HOUSE OF LORDS SYKES, APPELLANT; AND DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS, RESPONDENT See annotated Law
Reports version at [1962] A.C. 528 COUNSEL: Edward Clarke Q.C. and John Hugill for the appellant. Sir Jocelyn Simon Q.C., S.-G. and W. D. T. Hodgson Q.C. for the
respondent. SOLICITORS: Church, Adams, Tatham & Co.; Director of Public
Prosecutions. JUDGES: Lord Denning, Lord Goddard, Lord Morton Of Henryton, Lord
Morris Of Borth-y-Gest and Lord Guest. DATES: 1961 April 26, 27; May 1, 2, 3; June 23. [*551] Their Lordships took time for consideration. June 23. LORD DENNING. My Lords, this case raises the question
whether there is today such an offence as misprision of felony. Mr. Edward
Clarke says that there has never been such an offence known to our law; or if
there has, he says, it has ceased to be an offence by becoming obsolete. The
Solicitor-General says that there always has been such an offence and the
present case is a good example of its continuing usefulness. The facts giving
rise to the question were as follows: [*552] About March 18, 1960, thieves got into the weapon armoury at a
United States Air Force station in Norfolk. They stole 100 pistols, 4
submachine-guns and about 1,960 rounds of ammunition. They hired a taxi and
took the stolen goods to Manchester. They took them into the house of a man
named Kenny. A day or two later a man named Whittle brought a van to
Kennys house and took the stuff to the house of a
man named Black. On March 23, 1960, Sykes comes into the story. We do not know how
he came to know about the guns and ammunition but we know that he went up to an
Irishman named Kerwin who was a waiter in a Manchester club and asked him:
Have you any contacts with the I.R.A.? Kerwin said: I
don't want to talk about it in the club. They talked about it later:
and they went to a hotel where they met two men. One of them was Kenny (the man
who first received the guns in Manchester) and the other was a man named Tucker
(who has not appeared in the story before). Kenny said they had 100 revolvers,
some submachine-guns and ammunition for sale. Kerwin led them to think that he
had contacts with the I.R.A. and would have to go to London to see them. But
instead of going to London, he went to the police and acted under their
instructions. On March 27, 1960, Kerwin (prompted thereto by the police) told
Sykes that he had arranged to dispose of the guns but he needed a sample to
convince the organisation that the guns were there. Kerwin that night asked
Sykes what he expected to gain financially and he said: Half of what
Tucker gets for his share. On March 28, 1960, Kenny took a sample of one of the pistols and
gave it to Kerwin (who gave it to the police). Later the police disguised
themselves as would-be purchasers of the guns. They were taken to
Blacks house and shown the goods. Whereupon the police officers
disclosed their identity, and arrested Kenny, Whittle and Black. They took
possession of the stolen property. Afterwards they arrested Tucker and Sykes. In the early morning of March 29, 1960, at the police station, the
superintendent said to Sykes: I have reason to believe that you were
the man who first got into touch with an Irishman and asked him to contact the
I.R.A. so that they could buy the guns and that you have been actively helping
Kenny and Tucker in arranging for the sale of these guns during the past
week. Sykes said: Look, Inspector, that can't be possible.
I don't know this man Kenny and I haven't seen Tucker for four
months. All five men were taken before the magistrates. Kenny, [*553] Tucker, Whittle and
Black were charged with receiving the goods, knowing them to have been stolen.
Sykes was charged as being accessory after the fact. After the evidence was
taken, counsel for Sykes urged strongly that he ought not to be committed for
trial on the charge of being accessory: there was no evidence that he had taken
any active steps to conceal the felony or had done any act for the purpose of assisting
the others to escape conviction. He relied on Rex v. Jones.1 But the magistrates
committed all five men for trial. When counsel was instructed to draft the indictment, he was so
impressed by the argument which had been urged before the magistrates that he
did not put in a count charging Sykes with being an accessory after the fact
but charged him with misprision of felony. The indictment against the five men
was as follows: First count: Kenny, Tucker and Sykes were charged with
receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen. Second count: Tucker
and Sykes were charged with misprision of felony. Third count: Black and
Whittle were charged with receiving. Fourth count: Kenny, Tucker and Sykes were
charged with attempted sale of firearms contrary to the Firearms Act, 1937. On May 9, 1960, when the case was called on, counsel for Sykes
moved to quash counts 1 and 2 against Sykes on the ground that there was no
evidence to warrant them. The judge (Sir Basil Nield) upheld this contention so
far as regards count 1 for receiving there was clearly no evidence
of his having possession of the goods but disallowed it on count 2.
So the charge of misprision of felony remained. On arraignment Black pleaded guilty to receiving. The rest pleaded
not guilty and were put in charge of the jury. After the evidence for the
prosecution had been called, Kenny, Tucker and Whittle withdrew their pleas of
not guilty and pleaded guilty to certain of the charges against them,
including, be it noted, a plea of guilty by Tucker to misprision of felony. So
at that point all except Sykes had pleaded guilty, and the case went on against
Sykes alone. He gave evidence and the judge summed up. The jury found him
guilty of misprision of felony but not guilty of attempted sale of firearms. On May 26, 1960, the judge sentenced Kenny to seven years for
receiving (and two years concurrent for attempted sale of firearms), Tucker to
five years for misprision of felony (and two years concurrent for attempted
sale of firearms). Black and 1 [1949] 1 K.B. 194; 64 T.L.R. 616; [1948] 2 All E.R. 964; 33
Cr.App.R. 33, C.C.A. [*554] Whittle each to fifteen months for receiving and Sykes to five
years for misprision of felony. Kenny and Tucker applied for leave to appeal against their
sentences but their applications were refused. Sykes applied for leave to
appeal against conviction and sentence. On January 23, 1961, the Court of
Criminal Appeal refused him leave to appeal against conviction but granted
leave to appeal against sentence. On February 13, 1961, the Court of Criminal
Appeal set aside the sentence on Sykes of five years and substituted such a
period of imprisonment as would allow him to be discharged on the next day,
February 14, 1961. It transpired, however, that Sykes did not need leave to appeal
against conviction because he had a right of appeal on a point of law. So the
court treated his application as if it was a final appeal against conviction
which had been dismissed; and they gave him leave to appeal to this House
limited to the following points: (1) Whether there is such an offence as
misprision of felony. (2) Whether active concealment is an essential ingredient
of the offence. The question whether there is such an offence as misprision of
felony is of great importance and we were privileged to have the results of
much research placed before us by counsel on both sides. Most lawyers know, roughly speaking, what misprision of
felony means. It means that a man knows that a felony has been committed
and neglects to disclose it. But many laymen are perplexed by the word
misprision. What does it mean? Whence its derivation? Lord
Coke [Third Institute, p. 36] attempted to fit it in with present notions when
he said that Misprision cometh of the French word mé;spris
which properly signifieth neglect or contempt.: but the authors of
the Oxford English Dictionary, who included Sir Frederick Pollock, in a very
learned article say that the word misprision is derived
from the old French word mé;sprendre which means
to act wrongly: and in early times it meant simply a wrong action or omission.
This is borne out by the old law books where it is used almost as synonymous
with misdemeanour, that is to say, something less than felony which did not
carry the death penalty. One of the earliest records of its use is in the Year
Book in 1484 (2 Richard III, case 22, p. 9 et sequitur) where a man called
Mundy had falsified a writ. It was a felony and, if charged as such, would
carry the death penalty: but for mercys sake, and may be for
convenience also, the judges said he could be indicted for a misprision.
It was allowed it was felony [*555] and so included misprision, etc. As
a result of this case it was held that every treason or felony included a
misprision. The King used to take advantage of this rule in cases of treason,
so that, if the man did not deserve the death penalty, he was indicted only
with misprision of treason. Now concealment of treason was
itself treason. If anyone knew that another was guilty or in any way
incriminated in treason, he was bound at once to go to the King or to anyone in
his immediate circle and tell him all that happened: see Bracton, Book III, fol.
118, 119. If he did not do so, he could be indicted either for treason which
carried the death penalty, or misprision of treason which did not. But this
alternative was taken away in 1555. By the statute of 1555 (1 Ph. & M. c.
10) it was enacted that concealment or keeping secret of any high
treason be deemed and taken only misprision of treason. From this
time forward the phrase misprision of treason was taken to
denote only the concealment or keeping secret of treason. And by a natural
sequence misprision of felony denoted only the concealment
or keeping secret of felony. So much for the meaning of the phrase. But now comes the question:
Has it ever been an offence known to the law? My Lords, it has been an offence
for the last 700 years or more, not always under the name misprision
of felony, but still an offence. Ever since the days of hue and cry,
it has been the duty of a man, who knows that a felony has been committed, to
report it to the proper authority so that steps can be taken to apprehend the
felon and bring him to justice. In the thirteenth century it was his duty
to raise hue and cry, that is to say, he had to report it
to the sheriff of the county or his officer or to the constable of the town:
whereupon it was the duty of that officer to levy hue and cry, that is, to
shout aloud calling on all able-bodied men over the age of 15 to pursue the
offender and arrest him: and it was their duty to join in the pursuit. The duty
on the officer to levy hue and cry and on the citizens to join in pursuit was
reinforced by various statutes and particularly by the Statute of Westminster
(1275) 3 Edw. 1, st. 1, c. 9. Under that statute if the officer failed to levy
hue and cry when he should have done so, he was liable to imprisonment for a
year and to a fine. If a citizen failed to join in pursuit, he was liable to a
fine. This statute was re-enacted as recently as 1887 when in section 8 of the
Sheriffs Act, 1887, it was laid down that Every person in a
county shall be ready and apparelled at the command of the sheriff and at the
cry of the country to arrest a felon. [*556] Although these statutes dealt with the duty of the officers and of
citizens to join in pursuit, there was no statute dealing with the duty of the
man, who knew of the felony, to report it. This duty rested solely on the
common law. There are several cases in the Rolls of the Justices in Eyre where
a man was present where a felony was committed, or in the house at the time, or
found the dead body of a man who was slain. If he did nothing did
not raise the hue and cry or do anything he was
guilty of an offence and liable to be fined. The case which is usually cited in
this regard is a case in 1315 which was noted by Fitzherbert in his
Abridgement, Title Pleas of the Crown, para. 395: but it can be found much more
fully reported now in the Selden Society, volume 24, p. 152, where Ormesby J.
said: It is the law of the land that such as be present when such a
felony as this is committed shall raise hue and cry, and give their aid towards
arresting the felons. Wherefore you will make fine with the King. The
other case on the point is also noted by Fitzherbert in his Abridgement, Title
Conspiracy, para. 5. It was a case in the year 1457 where a man, who had been
present at a killing, reported it to a guardian of the peace. On this account
he was charged with conspiracy. The judges rejected the charge: and Prisot, the
Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, said: He was bound by the law to
do what he did. Sir William Staunford summarised these cases in this
way: If anyone happens to be present when another is killed, or when
a felony is committed, and did not come there in the company of the felons, nor
was part of their confederacy, but nevertheless did not intervene or disturb
the felons or raise hue and cry, he is not on that account to be held a
principal or accessory, for it is not a felony in him but only an offence for
which he can be fined like trespass: see Staunford, Pleas of the
Crown, para. 40B. In those early cases the accused man was present at the
killing and so knew of it. But any other proof of knowledge would suffice. In
1550 there was a case where the man was not present but knew of the felony, and
was held to be under duty to report it. This was the case: I. S. was robbed of
his goods. After the robbery, he pursued the felon and retook his goods. But he
let the felon go. All the judges at Serjeants Inn agreed that he was
not to be held to be an accessory but he was guilty of un
concealment: see Moore (K.B.), p. 8. It was said to be le
duty de chescun home sur son allegiance de discoverer felonies. This offence concealing or failing to report a felony
does not seem to have acquired a name for itself until 1557 when
Staunford [*557] gave it one. At the
time he wrote, there had recently been enacted the statute of 1555 dealing with
misprision of treason, which was the concealing or keeping secret of
any high treason. Staunford seems to have seen here a parallel with
the common law offence of concealment of felony. So he, by analogy with the
statute, used the words misprision of felony to denote the
concealment or keeping secret of felony. He gave a separate chapter to
misprision and started off with these words: Misprision: est
properment quant ascun sciet ou conust, que un auter ad fait treason ou felony,
et il ne voille luy discoverer al roy, ou son counsel, ou a ascun magistrat,
eins conceala son offence, ceo est misprision which may be
translated as follows: Misprision: this is properly when anyone
learns or knows that another has committed treason or felony, and he does not
choose to denounce him to the King or to his Council, or to any magistrate, but
conceals his offence; this is a misprision. My Lords, it was suggested that Staunford in this passage made a
clerical mistake. Ou should be et: or,
in the translation or should be and. I
cannot subscribe to this for a moment. There is internal evidence from the book
itself which shows it was no mistake. But apart from this, it was, as I have
said, always an offence for a man to conceal or keep secret a felony of which
he knew. Actual presence at the felony or actual finding of the body was proof
positive of knowledge. But other proof of knowledge would suffice, as in the
case of the man who retook stolen goods from the thief. All that Staunford did
was to state the principle disclosed by the cases. Let no one mistake the high standing of Sir William Staunford. He
was a judge of the Common Pleas from Michaelmas, 1554, till his death on August
28, 1558. Foss tells us that he was a great and learned lawyer and he
distinguished himself as the author of a highly esteemed Treatise on the Pleas
of the Crown which is of great authority. The first edition of it appeared in
1557 during his lifetime and it has been repeatedly followed by subsequent
writers. They have often taken his exact words and acknowledged him as the
source of what they say. Upon this very subject of misprision of felony you
will find him quoted verbatim in 1579 in Rastells Termes de
la Ley [1721 ed., p. 443]; in 1583 in Cromptons edition of
Fitzherberts Justices of the Peace (Fitzherbert himself had died in
1538 so his own edition did not mention it); in 1607 in Cowells
The Interpreter; and in 1609 in Pultons De Pace
Regis et Regni, p. 116. It was quite apparent to the lawyers of that time that
Staunford derived his [*558] principle from the hue and cry cases; for
both Crompton in his Fitzherbert (p. 44), Lambard in his Eirenarcha (1614), p.
289, and Dalton in his Country Justice (1619), p. 284 refer to the
hue and cry cases and say that a man who is present at a
felony and does not raise hue and cry or do anything is guilty of misprision of
felony: and they cite the case in 1315 from Fitzherbert, Pleas of the Crown,
para. 395. My Lords, if Staunford stood alone, it would suffice. But in 1628
Lord Coke in his Third Institute gave the great imprint of his authority to it.
He had evidently studied Staunfords book with great care
indeed he pays special tribute to him (at p. 138) and dealing with
misprisions, he says (at p. 139): Now are we to speak of concealment
or not discovery of felony. As in the case of high treason, whether the treason
be by the common law, or statute, the concealment of it is misprision of
treason. So in case of felony, whether the felony be by the common law, or by
statute, the concealment of it is misprision of felony.
And as the concealment of high
treason is higher by many degrees than the concealment of felony, so the
punishment for the concealment of the greater is heavier than of the lesser,
and yet the concealment of felonies in sheriffs, or bailiffs of liberties is
more severely punished than in others, viz. by imprisonment by one year, and
ransom at the will of the King. [This is clearly a reference to the
Statute of Westminster, 1275, c. 9, and shows that Coke too had in mind the
hue and cry cases.] From which punishment if any
will save himself he must follow the advice of Bracton, to discover it to the
King, or to some judge or magistrate, that for administration of justice
supplieth his place, with all speed that he can.
And this is intended of a
concealment, or not discovery [that is, non-disclosure] of
his mere knowledge: for in case of high treason, he that knoweth it, before it
be done, and assenteth to it, is particeps criminis, and guilty of treason; and
in case of felony, he that receiveth the thief, and assenteth to it, is
accessory. But great as is the authority of Lord Coke, greater still is the
authority of the great Chief Justice Sir Matthew Hale on such a subject as
this. Writing about the year 1670 he said in his Pleas of the Crown (1800 ed.,
vol. 1, p. 374): By what hath been said touching misprision of
treason we may easily collect what is the crime of misprision of felony,
namely, that it is the concealing of a felony which a man knows, but never
consented [*559] to, for if he consented,
he is either principal or accessory in the felony, and consequently guilty of
misprision of felony and more. Now what Sir Matthew Hale there said has ever since been regarded
as a correct statement of the law of England. In 1755 it was so treated by
Foster J. (himself no mean authority), who quoted it in Rex v. M'Daniel2: and a few years
later Sir William Blackstone took it verbatim into the fourth book of his
commentaries (1st ed., p. 121), borrowing the rest from Lord Coke:
Misprision of felony is also the concealment of a felony which a man
knows, but never assented to; for, if he assented, this makes him either
principal, or accessory. And the punishment of this, in a public officer, by
the Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 9, is imprisonment for a year and a
day; in a common person, imprisonment for a less discretionary time; and in
both, fine and ransom at the Kings pleasure.
Every author of any note from that day to this has followed these
great names and has said there is an offence of misprision of felony and
described it in much the same terms. What need we of any further authority? If
Staunford, Coke, Hale and Blackstone all say there is such an offence as
misprision of felony, are we to say the contrary? Mr. Edward Clarke invited
your Lordships to do so. He said there are no precedents, no recorded cases
where any man has been ever indicted for misprision of felony, not from the
time that Staunford wrote in 1557 till the year 1938. He said that Staunford made
a mistake and all the authors copied from him like automata and fell into error
with him. The mere repetition of the cantilena of lawyers cannot, he said, make
law. But I would say in answer that there are precedents. There are all the
hue and cry cases before Staunford wrote. And since he
wrote there are records to carry us down to date. In 1813 Thompson B.,3 in his charge to the grand jury at York,
drew their attention to the offence of misprision and thus invited them to find
a true bill for it. In 1826 Joseph Chitty gives a precedent of an indictment for
misprision of felony which he says was settled by a very able Crown
lawyer. This must have been an actual case. The precedent, after
setting out the offence by P.P. the original offender, proceeds as follows:
did conceal, keep secret, and neglect to discover the said
felony so committed by the 2 (1755) 19 State Tr. 745, 805. 3 (1813) 31 State Tr. 969. [*560] said P.P. as aforesaid, and the name, person, and usual place of
resort of the said P.P. did utterly refrain and forbear to disclose and make
known
[Chitty on Criminal Law, 2nd ed., vol. 2, p. 232]. In 1852 Parke B. when he went on the Home Circuit addressed the
Grand Jury at Lewes in these words as recorded in The Times
of March 18, 1852: In the western division particularly a great many
felonies were committed of which the parties who were the sufferers by them
gave no information to the authorities or the police. He therefore felt himself
called upon to say publicly, that it should be known that this proceeding,
which was known to the law by the name of 'Misprision of Felony' was a very
serious offence, and subjected the persons who were convicted of it to
imprisonment for a year. The law with regard to this matter had certainly
fallen into desuetude, but it was very necessary that it should be known it
still existed, and during the last 20 years he had himself been called upon to
make use of it in the county of Durham, and he had sentenced two persons to a
years imprisonment for having wilfully withheld information relating
to an act of felony that had been committed. We do not know whether any prosecutions for misprision of felony
followed upon the words of Parke B. and we have to pass over close on 100 years
before we find records of other prosecutions for misprision of felony. And then
we find a series of them. Seven or eight were drawn to the attention of your
Lordships. I would only mention the case of Mrs. Casserley4 tried by Humphreys
J. at the Central Criminal Court in May 1938, the case of Thomas Prothero5
tried by Hilbery J. at the Salop Assizes in June 1949, and the case of Chapman,
Wood & Hyde6 [Rex v. Tapp and Others] tried by Devlin J. at the Hampshire
Assizes in July 1952. Each of those learned judges accepted pleas of guilty to
charges of misprision of felony and passed sentence on them. In the light of this history it is plain that there is and always
has been an offence of misprision of felony and that it is not obsolete. It is
true that until recently it has been rarely invoked, but that is no ground for
denying its existence. This disposes of the first point on which leave to appeal was
granted. There remains the second point whether active 4 The Times, May 28, 1938. 5 Unreported, Salop Assizes, June 24, 1949. 6 Unreported, Hampshire Summer Assizes, Winchester, July 23, 1952.
[*561] concealment is an essential ingredient of the offence. Now the
ingredients of the offence can best be seen by comparing it with offences of
like degree which have other ingredients. First: Accessory after the fact. The classic definition of an
accessory after the fact is when a person, knowing a felony to have been
committed, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon, see 1 Hale P.C.
618, 4 Black. 37. These are all active acts of assistance from which it can be
inferred that he assented to the felon going free, in contrast to misprision
which consists of concealment only, from which no inference of assent need be
drawn. It might be thought that the acts of assistance given by Sykes in the
present case would be such as to make him an accessory after the fact. But it
has been said that, to make a man an accessory, the assistance must be given to
the felon personally, in order to prevent or hinder him from being apprehended
or tried or suffering punishment, see 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 8th ed.,
chap. 29, s. 26, p. 445, and 4 Stephens Commentaries, 21st ed., chap.
3, p. 31, Reg. v. Chapple,7 Rex v. Levy8: so that if the
assistance was not given the felon personally, but only indirectly by
persuading witnesses not to give evidence against him (see Roberts
case9;
or if the acts of assistance were done, not to hinder the arrest of the felon,
but with another motive, such as to avoid arrest himself (see Rex v. Jones10 or to make money
for himself without regard to what happened to the felon (as in the present
case), he would not be guilty as an accessory after the fact. It was these
limitations on the offence of being an accessory that led to Sykes being
charged with misprision of felony. Second: Compounding a Felony. This is the old offence of
theft-bote, now made of general application to all felonies and probably also
to misdemeanours. Lord Coke says that this offence is more than
misprision of felony, for that it is not a concealment of his bare knowledge
only: but theft-bote is when the owner not only knows of the felony, but taketh
of the thief his goods again, or amends for the same, to favour or maintain
him, that is not to prosecute him, to the intent he may escape
, see 3rd Inst., p. 134. The offence of compounding a
felony in short is an agreement not to prosecute a felon in 7 (1840) 9 C. & P. 355. 8 [1912] 1 K.B. 158; 28 T.L.R. 93: 7 Cr.App.R. 61, C.C.A. 9 (1569) 3 Co.Inst. 139. 10 [1949] 1 K.B. 194; 64 T.L.R. 616; [1948] 2 All E.R. 964; 33 Cr.
App.R. 33, C.C.A. [*562] consideration of the return of the goods or other reward, see 4
Black. 133, Reg. v. Burgess11: whereas in misprision there need be no
benefit. This distinction was overlooked by Lord Westbury in Williams v.
Bayley.12
He seems to have thought that for misprision of felony the
man must not only have concealed his knowledge of the felony but further
converted it into a source of emolument to himself. That is essential in
compounding a felony, but not in misprision of felony. Lord Westburys
dictum has been frequently cited as, for instance, in Rex v. Aberg13: but it is not
correct and should no longer be relied upon. Third: Interfering with the course of justice. It is an offence at
common law to interfere with the course of justice, such as persuading
witnesses not to give evidence (Roberts case14 or fabricating
evidence (Reg. v. Vreones15: or making a false accusation of crime to
the police (Rex v. Manley16. But this offence requires something active
to be done to pervert the course of justice. Fourth: Obstructing the police. It is an offence by statute
wilfully to obstruct any constable or peace officer when in the execution of
his duty. This offence is not confined to physical obstruction. If a policeman
was investigating a crime, and someone wilfully misled him by false
information, he might well be guilty of this offence. But it is one thing to
obstruct a policeman. It is another thing to refuse to help him. Take the case
in Australia where a man, who was shot and wounded in an affray, refused to
disclose to the police the name of the person who had shot him. It would seem
that he was engaged in gang warfare, for he said that he would cop it
sweet if he did disclose the name. He said he would attend to the
matter himself, that is, take his own revenge. No civilised community can
tolerate such behaviour. But his offence is not obstructing the police. It is
misprision of felony, see Reg. v. Crimmins.17 It comes to this, therefore, that these other offences require
something active to be done to conceal the crime: whereas misprision requires
nothing active. The failure or refusal to 11 (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 141; 2 T.L.R. 176. 12 (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 200, 220, H.L. 13 [1948] 2 K.B. 173, 176; 64 T.L.R. 215; [1948] 1 All E.R. 601;
32 Cr.App.R. 144, C.C.A. 14 3 Co.Inst. 139. 15 [1891] 1 Q.B. 360; 7 T.L.R. 223. 16 [1933] 1 K.B. 529; 49 T.L.R. 130; 24 Cr.App.R. 25, C.C.A. 17 [1959] V.R. 270. [*563] disclose the felony is enough. This disposes of the second point
on which leave to appeal was granted. This review of the authorities shows that the essential
ingredients of misprision of felony are: 1. Knowledge. The accused man must know that a felony has been
committed by someone else. His knowledge must be proved in the way in which the
prosecution have been accustomed in other crimes when knowledge is an
ingredient, such as receiving, accessory after the fact, compounding a felony,
and so forth. That is to say, there must be evidence that a reasonable man in
his place, with such facts and information before him as the accused had, would
have known that a felony had been committed. From such evidence the jury may
infer that the accused man himself had knowledge of it. He need not know the
difference between felony and misdemeanour many a lawyer has to look
in the books for the purpose but he must at least know that a
serious offence has been committed: or, as the commissioners of 1840 put it, an
offence of an aggravated complexion: for after all, that is
still, broadly speaking, the difference between a felony and misdemeanour.
Felonies are the serious offences. Misdemeanours are the less serious. If he
knows that a serious offence has been committed and a lawyer on
turning up the books sees it is a felony that will suffice. This
requirement that it must be a serious offence disposes of many of the supposed
absurdities, such as boys stealing apples, which many laymen would rank as a
misdemeanour and no one would think he was bound to report to the police. It
means that misprision comprehends an offence which is of so serious a character
that an ordinary law-abiding citizen would realise he ought to report it to the
police. 2. Concealment. The accused man must have concealed or
kept secret his knowledge. He need not have done anything active: but
it is his duty by law to disclose to proper authority all material facts known
to him relative to the offence. It is not sufficient to tell the police that a
felony has been committed. He must tell the name of the man who did it, if he
knows it; the place, and so forth. All material facts known to him, see Reg.
v. Crimmins.18 If he fails or refuses to perform this duty when there is a
reasonable opportunity available to him to do so, then he is guilty of
misprision. He can perform this duty by reporting 18 [1959] V.R. 270. [*564] to the police or a magistrate or anyone else in lawful authority.
Failure to do so is a misprision of felony. Misprision of felony is itself a misdemeanour and is punishable by
fine and imprisonment. Whatever limitations may have existed in olden days on
the period of imprisonment that might be imposed, the only limitation now is
that it must not be an inordinately heavy sentence. My Lords, it was said that this offence is out of date. I do not
think so. The arm of the law would be too short if it was powerless to reach
those who are contact men for thieves or assist them to
gather in the fruits of their crime; or those who indulge in gang warfare and
refuse to help in its suppression. There is no other offence of which such
persons are guilty save that of misprision of felony. I am not dismayed by the suggestion that the offence of misprision
is impossibly wide: for I think it is subject to just limitations.
Non-disclosure may sometimes be justified or excused on the ground of
privilege. For instance, if a lawyer is told by his client that he has
committed a felony, it would be no misprision in the lawyer not to report it to
the police, for he might in good faith claim that he was under a duty to keep
it confidential. Likewise with doctor and patient, and clergyman and
parishioner. There are other relationships which may give rise to a claim in
good faith that it is in the public interest not to disclose it. For instance,
if an employer discovers that his servant has been stealing from the till, he might
well be justified in giving him another chance rather than reporting him to the
police. Likewise with the master of a college and a student. But close family
or personal ties will not suffice where the offence is of so serious a
character that it ought to be reported. In 1315 it was held that it was the
duty of a brother to raise hue and cry against his own brother and he was fined
for not doing so, see 24 Selden Society, p. 144: and in 1938 a mistress was
found guilty of misprision for shielding her lover: (Mrs.
Casserleys case19. The judges have not been called upon further to define
the just limitations to misprision, but I do not doubt their ability to do so,
if called upon. My Lords, there was some discussion before us whether a man was
bound to disclose a contemplated felony which comes to his knowledge, such as a
planned raid on a bank. There is a striking passage in Lambards
Eirenarcha (1614), p. 289, which says that 19 The Times, May 28, 1938. [*565] failure to do so is misprision of felony. So does
Daltons Country Justice (1619), p. 211, and Hawkins Pleas
of the Crown, 8th ed., vol. 2, chap. 29, s. 23, p. 444. These are weighty
authorities and the commissioners who reported on the Criminal Law in 1843 were
clearly in favour of it. They said: The necessity for making such
disclosures extends, perhaps, with greater force, to the knowledge of a
meditated crime, the perpetration of which may, by means of such a disclosure,
be prevented, than it does to the knowledge of one already committed.
This is good sense and may well be good law. I would therefore reserve this
point which does not arise in the present case. I ought to mention one other matter. Mr. Clarke sought to raise a
point of misdirection on which leave to appeal was not granted. He said that,
once leave to appeal was given, the appellant in this House can open up all
grounds available to the court below. He is not limited to the point on which
leave was granted. The Solicitor-General denied this. He said that the
appellant was limited to the point of general public importance but the
respondent was not. I do not think it necessary to resolve this question today
because there is no substance in the point which Mr. Clarke sought to raise. He
suggested that the judge had misdirected the jury in drawing their attention to
the fact that Kenny had pleaded guilty to receiving. I see no misdirection in
the judge telling the jury what they very well knew Kenny had
pleaded guilty in their presence for the judge had already warned
them that the pleas of guilty should not be allowed to prejudice Sykes. I would dismiss the appeal. LORD GODDARD. My Lords, the appellant was convicted at Manchester
Crown Court of the misdemeanour known as misprision of felony. His appeal to
the Court of Criminal Appeal was dismissed and he applied for and obtained a
certificate that a point of law of general public importance was involved and
was given leave to appeal to this House limited to two points: (1) Whether
there is such an offence as misprision of felony, and (2) Whether active
concealment is an essential ingredient of the offence. Before this House
counsel for the appellant contended that there never was known to the law such
an offence but that if there ever had been it had disappeared by obsolescence
and should no longer be indictable. On the question whether there ever was such
an offence counsel with immense industry had brought to your
Lordships notice a very large number of authorities, consisting of
extracts from institutional writers on the criminal law, and cases [*566] decided not only in
England but in other jurisdictions where the English common law prevails, and
the result is, as it appears to me, to show that for centuries there has been
communis opinio among all the writers and such of the judges who have had to
consider the matter that there is such an offence and no trace of it ever
having been doubted until the present case. The first book that was discussed in argument was an edition of
Staunfords Pleas of the Crown published in 1607, some years after the
authors death. He was a judge of the Common Pleas from 1554 to 1558
and seems to have been a fairly prolific writer on the law. He describes
misprision as properly when anyone knows or understands that another
has committed treason or felony and will not disclose it to the King or his
Council or any magistrate and so conceals the offence, and then he
quotes a passage from Bracton which is wide enough to cover misprision both of
treason and felony. No one doubts that misprision of treason was and is a crime
and it was specially the subject of a statute, 1 & 2 Ph. & M. c. 10.
Mr. Clarke contended that Staunford was mistaken in treating misprision of
felony as distinct from treason as a crime and that this mistake has continued
and misled all the subsequent writers on the subject. As I understood the
argument it was that when the writer refers to treason or felony the or is a
misprint or mistake for and. If so it is remarkable that it is repeated three
times in the article and has misled, to name only a few, Coke, Hale and
Blackstone, all of whom name misprision of felony as a misdemeanour while at
the same time they deal with misprision of treason as quite a separate offence.
I cannot think that either Staunford or the editor of his work were under any
misapprehension on this matter. It is stated to be an offence by Fitzherbert,
who was a judge of the Common Pleas from 1522 to 1538. He was the author of The
Natura Brevium and has always been regarded as a writer of the
highest authority. It is in his book entitled L'Office et Auctoritie
de Justices de Peace that he deals with this offence. An English
edition of this book according to Dr. Round was first published in 1538 and
frequently republished with additions by Richard Crompton, a bencher of the
Middle Temple, and it may well be that some part of the article on misprision
was added by the editor as he quotes Staunford in support. That there seem to
have been at least six editions of this work, the last in 1617, shows the
respect in which it was held. The offence was discussed in detail by Dalton in
his Country Justice, first published, again according to
Dr. Round, in 1618 and held in such high repute that it was constantly
republished, the last edition [*567] being dated 1742. It may indeed be described as the
eighteenth century Stone. Then the offence is described and
discussed in detail by Coke in his third Institute and at even greater length
by Sir Matthew Hale, who became a judge of the Common Pleas in 1654 and was
afterwards Lord Chief Justice of the Kings Bench from 1671 to 1676.
His works on the Pleas of the Crown have always been regarded as of the highest
authority and are still cited at the present day. Blackstone deals with the
matter, quite shortly defining the offence as the concealment of a felony which
a man knows but never assented to; for if he assented this makes him either
principal or accessory. Before parting with the writers of the eighteenth
century, and there are several others, all to the same effect, it is worth
noticing the case of Rex v. MDaniel.20 All the judges had
considered at Serjeants Inn the effect of a special verdict returned
by a jury at the Newgate Sessions and Foster J., who afterwards delivered the
judgment, quoted as an authority: What Lord Hale saith, in 1 Hale 374
Misprision of felony is concealing a felony which a man knoweth but never
consented to for if he consented he is either principal or accessory.
It appears to me, therefore, to be beyond question that at least by the middle
of the eighteenth century it was firmly established that misprision of felony
was an offence. But I would add that it is not so clear whether the concealment
of knowledge that an offence was contemplated is indictable. This indeed is
stated by Lambard, Dalton and Hawkins as included in the offence of misprision,
but not by any other authority. One can well understand the opinion that it
ought to be. It arises out of the recognition that it is the duty of every
citizen to assist in the detection and suppression of crime and that prevention
is better than cure. The offence may be said to be in the same category as
refusing to aid in arresting a suspect when called on by an officer of the law
or refusing to comply with the sheriffs call on the posse comitatus
or failing to take part in the hue and cry, but to hold that there was a
positive duty to inform the executive that a crime was or might be contemplated
might in practice cause many difficulties and as, except for the observations
of the three writers to whom I have referred, there is otherwise no authority
on the point, as at present advised I hesitate to hold that it is established
there is such a duty. But it is contended that the offence is obsolete or fallen in
desuetude. On this subject we have the guidance of Lord Sumner 20 19 State Tr. 745, 805. [*568] in Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd.,21 where he said:
if [a] maxim expresses a positive rule of law, once established,
though long ago, time cannot abolish it nor disfavour make it
obsolete. This in no way detracts from the wisdom of Bacon who, in
his Essay on Judicature, observes: Penal laws if they have been
sleepers of long time or if they have grown unfit for present use should by
wise judges be confined in execution, which seems to me to mean
should be sparingly enforced. But this law has not been sleeping for a long
time. So far I have traced it to the end of the eighteenth century. No doubt it
was seldom prosecuted in the nineteenth century, but we have been referred to a
report of a charge to the Grand Jury at York by Thompson B. in 1813, from which
it appears that in his opinion misprision of felony was indictable as a
misdemeanour, and even more striking is it that Joseph Chitty, whose
pre-eminence as a pleader both in civil and criminal matters and as an author
on many branches of the law is well known, in his second edition of precedents
sets out one for this offence with a note that it was settled by a well-known
Crown lawyer. Chittys works were essentially working books for
practitioners and it is most unlikely that he would have included a precedent
for this offence if by this time, 1826, it was regarded as obsolete. Then we
were supplied with a report of a charge given to the Grand Jury of Sussex in
1852 by Parke B., one of the greatest Victorian judges, in which he said it
should be known that failure to give information as to felonies to the
authorities, known to the law as misprision of felony, was a very serious
offence. That law, he said, had certainly fallen into desuetude but it was very
necessary it should be known that it still existed and that during the previous
twenty years he had been called on to make use of it. In 1866 Lord Westbury
referred to misprision of felony in his speech in Williams v. Bayley,22 though he added a
dictum with regard to the constituents of the offence that the concealment must
be for the benefit of the person concealing the matter. It seems that his
Lordship was momentarily confusing misprision with compounding a felony, which
was what the case was concerned with, and in my opinion there is no authority
for that dictum and it matters not what induces the concealment. This was the
view of the Supreme Court of Victoria whose careful and interesting judgment on
this subject in the case of Crimmins23 was delivered as recently as February,
1959. The court emphatically affirmed the 21 [1917] A.C. 406, 454. 22 L.R. 1 H.L. 200, 220. 23 [1959] V.R. 270. [*569] existence of the offence at the present day. Finally, it is to be
observed that Sir FitzJames Stephen in 1877 described the offence in his Digest
of the Criminal Law. Though in my opinion the offence should be sparingly prosecuted, I
am by no means prepared to say that it has no use in our criminal law at the
present day; it may well be used when there is technical difficulty in framing
a charge of being an accessory after the fact to a felony, and counsel who had
acted for the prosecution told us that was the reason for using it in the
instant case. Moreover, it is almost a common-place in these days to find the
police appealing for persons whom they think must be able to throw light on
some serious crime to come forward and give their assistance. And there have
been instances quite recently in wounding cases arising out of gang warfare of
refusing to assist the police as to the identity of the attackers, whether from
fear of reprisals or from a mistaken sense of loyalty. It is very easy to poke
ridicule at the offence and say that it obliges people to inform against a boy
stealing an apple. The law is nowadays administered with dignity and common
sense. And if it is said it obliges a father to inform against his son, or
vice-versa, I would answer that in the case of a really heinous crime be it so. In my opinion, therefore, misprision of felony is today an
indictable misdemeanour at common law, and a person is guilty of the crime if
knowing that a felony has been committed he fails to disclose his knowledge to
those responsible for the preservation of the peace, be they constables or
justices, within a reasonable time and having a reasonable opportunity for so
doing. What is a reasonable time and opportunity is a question of fact for a
jury, and also whether the knowledge that he has is so definite that it ought
to be disclosed. A man is neither bound nor would he be wise to disclose
rumours or mere gossip, but if facts are within his knowledge that would
materially assist in the detection and arrest of a felon he must disclose them
as it is a duty he owes to the State. The gist of the offence is concealment
which may be passive, that is mere non-disclosure, or active in destroying or
hiding evidence, though in the latter case it would probably often amount to
being an accessory after the fact, and I would add that where it is thought
possible and proper to charge a person as an accessory it is preferable to do
so rather than have recourse to the offence of misprision. I would also add
that it matters not [*570] what induces the concealment, and that the dictum of Lord
Westbury24 referred to above should be regarded as incorrect. My Lords, I would dismiss the appeal. LORD MORTON OF HENRYTON. My Lords, in my opinion (1) there is such
an offence as misprision of felony, and (2) active concealment is not an
essential ingredient of that offence. I gratefully adopt the following passage
in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Sir Edmund Herring C.J.,
OBryan and Dean JJ.) in Reg. v. Crimmins25: In our
opinion
the citizens duty to disclose
any
treason or felony, of which he has knowledge, remains the same and is still as
binding upon him as it was in the early days of the common law. And no doubt
cases will arise, from time to time, when the public interest will be best
served by the citizen, who fails in this duty, being prosecuted for misprision
of felony. There is certainly no justification for the view that such a
prosecution is no longer available to the Crown. The question then is: What are
the constituent elements of the crime? We think they are really determined by
what we have already said. The offence lies in the failure to perform the duty
to disclose
And so it matters not what induced the citizen
not to do his duty. I refrain from dealing with the earlier authorities on this
important matter, as they have been fully discussed in the speeches of my noble
and learned friends Lord Denning and Lord Goddard. As to the recent
authorities, although I agree with the last sentence in the passage which I
have quoted from the judgment in Reg. v. Crimmins,26 I have much
sympathy with the view recently expressed by Slade J. when summing up to the
jury in the case of Reg. v. Wilde27 at the Leeds autumn assizes on December 14,
1959. That case is shortly reported in the Criminal Law Review, 1960, and a
transcript was provided for your Lordships use. The learned judge
introduced a limitation in putting to the jury the question whether the accused
men had failed in their duty to disclose certain thefts by a woman employee. He
put the question thus: Has the prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the nature and extent of her thefts, as known to the accused, was
such that a reasonable man would consider it his duty to inform the police of
it. And he added: I put that in to eliminate the case of
the small boy and the 24 L.R. 1 H.L. 200, 220. 25 [1959] V.R. 270, 272. 26 Ibid. 27 [1960] Crim.L.R. 116. [*571] windfalls. Earlier, the learned judge had said:
Counsel
urged upon me not to regard as a sufficiently
serious offence to require reporting to the police if you saw, for example, a
fifteen-year-old boy picking up a couple of windfalls in your garden and you
knew that in fact he had stolen them. In law it is as much a felony as the most
serious bank robbery. I have endeavoured, because I prefer to err, if at all,
in favour of the accused, to draft a question to embody that
limitation. My Lords, I think the learned judge erred in law in importing that
limitation into the offence of misprision of felony; but his words may well be
regarded as a valuable indication of the type of case in which a prosecution
for that offence is appropriate. I would dismiss the appeal. LORD MORRIS OF BORTH-Y-GEST. My Lords, it was contended on behalf
of the appellant that no such offence as misprision of felony has existed in
English criminal law and that the manifold references to its supposed existence
have been based upon mistaken repetitions of error or misapprehension which
were contained in Staunfords Plees del Coron. Alternatively, it was
contended that if this common law misdemeanour was ever known to the law it has
now become obsolete so that today no such offence exists. I have had the
privilege of reading in advance the speeches which have been delivered by my
noble and learned friends Lord Denning and Lord Goddard, and I concur with the view
that for centuries misprision of felony has been recognised as an offence. I
find no convincing justification of the suggestion that Staunford made a
misstatement or a mistake. Furthermore, the words of Coke and of Hale and of
Blackstone are as clear as their authority is massive. Not only have they
declared that there is such an offence but they have shown that it consists in
the concealment of a felony of which a man knows though he has not assented to
it. The authorities do not support the view that some active
concealment must be proved. If there is knowledge that a felony has been
committed then the mere failure and omission to report and disclose what is
actually known is an offence. The suggestion contained at one point in the
speech of Lord Westbury in Williams v. Bayley28 that the
concealment must be of advantage or a source of profit is not founded upon
authority. The question whether any offence is committed if there is a failure
to disclose 28 L.R. 1 H.L. 200, 220. [*572] knowledge that some felony is being planned and projected does not
now call for decision. It may well be that long periods passed during which there were no
recorded convictions for this offence, but this does not warrant an assumption
that in some way or by some process the law became changed. The references in Rex
v. MDaniel,29 in the charge of Thompson B. in 1813,30 and in the charge of
Parke B. in 1852, demonstrate that judges regarded the offence as existing at
those dates, and several examples of convictions of the offence within this
century have been cited. Situations and circumstances can be postulated in which it can be
urged that it would seem to run counter to the fitness of things to acknowledge
that the offence has been committed. On the other hand, situations and
circumstances can also be contemplated in which a failure to disclose knowledge
would be condemned as being outrageous. The fact that prosecutions have been,
and doubtless will continue to be, infrequent demonstrates that the law is the
handmaid of reason. I would dismiss the appeal. LORD GUEST. My Lords, the Court of Criminal Appeal granted leave
to appeal to the House of Lords limited to the following points: (1) Whether
there is such an offence as misprision of felony. (2) Whether active concealment
is an essential ingredient of that offence. Upon the first question I agree with the opinion expressed by my
noble and learned friend Lord Goddard that the answer to this question must be
Yes for the reasons given by him. Upon the second question I also agree with your Lordships who have
preceded me that the answer is No. Reference has already
been made to the numerous institutional writers who have defined this offence,
and I cannot find in these writers any statement that active steps of
concealment are required to constitute the offence. Staunfords Plees
del Coron (1607), p. 37: Misprision is properly when anyone knows or
understands that another has committed treason or felony, and he will not disclose
it to the King or his Council, or any magistrate, and so conceals the offence,
this is misprision, which offence Bracton has put amongst the offences of
treason, because it seemed to him that concealments sometimes were closer to
treason than to a misprision and on that account these are his words
29 19 State Tr. 745. 30 31 State Tr. 969. [*573] He then quotes from Bracton the passage already cited. The writers
who follow in describing misprision of felony refer to the failure to disclose
the commission of a felony as an offence of omission. If more active steps were
required to constitute the offence of misprision of felony, this would
equiparate the offence to that of being accessory after the fact, which is an
entirely distinct offence. Sir Basil Nield, in his summing-up to the jury,
incorporated in his definition of misprision of felony the conception of
deliberate concealment which would suggest that the concealment must be wilful.
There is, in my opinion, no sufficient justification in the authorities for
limiting the offence in this way. The offence consists in a mere omission to
disclose a felony. Sir Basil Nield also directed the jury that the concealment must
be for gain or reward to the misprisor. I have no doubt that this direction was
derived from an expression of an obiter dictum of Lord Westbury in Williams
v. Bayley,31 where he said: If men were permitted to trade upon
the knowledge of a crime, and to convert their privity to that crime into an
occasion of advantage, no doubt a great legal and a great moral offence would
be committed. And that is what, I apprehend, the old rule of law intended to
convey when it embodied the principle under words which have now somewhat
passed into desuetude, namely, 'misprision of felony.' That was a case when a
man, instead of performing his public duty, and giving information to the
public authorities of a crime that he was aware of, concealed his knowledge,
and, further, converted it into a source of emolument to himself.
There is, in my opinion, no warrant for this limitation, and the direction
which was, of course, favourable to the accused did not correctly express the
law. I would, for these reasons, refuse the appeal. Appeal dismissed. 31 L.R. 1 H.L. 200, 220. |