Hog v. Lashley
House of Lords
Original Citation: (1792) 6 Bro PC 577
English Reports Citation: 2 E.R. 1278
Original Eng. Rep. version,
PDF
7th May 1792
See the note at the head of the preceding case.
1 Scots R.R. 667. Cf. 2 Scots R.R. 182, and De Nicols v. Curlier, 1900,
69 L.J. Ch. 109[, [1900] A.C. 21].
[577] APPENDIX.
In the case of Hog v. Lashley, 7th May 1792, the argument on this
question of the lex domicilii and the lex loci arose from two interlocutors;
one of the lord ordinary, which found " that there was no ground for
distinguishing between Scots and English effects: beca,use the succession to a
defunct's, effects ought to be regulated, not by the different laws of the many
different countries in which these may happen to be locally situated at the
time of his death, but by the law of the domicile; and because it ha,d been in
several cases1 so determined in England." Another interlocutor of the
whole court of session found expressly, " that the succession to the
personal effects of the deceased, wherever situated, must be regulated by the
lex domicilii."
The appellant contended, lmo , that by the more modern decisions of the
court of session, particularly in the case of Lord Banff; the case of Larimer
against Mortimer, decided in 1770; the case of Elcherston against Davidson in
1778; and the case of Morris against Wright in 1785 ; it had been established
that the succession to perÁsonal estate ab intestato, was to be regulated not
by the law of the country where the defunct had his domicile^ but by the laws
of the different countries in which his said personal estate happened to be
situated at the time of his death.
2do, That whatever might be the rule with regard to succession ab
intestato, the power of making a will was juris gentitwm,, and therefore any
restraints upon the liberty of testing, imposed by the lex domicilii, must be
confined to effects over which that law extends, and can be attended with no
consequence in other countries where no such restraints prevail: that the power
of alienation is inherent in the right of every proprietor; and as a testament
is a species of alienation, so one who. can alienate his property in a foreign
country, notwithstanding any restraints upon alienation, or the mode of
alienation, in his own, must be equally at liberty to dispose of it by
testament, whatever limitations may, in that respect, be imposed by the law of
his domicile, from which he withdraws his effects, by the very act of placing
them elsewhere: that the fiction of law mentioned by some foreign writers,
mobilia nan habent situm vel sequelam, deserved no regard; reality was alone
to be attended to; and moveables had, in truth, a local situation : the same
was likewise the case with nmrvmck debitorum; the proper situs whereof was the
place of the debtor's residence, as there only the [578] subject existed upon
which the right of the proprietor was to operate; and there only it could have
any substantial effects: that it had been reÁpeatedly decided that the right to
a debt due in Scotland, does not vest ipso jure in the assignees under an
English commission of bankruptcy; but if the debt, or no-men debitoris, was
understood to be in England, and if the transmission of the right of exaction
was to -be regulated only by the law of the creditor's domicile, the direct
contrary would follow, and the assignees would have a complete right ipso jure;
in like manner it has been found, that the assignation of a debt due by a
debtor in Scotland, is not complete without intimation, whatever be the law of
the creditor's country; which is inconsistent with the respondent's hypothesis.
Whether, thereÁfore, the situs of debts is to be judged of by the rules of the
law of Scotland, or by general principles derived from the intrinsic nature and
reason of the thing, the conclusion must be the same, that the debt is situated
where it must be recovered; that is, where the debtor resides,
There were also two other arguments merely on the extent and operation
of the Scotch law of legitim.
1278
APPX. NO. II.
HOG V. LASHLEY [l7i)2] VI BROWN.
In answer to these pleas the respondents contended, Imo, that as the
municipal regulations of different states are frequently at variance with each
other, the ques^ tion must frequently occur, whether the law of one country or
of another ought to be the prevailing rule; and in all such cases recourse must
be had to the law of nations, which settles the duties that one state owes to
another in their mutual interÁcourse, in the same manner as the law of nature,
when applied to men considered in their first condition, imposes certain duties
on individuals. In cases of succession, a distinction has been universally
adopted between moveables and landed property: in ˜every country of modern
Europe it is established, that the succession to the latter must be governed by
the laws of the state in which it is situated; it makes a part of the Territory
of such state, from which it cannot be removed; but moveables being fixed to no
particular place, may be removed at will from one kingdom to another; and it
often happens, in the course of modern commerce, that moveables of immense
value, belonging to the subjects of one state, are lodged within the territory
of another, subject however to be withdrawn at the pleasure of the owners;
hence have arisen those celebrated maxims mobilia non fiabent situm, and mobilia
sequuwtur personam -the plain meaning of which is obviously this, that nations
will not consider the local situation of moveables in any question concerning
them; and that they will dispose of the moveable property within their
territory, belonging to a stranger, in the same manner as if it were with him
in his own country. The more ancient deÁcisions of the courts of law in
Scotland did accordingly embrace the same system; even as recently as the year
1744, it was held in the case of Brown contra Brown, that the succession to
certain debentures and promissory notes due in Ireland, was to be regulated by
the law of Scotland, where the defunct had his domicile; and although in some
later cases the court [579] had adopted a different opinion, that was owing to
its being erroneously taken for granted, that the courts in England, in judging
of effects locally situated there, proceeded according to the rules of the law
of England, without any regard toi the lex domicilii; but that this was clearly
a mistake, the court of session had occasion to be well informed, from what
passed upon the decision of a late case before your lordships, Bruce versus
Bruce, from the decisions of the English courts, and from authorities on the
law of England.
2do, That if the lex domiciKi must regulate the course of succession ab
intestate), it must in the like manner regulate every question with regard to
the defunct's power of testing upon his moveable or personal estate. To say
that a will is juris gentium, and being protected by that law, must be good all
the world over, except where it is fetr tered by municipal restraints, is a
mere fallacy. The sole province of the jus gentium is to decide upon
controversies betwixt one state and another; but if it is once adÁmitted, that
the domicile of a defunct is the circumstance upon which such contro* versies,
with regard to succession to personal estate, is to be determined, it can be a
matter of no consequence whether the defunct has made a will or not; for by the
very same law that would regulate his succession db intestato, every question
relative to his power of testing must of necessity be decided. To appeal to the
inherent rights arising from property cannot avail the appellant; a man may no
doubt alienate his property of whatever kind, provided he does not thereby
transgress the law of the country where it is situated; but with regard to his(
power of testing, he must of necessity submit to the law of that country of
which, by his fixing his domicile there, he has become a subject; his property,
wherever situated, is in effect a part of the total property of that country;
it is therefore interested in the distribution thereof; and of course every
restraint which its law imposes upon the facultas testandi, must be equally
binding upon him, quoad effects locally situated without, as within its
terÁritory. It isi presumed, fictions juris, that the whole of his personal
estate is with the owner in his own country; and it is a, necessary
consequence, that his power of disÁposing of it by will must depend upon the
law of that country. " Sed considerandum, quadam fictione juris, sen,
malis, praesumptione, hanc de mobilibus determinationem conceptam- niti: cum
enwn certÇ stabUique haec situ careant, nee certo* sint alliffata loco*; sed ad
arbitrium domimi undiquaque in domicilii locum revocari facile ac reduci
possint, et maxvrmvm domino plerwnque commodwm. adferre soleant cum ei sunt
praesentia; visum fuit, hanc inde conjecturam surgere, quod dominus velle
cen-seatur, ut illic omnia sua
sint mobilia aut saltern esse intelligantur, ubi fortunarum suarum larem
summainque constituit, id est in loco domicilii: proinde si quid
1279
VI BEOWN. APPX. NO. II.
HOG V. LASHLEY [1792]
domicilii judex constituent, id ad mobHia, libicunque sita, non atia
pertiriebit ratione, quam, quia ilia in ipso domicilii loco esse
concipiwvfrutr." . (Voet. Tit. de Statutis, see. 11.)
And these answers were enlarged upon, and enforced by the following
reasons annexed to the respondent's case in the House of Lords. (R. Dundas, J.
Scott, A. Wight, W. Adam, J. Clerk.)
[580] I.The question, whether succession to personal estate ab
intestate, must be governed by the Laws of the country, where the defunct was
domiciliated, or of all the different countries, where his funds happen locally
to be at the-time of his death? is a question, juris gentium; a law, though not
consisting of positive institutions, yet recognized in every civilized state,
and by which a nation is considered as an inÁdividual, and its duties to other
nations, and its conduct towards them as individuals, are pointed out and
directed. In every case where a doubt arises, whether the law of one country,
or that of another, ought to be followed, recourse must be had to this jus
gentium, there being no other rule of decision. But once this point is settled,
the case becomes strictly municipal; and what is the law of nations, becomes of
necessity the law of that state where the suit is instituted.
A distinction has been made in every country of modern Europe, in cases
of succession, between bona immobilia; and bona, mobilia, and this distinction
makes part of the jus gentium. Landed property has been universally considered
as most important; and as it cannot be moved from one country to another, but
makes a part of the territory of the state in which it is situated, the owners
thereof are in effect citizens of that state, and qua, such bound to- conform
to its laws, the rules whereof must govern not only the mode of transferring
the land from one to another, but also the course of succession. Moveables
stand, however, in a different predicament; they are fixed to no' particular
place, but may be removed at will from one state to another. They are
accordingly held sequi personam of the owner; and the very same principle upon
which the succession to landed property is regulated by the lex loci rei
sitae, dictates the propriety of governing the succession of moveables or
personal estate, wheresoever situated, by the law of that country to which the
owner properly belongs, A late political writer, Dr. Adam Smith, justly
observes, that the wealth of a state is an aggregate of the wealth of all the
individuals in it; and in like manner it is laid down by the writers on the law
of nations, that the property of inÁdividuals is the property of the state, and
the sum of all the wealth of individuals is the total wealth of the state.
Hence the Goods of an individual, although passing into a foreign country,
still belong to the state of which
he is a member; and the country, where they accidentally are situated at the
time of his death, can have neither right nor interest to regulate the
succession. " Les biens d'un particulier ne cessent pas d'etre a lui,
parce qu'H se trouve. en pais etranger, et Us sont encore partie de la,
tatalite des biens de sa nation. Les pretensions que le seigneur du territoire
voudroit- former sur les biens d'un etranger, seroient done egalement contraire
aux droits du proprietaire, et a ceux de la nation dont il est m.embrej"
(Vatell, liv. 2. c. 8. sec. 109. sec. 181.). Hence it is justly held by the law
of nations, that moveables belonging to strangers shall be equally safe both to
the owners and to their country, as if they were locally situated within it,
and must, in respect to1 the right of succession, be regulated by the law of
that country, i.e. the state in which he has fixed his [581] domicile; or, as
it is said by the writers, ubi sedem fortunarum figerit; the words patria and
domicilium being among these writers convertible terms.
This rule is also founded o n other just and wise principles. One may
have moveable property in a number of different countries, each of which may
entertain different systems of distribution. If, therefore, lex loci rei sitae
were to govern his succession, a separate distribution would take place in
every different country where his property happened to be situated; and as no man, can, be
supposed acquainted with the laws of every foreign country, he would be
uncertain what was to become of his succession. Even after making a, will, he
could not know what effect it would have, as almost in every country there are
restraints upon the testamenti factio, unknown to the generÁality of the
subjects of other stateÇ. Nay, what is still worse, a, debtor, by changing his
former residence, and fixing his domicile in another country, would be able to
govern the succession of his creditor, without his own knowledge.
1280
APPX. NO. II.
HOG V. LASHLEY [1792] VI BROWN.
The lex domicilii has accordingly been recognized by all the writers on
the law of nations, and by the civilians, as the rule by which the succession
to bona mobilia, or personal estate, ought to be regulated.
This rule seems accordingly to be adopted in every nation in Europe.
From several of the Authorities in the appendix, it appears to be so
universally throughout the Dutch, FlemisK, and German Provinces. The law of
France is also the same: " C'est le domicile qui regie le portage des
successions mobitiarts; ainsi par example, si un particulier decede ay ant son
domicile a Paris, so, succession mobiliare sera reglee et appartiendra a ceux,
qui la coutume de Pairis appelle pour etre ses heritiers." (Denisart Coll.
de Juris Prud. Voce Domicile, sec. 3 and 4.)
The law of England.is-also the same: in the case of Burn. v. Coll, Privy
Council, 1st April 1762, it was determined, that when a testator resident in
England died, the judge of the probate in the plantations was bound by the
probate granted in England. In Pipon v. Pipon, Trin? 1744, in Chancery, it was
decided, that succesÁsion in moveables is regulated by the lex domicilii. This
decision is referred to in the case of Thorne v. Watkins, which was decided in
the court of chancery in 1750, and is collected in Vezey's Reports, vol. ii. p.
35. On the margin of the report there is the following note, which is a sort of
title or rubric : " English subject residing and dying here, and
administration here, with debts or Chases in Action, due in Scotland,
distributable as the rest of his personal estate. So if in, other foreign
countries; debts follow the person, of the creditor, not debtor. (See also
Hunter v. Potts, 4 Term Rep. K. B. 182 : Foubert v. Turst, ante vol. 1. p. 129.
of these Parliament cases.)
That the same rule was understood to prevail in Scotland, till an
erroneous idea was entertained with regard to the practice in England, is
equally clear.
Dirleton, in one part of his work (and p. 39. Voce Nomina debitorum),
throws out a doubt upon this subject in the following words: " If nomina
which are not res but entia rationis, have situm; when the debtor is in
Scotland animo [582] re-manendi, and the debt is contracted with him as
residing there! ratio dubitandi, they are thought and called a personal
interest, and therefore should sequi personam : contra they are res in
obligatione et potentia." But Sir James Stewart, in his answer, speaks
decidedly upon the subject: " Nomina debitorum are not accounted res, nor
yet are they mere entia rationis, but in plain Scots are debts; and whether
they have situm or not, requires a distinction, if thle situd should be that of
the debtor, or that of the creditor; but personal debts are thought sequi
personam credi-toris; yet what may be the consequence, when the debtor lives in
one kingdom and the creditor in another, is very uncertain; but cum sequuntur
personam creditoris, I should think, that wherever the creditor either
transmits or forfeits his, right, it should go accordingly."
Dirleton repeats the same doubt again, under the word mobilia: but, in
the same page, he states it not as a doubt, but as a clear proposition, That,
"mobilia sequuntur conditionem personae sui domini, adeo ut ejus ossibus
adherant active et passive; immobilia autem coherent territorio: " And
Stewart, in his answer says, " If mobilia has situm, seems to1 be1 an
improper question; for it is more proper, that mobilia sequuntur personam; and
as to the question, if an Englishman in Scotland could make a nuncupative
testament, as to moveables in Scotland, to me it is without doubt, and that
even a Scotchman, residing and dying in England, may also make a nuncupative
testament reaching his moveables. But in our law, we have a rule as to the
probation by witness, limiting the same to1 100 Scots, which being a, rule of
judgement, might incline our judges to reject a nuncupative testament, though
made in England. The court of session seems to- have proceeded upon this
last-menÁtioned circumstance, in denying effect to English nuncupative
testaments in Scot land; as indeed it is a general rule with respect to1
process and execution, as well as making up legal titles, to any subject, that
the forma of the country where the proÁceedings are instituted, must be
observed."
Mr. Erskine's authority is clear and express upon this, Subject (I. 3.
T. 9. sec. 4.):
"Where a Scotchman dies abroad, sine animo remanendi, the legal
succession of his moveable estate in Scotland must descend to his next of kin, according
to the law of Scotland; and where a foreigner dies in this country, sine animo
remanendi, the moveables which he brought with him hither ought to be regulated, not by
the law of the country in which they locally were, but by that of the
proprietor's patria, or domicile whence he came, and whither he intends again to return. This
rule is
H.L. ii 1281 81
VI BROWN. APPX. NO. II.
HOG V. LASHLBY [1792]
founded on the law of nations; and the reason of it is the same in both
cases, that since all succession ab intestato is grounded on the presumed will
of the deceased, the estate ought to descend to him, whom the law of his own
country calls to the succession, as the person whom it presumes to be most
favoured by the deceased, see Principles of Eqwty, p. 279, and the decision
there quoted; Falc. 1. November 28th. 1744, Brown; which however is contrary to
some former [583] decisions, though conformable to the opinion of the most
celebrated civilians. As nomina debitorum, or personal debts, are moveable in
the strictest sense, their succession is therefore descendible, according to
the lex patriae or domicilii, wherever they may be locally situated or be
due."
It may here, in passing, be observed, That Mr. Erskine speaks rather
inaccurately, when he supposes that all succession ab intestafo is grounded
upon the presumed will of the deceased; such presumed will can only apply to
the part of a man's estate, over which he has. the power of testing; and the
preference that is given to the
lex domicilii, does not arise from the preswnpta voluntas of the deceased concerning
the distribution of his effects, but from its being presumed, that he wished to
have them with himself in the place of his domicile, and meant to collect them
all there.
It is true, that in some cases decided since that of Brown, referred to-
in the above passage of Mr. Erskine, the court of session adopted a different
rule; but these judgments proceeded altogether upon a mistake with regard to
the practice in England.
The first regarded the succession to personal effects situated in
England, that belonged to Alexander lord Banff, who died at Lisbon in November
1746, without making a will. The competitors were, an aunt by the father's
side, who was next of kin according to the law of Scotland, and three brothers
uterine, who were preferable by the la,w of England. It was stated, that the
defunct's principal domicile was in Scotland, and that he never had any settled
domicile in England; but sir Dudley Kyder, at that time Attorney General,
having given an opinion that the succession to effects situated in England was
to be. governed by the law of England, it came to be taken for granted, both in
that and in subsequent cases, that the judges in England did in such questions
regard only the lex foci rei sitae. It was accordingly stated in the next case
of Larimer against Mortimer, decided in 1770, " That, by the law of
England, effects, as well heritable as moveable, situated in England, do
deÁscend ab intestato, agreeably to the rules of descent established by the
laws of EngÁland, without any regard to the lex domicilii; " and this proposition
was not so much as controverted by the other party. In like manner, in the case
of Elcherson versus Davidson decided in 1778, the same erroneous statement was
made in the following words: " if a Scotsman leave effects in England, the
person entitled by the law of England will obtain letters of Administration in
Doctors Commons; and it will be in vain for an uncle or an aunt to- compete
with a mother, no such thing being known in the law of England; and in
conferring the office in Doctors Commons, the civilians there will not give
themselves the trouble to inquire what, the law of Scotland is with respect
to succession."
The same mistake led to a similar decision in the case of Morris in
1785. But when the case of Bruce v. Bruce came to be determined by your lordships
two years ago, the cloud was dispelled and the court of session became sensible
of their error.
[584] It may at times be attended with some difficulty to determine what
is a person's proper domicile; and in some cases, the court of session seems on
that account to have adopted the lex originis ; but when the domicile is
ascertained, the succession must be regulated by the law which there prevails.
II. But if the succession ab intestato is to be regulated by the lex
domicilii, the same law must likewise regulate the power of testing upon
personal estate. The writers upon the law of nations, a.nd the civilians, are
equally clear upon this point, as appears from the authorities to be found in
the appendix.
The same rule takes place in England. The principles laid down by Lord
Hard-wicke in the case of Thorn v. Watkins apply equally to testate as to
intestate sucÁcession. And in 1787 a decree, almost precisely in point, was
given by one of your Lordships' number (Lord Kenyon), then Master of the Rolls,
in the case of Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, which stood thus: Kilpatrick of
Bengal, made his will in 1781, bequeathing certain legacies to be paid, partly
o-ut of his effects
1282
APPX. NO. II. HOG V.
LASHLEY [1792] VI BROWN.
in India, and partly out of his effects he had in England; among others,
he bequeathed 300 to Archibald Fleming, a Scotchman, residing in Scotland. On
Kilpatrick's death, this 300 became a vested interest in the legatee, was a
Chose in Action recoverable from the executors in England, a,nd consequently an
English debt, which Fleming might have disposed of by testament, if he had
lived in England. Fleming did not recover payment of the legacy, but died in
1783, having made a will, disposing of his whole estate and effects to
Farquharson, and appointing him executor. Fleming's widow, however, put in her
claim to the half of his personal estate, as being entitled thereto by the law
of Scotland, jure relictae; and in parÁticular, to the half of Kilpatrick's
legacy; and one o;f the masters in chancery having reported, that he conceived
the widow to be entitled to one moiety of the legacy, it was ordered, "
That it should be referred back to the said master to review his said report of
the 17th day of this instant July, and to state to the court the ground on
which he founded the opinion mentioned in his said report; and that the matter
of the said petition should stand over in the mean time: In pursuance whereof,
the said master by his report, bearing date this day, certified, that he had reviewed
his report of the 17th day of this instant July, and that the opinion therein
mentioned was grounded on the answer given by Hay Campbell, Esq, Lord Advocate
of Scotland, to a case laid before him on behalf of the defendant Ann Fleming,
respecting her right to a share of the legacy in question : In which answer the
said Lord Advocate declared, That by the law of Scotland, those effects which
were called simply moveable, belonging either to husband or wife at the time of
the marriage,, fell under the comÁmunion of goods between the married parties;
and in which also the children, if any existed, had an interest; and that the
husband, jure mariti, had the administration and disposal of them while the
marriage subsisted, but upon the dissolution thereof a division took place,
[585] and the wife (if she was the survivor) took one third as their legitim
in case a widow existed, and one half if no widow; and that the remaining share
alone the husband could dispose of by testament: for that he could not by any
testamentary deed exclude the children's legitim, or the wife's jus relictae,
and that the jus relictae might hoivever be excluded by settlements or
provisions made upon the wife, with her own consent, before or after marriage;
and that in Scotland there was no distinction between choses in action, and
effects actually recovered. Therefore, such being the doctrine of the law of
Scotland, laid down, by a gentleman of Mr. Campbell's eminence for professional
learning, he, the said master, made no difficulty of subscribing thereto; and
upon these principles founded his opinion, that the petitioner, Ann Fleming,
the widow of the said defendant Archibald Fleming, not having any settlement or
provision made upon her by her husband, and he having died without issue, she
was entitled to one moiety of the legacy in question, and the interest thereof
"Upon which the Master of the Rolls ordered, " That the said
Master's reports, bearing date respectively the 17th and 25th days of this
instant July, be conÁfirmed; and that one moiety of the sum of 356 17s. 4d.
cash in the bank, placed to the credit of their cause, on the account of the
defendant Archibald Fleming, be paid to the petitioner Ann Fleming, the widow
of the late defendant Archibald Flem-
Here a few words appear to be wanting in the copy of the decree.-The
words omitted appear to be the following, "if there was no child, or if a
child, one-half as her jus relictae; and the children one-third."-The
following statement is extracted from a subsequent part of the case, not
connected with the present question.
The general rules of succession, with respect to the moveable estate
of a person deceased, have subsisted in the law of Scotland, with little
alteration, as far back as any written records of the law are extant. When the
defunct leaves a widow, and child or children, his moveable estate, after
payment of debts, in divided into three equal parts, one of which goes to the
widow, and is called the jus relictae; another goes to the child, or children,
under the name of Legitim, (an expression borrowed from the Roman law,) portion
natural, or bairns part of gear; and the remaining third is held to be the
dead's part, which may be.disposed of by testament; and if not so disposed of,
will fall to the children likewise:, as nearest in kin. If there is a widow and
no children, the division is bipartite, the wife being entitled to one half, as
jus relwtae, and the dead's part is the other part: or if the defunct has left
a child or children, but no widow, the division is also bipartite; one half
being accounted legitim, and the other half dead's part."
1283
VI BROWN. APPX. NO. II. HOG V. LASHLEY [1792]
ing; and the other moiety thereof to the defendant Archibald
Fa.rquha.rson, the executor of the said defendant Archibald Fleming." It
seems scarcely necessary to observe, that the decree must have been the same if
the question had been between the executor of Fleming and the children of
Fleming claiming their legitim.
Although the case has not hitherto directly occurred as a subject of
decision in the courts of law in Scotland, the plea that the respondents are
now maintaining, will upon inquiry be found to be supported in several of the
ancient statutes of that country.
In the Statuta Willielmi there is a chapter " De hospitio et
testamento pere-fft-inorum;" from which it is plain that their succession
was not regulated by the laws of the kingdom, " si testari volueri/nt
liberam [586] inde habeant facultatem quorum ordinatio inconcussa
servetur." And if they died intestate, " bona eorum per manus
episcopi, in cujus episcopatu aunt, perveniant; et tradantur si fieri potest
heredibus, vel in pias causas erogentur." There is no division here into
Dead's part, Eelict's, and children's part: But by the act 1425. c. 48. "
that all the king's lieges live and be governed by the laws of the reahne;
item, It is ordained be the king be consent and deliverance of the three
estates, that all and sundry the Kingis leiges of the realme live and be
governed under the Kingis lawes and Statutes of the realme allaner-lie, a.nd
under na particular lawes nor special priviledgei, nor be.ua laws of other
countries or realmes." The act 1503, c. 79. is nearly in the same terms,
and it is remarkable, that the enactment is not, that the laws of Scotland and
no other shall be used within the realm, but that all and sundry King's lieges
be governed by these laws; nor is this expression casual, for it is repeated in
the act 1503 ; and agreeably to this way of speaking the King was Rex Scotorum
not Scotiae; his right of sovereignty being over the people rather than the
territory. The, act 1436, c. 88. has very justly been considered as another
legislative enactment in favour of the lex domicilii, in cases of succession
" Eodem die rex, ex deliberatione trium statuum in parliamento
congregatorum, decrevit, quod causae omnium mercatorum et in-colarum regni
Scotiae, in Zelandia, Flandria, vel alibi extra regnum decendentium, qui se
causa merchandisarum suarum, peregrinationis, vel aliqua quacunque causa (dummodo
causa non morandi extra regnum) se transtulerunt, debent tractari coram suis
ordinariis infra regnum, a quibus sua testamenta confirmantur, non obstante,
quod quaedam ex bonis hujusmodi decedentium, tempore sui obitus fuerunt in
Anglia vel in partibus transmarinis." It is fair to presume that the
purpose of the legislature in enacting that these causes should be determined
by the judges of the land, was to- have them determined by the law of the land.
In that view this act amounts to, a legislative declaration in favour of the
principle for which the respondÁents contend ; for it directs that the effects
of Scotchmen shall be governed by the law of Scotland wherever they are
situated.
Dirleton states the following doubt: " If mobilia or nomina
belonging to strangers (e.g. in England) should be confirmed here? or if it be
sufficient they should be conÁfirmed in England? Ratio dubitandi, sequuntur
personam: on.the other part they are a Scotch subject or interest." Sir
James Stewart, his commentator, is however completely decided, and answers this
last question as follows: " we met with this before, and it is still
thought, that mobilia et nomina in this country belonging to strangers do
transfer according to the law of the country where the owner resides and dies,
quia sequuntur pers'onam." Dirleton himself indeed, voce testament, seems
to acknowledge that the lex domicilii is- the rule, as follows: " Quae
ratio, that a testar ment made in France or Holland according to the custom
there, which is different from ours, should be sustained in Scotland, as to any
Scots interest [587] falling under the same?" Stewart in his answer to
this doubt, which is not as io- what is law, but merely to the reason of it,
expresses the same decided opinion as formerly: " A testament made by a
person dying in France or Holland according to the custom there, should be
sustained in Scotland, though the custom be different; and even as to a Scotch
interest falling under the same, because testamenti factio ought in all reason
to follow the person ; and persons dying any where, ought to be: allowed to act
or testate' according to the custom of the place, as to all their jura
personalia."
Lord Kames suggests a case in point, and gives a decided opinion for the
respondÁents. After laying down the doctrine of intestate succession, he
proceeds as follows: " But what if he, a Scotch husband, have made a will,
dividing his moveables among
1284
APPX. NO. II.
HOG V. LASHLEY [1792] VI BROWN.
his blood relations, leaving nothing of his moveables in England to his
wife; her contract of marriage affords an effectual claim against him, which he
cannot evade by any voluntary deed; and even without a contract, as the jus
relictae is established by the law of Scotland beyond the power of the husband
to alter, she ought to have her proportion of these transient moveables, as the
English j.udges are in this case bound by the law of Scotland, not by their
own. To fortify this doctrine, I urge the following argument: where two persons
joining in marriage are satisfied with the legal provisions, there is no
occasion for a contract, and the parties may be held as agreeing that the law
of the land shall be the rule. It is in effect the same as if'the parties had
subscribed a short minute, bearing, that the jus relictae, and every other
particular between them, should be regulated by the law of their country; and
such an agreement expressed or implied must be binding all the world over, to
support the relict's claim against the testament of a deceased husband. It may
however happen, that two persons carelessly join in marriage, having an, object
in view very distant from a legal provision. Law does not admit of a
presumption against rational conduct; but though it should be admitted, it will
not avail: as every man is bound in conscience to obey the laws of his country,
the husband, when disposed to think, will find his wife entitled by that law to
the jus relictae, and will see that an attempt to disappoint her would be
against conscience. This must be evident to him when at home, and it must be
equally evident that change of place cannot relieve him. At any rate, the jus
relictae must have its effect as to his moveables in Scotland; and it would not
be a little heteroclete, that his transient effects should be withdrawn, for no
better reason, than that they happen accidentally to be in a foreign country,
where the jus relictae does not obtain. (B. 3. C. 8. sec. 3.)
[588] The following authorities were stated, at length at the end of the
responÁdent's case, from tlie writers on the law of nations, and the civilians,
in -favour of the lex domicilii.
" Puisque 1'etranger demeure citoyen de sou pais et membrei de sa
nation, les biens qu'il laisse en mourant dans un pais etranger, doivent
naturellement passer a 'ceux qui sent heritiers suivant les loix de 1'etat dont
il est membre. Mais oette regie generale n'empeche point que les biens
immeubles ne doivent suivre les dispositions des loix du paisi ou ils sont
situes.-Mais quant Èux biensi mobiliares, argent ct autres effets, qui'l
possede ailleurs, qu'il a aupres de lui, o u, qui suivent sa personne; il faut
distinguer entre les lois locales, dont 1'effeit ne peut s'etendre au dehors du
territoire et les loix qui affectent proprement la qualite de citoyen.
L'etranger ˜ demeurant citoyen de sa patrie il est toujours lie par ces
dernieres loix, en quelque lieu qu'il se trouve, et il doit s'y conformer dans
la disposition de ses biens libres, de sea biens rnobiliaires quelconques. Les
loix de cette espece, du pais ou/ il se trouve, et dont il ne'est pas citoyen,
ne 1'obligent point. Ainsi un homme qui teste et meurt en pais etranger, ne
peut oter a sa. veuve la portion de ses biensi mobiliaires assignee a cette
veuve par les loix de la patrie. Ainsi un Genevois, oblige par la lod de Geneve
a laisser une legitime a ses freres, on a ses cousins, s'ils sont ses plus
proches heretiers, ne peut les en priver en testant dans un pais etranger, tant
qu'il demeure citoyen de Geneve ; et un etranger mourant a Geneve n'est point
tenu de se conformer a cet egard aux loix de la republique. C'est tout le
contraire pour les loix locales; elles reglent ce qui peut se faire dans le
territoire et ne s'etendent point au dehors." (Vattel, liv. 2. cap. 8.
sec. 110, 111.)
" Etenim regulariter mobilia ubicunque naturaliter existerent illic
censentur esse ubi dominus domicilium fovet, immobilia, illic ubi vere saint.
Indeque immobilia regenda lege loci in quoi sita sunt, mobilia vero es lege
domicilii domini; cum ergo actiones personates saltern ex communi consensu eas
quae ad rem mobilem tendunt mobilibus annumerari dictum sit; consequens est ut
licet proprie nullibi situm habeant tanquam incorporalesi, tamen illic esso
censea,ntur ubi creditor in cujus domino et patrirnonio actiones sunt, doimicilium
fixit." (Voet, lib. 1. tit. S. sec. .)
" Mobilium tamen rations in dispoaitionibus testamentariis dum
quaeritur an illae in universum permittendae sint nee ne, uti et ab intestato
successionibus dona-tionibus. inter conjuges vetitis permissisve, et aliis
similibus, de juris rigore corn-muni, quasi gentium omnium consensu laxatum
est, sic ut ex comitate profecta regula praxi universali invaluerit, mobilia in
dubio regi lege loci in quo eorum
1285
VI BROWN. APPX. NO. II. HOG V. LASHLEY [1792]
dominus domicilium fovet, ubicunque ilia vere extiterint." (Tit. 4. de Statut.
sec. 12.)
" Irritum proprie dicitur testamentuni, cum testator maximam,
mediam, vel minimam patitur capitis diminutionem, atque ita [589] activam
testamenti factionem habere desinit ex status mutatione. § aliO' autem 4
Instit. quib. mod. testam. infirm. 1. si quis 6, § irritum 5 S. h. t. Et
quamvis hodie apud nos et plerosque alioe nulla capitis diminutio testamenti
semel recte conditi vires perimat; tamen si quis habitans in loco, in quoi
minor annorum numerus in testatore requiritur, veluti in testari licet, veluti
in Hollandia, ibidem anno decimoi quinto testanientum feoerit, deinde vero
domicilium alia transtulerit, ubi necdum per aetatem testari licet, veluti
ultrajectum, ubi plena pubertas in masculo testatore exigitur, testanientum ejus quantum ad mobilia per
talem migrationem irritum efficitur. Idemque eveniet, si Hollandus uxoreni
heredeni instituerit (quod ibi licitum) deinde vero ad aliam migret regionem,
ibique domicilium figat, ubi gratificatio inter conjuges ne supremo quidem
elogio permissa est; nam et hoc in casu mobilium intuitu in irritum deducitur
voluntas ejus; cum mobilia in successione testata, vel intestata regantur ex
lege domicilii defuncti, adeoque res devenerit in hisce ad eum cas.um, a quo
propter qualitateim testatoris, vel honorati, initium habere nequit. Neque enim
suffioit in honorato, quod tempore facti testamenti capax sit, sed et tempore
mortis testatoris eum capacem esse, necesse est. § in extraneis 4 Instit. de
hered. qualit. eit differentia. Et quod attinet aetatem in testatore
requisitam, ilia utique testatoris qualitatem conceirnit, quam a jure habet,
adeoque ilia testandi habilitas aut inhabilitas, quae ex aetate est, pro-xime
accedit ad illa^m, quae ex eo1 est, quod quis vel paterfamilias vel films
faniilias sit; ac proinde, uti testator paterfamilias sibi imputare debet, quod
ge&e alteri adrogaadum dederit et sic sese exuetrit testandi faoultate: ita
quoque, qui ex Hollandia domicilium transfert ad eum locum in quo per aetatem
necdum testari potest." (Lib. 28. tit. 3 sec. 12.)
Ulric Huber, after laying down certain axioms relative to the municipal
la.ws of particular states, thence deduces the following position: "
Cuncta negotia et acta, tarn in judicio quam extra judicium, seu mortis causa
sive inter vivos, secundum jus certi loci rite celebrata, valent, etiam ubi
diversa juris observatio viget, ac
ubi sic inita, queimadmodum f acta sunt, non valerent. E contra, negotia et
acta. certo loco contra leges ejus loci celebrata, cum sint ab initio invalida,
nusquam valere possunt; idque non modo' respectu hominum, qui in locus
contractus haibent do'inicilium, sed et illorum, qui ad tempus ibidem
commorantur. Subhac tamen exceptione; si rectores 'alterius populi ex inde
notabili incommodo afficerentur, ut hi talibus actis atque negotiis usum
effectumque dare non teneantur, secundum tertii axiomatis limitationem."
(Pars 2. Lib. 1. Tit. 3. sec. 3.) And after illustrating this rule by different
examples, from testaments, contracts, decrees, actions, marriages, and the
qualities of persons; under which last he seems to comprehend the power of testing, he says: " Qualitates
personales certo loco alicui jure impressas, ubique circumferri et personam
comitari, cum hoc effectu, ut ubivis locorum eo jure, qua tales personae alibi
gaudent vel subject! sunt, fruantur et subjiciantur. Hinc qui apud nos in
tutela, cura.ve sunt, ut adolescentes, filiifam. [590] prodigi, mulieres
nuptae, ubique pro personis curae subjectis habentur, et jure, quod cura
singulis in locis tribuit, utuntur, fruuntur. (Sec. 13.)-Sunt, qui huno
effectum qualitatis personalis ita interpretantur, ut qui certo loco1, major
aut minor, pubes aut impubes, films aut paterfamilias sub curatorei vel extra
curam est, ubique tali jure fruatur, eique subjiciatur, quoi fruitur et cui
subjicitur in eo loco, ubi primum talis factus est, aut talis habetur; proinde,
quod in patria potest aut non potest f acere, id eum nusquain non posse vel
prohiberi facere. Quae res mini non videtur habere rationem, quia nimia inde
o-vyx1'0''5 jurium et onus pro vicinis, ex aliorum legibus oriretur. Exemplis
momentum rei patebit. Filiusfam, in Frisia non potest facere testanientum.
Proficisoitur in Hollandia,m ibique facit testanientum, quaeiritur, aii vaJeat?
Puto valere utique in Hollandia, per regulam primam et secundam, quod leges
afficiant omnes eos, qui sunt in aliquo territorio : nee civile sit, ut Batavi
de negotio apud se gesto, suis legibus neglectis, secundum alienas judicent.
Attamen verum est, id heic in Frisia non habiturum esse effectum, per regulam
tertiam, quod eo modo nihil facilius foreti qua.ni leges nostras a civibus
eludi, sicut eluderentur Omni die. Sed alibi tale testanientum valebit, etiam
ubi filiusfam. non licet facere testanientum,
1286
APPX. NO. II. HOG V.
LASHLEY [1792] VI BROWN.
qui cessat ibi ilia ratio eludendi juris patrii per sues cives: quod in
tali specie non foret commissum. (Sec. 14.)-Hoc exemplum spectabat actum ob personalem
quali-tatem domi prohibitum. Dabimus aliud da actu domi lioito, sed illic, ubi
celebratus est, prohibito, in suprema curia quandoque judicatum. Rudolphus
Monsema natus annos 17, Groninga diebus quatuordecim postquam illuc
migra,verat, ut pharma-ceuticam disceret, testamentum condiderat, quod ei in
Frisia liberum erat facere, sed Groningae, ait D. Nauta relator hujus judicati,
non licet idem puberibus infra 20 annos, nee tempore morbi fatalis, neque de
bonis haereditariis ultra partem dimidiam. Decesserat ex eoi morbo adolescens,
herede patruo, materteris legato dimissis, quae testamentum dicebant nullum,
utpote factum contra jus loci. Heres urgere, personÁalem qualitatem ubique
circumferri, et jus ei in patria. competens alibi quoque valere; sed judicatum
est contra testamentum, convenienter ei quod diximus, praesertim, cum heic
eludendi juris patrii affectatio' nulla suisset."
Rodenboiirg not only lays down the general principle in his treatise
" De jure quod oritur ex statutorum vel consuetudinum discrepantium
oonflictu," but also1 refers to many particular cases in which the law of
the domicile applies to testate as well as to intestate succession. It will
suffice to state the rule itself in his own words. (Cap. 2. Tit. 1. in fine.)
In one passage he says, " Mobilia quippe ilia non ideo subjacent statute-,
quod personale illud sit, sed quod mobilia certo ac fixo situ ca-rentia, ibi
quemque situm velle habere, ao existere intelligimus, ubi larem ac fortunarum
fixit summarn. Quare quodcunque domicilii judex de mobilibus statuerit, non
ideo in alibi existentibus obtinere dixeris, quod vires extra territorium
porrigat statutum, nedum quod personale sit, sed quod in domicilii loco mobilia
intelligantur existere." (Tit. 2.) And in another [591] " Diximus
mobilia situm habere intelligi, ubi dominus instruxerit domicilium, nee aliter
mutare eundem, quam una cum domicilio. Et subest ratio, mobilia quippe, curn
perpetuum ac fixum, ut res foli, locum non habeant, totum illud dependeat
necesse est a destinatione ejus, cujus ea res est, ut ibi habeantur mobilia
existere, ubi esse ea voluerit dominus: ha,ud aliter ao ipsamet persona, ibi
esse, vel domicilium habere accipitur, ubi semet esse voluerit. Igitur ibi
mobilia. sua quemque velle ut existant credimus, ubi degit ipse, laremque favet
ac fortunarum habet summa.m. Quo jure et nomina non immerito censueris, ut ea
in successionibus et similibus mobilium rerum sortiantur naturam."
By the 39th article of the 16th title of the laws of Meckline, it is
declared, that " Omnia bona mobilia, aurum, argentum, gemmae, ornamenta,
pecunia numerata, siv(r) quae in nominibus debjentur haareditati, intra fines
jurisdibti'onisi reique publicae Mechliniensis, quocunque loco ea reperta
fuerint, ita dividentur, ut ea bona mobilia quae intra pomoerium Mechliniense
reperiuntur."
Christinaeus thus begins his commentary upon this law: "Mobilia
ergo quae sunt extra territorium statuentium, debent judicari perinde ac si
forent in eo loco in quo erat persona defuncti, secundum tradita a Do. Andr.
Gayl. Pract. Observ. lib. 2. Observ. 124. num. 18. quia, uti ibidem dicit, bona
mobilia respiciunt per-sonam." Here follow several authorities, after
which the author thus proceeds: " Idem dicendum sit in nominibus
dubitorum, eo quod actio personalis semper cohoereat ossibus personae, et ab ea
separari nequeat. Ac proind(r) non habent situm."
The fifth head of his commentary upon this article states the Question:
" An hie articulus locum habeat tarn in causa testati quam intestati ?
" with regard to which he observes, " Ej usque ratione cum statutum
hoc, ibi, Alle havelyche geoden; (omnia bona mobilia) et ibi Gelt ende
schulden, generaliter loquatur, diu multum-que me referente agitatum
disputatumque fuit in causa Caroli vanden Wiele et consortium actorum, contra
haeredes domicellae Anna(r) Bernaerts viduae quondam Arnoldi vanden Wiele, ej
usque institutae haeredis reos, an hie articulus locum haberet tarn in causa
testati quam intestati: et sanior pars censuit eundem locum habere, cum
statutum non constituat difEerentiam inter succedendi modum, sed indistincte
declaret, mobilia et nomina^ ubicumque loeorum reperta, haberi debere pro
repertis in loco domus mortuariae; ut inde recte consequatur maritum et uxorem,
cum haec mobilia et nomina habeantur quasi subjurisdictione Mechliniensi sita,
de his aliter disponere non potuisse per testamentum in mutuum favorem et
commodum, quam ex praescripto statuti, hoc est coram magistratu Mechliniensi,
na,m si testati et intestati causam probe spectemus, nulla hac in parte
constituenda videtur differentia."
1287
VI BROWN. APPX. NO. II. HOG V. LASHLEY [1792]
[the appeal in this case was barely dismissed, and the interlocutors
comÁplained of affirmed; but the Editor has no opportunity o f knowing from
anything that appears on this case, to what extent [592] the House of Lords
coincided with the reasons adduced by the Respondents.
The following extracts from the Appellant's case will, in some measure,
shew the state of the argument on the contrary side of the question. The
reasons, as stated in that case, were merely short deductions from these
arguments.]
It was argued (T. Erskina, W. Grant, J. Anstruther), that the right of
succession is a consequence of the right of property, and that a right of
alienation is necesÁsarily inherent in a right of property: the same reasoning
which supports the right of alienation and conveyance inter vivos, applies
equally to trans^ ferring property by testamentary deeds; and accordingly it
has. been so treated by every writer upon the law, and particularly by Grotius,
and by Lord Stair, B. 3, Title 4. § 2. The former of these writers exÁpresses
himself in the following terms: " Quanquam, ewim testamentum ut actus alii
formam certain accipere possit a jure civili ipsa tamen ejus substantia cognata
est dominio, et eo' dato juris naturalis;" and the latter says, that Every
right being a faculty or power of exaction, or disposal, it is a chief interest
and effect of it that the owner may dispose thereof, not only to take effect presently, but, if he
please, after his death; and, by the law of nature,, the sole will of the owner
is sufficient to pass his right, if communicable, to take effect in his life,
or after his death: so then the first rule of succession, in equity, is the
express will of the; owner, willing such and such persons to succeed him in
whole or in part."
Testamentary succession being therefore founded on the nature of
property itself, is the original species of succession; and legal succession,
or succession ab intestato, can only take place as subsidiary to, and in the
absence of the express declared will of the deceased. It has accordingly been
held by all writers as founded on the presumed will of the proprietor, which is
not to1 be understood to mean the will which it is to be presumed the party actually had, but that which it is to
be presumed he either had or would have had if he had willed at all upon the
subject. Grotius, L. 2. C. 7. § 3. says, " Successio ab intestato quae
dicitur posito dominio remota omni lege civili ex conjectura voluntatis
naturalem habet originem," Puf-fendorf, 1. 4. c. 11. § 1. treats it thus:
" Ex dispositione legis naturalis sine expresso et peculiari facto prioris
domini dominia rerwm transire dicuntur in successionibus ab intestato scilicet
cum eo dominii vis foret attributor ut quis de rebus suis possit disponere non
solum quoad ipse-in vivis esset sed etiam efficaciter in mortis eventum in
olios transferre probabile non videatur si quis super bonis suis, nihil
dkpre-henderetur dispossuisse eum ilia a morte sua pro derilectus habita cui
vis occupanti voluisse pateri igitur sequendum hie defuncti voluntatem
probabilissime presump-tam ratio naturalis dictabat."
Lord Stair, throughout his whole title of succession, B. 3. t. 4. treats
succession ab intestato as founded on the presumed or conjectured will of the
deceased, and expressly says, s. 3. where there is no express will, " the
presumed will of the defunct takes place."
[593] If the will of the proprietor forms the groundwork of the natural
right of succession, and if succession ab intestato be founded also upon that will, to be preÁsumed
according to some rule which each particular country may think best for that
purpose; it will follow, that all restraints upon the will of the proprietor, or
upon his power of disposing, established by the municipal laws of any country,
are pro tanto contrary to the nature of property, and infringements upon
natural right; they are therefore to be construed strictly even by the courts
of justice of that state by which they are imposed, and are not to be extended
to another state, when the law leaves an absolute power of disposal in the
owners of property.
If there be no positive la,w regulating the succession, to1 property
situated in another state, and if succession ab intestato be nothing more than
a rule established for discovering the presumed will of the deceased, the rule
adopted for that purpose may either be the lex domicilii of the deceased, or
the law of the locus rei sitae, according as the one or other shall be thought
most proper for the purpose. Both countries act upon the same principles, viz.
a desire to carry into effect the will of the deceased, although they may have
adopted different means of attaining their conÁclusion ; but the question cannot
arise in the case of testamentary succession, because
1288
APPX. NO. II.
HOG V. LASHLEY [1792] VI BROWN.
it is idle to discuss whether this or that rule be the most proper for
discovering the presumed will of a person who* has expressly declared what his
will is.
Property situated in another country can only pass by the law of that
country where it is situated. The lex domicilii of the owner is in every
respect a foreign law, and has no binding operation as law in the country where
the property is situated; and when adopted, it is not adopted as a law to
regulate property: but as a rule of presumption can only be appealed to in a
case where there is room for presumption, and in such cases it may perhaps be
the best rule of presumption after succession ab intestate is established, it
seems no unreasonable supposition that when a person dies without a will, he
means to leave his succession to be regulated as the law shall direct; and if
such a supposition is to take place, it is equally reasonable to suppose that
he meant his property to be regulated by that law which he knew best; or in
other words, by the lex domicilii; and the appellant would hazard nothing in
admitting that such presumptions are fair and reasonable in any case where
preÁsumptions can at all take place.
It was further argued, That there is no reason for distinguishing
alienation by will, from any other species of alienation. If a person having
property in England, alienates that property by an instrument valid by the laws
of England for that purÁpose, it seems perfectly immaterial to inquire, whether
such an instrument was valid by the laws of the country where he happened to
reside at the time; it is not intended to have any operation there, nor
intended to convey property
situated there. '
[594] It is enough if it be valid by the law of the country where it is
intended to, operate; and it would be carrying the argument a great way, to
say, that in order effectually to alienate property situated in another
country, it is not only necessary to do it by an instrument effectual by the
law of the country where the property is situated; but also, that the
instrument must be one which would have been effectual to have transferred the
property, if it had been situated in the place where the party resided.
And therefore, unless it can be contended that there is some distinction
between alienation by will, and other modes of alienation, it is sufficient to
inquire whether the instrument is valid to transfer property situated in
England, a point which cannot be disputed after probate has been granted by the
proper ecclesiastical court.
But further; This is not a case where the alienation could not have been
made by the law of Scotland; for it is admitted, that the right to legitim
might have been deÁfeated a thousand ways by conveyance inter vivos, by
changing the nature of the property, by vesting it in heritable bonds, in
personal bonds, secluding executors' bonds, bonds with substitutions; or even
in bonds with a substitution to such person as he should name by any writing
under his hand; therefore, as the thing might have been done by one mode or
other, according to the law of Scotland, the question comes to- be, Whether in
order to transfer property in England, which property might have been legally
transferred according to the law of both countries, it be necessary to use the
English or Scotch form of conveyance? or whether a conveyance valid by the laws
of England, becomes invalid, merely because the person executing it happens to
live in Scotland? It has been often contended and properly decided, that a
conveyance of personal property, if executed according to- the forms of the lex
domicilii, is sufficient to convey property, although situated in another
country; because the person is supposed to be conversant in the law of his own
country only. It is upon this principle that the deeds of one country are
sustained in another; but it never was contended, that if a person living in a
foreign country, made himÁself acquainted with the laws of the country where
his property was situated, and endeavoured to convey it according to those
laws, that this very act rendered his conÁveyance invalid ; and that no
conveyance can be valid but one executed according to the forms of the lex
domicilii, although it be executed according to the forms of the law in loco
rei sitae.
It was also observed by the appellants, that one great argument used by
Lord Hardwick, in the case of Thorn and Watkins, in favour of the lex domicilii
taking place in intestate succession, namely, that a contrary decision would
destroy the credit of the funds, must, in this case of testate succession,
operate directly the conÁtrary way; for if it shall be held, that the property
of [595] Scotchmen situated in
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VI BROWN. APPX. NO. II.
HOG V. LASHLEY [1792]
England, is liable to the claim of legitim, it necessarily follows, that
every Scotchman who wishes to have a power of disposing of his property by will
or testamentary deed, must withdraw his property from the funds, and transfer it
to Scotland.
The respondent, in the course of his arguments, laid much stress upon
the supÁposed maxim, that mobilia non habent situs, and are to be considered as
having no proper local situation, but as being attached to the person of the
proprietor, and therefore situated at the place of his domicile. If this maxim
bq true to its utmost extent, then unquestionably there can be no dispute what
law is to take place; for in every possible case, the lex domicilii, and the
law of the locus rei sitae, must be the same. It is because the maxim is not
true, that the question is raised; for, in the very terms of it, it supposes
the situs of the property to be in one place, and the domicile of the person in
another.
It would be idle to discuss, whether property situated in England was
to be governed by the law of England, if it were an incontrovertible
proposition of law, that no domiciled Scotchman could have moveable property
situated in England. It is however unquestionably true, that to many purposes,
moveables have a situs, and may be described by it.
The maxim can mean no more than a short way of expressing the opinion of
those who think that the lex domicilii should regulate succession ab intestato in
moveables; and therefore this maxim, or rather this section, may be very much
laid out of the question; the true state of it being, by what law is testate
succession in inobilibus to be regulated, when the domicile is in one place,
and the -situs of the moveÁables in another? It may also be observed, that this
maxim or fiction of some foreign jurists (for they are by no means all agreed
on it) has no force in this country as a maxim of law. It can derive its force
only from the reasoning by which it is supported. It is therefore by a
discussion of that reasoning, by which it is proved that the lex domicilii
ought to take place in opposition to the law of locus rei sitae, that the
question is to be decided, and not by a quotation of the maxim that mobilia non
habent situs. Indeed, it is in itself nothing more than a fiction, invented and
supported as a means of getting rid of the difficulty of the reasoning, by
converting a question of fact into a proposition of law; and it is accordingly
treated by its warmest supporters as a pure fiction.
From the quotation from Voet, lib. 1. tit. 4. pars 2. de statut. sect.
11. relied upon by the respondent (see ante, p. 579 ), it was contended by the
appellant to be clearly understood by that author as nothing mo re than, a
fiction, or presumption, established for discovering the presumed will of a
person. Where that will is not expressed and confined to that case, the
appellant has no occasion to dispute its truth, or the propriety of its
application. It may however be remarked, that it would be more simple to [596]
say, that when a person dies intestate, it may be fairly presumed, that he
intended his property to be divided at his death by the law of his own country,
with which he was acquainted, than to have recourse to any fiction whatsoever,
the truth of which cannot be supported even by those who are its warmest
advocates. For this very same author, lib. 48. tit. 20. sect. 7. treats it as a
maxim by no means applicable to all cases; or rather, he confines its applicaÁtion
to the single case of intestate succession. In reasoning upon the effect of a
forfeiture for a crime in one state, upon property situated in another, after
conÁtending that such forfeiture would operate1 to confiscate immoveable
property to the state where it lay, provided the crime was such as would have
induced a forfeiture if it had been tried in that state, he adds, " Nee
aliud ex juris rigore statuendum de mobilibus licet enim in materia
successionis ab intestato, receptum sit mobilia regi lege, domicilii defuncti
quia ubicunque naturaliter existant finguntur domino presentia esse tcunen vere
subsant potestati atque imperio ejus in cujus territorio inveniwntw."-From
this quotation it is clear, that Voet does not consider this maxim, so much relied
upon by the respondent, as universally true or universally applicable. On the
contrary, he considers it as solely relating to the case of intestate
succession, and as a presumption established for the discovery of supposed
will. With this case, therefore,, it has no relation. This, which is fairly to
be inferred from the opinions of Voet, is distinctly laid down by Huber, an
eminent Dutch, lawyer, and one no less an advocate for the lex domicilii being
the proper rule for determining succession ab intestato. He states the
question, " Si quis moriatur
1290
APPX. NO. II.
HOG V. LASHLEY [1792] VI BROWN.
intestatus relictis bonis in diversis civitatibus quae non eisdem
legibus succedendi utuntur utrum successio defera-tur secunduin legis
reipublici in qua vixit et mortuus est defunctus an ubi sita sunt bona."
To which hei answers, " ImmobHia sequi jus loci in quo sita sunt mobilia
cum non faciant partem territorii sed afectionem ad personam ultimi possessoris
habeant sequntur jus locit in quo illi domicUium habuit." And then he
adds, " Quod si testatoris vel contrahentes claris verbis ex-presserunt
quid de rebus immobilibus fieri vellent turn ratio juris gentium postulat ut
voluntas afectum suum habeat ubicunque sitae sint mobilis immobilisve, cum nihil
tarn naturali, sit quam ut volwntas domini volentis rem suam in aliwm
traii*-ferre rata habeatur ut ait Justinianus in sect, per Traditionem 40 Inst.
de Acquir. B. D. Hob. di. Jur. I. 5. sect. 4. tit. sect. 22, 23." It might
almost be supposed, that this opinion was given upon this very case, and will
decide it, as far at least as the opinions of foreign lawyers can have any
weight.
But it has been contended, that although it may be true that some
moveables have a situs, yet that debts nomina debitoris follow necessarily the
person of the creditor. This, although it were admitted, would not affect a,
great part of the property, conÁtested in this case, most of which consists of
money in the [597] funds, which cerÁtainly must peculiarly be considered as
having a situs; so much, that it cannot be: transferred from one hand to
another, unless the owner comes himself to the place where it is, or authorises
some person to appear and act for him; and accordingly every foreign writer
upon the law has stated depositae montium, as peculiarly having a situs, which
bears a strict similarity to money in the funds.
It seems to have been a point by no means settled in the law of
Scotland, whether nomina debitoris follow the person of the creditor or the
debtor. Dirleton, one of the acutest writers on the law of Scotland, puts the
questions, si nomina, which are not res, but entio rationis have situm, when
the debtor is in Scotland, animo re-manendi, and the debt is contracted with
him as residing there? He then states the argument on both sides, and clearly
shews to which his own opinion leans. Ratio dubitandi, they are thought and
called a personal interest; and, therefore, should sequi personam: Contra, they
are res in obligationi et potentia. Ido, If the creditor be forefaulted in
France, being a Frenchman, they do not forefault to that king quia subditus
amittet, only quia sunt civitatis. Ztio, They are liable in ScotÁland to
extraordinary taxation. 4to, The debitor is quasi servus and servi habend.
situm,; to consider quid juris elsewhere, as to Banks, and monies pietatis.
Stewart, the commentator-of Dirleton, leans to the opposite opinion, but with
great hesitation.
In a variety of cases the law does suppose debts to have a situs in the
country of the debtor; a debt due in Scotland does not rest, ipso jure, in the
assignees under a commission of bankrupt. Now, if they were to be considered as
situated in England only, the assignees must have, ipso jure, a complete right.
The process of arrest ment, by the law of Scotland, is founded entirely upon
the idea, that the property of a creditor is in the hands of debtor, situated
where he is, and must be produced by him upon the decree of forthcoming. It is
not used for the purpose of preÁventing the debtor from paying to his creditor,
or for transferring a right from the creditor, but is a process to compel the
debtor to deliver up property which he has in his hands really belonging to his
creditor, but which that creditor ought to pay to the person using the;
arrestment. It is therefore not the transference of a right, but a demand to
deliver up property; for this purpose, it must be supposed to have an actual
situs in the place where it is demanded, and where it is required to be
delivered up. The decree is looked upon as a judicial assignation of a subject,
which therefore must be supposed to be situated in the place where the debtor
is; otherwise the judge can have no authority to deliver it up or assign it;
for arrestment is not a process in personam,, but is held by all the writers on
the law of Scotland to lay a nexus upon the subject itself, and to entitle the
arrester to an action, by which he may appropriate it to himself. The only
foundation for it therefore is, [598] that debts have a situs where the debtor
is, and where alone they can be exacted.
But the appellant further apprehends, that a series of decisions has
established it as a point of Scotch law, that the lex loci rei sitae is the
governing rule both in testate and intestate succession; and therefore, if it
be the law of England that the law of Scotland, with regard to succession, is
to regulate the succession of ScotchÁmen, dying and leaving property in
England, it will necessarily follow that the
1291
L- J
VI BROWN. APPX. NO. II. HOG V. LA.SHLEY [1792]
operation of the la.w of Scotland must be confined to property situated
in Scotland only. The law of Scotland must therefore be inquired after as a
fact; and if a series of decisions are adhered to, the law of Scotland confines
itself within the limits of the country, and decides that the law of England
must take place with regard to proÁperty situated there; it is therefore a
matter of no importance to the appellant, whether the law of England or the law
of Scotland be held the rule of succession in the present case. If the law of
England be, that the law oi Scotland shall prevail with regard to the property
of Scotchmen situated in England, then the law of Scotland decides, that with
regard to such property, the law of England is the rule; if, on the contrary,
it be held, that the law of England and its rules of distribution regulate
without distinction all property lying within its reach, then equally the
appellant must succeed. At the same time it is to be observed, that although
it were proved that the lex domicilii were the rule as to intestate succession,
the argument will not bear upon the case of testamentary succession. Lord
Stair, b. 1. t. 1. sect. 16. says, " The law of Scotland regulates the
succession and rights of Scotchmen in Scotland, though dying abroad and
resident there; expressly laying it down, that though domiciled abroad, the
succession, to Scotch rights must be governed by Scotch law, and completely
disregarding the law of the domicile." Lord Bankton follows the same
doctrines, b. 1.1. 1. sect. 82, 83. He says, " The succession of persons
residing and dying abroad, devolves according to the laws of the place where
the subject lies." He then proceeds to give instances, and concludes,
" For the same reason in legal succession, whether of heritage or
moveables, the rule is, that those who are called to it, who by the laws of the
place where the subject lies are entitled, and not those who are the lineal
successors by the law of the country where the proprietor resided and
died." These opinions of the most respectable writers upon the Scotch law
have been followed by a series of decisions in the courts of that country for
near two centuries. The first case which is to be found, is so early as the
year 1611, Haddington; and is thus abridged in the Dictionary, vol. 1. p.
320.-"A ScotchÁman, born bastard, dying in England, his goods will fall
under escheat to1 the king, and his donator will have a right thereto,
notwithstanding any testament made by the; bastard unconfirmed in England; and
[599] albeit it be alleged that bastards have testamenti factionem there."
It is clear, that if in this case the lex domicilii had been, followed,
and if it were supposed that all moveables had situs, there the decision must
have been in favour of the will. And what forms a strong point of similarity
between this case and the present is, that the restraint which the law of
Scotland imposes upon the facultas testandi of bastards is not dissimilar to
the restraint which is imposed on a father with respect to legitim.
The next case, in point of time, is to be found in Durie, December 9th,
1623, Henderson's Bairns contra Debtors. And although it was a case concerning
heriÁtable bonds only, and in which the testator had, by will made in Flanders,
instituted all his children his heirs, which testament was not by the law of
Scotland valid to pass heritage; yet it is important to mention it here,
because thei reasons assigned for the judgment clearly shew the opinion of the
judges upon the present point. After mentioning that such a testament was valid
by the law of Flanders, it is said, '˜' That that testament could not be
valuable but for the goods and heritage which was within the province where the
testator made his testament, and could not extend to goods and gear which were within
another kingdom, when the goods would not fall under that division and
testament by the law of the kingdom where the goods and lands lay; but the said
goods ought to be asked by that person who' would be found to have right
thereto, by the law of the kingdom where they were, and not by the law of any
other kingdom; neither could the law of any other country have place in
Scotland, for any thing being within Scotland, but the proper law of the
country itself."-The next casie is Melvill and Dnuniiiond, July 16, 1634,
Durie, whic also related to heritable bonds, but the ratio decidendi is stated
to be, that bona tarn mobilia quam immobilia regulantur juxta legis regni and
loci quo bona ea jacent et sita swnt.
The same principle seems to have guided the judges during the
usurpation, June 1656, Craig v. Lord Traquair, and January 19, 1665, Lewis
contra Shaw, where a nuncupative testament made by a person domiciled in
England was found
1292
DRUMMOND V. DRUMMOND [1799] VI BROWN.
not effectual to carry moveable estate situated in Scotland, although
the, will was actually proved in the ecclesiastical court in England; and this
case is more deservÁing of attention, because the very same arguments which are
now adduced were then offered without effect. Yet had it ever been imagined by
the lawyers of that day, that the lex domicilii must govern, and that mobilia-
non habent situs, it is impossible not to have given them effect, and decided a
contrary way.
The rule in the law of Scotland, of rejecting nuncupative testaments, is
a limitation of the facultas testandi; and in this case, the law of Scotland
gave effect to its own restraints in the [600] case of goods in Scotland
belonging to a. domiciled Englishman; it never could intend that Scotch
restraints were to operate over proÁperty situated in England, although
belonging to a person domiciled in Scotland. There are a variety of other
cases, all tending to establish the proposition, that the law of Scotland
regulates the succession to personal property by the lex loci rei sitae: It is
unnecessary to do more than mention them. Bisset v. Brown, July 19th, 1666,
reported by Dirleton; Archbishop of Glasgow contra Bruntsfield, Mar. 1583;
Dryden v. Elliot, 1684; both reported in Harcarse; Larimer contra Mortimer,
February 1st, 1770; Elcherson and Davidson, January 13th, 1778; and Henderson
and Maclean in the same year; and the only case which supports the contrary
docÁtrine, is that of Brown and Brown, November 28th, 1744, reported by
Falconer and Kilkerran, which seems never to have been followed, and even to
have been disÁapproved of at the time it was made, as clearly appears, by what
is said by Lord Kilkerran, in his report of Morrison's case, Kelk. 214. voce
Foreign.
The very respectable opinion supposed to be delivered in the house of
lords in the case of Bntce and Bruce, is thought by the respondent to bear upon
this case; but the appellant apprehends, that it was not necessary in that case
expressly to determine what was the law of Scotland, because the House of Lords
were of opinion, that Mr. Bruce was not domiciled in Scotland; and therefore;
the law of Scotland could not apply to his case, it not even being pretended
that he had any property there. He imagines himself, with the utmost deference
to that opinion, still at liberty to contend what the law of Scotland is in
his case; and even if it were supÁposed that that very weighty opinion decided
what was the law of Scotland in a case of intestate succession, and what was
the best rule of presuming the will of the deceased; yet he still apprehends,
that he is at liberty to argue, and hopes he has proved, that the principles
upon which that opinion is supposed to be grounded, do not apply to the case of
testate succession upon which he relies. If the appellant succeeds in
establishing, either that the lex loci rei sitae is the rule of Scotch law,
with regard to the succession to the moveable estate of Scotchmen, wherever
situated; or if he has succeeded in establishing, that the1 lex domicilii is a
rule only adopted for the purpose of ascertaining presumed will, and therefore
not applicable to this case; it will be, unnecessary for him to discuss what is
the rule adopted by the law of England. It is quite enough for his purpose,
that it is admitted that the law of England looks to the lex domicilii, that
is, the law of Scotland, which he conceives he has proved to be in his favour.