JUDGE: CASEY, J.

DATE: March 23, 2005.

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: See 2006 WL 1096816 (S.D. N.Y.)
 

[*1] Plaintiff Rachel Ehrenfeld brought this action for a declaratory judgment against Khalid Salim a bin Mahfouz (“Defendant”). Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to serve Defendant with the summons and complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendant cannot enforce a default judgment that he has obtained or will obtain against her in the United Kingdom. [FN1] The action in the United Kingdom arises out of Plaintiff’s allegedly defamatory statements in her book, Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed—and How to Stop It. Plaintiff filed this suit on December 8, 2004, but has been unable to effect service of process on Defendant, who resides in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Plaintiff has located a website that Defendant purportedly operates and an e-mail address associated with the website, a post-office box in Saudi Arabia listed on the court papers from the United Kingdom as belonging to Defendant, and a business address of a company with which Defendant may be affiliated. She has not identified Defendant’s residence address, however. The legal documents served on Plaintiff from the United Kingdom suit bear the address of Defendant’s attorneys (“Defendant’s U.K. attorneys”). In addition, Defendant is involved in another suit before this Court stemming from the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center of September 11, 2001, and is represented in that suit by the law firm of Jones Day in Washington, D.C. (“Defendant’s U.S. attorneys”). Plaintiff seeks leave to serve Defendant by e-mail, by mail to the post-office box and to the place of business, and through Defendant’s U.K. and U.S. attorneys.

FN1. The complaint states that Defendant’s “attorneys have threatened to enter judgment on default” if Plaintiff does not appear in the U.K. action. (Compl.¶ 20.)

II. DISCUSSION

Rule 4(f) governs service of process upon individuals in foreign countries and provides three mechanisms of service:

(1) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those means authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents; or

(2) if there is no internationally agreed means of service or the applicable international agreement allows other means of service, provided that service is reasonably calculated to give notice:

(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or

(B) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or

(C) unless prohibited by the law of the foreign country, by

(i) delivery to the individual personally of a copy of the summons and the complaint; or

(ii) any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or

(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by the court.

[*2]  Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(f).

The only limitations on Rule 4(f)(3) are that the means of service must be directed by the court and must not be prohibited by international agreement. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir.2002). “[S]ervice of process under Rule 4(f)(3) is neither a ‘last resort’ nor ‘extraordinary relief.’ It is merely one means among several which enables service of process on an international defendant.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Because the Court is not aware of any international agreement that speaks to service of process in Saudi Arabia, Plaintiff needs only to obtain the Court’s permission. To do so, she must show that “the facts and circumstances of the present case necessitate[ ] … district court [ ] intervention.” Id. at 1016. The proposed means of service must also comport with constitutional notions of due process. Id.

Plaintiff has reasonably asserted that the Court’s intervention is needed here. First, Plaintiff does not have the option of utilizing the service means authorized by the Hague Convention because Saudi Arabia is not a party to that treaty. See U.S. Dep’t of State Circular on Service of Legal Documents Abroad, available at http://www. travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_680.html (listing countries that are parties to the Hague Convention); Tinicum Props. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Garnett, No. Civ. A 92-0860, 1992 WL 99590, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Apr.29, 1992) (noting that Saudi Arabia is not a party to the Hague Convention). Second, Plaintiff has stated that it would be extremely difficult to identify someone who would be willing to attempt personal service on Defendant in Saudi Arabia. Plaintiff submits the affidavit of the President of Process Service Network, a firm specializing in international service of process, which supports the claim that locating a process service in Saudi Arabia is extremely difficult at the present time. (Affidavit of Nelson Tucker ¶¶ 9-10, Ex. D to Affidavit of Mark Platt (“Platt Aff.”).) Furthermore, Plaintiff’s counsel states that he has been unable to locate a residence address for Defendant. (Platt Aff. ¶ 4.) Rule 4(f) does not otherwise permit service by mail without a signed receipt, see Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii), and the website provides only an e-mail address. Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel requested that Defendant’s U.S. attorneys accept service on Defendant’s behalf. (Platt Aff. ¶ 6.) Those attorneys declined to do so and also declined to provide Plaintiff’s counsel with Defendant’s residence address. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) Therefore, Plaintiff has demonstrated that the circumstances of the case necessitate the Court’s intervention.

Plaintiff offers five proposed court-ordered means of service: (1) by certified mail on Defendant’s U.S. attorneys; (2) by Federal Express on Defendant’s U.K. attorneys; (3) by e-mail to the e-mail address on Defendant’s website; (4) by Federal Express to the business address in Saudi Arabia; and (5) by international mail to Defendant’s post-office box in Saudi Arabia. Service of process must be “reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). The Court finds that some but not all of these methods would satisfy due-process considerations.

[*3]  Service on Defendant’s U.K. and U.S. attorneys would satisfy this standard. Both sets of attorneys must be in communication with Defendant in relation to the pending legal proceedings in the United States and the United Kingdom and will know how to locate Defendant. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017 (upholding service on the defendant’s attorney under Rule 4(f)(3) because he was in communication with the defendant at its location abroad); Forum Fin. Group, LLC v. President & Fellows of Haryard Coll., 199 F.R.D. 22, 25 (D.Me.2001) (holding that service on foreign defendant’s attorney was likely to provide the defendant with notice because the attorney was in communication with his client). In addition, Defendant’s counsel in the United Kingdom is aware of the facts underlying this suit and therefore will not be likely to disregard notice of the suit. Accordingly, service on Defendant’s attorneys is reasonably calculated to provide Defendant with notice of this suit.

Service via mail to Defendant’s post-office box would also likely notify Defendant of the proceedings. Defendant has listed the post-office box in Saudi Arabia as his address for purposes of the lawsuit against Plaintiff in the United Kingdom. He therefore has represented that he will receive communications that are sent to the post-office box. Based on that representation, the Court finds that service by mail to the post-office box is reasonably calculated to provide Defendant with notice.

Service via e-mail and service on the place of business, however, do not meet the constitutional standard under the circumstances. Although courts have upheld service via e-mail, those cases involved e-mail addresses undisputedly connected to the defendants and that the defendants used for business purposes. See, e.g., Rio Props. 284 F.3d at 1017-18; Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., No. 02-CV-0133E, 2002 WL 1628933, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002). In Rio Properties, the Ninth Circuit upheld service via e-mail when the defendant company maintained a website and designated its e-mail address as its preferred means of communication. See 284 F.3d at 1017-18. Similarly, the court in Ryan permitted service by e-mail because the defendant maintained an Internet site and listed an e-mail address as a means of business communication. See 2002 WL 1628933, at *2. In contrast, Plaintiff has provided no information that would lead the Court to conclude that Defendant maintains the website, monitors the e-mail address, or would be likely to receive information transmitted to the e-mail address. The website directs individuals seeking information to send inquiries to “information@binmahfouz.info.” (Platt Aff. ¶ 15.) In Rio Properties and Ryan, the e-mail addresses were the mechanisms by which the defendants conducted business, presumably on a daily basis; here, the e-mail address is apparently only used as an informal means of accepting requests for information rather than for receiving important business communications. Accordingly, the Court does not authorize service by e-mail in this case.

[*4]  Finally, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request to serve the Defendant by Federal Express to a business address in Saudi Arabia. Plaintiff’s counsel states that he “obtained an address for a company named Al-Murjan Company in Saudi Arabia with which defendant is affiliated.” (Platt Aff. ¶ 14.) That is the extent of the information provided to the Court about this business. Plaintiff’s counsel does not state the basis of his conclusion that Defendant is affiliated with this company, nor the means by which he obtained this address. The Court therefore has no way of knowing whether service of process to this address will have any chance of reaching Defendant.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion to serve by alternative means under Rule 4(f)(3) is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall effect service of process on Defendant by (1) certified mail on Defendant’s U.S. attorneys; (2) Federal Express on Defendant’s U.K. attorneys; and (3) mail to Defendant’s post-office box in Saudi Arabia. Plaintiff shall serve the summons and complaint, along with a copy of this order, within 30 days of the date that this order is entered on the Court’s docket.

So Ordered