Appeal from superior court, St. Croix county; E. B. BUNDY, Judge.

This action is to recover $1,195, being the proceeds of a quantity of personal property seized in St. Croix county, in this state, by the defendant, Campbell, as sheriff of said county, under and by virtue of a writ of attachment sued out by one Johnson against the property of Gillespie & Harper, a copartnership firm, theretofore doing business in Minnesota and this state. By an arrangement between the parties, the sheriff sold the property, and retains the proceeds subject to the determination of this action. Johnson obtained a judgment in his action against Gillespie & Harper, and issued execution thereon, which the sheriff levied upon such proceeds. Johnson was named herein as a defendant, but the summons was not served upon him, and he has made no appearance. The plaintiff, McClure, claims the proceeds of the property, under an assignment executed to him by Gillespie & Harper, in the state of Minnesota, pursuant to chapter 148 of the General Laws of that state for 1881. The trusts specified in the assignment are that the assignee shall distribute the proceeds of the assigned property to those creditors of the assignors who shall file releases of their demands, and, if a surplus remains after paying such debts, he shall pay the same to the assignors. The plaintiff, McClure, Johnson, and the members of the firm of Gillespie & Harper are residents of the state of Minnesota, and were such residents when the assignment was executed. Gillespie & Harper had real and personal property, both in Minnesota and this state. The property thus seized and sold was, when seized, in use in and about a saw-mill in St. Croix county, owned and operated by Gillespie & Harper before such assignment, but was then in possession of the assignee. No question is made on the pleadings, and there is no dispute as to the facts. The circuit court held that the plaintiff took no title to the property in this state thus seized and sold, and hence was not entitled to the proceeds thereof, and gave judgment for the defendant accordingly. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment.

[*343]  Fayette Marsh and Ray S. Reid, for appellants.

The assignment must be governed by the <\i>lex loci contractus, and being valid under the laws of the state in which it was executed, is valid everywhere. Smith v. Railroad Co. , 23 Wis. 269. In Page v. Lumber Co. , 16 N. W. Rep. 700, an assignment was valid in the state of Wisconsin, and, although it contravened the statute in reference to assignments in Minnesota, was recognized in that state as valid and effectual to transfer personal property wherever situated. An assignment giving preference to certain creditors is valid in Wisconsin.  [*344]  Ball v. Bowe, 49 Wis. 495, 5 N. W. Rep. 909. As a matter of comity, the assignment should be effectual in both states. Bentley v. Whittemore, 19 N. J. Eq. 469; Moore v. Bonnell, 31 N. J. Law, 90. Also a creditor should not be permitted to go into a foreign jurisdiction, and there seize personal property of the debtor in violation of the policy of his own state, and thus obtain an undue advantage over other creditors, also residents and citizens of his own state. He should be estopped from raising the question as to the validity of the assignment or not in a foreign state when he seeks the aid of the court to defeat the settled policy of his own. Einer v. Beste, 32 Mo. 240, 249-251; Thurston v. Rosenfield, 42 Mo. 475; May v. Wannemacker, 111 Mass. 208; Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen, 545; Dehon v. Foster, 7 Allen, 57; Train v. Kendall, 137 Mass. 366; Butler v. Wendell, 23 N. W. Rep. 460; Green v. Gross, 12 Neb. 117, 10 N. W. Rep. 459; Chafee v. Bank, 36 Amer. Rep. 345, 71 Me. 514; Fuller v. Steiglitz, 27 Ohio St. 355; President, etc., v. Minor, 48 Amer. Dec. 727; Richardson v. Leavitt, 45 Amer. Dec. 90: Sanderson v. Bradford, 10 N. H. 260. The assignment is a voluntary one for the benefit of creditors, and as such must have all the force and effect of a voluntary assignment, as distinguished from the case where the courts seize the debtor’s property under insolvent laws, and convey to an assignee without any voluntary act of the debtor. Burrill, Assignm. § 304; Shelby v. Bacon, 10 How. 56; Lapp v. Van Norman, 19 Fed. Rep. 406; Adler v. Ecker, 2 Fed. Rep. 126; Griswold v. Railroad Co. , 9 Fed. Rep. 797; Lehman v. Rosengarten, 23 Fed. Rep. 642.

H. L. Humphrey, for the respondent.

The assignment is void under the laws of Minnesota. May v. Walker, (Minn.) 28 N. W. Rep. 252. The assignment does not conform to the laws of Wisconsin in respect to the transfer of property, and is therefore void. Auley v. Osterman, 65 Wis. 118, 25 N. W. Rep. 657, 26 N. W. Rep. 568; King v. Glass, 34 N. W. Rep. 820; Manufacturing Co. v. Prall, 9 Conn. 487. It exempts all property exempt by the laws of Minnesota when the personal property in this state must be governed by the laws of this state. The assignee is not a resident of this state, as required by statute. Rev. St. Wis. å¤ 1694. Laws of a state have no force beyond its territorial limits, and should not be allowed to operate in another state when such state, or one seeking redress before its tribunals, would suffer by its application. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367. Every state may by positive laws regulate as it pleases the disposition of personal property found within it, and may prefer an attaching creditor to a foreign assignee, and no other authority has a right to question its determination. Holmes v. Remson, 4 Johns. Ch. 470. The law of domicile has no force in a state which has by positive law proscribed a method of transfer or disposition of property within it. Where law is imperative, comity must yield. Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196; Upton v. Hubbard, 28 Conn. 275; Osborn v. Adams, 18 Pick. 245.

LYON, J., (after stating the facts as above.)

Chapter 148, Gen. Laws Minn. 1881, under which the assignment in question was made, is entitled “An act to prevent debtors from giving preference to creditors, and to secure the equal distribution of the property of debtors among their creditors, and for the release of debts against debtors.” The act provides that whenever the property of any debtor shall be attached or levied upon by any writ or process from a court of record of that state in favor of any creditor, or garnishment made against any debtor, such debtor may, within 10 days after such levy or garnishment, “make an assignment of all his property and estate, not exempt by law, for the equal benefit of all his creditors, in proportion to their respective valid claims, who shall file releases of their debts and claims against such debtors as hereinafter provided.” The act then provides that, upon such assignment being made, the attachments, levy, or garnishments shall be dissolved,  [*345]  and the officer shall deliver the property to the assignee, unless the latter elect to retain the process for the benefit of all such creditors. Section 1. It is further provided in section 10 that “no creditor of any insolvent debtor shall receive any benefit under the provisions of this act, or any payment of any share of the proceeds of the debtor’s estate, unless he shall first have filed with the clerk of the district court, in consideration of the benefits of the provisions of this act, a release to the debtor of all claims other than such as may be paid under the provisions of this act for the benefit of such debtor; and thereupon the court or judge may direct that judgment be entered discharging such debtor from all claims or debts held by creditors who shall have filed such releases.” Within 10 days before the assignment to the plaintiff was executed, the property of Gillespie & Harper in Minnesota was seized by virtue of a writ of attachment issued out of a court of record of that state. Another statute of Minnesota (chapter 41, Gen. St.) gives the procedure for making general assignments for the benefit of creditors. Its provisions are not unlike chapter 80 of our Revised Statutes, entitled “Of voluntary assignments.” The contention on behalf of the plaintiff is that the instrument under which the plaintiff claims to recover the proceeds of the property in question is essentially a voluntary assignment by Gillespie & Harper for the benefit of their creditors; and that it is a valid conveyance to the assignee of all the personal property of the assignors, wherever the same may be situated. In other words, their position is that, in respect to personal property, the lex loci contractus governs, and an assignment valid under the laws of the state in which it was executed is valid everywhere. The contention on behalf of the defendant (who represents the creditor Johnson) is that the instrument is not a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors, within the meaning of that term as used in the common law, or in chapter 41 of the Minnesota statute, or chapter 80 of our Revised Statutes, but is part of a statutory proceeding in insolvency, looking to a full discharge of the debts of the insolvent without full payment thereof,—a result which cannot follow a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors; and, further, such being the nature of the proceeding, the assignment has no effect beyond the territorial limits of the state in which it is made, and in which the assignor resides. It is also denied that it has any such extraterritorial effect, even though it be a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors.

The question as to the character of the instrument under which the plaintiff claims has been determined by the supreme court of Minnesota in Jenks v. Ludden, 27 N. W. Rep. 188, and other cases therein cited. In Jenks v. Ludden the court say: “Our act of 1881 is, as we have repeatedly held, a bankrupt act; the assignee being, in effect, an officer of the court, and the assigned property being in custodia legis, and administered by the court, or under its direction. Wendell v. Lebon, 30 Minn. 234, 15 N. W. Rep. 109; In re Mann, 32 Minn. 60, 19 N. W. Rep. 347; Lord v. Meachem, 32 Minn. 66, 19 N. W. Rep. 346; Bennett v. Denny, 24 N. W. Rep. 193; Simon v. Manser, 23 N. W. Rep. 856.” Thus it will be seen that although an assignment under chapter 148 of the Statutes of Minnesota for 1881, in a certain sense, is voluntary, in that the debtor is not compelled to make it,—a feature common to many, perhaps most, insolvent laws, including those of this state, (Rev. St. c. 179,)—still that court holds it to be, in substance and legal effect, an assignment by operation of the statute thus held to be a bankrupt law, executed as a part of the procedure in the administration of that law. We regard the above adjudications of the supreme court of Minnesota, giving construction to their act of 1881, as binding upon this court, and hence shall not examine or discuss the argument of counsel for the plaintiff against the accuracy of such construction. We will only say that our consideration of the subject has inclined us to think that the court construed the act correctly. Our conclusion as to the character of the instrument in question renders it  [*346]  quite unnecessary to determine whether a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors executed in Minnesota by a resident of that state, pursuant to chapter 41, passes to the assignee title to personal property named in such asssignment having a situs in this state. This question was very fully argued by the respective counsel, and their citations of authorities (to which we add Mowry v. Crocker, 6 Wis. 326) will be preserved in the official report of the case.

The only remaining question (and it is the controlling question in the case) is, has an assignment of property, made pursuant to a bankrupt act, the assignee being, in effect, an officer of the court, and the assigned property being in custodia legis, and administered by or under the direction of the court, any extraterritorial effect? That is to say, should the courts of this state recognize such an assignment as a valid transfer to the assignee of personal property in this state, and thus defeat an attachment levied upon it, pursuant to the laws of this state, by a creditor of the assignor? We think the question is not affected by the fact that the property, when seized, was in the possession of the assignee, or that the attaching creditor is a resident of the state in which the insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings were had. The cases on this subject are very numerous. No review of them will here be attempted. While some of them may, under special circumstances, extend the rule of comity to such a case, and thus give an extraterritorial effect to somewhat similar assignments, we are satisfied that the great weight of authority is the other way. The rule in this country is, we think, that assignments by operation of law in bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings, under which debts may be compulsorily discharged without full payment thereof, can have no legal operation out of the state in which such proceedings were had. This rule is laid down in Burrill, Assignm. (5th Ed.) p. 458, § 303, and numerous cases are cited in the note to that section in support of it. An application of the above rule to this case negatives the plaintiff’s right to recover in the action.

The judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.