DATE: Feb. 28, 2007.

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: As Corrected March 8, 2007. As Corrected March 1, 2007.

PRIOR HISTORY: An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, D. Bruce Levy, Judge. Lower Tribunal No. 04-2930.

COUNSEL Billbrough & Marks and G. Bart Billbrough and Geoffrey B. Marks, Coral Gables, for appellant.
Brian R. Hersh, Andrew Teschner, Miami, for appellee.

JUDGES: Before SHEPHERD, J., and SCHWARTZ and LEVY, Senior Judges.
Schwartz, Senior Judge, filed dissenting opinion.

HEADNOTE: Inasmuch asd decedent had a life estate in her home and occupied it continuously before her death pursuant to the right afforder her by an irrevocable trust she was an “owner” of the home for purposes of devising the homestead protection on her death to her daughter pursuant to Art. X, § 4(b), Fla. Const.

SHEPHERD, J.

[*1] It has been said by those who labor in the area, that “the leading cause of cerebral herniation among probate lawyers, real estate lawyers, circuit court judges sitting in probate, and appellate judges reviewing their work, is the study of the [‘]legal chameleon[’], also known as homestead.” FN1 The knotty question presented in this case is whether a testator’s specific devise of protected homestead under the “inuring clause” of Florida’s homestead law, Article X, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution, trumps her residuary direction that the property participate in the satisfaction of estate debts, if necessary, to pay those expenses. The less difficult question presented by appellant-but one zealously advanced-is whether the fact that legal title to the homestead property lay in an irrevocable trust at the time of the decedent’s death makes our labor unnecessary. Unraveling the law in the area, the astute trial court concluded the specific devise was protected homestead property not subject to invasion for the payment of estate expenses. Our study of the trial court decision and the relevant law leads us to affirm the decision.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant, Edward T. Cutler, a beneficiary of the estate of Edith Alice Cutler, deceased, appeals from an order determining homestead.FN2 The order confirms a devise by his mother, Edith, to her other child, Cynthia V. Cutler, of the property on which Edith resided until the time of her death, and concludes that the devised property is exempt from claims of Edith’s creditors under the “inuring clause” of Article X, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution, effectively derailing Edith’s plan that if other available assets are insufficient to satisfy her creditors' claims and the final expenses of her estate upon her death, the residence she devised to Cynthia and the adjacent vacant parcel she devised to her son Edward will abate equally to satisfy those expenses. In so doing, the trial court rejected Edward’s contentions that (1) the devised property was not protected homestead property in Edith because, at the time of her death, legal title was held in an irrevocable trust, and (2) allowing the exemptions to inure to Cynthia directly contravenes Edith’s express desire written into her Last Will and Testament. From this decision, Edward appeals.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At the time of her death, Edith Cutler was not married and had two adult children, Edward and Cynthia. On October 27, 2003, just eight months before her death, Edith created the Cutler Irrevocable Land Trust for estate planning purposes. Edith named herself and her two children as co-trustees. Into the trust, she deeded two parcels of property: her residence located at 10979 S.W. 77th Avenue, and an adjacent vacant lot. Under the terms of the trust document, Edith retained a life estate in the property, which gave her the express “right to use, possess and occupy said property during [her] lifetime.” Upon her death, Paragraph 4 of the trust provided:

[*2] [T]he entire remaining Trust Estate, including without limitation any accumulated income, shall be distributed to the Estate of the Settlor to be administered and distributed as any other part of the Estate of the Settlor. Title to all property then part of the Trust Estate shall be deemed to pass automatically to the Estate of the Settlor; nevertheless, the Trustees shall execute and deliver all instruments reasonably necessary or appropriate to effect or confirm such passage of title.

(Emphasis added.)

Edith’s estate plan also included a will. In Article VI of the will, Edith devised:

all of my right, title and interest in the home in which I now live, located at 10979 S.W. 77th Avenue, Miami, Miami-Dade County, Florida, and which is legally described as:

Lot 67, Block 2, KENDALL LANE ESTATES, SECTION A, according to the Plat thereof, as Recorded in Plat Book 86, Page 89, of the Public Records of Miami-Dade County, Florida,

to my daughter, CYNTHIA VIRGINIA CUTLER, or if she does not survive me, this gift shall be made instead to the Trustee of the Edith A. Cutler Trust under Agreement of August 15, 1994 between Edith A. Cutler as Settlor and First National Bank of South Miami as Trustee.

(Emphasis added.)

In Article VII of the will, Edith devised:

all of my right, title and interest in the home in the vacant real property located next to my home in which I now live and which is legally described as:

Lot 5, Block 2, KENDALL LANE ESTATES, SECTION A, according to the Plat thereof, as Recorded in Plat Book 86, Page 89, of the Public Records of Miami-Dade County, Florida,

to my son, EDWARD TROTTER CUTLER, or if he does not survive me, this gift shall be made instead to my daughter, CYNTHIA VIRGINIA CUTLER, or if she does not survive me, to the Trustee of the Edith A. Cutler Trust under Agreement of August 15, 1994 between Edith A. Cutler as Settlor and First National Bank of South Miami as Trustee.

(Emphasis added.)

Finally, pertinent to this case, in Article XII of the will, Edith directed:

All claims, charges and allowances against, and costs of administration of [ ] my Estate, which are ultimately required to be paid, and any and all succession, inheritance or estate taxes, state or Federal, levied or assessed by reason of my death and the transfer of property (including all property determined to be part of my taxable gross estate, even property passing outside my Will) at my death, shall be paid out of the residuary portion of my Estate to the extent that gift suffices. The balance of such items shall be paid out of and shall reduce equally the gifts under Article VI (the gift of my home to Cynthia Virginia Cutler) and Article VII (the gift of the vacant real property next to my home to Edward Trotter Cutler) herein.

(Emphasis added.)

On June 6, 2004, Edith died. There are insufficient funds in the residue of the estate to pay all of Edith’s creditors. Edward contends that, in accordance with his mother’s wishes, the two parcels must abate “equally” to satisfy the remaining creditors. Cynthia argues the devise to her is constitutionally protected from such an invasion.

III. DISCUSSION

[*3] As the Florida Supreme Court noted in Snyder v. Davis, 699 So.2d 999, 1001-02 (Fla.1997), there are three kinds of homestead with one purpose: preserving the family home for its owner and heirs. The first kind, unrelated to this case, provides homestead with an exemption from taxes. See Art. VII, § 6, Fla. Const. The second protects homestead from forced sale by creditors. Art. X, §§ 4(a)-(b), Fla. Const. The third delineates the restrictions a homestead owner faces when attempting to alienate or devise homestead property. Art. X, § 4(c), Fla. Const. This case involves the second of these protections. The specific homestead protection at issue in this case is protection against forced transfer for use by an estate after the death of a decedent. Art. X, § 4(b), Fla. Const. To clearly distinguish this particular protection in the Florida Probate Code from other forms of homestead, the Legislature has denominated it as “protected homestead.” See § 731.201(29), Fla. Stat. (2003) (defining “protected homestead as [that] property described in s. 4(a) (1), Art. X of the State Constitution on which at the death of the owner the exemption inures to the owner’s surviving spouse or heirs under s. 4(b), Art X of the State Constitution”).FN3

As previously stated, Edward contests Cynthia’s claim that her mother’s residence was “protected homestead” under Article X, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution because, at the time of her death, title resided in an irrevocable trust. Edward further contends that even if the property was homestead in his mother when she died, nevertheless her residuary direction that the homestead abate equally, if necessary, to pay estate expenses controls. We consider each of these contentions in turn.

A. Was Edith’s Property “Protected Homestead” At The Time of Her Death?

For Cynthia to prevail on her claim that the devise of her mother’s residence to her was “protected homestead” exempt from forced sale for the payment of creditors' claims after her mother’s death, she must demonstrate: (1) the property in question was devised by the decedent to her; (2) she is an heir within the meaning of the constitutional provision; and (3) at the time of Edith’s death, the residence was homestead property in Edith. Snyder v. Davis, 699 So.2d at 1003 (protections against creditors found in homestead provision may inure to a devisee); Art. X, § 4(a)-(b), Fla. Const. (2003). It is not contested that the property was devised to Cynthia or that she is a qualified “heir” for purposes of Article X, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution. See § 732.103, Fla. Stat. (2003); McKean v. Warburton, 919 So.2d 341 (Fla.2005) (applying section 732.103 to qualified heir determination for purposes of Article X, section 4(b)). Thus, the only question we must resolve is whether the residence was homestead in Edith at the time of her demise.

Although the Legislature has, in section 731.201(29) of the Florida Statutes, labeled homestead in the hands of a qualified devisee under the “inuring clause” of Article X, section 4(b) as “protected homestead,” see supra p. ----, neither the Legislature nor the Florida Constitution has provided a definition of what is homestead property for purposes of Florida’s homestead law. From the text of the constitutional provision and applicable case law interpreting it, however, it is quite apparent that the following requirements must be satisfied for property to be determined as homestead property under Florida law:

[*4] 1. The property must be owned by a “ natural person.”

2. The person claiming the exemption must be a Florida resident who establishes that he or she made, or intended to make, the real property his or her permanent “residence.”

3. The person claiming the exemption must establish that he or she is the “owner” of the property.

4. The property claimed as the homestead must satisfy the “size and contiguity” requirements of the constitution.FN4

See also Art. X, § 4(a), Fla. Const. (1985) (“natural person”); In re Est. of Van Meter, 214 So.2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), approved 231 So.2d 524 (Fla.1970) (permanent “residence”); Raulerson v. Peeples, 77 Fla. 207, 81 So. 271 (1919) (“owner”); and Art X, § 4(a) (1), Fla. Const. (2003) (size and contiguity requirements).

Edward argues that Edith’s residence was not homestead property at the time of her death because it was not owned by a “natural person” within the meaning of Florida’s homestead law. We disagree.

1. Ownership

Although the Florida Constitution places size limits on real property that can qualify for homestead status, it does not limit the types of estates eligible for homestead status. S. Walls, Inc. v. Stilwell Corp., 810 So.2d 566, 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) quoting Menendez v. Rodriguez, 106 Fla. 214, 221, 143 So. 223, 226 (1932) (Whitfield, J., concurring) (“The Constitution limits the homestead land area that may be exempted, but it does not define or limit the estates in land to which homestead exemption may apply; therefore, in the absence of controlling provisions or principles of law to the contrary, the exemptions allowed by section 1, article 10 [now Article X, section 4], may attach to any estate in land owned by the head of a family [now natural person] residing in this state, whether it is a freehold or less estate, if the land does not exceed the designated area and it is in fact the [natural person’s] home place.”). A life estate, the property interest concededly held by Edith at the time of her death, has been expressly found to be among the property interests eligible for homestead status. S. Walls, Inc. v. Stilwell Corp., 810 So.2d at 566, 572 (citing Hill v. First Nat’l Bank, 73 Fla. 1092, 75 So. 614 (1917)) (holding that a life estate interest is sufficient beneficial interest in property to qualify for homestead exemption) and King v. King, 652 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (holding that a life estate interest in a condominium qualifies for the homestead exemption from forced sale). See also Hill v. First Nat’l Bank, 75 So. at 614 (tenancies in common); Heiman v. Capital Bank, 438 So.2d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (other beneficial interests). Because it is not disputed that Edith both had a life estate in the residence property and occupied it continuously before her death pursuant to the right provided to her in the irrevocable land trust-and had, indeed, resided on the property for many years prior thereto-she was an “owner” of her residence for purposes of devising the homestead protection on that residence on her death.

2. Natural Person.

[*5] Despite this, Edward further contends that the property was not homestead property at the time of Edith’s death because legal title was held during her lifetime in an irrevocable trust. We also reject this contention. This court and other district courts of appeal consistently have found that properties held in trust can be impressed, legally speaking, with the character of homestead. Callava v. Feinberg, 864 So.2d 429, 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“[t]he constitutional provision does not designate how title to the property is to be held and it does not limit the estate that must be owned”) (internal citations omitted) rev. denied, 879 So.2d 621 (Fla.2004); HCA Gulf Coast Hosp. v. Estate of Downing, 594 So.2d 774, 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (devise of house to spendthrift trust irrelevant for purposes of homestead under Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution (2003)). Although these cases involve revocable trusts, we find no reason to limit the holdings of these cases to revocable trusts. Accordingly, we find it immaterial that legal title to the residence in this case was held in an irrevocable trust during Edith’s lifetime. The conveyance to Cynthia fulfills all of the legal requirements entitling her to claim that it is “protected homestead” in her.

B. Does Edith’s Residuary Direction Supersede the Homestead Devise?

Having concluded that Edith’s residence is “protected homestead” within the meaning of Article X, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution, we now address Edward’s contention that even in the face of this finding, we are legally required to accede to Edith’s wish that both parcels abate equally, if necessary, to pay her final expenses. We again disagree.

While it is a cardinal rule of testamentary construction that “the primary objective in construing a will is the intent of the testator,” McKean v. Warburton, 919 So.2d, 341, 344 (Fla.2005); Phillips v. Estate of Holzmann, 740 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (“[t]he polestar in construing any will is to ascertain the intent of the testator”), it is likewise an elementary principle of law that a person cannot dispose of his or her property as he or she pleases if contrary to law or public policy. Warburton, 919 So.2d at 344 (citing Mosgrove v. Mach, 133 Fla. 459, 471, 182 So. 786, 791 (1938)) (“[i]n the construction of a will, the intention of the testator, as therein expressed, shall prevail over all other considerations, if consistent with the principles of law”) (emphasis added); Marshall v. Hewett, 156 Fla. 645, 24 So.2d 1, 2 (1945) (“In will construction the primary objective of the courts is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the testator. In the ascertainment of such intention the will in its entirety will be considered, and when once the intention has been discovered the wording of the will will be given such liberal construction as will effectuate the intention of the testator so far as may be consistent with the established rules of law.”) (emphasis added). Here, we are confronted with two specific devises of property, which, in the general residuary clause of her will, Edith directed should be contingently available to her personal representative, if necessary, to pay the expenses of her estate. See Park Lake Presbyterian Church v. Estate of Henry, 106 So.2d 215, 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (defining a specific devise as “a gift of a particular thing or of a specified part of a testator’s estate so described as being capable of distinguishment from all others of the same kind,” and defining a residuary legacy as “a general legacy wherein fall all the assets of the estate after all other legacies have been satisfied and all charges, debts, and costs have been paid”). On their face, these two specific devises appear equal in dignity. But upon closer examination, it is clear that they are not. In the case of the specific devise of the vacant land to Edward, there is no question but that Edith had the legal right to subject this devise to the debts of the estate if she so desired. § 733.805(1) Fla. Stat. (2004) (“Funds or property designated by the will shall be used to pay debts [of the estate] … to the extent the funds or property is sufficient.”); In re Estate of Potter, 469 So.2d 957, 959 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). However, as we have learned, the devise to Cynthia was followed by a constitutional exemption from forced sale of her devise to satisfy the expenses of Edith’s estate. This constitutionally created benefit is personal to Cynthia, and hers to assert. For reasons of her own, she has determined to do so. We do not consider ourselves liberated to deny her this constitutional benefit. There are several reasons we consider ourselves constrained from doing so.

[*6] First, as a strict legal proposition, it is the settled law of this state that upon the death of a decedent, “protected homestead” under Article X, section 4(b), passes outside the estate. See Clifton v. Clifton, 553 So.2d 192, 194 n. 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (noting, “[h]omestead property, whether devised or not, passes outside of the probate estate”); Cavanaugh v. Cavanaugh, 542 So.2d 1345, 1352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (accord); See also Estate of Hamel v. Theodore Parker, P.A., 821 So.2d 1276, 1280 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (homestead vests on death, even in the absence of a court order confirming homestead status); Bartelt v. Bartelt, 579 So.2d 282, 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (“The test is not how title was devolved, but rather to whom it passed.”). This is consistent with Florida’s statutory scheme relating to the administration of estates of the Florida Probate Code. Section 733.607(1) of the Code states that a personal representative shall “take possession or control of, the decedent’s property, except [for] the protected homestead.” § 733.607(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). As the Florida Supreme Court recently stated, “Nothing in the [Code] indicates that [ ] protected homestead should be distributed as part of the decedent’s estate.” Warburton, 919 So.2d at 346.

Second, we must recognize that it is a constitutional claim with which we are dealing. Although it may seem harsh to countenance Cynthia’s desire in this case, we are not authorized to embellish constitutional requirements by our own notions of what might be appropriate. See Sarasota Herald-Tribune Co. v. Sarasota County, 632 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). In Florida, the homestead provision “has its own contours and legal principles.” Snyder, 699 So.2d at 1002. Its oft-repeated purpose is “to promote the stability and welfare of the state by securing to the householder a home, so that the homeowner and his or her heirs may live beyond the reach of financial misfortune and the demands of creditors who have given credit under such law.” Id.FN5 The protection “has never been based on principles of equity.” Bigelow v. Dunphe, 143 Fla. 603, 608, 197 So. 328, 330 (1940). Rather, as the Florida Supreme Court recently stated in Snyder, “The homestead protection … always has been extended to the homesteader and, after his or her death, to the heirs whether the homestead was a twenty-two room mansion or a two-room hut and whether the heirs were rich or poor.” Snyder, 699 So.2d at 1002. Although of little comfort to Edward, creditors in this state have been on notice for many years that the plain language of the constitution protects homestead property from most creditors and is construed liberally to achieve that purpose whatever may be the equities of the individual circumstance. Snyder, 699 So.2d at 1002. Similarly, to the extent that a rule of testamentary construction may be deemed here to conflict with a constitutionally afforded benefit, the rule of testamentary construction must yield. Engelke v. Estate of Engelke, 921 So.2d 693, 697 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“We have found no case in which a general direction to pay the estate expenses has trumped the constitutional homestead protections which are the rights of the heirs as much as the decedent.”)

[*7] Finally, we find that our conclusion is consistent with the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court in its recent pronouncements in Snyder and Warburton. In each of these cases, the Florida Supreme Court liberally applied Article X, section 4(b) of Florida’s homestead law to shield from the consequences of probate devisees who had received homestead property through a non-specific devise in the residuary clauses of the respective decedent’s last wills and testaments. Snyder, 699 So.2d at 1000; Warburton, 919 So.2d at 342. Here, we have a specific devise of homestead property to a qualified heir entitled to assert a claim for the same benefit. Guided by the same principles of liberal construction applied by the Florida Supreme Court in those cases, Snyder, 699 So.2d at 1002 (“the homestead provision is to be liberally construed in favor of maintaining the homestead property”); Warburton, 919 So.2d at 344 (“issues of homestead protection have been interpreted broadly”), we are of the view in this case that the specific devise to Cynthia is likewise constitutionally exempt from invasion to pay the expenses of her mother’s estate. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the law and public policy of this state as expressly embodied in the Florida Constitution.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court.

LEVY, Senior Judge, concurs.

SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge (dissenting).

[*7] The ground of my dissent is aptly stated in the appellant’s brief:

When there is no surviving spouse or minor child, as in this case, the decedent’s homestead may be freely transferred, gifted, or devised without limitation. Art. X, Section 4(c), Fla. Const.; City National Bank of Fla. v. Tescher, 578 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla.1991). … If Mrs. Cutler could have left her properties to someone outside of her family, which she could have done, why could she not leave it to her heirs with the provision that the properties be available to satisfy her debts? The answer to this question is simple-she was lawfully entitled to do so.

See also DeMayo v. Chames, 934 So.2d 548, 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (Shepherd, J., concurring) (persuasively stating view that property owner should have authority to deal with homestead property as she sees fit), review granted, 937 So.2d 122 (Fla. 2006).FN6

FN1. Brief of Real Property Probate & Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar, as Amicus Curiae, McKean v. Warburton, 919 So.2d, 341 (Fla.2005). See also, Harold B. Crosby & George John Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, the Florida Homestead Exemption: I-III, 2 U. Fla. L.Rev. 12 (1949); Harold B. Crosby & George John Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, the Florida Homestead Exemption: IV, 2 U. Fla. L.Rev. 219 (1949); Harold B. Crosby & George John Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, the Florida Homestead Exemption: V, 2 U. Fla. L.Rev. 346 (1949); J. Allen Maines & Donna Litman Maines, Our Legal Chameleon Revisited: Florida’s Homestead Exemption, 30 U. Fla. L.Rev. 227 (1978); Donna Litman Seiden, An Update on the Legal Chameleon: Florida’s Homestead Exemption and Restrictions, 40 U. Fla. L.Rev. 919 (1988).

FN2. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a) (3) (c) (ii) (non-final order determining the right to immediate possession of property). See Harrell v. Snyder, 913 So.2d 749 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

FN3. The Florida Constitution also affords protection against a forced transfer of homestead property for the benefit of creditors before death. The portion of the Florida constitution that addresses a forced sale of homestead property reads as follows in its entirety:

SECTION 4. Homestead; exemptions. – (a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor performed on the realty, the following property owned by a natural person: (1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one hundred sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon, which shall not be reduced without the owner’s consent by reason of subsequent inclusion in a municipality; or if located within a municipality, to the extent of one-half acre of contiguous land, upon which the exemption shall be limited to the residence of the owner or the owner’s family; (2) personal property to the value of one thousand dollars. (b) These exemptions shall inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of the owner. Art. X, § 4(a)-(b), Fla. Const. (2003).

FN4. We acknowledge assistance gleaned from Professor John F. Cooper’s and Professor Thomas C. Marks, Jr.’s, casebook, Florida Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials, 618-619 (4th ed.2006), in making this analysis.

FN5. A provision protecting homestead property first appeared in the Florida Constitution of 1868. Art. IX, § 1, Fla. Const. (1868). Historical materials indicate that its appearance originally was inspired by a desperate attempt by Floridians to repel the invasion of Yankee carpetbaggers at the conclusion of what citizens of the state then referred to as the War of Northern Aggression. See Josephine W. Thomas, Increasing The Homestead Tax Exemption: “Tax Relief” Or Burden On Florida Homeowners And Local Governments?, 35 Stetson L.Rev. 509, 518 (2006) (“The homestead provisions first appeared in the 1868 Constitution, and they were intended to prevent families from losing their homes and farms after the end of the Civil War. Florida was a family-focused state and did not want to risk families or their heirs losing their homes because of unpaid debts.”) (footnotes omitted); 41 Fla. Hist. Q. 356, 372 (April 1963) (stating that the 1868 Constitution “was not … the work of benevolent Northerners”). Supporting this thesis is the fact that the first homestead provision focused on protecting homestead property from forced sales to the exclusion of limitations on devise or alienation, which first appeared in the 1885 Constitution. Art. IX, §§ 1-3, Fla. Const. (1868); see also Palmer v. Palmer, 47 Fla. 200, 35 So. 983 (1904) (comparing 1868 homestead protection in Article IX, section 3 with 1885 homestead protection in Article X, section 2).

FN6. I hope, without confidence, that the majority is not saying that the limitation on the devise would have been okay if it were contained in the same sentence or paragraph as a condition of the devise, but it is not and the testatrix’s clearly expressed wishes must be frustrated because it is in a separate provision of the will. If my hope is unjustified, as I write I can hear workers installing the words — in Gothic letters, of course — “All common sense abandon, ye who enter here” over the doors to our courtroom.