 1977 and Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades in 1978, the 1974 and 1980 bomb attacks by Italian right-wing extremists onboard the Italicus express and at the Bologna railway station (with 85 deaths the most lethal attack recorded in the TWEED dataset), the Provisional IRA’s 1974 pub bombings and the 1996 blast at Canary Wharf in central London, all attacks that captivated authorities, the media and the public. In addition, thousands of other terrorist attacks, some gaining considerable public attention and publicity, others less so, are included in the dataset.

A total of 11,245 events are recorded in the TWEED dataset. Of these, 9,730 events (86.5%) are actions initiated by terrorist groups or non-state agents. The remaining events are government actions directed against terrorists mainly in the form of arrests and court sentences. Considerable variation exists between countries, with the United Kingdom and France being hardest hit, based on a simple event count. The total number of deaths resulting from events initiated by terrorist agents recorded in the TWEED dataset is 2,956. Again, the United Kingdom is the country most severely affected. The relatively low death toll resulting from terrorist actions compared to the high number of attacks in France is a reminder that a simple event count does not necessarily reflect the intensity of terrorist violence in a country. Italy, for instance, has a much lower total event count than France in the TWEED dataset, but nevertheless the country has over 300 deaths resulting from terrorist initiated attacks, compared with 179 in France.

**Variables: Attributes of the Action and Attributes of the Agent**

The TWEED dataset contains variables that concentrate on information concerning, to paraphrase Lasswell (1936), who did what, why, where, when and how. The death toll for Italy includes the killings resulting from the bomb attack at Bologna railway station on 2 August 1980. One reviewer recalled ‘accounts that hundreds of people were killed in the Bologna train station bombing’. However, *Keesing’s* reports 85 deaths and sources agree on this figure. In an analysis of the effects of the bomb, Brismar & Bergenwald (1982) explain that ‘altogether 291 persons were injured, 73 of whom died at the scene’ and that eleven people died in the two weeks following the bomb attack as a result of injuries inflicted by the explosion, raising the death toll to 84. Brismar & Bergenwald had no information on deaths occurring after their two-week investigation period, thus missing the final death that brought the death toll to 85.  

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5 West Germany has been covered until unification with East Germany in October 1990, after which both parts of the reunited Germany have been covered. Events taking place in French overseas territories and departments, as well as overseas territories and colonies of the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands, have not been covered. Events taking place in Northern Ireland are included under the United Kingdom (a variable is included to allow regional identification of events).

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Table I. Intrastate Terrorism, 1950–2004 (TWEED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of terrorist-initiated events recorded</th>
<th>Total number of deaths</th>
<th>Number of groups recorded with events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3,046</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (Republic)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4,263</td>
<td>1,507</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,730</td>
<td>2,938</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

when, how and with what consequences. For each event, both attributes of the action itself and attributes of the agents have been recorded.

For each event selected from the source, TWEED contains a number of variables that seek to record basic information about the event. Because of the limited information available in the source for each individual event, the most useful variables of the TWEED dataset are variables that record basic factual attributes, such as the time and place (country) of the terrorist act, its consequences in terms of death and injury inflicted, and the identity of agents and victims. Thus, among the core variables of the dataset, we find the following variables recording attributes of the action.

**Date**
The day, month and year the event took place. In Figure 1, the distribution of events on years is presented. While the pattern confirms the impression that the frequency of terrorist attacks was high throughout the 1970s and 1980s, we are also reminded of the presence of terrorism in Western Europe before the turning point of 1968, especially in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

**Country**
The country in which the event took place. Table I presents the total number of terrorist acts recorded for each country in the dataset for the entire time period covered by the TWEED dataset.

**Agent**
The name of the acting group or organizations. Where possible, the dataset identifies by name the groups or organizations responsible for initiating an event. In case the name of the acting group or organization is not mentioned
by Keesing’s, generic names for agents belonging to a particular regional movement (for instance, Republicans or Loyalists in the Northern Ireland regional context of the United Kingdom) or to an ideological tendency (for instance, right-wing extremists or left-wing extremists) were used so as to retain as much information as possible. A little more than 70% of events initiated by terrorist agents have a group name or a generic label attributed to them; generic labels are attributed to 14.3% of the total number of events initiated by terrorist actors. The TWEED dataset records activity by 214 terrorist groups identified by name.

**Killings and Injuries**

For each event, the number of people killed or injured in the event is recorded. Besides these figures, sets of separate variables break these totals down into categories according to the status of the victim. Thus, the dataset contains variables for the number of military personnel, police officers, civil servants, politicians, business executives, trade union leaders, clergymen, militants, civilians and others who were killed or injured as a result of the act of terrorism.

Table I presents the total number of people killed by terrorist agents in each of the countries covered for the 1950–2004 period, whereas Figure 2 shows the accumulated death toll by year in Western Europe as a whole. The figures reveal an interesting development: the growth and decline of internal terrorism in Western Europe from the early 1970s and the subsequent decline from the early 1990s onwards. In terms of
annual aggregated death toll, internal terrorism in Western Europe is now back at the levels experienced in the 1950s and 1960s. However, as there are fewer incidents in the 1990s and onwards, each incident is more likely to result in death, which is an indication that terrorism has become more lethal.

Type of Violent Means Employed
This refers to whether the act of terrorism was perpetrated by the means of a letter bomb, car bomb, fire bomb (incendiary device), other bomb, rocket or grenade attack, armed attack, arson or kidnapping. Figure 1 is based on all events regardless of type of action and thus includes the whole range of means employed. However, special care should be taken concerning one of the categories: owing to the way Keesing’s reports, many fire bombs, mostly comprising simple, hand-thrown incendiary devices made from bottles filled with flammable liquid (often referred to as Molotov cocktails), have been selected and included in the dataset. Altogether, 13.1% of the total number of events, many of which have no identified group attributed to them, fall into this category. In particular, the fire-bomb incidents are associated with events that have no named agent or only a generic agent attributed to them: events falling into the fire-bomb category account for 86.7% of the terrorist-initiated acts with no named or only a generic agent attributed. Many of the fire-bomb events, however, are of a low-intensity nature, like the throwing of a Molotov cocktail or similar device. In some
cases, these may have fatal consequences, but mostly they do not. Nevertheless, when such incidents are reported by Keesing’s, they have been consistently included in the dataset. The decision to include such events may have inflated the event toll, and excluding events involving fire bombs from the analysis might be advised. However, as events involving fire bombs may nevertheless be of relevance in some circumstances, a decision has been made to let users decide on this issue.

**Government Reaction**
A set of variables record what type of responses were made by the state institutions in conjunction with acts of terrorism. This includes armed response, arrests, court convictions, and also the number of people killed or injured by authorities in response actions directed at terrorists.

In addition to registering the identity, or name, of the acting group or organization, some further attributes concerning the agent were also included.

**Regional Origins**
This refers to the agent’s association with a geographical unit below the state level, in cases where the acting group originates from an ethnic (linguistic) or religious minority group. The regions are based on the linguistic minorities of Western Europe, supplemented by regions inhabited by religious minorities and some historically defined regions without linguistic or religious minority groups. This allows for identification of terrorist activities associated with such regions as the Basque Country, Corsica, Northern Ireland or South Tyrol.

**Ideological Profile**
This refers to whether the acting group may be said to belong ideologically to the right wing or left wing, or whether it is ethnic nationalist. Though ethnic-nationalist groups may also claim a non-nationalist ideology, this has been seen as subordinate to the ethnic-nationalist position. More than 80% of incidents initiated by terrorists were perpetrated by ethnic-nationalist groups.

**Agent’s Attitude Towards the State**
Besides knowing the ideological inclination of a group, it might also be interesting to know how it relates to existing state structures. Therefore, a variable has been included in the TWEED dataset that attempts to distinguish between different aims in relation to the state. Groups operating within a regional context may have different attitudes towards the existing state formation and state borders. Agents that seek to unite the region within which they originate with a state other than the one to which it presently belongs are recorded as irredentist. Groups aiming at splitting off a piece of state territory in order to establish a new, independent, state are recorded as separatist, whereas agents that work for extended rights and self-government on behalf of their region, but within the existing state formation, are counted as autonomist. In cases where the group aims at preserving existing borders and arrangements within the state or aims at integrating or assimilating the minority group in the region, the group is counted as a state defender.

As the information available in the source is rather limited, the range of variables has to reflect this fact. With the source used, finding information on all aspects that might be of interest is simply not possible. Further, the variables mentioned above and related to attributes of the action all concern factual attributes of events that involve little discretion on part of the coder.

Naturally, owing to a greater degree of coder discretion or to lack of information in the source used to construct the dataset, not all variables yielded useful results after the coding process was completed. For instance, attempts at coding the arbitrariness of the action will always be a matter of judgement.
Attempts at recording the level of randomness of the acts of terrorism by distinguishing between acts aimed at individual people, acts aimed at a defined group of people, acts aimed at the general public, failed acts, and acts aimed at material targets proved to involve too much coder discretion to produce a useful variable. Similarly, an attempt to collect information on the attribution of responsibility and blame in a variable that distinguished between admittance of responsibility from an agent, as opposed to attribution of blame from government agents or the media, was not entirely successful, simply because it turned out that *Keesing’s* did not systematically report attribution of blame (though it often reported claims of responsibility on the part of terrorist groups). In most cases, we are only told by *Keesing’s* which agent was responsible. Thus, as explained above, the TWEED dataset provides data on a set of dimensions concentrating on key attributes of the terrorist incident and the perpetrator.

**Final Remarks**

The need for better data in research on terrorism has been noted repeatedly (Brück & Wickström, 2004: 294; Turk, 2004: 283). A dataset on internal terrorism, like the one described here, may supplement existing data sources focusing on international terrorism. TWEED may be utilized for diverse research purposes within a multitude of approaches and may help answer quite different research questions related to the context, causes and consequences of terrorism.

The TWEED dataset allows the researcher to do more than analyse patterns of terrorist incidents over time and between countries, mapping the rise and decline in terrorism over time and in different countries. Using TWEED, terrorism may also be analysed from the angle of the ideologies or regional attachments of terrorist groups. As TWEED focuses on internal terrorism, and other existing datasets tend to make international terrorism their main object, the TWEED dataset could be used in conjunction with datasets covering international terrorism to further explore the similarities and differences between the two types of terrorism.

Treating terrorism as the dependent variable, a dataset like the one presented here may contribute to analyses of the causes of terrorism, a topic that features prominently in research on terrorism. This would include not only analyses of the origins of terrorism (causes) and its correlates with other independent variables of a social, economic, cultural or political nature, but also analyses of how terrorism declines and even ends in certain contexts.

Undoubtedly, terrorism has an impact on other social and political conditions, and increasing attention is given to the social and political consequences of terrorism. Treating terrorism as an independent variable, TWEED may also contribute to analyses of the costs and consequences of terrorism, whether these are economic, social or political.

**References**


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