1998
WL 34089590 (9th Cir.)
For
opinion see 205 F.3d 1130
Briefs
and Other Related Documents
United
States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
HUMANITARIAN
LAW PROJECT, Ralph Fertig, Ilankai Thamil Sangam, Tamils of Northern
California, Tamil Welfare and Human Rights Committee, Federation of Tamil
Sangams of North America, World Tamil Coordinating Committee, and Nagalingham
Jeyalingam, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Janet
RENO, as Attorney General of the United States, United States Department of
Justice, Madeline Albright, as United States Secretary of State, and United States
Department of State, Defendants-Appellees.
Nos.
98-56062, 98-56280.
September
14, 1998.
On
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of
California the Honorable Audrey B. Collins, Judge Presiding
Brief
of Amicus Curiae the Anti-Defamation League in Support of Defendants-Appellees
Of
Counsel: Linda Dakin-Grimm [FN*] David M. Raim, Philip J. Goodman Joy L.
Langford, Cha??bourne & Parke LLP, 1200 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20036 and 601 South Figueroa Street, Los Angeles, CA 90017,
213-892-1000.
Elizabeth
J. Coleman, Steven M. Freeman, Michael Lieberman, Anti-Defamation League, 823
United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017.
FN* Counsel of Record
*ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE
OF AUTHORITIES ... iii
STATEMENT
OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ... 1
INTEREST
OF THE AMICUS CURIAE ... 2
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE ... 6
SUMMARY
OF THE ARGUMENT ... 6
ARGUMENT
... 10
I.
"HUMANITARIAN" AND "SOCIAL SERVICE" COMPONENTS OF FOREIGN
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ARE INSEPARABLY LINKED TO THEIR ABILITY TO ENGAGE IN
TERRORIST ACTS. ... 10
II.
SECTION 303 OF THE AEDPA DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT. ... 19
A.
The Constitution of the United States does not protect as "speech"
the conduct which is criminalized by the AEDPA. ... 19
B.
In the alternative, analyzed under the O'Brien standard, the AEDPA's
prohibition against providing material support to foreign terrorist
organizations is constitutionally acceptable. ... 25
C.
Even if the material support for foreign terrorist organizations prohibited by
the AEDPA is considered to be "pure speech," it satisfies
"strict scrutiny" analysis. ... 33
CONCLUSION
... 45
*iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 119 F.3d 1367 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 118 S. Ct. 1059 (1998) ... 41, 42
American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995) ... 41
Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ... 22, 23, 26, 43
Bullfrog
Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 512 (9th Cir. 1988) ... 21, 30
Department
of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) ... 31
In
re Extradition of Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook, 924 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y 1996)
... 12
Farrakhan
v. Reagan, 669 F. Supp. 506 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir.
1988) ... 26, 36, 37, 38
Foti
v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 1998) ... 27
Freedom
to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1996) ... 29, 30
Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) ... 24
Haig
v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) ... 4, 21, 27, 28, 30, 32, 38, 39
Humanitarian
Law Project v. Reno, No. CV 98-1971, 1998 WL 385955 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 1998)
... 32, 42
NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) ... 19
Palestine
Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ... 23, 22, 27, 30,
34
*iv
Perry Educ, Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) ... 33
Regan
v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) ... 30, 38
Teague
v. Regional Comm'r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 930 (1969) ... 31, 30
United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) ... 25, 26
United
States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1375 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 507
(1996) ... 19, 25
Veterans
& Reservists for Peace in Vietnam v. Regional Comm'r of Customs, 459 F.2d
676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 933 (1972) ... 30
Vietnamese
Fishermen's Assoc. v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex.
1982) ... 22
Walsh
v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir 1991) ... 30
Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) ... 26, 30
Wisconsin
v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) ... 4, 24
Zemel
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) ... 30
Statutes
and Congressional Materials
142
Cong. Rec. S3359-63 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) ... 4, 19, 20, 31
18
U.S.C.A. ¤ 2339A(a) ... 25, 35, 36
18
U.S.C.A. ¤ 2339B(g)(4) ... 25, 36
62
Fed. Reg. 52650 (1997) ... 10, 17
*v
Pub. L. No. 104-132, ¤ 301(a), 110 Stat. 1214-1319 (1996) (AEDPA findings
reprinted at 18 U.S.C.A. ¤ 2339B note) ... 19, 22, 27, 31
H.R.
Rep. No. 383, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) ... 22, 24, 29, 31
U.S.
Const. art. I, ¤ 8, cl. 3, 11, 18 ... 26, 27
U.S.
Const. art II, ¤ 2, cl. 2 ... 27
Books,
Periodicals and Reports
James
Brooke & Elaine Sciolinio, "U.S. Muslims Say their Aid Pays for
Charity, Not Terror," N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1995, at A1 ... 12, 13, 14
Civil
Rights Report; ADL in the Courts; Litigation Docket 1997 (1997) ... 2
William
Drozdiak, "Social Programs in Gaza Win Support for Hamas," Washington
Post, Aug. 18, 1997, at A14 ... 13
Nicholas
Goldberg, "The Enigmatic Face of Hamas," N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1997,
at A3 ... 12, 14
Jan
Hoffman, "Palestinian Held by the U.S. Now Faces Legal Limbo," N.Y.
Times, Apr. 6, 1997, at A1 ... 13
David
Josar, "Engineer Denies Links to Hezbollah," Detroit News, Jul. 28,
1998 ... 17
John
Kifner, "Alms and Arms: Tactics in a Holy War," N.Y. Times, Mar. 15,
1996, at A1 ... 15
Judith
Miller, God Has Ninety-Nine Names (1996) ... 16
Reuven
Paz, "Hamas Responds to the American Counter-Terrorist Laws" (visited
Sept. 11, 1998) <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/Hamas> ... 18
*vi
Judith Colp Rubin, "Unmasking Hamas," Jewish Week, Oct. 28, 1994, at
1 ... 14, 15
Jill
Snyder and Eric Goodman, Friend of the Court 1947-1982 (1983) ... 2
Special
Dispatch No. 2 (Middle East Media Research Institute, Washington, D.C.), July
20, 1998 ... 14
Khaled
Abu Toameh, "From Cradle to Grave,' The Jerusalem Report, Sept. 4, 1997,
at 34 ... 12, 14, 16, 17
*1
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether,
consistent with the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Congress may
prohibit persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction from knowingly providing money,
weapons, explosives and other designated forms of material support or resources
to designated foreign terrorist organizations.
*2
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE [FN1]
FN1. This brief is
submitted with the consent of the parties, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29.
Letters reflecting such consent are being filed simultaneously with the filing
of this brief.
The
Anti-Defamation League ("ADL"), one of the nation's oldest civil
rights organizations, was founded in 1913 to promote good will among all races,
ethnic groups and religions. ADL is dedicated to exposing and countering
bigotry of every kind, and to promoting and protecting civil rights and
liberties.
ADL
implements its mandate by educating and informing the general public about
prejudice and discrimination. It has filed amicus briefs in a broad range of
cases -- from separation of church and state, to racial discrimination, to free
speech -- in order to defend the Constitutional rights and liberties of all
Americans. [FN2] In addition, in recent years, ADL has been at the forefront in
monitoring extremists, hate groups, terrorists and others whose actions pose
threats not only to the mutual respect and tolerance upon which our diverse *3
society is based but, ominously, to the physical safety and security of
Americans and others throughout the world.
FN2. For a historical
chronology of civil rights litigation in which 12 has participated, see Jill Snyder
and Eric Goodman Friend of the Court 1947-1982 (1983). Information on more
recent cases may be found in ADL's publication, Civil Rights Report; ADL in the
Courts; Litigation Docket 1997 (1997), and earlier editions.
In
pursuing its historical fight against racism, anti-Semitism and other forms of
bigotry, ADL has always relied on the free speech guaranties of the First
Amendment, adhering to the philosophy that the best antidote for "bad
speech" is more speech, and that when hatred and bigotry are exposed, the
vast majority of Americans will reject them. Indeed, ADL could not carry out
its mission absent the protections provided for its own speech by the First
Amendment, and has never advocated any form of official censorship of the
speech of any person or organization.
By
the same token, ADL recognizes the difference between speech and conduct, and
the difference between protected speech and facilitation of violence. Thus,
while ADL's utmost respect for the First Amendment has never wavered, we have
been at the forefront in advocating for implementation of constitutionally
sound laws to protect our society from the evil that results when *4 hateful
beliefs turn into hateful conduct. [FN3] In this respect, ADL agrees with
Justice Goldberg's observation that "the Constitution ... is not a suicide
pact." [FN4]
FN3. See, e.g., Wisconsin
v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (citing amicus brief of ADL and upholding
Wisconsin's "hate crimes" statute against First Amendment challenge).
FN4. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280, 309-310 (1981) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160
(1963)).
As
the recent murderous attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
demonstrate, some "political organizations" choose to promote their
agenda through violence, rather than through speech. Terrorists who blow up
embassies, shoot at crowds of shoppers, or hold diplomats hostage, are entitled
to no constitutional protection for such conduct. Nor are their supporters,
whose contributions make such actions possible. The Constitution does not
prevent the Government from addressing these evils, through statutes such as
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"),
by prohibiting Americans from providing material support to foreign terrorist
organizations who perpetrate them. [FN5] Such monetary and other material
support, *5 often from U.S. individuals, is the fuel which powers the terrorist
engine, and Congress is well within its Constitutional mandate in seeking to
cut it off.
FN5. ADL is on record as an
early and strong supporter of the AEDPA. "I was really pleased to see the
help that we have had and the positive work that we got from the
Anti-Defamation League.... They have been very, very concerned about
this." 142 Cong. Rec. S3363 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hatch on consideration of AEDPA Conference Report).
Thus,
amicus believes that it adds two significant elements to the court's
consideration of the important issues in this case. First, although ADL is a
national organization dedicated to promoting and preserving civil rights, and
we take a back seat to no one in our staunch support of the freedoms of speech
and association we are convinced that the guaranties of the First Amendment do
not render constitutionally infirm Section 303 of the AEDPA. We respectfully
submit that providing the Court with ADL's perspective on this provision of the
AEDPA warrants this amicus filing.
In
addition, and perhaps of even greater significance, because ADL has monitored
the operation of certain foreign terrorist organizations, such as Hamas and
Hizballah, we can offer the court a brief but chilling picture of the elaborate
"social service" networks maintained by such organizations --
networks which in fact feed, nurture, and energize their terroristic
activities. As Congress found, there is simply no way to compartmentalize the
supposedly "good" works of such terrorists from the bad, and it is
therefore entirely appropriate for the United States to bar the provision of material
support to *6 these foreign terrorist organizations, regardless of how one
wishes or claims to believe that support will be used.
ADL
firmly believes that the AEDPA is an important tool for combating terrorism,
and that it is consistent with the First Amendment, and we urge this court to
so hold.
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
Amicus
Curiae adopts the Statement of the Case set forth in the brief of
defendants-appellees.
SUMMARY
OF THE ARGUMENT
As
most Americans are well aware, Congress' concern with the menace of
international terrorism is neither theoretical nor academic. Ever more
frequently we read and hear of Americans and others brutally murdered by
foreign terrorists -- including not only the terrorist organizations to whom
plaintiffs-appellants herein wish to provide support, but others such as Hamas,
the middle-eastern terrorist regime whose suicide bombers indiscriminately
target innocent citizens on public streets. Congress has made a finding that
material support from U.S. donors facilitates and promotes terrorism, and it
does so whether or not that support is ostensibly directed to the
"humanitarian" elements of these foreign terrorist organizations.
*7
There is ample evidence demonstrating the urgency of this problem and the
wisdom of Congress' solution of prohibiting persons subject to U.S.
jurisdiction from sending money and other material support to terrorists. In
Part I of this brief we summarize information about the extensive social
service infrastructure maintained by Hamas, a designated foreign terrorist
organization, and the way in which the terrorist operations of Hamas and
similar organizations are supported and enhanced by such programs. While we
recognize that plaintiffs-appellants' challenge to the AEDPA arises from their
interest in the LTTE and the PKK, and not Hamas, if their challenge to the
AEDPA's constitutionality were to succeed, Hamas is among those organizations
that would benefit. Accordingly, ADL believes that information concerning this
particular designated foreign terrorist organization will be of use to the
court.
In
Part II.A, we argue that even if the conduct outlawed by the AEDPA would, in
some other contexts, implicate First Amendment values, the knowing provision of
material support to foreign terrorist organizations is not "protected
speech." Rather, because of the violence and harm that is inextricably
linked to such "speech," it is outside the realm of the First
Amendment.
*8
Even if the law recognizes some level of First Amendment protection for
knowingly providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations,
however, we argue in Part II.B that the district court did not err in ruling
that the O'Brien test applied. As the district court recognized, the AEDPA is a
content-neutral restriction on what is, at most, a combination of
"speech" and "nonspeech." Applying the O'Brien analysis,
the AEDPA's restrictions easily pass constitutional muster, because the
government's interest in limiting fundraising for terrorists is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression, and its restrictions are no greater than
necessary in light of the important interests Congress seeks to address.
Finally,
we argue in Part II.C that because the national security interests underpinning
the AEDPA are compelling, and because no more narrowly drawn statute would
address Congress' finding that any funding to terrorists amounts to funding of
terrorism, the AEDPA even passes a "strict scrutiny" analysis.
The
court's consideration of the constitutionality of the AEDPA's material support
provision should be animated both by an appreciation of the degree of evil
Congress is seeking to address, and a recognition that Congress' findings and
enactments in the area of national security and foreign relations are *9
entitled to substantial deference. While ADL cherishes the freedom of speech
and association protected by our First Amendment, we respectfully urge this
court to find that those values are not offended by the AEDPA's prohibition on
knowingly providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations.
*10
ARGUMENT
I.
"HUMANITARIAN" AND "SOCIAL SERVICE" COMPONENTS OF FOREIGN
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ARE INSEPARABLY LINKED TO THEIR ABILITY TO ENGAGE IN
TERRORIST ACTS.
Like
guns, bombs, and rockets, money can be a lethal weapon. Terrorists depend on
private donations, using them to purchase weapons and fund violent attacks
against innocent persons throughout the world. Even when money is donated
allegedly for "humanitarian" purposes, it remains a dangerous
commodity. Money is fungible. When individuals funnel money or other material
support to terrorist groups ostensibly for nonviolent purposes, it serves to
free up other money that can then be used to purchase weapons or in other ways
to facilitate terrorism. Or, money that is donated, allegedly for humanitarian
or educational programs, may well be diverted to directly support terrorist
training and violent acts. Moreover, social service programs or schools
operated by foreign terrorist organizations and funded by
"humanitarian" aid often operate as part of a culture of hate and
violence. Such programs can and do nurture potential terrorists, setting and
keeping them on the path to violence, destruction and murder.
*11
In enacting the AEDPA, Congress understood the necessity for an absolute ban on
providing support for designated foreign terrorist organizations which would be
as comprehensive as possible. Congress recognized that the social service
networks of foreign terrorist organizations are inextricably connected to the
terrorist programs of these organizations. Therefore, they reasoned, it is not
sufficient to stop the flow of money explicitly intended by the donor for
purchasing arms and funding violence. All aid to terrorists must be banned.
As
explained in the government's brief and in its papers presented to the district
court below, including the Declaration of Kenneth R. McKune, [FN6] the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE") and the Kurdistan Workers'
Party ("PKK") are foreign terrorist organizations which precisely fit
this mold.
FN6. Declaration of Kenneth
R. McKune ("McKune Dec."), Associate Coordinator for
Counterterr??rism, U.S. Department of State, dated Apr. 21, 1998, contained in
the government's Supplementary Excerpts of Record ("SER") at 4-15.
Another
group classified by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization
pursuant to the AEDPA, see 62 Fed. Reg. 52650 (1997), is Hamas. We focus herein
on this organization because ADL believes that its seamless *12 linking of
overt terrorism with social programs, and the resulting necessity to completely
eliminate U.S. material support, is illustrative of the activities of foreign
terrorist organizations and their supporters which Congress is trying to
combat.
Hamas,
or "Islamic Resistance Movement," is a terrorist organization which
"seeks the establishment of a Palestinian identity and homeland." In
re Extradition of Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook, 924 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). It does so through "education, health care, and other social
services," but also engages in monstrous acts of terrorism, including
"indiscriminate bombing of buses laden with civilians and other such types
of attacks targeted at civilians." Id. at 568, 577. For example, in
October, 1994, an alleged Hamas agent detonated a bomb attached to his body on
a Tel Aviv bus, killing twenty-two civilians and injuring forty-six others. Id.
at 584. A few days earlier, also in October, 1994, two Hamas terrorists fired
automatic weapons into a crowded downtown pedestrian mall in Jerusalem, killing
two people and injuring eighteen others. Id. at 584.
As
we show below, the structure and operation of organizations such as Hamas
demonstrate that the decision by Congress to ban all fundraising for *13
foreign terrorists is well justified. First (as do the LTTE and the PKK), Hamas
offers a variety of health and welfare services in order to enhance its
credibility and political strength within its constituency, and thereby enhance
its ability to conduct terrorist operations. In the case of Hamas, such
services include clinics, kindergartens, summer camps and sports clubs. See
Khaled Abu Toameh, "From Cradle to Grave," The Jerusalem Report,
Sept. 4, 1997, at 34, 35. In return for its services, it asks for community
members' support; such support, for example, could include harboring a suicide
bomber shortly before his deadly mission.
Second,
it is impossible to verify the final destination or ultimate use of a
"charitable" contribution within the budget of a terrorist
organization. Even if a donor's purported intent is to purchase blankets, not
bombs, there is no guarantee that the money or support will be used that way.
"Once the charity money hits its foreign destination, it is very difficult
to determine where it really goes," according to Oliver B. Revell, a Texas
security consultant who previously served as the Deputy Director of the FBI.
James Brooke & Elaine Sciolinio, "U.S. Muslims Say their Aid Pays for
Charity, Not Terror," N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1995, at A1.
*14
Hamas raises $30 to $60 million annually, including money collected in the
United States. See Nicholas Goldberg, "The Enigmatic Face of Hamas, N.Y.
Newsday, Oct. 14, 1997, at A3. Under the leadership of Mousa Abu Marzook, the
chief of Hamas' political bureau, who lived and was educated in the United
States, hundreds of thousands of dollars have been moved from the United States
to the Middle East. Marzook claimed that the money he solicited was used solely
for kindergartens, mosque kitchens, schools, hospitals, orphanages, and
clinics. See Jan Hoffman, "Palestinian Held by the U.S. Now Faces Legal
Limbo," N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1997, at A1; Brooke, supra. The Israelis,
however, "have said some of the money collected for [these] charitable
organizations filters to Hamas's military activities." Hoffman, supra.
Third,
social services programs themselves can lead to other dangerous involvements;
they may instill in individuals a desire and a willingness to commit hor??ific
acts. It is well known that Hamas "has steadfastly rejected the peace
process" between the Israelis and the Palestinians. William Drozdiak,
"Social Programs in Gaza Win Support for Hamas," Washington Post,
Aug. 18, 1997, at A14. Accordingly, its leaders use its "humanitarian"
facilities as *15 forums for spewing anti-Israel propaganda and mobilizing
support for violence against Israelis and others. [FN7] One writer explains:
FN7. The New York Times
writes, "Hamas also used schools, mosques, jails and funerals to spread
the gospel about their jihad, or holy war, and to recruit young suicide bombers
with the lure of martyrdom." Brooke, supra. The rhetoric of Hamas
continues to be violent. For instance, in July 1998, Hamas leader Sheik Ahmad
Yasin, addressing a rally, declared that "struggle in all its forms and
resistance to the occupation should be escalated." Special Dispatch No. 2
(Middle East Media Research Institute, Washington, D.C.), Jul. 20, 1998.
"These
[social-service] centers also serve other functions. In 1995, for example,
Israeli security forces raided the Science and Technology College in Abu Dis,
east of Jerusalem, and found piles of instruction manuals on the use of arms,
including instructions on the assembly of homemade bombs. There were also
booklets of advice on standing up to Israeli interrogations."
Toameh
at 35.
The
religious, educational, and social welfare aspects of these groups certainly
can help create an environment that nurtures volunteer suicide bombers. Even a
Hamas kindergarten in Gaza promotes murder: A sign posted on the wall declares
that "Jihad [holy war] is Our Way." Goldberg, supra. Nearby, there is
also a colored piece of paper with the pictures of the four- and five-year-olds
posted under the words "[d]ying for the Sake of God is Our Highest
Goal." Id.
*16
One man told a journalist interviewing Palestinians in Gaza that "Hamas
uses the terrible social conditions here better than any other political group
to recruit the young [for terrorism] .... How can you tell a young boy not to
go to mosque?" Judith Colp Rubin, "Unmasking Hamas," Jewish
Week, Oct. 28, 1994, at 1. Visiting the Palestine Mosque, the largest
Hamas-controlled mosque in Gaza, at Friday prayers, the journalist notes:
"[T]housands
of people spill out onto the sand-filled roads listening to a fiery sermon
urging a continuation of the Intifada against Israel. A group of about 40 boys
-- barefoot and wearing tattered clothes -- stands outside. One shows a
photograph of a Palestinian warrior carrying two large guns .... After
services, the children hear lectures about the history of the glorious Islamic
empire that would once again reign and see films of the heroes battling Israel.
They learn that according to Islam, those who die as martyrs are guaranteed
entry to heaven."
Id.
After
using the schools, mosques, and clubs to recruit individuals to serve as
suicide bombers, Hamas supports their families once the attack has been carried
out. For instance, "the family of every one of the Hamas ... warriors ...
killed in an action against Israel gets a lump sum payment of 1,000 Jordanian
dinars (about $1,500)." Id. Lifetime annuities are established for the
families of terrorist bombers. These annuities to the families of suicide
bombers have been *17 described as "one of the most important uses of
charitable donations to Hamas." See John Kifner, "Alms and Arms:
Tactics in a Holy War," N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1996, at A1.
That
Hamas raises funds in the United States is beyond question. The extent of its
substantial links to the United States became readily apparent in December
1992, when the Israeli authorities arrested Dr. Mahmud ar-Rumayhi, the local
liaison for two Palestinian-Americans living in the Chicago area. On January
25, 1993, the Israelis then arrested these two operatives, Muhammad Abd
al-Hamid Salah and Muhammad Hilmi Jarad, on charges of distributing more than a
half-million dollars to local Hamas activists. A witness to Mr. Salah's
confession recounted:
"Salah
had also given the Gaza commander money during his most recent trip, he told
the Israelis -- about $100,000 -- and the money was used for ... M-16s,
Kalashnikovs, Uzi submachine guns, and pistols on the Israeli black market.
Some of the money was also earmarked for securing at least twenty underground
shelters for hiding fugitives and for purchasing equipment to forge student
identity cards so that Hamas could smuggle wanted men out of Gaza into
neighboring Egypt."
Judith
Miller, God Has Ninety-Nine Names, at 383 (1996).
The
amount of money raised in the United States, as well as the nature and scope of
Hamas' activity on our shores, however, cannot be reliably *18 documented.
"Hamas keeps its expenditures and its sources of income secret, but it is
known that much of the money is brought in, in cash, by couriers from
abroad." Toameh at 35. In 1994, Israel arrested several Palestinians emigrants
with U.S. citizenship "who had smuggled in hundreds of thousands of
dollars in cash they'd collected for Hamas." Id. [FN8]
FN8. Activists in the
United States not only help fund terrorist actions, in some cases they directly
supply terrorists with the tools they needs to enhance their ability to engage
in terrorism. For example, on July 23,
1998, Fawzi Mustapha Assi,
a resident of Dearborn, Michigan was charged with unlawfully providing support
to a foreign terrorist organization under the AEDPA. Assi allegedly attempted
to deliver seven night vision goggles, a??thermal imaging camera, and two
global positioning modules to a representative of the terrorist Hizballah
organization in Lebanon. See David Josar, "Engineer Denies Links to Hezbollah,"
Detroit News, Jul. 28, 1998. (Hizballah is a "designated foreign terrorist
organization" pursuant to 62 Fed. Reg. 52650 (1977)) If
plaintiffs-appellants' position in the present case is correct, then Assi's
actions would be constitutionally protected by the First Amendment from
prosecution under the AEDPA, so long as it cannot be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that his intentions were evil rather than just mercenary.
As
has been demonstrated above, it is impossible to distinguish between the
"humanitarian" and military activities of foreign terrorist groups
such as Hamas. The AEDPA's material support restrictions represents a
significant step forward in addressing the "stealth" funding of
terrorism by halting the flow of money and other support to terrorists and
their organizations. Summing up the problem, a noted terrorism analyst has
explained: "Hamas activists continue to *19 feign innocence in regard to
their activity in the U.S. They refuse to admit that their activity is a
combination of political and cultural activity, which creates not only a social
infrastructure but a framework for terrorism as well." Reuven Paz,
"Hamas Responds to the American Counter-Terrorist Laws" (visited
Sept. 11, 1998) <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/Hamas-art3.htm>.
II.
SECTION 303 OF THE AEDPA DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
A.
The Constitution of the United States does not protect as "speech"
the conduct which is criminalized by the AEDPA.
Freedom
of speech is the touchstone of individual liberty - and yet, if the First
Amendment is to allow our nation to function as a free democratic society, it
cannot be used to invalidate laws proscribing violent conduct even if such
violent conduct is arguably based upon philosophical, religious or political
beliefs. Simply put, "political speech" inextricably intertwined with
violence is not constitutionally protected. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982).
Without
this necessary limitation on the protection afforded by the First Amendment our
government would be powerless to outlaw a parade of horrendous acts simply
because the perpetrators of those acts argue that they *20 incorporate some
form of expression. Hate crimes, abortion clinic bombings, and paramilitary
training camps, [FN9] for example, would be legalized in the name of free
speech. Our society will not and need not tolerate this.
FN9. See, e.g., Wisconsin
v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (upholding hate crimes legislation); United
States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.) (suggesting that it may be
constitutional to punish more severely crimes against employees of abortion
clinics than against employees of pregnancy clinics because generally there is
more violence perpetrated against abortion clinics), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 507
(1996).
In
light of this legitimate and inherent limitation on the scope of First
Amendment protection, plaintiff-appellants are wrong in their assertion that
the AEDPA is an unconstitutional infringement on the right of free speech or
association. The knowing contribution of material support to foreign terrorist
organizations is inextricably intertwined with violence. As Congress has
acknowledged in enacting the AEDPA, "foreign organizations that engage in
terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any
contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct." AEDPA,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, ¤ 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214-1319 (1996) (findings
reprinted at 18 U.S.C.A. ¤ 2339B note) (emphasis added). Given this finding,
the AEDPA must be upheld. "Clearly nothing in the Constitution provides
the right to engage in violence against fellow citizens or foreign nations.
Aiding and financing *21 foreign terrorist bombings is not constitutionally
protected activity." 142 Cong. Rec. S3360 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Hatch on consideration of AEDPA Conference Report).
Even
if knowingly providing material support to terrorist organizations is
characterized as "speech," it must be relegated to that narrow
category of speech that finds no protection under the First Amendment. Any
slight redeeming First Amendment values that the knowing contribution of
material support may implicate due to plaintiffs-appellants' alleged intentions
to further only "humanitarian" goals of terrorist organizations is
clearly outweighed by the serious and deadly problems visited upon the United
States' interests by international terrorism. Indeed, this court has recognized
that certain kinds of "speech" may "'adversely affect foreign
policy interests to such a degree that the speech is completely unprotected [by
the First Amendment]."' Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 512
(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting with approval from the District Court's decision in
Bullfrog, and citing *22Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)). "[T]he
clearest example of the kind of compelling government interest that would lead
to such a result is where the speech poses a clear and direct threat to
national security." Id. (emphasis added). See also Vietnamese Fishermen's
Assoc. v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198, 208 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(where the court found that the threat of violence defendants communicated
through their paramilitary operations constituted an "irrefutable and
dangerous 'communication' that ... resemble[d] the use of 'fighting words,' and
therefore [was] not protected by the First Amendment").
Plaintiffs-Appellants
contend that the AEDPA violates the First Amendment because it makes a crime of
conduct squarely held to be a protected associational activity, namely
providing money and/or other "physical assets" to political
organizations. (Pl.-App. Br. at 18-20 n.5). While it is true that the Supreme
Court has held in the context of U.S. federal elections that contributions to
candidates for political office are a protected form of association, Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17, 24-25 (1976), it is simplistic and dangerous to
believe that the knowing contribution of money and other physical assets which
facilitate the criminal conduct of foreign terrorist organizations are
therefore a likewise form of protected association.
*23
"The right to free association ... is not an absolute .... The [United
States Supreme] Court has long been willing to uphold limitations on free
association conducted for an illegitimate purpose." Palestine Information
Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973)). "The First Amendment's protection of
the right of association does not carry with it the 'right' to finance
terrorist, criminal activities." H.R. Rep. No. 383, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 144 (1995).
The
very real connection the contributions of money and other support at issue have
to the violent and criminal acts of the organizations which receive them makes
these contributions easily distinguishable from the monetary contributions that
have been recognized as a protected form of association. Any contribution to a
terrorist organization, whether designated for an ostensibly humanitarian goal
or not, is a contribution that furthers illegal and violent activity. [FN10] As
such, these contributions cannot be equated to the constitutionally protected
contributions to political candidates at issue in Buckley. Just as *24
"demonstrations [which] turn violent [must] lose their protected quality
as expression under the First Amendment," Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 116 (1972), so too must these contributions bear the label of
"unprotected" due to their inextricable connection to the violence
committed by their recipients. "Violence or other types of potentially expressive
activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact
... are entitled to no constitutional protection." Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 628 (1984)) (emphasis added).
FN10. See Congressional
findings, AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, ¤301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214-1319 (1996)
(reprinted at 18 U.S.C.A. ¤2339B note). As explained in the Government's brief,
these findings are entitled to substantial deference by this court. Moreover,
ADL is independently aware that foreign terrorist organizations' "social
service" functions are
part and parcel of their
overall terroristic program. See supra Part I.
Plaintiffs-Appellants
describe the conduct in which they wish to engage as simply "collective
expression." (Pl.-App. Br. at 20 n.6). But it is more than
"collective expression" -- it is collective expression that carries
violent physical consequences. Treating this form of "collective
expression" as protected is akin to affording political assassination
protection under the First Amendment because the assassin acts with the intent
to make a political statement. Indeed, *25 to allow plaintiffs-appellants to
knowingly make contributions to terrorist organizations is indistinguishable
from allowing them to knowingly provide the bullets for the assassin's gun.
This form of expression "'do[es] not enjoy the protecting cover of speech
in the constitutional sense,"' United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370,
1375 (7th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1250 (7th Cir.
1993)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 507 (1996).
B.
In the alternative, analyzed under the O'Brien standard, the AEDPA's
prohibition against providing material support to foreign terrorist
organizations is constitutionally acceptable.
Even
if this court finds that the prohibitions of Section 303 of the AEDPA limit
"expressive conduct" which is entitled to a degree of Constitutional
protection, it should hold, as did the district court below, that this statute
is subject only to the intermediate O'Brien standard, which it easily
satisfies. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). [FN11]
FN11. Congress, too, is
apparently of the view that the AEDPA's funding restriction is subject to, and
satisfies, the O'Brien standard. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 383, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 146-47 (1996) (report of the House Judiciary Committee, noting that
O'Brien is the "test to be utilized").
In
O'Brien, the Court reiterated that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements
are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important *26
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376. As was
the case with the law under consideration in O'Brien, which prohibited the
knowing destruction of draft registration cards, the AEDPA "plainly does
not abridge free speech on its face." Id. at 375. Rather, as Congress
explained, "[t]he prohibition is on the act of donation." H.R. Rep. No.
383, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 144 (1995). Contrary to the insistence of
plaintiffs-appellants, the Supreme Court has never established a blanket rule
that providing material support to any putatively "political" foreign
organization is "pure speech." Even in the factually distinguishable
case upon which plaintiffs-appellants most rely, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976), [FN12] the Court upheld substantial regulation of political *27
donations in Federal election campaigns. See id. at 20-38. Moreover, the
Buckley Court recognized that "[s]ome forms of communications made
possible by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve
conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the two." Id. at 16.
The AEDPA is content-neutral, and thus not subject to strict scrutiny, because
it does not "single [] out certain speech for differential treatment based
on the ideas expressed." Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 636
(9th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, O'Brien applies.
FN12. Plaintiffs-Appellants'
insistence that this statute is simply a variant of that considered in Buckley
is "imaginative but misguided." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 800 n.7. In??er alia, to accept their proffered analogy, this court would
have to agree that donations of money to candidates for U.S. national political
office are not distinguishable from donations of "currency or other
financial securities ... lodging ... safehouses ... false documentation or
identification, communication equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives ... transportation and other physical assets" to
foreign terrorist organizations. 18 U.S.C.A. ¤ 2339B(g)(4) (referring
to definition at 18
U.S.C.A. ¤ 2339A(b)). Plaintiffs-Appellants themselves argue that there is no
constitutionally cognizable distinction between providing money to terrorists
and providing weapons to terrorists, so long as the donator has good
intentions. (Pl.-App. Br. at 20 n.5). Nothing in Buckley requires this court to
consider as sacrosanct such transactions. See Farrakhan v. Reagan, 669 F. Supp.
506, 511 (D.D.C. 1987) (prohibition against financial transactions with Libya
content neutral, applying O'Brien test and rejecting religious' organization's
claim of right to associate with Libya), aff'd, 851 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
The
O'Brien test is well known, and requires a showing that:
(1)
the regulation is within the power of the government;
(2)
the regulation furthers an important or substantial government interest;
(3)
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and
(4)
the incidental restriction on the alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to further the important interest.
*28
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. As the district court already found, the AEDPA's
Section 303 clearly meets this standard. We address below each prong of the
O'Brien test.
(1)
There can be no serious doubt that the AEDPA is within the power of the
government. The sine qua non of legislative and executive power is in the area
of national security and foreign relations. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, ¤ 8,
cl. 3, 11, 18?? art II, ¤ 2, cl. 2; Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981);
Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
[FN13]
FN13. Congress found, inter
alia, that "international terrorism affects the interstate and foreign
commerce of the United States." AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, ¤ 301(a)(4),
110 Stat. 1214-1319 (1996) (findings reprinted at 18 U.S.C.A. ¤ 2339B note).
(2)
Similarly, the government's interest in addressing the threats posed by
international terrorism, including through prohibiting fundraising in the
United States, is certainly "important" or "substantial."
The AEDPA itself includes findings that "international terrorism is a
serious and deadly problem that threatens the vital interests of the United
States." AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, ¤ 301(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1214-1319
(1996) (findings reprinted at 18 U.S.C.A. ¤ 2339B note). Congress also made a
specific finding that "foreign *29 organizations that engage in terrorist
activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such
an organization facilities that conduct." Id. As a matter of law, the
government's interest in "national security" is a
"compelling" one. See, e.g., Haig, 453 U.S. at 307 ("no
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the
nation"). [FN14] The court is also respectfully referred to Part I of this
brief, supra. [FN15]
FN14. There is, of course,
no meaningful distinction to be drawn in this context between "national
security" and "foreign relations." See Haig, 453 U.S. at 307
("foreign policy and national security considerations cannot be neatly
compartmentalized"); Id. at 308 (recognizing a compelling interest in
"American foreign relations and foreign policy"). The court should
give no moment to plaintiffs-appellants' strained argument that the government
has an insufficient interest here in "mere" foreign relations.
(Pl.-App. Br. at. 35).
FN15. See also McKune Dec. ¦
8 at SER 10 ("Given the purposes, organizational structure, and
clandestine nature of foreign terrorist organizations, it is highly likely that
any material support to these organizations will ultimately inure to the
benefit of their criminal terrorist functions -- regardless of whether such
support was ostensibly intended to support nonviolent, non-terrorist
activities.").
(3)
Moreover, the government's interest in addressing the threats posed by foreign
terrorist organizations is wholly unrelated to suppression of free expression.
As addressed in Part II.A., supra, Section 303 regulates conduct -- the act of
knowingly providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations. While
plaintiff-appellants argue that the government has *30 "targeted"
certain groups, the fact is that the government is acting, in a viewpoint
neutral way, to prevent such groups from "targeting" Americans and
American interests. The standards by which foreign terrorist organizations are
designated, AEDPA ¤ 302, and the applicability of the material support
provision, AEDPA ¤ 303, are based only upon conduct. They apply uniformly to
any person who would knowingly provide material support to a foreign terrorist
organization. "Congress is not ... selectively choosing which citizens can
contribute funds and which cannot.... The ban is designed to protect our
nation's security, and applies uniformly and equally to all persons within the
United States, regardless of political, philosophical, or religious
affiliation." H.R. Rep. No. 383, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 146 (1995).
Courts
have endorsed this rationale in the context of foreign relations many times.
See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (incidental burden on
associational rights with Cubans under travel ban justified by foreign policy
concerns); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (same); Freedom to Travel Campaign
v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229
(D.C. Cir 1991) (same); Veterans & Reservists for Peace in Vietnam v.
Regional Comm'r of Customs, 459 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.) (incidental *31 infringement
on free speech of regulation licensing import of North Vietnamese literature
upheld in light of compelling interest in depriving China and North Vietnam of
economic benefit), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 933 (1972); Teague v. Regional Comm'r
of Customs, 404 F.2d 441, 445 (2d Cir. 1968) (same), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 930
(1969). [FN16]
FN16. Although this court
has noted that "there is no 'sliding scale' of First Amendment protection
under which the degree of scrutiny fluctuates in accordance with the degree to
which the regulation touches on foreign affairs," Bullfrog Films. Inc.,
847 F.2d at 512, many courts, including this one in the Bullfrog case, have
recognized that in the context of its legitimate national security and foreign
relations role, the necessity for the government to justify its incidental
infringement of constitutional rights is somewhat attenuated. See. e.g., Haig,
453 U.S. at 308 ("Assuming, arguendo, that First Amendment protections
reach beyond ou?? national boundaries ...."); Bullfrog, 847 F.2d at 509
n.9 (recognizing that the First Amendment may not "protect[] communications
with foreign audiences to the same extent as communications within our
borders");
Freedom to Travel Campaign,
82 F.3d at 1438-39 (freedom to travel internationally, a liberty interest,
"is not accorded the same stature as the freedom to travel among the
states"); Palestine Information Office, 853 F.2d at 941 (recognizing
"broad governmental discretion" in claims that "touch upon a
right to associate with foreign entities").
(4)
Finally, the AEDPA's material support restrictions are no greater than
necessary in light of the important interests at which they are directed. It is
settled law that this prong of the O'Brien test does not require the government
to use the "least restrictive or intrusive means" of regulation,
"so long as the [the important interest] ... would be achieved less
effectively absent the *32 regulation." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989). [FN17] Here, however, it is hard to imagine how the
material support provision could be any more narrowly crafted. [FN18]
FN17. An alternative
formulation to the O'Brien standard is that applicable to "time, place and
manner" restrictions. See, e.g., Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 798
(noting that "the O'Brien test 'in the last analysis is little, if any,
different from the standard applied to time, place or manner
restrictions"' (citation omitted)).
FN18. On this point, see
also discussion in Part II.C., infra.
Congress
found that foreign terrorist organizations "are so tainted by their
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that
conduct." AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, ¤ 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214-1319
(1996) (findings reprinted at 18 U.S.C.A. ¤ 2339B note). See also H.R. Rep. No.
383, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 147 (1995) ("[t]here is no other
mechanism, other than an outright prohibition on contributions, to effectively
prevent such organizations from using funds raised in the United States to
further their terrorist activities abroad"); 142 Cong. Rec. S3359-60
(daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch on consideration of AEDPA
Conference Report) ("This provision is aimed at cutting off the dollars
and, thus, the lifeblood of foreign terrorist organizations that are wreaking
havoc and destroying lives all *33 over the world."). It is readily
apparent that Congress did not consider that a partial or lesser solution was
appropriate. This court should respect that finding. See Department of the Navy
v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (in context of national security, court is
not qualified to "determine what constitutes an acceptable margin of error
in assessing the potential risk" the government is seeking to regulate).
C.
Even if the material support for foreign terrorist organizations prohibited by
the AEDPA is considered to be "pure speech," it satisfies
"strict scrutiny" analysis.
As
the district court correctly found, even if a strict scrutiny analysis is
applied to the AEDPA's prohibition on knowing contributions to foreign
terrorist organizations, the AEDPA still passes constitutional muster.
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, No. CV 98-1971, 1998 WL 385955, at *29 n. 20
(C.D. Cal. Jun. 8, 1998).
A
statute survives strict scrutiny if the governmental interest served by the
statute is "compelling" and if the statute is narrowly drawn to
achieve the ends for which it was drafted. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). As discussed in Part II. B., supra, it
is clear that the governmental interest served by the AEDPA is a compelling
one. Indeed, *34 "no governmental interest is more compelling than the
security of the nation." Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). Despite
plaintiffs-appellants' arguments to the contrary (which are treated in turn
below), it is equally clear that the AEDPA is crafted as narrowly as possible
to serve the governmental interests at stake.
1.
Contributions to foreign terrorist organizations are inextricably intertwined
with violence, thus making it impossible to enact a more narrowly tailored
prohibition on material support.
As
explained previously, it is impossible to ensure that support ostensibly
directed to the allegedly humanitarian elements of foreign terrorist
organizations will not be directed to the illegal and violent elements of the
organizations. Hence, nothing less than the complete prohibition authorized by
Congress in the AEDPA will serve the nation's interest in fighting
international terrorism.
Plaintiffs-Appellants
blindly reject this fact and Congress' related finding. But the reality is that
in the context of foreign terrorist organizations money is fungible -- even
support of a foreign terrorist group's "lawful" activities ultimately
only serves to free up resources that can be used to support illegal
activities. (Pl-App. Br. at 35). Plaintiffs-Appellants counter the "money
*35 is fungible" position by arguing that if the government is allowed to
prevail on this basis, it will result in the corollary that "all support
of a group frees up resources that could be used for illegal activities and therefore
all associational support to any group that engages in illegal activities could
be criminalized." (Pl-App. Br. at 36) (emphasis added). This assertion is
little more than dramatic hyperbole.
It
need not be decided whether the government's "freeing up" argument is
legitimate in relation to any groups other than foreign terrorist
organizations. While one might find a more narrowly tailored alternative to the
blanket prohibition of material support effective in regulating the aiding and
financing of certain groups' domestic criminal activity, there simply is no
such alternative that would prove effective in the context of foreign terrorist
organizations. [FN19]
FN19.
Plaintiffs-Appellants' argument suggests that this court must analyze the AEDPA
in the same manner as it would a challenge to a law alleged to infringe upon
one's right to associate with a domestic organization. This is wrong. In
Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1988) the
D.C. Court of Appeals refused to accept plaintiffs' reliance upon caselaw
arising in the domestic context as determinative on the issue of whether
American citizens and resident aliens had a First Amendment right to operate a
foreign entity's mission in the United States: "No court has ever found in
the right to freedom of association a right to represent a foreign entity on
American soil. The cases cited by appellants for this proposition are
inapposite because, arising in the domestic context, they do not speak to the
crucial issue of representation of foreign entities." (emphasis added).
See also supra note 16.
*36
In connection with the designated foreign terrorist organizations at issue in
the present case, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism [FN20] has
determined, inter alia, that:
FN20. This office was
established within the Office of the Secretary of State in 1985 and is
responsible for coordinating oversees counterterrorism policy and responding to
international terrorist incidents. The office receives reporting and analysis
from U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and from various foreign
sources and embassies. McKune Dec. at ¦ 2 at SER 4-5.
"Funds
raised ostensibly for charitable purposes have in the past been redirected by
some terrorist groups to fund the purchase of arms and explosives.... Sri
Lankan officials have publicly stated that funds raised by the LTTE in London
have been used to acquire weapons and explosives. Leaders of LTTE fundraising
efforts have publicly admitted that they are not so 'na•ve' as to assume that
funds collected by the LTTE will be used only for 'humanitarian' purposes
advertised by the LTTE."
McKune
Dec. at ¦ 10 at SER 11. In relation to other designated terrorist
organizations, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism has unearthed
similar evidence that has led to the following conclusion:
"[F]unds
raised [by these terrorist organizations] for purportedly legitimate purposes
are used to support the establishment of logistical infrastructure
(communications, housing and the like) and intelligence networks that are
shared both by those group members involved in civilian activities and those
involved in terrorist activities."
*37
Id. These findings prove that the government is justified in its determination
that the very nature of foreign terrorist organizations dictates that the
absolute prohibition of material support is the most narrowly tailored manner
to protect our national security interests from the threat of international
terrorism. This Court may accept that rationale without simultaneously
endorsing governmental authority to enact like measures with respect to
organizations other than foreign terrorist organizations.
Plaintiffs-Appellants' "slippery-slope" argument is a red-herring.
[FN21]
FN21. Plaintiffs-Appellants
also suggest that 18 U.S.C.A. ¤ 2339A(a), which "criminalizes aid to a
long list of specific terrorist acts" is proof that "the government
has more narrowly tailored ways to respond to support for terrorism."
(Pl.-App. at 35 n.13). This argument is misplaced. Accepting, arguendo,
plaintiffs-appellants' assertion that ¤ 2339B is broader than ¤ 2339A, the
decision to enact ¤ 2339B (a statute criminalizing knowingly providing material
support to designated foreign terrorist organizations) two years after it had
enacted ¤ 2339A (a statute criminalizing the provision of material support with
the intent of violating certain other provisions of the United States Code) may
evidence nothing more than Congress' recognition that its earlier law standing
alone
was insufficient to protect
our country from terrorism. Moreover, it is questionable whether ¤ 2339B is
truly broader than ¤ 2339A, since it only prohibits material support to those
terrorist organizations that have been designated by the Secretary, as opposed
to ¤ 2339A, which is not restricted to designated terrorist organizations.
The
position that the AEDPA is as narrowly drafted as circumstances will allow is
supported by the decision of the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia in *38Farrakhan v. Reagan, 669 F. Supp. 506 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
aff'd, 851 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In Farrakhan, Muhammad Mosque, Inc. and
Louis Farrakhan challenged the constitutionality of President Reagan's decision
to impose wide-ranging economic sanctions against Libya for its connection to
terrorist bombings at airports in Rome and Vienna. The sanctions virtually
cut-off all economic relationships between the United States and Libya and
prohibited all transactions relating to travel to or within Libya. Id. at 508.
Farrakhan, who traveled to Libya subsequent to the imposition of the sanctions,
and Muhammad Mosque, which had received a $5 million loan from an agency of the
Libyan government that it could not repay without violating the sanctions,
argued that the sanctions interfered with their First Amendment rights.
The
court upheld the Libyan sanctions as constitutional and explained that these
were the least restrictive means for serving the government's "compelling
interest in national security and the end of Libya's alleged participation in
'state sponsored' terrorism." Farrakhan, 669 F. Supp. at 510. The Court
stated:
"To
find the First Amendment free speech guarantees mandated that Muhammad Mosque
be allowed to send money to Libya would be to open the door for any group or
individual to send money anywhere as an act of symbolic speech. In the face of
*39 the national security interest lying behind the sanction regulations, we
conclude that there is no alternative that would allow organizations to speak
through contributions while still allowing the government to effectuate its
legitimate and compelling interests in national security."
Farrakhan,
669 F. Supp. at 512 (emphasis added). The district court also noted that the
fact that Muhammad Mosque claimed that the monies it proposed to send to Libya
were the legitimate repayment of debt mandated by the Mosque's religious
dictates did not render the enforcement of the sanctions as applied to Muhammad
Mosque unconstitutional:
"[W]e
cannot ascertain what will happen to the money once it reaches Libya.
Conceivably, the money could be used for purely innocuous purposes, or it could
be used directly or indirectly, to subsidize the types of anti-United States
activity that the sanction regulations aim to prevent.... Even if both Muhammad
Mosque and the Islamic Call Society were to represent to this court that the
loan repayments or contributions would not flow to purposes inimical to United
States security interests, we would have no assurance that, once the money
entered Libyan jurisdiction, it would not be seized, appropriated, taxed, or
otherwise diverted to other purposes.... [There are] no assurances that
Muhammad Mosque's money will not, in fact, inure to purposes injurious to this
country.... [W]e cannot say that Muhammad Mosque's [First Amendment] interest
[s] ... outweigh[] the legitimate and compelling security interest of the
United States."
Farrakhan,
669 F. Supp. at 511-512.
*40
The Farrakhan Court found the blanket prohibition authorized by the sanctions
to be narrowly tailored because it was impossible to ensure that the monies
Muhammad Mosque desired to send to Libya would not ultimately further terrorist
goals. In this respect, the instant case is no different. It simply cannot be
guaranteed that the money and physical assets plaintiffs-appellants desire to
provide designated foreign terrorists will only be used to further humanitarian
goals as opposed to illegal and violent terrorist activities. Indeed, the only
evidence before this court is to the contrary. Hence, as was the case in
Farrakhan, the decision of our government in relation to foreign policy enacted
in the interest of national security must be granted deference and must be
upheld. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. at 242 (1984) ("classical deference to
the political branches in matters of foreign policy" is owed); Haig, 453
U.S. at 292 ("Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national
security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.").
2.
The "medicine and religious articles" exception is not a
"telltale" sign that the AEDPA is not narrowly drafted.
Plaintiffs-Appellants
contend that the AEDPA's exception for "medicine and religious
articles" fatally undermines the government's position that it is
necessary to bar all material support to designated foreign terrorist *41
organizations. (Pl.-App. Br. at 36). Again, they are wrong. If anything, the
fact that the government exempted these items suggests that Congress set out to
craft as narrow a statute as possible. In any event, plaintiffs-appellants'
argument is disingenuous -- no doubt their opposition to the AEDPA would be no
less vociferous if these articles had not been exempted. Moreover, these
exemptions may provide plaintiffs-appellants with the opportunity to make some
type of humanitarian contribution, which is what they contend is their goal.
3.
Plaintiffs-Appellants' reliance on the ADC cases is misplaced.
Plaintiffs-Appellants
also argue that the AEDPA cannot pass strict scrutiny analysis because it lacks
a "specific intent" requirement. To support this argument, they rely
on American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir.
1995) ("ADC I") and American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno,
119 F.3d 1367 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 2059 (1998) ("ADC
II"). These cases are inapposite to the issue now before the court. They
do not involve the AEDPA; they address allegations of selective enforcement of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRIA"). As such, the ADC cases do not even *42 involve a fa??ial
challenge to the IIRIA -- they are an "as applied" challenge under
facts which are different than those at issue here.
In
ADC II, this court's decision to uphold the preliminary injunction sought by
the plaintiffs was largely premised upon the fact that "even after the
government made its supplemental evidentiary submission, there was 'no evidence
in the record that could have led a reasonable person to believe that any of
the plaintiffs had the specific intent to further the PFLP's unlawful
aims."' ADC II, 119 F.3d at 1376. In the case of the AEDPA, however,
Congress has specifically found that any funds or physical assets contributed
to designated foreign terrorist organizations ultimately will further criminal
and violent activity. This finding, coupled with the "knowing"
element included in ¤ 303 of the AEDPA, renders plaintiffs-appellants
"specific intent" argument misplaced.
4.
Plaintiffs-Appellants are not prohibited from all forms of association with
foreign terrorist organizations.
Finally,
the constitutionality of the AEDPA is also apparent because the Act does not
prohibit plaintiffs-appellants from engaging in all forms of association with
foreign terrorist organizations, nor from advocating the ends they claim that
they support, nor from providing humanitarian aid for the *43 purposes
discussed in their Complaint. In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld campaign
contribution limitations under the strict scrutiny standard because it was
satisfied that the opponents to the law were still free to engage in independent
political expression:
"The
Act's $1,000 contribution limitation focuses precisely on the problem of large
campaign contributions -- the narrow aspect of political association where the
actuality and potential for corruption have been identified -- while leaving
persons free to engage in independent political expression, to associate
actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but
nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with
financial resources. Significantly, the Act's contribution limitations in
themselves do not undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and
effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual citizens,
associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political parties."
Buckley,
424 U.S. at 28-29.
Similarly,
the AEDPA's prohibition on providing material support to foreign terrorist
organizations does not prohibit plaintiffs-appellants from participating in
other forms of political expression and association on behalf of the PKK's and
LTTE's allegedly legitimate goals. As the district court explained by way of
example, "plaintiffs-[appellants] are free to spend money themselves, such
as distributing information about the plight of the Kurds and *44 Tamils; are
free to associate with others to express their advocacy of the PKK's and LTTE's
political and humanitarian goals; and are free to provide direct humanitarian
aid to individuals who need it." Humanitarian Law Project, 1998 WL 385955,
at *29 n. 20.
*45
CONCLUSION
For
the foregoing reasons, amicus respectfully urges this Court to uphold the
constitutionality of the AEDPA's material support prohibitions.