[DIVISIONAL COURT]

THE KING v. GROOM AND OTHERS.

Ex parte COBBOLD AND OTHERS.

Licensing Acts - General Annual Licensing Meeting - Adjournments - Power of Justices to Adjourn into October - Alehouse Act, 1828 (9 Geo. 4, c. 61), s. 3 - Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 29), s. 11.

Where a full licence to sell intoxicating liquors, under 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, is applied for at an adjourned general annual licensing meeting held in September, the justices have no power to adjourn that meeting to a date after the end of September in order to allow the applicant, who has not given sufficient notice of his application, to give fresh notices.

RULE, for a writ of certiorari to bring up and quash an order of justices for the borough of Harwich, by which order J. K. White was granted a provisional licence authorizing him to hold any of the excise licences that might be held by a publican for the sale of intoxicating liquor, to be consumed either on or off the premises, at a house then in course of erection within the borough.

The following facts appeared from the affidavits used on the application for the rule:-

The adjourned general annual licensing meeting for the borough of Harwich was held on September 25, 1900, and J. K. White applied at that meeting for the provisional licence in question. His application was opposed by two firms of

brewers in the borough. When the application was called on, the applicant's solicitor adduced evidence to prove the due service of notice of the application; and it then appeared that a copy of the notice had been served upon the superintendent of police nineteen days before the adjourned meeting, being two days short of the twenty-one days prescribed by the Licensing Acts. This, it was alleged, was owing to the sudden illness of the person employed to serve the notice. Upon the application of the solicitor for the applicant the justices adjourned the licensing meeting to October 23, 1900, in order to enable notices to be properly served. The adjournment was objected to by the solicitor who appeared for the opposing firms of brewers. On October 23, 1900, the application again came on for hearing, and objection was taken by the brewers' solicitor that the justices had no power to adjourn the licensing meeting into the month of October, or to sit as licensing justices in that month; and, therefore, that they had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for a licence.

The justices overruled this objection, and in the result granted to J. K. White the provisional licence applied for, their order being confirmed at a meeting held on November 6, 1900, when the same objection was again taken.

This rule was thereupon obtained on behalf of the brewers.

C. E. Jones, for the applicant for the licence, shewed cause. This rule has been obtained by brewers who own public-houses in the borough, and are, therefore, rivals in trade; but they have no interest in the particular house in respect of which the licence has been granted, and they are not "persons aggrieved." In Reg. v. Nicholson (1) Vaughan Williams L.J. pointed out (2) that the practice of the Courts has always been to insist that persons applying for a writ of certiorari should be persons who are aggrieved.

Next, the justices had power to adjourn the licensing meeting until October 23, and therefore had jurisdiction to make the order granting the licence and the confirming order. By s. 2 of the Alehouse Act, 1828, the date of the general annual

(1) [1899] 2 Q. B. 455.

(2) [1899] 2 Q. B. 471.

licensing meeting is to be fixed by justices at petty sessions. By s. 3 (1) they are required to adjourn that meeting to such day or days as they may deem most convenient for persons applying for licences, and there is a proviso that every adjournment shall be holden within the months of August and September in counties other than Middlesex and Surrey.

Under s. 7 of the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 27), and s. 40 of the Licensing Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 94), the notice of an application for a licence is a twenty-one days' notice. It is submitted that the justices had power to adjourn the adjourned meeting of September 25 into October in order to allow the notices to be properly given. It has been held - in Reg. v. Justices of the West Riding, Drake's Case (2) - that a notice given twenty-one days before the adjourned meeting is good. The general annual licensing meeting may, by s. 1 of the Alehouse Act, 1828, be held on any day between August 20 and September 14 inclusive. It follows that, if it was fixed on the latter day, the justices must adjourn into October if the notice is to be given for the adjourned meeting.

Further, s. 11 of the Wine and Beerhouse Act,1870 (3), alters

(1) 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 3: "And be it further enacted, that it shall be lawful for the justices acting at the general annual licensing meeting, and they are hereby required, to continue such meeting by adjournment to such day or days, and to such place or places within the division or place for which such meeting shall be holden, as such justices may deem most convenient and sufficient for enabling persons keeping inns within such division or place to apply for such licence: Provided, nevertheless, that the adjourned meeting to be holden next after such general annual licensing meeting shall not be so holden in or upon any of the five days next ensuing that on which such general annual licensing meeting shall have been holden as aforesaid, and that every adjournment of the said general annual licensing meeting shall be holden within the month of March in the counties of Middlesex and Surrey, and of August or September in every other county."

(2) (1869) L. R. 5 Q. B. 33.

(3) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 29, s. 11: "Where any applicant for the grant or renewal of a certificate has, through inadvertence or misadventure, failed to comply with any of the preliminary requirements of the principal Act or this Act, or any Act incorporated therewith, the justices may, if they shall so think fit, and upon such terms as they think proper, postpone the consideration of the application to an adjourned meeting, and if at such adjourned meeting the justices shall be satisfied that such terms have been complied with, they may proceed to grant or withhold such certificate as if

and extends the proviso at the end of s. 3 of the Alehouse Act, 1828, in cases where the applicant for a licence has, through inadvertence or misadventure, failed to comply with any of the preliminary statutory requirements. In those cases the justices may, in their discretion, adjourn to a day beyond September. In Reg. v. Justices of Denbigh (1) the licensing justices had adjourned the general annual licensing meeting into October, and the Court made absolute a rule for a mandamus commanding them to hear and determine the application for a licence. That decision is in point here. In Reg. v. Justices of Anglesea (2) Hawkins J. expressed his opinion that the general annual licensing meeting continues for all purposes of granting or refusing licences from the moment of its commencement until the last moment of the adjourned meeting or meetings as if the first meeting and every adjourned meeting were all one meeting held on one single day. In Webber v. Justices of Birkenhead (3) there was no question of inadvertence or misadventure. Ridley J.'s decision, therefore, in that case is not against the view contended for here.

Rawlinson, K.C. (Ernest Wild with him), in support of the rule. The proviso to s. 3 of the Alehouse Act, 1828, applies to this case, and the justices had no power to adjourn into October. The application was for a full alehouse licence. Sect. 11 of the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1870, applies only to applications for grants or renewals of certificates in respect of the sale of beer, wine, and cider under that and the principal Act; it does not alter or affect the provisions of s. 3 of the Act of 1828. Reg. v. Justices of Denbigh (1) does not govern the present case. The application was for a mandamus to compel the justices to hear and determine - i.e., to compel them to do what they ought to have done in September. The decision of Ridley J. in Webber v. Justices of Birkenhead (3) is an authority in favour of the rule.

The applicants for the rule here are persons aggrieved by the

the preliminary requirements of the principal Act had been complied with."

The "principal Act" referred to is the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 27).

(1) (1895) 59 J. P. 708.

(2) (1895) 59 J. P. 743.

(3) (1897) 61 J. P. 664.

justices' decision. They are persons who have an interest in the matter of the application for a licence, and are, therefore, entitled to a certiorari: Reg. v. Justices of Surrey (1); Reg. v. Nicholson. (2) [He also referred to Reg. v. Justices of London. (3)]

LORD ALVERSTONE C.J. With great regret I come to the conclusion that this rule should be made absolute. If I could see my way to decide against the applicants for a certiorari, who are only rivals in trade of the person to whom the licence has been granted, and are now taking this purely technical objection, I should be glad to do so. But if we were to hold that this licensing meeting could be adjourned as it has been in this case, our judgment would amount to a decision that, under the Act of 1828, an adjourned general annual licensing meeting to receive original or fresh notices could be held in the month of October. I think that would be going too far. Sect. 3 of the Act of 1828 clearly contemplates that the general annual licensing meeting and every adjournment of it shall be held in the month of August or September. Prima facie, therefore, that section directs that the licensing work shall be got through by the end of September. It was contended that the justices had power to adjourn the adjourned meeting into October apart from the section in the subsequent Act which deals with the question of inadvertence or misadventure. But if it were competent to the justices, under s. 3, to sit in October, the ground of the judgments in Reg. v. Justices of the West Riding, Drake's Case (4), would appear to be ill-founded. I should, therefore, apart from any other enactment, come to the conclusion that an adjourned meeting to receive fresh notices could not be held in the month of October. We have next to consider s. 11 of the Act of 1870, which, if it applied, would cover what has been done in this case. That section allows an adjournment where an applicant for the "grant or renewal of a certificate" has, through inadvertence or misadventure, failed to comply with any of the preliminary requirements of "the principal Act or this Act, or any Act incorporated therewith."

(1) (1870) L. R. 5 Q. B. 466.

(2) [1899] 2 Q. B. 455.

(3) [1895] 1 Q. B. 616.

(4) L. R. 5 Q. B. 33.

I should be glad if I could see my way to holding that the provisions of s. 11 were attracted to the Act of 1828; but I do not think they are. It is true that s. 8 of "the principal Act" (the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869) applies provisions of the Alehouse Act, 1828; but they are only applied to "grants of certificates under this Act." If s. 11 had been intended to apply to every licence, one would not find language limiting its application to grants or renewals of certificates under the Act of 1870 and grants of certificates under the Act of 1869. With regard to Reg. v. Justices of Denbigh (1), it is to be observed, in the first place, that the application was for a mandamus to the justices to hear and determine, and that may be the reason of the decision, and there is also a doubt whether the Court did not think the case came within the provisions with respect to renewals of licences of s. 42, sub-s. 2, of the Licensing Act, 1872. Ridley J., in Webber v. Justices of Birkenhead (2), seems to have thought that was the explanation of Reg. v. Justices of Denbigh. (1) As to the question whether the applicants for the rule are persons aggrieved, there can be no doubt that they have no real grievance arising from the omission to serve the notice in time. That, however, is not the sense in which persons applying for a certiorari are required to be persons aggrieved. It is sufficient if they have a real interest in the decision of the justices, and they have in this case. They took the point now raised before the justices at the adjourned general annual licensing meeting and when the confirming order was made, and it would be too strong to say that they had not a sufficient interest in the matter to enable them to apply for the rule.

I am, therefore, of opinion that the rule should be made absolute.

LAWRANCE J. I concur.

Solicitors for applicant for licence: Gibbs, White & Strong.

Solicitors for applicants for a certiorari: Godden, Son & Holme.

W. A.

(1) 59 J. P. 708.

(2) 61 J. P. 664.