[HOUSE OF LORDS]

AND

[On appeal from ARSENAL FOOTBALL CLUB LTD. v. ENDE]

Rating - Rateable occupation - Manager of house - Agent receiving rent and paying rates - Whether person who "receives the rents" - Whether in rateable occupation - Whether "person... aggrieved" by under-valuation of football stadium - General Rate Act 1967 (c. 9), ss. 24, 69 (1), 115 ¹

Rating - Valuation list - Alteration - Ratepayer's proposal for increase in rateable value of football stadium - Whether ratepayer in same rating or precepting area without direct financial detriment "person... aggrieved" by under-assessment - Position of taxpayer - General Rate Act 1967, s. 69 (1)

The rateable value of a football club's stadium in the London Borough of Islington was shown in the valuation list

1 General Rate Act 1967, s. 24: see post, pp. 14G-15A.

S. 69 (1): see post, p. 14C-D.

as £9,250. A ratepayer, E, who lived about half-a-mile from the stadium in the adjoining borough of Hackney, in the same precepting area as Islington, managed a house in Islington as agent for a private company. E received the rents from the occupiers of the house, which was rated as a single hereditament, and out of the rents he paid the rates and outgoings for the house. E claimed to be a "person... aggrieved" within section 69 (1) of the General Rate Act 1967 by the value ascribed in the list to the stadium and proposed that it should be altered to £60,000. The local valuation court increased the entry for the stadium in the valuation list to £13,900. The Lands Tribunal, on appeals by the club and the valuation officer, held on a preliminary issue that E was not the person who "receives the rents" of the Islington house within section 24 of the Act of 1967 and so was not a ratepayer in Islington, and that even if he was such a ratepayer, or was a precept payer or taxpayer, he was not a "person... aggrieved" within section 69 (1) of the Act of 1967 and accordingly restored the entry of £9,250. On appeal by E, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.

On appeal by the club:-

Held, dismissing the appeal, (1) that E was the person who "receives the rents" of the Islington house within the meaning of section 24 of the Act of 1967, and that therefore he had all the rights - as well as the liabilities - which he would have had if he had been actually in occupation of the property, and as ratepayer in his own right (post, pp. 15A-D, 21D-22B,29G - 30A, 36E-G, 37C).

Adams and Watts v. Southall Rating Authority [1943] K.B. 359, D.C. distinguished.

(2) That fairness and uniformity had always been standards by which to judge the validity of rates, and that there was nothing in the Local Government Act 1948 which derogated from that principle or changed the basic rights of individual ratepayers to complain, and that accordingly, although E could not demonstrate any financial or other loss as a ratepayer, he was in the circumstances a "person... aggrieved" within the meaning of section 69 (1) of the Act of 1967 by the alleged under-assessment of the stadium (post, pp. 15D-F, 17D-F 18C-D, 22F-H, 24F-G, 27G - 28F, 32H-33C, 34F-G, 37C).

Rex v. Sussex Justices (1812) 15 East 206 and Reg. v. Paddington Valuation Officer, Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B. 380, C.A. followed.

(3) That a ratepayer within the same precepting area as the hereditament in question had a locus standi to make a proposal in respect thereof, the only qualification on that right being that the proposal must not be frivolous or vexatious or irrelevant, and that E therefore on that ground also was entitled to make the proposal that he did (post, pp. 18E-G,25A-F, 30B-D, 35D, 37C), but not as a tax payer, his interest in that capacity being too remote (post, pp. 14F, 25H-26A,28H-29A, 35D-E, 37C).

(4) That the Lands Tribunal had had jurisdiction on appeal from the local valuation court to determine whether E was a "person... aggrieved" within the meaning of section 69 (1) of tct of 1967 (post, pp. 18G-H, 20A, 31B-C, 36G-37B, C).

Decision of the Court of Appeal [1977] Q.B. 100; [1976] 3 W.L.R. 508; [1977] 1 All E.R. 86 affirmed.

The following cases are referred to in their Lordships' opinions:

Adams and Watts v. Southall Rating Authority [1943] K.B. 359; [1943] 1 All E.R. 491, D.C.

Glamorgan County Valuation Committee v. Barry Area Assessment Committee [1931] 1 K.B. 157, D.C.

Grainger v. Liverpool Corporation [1954] 1 Q.B. 351; [1954] 2 W.L.R. 275; [1954] 1 All E.R. 333, D.C.

Ladies Hosiery and Underwear Ltd. v. West Middlesex Assessment Committee [1932] 2 K.B. 679, C.A.

Lilley and Skinner Ltd. v. Essex County Valuation Committee (1935) 51 T.L.R. 432, D.C.

Reg. v. Paddington Valuation Officer, Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B. 380; [1965] 3 W.L.R. 426; [1965] 2 All E.R. 836, C.A.

Rex v. Surrey (Mid-Eastern Area) Assessment Committee, Ex parte Merton and Morden Urban District Council [1948] 1 All E.R. 856, D.C.

Rex v. Sussex Justices (1812) 15 East 206.

Society of Medical Officers of Health v. Hope [1960] A.C. 551; [1960] 2 W.L.R. 404; [1960] 1 All E.R. 317, H.L.(E.).

Tidy v. Battman [1934] 1 K.B. 319, C.A.

Union Cold Storage Co. Ltd. v. Phillips [1976] R.A. 173, H.L.(E.).

The following additional cases were cited in argument:

Almond v. Ash Brothers & Heaton Ltd. [1969] 2 A.C. 366; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 1024; [1969] 2 All E.R. 246, H.L.(E.).

Double v. Southampton Assessment Committee [1922] 2 K.B. 213, D.C.

Hulme v. Bucklow Area Assessment Committee [1940] 2 K.B. 255; [1940] 3 All E.R. 79, D.C.

London Housing and Commercial Properties Ltd. v. Cowan [1977] Q.B. 148; [1976] 3 W.L.R. 115; [1976] 2 All E.R. 385, D.C.

Manchester Assessment Committee v. Heyland Ltd. (1943) 14 D.R.A. 121, D.C.

Pointer v. Norwich Assessment Committee [1922] 2 K.B. 471, C.A.

Pratt v. North-West Norfolk Assessment Committee [1947] A.C. 635; [1947] 1 All E.R. 920, H.L.(E.).

Reg. v. Greater London Council, Ex parte Blackburn [1976] 1 W.L.R. 550; [1976] 3 All E.R. 184, C.A.

Reg. v. Hereford Corporation, Ex parte Harrower [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1424; [1970] 3 All E.R. 460, D.C.

Rex v. Brentford Union Assessment Committee, Ex parte Herring (1907) 96 L.T. 704, D.C.

Rex v. Cornwall County Valuation Committee, Ex parte Falmouth Rating Authority [1937] 2 K.B. 222; [1937] 2 All E.R. 266, C.A.

Rex v. Exeter Assessment Committee, Ex parte Devon and Exeter Hotel Co. Ltd. (1948) 46 L.G.R. 553, D.C.

Rex v. Horsham and Worthing Assessment Committee, Ex parte Burgess [1937] 2 K.B. 408; [1937] 2 All E.R. 681, D.C.

Rex v. Mast (Thomas) (1795) 6 Durn. & E. 154.

Sevenoaks Urban District Council v. Twynam [1929] 2 K.B. 440, D.C.

Walsh (John) Ltd. v. Sheffield Corporation [1957] 1 W.L.R. 1074; [1957] 3 All E.R. 353, C.A.

APPEAL from the Court of Appeal.

This was an appeal by the appellants, the Arsenal Football Club Ltd., from an order of the Court of Appeal (Lord Denning M.R., Orr and Waller L.JJ.) dated August 2, 1976, allowing an appeal by the second respondent, Theodore Arthur Ende, from a decision of the Lands Tribunal dated February 5, 1975, whereby on two consolidated appeals (one by the appellants and one by the first respondent, Richard Leslie Smith (valuation officer)) from a decision of a valuation court for Greater London Central dated January 16, 1974, the Lands Tribunal on a preliminary issue allowed the appeals.

The appellants were owners and occupiers of premises known as Arsenal Football Stadium situated in the London borough of Islington (the "hereditament"). The hereditament was described in the rating valuation list for the borough as "Football grounds, stands and offices" and prior to the decision of the local valuation court mentioned above was assessed at a rateable value of £9,250.

The first respondent was the duly appointed valuation officer for the valuation area in which the hereditament was situated.

The second respondent was a private individual who (a) resided in a flat in the London borough of Hackney; and (b) was the managing agent, having the duty of collecting the rents from premises known as 22 Beaumont Rise in the London Borough of Islington used for the purposes of multiple residential occupation.

The facts are set out in their Lordships' opinions.

Lord Silsoe Q.C. and Guy Roots for the appellants. The principal issue in this appeal is whether the second respondent is "a person aggrieved" by the under-valuation for rating purposes of Arsenal Football Stadium. The appellants have contested all three of the second respondent's arguments, namely that he has a locus as (i) a ratepayer; (ii) as a precept payer and (iii) as a taxpayer. The valuation officer contends that the second respondent is not a person aggrieved as a precept payer or as a taxpayer but supports the second respondent's contention that he is a person aggrieved as a ratepayer. Whether the second respondent is a ratepayer in the Borough of Islington is a question of law which is open to some doubt.

Reliance is placed on the following propositions: (1) Merely to be a fellow ratepayer or a fellow precept payer or a taxpayer is not enough to constitute a person as one aggrieved by the under-valuation of another person's hereditament. (2) The expression "a person aggrieved" in section 69 (1) of the General Rate Act 1967 is to be construed in the context of the rating legislation as a whole and, in particular, decided cases on the prerogative orders which were relied on by the Court of Appeal are not helpful as in that field the court has a discretion whereas the valuation officer, the local valuation court and the Lands Tribunal have no discretion whether a proposal is to be given effect. (3) The test to be applied is that put forward by the appellants in the Court of Appeal and adverted to by Lord Denning M.R. in his judgment [1977] Q.B. 100, 112F-G, namely, that a person cannot be said to be "aggrieved" unless his grievance is of a kind which has some demonstrable effect on his pocket, rights or interests,

particularly singled out from those of the public generally. No matter whether the second respondent is a ratepayer, or in the precepting area, or taxpayer he has no locus standi unless he can show that the under-assessment of the Arsenal Football Club has some demonstrable effect on him. (4) Even if a ratepayer as such has a locus to make a proposal (that is as a person aggrieved) that would not go so far as to cover the position of the second respondent assuming that he is a ratepayer in Islington - it is not shown that in practice he has to bear any rates in Islington. (5) The second respondent is not a ratepayer in Islington since the person liable under section 24 of the Act is the person who receives the rent or rents for his own use and not one who receives them for someone else. (6) The Lands Tribunal did have jurisdiction to decide whether the second respondent was a person aggrieved and therefore whether the proposal was valid or not.

The General Rate Act 1967 is a consolidating Act. The scheme of the Act for present purposes is to be found in sections 1 (1), (2), 2 (1), (3), (4) (a), (b), 5 (1) (ee), 7 (1), (2), 16, 24, 67 (1), (2), (5), (6), 68 (1), (6), 69 (1), (2), (3), (5), 70 (1), (2), 71 (1), (2), 73 (1), (2), 74 (1), 76 (1), (4), (5), 77, 79 (1), (2), (3), 81 (1), (3), 87, 88 (1), 108 (1), (3), and 115 (1), (5).

A "person aggrieved" for the purposes of section 69 (1) is not defined. It need not be a ratepayer, for example it might be the tenants of 22 Beaumont Rise and therefore one requires some concept of what constitutes a grievance for the purposes of section 69 (1) which covers persons other than ratepayers.

[VISCOUNT DILHORNE: Take the case of an identical semi-detached house. Can the owner of House A be aggrieved because the rates on House B are lower than on his?]

No. The same submission applies also to houses which are opposite one another in, for example, different precepting areas, the road forming the boundary. A person aggrieved is not a person who is entitled to insert a hereditament in the list: see John Walsh Ltd. v. Sheffield Corporation [1957] 1 W.L.R. 1074. Ratepayers can only complain concerning what is in the list. It is for the valuation officer and not for ratepayers to see that there is uniformity in the list.

Even if (which is denied) ratepayers in general may be aggrieved by an under-assessment of a hereditament in the same rating area, the position of the second respondent in relation to the hereditament is very special and not such as to constitute him a person aggrieved in respect of it. Thus: (i) A football stadium and a Victorian house containing four dwellings are quite dissimilar. (ii) The second respondent (who did not give evidence in the Lands Tribunal) has not shown that the rents which he receives from occupants of 22 Beaumont Rise are insufficient to cover the rates payable on it, or (if they were insufficient) that he would be unable to recover any deficiency from his principal, or that he would be unable to protect himself by ending the arrangement by which he receives the rents. Thus, assuming that he is liable under section 24, he has not shown that any rates paid on 22 Beaumont Rise do or would come from his own pocket. (iii) As a practical matter, the second respondent's interest in the assessment of the appellant's hereditament is no different whether he is,

or is not, liable under section 24 in respect of 22 Beaumont Rise, and no different whether the valuation officer exercises his discretion under section 24 to value 22 Beaumont Rise as one or as four hereditaments. It would be illogical if the second respondent's right to make the proposal depended on the legal understanding of his position in relation to 22 Beaumont Rise, or on the way in which the valuation officer exercised his discretion on the assessment thereof. (iv) The second respondent did not disclose to the appellants, when he made the proposal, that he managed 22 Beaumont Rise as an agent, nor did the appellants know this until well after the time of objecting to the proposal. There was nothing to indicate that he made the proposal in the capacity of manager of 22 Beaumont Rise, and in truth the fact that he is the manager of it is purely fortuitous.

The expression in section 69 (1) is "a person aggrieved"; it is not "any person" and therefore there is a limitation on persons who are able to claim that they are aggrieved by one of the three stated factors in section 69 (1). In every case it is necessary to ascertain as a question of fact whether the person in question is personally affected by the under-valuation. The mere status of being a ratepayer is not sufficient to enable such a person to make a proposal. These provisions are, in effect, limited to the valuation officer, the local authority and the owner-occupier of the premises in question. In the present case it has not been demonstrably shown that the second respondent would be at all affected by the proposal.

It is to be observed that the majority of cases cited by the Court of Appeal were decisions which preceded the enactment of the General Rate Act 1967 and the Local Government Act 1948 and related to statutes where the relevant wording was materially different from that under consideration in the present appeal. Before 1862 there were no valuation lists and until that date a person whether a ratepayer or not could appeal against the general rate under a section which was the predecessor of section 7 of the Act of 1967. The system within the Metropolis differed from that in the rest of the country between 1869 and 1948 and therefore before the Local Government Act 1948 there were two separate systems in which persons might be aggrieved.

In considering the history of rating for present purposes the relevant periods are: (a) before 1862; (b) between 1862 and 1925; (c) between 1925 and 1948; (d) after 1948.

Nothing comparable to section 7 (2) of the Act of 1967 existed before 1862. That provision first came in, it is believed, in 1925. Since before 1862 there was not as now an independent valuation officer and the present rights of appeal in rating matters are more limited than they were under earlier legislation the older cases are not relevant. See for example section 4 of the Poor Relief Act 1743 which provides "(if any person) shall find himself aggrieved by any rate." Thus a case like Rex v. Sussex Justices (1812) 15 East 206 does not assist for it is not a case concerning status at all but one of procedure for at that period under the Act of 1743, as has been seen, any person could appeal.

Rex v. Brentford Union Assessment Committee, Ex parte Herring (1907) 96 L.T. 704 supports the appellant's contention. There, "any person who may feel himself aggrieved" under section 18 of the Union Assessment Committee Act 1862 was held to include a person liable to

indemnify the person actually rated. It is a question of fact. "Aggrieved" means having some material grievance and not in the sense of being aggrieved that a charity or a council house is assessed too high or too low. Double v. Southampton Assessment Committee [1922] 2 K.B. 213 supports the proposition that the mere status of being a ratepayer or precept payer is not enough to found a proposal. The grievance must relate to the same type of property as that of the ratepayer. Thus it was held in that case that a publican was "entitled to compete with his rivals in the same trade on an equal footing" (p. 224). The basis for the grievance was that there was an economic inequality. Pointer v. Norwich Assessment Committee [1922] 2 K.B. 471 has no bearing on the extent to which a person may complain concerning the valuation of a hereditament. If a person wishes to complain there are steps which he may take. Glamorgan County Valuation Committee v. Barry Area Assessment Committee [1931] 1 K.B. 157 is far removed from the present case. Ladies Hosiery and Underwear Ltd. v. West Middlesex Assessment Committee [1932] 2 K.B. 679 was not concerned with the precise extent of the grievance it was necessary to show. It does suggest however that, if the ratepayer had proceeded under section 37 of the Rating and Valuation Act 1925, there must be economic inequality in relation to the same type of property as that of the ratepayer in order to found a proposal. But the extent of the area from which a person aggrieved could be drawn was not before the court and the court was not treating it as obvious that a ratepayer as such could make a proposal. Thus Scrutton L.J. at pp. 686-688 stressed the "vital principle" of rating law that "each hereditament should be independently assessed" and that correctness should not be sacrificed to ensure uniformity so as to "obtain uniformity by correcting inaccuracies."

It is conceded that Lilley and Skinner Ltd. v. Essex County Valuation Committee (1935) 51 T.L.R. 432 is against the appellants. But again, it is not a decision which supports the proposition that status as such will support a grievance under the Act of 1925. Nor does Rex v. Cornwall County Valuation Committee, Ex parte Falmouth Rating Authority [1937] 2 K.B. 222. In Rex v. Horsham and Worthing Assessment Committee, Ex parte Burgess [1937] 2 K.B. 408, 419, 423, Lord Hewart C.J. and Singleton J. appear to have had in mind the institutions there named who were entitled to make a proposal under section 37 of the Act of 1925 and not the position of the ordinary ratepayer. Rex v. Surrey (Mid-Eastern Area) Assessment Committee, Ex parte Merton and Morden Urban District Council [1948] 1 All E.R. 856 was concerned with the phrase "a person aggrieved." It does not indicate that any person who is a ratepayer may make a proposal; it is judging whether there is a grievance or not by the result, that is, the decision of the Assessment Committee or Quarter Sessions. In the present case the second respondent has no grievance whether he be a ratepayer or not.

Following the legislation of 1948 came Rex v. Exeter Assessment Committee, Ex parte Devon and Exeter Hotel Co. Ltd. (1948) 46 L.G.R. 553 which followed the Surrey case. It indicates that for a complainant to be a "person aggrieved" it is necessary for him to have more to his case than the notion that the hereditament in question was wrongly

assessed. Grainger v. Liverpool Corporation [1954] 1 Q.B. 351 is concerned with what are the functions of a rating authority. Lord Goddard C.J. was there stating (i) that the corporation was a rating authority and (ii) a ratepayer and therefore had a right to make proposals since it could be a person aggrieved. But it is plain that the duty "laid on" a rating authority cannot apply to an ordinary ratepayer. It is not clear what "statutory limitation" upon the "right of objection" Lord Radcliffe had in mind in Society of Medical Officers of Health v. Hope [1960] A.C. 551, 565 and counsel's reference to there being "no bar to any ratepayer, as a person aggrieved, raising an objection to the alteration of the list," to which he referred, was wrong.

It is emphasised that the question whether a ratepayer could in law be "aggrieved" by an under-assessment of another hereditament, merely by his status as a ratepayer and without demonstrating a particular grievance, was not in issue in the cases relied on by the Court of Appeal. Thus in Reg. v. Paddington Valuation Officer, Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B. 380, the complainants were owners of blocks of residential flats available for letting. They were aggrieved by the under-assessment of similar residential flats in the same area. Had the above-mentioned question been raised, they could have contended that they were aggrieved by their direct competitors having an advantage in the letting market resulting from the lower assessments on their competitors' flats. Furthermore, the complainants were not ratepayers in respect of flats which they had let or were seeking to let. The Court of Appeal was wrong in taking the view that that case concluded this matter. It arose out of an application for certiorari to quash the whole valuation list. Certain dicta suggested that it was open to the complainants, as an alternative remedy, to make proposals to alter the valuation lists, but these were not part of the ratio decidendi and were made in the context of facts in which the complainants had a particular grievance and were not ratepayers in respect of their flats.

It is to be observed that a person may be aggrieved for the purposes of obtaining relief by way of a prerogative order but not aggrieved in respect of the same matter for the purposes of section 69 (1) of the Act of 1967. There is an important distinction between procedures for obtaining prerogative orders and the procedure under section 69 (1) of the Act of 1967. The grant of a prerogative order is discretionary but if a person is aggrieved under section 69 (1) he is aggrieved and there is no discretion in the matter. Cases such as Sevenoaks Urban District Council v. Twynam [1929] 2 K.B. 440; Reg. v. Hereford Corporation, Ex parte Harrower [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1424 and Reg. v. Greater London London Council, Ex parte Blackburn [1976] 1 W.L.R. 550, relied on by Lord Denning M.R., are irrelevant to the present question.

In summary, as to previous legislation, originally the only way to correct any error in a rate was by some person appealing against me rate and a person aggrieved was able to do that. The language of the Act of 1743 which gave that right was very wide. Further, there was no other way of correcting errors and there was no person to keep the balance as between various properties. A measure of control came in with the Act of 1862 and up until 1948 matters of valuation had become

increasingly the subject of specific codes rather than being left to the general remedy of an appeal against the rate. But the statutory language used before 1948 was different from and wider than that used in the Act of 1948. For example, see section 26 of the Act of 1925. Moreover, before 1948 there were two codes, one for the Metropolis and one for the rest of England and Wales with different language and different remedies and different courts to which a complainant went. Even so despite the width of the relevant language no case shows that someone in the position of Mr. Ende not himself under an obligation to bear the burden of the rate had a right to complain. Section 33 (1) of the Local Government Act 1948 and the long title thereto suggest that a new system was being established and therefore it is submitted cases decided under previous legislation are not necessarily of assistance. A new system became imperative because it was desired to unify the system of rating for London and that of the rest of the country and also because it introduced valuation officers for the first time. It follows that since that date grievances that can be advanced by a ratepayer form a narrower and more limited class. It is therefore necessary to construe the code which now exists - section 69 (1) of the General Rate Act 1967 - and whatever powers ratepayers may have had hitherto to promote uniformity as such they have no such power now for this is now the province of the valuation officer.

As to section 69 (1), the existence of the words "... who is aggrieved" impose a limitation on the previous words "any person" and, therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the limitation which defines the category or categories of persons who can complain. On the other hand, the test of who is aggrieved must be wider than a ratepayer as such: see Rex v. Brentford Union Assessment Committee, Ex parte Herring, 96 L.T. 704. Accordingly, it is necessary to have a standard to ascertain if a person is aggrieved in respect of a hereditament whether he be a ratepayer or not. There are two possible yardsticks: (1) The person in question in fact contributes to the rate fund, or (2) The proposer's own contribution to the rate fund would be affected by the result either (a) in common with all other contributors or (b) in common with a class of contributors or (c) alone. On neither of these yardsticks would Mr. Ende comply for he does not contribute to the rate of Islington. As to (1), the tenants of 22 Beaumont Rise could presumably make a proposal in respect of the Arsenal Stadium and presumably also could Mr. Ende's principal. The appellants commend to the House the adoption of the second yardstick.

Under section 69 (1) there is no power for a person to propose the inclusion of a hereditament in the list. This is certainly a case where a person would be aggrieved for this is the most basic objection of all that there has been in effect a nil assessment in respect of the hereditament in question. But the drawing up of the list for the relevant rating area is the duty of the valuation officer. Value being inevitably a matter of opinion, some person's opinion must prevail. Initially it is the opinion of the valuation officer to whom Parliament has entrusted the task. If the valuation is subsequently changed it becomes the opinion of some other person, in the first instance, that of the local valuation court. The

promotion of uniformity is an end in itself and is not the function of the private individual as a person aggrieved under section 69 (1). If it were, one would be back to the question of status.

The precept payer. The status of the ratepayer applies with equal force to the status of the precept payer or indeed the taxpayer. It is not disputed that Mr. Ende is a precept payer so that if the mere contribution to some fund be the test or merely being a precept payer is the test, then it is accepted that Mr. Ende would be a person aggrieved. In support of the above the appellants pray in aid the difficulties that the Court of Appeal found in deciding what were the necessary elements which gave a precept payer the status of a person aggrieved.

In so far as Mr. Ende complains as a taxpayer it is plain beyond peradventure that his interest is too remote.

Section 24 of the Act of 1967. The second respondent is not a ratepayer in respect of 22 Beaumont Rise because on the true construction of section 24 the person who receives the rent means the person who receives it beneficially not as agent for another. Clear words are needed to make an agent personally liable, which words are not found in the section. It is to be observed that section 24 does not appear in Part IV of the Act but in Part III which starts with section 19. The language of section 24 indicates that it is a section concerned with valuation rather than with the collection of rates. It is a section designed to assist the valuation officer. Reliance is placed on section 115 of the Act. This provision contains two definitions of "owner" in which a distinction is drawn between persons entitled to receive rents and persons receiving them. Further, in sections 49, 50, 55, and 56 and section 60 "owner" is defined as meaning any person receiving or entitled to receive the rack rents "whether on his own account or as agent or trustee for any other person" and as meaning a person entitled to receive those rents. For the purposes of section 24 a person who "receives" the rents is a person who receives them beneficially and not one who collects them as agent on behalf of his principal. If it were otherwise it would have the surprising result that if the second respondent as the agent is deemed to be the occupier, he will be the only person entitled under section 70 of the Act to receive a copy of any proposal under section 69 relating to the premises in question and the right under section 72 to agree on any alteration of its value, to the exclusion of the owner of the building or the tenants of the separate flats.

It would be surprising under Part III of the Act if an agent were to be liable for the rates generally. It would be surprising if distress could not be levied against the person who received the rents beneficially. Clearer words than are to be found in section 24 would be necessary to make an agent, who is receiving rent for his principal, liable for the full amount of the rates or whatever amount of rent passed through the agent's hands. Reliance is placed on Adams and Watts v. Southall Rating Authority [1943] K.B. 359 on the approach there adopted by the court that when the legislature requires an agent to be liable for the rates it uses very clear language. Accordingly, the second respondent is not the occupier of 22 Beaumont Rise for the purpose of being liable for the rates under section 24.

The Jurisdiction of the Lands Tribunal. The second respondent was

correct in his contention that the local valuation court had jurisdiction to decide whether he was a person aggrieved. It follows that under section 77 of the Act the Lands Tribunal likewise had jurisdiction to hold that the second respondent was not a person aggrieved.

Alan Fletcher for the first respondent. On the question of jurisdiction the argument of Lord Silsoe Q.C. is adopted. Further, the Court of Appeal were right in holding that the second respondent in his capacity as a precept payer or taxpayer was not a person aggrieved for the present purposes.

On the question whether the second respondent is a ratepayer for the purposes of section 24, reliance is placed on the language of section 24 and the definition of owner in section 115 (1). Where a single house is let out in parts and is treated as a single hereditament under section 24 it is very desirable that the rating authority should be able to look to the actual person who receives the rents, that is, to the agent. Section 24 is not in Part IV of the Act for the very good reason that it is not concerned with ownership at all. It is a deemed occupation provision. Reliance is placed on the difference in language between section 24 which uses the phrase "the person who receives the rents" in contradistinction to the definition of owner in section 115 where the phrase is "entitled to receive the rent." For the reasons given by Lord Denning M.R. the agent is liable to pay the rates. The principle of rating the agent goes back to the Vestries Act 1819. To the argument that it is unfair to make the agent liable for rates for more than the rents that he receives, the answer is that he will have indemnity under his contract with his principal. It is emphasised that the agent is the occupier for present purposes. Under section 24 there is nothing to show that the ordinary rights of the occupier should be cut down. The owner also can make a proposal. Accordingly the second respondent is personally liable to pay the rates in respect of 22 Beaumont Rise by virtue of section 24.

It is not necessary to find a single test for what constitutes a "person aggrieved." There may be different types of persons aggrieved. For the purposes of section 69 (1) the second respondent is a person aggrieved by reason of the under-assessment of any hereditament within the same rating area. The mere status of being a ratepayer suffices.

Reliance is placed on the following propositions: (a) The expression "person aggrieved" must be construed in the context of the particular statute in which it is found: see Sevenoaks Urban District Council v. Twynam [1929] 2 K.B. 440, 443. (b) The prime purpose of rating legislation is to promote fairness in the valuation list between one ratepayer and another and this purpose can only be achieved by the correct valuation of all hereditaments: see Union Cold Storage Co. Ltd. v. Phillips [1976] R.A. 173, per Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Almond v. Ash Brothers & Heaton Ltd. [1969] 2 A.C. 366, 381, per Lord Pearce. (c) A ratepayer has a legitimate interest in ensuring that there is fairness between his assessment and that of others in the same rating area whether or not his own pocket is affected. It is the ratepayer's sense of justice or fairness which is affected if his neighbour is not paying his fair share of the rates. (d) The Poor Relief Act 1743, section 4, gave to ratepayers as such the right to object to the under-assessment of other ratepayers

within the same rating area and the continuation of this right under successive statutes has been recognised by the courts ever since. Thus the Poor Rate Act 1801, section 6, makes plain that at that period a person could have his neighbour's rates increased by way of appeal. Moreover, it is to be noted that section 18 of the Union Assessment Act 1862 is in very wide terms. Double v. Southampton Assessment Committee [1922] 2 K.B. 213 shows that the smallness of the complaint in money terms is irrelevant. It was well recognised in the cases decided up to 1925 that the right of a person to complain against his neighbour's rates still existed. As to the Act of 1925, sections 26 and 37, these again were enacted in very wide terms: see the observations of Lord Simonds in Pratt v. North-West Norfolk Assessment Committee [1947] A.C. 635, 643. In the Local Government Act 1948, section 40, the right to object to the omission of a hereditament from the list was taken away not only from persons who may be aggrieved but also from the rating authority. In Grainger v. Liverpool Corporation [1954] 1 Q.B. 351 the Divisional Court was clearly of the view that the corporation had power to make objections as regards other properties and there was no suggestion that the corporation was limited to hereditaments of a particular class and that it sufficed that the corporation was a ratepayer and was making complaints in respect of hereditaments in the same rating area. It is plain that Lord Radcliffe in Society of Medical Officers of Health v. Hope [1960] A.C. 551, 565, presumed that individual ratepayers had an interest in the valuation or exemption of hereditaments in their rating area and that there was a procedure whereby they could object. Lord Denning M.R. said in Reg. v. Paddington Valuation Officer, Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B. 380, 400, that "in theory" Peachey "might make proposals for the alteration of every one of the 31,656 hereditaments in the list "but comparatively few of them would be in competition with the flats owned by Peachey. Lord Denning M.R. was there dealing with prerogative writs, but the same principle applies here concerning what he had to say on what constitutes "a person aggrieved." (e) The existence of this right remains today an important safeguard for the individual ratepayer. The valuation officer is a neutral official: see Society of Medical Officers of Health v. Hope [1960] A.C. 551, 565, 566, per Lord Radcliffe. The valuation officer may fall into error and therefore it is important to have the safeguard that the individual ratepayer is able to make a proposal. (f) The language of the statute of 1967 does not require that the grievance must be of a kind which has some demonstrable effect on the ratepayer's pocket, rights or interest (apart from his interest in the fairness of the list) nor do the authorities support the proposition that there is any such limitation. (g) Any attempt to define any such limitation involves difficulty and illogicality. Whatever test is propounded there are difficulties. (h) To hold that a ratepayer as such is aggrieved by the under-assessment of a hereditament within the same rating area does not rule out the possibility that there may be other grounds for grievance. There is no need to lay down that one test only must apply to all grievances. The court has to look at the particular circumstances and ascertain whether or not they come within section 69 (1). As to Rex v. Brentford Union Assessment Committee, Ex parte Herring, 96 L.T. 704, it could

well be that under the present section 69 (1) Herring would be entitled to make a proposal in relation to the hereditament he had to indemnify in respect of rates.

Is the deemed occupier in the same position as the actual occupier? If a person is deemed by statute to be the occupier then if he has liabilities he also has rights: see sections 24 and 70 (2) of the Act of 1967. If he has a right to object under section 70 (2) then it is submitted he has also a right to make a proposal under section 69 (1). If an agent has the status of a ratepayer he should have all the rights of a ratepayer.

On the issue of the second respondent's status as a precept payer the argument of Lord Silsoe Q.C. is adopted.

The second respondent, Mr. Ende, in person, read and adopted the argument contained in his printed case. On his qualification as a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of section 69 (1) of the Act of 1967 by reason of his status as (1) a contributor to the precepting fund common to Hackney and Islington Rating areas, (2) a contributor to taxation, customs and excise in the United Kingdom and, (3) as a ratepayer in the Islington rating area, he drew attention in particular to paragraph 5 (6) of his printed case: for the first time since the first statute dealing with rating came into existence, the whole of rating and valuation law was consolidated into one Act of Parliament, namely, the General Rate Act 1967, and in deciding this case it should not be assumed that that Act discarded custom, usage and precedent which have grown up in rating and valuation, local government, and representation of the people unless the Act makes it clear that that was the intention of Parliament.

As to Lord Goddard C.J.'s observations in Grainger v. Liverpool Corporation [1954] 1 Q.B. 351, 359, a rating authority has no duty to put forward a proposal but only as a "busybody" like myself.

On the question of jurisdiction, a "person aggrieved" is a question of fact and not a question of law and therefore before the Lands Tribunal I ought to have been able to take the preliminary point that it was a question of fact.

Lord Silsoe Q.C. in reply referred to Hulme v. Bucklow Area Assessment Committee [1940] 2 K.B. 255; Manchester Assessment Committee v. Heyland Ltd. (1943) 14 D.R.A. 121; Pratt v. North-West Norfolk Assessment Committee [1947] A.C. 635; John Walsh Ltd. v. Sheffield Corporation [1957] 1 W.L.R. 1074; Society of Medical officers of Health v. Hope [1960] A.C. 551 and London Housing and Commercial Properties Ltd. v. Cowan [1977] Q.B. 148.

Their Lordships took time for consideration.

April 1977. LORD WILBERFORCE. My Lords, the Arsenal Football Club Ltd. owns and occupies a stadium in the London Borough of Islington. It had a rateable value of £9,250. The second respondent, Mr. T. A. Ende, took the view that this value was too low, so in March 1972 he made a proposal for an alteration in the valuation list as regards Arsenal's hereditament. He suggested a figure of £60,000. Arsenal objected to this proposal, so did the valuation officer for the area, the first respondent: on these objections, the matter went to the local valuation

court. That court held that Mr. Ende was entitled to make the proposal and increased the rateable value to £13,900 - i.e., by about 50 per cent. Arsenal and the valuation officer appealed to the Lands Tribunal, which decided to hear as a preliminary issue the question whether Mr. Ende was entitled to make the proposal he did. After argument they held that he was not. But Mr. Ende took his case to the Court of Appeal which reversed the Lands Tribunal's decision. On the appeal by Arsenal to this House, Mr. Ende, as to part of his argument, is supported by the valuation officer. We are not concerned at this stage with the quantum of the valuation.

Mr. Ende's right to make the proposal depends upon section 69 (1) of the General Rate Act 1967. This provides:

"Subject to subsection (6) of this section, any person (including a rating authority) who is aggrieved - (a) by the inclusion of any hereditament in the valuation list; or (b) by any value ascribed in the list to a hereditament or by any other statement made or omitted to be made in the list with respect to a hereditament; or (c) in the case of a building or portion of a building occupied in parts, by the valuation in the list of that building or portion of a building as a single hereditament, may at any time make a proposal for the alteration of the list so far as it relates to that hereditament."

The proposal certainly falls into paragraph (b), but the question is whether Mr. Ende is "aggrieved" by the value ascribed to the hereditament. In order to answer this it is necessary to consider his status under three headings.

1. Mr. Ende is the managing agent of premises in the same borough - 22 Beaumont Rise. This is a house in multiple residential occupation, and Mr. Ende has the duty of collecting the rents.

2. Mr. Ende resides in a flat in the London Borough of Hackney which adjoins Islington, and is, as is Islington, within the area of the Greater London Council and Metropolitan Police precepting areas.

3. Mr. Ende is, of course, also a taxpayer - but I agree with both courts below that this circumstance does not give him a locus standi to make proposals even though taxpayers, in effect, contribute by rate support grant to the borough finances. His interest in this respect is too remote.

1. His locus standi as managing agent of 22 Beaumont Rise depends upon section 24 of the General Rate Act 1967 ("the Act"). This, so far as relevant, provides:

"Where a building which was constructed or has been adapted - (a) for the purposes of a single dwelling; or (b)... is occupied in parts, the valuation officer, in preparing a new valuation list or in altering a current valuation list, may, if he thinks fit, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the extent, if any, to which the parts separately occupied have been severed by structural alterations, treat the building or any portion thereof as a single hereditament, and a building or portion of a building so treated as a single hereditament shall, for the purposes of rating, be deemed to

be a single hereditament in the occupation of the person who receives the rents payable in respect of the parts."

The first question is whether Mr. Ende "receives the rents": in my opinion he does. There is a distinction in rating legislation between a person who "receives the rents" and a person who is "entitled to receive the rents" - viz., the owner of the property: see for example section 115 of the Act s.v. "owner": the actual definition does not I think bear upon this case. Mr. Ende is certainly a person who receives the rents. There is no doubt that his name appears in the rate book in respect of this property: he is personally liable for the rates, his goods could be distrained against if he did not pay. No doubt he has no beneficial interest in the rents unless by way of commission, though it does not follow that the owner is entitled to receive them, since there may be outgoings or deductions against them. He is presumably entitled to be indemnified by the owner against liability for the rates. But the section, in my opinion, puts him "for the purposes of rating" in the position of a ratepayer - and no doubt does so deliberately so as to save the local authority the trouble and expense of searching for the owner and proceeding against him. So I think that Mr. Ende has all the rights - as well as the liabilities - which he would have if he were actually in occupation of the property, and a ratepayer in his own right.

Then is a ratepayer a person aggrieved by the under-valuation of a hereditament in the same rating area? The way in which section 69 (1) (b) of the Act is drafted "aggrieved... by any value ascribed in the list to a hereditament" suggests that he may be - for these words are not confined to the value (i.e., over-valuation) of his own hereditament, they can cover other hereditaments and must include cases of under-valuation of other hereditaments. But Arsenal suggest that the expression must be limited in some way and the limitation for which they contend is that, to show that a person is "aggrieved," he must prove that he is demonstrably affected in his pocket, rights or interests, by the under-valuation of the hereditament. Since, they continue, a revaluation, even on the scale suggested here, will not have the slightest effect on the amount which Mr. Ende as ratepayer will have to pay, he cannot be said to be aggrieved by the under-valuation. To deal with this argument it is necessary to consider more closely the meaning of "aggrieved."

The word is not one of normal English speech - it is, if not a legal term, at least one coloured by usage in the law. It has appeared in a number of rating Acts over the 234 years since the Poor Law Relief Act 1743 (17 Geo. 2, c. 38). The formula has varied. Taking only the main enactments we find, "[if any person] shall find himself aggrieved by any rate" (Act of 1743, section 4): "any person who may feel himself aggrieved by any valuation list" (Union Assessment Committee Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 103), section 18): "Any person... who is aggrieved by the incorrectness or unfairness of any matter in the valuation list... or otherwise..." (Rating and Valuation Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5 c. 90), sections 26, 37): "Any person who is aggrieved" (as in section 69 of the Act of 1967) (Local Government Act 1948 (11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 26), section 40).

The remedy too has varied with the development of the rating machinery. In 1743 it was by appeal to quarter sessions and in the Poor Rate Act 1801, section 6, it was recognised that an appeal would lie against the insufficient assessment of one or of several persons. In 1862, when valuation lists were first introduced it was by notice of objection which would be heard by the assessment committee of the union. The Act of 1925 introduced the right to make a proposal for amendment of the valuation list which then had to be heard and determined by the assessment committee. The Act of 1948 continued this - in terms almost identical to those used in the Act of 1967 - and set up local valuation courts to decide upon them.

There were, as one would expect, a number of cases decided upon these various provisions: many of them are referred to by Lord Denning M.R. in his judgment. It was said that the tenor of these authorities was less definite and clear than Lord Denning M.R. suggests. Whether this criticism is justified or not, it is certain that they amount to a formidable body of assumption, even if not of direct decision, that a ratepayer as such has locus standi as an aggrieved person to complain of wrong valuations, and, most importantly, that none of them lends the slightest support to an argument that a person in order so to complain, must show a demonstrable effect upon his pocket, rights or interests. I take some illustrations, from cases prior to the watershed Local Government Act 1948.

In Rex v. Sussex Justices (1812) 15 East 206, 207 six persons appealed on the ground: "That several persons (nominatim) were rated at much less, and not enough in proportion with the appellants"; the validity, in principle of this objection was clearly accepted, or assumed, by Lord Ellenborough C.J.

In Glamorgan County Valuation Committee v. Barry Area Assessment Committee [1931] 1 K.B. 157, the Divisional Court recognised the rights of individuals to complain of insufficient assessments; referring to the Poor Rate Act 1801. Talbot J. pointed out that it was hardly ever worth the pecuniary outlay for an individual ratepayer to take action. But his right to do so was clearly assumed to exist.

In Ladies Hosiery and Underwear Ltd. v. West Middlesex Assessment Committee [1932] 2 K.B. 679 the appellant complained that his property was assessed at a higher value than seven other hereditaments of the same class. The Court of Appeal refused to lower the appellants' rate - this would be indulging a passion for uniformity by securing uniform inaccuracy: the right course was for him to correct the inaccuracy of his neighbours' assessments on the ground of unfairness or inaccuracy.

This point was again made in Lilley and Skinner Ltd. v. Essex County Valuation Committee (1935) 51 T.L.R. 432. All three members of the Divisional Court accepted that a grievance could exist through the under-valuation of other properties, and considered that the proper remedy was by way of section 37 of the Act of 1925.

My Lords, I need not multiply authority on this point, for I think that the appellants could not and did not really dispute that up to 1948 it was accepted that individual ratepayers might be aggrieved by under-valuations,

and that no court had laid down a criterium of grievance, other than the fact of under-valuation. The appellants' real argument was that a change came about with the Local Government Act 1948. That Act introduced an entirely new system. It abolished local assessment committees and made the Inland Revenue responsible for all valuations for rating purposes. It introduced a new independent officer - the local valuation officer - whose responsibility it became to make proper and uniform valuations. It abolished the distinction which had hitherto existed between the Metropolis and the rest of the country. It introduced a new, and, it is claimed, a more restrictive formula for challenging and correcting valuations: for whereas, under the Act of 1925 (sections 26 and 37) objections or proposals could be made by persons aggrieved by the incorrectness or unfairness of any matter in the valuation list, or otherwise with respect to the list, the new formula (section 40), which is repeated in the Act of 1967, is more restrictive. It does not mention uniformity, for the reason, it is said, that uniformity became thereafter the responsibility of the local valuation officer and not that of the individual.

My Lords, I cannot accept this argument. It cannot be supposed that Parliament, in setting up a new machinery of valuation, even with a new independent valuation officer, intended thereby to cut down the rights of ratepayers, which have existed for centuries to complain of valuations. Nor can any indication be found in the Act of 1948 that Parliament intended to create a new and more limited area of grievance, without taking the trouble to define it. On principle, and on the history of this matter, there is no reason, in the absence of express limiting words, for confining grievances to demonstrable injurious effects. Uniformity and fairness have always been proclaimed, and judicially approved, as standards by which to judge the validity of rates. Indeed I believe that many men feel a more acute sense of grievance if they think they are being treated unfairly in relation to their fellow ratepayers than they do about the actual payments they have to make. To produce a sense of justice is an important objective of taxation policy.

As regards the new machinery, all that needs to be said is that its creation does not remove the need for further safeguards: if English law is weak in remedies of administrative law, it compensates to some extent for that weakness by sometimes permitting individual citizens to complain of administrative action, or inaction. "Busybody" is a term applied to some of these individuals but it remains a respectable designation. And if it is true that the vast increase in local government finances makes the impact of any correction of individual rateable values almost imperceptible, it is also the case that the area of error may have correspondingly increased so that one correction may be followed by a multitude of others. We were told that there are 33,000 municipal owned dwelling houses in Hackney.

So I do not agree that the Act of 1948 has changed the basic rights of individuals to complain.

There have been a few decisions since then which I should mention.

In Grainger v. Liverpool Corporation [1954] 1 Q.B. 351 - a case not

directly concerned with a rating question - Lord Goddard C.J. expressed the clear opinion that the corporation, as a ratepayer, had locus standi to complain of an under-valuation. He said, indeed, that it had a duty to make amendment proposals, a statement which I cannot follow unless limited to its functions as rating authority. In Society of Medical Officers of Health v. Hope [1960] A.C. 551, this House was concerned with a claim to exemption by a charity. Lord Radcliffe (p. 565), in a passage which is perhaps compressed in reasoning, clearly supposed that individual ratepayers - as such - had an interest in the valuation or exemption of any single hereditament and had procedural means of objecting.

In Reg. v. Paddington Valuation Officer, Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B. 380 the Court of Appeal was concerned with an application for prerogative orders to quash the valuation list as a whole. Lord Denning M.R. said that "in theory the [applicants] might make proposals for the alteration of every one of the 31,656 hereditaments in the list" (p. 400) and Danckwerts and Salmon L.JJ. said that incorrect values of particular hereditaments "can be dealt with by the method of proposals and appeals" provided for by sections 40 to 44 of the Local Government Act 1948 (pp. 414, 422). It is true that the effect of quashing the list, or of correcting the valuations of so many properties, might have had an effect, though even so a small one, on the rates of the applicants in that case: but the expressions of the members of the court are quite general in character.

So there is no warrant in authority since 1948 for the limitation now suggested.

In my opinion, therefore, Mr. Ende, as a ratepayer, had locus standi to make his proposal.

2. Mr. Ende is also a ratepayer in the adjoining borough of Hackney. The rates which he has to pay to Hackney consist, as to two-thirds of the amount, of money required by precepting authorities, viz., the Greater London Council and the Metropolitan Police. That these sums are rates is clear from section 12 of the Act. Islington, as others of the 32 precepting areas, is in the same position as Hackney so that part of the rates payable by Arsenal go for the same purposes into the same precepting fund. I can see no difference in principle between Mr. Ende's interest as, in effect, a ratepayer in common with Arsenal towards these precepted purposes and his interest as a ratepayer in common with Arsenal towards the borough rates of Islington. In my opinion he had locus standi to make his proposal in this capacity too. I agree with the qualification put upon this by Lord Denning M.R. that the complaint must not be frivolous, or vexatious or irrelevant. I cannot agree with any test based on propinquity.

In my opinion, Mr. Ende had, in two capacities, the right to make the proposal he did. In addition, he raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Lands Tribunal to review the decision of the local valuation court. I should say in agreement with the Court of Appeal that I do not agree with it. I think that both the local valuation court and on appeal the Lands Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide whether Mr. Ende had locus standi or not to make a proposal.

I would dismiss the appeal and order the appellants to pay Mr. Ende's costs and half the valuation officer's costs in this House.

LORD MORRIS OF BORTH-Y-GEST. My Lords, the issues which arise in this appeal can best be indicated by referring to the course of the legal proceedings which now have reached this House. Mr. Ende made (on March 23, 1972) a proposal for the alteration of the valuation list of the London Borough of Islington. He claimed to be an "aggrieved person." So far as is now material he proposed that the rateable value of the Arsenal football grounds at Islington as set out in that valuation list ought substantially to be increased. He claimed that the grounds were considerably under-valued in the valuation list. The Arsenal Football Club Ltd. (by notice dated April 4, 1972) objected to the proposal. Apart from questions as to amount they said that the proposal was "bad in law." By letter Mr. Ende was asked why he claimed to be an aggrieved person. In reply (on May 23, 1972) he said that it must be self-evident that a person who is a ratepayer could be aggrieved by any value ascribed in the valuation list to a hereditament as could a manager of rated property: he said that a person aggrieved could be a ratepayer within a rating area or could be a ratepayer within a precepting area or could be a taxpayer.

The valuation officer (by notice dated June 21, 1972) objected on precisely the same grounds.

On July 28, 1972, the Arsenal club took out an originating summons in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court seeking a declaration that Mr. Ende was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of section 69 of the General Rate Act 1967. On July 5, 1973, that originating summons was struck out. In a decision of the Lands Tribunal to which reference must later be made it was stated that the summons was struck out on the ground that the claim was an abuse of the process of the court for the reason that the local valuation court had jurisdiction to resolve the matter.

Later there was a three day hearing before the local valuation court. By its decision dated January 16, 1974, that court concluded that Mr. Ende should be treated as a person aggrieved. That was for three reasons viz. (a) that his name appears on the rate books of the Islington London Borough Council "as the rated occupier for a property for which he collects rent on behalf of the owner," (b) that though he lived in Hackney he was near enough to the appeal premises to be affected by the parking of vehicles and other created disturbances, (c) that he was a resident within the same precept area. Accordingly the court decided that the originating proposal was valid: they further decided that the valuation list should be altered so that the rateable value of the football grounds should be £13,900 instead of £9,250. Mr. Ende contends that it should have been £60,000.

The football club on February 11, 1974, gave notice of appeal to the Lands Tribunal. Appeal so lay (see section 77 of the General Rate Act 1967) at the instance of a party "aggrieved" by the decision of the local valuation court. In such context I consider that a party to an appeal from the local valuation court could be "aggrieved" if he so considered

himself to be though until the conclusion of later proceedings it would not be known whether or not he did have a grievance: the suggested grievance would be that the court had reached an erroneous conclusion. I am not prepared to accept a submission made by Mr. Ende that the conclusion which the local valuation court had reached (i.e., that he, Mr. Ende, could be treated as a person aggrieved) could not be the subject of an appeal to the Lands Tribunal.

One ground of appeal to the Lands Tribunal was that the proposal made by Mr. Ende was bad in law and void for the reason that Mr. Ende was not a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of section 69 (1) of the General Rate Act 1967. The other ground was that the valuation decided upon by the local valuation court was incorrect, excessive and unfair. The valuation officer (on February 12, 1974) gave notice of appeal on substantially the same grounds as those raised by the football club.

The two appeals were then (on March 15, 1974) consolidated. After certain interlocutory proceedings the Lands Tribunal ordered (on October 10, 1974) that there should be a preliminary hearing of the question whether Mr. Ende's proposal (of March 23, 1972) was or was not bad in law and void for the reason that Mr. Ende was not a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of section 69 (1).

The preliminary hearing took place. On that hearing the valuation officer, though an appellant, supported Mr. Ende in his contention that by virtue of section 24 of the Act (to which I must later refer) he (Mr. Ende) was a ratepayer in Islington and being such could be an aggrieved person if there was error or unfairness or lack of equivalence in the valuation list in Islington.

The main facts, as to which there was no dispute, were recorded in the decision of the Lands Tribunal. The conclusions of the Lands Tribunal were (1) that Mr. Ende was not a ratepayer in the rating area of Islington, (2) that even if he were he would not, by reason of that fact alone, and without regard to other considerations, be a person aggrieved, (3) that even if Mr. Ende was to be considered as a ratepayer in Islington he was not on the facts aggrieved even if the football grounds had been under-assessed, (4) that Mr. Ende could not be regarded as an aggrieved person on the basis of being a ratepayer within the precept area or of being a taxpayer. As a result of those conclusions the appeal of the football club was allowed and it was ordered that the rateable value of their hereditament should again be entered at the sum of £9,250 and that the valuation should accordingly be amended.

Though a decision of the Lands Tribunal is final it may be challenged as being erroneous in point of law.

By section 3 (4) of the Lands Tribunal Act 1949 it is provided that a "person aggrieved by the decision" (of the Lands Tribunal) "as being erroneous in point of law" may require the tribunal to state and sign a case "for the decision of the court." By section 3 (11) of that Act it is provided that the court referred to in section 3 (4) is to be the Court of Appeal.

Mr. Ende was a "person aggrieved" within section 3 (4) and he required the Lands Tribunal to state a case. The tribunal did so state

a case and, annexing their judgment to it, they set out the questions of law as being those which I have set out under (1) (2) (3) and (4) above.

On the hearing of the case stated the Court of Appeal held that the decision of the local valuation court that Mr. Ende was a person aggrieved within the meaning of section 69 (1) of the Act was correct and should be reinstated: they indicated in their judgments their answers on the questions of law: the matter was remitted to the Lands Tribunal for consideration of figures and for determination in accordance with the law as laid down.

The main facts are clear. Mr. Ende lives in Hackney and is a ratepayer there. In Islington he is the manager of a property known as 22 Beaumont Rise. That property was in multiple occupation in the sense that from being one dwelling house it had been converted into four dwellings for separate occupation: at the time of the hearing two of these were occupied and two were not. The property is owned by a company - Overcourt Ltd. The property is rated as one single hereditament. Mr. Ende's name has at all material times appeared in the rate books in Islington as the person liable to pay the rates on the property and he has paid the rates. As manager of the property he collects the rents from the occupiers and then he pays all outgoings (including the rates): subject to whatever arrangement he has with the owners he pays to them any balance remaining.

In these circumstances it seems to me that the facts bring the matter squarely within section 24 of the Act. The building was constructed for the purposes of a single dwelling. It was occupied in parts. The valuation officer did treat the building as a single hereditament. "For the purposes of rating" it was to be "deemed to be a single hereditament in the occupation of the person who receives the rents payable in respect of the parts." That was Mr. Ende and no one else. The owners had made arrangements under which they were not to receive the rents. They would receive such net amount as would or might result when payments out had been made. The situation was different from that with which the case of Adams and Watts v. Southall Rating Authority [1943] K.B. 359 was concerned. In that case a statutory provision made "the owner" liable to pay rates where he had agreed with an occupier to pay them and the expression "owner" was defined as meaning the person who was "entitled to receive the rent." The wording of section 24 is different.

There is a distinction between being entitled to receive and receiving. In the definition of owner in section 115 the distinction seems to be recognised. If a landlord lets to a tenant it is the landlord who is ordinarily entitled to receive the agreed rent. But a landlord might make an arrangement under which someone else receives it: he might make an arrangement under which someone else physically receives it but only as an agent to pass it on to the landlord. In the latter case the landlord might be said to be the person who received the rent. But in my view the wording of section 24 seems to contemplate the situation which arose in this case. The provisions of section 24 are "for the purposes of rating." A "deeming" situation is often arranged for administrative or all-round convenience. It probably suited the tenants

at 22 Beaumont Rise, and also the owners of that property, and also the valuation officer and the rating authority and also Mr. Ende that Mr. Ende should be deemed to be the occupier of the single hereditament known as 22 Beaumont Rise. Doubtless arrangements could be altered but unless and until they were it seems to me that as the deemed occupier, Mr. Ende was "for the purposes of rating" the occupier of the hereditament. As such (see section 16 of the Act) he was liable to be assessed to rates in respect of it. He was the ratepayer. Under section 115 "ratepayer" means a person who is liable to any rate in respect of property entered in "any valuation list."

On the first point of law raised in the case stated I would therefore hold in agreement with the Court of Appeal that Mr. Ende was "a ratepayer" in the rating area of Islington.

Was he then entitled to do what he had done, i.e. to make a proposal for the alteration of the valuation list so far as it related to the hereditament of the Arsenal Football Club? Could he claim to be "aggrieved" by the value ascribed in the list to that hereditament or by any statement made or omitted with respect to it?

It seems to me that a person aggrieved (within section 69 of the Act) is a person who can reasonably assert that he has a grievance of a nature described under (a) or (b) or (c) of subsection (1) of the section. Whether a person has a grievance cannot actually be decided until there is investigation as to whether his complaint or alleged grievance possesses or lacks substance. The words "any person" are of course very wide but in the context of section 69 I think that they denote a person who has sufficient concern with the correctness of a valuation list as to entitle him to show, if he can, that the list should be altered. A visiting stranger from another country who happened to find what he thought was an error in a valuation list in relation to a hereditament in which he could have no interest could hardly be a person who was aggrieved. But whether a person could have what I have called a sufficient concern must be a question of fact and degree. In some cases a concern which could perhaps technically be expressed and phrased might be so nominal or minimal that it should be ignored as being too remote.

Who then might qualify to assert that within section 69 he is "aggrieved" and as such entitled to make a proposal? I do not find it necessary to describe the range of the persons who might so qualify. For the purposes of this case it suffices to consider in the first place whether a ratepayer within a rating area could be such a person. In my view he could.

Prima facie a ratepayer in a rating area though not complaining that the asssessment of his own hereditament was wrong would have legitimate concern if all the assessments of all other hereditaments were wrong. Why would he not have concern if some others were wrong? Subject to any limitations that ordinary common sense might impose why could he not have concern if one other was wrong?

In Grainger v. Liverpool Corporation [1954] 1 Q.B. 351 Lord Goddard C.J. treated it as almost axiomatic that a ratepayer could make a proposal. In reference to section 40 of the Local Government Act

1948 (which may be compared with section 69 of the Act of 1967) he said, at pp. 357-358:

"Further, the rating authority, which in this case is the Corporation of Liverpool, is itself a ratepayer, and can be a person aggrieved. The corporation can be a person aggrieved under section 40 because it may be able to say that its own property, such as the town hall and other property, is rated too high, or that other persons in the area of rating are rated too low. It seems to me, therefore, that it can make a proposal to the local valuation officer either as the rating authority or as a ratepayer in the city, and it matters not whether it describes itself as one or the other. The question is whether the corporation has a locus standi to be heard, and I do not think that it is even faintly suggested in this case that it has not."

Lord Goddard's phrase "a locus standi to be heard" is I think helpful. In normal circumstances a ratepayer will have a "locus standi to be heard" to assert that other persons in the area of rating are wrongly assessed. So he will have a locus standi to say that he is aggrieved or that he has a grievance. Whether he will succeed in showing that in fact he has one will be a different matter. This was pointed out by Lord Goddard C.J. in Rex v. Surrey (Mid-Eastern Area) Assessment Committee, Ex parte Merton and Morden Urban District Council [1948] 1 All E.R. 856. A person who has some warrant for claiming to show or starting to show that he is "aggrieved" may fail to show what he set out to show: in one sense therefore it will not be until the end of the case that it will be known whether a person claiming to be aggrieved is or is not a person who is aggrieved.

On behalf of the football club it was submitted that there was a very severe limitation placed upon a person seeking to assert that he was "aggrieved." It was submitted that even if a person was a ratepayer within a rating area he could achieve nothing unless he could show that his grievance was "of a kind which had some demonstrable effect on his pocket, rights or interests, particularly singled out from those of the public generally." In effect this meant that even though a ratepayer proved that a particular hereditament was under-valued, unless he also proved that the alteration to a correct assessment would have "some demonstrable effect" on him his proposal ought to be rejected as that of a meddlesome busybody. I regard this as an unwarranted approach and I find no authority for it in the statute. Apart from the vagueness of the suggested test or qualification it seems to me to be designed to silence and suppress the voice of protest. What is a "demonstrable" effect on a pocket? If a ratepayer could show that by reason of some under-value of some property he would be paying a fraction of a penny too much by way of rates would he pass the test? If a ratepayer could show that by reason of some under-value of some property he would be paying a fraction of a penny too much as also would nearly all other ratepayers would he fail to pass the test because he could not particularly single himself out from the public generally? What is meant by his "interests" if they are to be entirely unrelated to his pocket? If one ratepayer is

paying too little are the "interests" or the "rights" of all others affected? If one of the majority wished to protest would he be told that he had not particularly singled out his interests from those of the public generally? I refrain from adding to the questions that would accumulate if the meaning of the test had to be explained.

It may well be that the difference between a correct and an incorrect valuation in regard to one hereditament would not have any appreciable effect upon the financial position of any particular ratepayer. But if there is error in the valuation list why should it not be corrected? Surely the aim must be to attain accuracy. Surely it must be the aim to secure fairness as between any one ratepayer and all others.

In Reg. v. Paddington Valuation Officer, Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B. 380 the owners of some purpose-built flats complained of the assessments of fiats in converted houses. It was said however that even if the latter assessments were greatly increased no difference for the former would result: it was said that if the assessments were increased by £1,000,000 the rate poundage would only be reduced by one penny. I agree with the comment made by Lord Denning M.R. (at p. 401) that grievances are not to be measured in pounds and pence.

Let it be supposed that a ratepayer considered that though his own hereditament was correctly assessed there were very many houses in his rating area which had inadequate values ascribed to them in the valuation list. Such a state of affairs might result from some wrong application of principle. Should the ratepayer be debarred from making a proposal in respect of one of the houses because he could not show that any appreciable financial benefit would result to him if that one assessment was corrected? I think not. The correction of one error might lead to the corrections of others. Fairness for all might result. I cannot think that a ratepayer ought to be prompted in such a situation to make some thousands of separate proposals merely for the reason that until they all succeeded the financial consequences for him would be negligible. In theory at least it must be the case that if even one person who has been paying too little is made to pay more there will be less to be paid by all the rest. Fairness and justice ought not to have to wait until there is a "demonstrable" effect upon someone's pocket. Unfairness on a small scale is still unfairness. Are rights and interests not to be acknowledged unless they can be defined in balance-sheet terms?

For the reasons which I have set out I consider in agreement with the Court of Appeal that Mr. Ende had a locus standi to make a proposal and would be a person aggrieved within section 69 (1) if the football grounds had been under-assessed.

There remains the question whether Mr. Ende had a locus standi in Islington in his capacity as a ratepayer in Hackney or in his capacity as a taxpayer. Strictly speaking my view that as a ratepayer in Islington Mr. Ende had a locus standi makes it unnecessary to decide this further question. It was however raised in the case stated and considered in the Court of Appeal. It is to be noted that in the case stated Mr. Ende was referred to as a precept payer. The actual precept payer however was the Hackney London Borough Council who had to pay sums for the purposes

of the Greater London Council and of the Metropolitan Police: the latter bodies issued precepts to the borough.

By the precepts each borough was required to levy as part, or as an additional item, of the rate, a rate of a specified number of pence in the pound. Mr. Ende was a ratepayer in Hackney and as such he was paying his appropriate proportion of a sum which had to be raised and which was considerably increased by the fact that it included the amount which the Borough of Hackney had to pay to the Greater London Council and the Metropolitan Police. The case proceeded on the basis that approximately two-thirds of the rates which had to be collected by the Hackney London Borough Council had to be paid to the precepting authorities. If an assessment in Islington was too low with the result that an inadequate sum was paid by way of rates it would follow in theory that all other ratepayers within the precepting area would be paying more than they need have paid if the assessment in question had been correct. The likely consequences for the pocket of any one ratepayer in any one borough as the result of one under-valuation of one hereditament in another borough could clearly not be appreciable. Questions of principle might however arise and upon their decision might depend the correctness of the valuations of very considerable numbers of hereditaments. Appreciable results affecting the pockets of very many people might result - though the importance of a question of principle (such as that of fairness) ought not in my view to be measured in or to be dependent upon statement in financial terms. By way of illustration if there could be ground for suggesting that within a precept area certain hereditaments of a particular description were all under-assessed and that the particular description was invalid as a reason for distinguishing them from other comparable hereditaments - in such a situation I see no reason why a ratepayer within the precept area should not possess a locus standi to assert that he is a person aggrieved. The particular positions and locations within the rating or precept areas of the hereditaments would in my view have no relevance. The burdens which will have to be assumed by such a ratepayer will be of a nature that will be likely to deter any merely meddlesome busybody.

The position of a taxpayer remains to be considered. Mr. Ende submitted that both boroughs (Islington and Hackney) were at all material times in beneficial receipt of funds provided by the National Exchequer from taxation customs and excise: that such funds were received for purposes of the rate support grant based upon their respective total rateable values: that he as a taxpayer contributed to the National Exchequer: and that the burden on the exchequer and consequently on him as a taxpayer was heavier than would be the case if all hereditaments were correctly valued.

As a taxpayer Mr. Ende is in no different position from all other taxpayers who pay the same amount of tax that he pays. His concern as a taxpayer in regard to the Arsenal Stadium becomes much removed from his concern in regard to that stadium in his capacity as a ratepayer in Islington and in Hackney. The concern of all other taxpayers is also far removed. In these matters there comes a stage at which the law

must draw a line and say that a claim is too remote. I think that the line to be drawn must deny a locus standi to one whose only status is that of a taxpayer.

I would therefore decide the points of law raised in the case stated in the ways that I have set out.

I would dismiss the appeal.

VISCOUNT DILHORNE. My Lords, section 69 (1) of the General Rate Act 1967 is in the following terms:

"Subject to subsection (6) of this section, any person (including a rating authority) who is aggrieved - (a) by the inclusion of any hereditament in the valuation list; or (b) by any value ascribed in the list to a hereditament or by any other statement made or omitted to be made in the list with respect to a hereditament; or (c) in the case of a building or portion of a building occupied in parts, by the valuation in the list of that building or portion of a building as a single hereditament, may at any time make a proposal for the alteration of the list so far as it relates to that hereditament."

A valuation list is maintained for each rating area and is prepared and from time to time caused to be altered in accordance with the provisions of Part V of the Act by the valuation officer (section 67 (1)).

Mr. Ende, the second respondent, is the occupier of premises and a ratepayer in the Borough of Hackney. He acts as agent for the owners and manager of 22 Beaumont Rise, a house in multiple occupation, in the Borough of Islington.

On March 23, 1972, Mr. Ende, claiming to be a person aggrieved by the value ascribed in the valuation list to the Arsenal Football Stadium in the Borough of Islington occupied by the appellants, made a proposal for the alteration of the list so far as it related to that hereditament. He contended that the value ascribed to it was too low and should be increased. As his proposal was opposed, it was referred to the Greater London Valuation Court which decided that the list should be amended by increasing the rateable value of the stadium from £9,250 to £13,900, an increase of just over 50 per cent. It was submitted to that court that Mr. Ende had no locus standi as he was not a person aggrieved by the value placed on the stadium but this submission was not acceded to.

The appellants and the first respondent appealed to the Lands Tribunal where the question whether Mr. Ende was an aggrieved person was dealt with as a preliminary issue and a decision as to the value of the stadium was postponed. The Lands Tribunal held that Mr. Ende was not a person aggrieved by the value placed on the stadium and so his proposal should not have been entertained by the valuation court. Consequently they held that no alteration should have been made to the valuation list.

Mr. Ende's appeal to the Court of Appeal (Lord Denning M.R., Orr and Waller L.JJ.) was allowed and the appellants now appeal to this House.

There are only two questions that have to be decided; first, whether Mr. Ende was a person aggrieved by the value ascribed to the stadium in

the list and, secondly, a question raised by Mr. Ende, whether the Lands Tribunal had power to disturb the decision of the valuation court that he was an aggrieved person.

While at first sight it might appear that the question whether Mr. Ende was an aggrieved person entitled under section 69 (1) to make a proposal could not be one of great difficulty, it is the case that no less than four days in the Court of Appeal and the greater part of four days in this House were devoted to consideration of it. We were treated to an argument on behalf of the appellants, which lasted two days, in the course of which the development of the law of rating was traced from 1743 to the present day and in which four statutes which have been repealed and no less than 16 cases were subjected to a detailed and meticulous examination. I did not find this helpful. Our task, as I see it, is simply to decide what meaning is to be given to the wording of section 69 (1) of the General Rate Act 1967, a consolidation Act, and then to see whether Mr. Ende is a person to whom that language applies. It is only exceptionally that consideration of repealed statutory provisions and of cases decided thereon assists in construing a differently worded provision, and much of the advantage which should flow from consolidation will be lost if, despite it, recourse is had to earlier repealed statutes.

Turning first to the language of the subsection, there can be no doubt as to the meaning of the words "any person." Parliament might have restricted the right to put forward proposals for the alteration of valuation lists to ratepayers as it restricted to ratepayers the right to inspect certain documents (section 108 (1)). It did not do so. Any person aggrieved by one of the matters mentioned can put forward a proposal. It is not enough for him to show that he is a ratepayer. He must show that he is aggrieved.

The subsection does not provide that a proposal can only be put forward for the alteration of a list for a rating area in which the proposer is a ratepayer or has an interest. The test laid down in the Act is that he must be a person aggrieved and the wording of the subsection entitles him, if he is aggrieved by one of the matters mentioned in any valuation list, to put forward a proposal for the alteration of the list. No doubt a ratepayer will seldom experience any difficulty in establishing that he is aggrieved by a wrong entry in a valuation list for his rating area but a ratepayer, say in Newcastle, may have great difficulty in showing that he is aggrieved by an entry in a list for a London borough. Still, if a ratepayer outside the rating area to which the valuation list applies can show that he is aggrieved by an entry in it, the subsection clearly permits him to put forward a proposal. Its language is clear.

While it is true that words in the English language take colour from the context in which they are used, I see nothing in the subsection or in the remainder of the Act to warrant giving to the word "aggrieved" any meaning other than its ordinary natural meaning. To be "aggrieved" a person must be affected by the matter of which he complains. In the Court of Appeal and in this House it was contended on behalf of the appellants that some standard must be laid down by which it could be judged whether a person was aggrieved. A test, it was said, was needed and it was suggested that the test to be applied was that a person was not to

be regarded as aggrieved unless the error in the valuation list had some demonstrable effect on his pocket, rights or interests, particularly singled out from those of the public generally. This test was rejected, and in my view rightly rejected, by the Court of Appeal. As my noble and learned friend Lord Simon of Glaisdale said in Union Cold Storage Co. Ltd. v. Phillips [1976] R.A. 173, 178: "The prime purpose of the rating legislation is, however, to promote fairness in the valuation list between one ratepayer and another." A ratepayer may well feel aggrieved if he finds that the value placed on another hereditament is too low with the result that the occupier of that hereditament is paying less in rates than he should but under the test proposed he will not be able to do anything about it unless he can show that correction of the error will have a demonstrable effect on his pocket, rights or interests; and it was clearly demonstrated in the course of the argument that an increase in the value placed on another hereditament is not in the least likely to lead to a reduction in the amount of rates payable by the ratepayer who is aggrieved.

The suggestion that some standard should be laid down and that a test is needed is a suggestion that the wording of the subsection is defective and an invitation to this House in its judicial capacity to embark on the process of legislating. I see no grounds for thinking the subsection defective or for restricting its operation as proposed. A test is laid down by the subsection It is that to be entitled to put forward a proposal, a person must be aggrieved by one of the matters mentioned in the subsection. It will not suffice just to show that there was an error in one of the respects mentioned in the list for it does not follow from the existence of an error that the proposer was aggrieved thereby. An error may be of so little significance that it is impossible to conclude that the proposer or any person was aggrieved by it. I repeat, to be aggrieved, he must be affected in some way by what has gone wrong.

In my opinion the subsection means what it says and there is no justification for putting any gloss on its language or for seeking to put a limit on its operation. Though the duty of securing uniformity in valuation rests on valuation officers of the Inland Revenue, this subsection is a valuable safeguard for the individual and enables errors to be corrected when otherwise they may escape notice or may not be corrected. If the decision of the valuation court as to the value to be placed on the stadium is right, then that is one instance of an error in valuation.

It must, I think, in every case be a question of fact whether the person putting forward the proposal is entitled to do so as a person aggrieved by one of the matters mentioned in the subsection. In this case there is no dispute as to the primary facts relating to Mr. Ende's position. The only question is the proper inference to draw from them.

Mr. Ende maintains that as a ratepayer in Islington and in Hackney he is aggrieved by the low value placed on the stadium. He also contends that he is aggrieved by that as a taxpayer. The Court of Appeal thought that his claim to be aggrieved on that account was too remote. Mr. Ende argued that if too low values were ascribed, it might result in too much rate support being given at the expense of taxpayers in which case every taxpayer was aggrieved and entitled to put forward proposals for the

alteration of a valuation list in any part of the country. Wide though the language of the subsection is, it is not in my opinion wide enough to lead to the conclusion that on account of this possibility any taxpayer is entitled to feel aggrieved by a low valuation of a hereditament.

Mr. Ende's claim to be aggrieved as a ratepayer in Islington arises in this way. Under section 24 of the General Rate Act a valuation officer may, if he thinks fit, treat a dwelling occupied in parts as a single hereditament and the valuation officer in the exercise of his discretion treated 22 Beaumont Rise, Islington as a single hereditament.

Section 24 provides that where a building is so treated, it is to be deemed to be in the occupation of the person who receives the rents payable and it appears that the deemed occupier will be liable to be assessed for rates in respect of the building (section 16) and to suffer a distress in the event of non-payment of them (section 96).

Mr. Ende as manager of 22 Beaumont Rise receives the rents paid by the occupiers of the flats there and so he says that he is deemed to be the occupier of and ratepayer in respect of those premises. As such a deemed occupier and ratepayer, he says that he is aggrieved by the occupiers of the stadium being called upon to pay less in rates than they should as a result of the value ascribed to the stadium.

Whether that is right depends on the meaning to be given to the words "the person who receives the rent" in section 24. Is the agent of the owners a person who receives the rents within the meaning of that section or are the owners or other persons entitled to the rents to be so regarded or are both owners and agents persons receiving the rents? Section 24 gives no guide to the proper answer to these questions. The Lands Tribunal decided that Mr. Ende did not receive the rents. The Court of Appeal held that he did.

Section 115 of the Act contains two definitions of "owner" in which a distinction is drawn between persons entitled to receive rents and persons receiving them. Except in or in connection with sections 49, 50, 55 and 56 and except in section 60 and Schedule 1 "owner" is defined as meaning any person receiving or entitled to receive the rack rents "whether on his own account or as agent or trustee for any other person" and in those sections and that Schedule as meaning a person entitled to receive those rents. Why this distinction was drawn is not apparent but as the definition of "owner" which applies to all parts of the Act other than those sections and that Schedule covers both persons receiving rents as agents and those entitled to receive them as agents, I do not think that it assists in interpreting these words in section 24.

Mr. Ende was the person who received the rents of 22 Beaumont Rise and being authorised by the owners to do so, he was also the person entitled to do so. It follows that in my view by virtue of section 24 he was deemed to be the occupier and so the ratepayer in respect of those premises. But as I have said, it does not in my view suffice to establish that he was a ratepayer. It must be shown that he was an aggrieved one, and one affected by the error in the list. If Mr. Ende had been an ordinary ratepayer in Islington, I have no doubt that he would have been entitled to make a proposal for the alteration of the list in respect of the stadium.

I do not think that the fact that he was deemed in consequence of the decision of the valuation officer to be the occupier and so a ratepayer, with all the liabilities of an ordinary ratepayer, makes any difference.

In my opinion the Court of Appeal and the valuation court were right in holding that as the deemed occupier he was entitled as a person aggrieved to make a proposal to alter the list in the Islington rating area.

Islington and Hackney London Borough Councils are subject to the same precepts and we were told that two-thirds of the rates paid by Mr. Ende in Hackney went to meet the precepts directed to that borough. It is to my mind obvious that just as a person may be aggrieved by the fact that someone in the same rating area as his is paying a smaller contribution than he should in rates due to an error in the valuation list, so may he feel aggrieved if a person in another rating area subject to the same precepts is making a smaller contribution than he should to the discharge of the sums precepted due to too low a valuation being placed on a hereditament.

As I have pointed out, there is nothing in section 69 (1) to restrict the exercise of the rights given by that subsection to a particular rating area and I see no justification for imposing a limit on its scope which Parliament has not thought fit to provide. I do not see anything to justify the conclusion that a person is only entitled to make a proposal with regard to an entry in the valuation list of another rating area if the hereditament to which the proposal relates is in proximity to his. If it be the case - there doest appear to be any indication of it at present - that the right to make proposals is being abused, then it is for Parliament, if it thinks fit, to narrow the scope of the subsection.

I repeat that whether a person is aggrieved is a question of fact. If his right to put forward a proposal is challenged, it will be for him to show that he was in fact aggrieved and affected by an error in the list. In Tidy v. Battman [1934] 1 K.B. 319, Lord Wright said, at p. 322:

"It is unfortunate that questions which are questions of fact alone should be confused by importing into them as principles of law a course of reasoning which has no doubt properly been applied in deciding other cases on other sets of facts"

and it would be unfortunate if the decision on fact in this case and in other cases in which it had to be determined that a person was aggrieved by an error in a valuation list was to be treated as establishing a principle of law.

In Rex v. Surrey (Mid-Eastern Area) Assessment Committee, Ex parte Merton and Morden Urban District Council [1948] 1 All E.R. 856, Lord Goddard C.J. said at p. 858:

"A 'person aggrieved' for the purpose of this Act "(the Rating and Valuation Act 1925) "that is to say, a person who is entitled to make a proposal either for increasing or decreasing the amount of the valuation, must mean a person who considers that he is aggrieved and may be able to show that he is aggrieved because until the decision is given either by the assessment committee or quarter sessions, if there is an appeal, no one can say whether the person is aggrieved. It may turn out that he has no case for grievance at all."

Until it is established that an error affecting him has been made in a valuation list, it cannot be said that a person is aggrieved but in some cases the information contained in the proposal may suffice to show that the proposer could not be an aggrieved person. In such a case it would be right to reject his proposal at the outset.

Where, as here, the valuation court has decided not only that there was a substantial error in the valuation list but also that Mr. Ende was an aggrieved person, an appeal lies to the Lands Tribunal which by virtue of section 77 has power to give any directions the valuation court could have given. The valuation court might, if it has not been satisfied that Mr. Ende was an aggrieved person, have rejected his proposal and have directed that no alteration should be made in the valuation list. In view of the terms of section 77 the Lands Tribunal has also, in my opinion, clearly power to take that course and I accordingly reject Mr. Ende's submission to the contrary.

For the reasons I have stated, I would dismiss this appeal.

LORD FRASER OF TULLYBELTON. My Lords, the main question raised in this appeal is whether a ratepayer whose property is correctly assessed can be a "person who is aggrieved" in the sense of section 69 (1) of the General Rate Act 1967 by the under-assessment of another ratepayer's property in the same rating area, although he cannot demonstrate that the under-assessment causes him any financial or other loss. There is also a further question whether the position is the same when the under-assessment hereditament is not within the same rating area, but is within an area subject to the same precepts as the area in which he is a ratepayer.

The second respondent maintains that he is a ratepayer in the London Borough of Islington and that he can be, and is, aggrieved by the fact that a hereditament occupied by the appellants in the same borough is under-assessed, and he is supported in that contention by the first respondent who is the valuation officer for the borough. The second respondent also maintains that as a ratepayer in the London Borough of Hackney he can be, and is, aggrieved by the under-assessment of the appellants' hereditament in Islington because Hackney and Islington councils are both bound to make payments under precepts issued by the Greater London Council and the Metropolitan Police. The first respondent does not agree with him in this contention. The appellants contend that a person cannot be said to be "aggrieved" unless "his grievance was of a kind which had some demonstrable effect on his pocket, rights, or interests, particularly singled out from those of the public generally." I quote that statement of the appellants' contention from the judgment of Lord Denning M.R. in the Court of Appeal [1977] Q.B. 100, 112, as it was expressly adopted in argument by the appellants' counsel, subject to qualification, as I understood the argument, that the words "particularly singled out from those of the public generally" might not be essential.

Mr. Ende, the second respondent, lived, at the material time, in the London Borough of Hackney where he occupied a flat which had (so far as appears) been correctly valued and on which he paid rates. There is no dispute that he was a ratepayer in Hackney. He also claims that he was

a ratepayer in the London Borough of Islington by virtue of the fact that he managed a property there from which he collected the rents. This claim is disputed and its soundness depends upon the construction of section 24 of the General Rate Act 1967 which I shall have to examine later. For the present I shall assume that Mr. Ende's claim to be a ratepayer in Islington, as well as in Hackney, is well founded. Mr. Ende says that he is aggrieved by the value ascribed to the Arsenal Football Stadium in the valuation list for Islington for the year ended March 31, 1972. The stadium was occupied by the appellants. Mr. Ende made a proposal on March 23, 1972, for altering the valuation list by increasing the value of the stadium from £9,250 to £60,000. (He also proposed that a more comprehensive description of the hereditament should be given, but no separate point turns on this part of the proposal.) The appellants objected to the proposal, first on the ground that Mr. Ende was not entitled to be treated as a person aggrieved, and secondly on the ground that the proposed value was excessive. The local valuation court decided in favour of Mr. Ende on the first point and, on the second point, they directed that the entry relating to the stadium be altered to show a value increased only to £13,900. Against that decision the present appellants appealed to the Lands Tribunal. The Lands Tribunal dealt with the former point first at a preliminary hearing and decided that Mr. Ende was not a person aggrieved in the sense of section 69. In view of that decision the Lands Tribunal did not require to consider the merits of the appeal. Mr. Ende appealed to the Court of Appeal which decided the preliminary point in his favour and from that decision the appellants appeal to your Lordships' House. In consequence of this series of appeals this House now, in March 1977, has to consider a preliminary point relating to a valuation list which is already almost five years out of date, and, in the event of the decision being in favour of the second respondent, merits of the matter will thereafter have to be dealt with by the Lands Tribunal.

The statutory basis of the right to make a proposal for altering the valuation list is section 69 of the General Rate Act 1967. Section 69 (1) is in the following terms:

"Subject to subsection (6) of this section, any person (including a rating authority) who is aggrieved - (a) by the inclusion of any hereditament in the valuation list; or (b) by any value ascribed in the list to a hereditament or by any other statement made or omitted to be made in the list with respect to a hereditament; or (c) in the case of a building or portion of a building occupied in parts, by the valuation in the list of that building or portion of a building as a single hereditament, may at any time make a proposal for the alteration of the list so far as it relates to that hereditament."

Subsection (6) is not relevant to this appeal. Counsel for the appellants and for the first respondent agreed, rightly in my opinion, that the word "aggrieved" has to be construed in the context of this Act and that the meaning given to it in other Acts or in other contexts is of no assistance. The word is not defined either in section 69 or elsewhere in the Act and the only guidance available from section 69 is that the Person must be

aggrieved by one of the three matters specified in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). There is no justification that I can see for reading the subsection as if it provided that a person was only to be treated as aggrieved if he had suffered demonstrable loss of a material nature. Such a construction not only lacks statutory warrant but it would be contrary to the principle, hitherto generally accepted, that every ratepayer has a legitimate interest in having a fair and uniform level of assessment as the basis for contributions to the local rates. There are many cases in which judges have treated that as obvious; Lord Denning M.R. in his judgment in the instant appeal [1977] Q.B. 100, 113 mentioned a number of these cases and I agree with him that they amount to "an impressive anthology." It is true that none of them is decisive of the present issue, because some were decided under earlier and differently worded rating Acts and in others the question for decision was different and the dicta were obiter, but taken together they must surely be regarded as having considerable weight. The earliest of the cases mentioned was Rex v. Sussex Justices (1812) 15 East 206, but I quote only from the latest, where Lord Radcliffe, speaking in your Lordships' House in Society of Medical Officers of Health v. Hope [1960] A.C. 551, 565, said:

"It is in the nature of the rating scheme that all those other ratepayers ... are interested in the valuation or exemption allotted to any single hereditament on the list... there was no bar to any ratepayer, as a person aggrieved, raising an objection...."

It was argued on behalf of the appellants that decisions and judicial dicta before 1948 were irrelevant for the purposes of this appeal because the Local Government Act 1948 (which, with later amendments, is consolidated in the General Rate Act 1967) had introduced a completely new system under which valuation for rates is made by an officer of the Inland Revenue, the valuation officer, who is entirely independent of the rating authority (section 33 (1)). It was said that the duty of ensuring fairness and uniformity of the valuation list has since 1948 rested primarily upon this independent quasi-judicial officer, and secondly upon the rating authority which is not only mentioned specifically in section 69 (1) as a person who may be aggrieved but is given by section 69 (3) the right, not enjoyed by ordinary ratepayers, to propose alteration of the list by inserting a hereditament which had not been included by the valuation officer and that therefore the individual ratepayer now has no concern with the fairness and uniformity of the list. I agree that the valuation officer and the rating authority have the duty of promoting uniformity but I do not think the suggested conclusion follows. It is contrary to the view expressed by Lord Radcliffe, which I have quoted, expressed in 1960, after the Local Government Act 1948. It also disregards the fact that, as it appears to me, a ratepayer may reasonably feel aggrieved if he sees that his neighbour has not been fairly assessed on the same basis as himself.

There are also more practical reasons for rejecting the argument. In the first place it may well be a useful and salutary safeguard for the individual ratepayer to be able to draw attention to cases where the system is not working fairly. It is not to be expected that valuation officers and rating authorities, however careful and diligent they may be in the

performance of their onerous duties, will avoid occasional errors; the success that has apparently attended some of Mr. Ende's earlier proposals for altering valuation lists seems to show that errors do occur. Secondly, if it were necessary for the proposer to show that this grievance had some effect upon his pocket, rights or interests, great uncertainty would be introduced. Obviously the fact that one hereditament in a rating area is assessed at too low a value is most unlikely to have any measurable effect on a proposer's pocket or other material interests. But it may do so if the one hereditament belongs to a large class - say a class consisting of all local authority houses of a certain type - and if an alteration in its valuation leads to revaluation of the whole class. The calculation of the effect, if any, of an under-assessment after allowing for subsidies, rate support grant, Greater London equalisation scheme, and other things would be beyond the powers of most ratepayers and I think it would be unreasonable that they should have to make such a calculation in order to show that they are aggrieved. Even if they could make the calculation, there would still be doubt as to how great an effect on the rate poundage would be required to constitute a grievance. In my opinion, the aggrieved ratepayer has no concern with such questions.

Moreover if a grievance for the purpose of section 69 (1) must be one that affects the pocket, rights or interest of the proposer alone, or at least in some special way, "singled out from those of the public generally," it would not be enough, and would not be even relevant, for him to show that the under-assessment of which he complains affects the general rate poundage applicable to all ratepayers in the area. The effect of applying the test suggested by the appellants would be, for practical purposes, to limit the right of an individual ratepayer under section 69 (1) (b) to proposing an alteration of the value ascribed to his own hereditament, that is to a right of appeal against the valuation of his own property. If that had been what Parliament intended by section 69 (1), and by section 40 (1) of the Local Government Act 1948 from which it is derived, I would not expect it to have used such comprehensive words as "any person who is aggrieved."

For these reasons I agree with all the members of the Court of Appeal that any ratepayer who is of opinion that any hereditament occupied by another ratepayer in the same rating area is under-assessed is a person who is aggrieved within section 69 (1) (b) of the Act of 1967 and that he is entitled to make a proposal altering the list so as to increase the value ascribed to that other hereditament.

The same principle seems to me equally applicable where the hereditament which is under-assessed is in a different rating area but within the same precepting area as that of the ratepayer who proposes the alteration. Rates are levied partly to pay for services administered by the rating authority itself, and partly to pay for services administered by other authorities which issue precepts to the rating authority. The latter services may account for more than half the total rate. Thus in Hackney for the year ended March 31, 1972, the total rate was 87 pence in the £ of which just over 30 pence was required for the purposes of the borough and almost all the rest, that is nearly two-thirds, was required for the

purposes of the Greater London Council and the Metropolitan Police. A ratepayer in Hackney therefore may be aggrieved just as much by under-assessment of a hereditament in some part of the Greater London Council or the Metropolitan Police precepting area outside Hackney as by the under-assessment of one within Hackney. No doubt the financial effect will probably be less because the number of hereditaments in the precepting area is larger than the number in the rating area, but if it be right that direct financial loss is not required that is not material. Accordingly I agree with Lord Denning M.R. and with Orr L.J. in the Court of Appeal that there is no reason in principle why a ratepayer may not be "a person who is aggrieved" within section 69 (1) by the under-assessment of another hereditament in the same precepting area although not within the same rating area. But with respect I cannot see any logical reason why he should not be aggrieved unless he lives near the under-assessed hereditament. Physical proximity does not appear to me to be relevant; if, for example, the complaint were that a large class of hereditaments scattered throughout the precepting area were all under-assessed, surely it would not be right to allow proposals for altering the valuation only of those members of the class which happened to be near the proposer's own property. I am of opinion that the right to make a proposal under section 69 (1) applies to any hereditament within the precepting area in exactly the same way as it does to any hereditament within the rating area.

Mr. Ende also claims to be aggrieved as a taxpayer because the taxes he pays are used partly to pay support grants to some local authorities. But in my opinion the connection between his payments of tax and any under-assessment of a hereditament is too remote to enable him, in his capacity as a taxpayer, to be considered as a person aggrieved under this Act. Moreover, taxes are assessed and levied on entirely different bases from rates, and there is no room for uniformity between them.

Two questions of less general importance remain for consideration. (1) The first is whether Mr. Ende's claim to be a ratepayer in Islington is well founded. It is based on section 24 of the General Rate Act 1967 which is in the following terms:

"Where a building which was constructed or has been adapted - (a) for the purposes of a single dwelling; or (b) as to part thereof for such purposes and as to the remainder thereof for any purpose other than that of a dwelling, is occupied in parts, the valuation officer, in preparing a new valuation list or in altering a current valuation list, may, if he thinks fit, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the extent, if any, to which the parts separately occupied have been severed by structural alterations, treat the building or any portion thereof as a single hereditament, and a building or portion of a building so treated as a single hereditament shall, for the purposes of rating, be deemed to be a single hereditament in the occupation of the person who receives the rents payable in respect of the parts."

The facts which are material to this question are that Mr. Ende, who is an estate agent, manages a building in Islington at 22 Beaumont Rise from which he collects the rents. No. 22 Beaumont Rise, a building

which was constructed for the purposes of a single dwelling, is now occupied in parts (in four flats) and the valuation officer has elected, under section 24, to treat the building as a single hereditament. It follows that the building is for the purposes of rating deemed to be a single hereditament "in the occupation of the person who receives the rents payable in respect of the parts." Mr. Ende is the person who "receives" rents physically as he collects them, though he does so not on his own account but as agent for the owner. His name appears in the rate book of the Islington Borough Council as the rated occupier for the property and he is the person who is liable, at least in the first instance, to the borough council for payment of the rates in respect of that property.

It was argued on behalf of the appellants that the person who "receives" the rents in the sense of section 24 is the person who receives them beneficially and not one who collects them as agent on behalf of his principal. I do not agree, particularly having regard to the definition of "owner" in section 115 (1) as meaning any person "receiving or entitled to receive the rack-rent... whether on his own account or as agent or trustee for any other person" (my emphasis). If an agent can be regarded as "receiving" the rent for the purpose of that definition, it seems probable that he can also be regarded as doing so for the purpose of section 24. Counsel for the appellants said (rightly, I think) that if Mr. Ende as the agent is deemed to be the occupier, he alone will have the right under section 70 of the General Rate Act 1967 to receive a copy of any proposal under section 69 relating to No. 22 Beaumont Rise, and the right under section 72 to agree on any alteration of its valuation, and that neither the owner of the building nor the tenants of the separate flats in it will have these rights, and counsel argued that that would be surprising. It may be so, but in my opinion that is what the Act provides. The effect of section 24 (1), in the circumstances of this case, is that the building No. 22 Beaumont Rise is deemed to be a single hereditament in the occupation of Mr. Ende. That is equivalent to saying that Mr. Ende is the occupier. By section 16 every occupier of inter alia a house is liable to be assessed to rates in respect of the house. By section 115 "ratepayer" is defined as meaning "a person who is liable to any rate in respect of property entered in any valuation list." In my opinion Mr. Ende is liable to pay the rates in respect of No. 22 Beaumont Rise and he is the ratepayer, and the only ratepayer, in respect of it. He is entitled to the rights as well as being subject to the liabilities of a ratepayer in Islington. One of these rights is to be treated as a person aggrieved by the under-assessment of another hereditament in Islington. Accordingly, in my opinion, Mr. Ende succeeds on this point also.

(2) The other question is raised by Mr. Ende's contention that the Lands Tribunal ought not to have dealt with the question of whether he was a "person aggrieved" as a preliminary matter or at all. The Lands Tribunal decided this point against Mr. Ende and they added: "The effect of this decision is that Mr. Ende's proposal was invalid, [and] that the local valuation court had no jurisdiction in the matter...." As I understood Mr. Ende's argument, it was that the Lands Tribunal was not entitled to challenge the jurisdiction of the local valuation court. In

my opinion this argument is misconceived. The question of whether Mr. Ende was or was not a person aggrieved was a question of fact, or of mixed fact and law, which had to be decided by the local valuation court in order to reach its decision on the appeal as a whole. As such it was open to review by the Lands Tribunal which under section 77 of the General Rate Act 1967 "may give any directions which the local valuation court might have given." In my opinion Mr. Ende fails on this point.

I would dismiss the appeal and affirm the order made by the Court of Appeal. With regard to the costs in this House I think that the proper order is that which counsel for the appellants and for the first respondent agreed would be appropriate in the event of the appeal failing, videlicet that the appellants should pay the costs of Mr. Ende and half the costs of the first respondent in this House. I would order accordingly.

LORD KEITH OF KINKEL. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Wilberforce. I agree with it and there is nothing that I can usefully add. I would dismiss the appeal.

Solicitors: Lawrence Jones & Co.; Solicitor of Inland Revenue.

J. A. G.