329 F.Supp.2d 1294,
17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 929 United States District
Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division. UNITED STATES of
America v. Sami Amin AL-ARIAN,
Sameeh Hammoudeh, Ghassan Zayed Ballut, Hatim Naji Fariz No. 8:03CR77T30TBM. Aug. 4, 2004. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Declined to follow by: Humanitarian
Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F.Supp.2d 1134 (C.D.Cal. Jul. 25, 2005) (No.
CV98-1971ABCRCX, CV03-6107ABCRCX) U.S. v. Marzook, 383 F.Supp.2d 1056 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 22, 2005) (No.
03 CR 0978) [*1295] COUNSEL: Daniel W. Eckhart, U.S. Attorneys
Office, Middle District of Florida, Orlando, FL, Walter E. Furr, III, U.S
Attorneys Office, Middle District of Florida, Tampa, FL, for
Plaintiff. Kevin T. Beck, Federal Public Defenders Office, Middle
District of Florida, Tampa, FL, Stephen N. Bernstein, Stephen N. Bernstein,
P.A., Gainesville, FL, Jeffrey Geldert Brown, Brown & Doherty, P.A, Palm
Harbor, FL, Richard P. Condon, Law Office of Richard P. Condon, Kissimmee, FL,
M. Allison Guagliardo, Federal Public Defenders Office, Middle
District of Florida, Tampa, FL, Daniel Mario Hernandez, Law Office of Daniel M.
Hernandez, Tampa, FL, Donald E. Horrox, Federal Public Defenders
Office, Middle District of Florida, Tampa, FL, Bruce G. Howie, Piper, Ludin,
Howie & Werner, P.A., St. Petersburg, FL, Franklyn Louderback, Louderback
and Helinger, St. Petersburg, FL, Nicholas M. Matassini, The Matassini Law
Firm, P.A., Tampa, FL, William B. Moffitt, Cozen OConnor, P.C.,
Washington, DC, Linda G. Moreno, Law Office of Linda Moreno, Tampa, FL, Wadie
E. Said, Federal Public Defenders Office, Middle District of Florida,
Tampa, FL, Terry Zitek, U.S. Attorneys Office, Tampa, FL, for
Defendants. ORDER JUDGE: MOODY, District Judge. This cause came on for consideration without oral argument upon
the Governments Motion for Modification of Ruling on Scienter under
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Dkts.# 519, 520) and
Defendants responses (Dkts.# 540, 541, 543, 563) thereto. After close
consideration, the motion is denied. I. BACKGROUND This is a criminal action against alleged members of the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi Faction (the PIJ) who
purportedly operated and directed fundraising and other organizational
activities in the United States for almost twenty years. The PIJ is a foreign
organization that uses violence, principally suicide bombings, and threats of
violence to pressure Israel to cede territory to the Palestinian people. The
PIJ has been designated a foreign terrorist organization
(FTO) and a specially designated terrorist
(SDT) by the United States government. Both designations
create potential legal consequences (including criminal liability) to those
people in the United States that support or are associated with the PIJ. On February 19, 2003, the government indicted eight defendants in
a 50 count indictment that included counts for: (1) conspiracy to commit
racketeering (Count 1); (2) conspiracy to commit murder, maim, or injure
persons outside the United States (Count 2); (3) conspiracy to provide material
support to or for the benefit of [*1296] foreign terrorists (Counts 3 and 4);
(4) violations of the Travel Act (Counts 5 through 44); (5) violation of the
immigration laws of the United States (Counts 45 and 46); (6) obstruction of
justice (Count 47); and (7) perjury (Counts 48 through 50). The four Defendants
[FN1] that are before this Court moved to dismiss the Indictment, raising a
variety of constitutional and procedural issues. In support of their respective
positions, Defendants and the government filed over three hundred pages of
briefs. The parties briefs largely concentrated on the
constitutionality of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub.L. No. 104-132 (AEDPA). In addition to the lengthy
briefs filed by the parties, this Court conducted an oral argument that lasted
over three hours that also focused on the constitutionality of AEDPA and the
statutory construction of that statute. FN1. For purposes of this Order, this Court is
only referring to Defendants Al-Arian, Hammoudeh, Ballut, and Fariz, when it
uses the word Defendants. During oral argument, this Court questioned governments
counsel at length on the mens rea required to support a conviction under
Section 2339B of AEDPA. The government took the position that the mens rea
necessary to support a conviction under Section 2339B was proof that a:
defendant knew of the designation of the organization as a foreign
terrorist organization or the defendant knew that the organization engaged in
or had engaged in terrorist activity
. Hrg. Tr. Jan. 21,
2004 at 81. Indeed, the government explicitly adopted the mens rea requirements
utilized by the Ninth Circuit in Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S.
Dept of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir.2003) (hereinafter Humantarian
II)
and Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir.2000) (hereinafter
Humanitarian I) (collectively Humanitarian I and Humanitarian
II
are referred to as the Humanitarian cases). [FN2] The
government argued that the presence of a mens rea requirement in AEDPA avoided
or cured the constitutional problems raised by Defendants. FN2. The government did not distinguish
between the mens rea requirements required in each of the two cases. The
governments argument was more consistent with the mens rea
requirement annunciated in Humanitarian II. On March 12, 2004, this Court entered an Order disposing of
numerous pretrial motions, including Defendants motions to dismiss
the Indictment. In its Order, this Court denied almost all of
Defendants motions to dismiss, [FN3] including Defendants
motions to declare AEDPA unconstitutional. As a prerequisite to dealing with
the constitutionality of AEDPA, this Court interpreted the mens rea required to
support a conviction under Section 2339B(a)(1) as requiring the government to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew (had a specific intent)
that the support would further the illegal activities of a FTO. [FN4] On April
26, 2004, the government sought reconsideration of this specific intent [*1297] requirement.
[FN5] For the most part, the governments arguments in the instant
motion remain unchanged from those positions it advanced in response to the
original motions to dismiss. [FN6] FN3. This Court granted Defendant
Farizs motion to quash the extortion allegation and deferred ruling
on several surplusage issues until trial. FN4. This Court commented, however, that this
burden was not extremely heavy on the government. For example, this Court
stated that the burden could be carried when the government demonstrated that
a defendant knows that the organization [the FTO] continues to commit
illegal acts and the defendant provides funds to that organization knowing that
money is fungible and, once received, the donee can use the funds for any
purpose it chooses. FN5. The government has not moved for
reconsideration of this Courts conclusion with respect to the mens
rea required to support a conviction under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq. (IEEPA).
In its prior Order, this Court concluded that a defendant must have had a
specific intent to further the illegal activities of the SDT by making or
receiving a contribution of goods or services. FN6. The governments claim that it
had not had the opportunity to address the scienter element
applicable to Section 2339B is disingenuous at best. The scienter
element was prominently featured and discussed throughout the briefs and oral
arguments of the parties. Indeed, it was one of the chief reasons the government
argued that Section 2339B was constitutional. II. DISCUSSION While this Court does not normally view its role in the federal
judiciary as one to comment on theoretical or philosophical subjects, this
Court finds that it is appropriate to do so briefly here. Underlying the
motions to dismiss is a question that has troubled courts throughout this
Nations history: how does this Nation (and its courts) balance an
individuals constitutional rights against national security and foreign
policy interests? Normally, the doctrine of separation of powers requires that
courts, including this one, defer to executive and legislative determinations
on foreign policy and national security questions. See, e.g., Zadvydas v.
Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 696, 121
S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (stating that heightened deference
[is due] to the judgments of political branches with respect to matters of
national security.). But, less deference is required when individual
constitutional rights are implicated. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264, 88
S.Ct. 419, 19 L.Ed.2d 508 (1967) (stating that: [i]t would indeed be ironic
if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of
those [constitutional] liberties
which makes the defense of the
Nation worthwhile.). More recently, Justice OConnor
acknowledged the judiciaries role in such issues, stating that in
our most challenging and uncertain moments
we must
preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight
abroad. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, ----, 124
S.Ct. 2633, 2647-48, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (OƠConnor, J., plurality).
She continued by bluntly commenting that a state of war is not a
blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the
Nations citizens and that the courts should play their
necessary role to balance individual constitutional rights with the
governments interest(s). Id. at 2650. While these Defendants have not been charged with making war
against the United States and no state of war exists between the United States
and the PIJ, the foreign policy and national security interests implicated in
this case and by AEDPA are no less weighty. In its prior Order, this Court,
being mindful of the weighty governmental interests implicated in this case and
the First Amendment and other constitutional rights of these Defendants,
attempted to achieve the appropriate balance. The government now seeks
reconsideration of that balance, arguing that this Court weighed too heavily
the individual constitutional rights [FN7] touched by 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B. [FN8] This Court disagrees. FN7. Indeed, the thrust of the
governments argument is that no constitutional rights are implicated
by the prohibitions contained in Section 2339B(a)(1). FN8. This Court would note that three out of
the four courts that have squarely considered the constitutionality of Section
2339B concluded that parts of it were unconstitutional. See, e.g., Humanitarian
I,
205 F.3d at 1133-34 (concluding personnel and
training as utilized in AEDPA to be unconstitutionally
vague); Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F.Supp.2d 1185
(C.D.Cal.2004) (concluding expert advice or assistance to
be unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Sattar, 272 F.Supp.2d 348,
357-60 (S.D.N.Y.2003). While none of these decisions is binding on this Court,
those decisions do indicate that other judges believe that serious
constitutional concerns exist under Section 2339B. [*1298] A. STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION In its prior Order, the question of statutory interpretation
before this Court was how to construe Section 2339B(a)(1), which provides that
persons who: knowingly provide[ ] material support [FN9] or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization, or attempt[ ] or conspire[ ] to do so, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and if
the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or
for life. FN9. Material support is
broadly defined in AEDPA to mean currency or other financial
securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons,
lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical
assets, except medicine or religious materials. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A(b); id. § 2239B(g)(4). 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). There are at least
three logical constructions of the level of knowledge required by this statute: (1) knowledge simply that a person is
providing something defined as material support in the
statute; [FN10] (2) knowledge, in addition to the first requirement, that the
recipient is a FTO or is an entity that engaged in the type of terrorist
activity that would lead to designation as a FTO; or (3) knowledge, in addition to the previous two
requirements, that the recipient could or would utilize the support to further
the illegal activities of the entity. FN10. This Court is not requiring that the
government prove that Defendants knew that what they actually were providing
was within the list of items defined as material support in
Section 2339A. Ignorance of the law is not a defense to Section 2339B. The government concedes that the first construction violates the
Supreme Courts decision in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 115 S.Ct. 464,
130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994). It urges that this Court reconsider its prior ruling,
adopt the second construction, and reject the third construction (the
construction that this Court previously chose). Central to this
Courts adoption of the third construction and largely unaddressed in
the instant motion is the canon of statutory interpretation that courts are to
interpret statutes in a manner that avoids constitutional difficulty. [FN11]
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239- 40, 119
S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999); X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 78, 115
S.Ct. 464; Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483, 108
S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988). FN11. Indeed, this Court is not to squarely
address constitutional issues if it can be avoided. See, e.g., Three Affiliated
Tribes of Ft. Berthold Reservation v. World Engineering, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157, 104
S.Ct. 2267, 81 L.Ed.2d 113 (1984) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (the doctrine of judicial restraint requires judges not
to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.). In Jones, the Supreme Court summarized this canon of statutory
construction [*1299] by stating that where a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are
avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter. 526 U.S. at 239, 119 S.Ct. 1215
(quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408, 29
S.Ct. 527, 53 L.Ed. 836 (1909)). The Court went on to conclude that the
standard for utilizing this canon was when prior precedent
suggest[ed] rather than establish[ed] that a particular
construction of a statutory provision was unconstitutional. Id. at 243 n. 6, 119
S.Ct. 1215. In other words, it is not necessary for this Court to be
certain that a particular construction is unconstitutional.
Id.
Instead, this Court must have a level of doubt about the
constitutionality of a particular construction. Id. In its prior Order, this Court avoided (in compliance with the
above precedents) squarely addressing the constitutionality of the
governments proposed construction. Instead, this Court stated the
constitutional concerns it had with the governments proposed
construction and analyzed the statute to see if an alternative construction
existed that avoided those constitutional concerns. By this Court resolving
those constitutional concerns in the manner that it did, this Court avoided
doing grievous harm to Section 2339B by declaring all or parts of it
unconstitutional. The practical result of this Courts construction,
compared to the construction and results reached by three other courts that
declared parts of Section 2339B unconstitutional, is that the government
continues to have the ability to stop certain kinds of support from flowing to
FTOs. B. PERSONAL GUILT The government first argues that it was unnecessary for this Court
to interpret Section 2339B(a)(1) as implying a specific intent requirement in
order to satisfy the due process requirements of personal guilt. The government
is correct to start with the Supreme Courts seminal opinion in Scales
v. United States, 367 U.S. 203,
81 S.Ct. 1469, 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961). This Court disagrees, however, that Scales and its progeny
require any different result than this Court reached in its prior order. Indeed,
the very language utilized by the Supreme Court in Scales raised the serious
constitutional concerns that this Court recognized in its prior order. The bottom line of the governments argument is that in
its opinion due process personal guilt problems only arise in membership
statutes and Section 2339B is not a membership statute. The government relies
heavily on the fact that the Smith Act, the act under review in Scales, was a membership
statute. Indeed, this Court does not quarrel with the government that the
Supreme Court in Scales held that [m]embership, without more, in an
organization engaged in illegal advocacy is insufficient to justify
individual criminal liability. Id. at 225. Scales is not so narrowly
worded, however, to be limited to just membership statutes. The Supreme
Courts opening sentence in its Fifth Amendment section states a much
broader principle that is expressly not limited to membership statutes. In that
section, the Court stated: In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and
when imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified
by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly
criminal activity
that relationship must be sufficiently substantial
to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [*1300] 367 U.S. at 224-25, 81 S.Ct. 1469 (emphasis added). If Scales only applied to membership statutes, the Supreme Court
would not have needed to use the phrases or on conduct or
or conduct because status would have
been sufficient to cover membership statutes. Instead, the Court held that when
criminality and punishment are justified by a relationship to others
conduct, that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to constitutionally
support criminal liability. [FN12] FN12. In that case, the Supreme Court termed
the Fifth Amendment constitutional concern as: impermissibly imput[ing]
guilt to an individual merely on the basis of his association and sympathies,
rather than because of some concrete personal involvement in criminal
conduct. 367 U.S. at 220, 81 S.Ct. 1469. Turning to Section 2339B(a)(1), this Court has to look no further
than the text of the provision to see that the severe punishments provided for
in Section 2339B are justified by and explicitly tied to the criminal activity
of a FTO. [FN13] For example, Section 2339B(a)(1) provides for a sentence of up
to life imprisonment if the provision of material support results in the death
of any person. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). FN13. Similarly, an element of a Section 2339B
offense is that the recipient or intended recipient (in the case of an attempt)
of the support be a designated FTO. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(a)(1). Consider the following hypothetical example that demonstrates how
criminal liability and punishment for conduct are intertwined with the criminal
conduct of others under Section 2339B(a)(1). A and B are members of a FTO. The
FTO exists to oppose and remove (by violent and non-violent means) a foreign
government. A opposes the FTOs use of violent means to accomplish its
goals. B has no problem with the groups use of violence and wants to raise
funds for weapons to further that interest. B travels to where A lives to raise
money. A does not know that B is coming to fundraise on behalf of the FTO. A
picks B up at the airport. A allows B to stay in his home, use his telephone, and
use his house to entertain other FTO members while A is at work. B fundraises
while A is gone. Under the governments construction of Section
2339B(a)(1), A is criminally liable for providing transportation, lodging,
communications equipment, and facilities, and, if the money raised results in
the death of any person, he will face life in prison. As criminal
liability is inextricably connected to his association with B and the FTO.
Further, the level of As criminal punishment is totally dependent on
Bs and other members of the FTOs criminal conduct. In such circumstances, a Fifth Amendment due process personal
guilt concern is suggested, because criminal liability and punishment is being
justified and tied to the criminal activities of others. This Court is to avoid
that constitutional concern and concludes that requiring a specific intent to
further the illegal activities of a FTO satisfies this concern. [FN14] FN14. This Court is not and has not required
the government to prove active membership. Though, the government alleged that
Defendants are active members, and that Defendant Al-Arian is (or was) on the
governing counsel of the PIJ. C. VAGUENESS In its prior order, this Court built on the hypothetical examples
utilized by the Ninth Circuit in the Humanitarian cases to illustrate how the
statutory definition for material support could be
unconstitutionally vague. The government argues that it was unnecessary for
this Court to consider hypothetical examples because as [*1301] applied to
these Defendants conduct Section 2339B is not unconstitutionally
vague. However, it should have been clear from this Courts prior
opinion that the constitutional concern that this Court identified was based on
a facial, and not an as applied, vagueness challenge to Section 2339B. In response to a facial challenge, the government argues that the
statute is constitutional because it is constitutional in a vast number of
circumstances. The government relies on the general rule that a challenger
raising a facial constitutional challenge must prove that no set of
circumstances exist under which the Act would be valid. United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). [FN15] FN15. Salerno involved a substantive due
process and Eighth Amendment challenge to the Bail Reform Act, not a First
Amendment challenge. If vagueness and overbreadth are as related and similar as
the Supreme Court implied in Kolender, it would figure that facial vagueness
challenges are also excepted from Salerno when First Amendment concerns are
raised. See, e.g., Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1855. The governments argument is disingenuous. In the very
case on which the government relies, the Eleventh Circuit conceded that the
appropriate standard to apply to facially invalidate a statute for vagueness
has been hotly debated and inconsistently applied by the Supreme Court. See Horton
v. City of St. Augustine, 272 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir.2001); also United
States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir.2000) (citing Supreme Court cases
discussing whether Salerno is the proper rule for facial challenges). Under the
one standard, which applies to most facial challenges and is the position taken
by the government, a challenger is required to prove that no set of
circumstances exist under which the statute would be valid. See 272 F.3d at
1330 (citing to Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095). However, under a
second standard, a court can invalidate a statute even if it has some valid
applications. In order to be unconstitutional under the second standard, the
statute must reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct
and fail to provide either actual notice or allow for discriminatory or
arbitrary enforcement. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-358 n.
8, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). The Eleventh Circuit in Horton concluded that several factors are
important to the Supreme Court in determining which standard applies: (a)
whether the ordinance is a criminal law; (b) whether it regulates business
behavior or infringes on constitutional rights; and (c) whether the statute
contains a scienter requirement. See 272 F.3d at 1330 (citing to City of
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,
55, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999)); also Village of Hoffman Estates
v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489,
498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). In addition to the factors set
out in Horton, this Courts review of the applicable precedents noticed
that all the cases where the Supreme Court (for example in Morales and Kolender) applied the stricter
vagueness test (the second standard) involved First Amendment rights being
impinged by criminal laws. For example in Kolender, which was decided prior to Salerno, the Supreme Court
concluded that an ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it required a
suspect to provide credible and reliable information to the police even when
the police lacked probable cause to arrest that suspect. See 461 U.S. at
361-62, 103 S.Ct. 1855. A majority of the Court stated that the doctrines of
vagueness [*1302] and overbreadth are logically related and similar
doctrines and reaffirmed the validity of facial vagueness challenges
when free speech or association are affected. [FN16] See id. at 358 n. 8, 103
S.Ct. 1855. In concluding that the ordinance was vague, Justice
OConnor provided a hypothetical example of how the ordinance would
apply to and impinge on the First Amendment rights of a jogger. See id. at 359, 103 S.Ct.
1855. FN16. Even in Salerno, the Supreme Court
created an exception for the overbreadth doctrine in First Amendment cases. 481
U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095. Section 2339B is a criminal statute that potentially impinges on
substantial amounts of First Amendment activity. [FN17] This Courts
previous hypotheticals were designed to show the broad and wide reach of
Section 2339B to constitutionally protected conduct. Without a specific intent
requirement, this Court is concerned that ordinary people could not understand
that innocuous conduct, like that discussed at oral argument and described in
the previous order and in the previous section, [FN18] would be prohibited by
the statute. FN17. As stated previously by this Court, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the act of contributing money to an
organization implicates the First Amendment right of freedom of association.
See, e.g., McConnell v. Fedl Election Commn, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619,
157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govt PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 120 S.Ct.
897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46
L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized that indirect
regulation of a persons associational rights can have the practical
realit[y] of impermissibly infringing on a persons First Amendment
right of freedom of association. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 182-83, 92
S.Ct. 2338, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972) (involving government regulation of the use
of college facilities). FN18. This Court would suggest that its prior
example of A and B in the previous section illustrates protected associational
conduct on As part (Bs would be criminal). Most of the Supreme Court cases relied on by the government in its
prior brief and again in this motion (for the proposition that this Court
should not allow a hypothetical challenge) can easily be distinguished from the
present case. For example, Posters N Things, Ltd. v.
United States, 511 U.S. 513,
114 S.Ct. 1747, 128 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994) involved a criminal statute that
regulated economic behavior (the sale of drug paraphernalia by a head
shop), [FN19] which typically has received a less strict vagueness
test than when First Amendment rights are potentially impinged. See, e.g., Hoffman
Estates,
455 U.S. at 499, 102 S.Ct. 1186. Similarly, Parker v. Levy involved a vagueness
challenge to provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct.
2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974). In concluding that the provisions were not vague,
the Supreme Court explicitly applied a less stringent vagueness test because it
concluded that Congress was entitled to greater flexibility in regulating
military society than civilian society. Id. at 756, 94 S.Ct.
2547. Likewise, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. involved a zoning
ordinance, and not a criminal statute like in this case, that prohibited the
operation of an adult business within a 1000 feet of any such other business or
within 500 feet of a residential neighborhood. [FN20] 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440,
49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976). Criminal statutes traditionally receive a much more
exacting vagueness analysis [*1303] than do other types of statutes and
ordinances. See, e.g., Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1855. FN19. 511 U.S. 513, 526, 114
S.Ct. 1747, 128 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994). FN20. Interestingly, the Supreme Court relied
on Parker v. Levy in concluding that it should not allow a hypothetical challenge,
even though Young involved civilian and not military society. See 427 U.S. at
58- 59, 96 S.Ct. 2440. The most troublesome case cited by the government is Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,
120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). Hill involved a challenge to a Colorado
statute that prevented abortion protesters from approaching within eight feet
of an individual who was within 100 feet of an abortion clinic. See id. at 714, 120 S.Ct.
2480. The government is correct (and this Court conceded in its prior Order)
that the Supreme Court in that case indeed did not address the abortion
protesters hypothetical examples in concluding that the statute was
not vague. 530 U.S. at 733, 120 S.Ct. 2480. What the government overlooks in
the instant motion is that the Supreme Court had already concluded that
[t]he likelihood that anyone would not understand any of those common
words seems quite remote before it stated that it was not appropriate
to address the protesters hypothetical examples. Id. at 732, 120 S.Ct.
2480. As this Court previously stated, the next paragraph on which the
government relies is dicta. Even if it were not dicta, this Court would
conclude that Section 2339B [FN21] does not utilize language nearly as clear
and precise as the statute in Hill. And, Section 2339B applies to a substantial
amount of protected conduct. FN21. For clarity purposes, Section 2339B
contains a cross reference to 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b), which
actually contains the potentially vague language. However, this Court need not resolve the seemingly conflicting
language between Hill and Kolender or divine the proper standard for facial
invalidity in this case. [FN22] Instead, it is enough that Supreme Court
precedent (and that of three other courts) suggests that some of the terms in
Section 2339B could be unconstitutionally vague. Because a constitutional
concern exists on whether Section 2339B is unconstitutionally vague, this Court
is to avoid that constitutional concern. Requiring a specific intent to further
the illegal activities of a FTO satisfies that concern. [FN23] FN22. A subject that the Supreme Court and the
Eleventh Circuit cannot consistently answer. FN23. To the extent an overbreadth concern
could also exist, construing the statute to contain a specific intent
requirement also ameliorates those concerns also. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 119-22, 110
S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). D. FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION Finally, if this Court granted the governments motion,
the governments proposed construction would change this
Courts freedom of association analysis. In its prior Order, this
Court concluded that, as construed, Section 2339B(a)(1) is constitutional
because it is closely drawn to further a sufficiently important government
interest. Important in this Courts analysis on the closely drawn
prong was that the statute had been construed to contain a specific intent
requirement that only impaired the illegal aims of a FTO (in this case the
PIJ). The government has not argued that this Courts application of
that standard of review is incorrect. Indeed, any discussion of the First
Amendment is almost completely absent from the instant motion. This Court
concludes that, if this Court were to reconsider that ruling, the
governments construction of the statute would also cause grave
concerns about Section 2339Bs constitutionality under the First
Amendment. In Scales v. United States, the Supreme Court analyzed the
constitutionality of the membership clause in the Smith Act that made it
unlawful to have a knowing membership in any organization that advocated the
violent overthrow of the [*1304] United States government. 367 U.S. 203, 81 S.Ct.
1469, 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961). Before reaching the constitutional questions raised
by the parties, the Court construed the clause and implied a specific intent
requirement. [FN24] See id. at 221, 81 S.Ct. 1469. In determining that
the provision was constitutional under the First Amendment (freedom of
association), this implied requirement was critical to the Courts
analysis that the clause was constitutional. See id. at 229, 81 S.Ct. 1469.
The Supreme Court stated: It is, of course, true that quasi-political
parties [the communist party in that case] or other groups that may embrace
both legal and illegal aims differ from a technical conspiracy, which is
defined by its criminal purpose, so that all knowing association with the
conspiracy is a proper subject for criminal proscription as far as First
Amendment liberties are concerned. If there were a similar blanket prohibition
of association with a group having both legal and illegal aims, there would
indeed be a real danger that legitimate political expression or association
would be impaired, but the membership clause, as here construed [to include a
specific intent requirement], does not cut deeper into the freedom of
association than is necessary to deal with the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. Id. (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct.
247, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919)). FN24. The governments arguments that
this Court impermissibly converted the knowingly requirement to a willful
requirement are directly contradicted by Scales where the Court implied a
specific intent requirement to avoid almost the exact same constitutional
infirmities that this Court has identified. This Court is accomplishing
Congresss express intent by allowing the prosecution of Section 2339B
to the fullest possible constitutional extent. The governments
position, which could lead this Court to invalidate all or part of Section
2339B, and not this Courts, is expressly contrary to
Congresss intent. In Healy v. James, the Supreme Court extended the right of
freedom of association to include cases where the practical
effect of an indirect governmental regulation was to infringe on a
persons associational rights. 408 U.S. 169, 182-83, 92
S.Ct. 2338, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972). Healy involved a civil action brought by a
group of university students denied recognition as an official student group.
See id. at 171-72, 92 S.Ct. 2338. Denial of official recognition meant
that the students could not use campus facilities for meetings and also could
not advertise meeting or place announcements on bulletin boards or the school
newspaper. See id. at 177, 92 S.Ct. 2338. The students argued that the
universitys non-recognition had the indirect effect of infringing on
their rights to freely associate. See id. at 182, 92 S.Ct. 2338. The university
(and the lower courts) argued that no constitutional rights were abridged
because the students could meet off campus, advertise off campus, and meet
unofficially on campus. [FN25] The Supreme Court reversed, stating [f]reedoms
such as these are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but
also from being stifled by more subtle governmental
interference. Id. at 183, 92 S.Ct.
2338. FN25. The government makes almost identical
arguments with respect to Section 2339B(a)(1). More recently, the Supreme Court has recognized that the act of
contributing money to an organization implicates the right of freedom of
association. See, e.g., McConnell v. Fedl Election Commn, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619,
157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govt PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 120 S.Ct.
897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46
L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). [*1305] The Court in those cases recognized that regulation
of association was constitutional if it was closely drawn to further a
sufficiently important government interest. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at ----,
124 S.Ct. at 654-56; Shrink Missouri Govt PAC, 528 U.S. at 387-88,
120 S.Ct. 897; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612. While AEDPA and Section 2339B does not directly bar membership in
a FTO, it does impose even more dramatic indirect restrictions than those in
Healy or in McConnell, Nixon, or Buckley on those who are associated with or
wish to associate with FTOs. It prohibits all funding and all tangible support
of any kind with extremely limited exceptions for medicine and religious
materials. Based on this blanket broad prohibition that has the practical
effect of impinging the right of freedom of association, this Court has grave
concerns about the constitutionality of Section 2339B. Requiring a specific
intent to further the illegal activities of a FTO relieves this concern. III. CONCLUSION This Court again would state that implying a specific intent
requirement does not, will not, and should not hamper the governments
anti-terrorism efforts. Such an intent can be easily inferred from
circumstantial evidence. This Court reiterates that it is in no way creating a
safe harbor for terrorists or their supporters to try and avoid prosecution
through utilization of shell charitable organizations or by
directing money through the memo line of a check towards lawful activities.
Instead, this Court is attempting to construe Section 2339B(a)(1) in a manner
that avoids constitutional infirmity. It is therefore ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the
Governments Motion for Modification of Ruling on Scienter under 18
U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Dkts. # 519, 520) is DENIED. |