COUNSEL: Schwabe, K.C., and Barrington-Ward,for the defendant.
Sir John Simon, K.C. (Hemmerde, K.C., W. O. Willis, andGuedalla with him), for the plaintiff

 

SOLICITORS: Solicitors for plaintiff: Guedalla & Jacobson.

Solicitors for defendant: Lewis & Lewis.

 

JUDGES: Swinfen Eady, Bankes, and Scrutton L.JJ.

 

DATES: 1917 Jan. 26, 29, 30, 31 

Feb. 1 

 

 

Husband and Wife – Action by Wife against Husband – Separation Deed – Action for Rescission on Ground of Fraud – Action of Tort – Restitutio in integrum – Married Women’s Property Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75), s. 12.

 

By s. 12 of the Married Women’s Property Act, 1882, every woman shall have in her own name against all persons whomsoever, including her husband, the same civil remedies for the protection and security of her own separate property as if such property belonged to her as a feme sole, but, except as aforesaid, no husband or wife shall be entitled to sue the other for a tort.

 

In 1910 a deed of separation was executed by a husband and wife under which the husband agreed to pay to the wife during her life or until she should marry again the annual sum of 500£., and the wife agreed to maintain herself and to keep indemnified the husband against her debts and torts, and not to take proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights nor for divorce or judicial separation in respect of any previous marital offence; and it was also agreed that all letters between the parties should be destroyed. The letters were accordingly destroyed and the husband paid his wife the 500£. a year. In 1915 the wife brought an action against the husband claiming to have the deed rescinded upon the ground [*814] that she had been induced to execute it by his false and fraudulent representations and concealment as to his means:–

 

Held, that before the Married Women’s Property Act, 1882, such a claim was maintainable; that the wife in claiming the relief was not suing her husband for a tort within the meaning of s. 12 of the Act of 1882; and that therefore the Act had not taken away her right to maintain the action.

 

The Court ordered the deed to be rescinded though the letters had been destroyed and could not be restored to the respective parties, and refused to make it a condition of rescission that the wife should repay to the husband the annual sums of 500£. which he had paid to her under the deed, the husband having received corresponding benefits under the deed.

 

Judgment of Lush J.  [1916] 2 K. B. 642 affirmed.

 

APPEAL from the judgment of Lush J. at the trial of the action with a jury. (1)

 

The facts may be shortly stated as follows:- The plaintiff when the action was commenced was the wife of the defendant. On November 28, 1900, she and the defendant were privately married, but they never set up a joint establishment. The defendant’s father was a newspaper proprietor in Manchester, and the business had been sold to a limited company in which the father held 103,276 shares of 1£. each out of 114,757 issued shares, and the defendant then held about 11,000 shares. The defendant allowed the plaintiff 500£. a year. According to the plaintiff’s evidence the defendant stated that he had 1000£. a year from his father in payment for services in connection with newspapers, which could be taken from him by his father, and that he had no other income. In fact in 1899 a dividend of 50 per cent. had been paid on the shares. In March 1904, the defendant’s father died, leaving an estate of 558,000£. According to the plaintiff’s evidence the defendant told her that he was no better off after his father’s death, his net income being the same. In February, 1905, they ceased to live together, but the defendant continued to pay her the 500£. a year. In 1909 the defendant advanced her 375£. to furnish a house, which was to be repaid by quarterly instalments of 25£. This led to solicitors being instructed, and ultimately a deed of separation of June 7, 1910, was executed. By this deed, which is set out in the report of the case in the Court

 

(1) [1916] 2 K. B. 642. [*815]

 

below, the parties agreed to live separate and not to molest, annoy, or interfere with each other; neither the husband nor the wife was to take any proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights, and the wife agreed not to take any proceedings against the husband to obtain a divorce or judicial separation in respect of any previous marital offence; the husband agreed to pay to the wife the clear annual sum of 500£. free of income tax during her life or, if she survived him, until she married again; the wife agreed to maintain herself and to keep the husband indemnified against her debts, liabilities, and torts, the husband released her from the sums of money advanced by him to her, and all letters and telegrams between the parties and all copies thereof were to be handed over to the respective solicitors for immediate destruction in the joint presence of the solicitors. (1)The letters were accordingly destroyed, and the annual sum of 500£. was paid to the plaintiff down to the date of the decree absolute for dissolution of marriage hereinafter mentioned. On March 2, 1915, this action was brought to obtain rescission of the deed of separation upon the ground that it was obtained by the fraudulent representations of the defendant as to his means, and for damages for the fraud. The statement of claim is fully set out in the report of the case in the Court below. The allegation was that the defendant had persistently represented that his income was only about 1000£. a year or thereabouts, whereas upon his father’s death his pecuniary position had greatly improved, his income being upwards of 30,000£. a year. The defendant denied that he made any such representations or concealed the amount of his income. Shortly before the date of the writ in the present action the plaintiff filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage with the defendant; and on July 8, 1915, a decree nisi was granted, the decree being made absolute on February 7, 1916 (before the trial of this action). Since the decree was made absolute under an order of the Divorce Division permanent maintenance was fixed at 5000£. a year to be paid to the plaintiff from February 7, 1916.

 

The learned judge left the question to the jury whether the plaintiff was induced to execute the deed of separation by the false and

 

(1) This last term was, it was stated, inserted at the instance of the defendant. [*816] fraudulent representations and concealment of the defendant, and the jury answered this question in the affirmative. The learned judge then made an order that the deed should be rescinded, the plaintiff undertaking as a condition of the judgment to refund the 375£. advanced by the defendant to her, by means of a deduction from her taxed costs, but refused to order her to refund the 500£. a year paid to her since the date of the deed; and he further held that the plaintiff could not in law recover from her husband damages for the fraud.

 

The defendant appealed and asked for judgment, and in the alternative for a new trial upon the ground that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence. The plaintiff served notice of cross-appeal against that part of the judgment which held that she could not recover damages for the fraud. At the hearing of the appeal, however, counsel for the plaintiff said that, without making any admission that the cross-appeal was ill-founded, they did not, in view of the present position, propose to argue the cross-appeal.

 

1917. Jan. 26, 29, 30, 31. Schwabe, K.C., and Barrington-Ward,for the defendant. The verdict of the jury that the defendant made false and fraudulent representations to the plaintiff as to his means and that she was thereby induced to execute the deed of separation is against the weight of the evidence and there should be a new trial. [Redgrave v. Hurd (1) was referred to.]

 

Next, if the verdict stands, the action for rescission of the deed on the ground that it was obtained by fraud is not maintainable by reason of s. 12 of the Married Women’s Property Act, 1882. The action is in substance “for a tort” within the meaning of that section. The substance and not the form of the action must be looked at. If the substance of the action is a tort committed by a husband against his wife the Court will not entertain it. A wife may sue her husband even in tort for the protection and security of her separate property, but that is not this action. In this action the plaintiff is only claiming a remedy for a wrong done to her, and she must prove facts which in an ordinary case would give rise to a claim for damages. An action by a husband against his wife for an injunction to restrain

 

(1) (1881) 20 Ch. D. 1. [*817]

 

her from pledging his credit is an action for a tort within the meaning of s. 12:  Webster v. Webster. (1) Before the Act of 1882 a married woman could have sued her husband in a Court of Equity to obtain rescission of a deed obtained from her by duress:  Lambert v. Lambert. (2) It is not contended that any distinction in this respect can be drawn between duress and fraud. Sect. 12 of the Act of 1882 has, however, deprived a married woman of the right to sue her husband in tort except for the protection and security of her separate property. [Evans v. Carrington (3) and  Evans v. Edmonds (4) were also referred to.]

 

Even if the action will lie, the Court will not grant rescission of the deed, because there can be no restitutio in integrum. The letters between the parties have been given up and destroyed, and they cannot be restored. The plaintiff has never offered to repay the 500£. a year which has been paid to her by the defendant, and the Court will not order rescission unless the plaintiff repays the sum so paid to her. A contract obtained by fraud is voidable, and if the person defrauded elects to avoid it the other party is entitled to be replaced in statu quo; otherwise the Court will not rescind the contract: Urquhart v. Macpherson. (5) It is a condition of rescission that there must be restitutio in integrum. If the plaintiff seeks rescission she must return the benefits which she has received under the deed.

 

[SWINFEN EADY L.J. referred to  Adam v. Newbigging (6), and Arnould on Marine Insurance, 9th ed., p. 1565.]

 

[They also contended that the separation deed had ceased to operate upon the decree absolute for divorce, and that the plaintiff had no longer any interest in having it set aside.]

 

Sir John Simon, K.C. (Hemmerde, K.C., W. O. Willis, andGuedalla with him), for the plaintiff, was only called upon to argue whether the plaintiff could claim rescission without repaying the annual sums paid to her under the deed. Where a Court of Equity is asked to rescind a deed or other contract the maxim “He who seeks equity must do equity” applies: Story on Equity Jurisprudence, 2nd English ed., s. 693. In  Erlanger v. New Sombrero

 

(1) [1916] 1 K. B. 714, 717.

 

(2) (1767) 2 Bro. P. C. 18.

 

(3) (1860) 2 D. F. & J. 481.

 

(4) (1853) 13 C. B. 777.

 

(5) (1878) 3 App. Cas. 831, 838.

 

(6) (1886) 34 Ch. D. 582; (1888) 13 App. Cas. 308. [*818]

 

Phosphate Co. (1) Lord Blackburn states the general rule thus: “It is, I think, clear on principles of general justice, that as a condition to a rescission there must be a restitutio in integrum. The parties must be put in statu quo”; and then a little later he says: “I think the practice has always been for a Court of Equity to give this relief whenever, by the exercise of its powers, it can do what is practically just, though it cannot restore the parties precisely to the state they were in before the contract.” Restitution therefore is not always a condition precedent to rescission, though it is in most cases: see also  Rees v. De Bernardy. (2) The Court will do what is “practically just.” By the fraud of the defendant the plaintiff, the innocent party, has from the date of the separation deed down to the date of the decree absolute for dissolution of marriage been receiving far less than she was entitled to as the wife of a wealthy man, and when she took proceedings for dissolution of marriage the deed prevented her from asking for alimony pendente lite to a greater amount. The defendant, on the other hand, was relieved from maintaining her in consideration of this very inadequate payment. It would be wholly inequitable to order her to repay the 500£. a year. The permanent maintenance allotted to her only dates from the decree absolute, and therefore there is nothing against which it can be set. It is not like the case of property obtained by fraud in consideration of a money payment where, if the contract is rescinded and the property restored, it is only just that the money should be repaid. The defendant has received full consideration for the payment of the 500£. a year, and as he cannot return the consideration he has received, the plaintiff cannot be called upon to repay the 500£. a year. [Donovan v. Fricker (3) and Whittington v. Seale-Hayne (4) were referred to.]

 

Schwabe, K.C., in reply.

 

Feb. 1. SWINFEN EADY, L.J. This action was tried by Lush J. and a special jury. The plaintiff when the action was commenced was the wife of the defendant. Since the action has been pending she has obtained a divorce from him. The object of this action was to

 

(1) (1878) 3 App. Cas. 1218, 1278, 1279.

 

(2) [1896] 2 Ch. 437, 445, 446.

 

(3) (1821) Jac. 165.

 

(4) (1900) 82 L. T. 49. [*819]

 

obtain the rescission and setting aside of a deed of separation between the plaintiff and defendant, dated June 7, 1910, which the plaintiff alleged had been obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations of the defendant, and for damages. The judge left to the jury the question whether the plaintiff was induced by the false and fraudulent misrepresentation of the defendant to execute the deed of separation. The jury answered the question in the affirmative. Thereupon the judge set aside the deed, but held as matter of law that the plaintiff could not recover from her husband damages for the fraud. (1) The defendant appeals, and contends that judgment should be entered for him, or in the alternative that there should be a new trial on the ground that the verdict was a perverse one, and that, especially having regard to certain letters, no reasonable men could find that the plaintiff was induced by fraud to enter into the deed. He also contended that the plaintiff could not legally maintain the action against her husband to set aside the deed for fraud, as he said that would be suing her husband for a tort, which would be contrary to the provisions of s. 12 of the Married Women’s Property Act, 1882. He also contended that the deed could not be set aside, as there could not be restitutio in integrum. There was a notice of cross-appeal by the plaintiff in which she asked to have it determined that the decision of the judge was erroneous when he held that the action, so far as it was a claim for damages, was not maintainable. This cross-appeal was not, however, proceeded with, and should be dismissed with costs. [The Lord Justice stated the facts at length (a short epitome of which is given above), and referred to the evidence and the summing-up of the learned judge, and came to the conclusion that it was quite impossible to maintain the position that no reasonable men could upon the evidence before them have found the verdict which the jury returned, and that therefore the application for a new trial must fail.]

 

It was next contended that the plaintiff could not maintain this action by reason of the Married Women’s Property Act, 1882, s. 12. It was not disputed that previous to the passing of this Act a married woman could have sued her husband to set aside a deed obtained by fraud or duress, the married woman, according to the old practice, suing by her next friend (see Mitford on Pleading, p. 28), and

 

(1) [1916] 2 K. B. 642. [*820]

 

consenting to the action being brought. The practice of the Court of Chancery was for actions that lay in infants or married women to be instituted by the next friend, the difference between them being that when the infant was plaintiff his consent was not necessary for the institution of the action, but that where the action was brought by a married woman by her next friend her consent was necessary. This was pointed out in  Andrews v. Cradock. (1) Lambert v. Lambert (2) was an action brought by a wife by a next friend against her husband and others to set aside as having been obtained by duress a deed dated November 29, 1762, whereby the husband agreed to give his wife 20£. a year by way of a separate maintenance. The wife succeeded in the action, and the decree was affirmed by the House of Lords. The appellant, however, contended that the right to bring such an action was taken away from a married woman by s. 12 of the Act of 1882, as the wife would be suing the husband for a tort. In my judgment this contention is not well founded, whether the claim to set aside the deed is based on facts which would or which would not as between other parties give ground for an action of deceit. A proceeding to set aside a deed for fraud is not suing for a tort within the meaning of s. 12. It is one of the matters which by the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 34, are assigned to the Chancery Division. A claim in an action to obtain damages for deceit would, in my opinion, be suing for a tort. In my judgment there is nothing in s. 12 of the Act of 1882 to take away from a married woman the right which she previously possessed of taking proceedings against her husband to have set aside any deed obtained by him from her by fraud or duress. The ancient jurisdiction of the Court in this respect is not diminished or affected by s. 12 of the Act of 1882.

 

There remains the further point that the plaintiff cannot obtain the setting aside of the deed as there cannot be complete restitutio in integrum. The learned judge accepted the plaintiff’s undertaking to repay the debt of 375£., from which she was released by the deed, by allowing that sum to be set off against costs awarded to her, but he declined to require her as a condition of relief to repay the annual sums of 500£. paid to her between the date of the deed and the date

 

(1) (1713) Prec. in Ch. 376; 1 Eq. C. Ab. 72.

 

(2) 2 Bro. P. C. 18. [*821]

 

of the decree absolute made by the Divorce Court. It must be remembered that the plaintiff had been receiving an allowance of 500£. a year from 1905 or before to the date of the deed in 1910. The same sum continued to be paid to her after the deed and pursuant to the deed, and she lived upon that amount, and the defendant’s credit was not pledged by the plaintiff for any necessaries. These were obtained by means of the annual payment. Moreover, the deed, so long as it stood, was a bar to the plaintiff obtaining alimony pendente lite from the Divorce Court. The permanent maintenance of 5000£. a year now fixed by that Court as a suitable provision for the plaintiff, and to be paid by the defendant to her, only commences to run from the date of the decree absolute, namely, February 7, 1916. The appellant now contends that he ought to escape from all liability to maintain his wife between June 7, 1910, the date of the deed, and February 7, 1916, and that the plaintiff ought to be put upon terms to refund all sums paid in respect of the period between the two last-mentioned dates; in other words, that the plaintiff should repay all sums paid to her, while he retains the full benefit and advantage of escaping from the burden of maintaining his wife during that period, and of having by means of the deed and so long as it remained in force prevented her from obtaining any alimony pendente lite from the Divorce Court. In my judgment this would be entirely inequitable. As against the defendant, upon the facts as they are now known, it must be taken that no less sum than 500£. a year could be considered a suitable provision for the wife’s maintenance, and this is all that he has paid. I agree with the view expressed by the learned judge at the trial that, having regard to the defendant’s actual means and to the finding of the jury, such a sum was altogether inadequate. The general rule is that as a condition of rescission there must be restitutio in integrum, but at the same time the Court has full power to make all just allowances. It was said by Lord Blackburn in  Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co. (1) that the practice had always been for a Court of Equity to give relief by way of rescission whenever by the exercise of its powers it can do what is practically just, though it cannot restore the parties precisely to the state they were in before the contract. In the present case the defendant has obtained certain

 

(1) 3 App. Cas. 1278, 1279. [*822]

 

advantages for which he stipulated, which cannot be taken away from him – the destruction of his letters is an accomplished fact, and he has been relieved of any claims in respect of the maintenance of his wife between the date of the deed and the date of the decree absolute. Under these circumstances the most that can be required of the plaintiff, as a condition of rescission, is to restore to the defendant the status quo ante with regard to the advance of 375£. This she does by allowing the amount to be set off against her costs.

 

It was further urged that the plaintiff did not really desire rescission, and could gain nothing by it. This must be considered with reference to the date when the action was commenced, namely, March 2, 1915. The deed was then a subsisting contract which prevented the plaintiff from instituting proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights, from obtaining a divorce for any previous matrimonial offence, from obtaining alimony pendente lite; and it bound her to indemnify the defendant from all torts theretofore committed or thereafter to be committed by her. If such a deed was obtained from her by fraud – and the jury have found that it was – she was entitled to have it set aside.

 

In my opinion the appeal fails and should be dismissed.

 

BANKES L.J. I agree. We have no power to set aside the verdict of a jury upon the ground merely that we do not agree with it. We can only set aside a verdict upon the ground that it is against the weight of the evidence if we come to the conclusion that the verdict is one which no reasonable men could have arrived at. That is the question which we have to consider. This is certainly a remarkable action. The main claim of the plaintiff was for damages. In my opinion that claim was one which, as a matter of law, could not possibly succeed. The second ground of claim was for the rescission of the deed of separation. [The Lord Justice discussed the evidence, and came to the conclusion that he was unable to say that the verdict was one which no reasonable men could have arrived at, and upon that ground the application for a new trial failed.]

 

With regard to the point that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover because she is, by this claim for rescission, suing her husband for a tort within the meaning of s. 12 of the Married Women’s Property [*823] Act, 1882, I entirely agree with what has been said by Swinfen Eady L.J. I think it is sufficient to say that, in my opinion, the words in that section “sue for a tort” relate to something quite different from that which is described in s. 34 of the Judicature Act, 1873, as “a cause or matter for the purpose of the setting aside or cancellation of deeds or other written instruments.”

 

With regard to the point that the plaintiff is not entitled to succeed without bringing into account the 500£. a year which she received between June 7, 1910, and February 7, 1916, the date of the decree absolute, it is sufficient to say that, in my opinion, we should not be doing either equity or justice if we were to order the plaintiff under the particular circumstances of this case to repay that amount.

 

SCRUTTON L.J. I am of the same opinion. Mrs. Hulton brought an action against her husband alleging that a deed of separation, dated June 7, 1910, had been obtained by fraudulent representations made by him, and claiming (1.) damages for the fraud; (2.) alternatively rescission of the deed. The action was tried before Lush J. and a special jury. The learned judge held that an action to recover damages for fraudulent representations could not be brought by a wife against her husband by reason of s. 12 of the Married Women’s Property Act, 1882, which provides that “no husband or wife shall be entitled to sue the other for a tort.” In the Court below counsel for the plaintiff put forward an extremely subtle argument – so subtle that I do not attempt to state it, because it is quite possible that I have not understood it – to show that this particular action for deceit was not really an action for a tort within the meaning of that section, but was an action for the protection of her separate property. The plaintiff gave a notice of cross-appeal against the judgment of the learned judge dismissing the claim for damages for tort, but in this Court counsel for the plaintiff did not proceed with the cross-appeal upon the ground that the plaintiff had attained what she desired, namely, a considerable money payment under the order of the Divorce Court for permanent maintenance. That part of the claim therefore disappears, and I can only say that I entirely agree with the judgment of the learned judge that it was quite unsustainable. [*824]

 

There remains the other part of the claim, namely, for rescission of the deed. It was argued for the defendant that, as the plaintiff, in proving facts which would entitle her to rescission, would prove fraudulent representations which would give rise to a claim for damages in an action between parties other than husband and wife, a claim for rescission was really a claim for a tort within s. 12 of the Married Women’s Property Act, 1882. The jurisdiction to rescind a contract in some cases for innocent misrepresentation and in some cases for fraud has been exercised by Courts of Equity long before the Act of 1882 was passed and before the action of deceit in its present form came into existence. The action of deceit, whereby damages are obtained for fraudulent representation, as I understand the history of the English law, was first supported by the Courts in the case of Pasley v. Freeman. (1) The representation there was as to the credit of a third person. In that case Grose J., who dissented, said that that was the first instance on record in which such a claim had been made; and twenty-seven years afterwards in  Ashlin v. White (2) Gibbs C.J. said: “I am old enough to remember when this species of action came into use. It was dexterously intended to avoid the Statute of Frauds.” Therefore in 1882, when s. 12 of the Act of 1882 was passed, there were two forms of action, one affecting the formation of a contract and saying that the contract was badly formed if it had been obtained by fraud and asking for rescission, and the other claiming damages for a fraudulent representation. It seems to me that the proceeding in a Court of Equity to obtain rescission is not an action “for a tort” within the meaning of s. 12. I understand that expression to mean an action complaining of a tort independently of contract and asking for damages following from such a tort. I do not see how that language can apply to a proceeding which asks for rescission on the ground of fraud in connection with the making of a contract. This part, therefore, of the defendant’s appeal fails, and the Court below had jurisdiction to consider whether the deed of separation was obtained by fraud.

 

The next question is whether this Court should interfere with the finding of the jury that the plaintiff was induced by the false and

 

(1) (1789) 3 T. R. 51; 2 Sm. L. C., 12th ed. p. 71.

 

(2) (1816) Holt, N. P. 387, 388. [*825]

 

fraudulent representation of the defendant to execute the deed of separation, not upon the ground that there was no evidence to support it, but upon the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, though in my view it comes to nearly the same thing; and the question which we have to ask ourselves is whether twelve reasonable men could on the evidence have found the verdict. [The Lord Justice referred to the evidence, and came to the conclusion that he could not say that the verdict was one which a reasonable jury could not upon the evidence have found, and that therefore the defendant failed on that part of the case where he asked for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.]

 

There remains the last point. It is said that the Court will only rescind the contract if it can put the other party back in the position in which he was before the contract. Courts of Equity, which have long exercised this power of rescission, have endeavoured to do so on the principle that he who seeks equity must do equity, and that he who asks to have a contract rescinded must as far as possible put the parties back into the position in which they were before the contract was made. The passage from Lord Blackburn’s opinion in  Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co. (1), which has been referred to by Swinfen Eady L.J., pointed that out in very clear language. It is said that the Court should not order rescission for two reasons. In the first place it is said that the letters have under the terms of the deed been destroyed, and that as those letters cannot be restored the Court will not decree rescission. Now I must take it on the verdict of the jury that those letters contained misrepresentations by the defendant. I further take into account that it was the defendant who was anxious that those letters should be destroyed. I cannot in these circumstances treat the letters as so important to him that there can be no rescission because they cannot be brought back into existence. Secondly it is said that the plaintiff has been receiving under the deed 500£. a year for over five years, and that if the deed is rescinded the plaintiff ought to be ordered to repay that 500£. a year. A Court of Equity has always in such a case, as I understand, endeavoured to do justice between the parties by making each of them return whatever benefit he has received

 

(1) 3 App. Cas. 1278, 1279. [*826]

 

under the deed, and if the benefits on the one side and the other are commensurate there is no question of return, because whatever has been received by the one party has been paid for by the other. As an illustration of that I may take the case of the purchase of a house being set aside and a reconveyance ordered on repayment of the purchase-money, when the party who has occupied the house has to pay an occupation rent: see Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 4th ed., p. 371, where the authorities are collected. Applying that to the present case, while it is true that the wife has received 500£. a year for some years, the husband has received during those years freedom from molestation, freedom from proceedings by the wife for restitution of conjugal rights, and other very considerable advantages. Taking all that into account, I see no reason for ordering the return of the 500£. a year, a sufficient quid pro quo having been given to the husband. Upon all points the appeal fails.

 

Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.