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[1959] S.C.R. 121, 16 D.L.R.
(2d) 689, 1959 CarswellQue 37 Frank Roncarelli (Plaintiff),
Appellant and The Honourable Maurice Duplessis (Defendant), Respondent Supreme Court of Canada, 1959 Judgment: June 2, 1958 Judgment: June 3, 1958 Judgment: June 4, 1958 Judgment: June 5, 1958 Judgment: June 6, 1958 Judgment: January 27, 1959 Judges: Kerwin C.J. and
Taschereau, Rand, Locke, Cartwright, Fauteux, Abbott, Martland and Judson JJ. Proceedings: On appeal from the Court of Queen's Bench, appeal
side, province of Quebec Counsel: F.R. Scott and A.L. Stein, for the plaintiff, appellant. L.E. Beaulieu, Q.C., and L. Tremblay, Q.C., for the defendant,
respondent. Subject: Public; Civil Practice and Procedure Administrative Law — Discretion of tribunal under review. Licensing. Per Rand J. "In public regulation of this sort there is no such
thing as absolute and untrammelled 'discretion', that is that action can be
taken on any ground or for any reason that can be suggested to the mind of the
administrator; no legislative Act can, without express language, be taken to
contemplate an unlimited arbitrary power, exercisable for any purpose, however
capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the nature or purpose of the statute.
Fraud and corruption in the Commission may not be mentioned in such statutes
but they are always implied as exceptions.". Administrative Law — Damages for unlawful administrative
action. Liquor Commission — Cancellation of licence on order of Prime
Minister — Alcoholic Liquor Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 255, s. 35 —
Code of Civil Procedure, art. 88. The appellant was the proprietor of a restaurant in Montreal which had
been continually licensed for the sale of liquor for 34 years. He was also a
member of a sect known as Witnesses of Jehovah, who were selling literature
regarded as insulting and offensive by the Roman Catholic population of the
province, and the appellant had been in the habit of providing bail for
numerous members of the sect who had been arrested in connection with the sale
of such literature. While his application for renewal of his annual liquor
licence was before the Liquor Commission his existing licence was cancelled and
his application for renewal was rejected with an added declaration that no future
licence would ever be issued to him. The appellant was unable to operate the
restaurant profitably without the liquor licence and eventually closed down and
sold the premises. An action against the respondent for damages for causing the
cancellation of his liquor licence without legal or statutory authority as an
act of reprisal because of his having acted as surety or bondsman for the
Witnesses of Jehovah was upheld by MacKinnon J. who found that the respondent,
the Attorney General and Premier of the province, had ordered the cancellation
of the licence and that as the result of such order the manager of the
Commission had cancelled the licence accordingly. The appellant was awarded
damages for loss of value of liquor seized by the Commission, for loss of
profits from the date of cancellation of the licence to the date when it would
normally have expired and for damage to his personal reputation. His decision
was reversed by the Court of Appeal. On appeal from the decision of the Court
of Appeal and from the refusal of the trial Judge to allow damages for loss of
future profits and loss of good will and reputation of the business, held, the
appeals should be allowed, and additional damages awarded for the diminution of
the value of the good will and for the loss of future profits. There was ample
evidence to support the finding that the cancellation of the licence was the
result of instructions given by the respondent to the manager of the
Commission. In giving such instructions the respondent was not acting in the
exercise of any official power which he possessed, and the cancellation of the
licence by the Commission was not a proper exercise of its powers under s. 35
of the Alcoholic Liquor Act. As the act of the respondent in causing the
cancellation of the licence was something entirely outside his legal functions
it was not necessary for the plaintiff to give notice of the action under art.
88 of the Code. Per Rand J.: "The act of the respondent through the
instrumentality of the Commission brought about a breach of an implied public
statutory duty toward the appellant; it was a gross abuse of legal power
expressly intended to punish him for an act wholly irrelevant to the
statute.". Damages — Remoteness and foreseeability — Torts
— Economic loss. Appellant was the proprietor of a restaurant in Montreal which had
been continually licensed for the sale of liquor for 34 years. He was also a
member of a sect known as Witnesses of Jehovah, who were selling literature
regarded as insulting and offensive by the Roman Catholic population of the
province, and appellant had been in the habit of providing bail for numerous
members of the sect who had been arrested in connection with the sale of such
literature. While his application for renewal of his annual liquor licence was
before the Liquor Commission his existing licence was cancelled and his
application for renewal was rejected with an added declaration that no future
licence would ever be issued to him. Appellant was unable to operate the restaurant
profitably without the liquor licence and eventually closed it down and sold
the premises. An action against respondent for damages for causing the
cancellation of his liquor licence without legal or statutory authority as an
act of reprisal because of his having acted as surety or bondsman for the
Witnesses of Jehovah was upheld by Mackinnon J. who found that respondent, the
Attorney General and Prime Minister of the province, had ordered the
cancellation of the licence and that as the result of such order the manager of
the Commission had cancelled the licence accordingly. Appellant was awarded
damages for loss of value of liquor seized by the Commission, for loss of
profits from the date of cancellation of the licence to the date when it would
normally have expired and for damage to his personal reputation. This decision
was reversed by the Court of Appeal, Rinfret J. dissenting. On appeal from the
decision of the Court of Appeal and from the refusal of the trial Judge to
allow damages for loss of future profits and loss of goodwill and reputation of
the business, held, the appeals should be allowed, and additional damages
awarded for the diminution of the value of the goodwill and for the loss of
future profits. Liquor Control — Liquor licensing and control boards
— Powers and procedures — Appeal or review — Grounds
— Fettering discretion. Discretion of tribunal under review — General —
Licensing. Per Rand J.: "In public regulation of this sort there is no such
thing as absolute and untrammelled discretion', that is that action can be
taken on any ground or for any reason that can be suggested to the mind of the
administrator; no legislative Act can, without express language, be taken to
contemplate an unlimited arbitrary power, execisable for any purpose, however
capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the nature or purpose of the statute.
Fraud and corruption in the Commission may not be mentioned in such statutes
but they are always implied as exceptions.". The Chief Justice: 1 No
satisfactory reason has been advanced for the Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal
Side)[FN1] setting aside the finding of fact by the trial judge that the
respondent ordered the Quebec Liquor Commission to cancel the appellant's
licence. A reading of the testimony of the respondent and of the person
constituting the commission at the relevant time satisfies me that the trial
judge correctly decided the point. As to the other questions, I agree with Mr.
Justice Martland. 2 The
appeals should be allowed with costs here and below and judgment directed to be
entered for the appellant against the respondent in the sum of $33,123.53 with
interest from the date of the judgment of the Superior Court, together with the
costs of the action. Taschereau J. (dissenting): 3
L'intimé est Premier Ministre et Procureur Général de la province de
Québec, et il occupait ces hautes fonctions dans le temps où les faits qui ont
donné naissance à ce litige se sont passés. 4
L'appelant, un restaurateur de la Cité de Montréal, et porteur d'un
permis de la Commission des Liqueurs pour la vente des spiritueux, lui a
réclamé personnellement devant la Cour supérieure la somme de $118,741 en
dommages. Il a allégué dans son action qu'il est licencié depuis de nombreuses
années, qu'il a toujours respecté les lois de la Province se rapportant à la
vente des liqueurs alcooliques, que son restaurant avait une excellente
réputation, et jouissait de la faveur d'une clientèle nombreuse et recherchée. 5 Il a allégué
en outre qu'il faisait et fait encore partie de la secte religieuse des
"Témoins de Jéhovah", et que parce qu'il se serait rendu caution pour
quelque 390 de ses coreligionnaires, traduits devant les tribunaux
correctionnels de Montréal et accusés de distribution de littérature, sans
permis, l'intimé serait illégalement intervenu auprès du gérant de la
Commission pour lui faire perdre son permis, qui d'ailleurs lui a été enlevé le
4 décembre 1946. Ce serait comme résultat de l'intervention injustifiée de
l'intimé que l'appelant aurait été privé de son permis, et aurait ainsi
souffert les dommages considérables qu'il réclame. 6 La
Cour supérieure a maintenu l'action jusqu'à concurrence de $8,123.53, et la
Cour du banc de la reine[FN2], M. le Juge Rinfret étant dissident, aurait pour
divers motifs maintenu l'appel et rejeté l'action. 7
L'intimé a soulevé plusieurs moyens à l'encontre de cette réclamation,
mais je n'en examinerai qu'un seul, car je crois qu'il est suffisant pour
disposer du présent appel. Le Code de procédure civile de la province de Québec
contient la disposition suivante: Art. 88 C.P. — Nul officier public ou personne remplissant
des fonctions ou devoirs publics ne peut être poursuivi pour dommages à raison
d'un acte par lui fait dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, et nul verdict ou
jugement ne peut être rendu contre lui à moins qu'avis de cette poursuite ne
lui ait été donné au moins un mois avant l'émission de l'assignation. Cet avis doit être par écrit; il doit exposer les causes de l'action,
contenir l'indication des noms et de l'étude du procureur du demandeur ou de
son agent et être signifié au défendeur personnellement ou à son domicile. 8 Le
défaut de donner cet avis peut être invoqué par le défendeur, soit au moyen
d'une exception à la forme ou soit par plaidoyer au fond. Charland v. Kay[FN3];
Corporation de la Paroisse de St-David v. Paquet[FN4]; Houde v. Benoit[FN5]. 9 Les
termes mêmes employés par le législateur dans l'art. 88 C.P.C., "nul
jugement ne peut être rendu" contre le défendeur, indiquent aussi que la
Cour a le devoir de soulever d'office ce moyen, si le défendeur omet ou néglige
de le faire par exception à la forme, ou dans son plaidoyer écrit. La
signification de cet avis à un officier public, remplissant des devoirs
publics, est une condition préalable, essentielle à la réussite d'une procédure
judiciaire. S'il n'est pas donné, les tribunaux ne peuvent prononcer aucune
condamnation en dommages. Or, dans le cas présent, il est admis qu'aucun avis
n'a été donné. 10
Mais, c'est la prétention de l'appelant que l'intimé ne peut se
prévaloir de ce moyen qui est une fin de non recevoir, car, les conseils ou
avis qu'il aurait donnés et qui auraient été la cause déterminante de la perte
de son permis, ne l'ont pas été en raison d'un acte posé par lui dans
l'exercice de ses fonctions. 11 La
preuve révèle que l'appelant était bien licencié de la Commission des Liqueurs
depuis de nombreuses années, que la tenue de son restaurant était irréprochable,
et que dans le cours du mois de décembre de l'année 1946, alors qu'il était
toujours porteur de son permis, celui-ci lui a été enlevé parce qu'il se
rendait caution pour plusieurs centaines de ses coreligionnaires, distributeurs
de littérature que l'on croyait séditieuse. 12
C'était avant le jugement de cette Cour dans la cause de Boucher v. Le
Roi[FN6], alors que la conviction était profondément ancrée parmi la
population, que les "Témoins de Jéhovah" étaient des perturbateurs de
la paix publique, des sources constantes de trouble et de désordre dans la
Province. On jugeait leur mouvement dangereux, susceptible de soulever une
partie de la population contre l'autre, et de provoquer de sérieuses
agitations. On parlait même de conspiration séditieuse, et ce n'est sûrement
pas sans cause raisonnable, car cette opinion fut plus tard unanimement
confirmée par cinq juges de la Cour du Banc de la Reine dans l'affaire Boucher
v. Le Roi[FN7], et également par quatre juges dissidents devant cette Cour
(Boucher v. Le Roi cité supra). 13 M.
Archambault, alors gérant général de la Commission des Liqueurs, soupçonnait
fortement que le "Frank Roncarelli" qui par ses cautionnements aidait
financièrement ce mouvement qu'il croyait subversif, était détenteur d'un permis
de restaurateur pour la vente de liqueurs alcooliques. Il pensait évidemment
qu'il ne convenait pas que les bénéfices que Roncarelli retirait de son permis
de la Commission, soient utilisés à servir la cause d'agitateurs religieux,
dont les enseignements et les méthodes venaient en conflit avec les croyances
populaires. Il en informa l'intimé, procureur général, qui en cette qualité est
l'aviseur légal officiel de la province pour toutes les affaires juridiques. 14 Au
cours d'une première conversation téléphonique, M. Archambault suggéra à
l'intimé que le permis de Roncarelli lui soit enlevé, ce que d'ailleurs il
avait personnellement le droit de faire, en vertu de l'art. 35 de la Loi des
Liqueurs, qui est ainsi rédigé: 35. — La Commission peut à sa discrétion annuler un permis en
tout temps. 15 Or,
comme l'exécutif de la Commission des Liqueurs ne se compose que d'un gérant
général qui était M. Archambault, cette discrétion reposait entièrement sur
lui. 16
L'intimé lui suggéra la prudence, et lui proposa de s'enquérir avec
certitude si le Roncarelli, détenteur de permis, était bien le même Roncarelli
qui prodiguait ses cautionnements d'une façon si généreuse. Après enquête,
l'affirmative ayant été établie, M. Archambault communiqua de nouveau avec
l'intimé, et voici ce que nous dit M. Archambault dans son témoignage au sujet
de ces conversations: Q. Maintenant, ce jour-là où vous avez reçu une lettre, le 30 novembre
1946, avez-vous décidé, ce jour-là, d'enlever la licence? R. Certainement, ce jour-là, j'avais appelé le Premier Ministre, en
l'occurrence le procureur général, lui faisant part des constatations, c'est-
à-dire des renseignements que je possédais, et de mon intention d'annuler le
privilège, et le Premier Ministre m'a répondu de prendre mes précautions, de
bien vérifier s'il s'agissait bien de la même personne, qu'il pouvait y avoir
plusieurs Roncarelli, et coetera. Alors, quand j'ai eu la confirmation de Y3 à
l'effet que c'était la même personne, j'ai appelé le Premier Ministre pour
l'assurer qu'il s'agissait bien de Frank Roncarelli, détenteur d'un permis de
la Commission des Liqueurs; et, là, le Premier Ministre m'a autorisé, il m'a
donné son consentement, son approbation, sa permission, et son ordre de
procéder. 17 Voici
maintenant la version de l'intimé: Probablement, à la suite du rapport que l'indicateur Y-3 a fait, le
rapport qui est produit, M. le Juge Archambault m'a téléphoné et m'a dit: 'On
est sûr, c'est cette personne-là.' Et comme dans l'intervalle j'avais étudié le
problème et parcouru les statuts depuis l'institution de la Commission des
Liqueurs et tous les amendements qui avaient eu lieu, et j'avais consulté, j'en
suis arrivé à la conclusion qu'en mon âme et conscience, mon impérieux devoir
c'était d'approuver la suggestion très au point du Juge et d'autoriser la
cancellation d'un privilège que cet homme-là ne méritait pas, à mon sens, et
dont il n'était pas digne. 18 Et: Après avoir mûrement délibéré et conscient et sûr de faire mon devoir,
j'ai dit à M. Archambault que j'approuvais sa suggestion d'annuler le permis,
d'annuler le privilège. 19 Et,
plus loin: ...j'ai dit au Juge Archambault que j'étais de son opinion, que je ne
croyais pas que Roncarelli fût digne d'obtenir des privilèges de la province
après son attitude que j'ai mentionnée tout à l'heure. ...et lorsque le Juge Archambault m'a dit, après vérification, que
c'était la même personne, j'ai dit: 'Vous avez raison, ôtez le permis, ôtez le
privilège.' 20
Quand on demande à l'intimé s'il a donné un ordre à M. Archambault,
voici ce qu'il dit: Non, je n'ai pas donné un ordre à M. Archambault, je viens de conter
ce qui s'est passé. 21 Que
le permis ait été enlevé à Roncarelli comme conséquence de la seule décision de
M. Archambault, ce qu'il avait le droit de faire à sa discrétion, ou que cette
discrétion ait été influencée par les paroles de l'intimé, n'a pas je crois
d'effet décisif dans la détermination de la présente cause. Je demeure
convaincu que même si les paroles de l'intimé ont pu avoir quelque influence
sur la décision qui a été prise, ce dernier demeurait quand même un officier
public, agissant dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, et qu'il était essentiel de
lui donner l'avis requis par l'art. 88 C.P.C. L'absence de cet avis interdit
aux tribunaux de prononcer aucune condamnation. 22
L'intimé est sûrement un officier public, et il me semble clair qu'il
n'a pas agi en sa qualité personnelle. C'est bien comme aviseur légal de la
Commission des Liqueurs, et aussi comme officier public chargé de la prévention
des troubles, et gardien de la paix dans la province, qu'il a été consulté.
C'est le Procureur Général, agissant dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, qui a
été requis de donner ses directives à une branche gouvernementale dont il est
l'aviseur. Vide: Loi concernant le Département du Procureur Général, R.S.Q.
1941, c. 46, art. 3, Loi des liqueurs alcooliques, S.R.Q. 1941, c. 255, art
138. 23
Certains, à tort ou à raison, peuvent croire que l'intimé se soit
trompé, en pensant qu'il devait, pour le maintien de la paix publique et la
suppression de troubles existants, et qui menaçaient de se propager davantage,
conseiller l'enlèvement du permis de l'appelant. Pour ma part, je ne puis
admettre le fallacieux principe qu'une erreur commise par un officier public,
en posant un acte qui se rattache cependant à l'objet de son mandat, enléve à
cet acte son caractère officiel, et que l'auteur de ce même acte fautif cesse
alors d'agir dans l'exécution de ses fonctions. 24
Parce que l'appelant ne s'est pas conformé aux exigences de l'art. 88
C.P.C., en ne donnant pas l'avis requis à l'intimé qui est un officier public,
agissant dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, je crois que l'action ne peut
réussir. Le défaut de remplir cette condition préalable, constitute une fin de
non recevoir, qui me dispense d'examiner les autres aspects de cette cause. 25 Je
crois donc que l'appel principal, de même que l'appel logé pour faire augmenter
le montant accordé par le juge de première instance, doivent être rejetés avec
dépens de toutes les Cours. The judgment of Rand and Judson JJ. was delivered by Rand J.: 26 The
material facts from which my conclusion is drawn are these. The appellant was
the proprietor of a restaurant in a busy section of Montreal which in 1946
through its transmission to him from his father had been continuously licensed
for the sale of liquor for approximately 34 years; he is of good education and
repute and the restaurant was of a superior class. On December 4 of that year,
while his application for annual renewal was before the Liquor Commission, the
existing license was cancelled and his application for renewal rejected, to
which was added a declaration by the respondent that no future license would
ever issue to him. These primary facts took place in the following
circumstances. 27 For
some years the appellant had been an adherent of a rather militant Christian
religious sect known as the Witnesses of Jehovah. Their ideology condemns the
established church institutions and stresses the absolute and exclusive
personal relation of the individual to the Deity without human intermediation
or intervention. 28 The
first impact of their proselytizing zeal upon the Roman Catholic church and
community in Quebec, as might be expected, produced a violent reaction.
Meetings were forcibly broken up, property damaged, individuals ordered out of
communities, in one case out of the province, and generally, within the cities
and towns, bitter controversy aroused. The work of the Witnesses was carried on
both by word of mouth and by the distribution of printed matter, the latter
including two periodicals known as "The Watch Tower" and
"Awake", sold at a small price. 29 In
1945 the provincial authorities began to take steps to bring an end to what was
considered insulting and offensive to the religious beliefs and feelings of the
Roman Catholic population. Large scale arrests were made of young men and
women, by whom the publications mentioned were being held out for sale, under
local by-laws requiring a licence for peddling any kind of wares. Altogether
almost one thousand of such charges were laid. The penalty involved in
Montreal, where most of the arrests took place, was a fine of $40, and as the
Witnesses disputed liability, bail was in all cases resorted to. 30 The
appellant, being a person of some means, was accepted by the Recorder's Court
as bail without question, and up to November 12, 1946, he had gone security in
about 380 cases, some of the accused being involved in repeated offences. Up to
this time there had been no suggestion of impropriety; the security of the
appellant was taken as so satisfactory that at times, to avoid delay when he
was absent from the city, recognizances were signed by him in blank and kept
ready for completion by the Court officials. The reason for the accumulation of
charges was the doubt that they could be sustained in law. Apparently the legal
officers of Montreal, acting in concert with those of the Province, had come to
an agreement with the attorney for the Witnesses to have a test case proceeded
with. Pending that, however, there was no stoppage of the sale of the tracts
and this became the annoying circumstance that produced the volume of
proceedings. 31 On
or about November 12 it was decided to require bail in cash for Witnesses so
arrested and the sum set ranged from $100 to $300. No such bail was furnished
by the appellant; his connection with giving security ended with this change of
practice; and in the result, all of the charges in relation to which he had
become surety were dismissed. 32 At
no time did he take any part in the distribution of the tracts: he was an
adherent of the group but nothing more. It was shown that he had leased to
another member premises in Sherbrooke which were used as a hall for carrying on
religious meetings: but it is unnecessary to do more than mention that fact to
reject it as having no bearing on the issues raised. Beyond the giving of bail
and being an adherent, the appellant is free from any relation that could be
tortured into a badge of character pertinent to his fitness or unfitness to
hold a liquor licence. 33 The
mounting resistance that stopped the surety bail sought other means of crushing
the propagandist invasion and among the circumstances looked into was the
situation of the appellant. Admittedly an adherent, he was enabling these
protagonists to be at large to carry on their campaign of publishing what they
believed to be the Christian truth as revealed by the Bible; he was also the
holder of a liquor licence, a "privilege" granted by the Province,
the profits from which, as it was seen by the authorities, he was using to
promote the disturbance of settled beliefs and arouse community disaffection
generally. Following discussions between the then Mr. Archambault, as the
personality of the Liquor Commission, and the chief prosecuting officer in
Montreal, the former, on or about November 21, telephoned to the respondent,
advised him of those facts, and queried what should be done. Mr. Duplessis
answered that the matter was serious and that the identity of the person
furnishing bail and the liquor licensee should be put beyond doubt. A few days
later, that identity being established through a private investigator, Mr. Archambault
again communicated with the respondent and, as a result of what passed between
them, the licence, as of December 4, 1946, was revoked. 34 In
the meantime, about November 25, 1946, a blasting answer had come from the
Witnesses. In an issue of one of the periodicals, under the heading
"Quebec's Burning Hate", was a searing denunciation of what was
alleged to be the savage persecution of Christian believers. Immediately
instructions were sent out from the department of the Attorney-General ordering
the confiscation of the issue and proceedings were taken against one Boucher
charging him with publication of a seditious libel. 35 It
is then wholly as a private citizen, an adherent of a religious group, holding
a liquor licence and furnishing bail to arrested persons for no other purpose
than to enable them to be released from detention pending the determination of
the charges against them, and with no other relevant considerations to be taken
into account, that he is involved in the issues of this controversy. 36 The
complementary state of things is equally free from doubt. From the evidence of
Mr. Duplessis and Mr. Archambault alone, it appears that the action taken by
the latter as the general manager and sole member of the Commission was dictated
by Mr. Duplessis as Attorney-General and Prime Minister of the province; that
that step was taken as a means of bringing to a halt the activities of the
Witnesses, to punish the appellant for the part he had played not only by
revoking the existing licence but in declaring him barred from one
"forever", and to warn others that they similarly would be stripped
of provincial "privileges" if they persisted in any activity directly
or indirectly related to the Witnesses and to the objectionable campaign. The
respondent felt that action to be his duty, something which his conscience
demanded of him; and as representing the provincial government his decision
became automatically that of Mr. Archambault and the Commission. The following
excerpts of evidence make this clear: M. DUPLESSIS: R. ...Au mois de novembre 1946, M. Edouard Archambault, qui était
alors le gérant général de la Commission des Liqueurs m'a appelé à Québec,
téléphone longue distance de Montréal, et il m'a dit que Roncarelli qui
multipliait les cautionnements à la Cour du Recorder d'une façon désordonnée,
contribuant à paralyser les activités de la Police et à congestionner les
tribunaux, que ce nommé Roncarelli détenait un privilège de la Commission des
Liqueurs de Québec. De fait, Votre Seigneurie, un permis est un privilège, ce
n'est pas un droit. L'article 35 de la Loi des Liqueurs alcooliques, paragraphe
1, a été édicté en 1921 par le statut II, Geo. V, chap. 24, qui déclare ceci: La Commission peut, à sa discrétion annuler le permis en tout temps. . . . . . "Je vais m'en informer et je vous le dirai." J'ai dit au
Juge: "Dans l'intervalle, je vais examiner la question avec des officiers
légaux, je vais y penser, je vais réfléchir et je vais voir ce que devrai
faire." Quelques jours après, et pendant cet intervalle j'ai étudié le
problème, j'ai étudié des dossiers, comme Procureur Général et comme Premier
Ministre, quelques jours après le Juge Archambault, M. Edouard Archambault, m'a
téléphoné pour me dire qu'il était certain que le Roncarelli en question, qui
paralysait les activités de la Cour du Recorder qui accaparait dans une large
mesure les services de la force constabulaire de Montréal, dont les journaux
disaient avec raison qu'elle n'avait pas le nombre suffisant de policiers,
était bien la personne qui détenait un permis. Je lui ai dit: "Dans ces
circonstances, je considère que c'est mon devoir, comme Procureur Général et
comme Premier Ministre, en conscience, dans l'exercice de mes fonctions
officielles et pour remplir le mandat que le peuple m'avait confié et qu'il m'a
renouvelé avec une immense majorité en 1948, après la cancellation du permis et
après la poursuite intentée contre moi, j'ai cru que c'était mon devoir, en
conscience, de dire au Juge que ce permis-là, le Gouvernement de Québec ne
pouvait pas accorder un privilège à un individu comme Roncarelli qui tenait
l'attitude qu'il tenait." . . . . . J'ai dit: "Il y a peut-être de pauvres personnes, de bonne foi,
plus riches d'idéal que d'esprit, de jugement, ces personnes-là sont
probablement à la merci de quelques-uns qui les exploitent, je vais donner une
entrevue pour attirer l'attention de tout le monde sur l'article 69 du Code
Criminel, qui déclare que les complices sont responsables au même titre que la
personne qui a commis l'offense." . . . . . D. Vous n'avez pas reçu d'autres documents, c'est seulement les
communications téléphoniques de M. le Juge Archambault? R. Oui, certainement, un message du Juge Archambault, un autre
téléphone au Juge Archambault, des examens de la situation, on en a même parlé
au Conseil des Ministres, j'ai discuté le cas, j'ai consulté des officiers en
loi et en mon âme et conscience j'ai fait mon devoir comme Procureur Général,
j'ai fait la seule chose qui s'imposait, si c'était à recommencer je ferais
pareil. D. Monsieur le Premier Ministre, le 8 février 1947, dans le journal La
Presse, paraissait un article intitulé: "Roncarelli subit un second
refus". Le sous- titre de cet article se lit comme suit: "L'honorable
M. Duplessis refuse au restaurateur, protecteur des Témoins de Jéhovah, la
permission de poursuivre la Commission des Liqueurs." Vous trouverez,
monsieur le Premier Ministre, presque à la fin de ce rapport, les mots
suivants: C'est moi-même, à titre de Procureur Général, et de responsable de
l'ordre dans cette province, qui ai donné l'ordre à la Commission des Liqueurs
d'annuler son permis référant à Roncarelli. Je vous demande, monsieur le Premier Ministre, si c'est un rapport
exact de vos paroles à cette conférence de presse? R. Ce que j'ai dit lors de la conférence de presse, c'est ce que je
viens de déclarer. Je ne connaissais pas Roncarelli, je ne savais pas que
Roncarelli avait un permis, ... lorsqu'il a attiré mon attention sur la
situation absolument anormale d'un homme bénéficiant d'un privilège de la
province, et multipliant les actes de nature à paralyser les tribunaux de la
province et la police municipale de Montréal, c'est là que j'ai approuvé sa
suggestion et que j'ai dit, comme Procureur général... LA COUR: — C'est une autre question que l'on vous pose,
Monsieur le Premier Ministre. Voulez-vous relire la question. (La demande
précédente est alors relue.) R. Ce que j'ai dit à la presse, c'est ce que je viens de dire tout à
l'heure. L'article tel que produit n'est pas conforme textuellement à ce que
j'ai dit. Ce que j'ai dit, ce que je répète, c'est que le Juge Archambault,
gérant de la Commission des Liqueurs m'a mis au fait d'une situation que
j'ignorais et comme Procureur Général, pour accomplir mon devoir, j'ai dit au
Juge Archambault que j'étais de son opinion, que je ne croyais pas que
Roncarelli fut digne d'obtenir des privilèges de la province après son attitude
que j'ai mentionnée tout à l'heure. . . . . . D. Les mots que je viens de vous lire tout à l'heure, c'est censé être
textuellement les mots que vous avez donnés, parce que c'est précédé d'une
indication d'un rapport textuel: Nous n'avons fait qu'exercer en ce faisant un droit formel et
incontestable, nous avons rempli un impérieux devoir. Le permis de Roncarelli a
été annulé non pas temporairement mais bien pour toujours. LE TÉMOIN: — Si j'ai dit cela? L'AVOCAT: — Oui. R. Oui. Le permis de Roncarelli a été annulé pour ce temps-là et pour
toujours. Je l'ai dit et je considérais que c'était mon devoir et en mon âme et
conscience j'aurais manqué à mon devoir si je ne l'avais pas fait. D. Avec ces renseignements additionnels diriez-vous que les mots:
"C'est moi- même, à titre de Procureur Général et de responsable de
l'ordre dans cette province qui ai donné l'ordre à la Commission des Liqueurs
d'annuler son permis." Diriez-vous que c'est exact? R. J'ai dit tout à l'heure ce qui en était. J'ai eu un téléphone de M.
Archambault me mettant au courant de certains faits que j'ignorais au sujet de
Roncarelli. Vérification, identification pour voir si c'était bien la même
personne, étude, réflexion, consultation et décision d'approuver la suggestion
du gérant de la Commission des Liqueurs d'annuler le privilège de Roncarelli. . . . . . LA COUR: D.M. Stein veut savoir si vous avez donné un ordre à M. Archambault? R. Non, je n'ai pas donné un ordre à M. Archambault, je viens de
conter ce qui s'est passé. Le juge Archambault m'a mis au courant d'un fait que
je ne connaissais pas, je ne connaissais pas les faits, c'est lui qui m'a mis
au courant des faits. Je ne sais pas comment on peut appeler ça, quand le
Procureur Général, qui est à la tête d'un département, parle à un officier,
même à un officier supérieur, et qu'il émet une opinion, ce n'est pas
directement un ordre, c'en est un sans l'être. Mais c'est à la suggestion du
Juge Archambault, après qu'il eut porté à ma connaissance des faits que
j'ignorais, que la décision a été prise. . . . . . D. Monsieur le Premier Ministre, excusez-moi si je répète encore la
question, mais il me semble que vous n'avez pas répondu à la question que j'ai
posée. Il paraît, non seulement dans ce journal, mais aussi dans d'autres
journaux, et cela est répété exactement dans les même paroles, dans le Montreal
Star, en anglais, dans la Gazette, en anglais, dans Le Canada, en français et
aussi dans La Patrie, en français, textuellement les mêmes mots: "C'est
moi-même, à titre de Procureur Géneral, chargé d'assurer le respect de l'ordre
et le respect des citoyens paisibles qui ai donné à la Commission des Liqueurs,
l'ordre d'annuler le permis." Je vous demande si c'est possible que vous
ayez employé presque exactement ces mots en discutant l'affaire avec les
journalistes, ce jour-là? R. Lorsque les journalistes viennent au bureau pour avoir des
entrevues, des fois les entrevues durent une demi-heure, des fois une heure,
des fois une heure et demie; quels sont les termes exacts qui sont employés, on
ne peut pas se souvenir exactement des termes. Mais la vérité vraie c'est ce
que j'ai dit tout à l'heure, et c'est cela que j'ai dit aux journalistes, comme
Premier Ministre et comme Procureur Général, je prends la responsabilité. Si
j'avais dit au Juge Archambault: "Vous ne le ferez pas", il ne
l'aurait probablement pas fait. Comme il me suggérait de le faire et qu'après
réflexion et vérification je trouvais que c'était correct, que c'était conforme
à mon devoir, j'ai approuvé et c'est toujours un ordre que l'on donne. Quand
l'officier supérieur parle, c'est un ordre que l'on donne, même s'il accepte la
suggestion de l'officier dans son département, c'est un ordre qu'il donne
indirectement. Je ne me rappelle pas des expressions exactes, mais ce sont les
faits. . . . . . D. Référant à l'article contenue dans la Gazette du 5 décembre,
c'est-à- dire le jour suivant l'annulation du permis, vous trouvez là les mots
en anglais: In statement to the press yesterday, the Premier recalled that: 'Two
weeks ago, I pointed out that the Provincial Government had the firm intention
to take the most rigorous and efficient measures possible to get rid of those
who under the names of Witnesses of Jehovah, distribute circulars which in my
opinion, are not only injurious for Quebec and its population, but which are of
a very libellous and seditious character. The propaganda of the Witnesses of
Jehovah cannot be tolerated and there are more than 400 of them now before the
courts in Montreal, Quebec, Three Rivers and other centers.' 'A certain Mr. Roncarelli has supplied bail for hundreds of witnesses
of Jehovah. The sympathy which this man has shown for the Witnesses, in such an
evident, repeated and audacious manner, is a provocation to public order, to
the administration of justice and is definitely contrary to the aims of
justice.' D. Je vous demande, monsieur le Premier Ministre, si ce sont les
paroles presque exactes ou exactes que vous avez dites à la conférence de
presse? R. Que j'ai dit ici: "A certain Mr. Roncarelli has supplied bail
for hundreds of witnesses of Jehovah. The Sympathy which this man has shown for
the Witnesses, in such an evident, repeated and audacious manner, is a
provocation to public order, to the administration of justice and is definitely
contrary to the aims of justice." Je l'ai dit et je considère que c'est
vrai. . . . . . M. ARCHAMBAULT: D. Maintenant, ce jour-là où vous avez reçu une lettre, le 30 novembre
1946, avez-vous décidé, ce jour-là, d'enlever la licence? R. Certainement, ce jour-là, j'avais appelé le Premier Ministre, en
l'occurrence le procureur général, lui faisant part des constatations, c'est-
à-dire des renseignements que je possédais, et de mon intention d'annuler le
privilège, et le Premier Ministre m'a répondu de prendre mes précautions, de
bien vérifier s'il s'agissait bien de la même personne, qu'il pouvait y avoir
plusieurs Roncarelli, et coetera. Alors, quand j'ai eu la confirmation de Y3 à
l'effet que c'était la même personne, j'ai rappelé le Premier Ministre pour
l'assurer qu'il s'agissait bien de Frank Roncarelli, détenteur d'un permis de
la Commission des Liqueurs; et, là, le Premier Ministre m'a autorisé, il m'a
donné son consentement, son approbation, sa permission, et son ordre de
procéder. 37 In
these circumstances, when the de facto power of the Executive over its appointees
at will to such a statutory public function is exercised deliberately and
intentionally to destroy the vital business interests of a citizen, is there
legal redress by him against the person so acting? This calls for an
examination of the statutory provisions governing the issue, renewal and
revocation of liquor licences and the scope of authority entrusted by law to
the Attorney-General and the government in relation to the administration of
the Act. 38 The
liquor law is contained in R.S.Q. 1941, c. 255, entitled An Act Respecting
Alcoholic Liquor. A Commission is created as a corporation, the only member of
which is the general manager. By s. 5. The exercise of the functions, duties and powers of the Quebec Liquor
Commission shall be vested in one person alone, named by the Lieutenant-
Governor in Council, with the title of Manager. The remuneration of such person
shall be determined by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council and be paid out of
the revenues of the Liquor Commission. R.S. 1925, c. 37, s. 5; 1 Ed. VII (2),
c. 14, ss. 1 and 5; 1 Geo. VI, c. 22, ss. 1 and 5. The entire staff for carrying out the duties of the Commission are
appointed by the general manager — here Mr. Archambault — who
fixes salaries and assigns functions, the Lieutenant-Governor in Council
reserving the right of approval of the salaries. Besides the general operation
of buying and selling liquor throughout the province and doing all things
necessary to that end, the Commission is authorized by s. 9 (e) to "grant,
refuse or cancel permits for the sale of alcoholic liquors or other permits in
regard thereto and to transfer the permit of any person deceased". By s.
12 suits against the general manager for acts done in the exercise of his
duties require the authority of the Chief Justice of the province, and the
Commission can be sued only with the consent of the Attorney-General. Every
officer of the Commission is declared to be a public officer and by R.S.Q.
1941, c. 10, s. 2, holds office during pleasure. By s. 19 the Commission shall
pay over to the Provincial Treasurer any moneys which the latter considers
available and by s. 20 the Commission is to account to the Provincial Treasurer
for its receipts, disbursements, assets and liabilities. Sections 30 and 32 provide
for the issue of permits to sell; they are to be granted to individuals only,
in their own names; by s. 34 the Commission "may refuse to grant any
permit"; subs.(2) provides for permits in special cases of municipalities
where prohibition of sale is revoked in whole or part by by-law; subs. (3)
restricts or refuses the grant of permits in certain cities the Council of
which so requests; but it is provided that ...If the fyling of such by-law takes place after the Commission has
granted a permit in such city or town, the Commission shall be unable to give
effect to the request before the first of May next after the date of fyling. Subsection (4) deals with a refusal to issue permits in small cities
unless requested by a by-law, approved by a majority vote of the electors. By
subs. (6) special power is given the Commission to grant permits to hotels in
summer resorts for five months only notwithstanding that requests under subss.
(2) and (4) are not made. Section 35 prescribes the expiration of every permit
on April 30 of each year. Dealing with cancellation, the section provides that
the "Commission may cancel any permit at its discretion". Besides the
loss of the privilege and without the necessity of legal proceedings,
cancellation entails loss of fees paid to obtain it and confiscation of the
liquor in the possession of the holder and the receptacles containing it. If
the cancellation is not followed by prosecution for an offence under the Act,
compensation is provided for certain items of the forfeiture. Subsection (5)
requires the Commission to cancel any permit made use of on behalf of a person
other than the holder; s. 36 requires cancellation in specified cases. The sale
of liquor is, by s. 42, forbidden to various persons. Section 148 places upon the
Attorney-General the duty of 1. Assuring the observance of this Act and of the Alcoholic Liquor
Possession and Transportation Act (Chap. 256), and investigating, preventing
and suppressing the infringements of such acts, in every way authorized thereby; 2. Conducting the suits or prosecutions for infringements of this Act
or of the said Alcoholic Liquor Possession and Transportation Act. R.S. 1925,
c. 37, s. 78a; 24 Geo. V, c. 17, s. 17. The provisions of the statute, which may be supplemented by detailed
regulations, furnish a code for the complete administration of the sale and
distribution of alcoholic liquors directed by the Commission as a public
service, for all legitimate purposes of the populace. It recognizes the
association of wines and liquors as embellishments of food and its ritual and
as an interest of the public. As put in Macbeth, the "sauce to meat is
ceremony", and so we have restaurants, cafés, hotels and other places of
serving food, specifically provided for in that association. 39 At
the same time the issue of permits has a complementary interest in those so
catering to the public. The continuance of the permit over the years, as in
this case, not only recognizes its virtual necessity to a superior class
restaurant but also its identification with the business carried on. The
provisions for assignment of the permit are to this most pertinent and they
were exemplified in the continuity of the business here. As its exercise
continues, the economic life of the holder becomes progressively more deeply
implicated with the privilege while at the same time his vocation becomes
correspondingly dependent on it. 40 The
field of licensed occupations and businesses of this nature is steadily
becoming of greater concern to citizens generally. It is a matter of vital
importance that a public administration that can refuse to allow a person to
enter or continue a calling which, in the absence of regulation, would be free
and legitimate, should be conducted with complete impartiality and integrity;
and that the grounds for refusing or cancelling a permit should unquestionably
be such and such only as are incompatible with the purposes envisaged by the
statute: the duty of a Commission is to serve those purposes and those only. A
decision to deny or cancel such a privilege lies within the
"discretion" of the Commission; but that means that decision is to be
based upon a weighing of considerations pertinent to the object of the
administration. 41 In
public regulation of this sort there is no such thing as absolute and
untrammelled "discretion", that is that action can be taken on any
ground or for any reason that can be suggested to the mind of the
administrator; no legislative Act can, without express language, be taken to
contemplate an unlimited arbitrary power exercisable for any purpose, however
capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the nature or purpose of the statute.
Fraud and corruption in the Commission may not be mentioned in such statutes
but they are always implied as exceptions. "Discretion" necessarily
implies good faith in discharging public duty; there is always a perspective
within which a statute is intended to operate; and any clear departure from its
lines or objects is just as objectionable as fraud or corruption. Could an
applicant be refused a permit because he had been born in another province, or
because of the colour of his hair? The ordinary language of the legislature
cannot be so distorted. 42 To
deny or revoke a permit because a citizen exercises an unchallengeable right
totally irrelevant to the sale of liquor in a restaurant is equally beyond the
scope of the discretion conferred. There was here not only revocation of the
existing permit but a declaration of a future, definitive disqualification of
the appellant to obtain one: it was to be "forever". This purports to
divest his citizenship status of its incident of membership in the class of
those of the public to whom such a privilege could be extended. Under the
statutory language here, that is not competent to the Commission and a fortiori
to the government or the respondent: McGillivray v. Kimber[FN8]. There is here
an administrative tribunal which, in certain respects, is to act in a judicial
manner; and even on the view of the dissenting justices in McGillivray, there
is liability: what could be more malicious than to punish this licensee for
having done what he had an absolute right to do in a matter utterly irrelevant
to the Liquor Act? Malice in the proper sense is simply acting for a reason and
purpose knowingly foreign to the administration, to which was added here the
element of intentional punishment by what was virtually vocation outlawry. 43 It
may be difficult if not impossible in cases generally to demonstrate a breach
of this public duty in the illegal purpose served; there may be no means, even
if proceedings against the Commission were permitted by the Attorney-General,
as here they were refused, of compelling the Commission to justify a refusal or
revocation or to give reasons for its action; on these questions I make no
observation; but in the case before us that difficulty is not present: the
reasons are openly avowed. 44 The
act of the respondent through the instrumentality of the Commission brought
about a breach of an implied public statutory duty toward the appellant; it was
a gross abuse of legal power expressly intended to punish him for an act wholly
irrelevant to the statute, a punishment which inflicted on him, as it was
intended to do, the destruction of his economic life as a restaurant keeper
within the province. Whatever may be the immunity of the Commission or its
member from an action for damages, there is none in the respondent. He was
under no duty in relation to the appellant and his act was an instrusion upon the
functions of a statutory body. The injury done by him was a fault engaging
liability within the principles of the underlying public law of Quebec: Mostyn
v. Fabrigas[FN9], and under art. 1053 of the Civil Code. That, in the presence
of expanding administrative regulation of economic activities, such a step and
its consequences are to be suffered by the victim without recourse or remedy,
that an administration according to law is to be superseded by action dictated
by and according to the arbitrary likes, dislikes and irrelevant purposes of
public officers acting beyond their duty, would signalize the beginning of
disintegration of the rule of law as a fundamental postulate of our
constitutional structure. An administration of licences on the highest level of
fair and impartial treatment to all may be forced to follow the practice of
"first come, first served", which makes the strictest observance of
equal responsibility to all of even greater importance; at this stage of
developing government it would be a danger of high consequence to tolerate such
a departure from good faith in executing the legislative purpose. It should be
added, however, that that principle is not, by this language, intended to be
extended to ordinary governmental employment: with that we are not here
concerned. 45 It
was urged by Mr. Beaulieu that the respondent, as the incumbent of an office of
state, so long as he was proceeding in "good faith", was free to act
in a matter of this kind virtually as he pleased. The office of Attorney-
General traditionally and by statute carries duties that relate to advising the
Executive, including here, administrative bodies, enforcing the public law and
directing the administration of justice. In any decision of the statutory body
in this case, he had no part to play beyond giving advice on legal questions
arising. In that role his action should have been limited to advice on the
validity of a revocation for such a reason or purpose and what that advice
should have been does not seem to me to admit of any doubt. To pass from this
limited scope of action to that of bringing about a step by the Commission
beyond the bounds prescribed by the legislature for its exclusive action
converted what was done into his personal act. 46
"Good faith" in this context, applicable both to the
respondent and the general manager, means carrying out the statute according to
its intent and for its purpose; it means good faith in acting with a rational
appreciation of that intent and purpose and not with an improper intent and for
an alien purpose; it does not mean for the purposes of punishing a person for
exercising an unchallengeable right; it does not mean arbitrarily and illegally
attempting to divest a citizen of an incident of his civil status. 47 I
mention, in order to make clear that it has not been overlooked, the decision
of the House of Lords in Allen v. Flood[FN10], in which the principle was laid
down that an act of an individual otherwise not actionable does not become so
because of the motive or reason for doing it, even maliciously to injure, as
distinguished from an act done by two or more persons. No contention was made
in the present case based on agreed action by the respondent and Mr.
Archambault. In Allen v. Flood, the actor was a labour leader and the victims
non-union workmen who were lawfully dismissed by their employer to avoid a
strike involving no breach of contract or law. Here the act done was in
relation to a public administration affecting the rights of a citizen to enjoy
a public privilege, and a duty implied by the statute toward the victim was
violated. The existing permit was an interest for which the appellant was
entitled to protection against any unauthorized interference, and the illegal
destruction of which gave rise to a remedy for the damages suffered. In Allen
v. Flood there were no such elements. 48 Nor
is it necessary to examine the question whether on the basis of an improper
revocation the appellant could have compelled the issue of a new permit or
whether the purported revocation was a void act. The revocation was de facto,
it was intended to end the privilege and to bring about the consequences that
followed. As against the respondent, the appellant was entitled to treat the
breach of duty as effecting a revocation and to elect for damages. 49 Mr.
Scott argued further that even if the revocation were within the scope of
discretion and not a breach of duty, the intervention of the respondent in so
using the Commission was equally a fault. The proposition generalized is this:
where, by a statute restricting the ordinary activities of citizens, a
privilege is conferred by an administrative body, the continuance of that
enjoyment is to be free from the influence of third persons on that body for
the purpose only of injuring the privilege holder. It is the application to
such a privilege of the proposition urged but rejected in Allen v. Flood in the
case of a private employment. The grounds of distinction between the two cases
have been pointed out; but for the reasons given consideration of this ground
is unnecessary and I express no opinion for or against it. 50 A
subsidiary defence was that notice of action had not been given as required by
art. 88 C.C.P. This provides generally that, without such notice, no public
officer or person fulfilling any public function or duty is liable in damages
"by reason of any act done by him in the exercise of his functions".
Was the act here, then, done by the respondent in the course of that exercise?
The basis of the claim, as I have found it, is that the act was quite beyond
the scope of any function or duty committed to him, so far so that it was one
done exclusively in a private capacity, however much in fact the influence of
public office and power may have carried over into it. It would be only through
an assumption of a general overriding power of executive direction in statutory
administrative matters that any colour of propriety in the act could be found.
But such an assumption would be in direct conflict with fundamental postulates
of our provincial as well as dominion government; and in the actual
circumstances there is not a shadow of justification for it in the statutory
language. 51 The
damages suffered involved the vocation of the appellant within the province.
Any attempt at a precise computation or estimate must assume probabilities in
an area of uncertainty and risk. The situation is one which the Court should
approach as a jury would, in a view of its broad features; and in the best
consideration I can give to them, the damages should be fixed at the sum of
$25,000 plus that allowed by the trial court. 52 I
would therefore allow the appeals, set aside the judgment of the Court of
Queen's Bench and restore the judgment at trial modified by increasing the
damages to the sum of $33,123.53. The appellant should have his costs in the
Court of Queen's Bench and in this Court. The judgment of Locke and Martland JJ. was delivered by Martland J.: 53 This
is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, Appeal Side, for
the Province of Quebec[FN11], District of Montreal, rendered on April 12, 1956,
overruling the judgment of the Superior Court rendered on May 2, 1951, under
the terms of which the appellant had bene awarded damages in the sum of $8,123.53
and costs. 54 The
appellant had appealed from the judgment of the Superior Court in respect of
the amount of damages awarded. This appeal was dismissed. 55 The
facts which give rise to this appeal are as follows: The appellant, on December 4, 1946, was the owner of a restaurant and
café situated at 1429 Crescent Street in the City of Montreal. At that time he
was the holder of a liquor permit, no. 68, granted to him on May 1, 1946,
pursuant to the provisions of the Alcoholic Liquor Act of the Province of
Quebec and which permitted the sale of alcoholic liquors in the restaurant and
café. The permit was valid until April 30, 1947, subject to possible
cancellation by the Quebec Liquor Commission (hereinafter sometimes referred to
as "the Commission") in accordance with the provisions of s. 35 of
that Act. The business operated by the appellant had been founded by his father
in the year 1912 and it had been continuously licensed until December 4, 1946.
The evidence is that prior to that date the appellant had complied with the
requirements of the Alcoholic Liquor Act and had conducted a high-class
restaurant business. The appellant was an adherent of the Witnesses of Jehovah. From some
time in 1944 until November 12, 1946, he had, on numerous occasions, given
security for Witnesses of Jehovah who had been prosecuted under City of
Montreal By-laws numbered 270 and 1643 for minor offences of distributing,
peddling and canvassing without a licence. The maximum penalty for these
offences was a fine of $40 and costs, or imprisonment for 60 days. The total
number of bonds furnished by the appellant was 390. These security bonds were
accepted by the City attorney and the Recorder of the City of Montreal without
remuneration to the appellant. None of the accused who had been bonded ever
defaulted. Subsequently the appellant was released from these bonds at his own
request and new security was furnished by others. As a result of a change of procedure in the Recorder's Court in
Montreal by the Attorney in Chief of that Court, the appellant was not accepted
as a bondsman in any cases before that Court after November 12, 1946. Up to November 12, 1946, the security bonds furnished by the appellant
were accepted without question. These bonds were based upon the value of the
appellant's immovable property containing the restaurant. The appellant did not
give any security in any criminal case involving a charge of sedition. About the 24th or 25th of November 1946 the pamphlet "Quebec's
Burning Hate" began to be distributed in the Province of Quebec by the
Witnesses of Jehovah. The Chief Crown Prosecutor in Montreal, then Mtre. Oscar
Gagnon, K.C., decided that the distribution of this pamphlet should be
prevented. There is no evidence that the appellant was at any time a
distributor of this pamphlet and his restaurant and café in Montreal was not
used for the distribution or storage of these pamphlets by himself or by anyone
else. The appellant had ceased to be a bondsman before the distribution of this
pamphlet in the Province of Quebec had commenced. On November 25, 1946, a number of pamphlets was seized in a building
in the City of Sherbrooke owned by the appellant and leased from him, as a
place of worship, by Witnesses of Jehovah under the control of the local
minister Mr. Raymond Browning. There is no evidence that the appellant was in
any way responsible for the activities of this congregation, or that he knew
that the pamphlet "Quebec's Burning Hate" was in those premises. 56 In
the course of his inquiries about the distribution of this pamphlet, Mr. Gagnon
learned that the appellant had been giving bail in a large number of cases in
the Recorder's Court and also that he was the holder of the liquor permit for
his restaurant. These facts were brought by Mr. Gagnon to the attention of Mr.
Edouard Archambault, then Chairman of the Quebec Liquor Commission and
subsequently Chief Judge of the Court of Sessions of the Peace. Mr. Archambault
then interviewed Recorder Paquette, who informed him that the appellant held a
licence from the Quebec Liquor Commission; that he was furnishing bail in a
large number of cases of infractions of municipal by-laws; that these were so
numerous that a great part of the police of Montreal had been taken from their
duties as a consequence and that his Court was congested by the large number of
cases pending before it. 57
Subsequent to the receipt of this information, Mr. Archambault
communicated by telephone with the respondent. The discussion which took place
on that occasion and on the occasion of a subsequent telephone call will be
reviewed later. Following the two telephone conversations between Mr.
Archambault and the respondent, Mr. Archambault, as manager of the Quebec
Liquor Commission, issued an order for the cancellation of the appellant's
permit without any prior notice to the appellant. All the liquor in the
possession of the appellant on his restaurant premises was seized and was taken
into the custody of the Commission. 58 The
appellant carried on his restaurant business without a liquor licence for a
period of approximately six months, after which, finding that the business
could not be thus operated profitably, he closed it down and later effected a
sale of the premises. 59 The
appellant commenced action against the respondent on June 3, 1947, claiming
damages in the total sum of $118,741. He alleged that the respondent, without
legal or statutory authority, had caused the cancellation of his liquor permit
as an act of reprisal because of his having acted as surety or bondsman for the
Witnesses of Jehovah in connection with the charges above mentioned. He alleged
that the permit had been arbitrarily and unlawfully cancelled and that, as a
result, he had sustained the damages claimed. 60 By
his defence the respondent alleged that the Witnesses of Jehovah, in the years
1945 and 1946, had, with the consent and encouragement of the appellant,
organized a propaganda campaign in the Province of Quebec, and particularly in
the City of Montreal, where they had distributed pamphlets of a seditious
character. The respondent referred to the fact that the appellant had acted as
surety for a number of persons under arrest and thus permitted them to repeat
their offences and to continue their campaign. He alleged that in his capacity
as Attorney-General of the Province of Quebec, after becoming cognizant of the
conduct of the appellant and of the fact that he held a permit issued by the
Quebec Liquor Commission, he had decided, after careful reflection, that it was
contrary to public order to permit the appellant to enjoy the benefit of the
privileges of this permit and that he, the respondent, had recommended to the
manager of the Quebec Liquor Commission the cancellation of that permit. It was
alleged that the permit did not give any right, but constituted a privilege
available only during the pleasure of the Commission. He alleged that in the
matter he had acted in his quality of Prime Minister and Attorney-General of
the Province of Quebec and, accordingly, could not incur any personal
responsibility. He further pleaded the provisions of art. 88 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and alleged that he had not received notice of the action as
required by the provisions of that article. 61 The
case came on for trial in the Superior Court before MacKinnon J., who made
findings of fact and reached conclusions in law as follows: 1. that the respondent gave an order to the manager of the Commission,
Mr. Archambault, to cancel the appellant's permit and that it was the respondent's
order which was the determining factor in relation to the cancellation of that
permit; 2. that the Commission had acted arbitrarily when it cancelled the
permit and had disregarded the rules of reason and justice; 3. that the respondent had failed to show that, in law, he had any
authority to interfere with the administration of the Commission, or to order
it to cancel a permit; 4. that the respondent was not entitled to receive notice of the
action pursuant to art. 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure because his acts
which were complained of were not done in the exercise of his functions. 62
Damages were awarded in the total amount of $8,123.53. 63 From
this judgment the respondent appealed. The appellant cross-appealed in respect
of the matter of damages, asking for an award in an increased amount. 64 The
respondent's appeal on the issue of liability was allowed and the appellant's
appeal was dismissed. Rinfret J. dissented in respect of the allowance of the
respondent's appeal. 65
Various reasons were given for the allowance of the appeal by the
majority of the Court[FN12]. They may be summarized as follows: Bissonnette J. reached the conclusion that, upon the evidence, the
decision to cancel the permit had been made by Mr. Archambault before taking
the respondent's advice. He also held that, according to the strict
interpretation of the Alcoholic Liquor Act, the Commission was not obliged to
justify before any Court the wisdom of its acts in cancelling a liquor permit. Pratte J. allowed the appeal of the respondent on the first ground
advanced by Bissonnette J., finding that there was no relationship of cause and
effect as between the acts of the respondent and the cancellation of the permit
because Mr. Archambault had already made his decision to cancel before
consulting with the respondent. Casey J. was of the same view with respect to this point. He also held
that, although the discretion of the Commission to cancel a permit should not
be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, no individual has an inherent right
to engage in the business regulated by the Act and the continuance of a permit
was conditional upon the holder being of good moral character and a suitable
person to exercise that privilege. In his view the chairman of the Commission
had reasonable grounds for believing that the Witnesses of Jehovah were engaged
in a campaign of libel and sedition and that the appellant, an active member of
the sect, was participating in the group's activities. His view was that, in the
light of this, the Commission could properly cancel the permit. Martineau J., like the other majority judges in the Court, found that
there was no relationship of cause and effect as between what the respondent
had done and the cancellation of the permit, also holding that Mr. Archambault
had decided to cancel it before communicating with the respondent. He was also
of the view that a Minister of the Crown is not liable if, in the exercise of
powers granted to him by law, he makes an erroneous decision upon reliable
information. He also held that, while the Commission's discretion to cancel a
permit was not absolute and had to be exercised in good faith, the discretion
is not quasi-judicial but "quasi-illimited" and only restricted by
the good faith of its officers. He was of the opinion that the good faith of
both the respondent and Mr. Archambault could not be doubted. He found that no
order to cancel the permit had been given by the respondent to Mr. Archambault.
He also held that, even if an order had been given and had been the determining
factor in procuring the cancellation of the permit, there would be no liability
upon the respondent, in view of the appellant's participation in the propaganda
of the Witnesses of Jehovah. Rinfret J., who dissented and who would have dismissed the
respondent's appeal, in general agreed with the conclusions reached by the
trial judge. 66 In
view of the foregoing, it appears that there are four main points which require
to be considered in the present appeal, which are as follows: 1. Was there a relationship of cause and effect as between the
respondent's acts and the cancellation of the appellant's permit? 2. If there was such a relationship, were the acts of the respondent
justifiable on the ground that he acted in good faith in the exercise of his
official functions as Attorney-General and Prime Minister of the Province of
Quebec? 3. Was the cancellation of the appellant's permit a lawful act of the
Commission, acting within the scope of its powers as defined in the Alcoholic
Liquor Act? 4. Was the respondent entitled to the protection provided by art. 88
of the Code of Civil Procedure? 67 It
is proposed to consider each of these points in the above sequence. 68 With
respect to the first point, after reviewing the evidence, I am satisfied that
there was ample evidence to sustain the finding of the trial judge that the
cancellation of the appellant's permit was the result of instructions given by
the respondent to the manager of the Commission. 69 Two telephone calls were made by Mr.
Archambault to the respondent. According to the evidence of the respondent, Mr.
Archambault telephoned him in November 1946 "et il m'a dit que Roncarelli
qui multipliait les cautionnements à la Cour du Recorder d'une façon
désordonnée, contribuant à paralyser les activités de la police et à
congestionner les tribunaux, que ce nommé Roncarelli détenait un privilège de
la Commission des Liqueurs de Québec." 70 In
reply the respondent says that he said to Mr. Archambault: C'est une chose très grave, êtes-vous sûr qu'il s'agit de Roncarelli
qui a un permis de la Commission des Liqueurs? 71 Mr.
Archambault then replied that he would inform himself and would communicate
with the respondent. 72 Some
time after the first telephone conversation, and apparently about November 30
or December 1, 1946, Mr. Archambault again telephoned the respondent to say: qu'il était certain que le Roncarelli en question, qui paralysait les
activités de la Cour du Recorder, qui accaparait dans une large mesure les
services de la force constabulaire de Montréal, dont les journaux disaient avec
raison qu'elle n'avait pas le nombre suffisant de policiers, était bien la
personne qui détenait un permis. 73 To
this the respondent replied: Dans ces circonstances, je considère que c'est mon devoir, comme
Procureur Général et comme Premier Ministre, en conscience, dans l'exercice de
mes fonctions officielles et pour remplir le mandat que le peuple m'avait
confié et qu'il m'a renouvelé avec une immense majorité en 1948, après la
cancellation du permis et après la poursuite intentée contre moi, j'ai cru que
c'était mon devoir, en conscience, de dire au Juge que ce permis-là le
Gouvernement de Québec ne pouvait pas accorder un privilège à un individu comme
Roncarelli qui tenait l'attitude qu'il tenait. 74 The
respondent further says that he told Mr. Archambault: Vous avez raison, ôtez le permis, ôtez le privilège. 75 In
February 1947 the respondent, in an interview with the press, stated that the
appellant's permit had been cancelled on orders from him. His statement on this
point appeared in a news dispatch to the Canadian Press from its Quebec
correspondent: It was I, as Attorney-General of the Province charged with the
protection of good order, who gave the order to annual Frank Roncarelli's
permit. Mr. Duplessis said: By so doing, not only have we exercised a right but we have fulfilled
an imperious duty. The permit was cancelled not temporarily but definitely and
for always. 76 It seems to me that the only
reason Mr. Archambault could have had for telephoning the respondent in the
first place, after his receipt of the information given by Mr. Gagnon and
Recorder Paquette, was to obtain the respondent's direction as to what should
be done. I find it difficult to accept the proposition that there was no
relationship of cause and effect as between what the respondent said to Mr.
Archambault and the cancellation of the permit. While it is true that in his
evidence Mr. Archambault states that he had decided to cancel the permit on the
day he received the written report from his secret agent Y3, dated November 30,
1946 (which was subsequent to the first telephone conversation), he goes on to
say: D. Maintenant, ce jour-là où vous avez reçu une lettre, le 30 novembre
1946, avez-vous décidé, ce jour-là, d'enlever la licence? R. Certainement, ce jour-là, j'avais appelé le Premier Ministre, en
l'occurrence le procureur général, lui faisant part des constatations, c'est-
à-dire des renseignements que je possédais, et de mon intention d'annuler le
privilège, et le Premier Ministre m'a répondu de prendre mes précautions, de
bien vérifier s'il s'agissait bien de la même personne, qu'il pouvait y avoir
plusieurs Roncarelli, et coetera. Alors, quand j'ai eu la confirmation de Y3 à
l'effet que c'était la même personne, j'ai rappelé le Premier Ministre pour
l'assurer qu'il s'agissait bien de Frank Roncarelli, détenteur d'un permis de
la Commission des Liqueurs; et, là, le Premier Ministre m'a autorisé, il m'a
donné son consentement, son approbation, sa permission, et son ordre de
procéder. 77 I
conclude from this evidence that any "decision" of Mr. Archambault's
was at most tentative and would only be made effective if he received direction
from the respondent to carry it out. I would doubt that, if the respondent had
advised against the cancellation of the permit, Mr. Archambault's decision
would have been implemented. 78 The
respondent appears to have shared this view because in his evidence he states
as follows: Si j'avais dit au Juge Archambault: "Vous ne le ferez pas",
il ne l'aurait probablement pas fait. Comme il me suggérait de le faire et
qu'après réflexion et vérification je trouvais que c'était correct, que c'était
conforme à mon devoir, j'ai approuvé et c'est toujours un ordre que l'on donne.
Quand l'officier supérieur parle, c'est un ordre que l'on donne, même s'il
accepte la suggestion de l'officier dans son département, c'est un ordre qu'il
donne indirectement. Je ne me rapelle pas des expressions exactes, mais ce sont
les faits. 79 I,
therefore, agree with the learned trial judge that the cancellation of the
appellant's permit was the result of an order given by the respondent. 80 The
second point for consideration is as to whether the respondent's acts were
justifiable as having been done in good faith in the exercise of his official
function as Attorney-General and Prime Minister of the Province of Quebec. 81 In
support of his contention that the respondent had so acted, we were referred by
his counsel to the following statutory provisions: THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT ACT, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 46 . . . . . 3. The Attorney-General is the official legal adviser of the
Lieutenant- Governor, and the legal member of the Executive Council of the
Province of Quebec. 4. The duties of the Attorney-General are the following: 1. To see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance
with the law; 2. To exercise a general superintendence over all matters connected
with the administration of justice in the Province. 5. The function and powers of the Attorney-General are the following: 1. He has the functions and powers which belong to the office of
Attorney- General of England, respectively, by law or usage, insofar as the
same are applicable to this Province, and also the functions and powers, which,
up to the Union, belonged to such offices in the late Province of Canada, and
which, under the provisions of the British North America Act, 1867, are within
the powers of the Government of this Province; 2. He advises the heads of the several departments of the Government
of the Province upon all matters of law concerning such departments, or arising
in the administration thereof; . . . . . 7. He is charged with superintending the administration or the
execution, as the case may be, of the laws respecting police. THE EXECUTIVE POWER ACT, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 7 . . . . . 5. The Lieutenant-Governor may appoint, under the Great Seal, from
among the members of the Executive Council, the following officials, who shall
remain in office during pleasure: 1. A Prime Minister who shall, ex-officio, be president of the
Council. THE ALCOHOLIC LIQUOR ACT, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 255 DIVISION XII
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF OFFENCES 148. The Attorney-General shall be charged with: 1. Assuring the observance of this act and of the Alcoholic Liquor
Possession and Transportation Act (Chap. 256), and investigating, preventing
and suppressing the infringements of such acts, in every way authorized
thereby; 2. Conducting the suits or prosecutions for infringements of this act
or of the said Alcoholic Liquor Possession and Transportation Act. 82 I do
not find, in any of these provisions, authority to enable the respondent, either
as Attorney-General or Prime Minister, to direct the cancellation of a permit
under the Alcoholic Liquor Act. On the contrary, the intent and purpose of that
Act appears to be to place the complete control over the liquor traffic in
Quebec in the hands of an independent commission. The only function of the
Attorney-General under that statute is in relation to the assuring of the
observance of its provisions. There is no evidence of any breach of that Act by
the appellant. 83
However, it is further argued on behalf of the respondent that, as
Attorney-General, in order to suppress or to prevent crimes and offences,
"He may do so by instituting legal proceedings; he may do so by other
methods". This amounts to a contention that he is free to use any methods
he chooses; that, on suspicion of participation in what he thinks would be an
offence, he may sentence a citizen to economic ruin without trial. This seems
to me to be a very dangerous proposition and one which is completely alien to
the legal concepts applicable to the administration of public office in Quebec,
as well as in the other provinces of Canada. 84 In
my view, the respondent was not acting in the exercise of any official powers
which he possessed in doing what he did in this matter. 85 The
third point to be considered is as to whether the appellant's permit was
lawfully cancelled by the Commission under the provisions of the Alcoholic
Liquor Act. Section 35 of that Act makes provision for the cancellation of a
permit in the following terms: 35. 1. Whatever be the date of issue of any permit granted by the
Commission, such permit shall expire on the 30th of April following, unless it
be cancelled by the Commission before such date, or unless the date at which it
must expire be prior to the 30th of April following. The Commission may cancel permit at its discretion. 86 It
is contended by the respondent, and with considerable force, that this
provision gives to the Commission an unqualified administrative discretion as
to the cancellation of a permit issued pursuant to that Act. Such a discretion,
it is contended, is not subject to any review in the Courts. 87 The
appellant contends that the Commission's statutory discretion is not absolute
and is subject to legal restraint. He cites the statement of the law by Lord
Halsbury in Sharp v. Wakefield[FN13]: An extensive power is confided to the justices in their capacity as
justices to be exercised judicially; and "discretion" means when it
is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities
that that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice,
not according to private opinion: Rooke's Case; according to law, and not
humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular.
And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to
the discharge of his office ought to confine himself. 88 That
was a case dealing with the discretionary powers of the licensing justices to
refuse renewal of a licence for the sale of intoxicating liquors. This
statement of the law was approved by Lord Greene M.R. in Minister of National
Revenue v. Wrights' Canadian Ropes, Limited[FN14]. 89 The
appellant further contends that, in exercising this discretion, the rules of
natural justice must be observed and points out that no notice of the intention
of the Commission to cancel his permit was ever given to the appellant, nor was
he given a chance to be heard by the Commission before the permit was cancelled. 90 With
respect to this latter point, it would appear to be somewhat doubtful whether
the appellant had a right to a personal hearing, in view of the judgment of
Lord Radcliffe in Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne[FN15]. However, regardless of this,
it is my view that the discretionary power to cancel a permit given to the
Commission by the Alcoholic Liquor Act must be related to the administration
and enforcement of that statute. It is not proper to exercise the power of
cancellation for reasons which are unrelated to the carrying into effect of the
intent and purpose of the Act. The association of the appellant with the
Witnesses of Jehovah and his furnishing of bail for members of that sect, which
were admitted to be the reasons for the cancellation of his permit and which
were entirely lawful, had no relationship to the intent and purposes of the
Alcoholic Liquor Act. 91
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the right of cancellation
of a permit under that Act is a substantial power conferred upon what the
statute contemplated as an independent commission. That power must be exercised
solely by that corporation. It must not and cannot be exercised by any one
else. The principle involved is stated by the Earl of Selborne in the following
passage in his judgment in Spackman v. Plumstead Board of Works[FN16]: No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the person
who is to decide is to proceed, the law will imply no more than that the
substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in
the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of
being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give
notice when he will proceed with the matter, and he must act honestly and impartially
and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the
authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind. There
would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything
of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice. While the Earl of Selborne is here discussing the rules applicable to
a quasi- judicial tribunal, that portion of his statement which requires such a
tribunal to act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some
other person or persons is, I think, equally applicable to the performance of
an administrative function. 92 The
same principle was applied in respect of the performance of an administrative
function by Chief Justice Greenshields in Jaillard v. City of Montreal[FN17]. 93 In
the present case it is my view, for the reasons already given, that the power
was not, in fact, exercised by the Commission, but was exercised by the
respondent, acting through the manager of the Commission. Cancellation of a
permit by the Commission at the request or upon the direction of a third party,
whoever he may be, is not a proper and valid exercise of the power conferred
upon the Commission by s. 35 of the Act. The Commission cannot abdicate its own
functions and powers and act upon such direction. 94
Finally, there is the question as to the giving of notice of the action
by the appellant to the respondent pursuant to art. 88 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which reads as follows: ACTIONS AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS 88. No public officer or other person fulfilling any public function
or duty can be sued for damages by reason of any act done by him in the
exercise of his functions, nor can any verdict or judgment be rendered against
him, unless notice of such action has been given him at least one month before
the issue of the writ of summons. Such notice must be in writing; it must state the grounds of the
action, and the name of the plaintiff's attorney or agent, and indicate his
office; and must be served upon him personnally or at his domicile. 95 The
contention of the respondent is that, as Attorney-General, he was a public
official whose function was to maintain law and order in the Province; that he
acted as he did in the intended exercise of that function and that he is not
deprived of the protection afforded by the article because he had exceeded the
powers which, in law, he possessed. 96 The
issue is as to whether those acts were "done by him in the exercise of his
functions". For the reasons already given in dealing with the second of
the four points under discussion, I do not think that it was a function either
of the Prime Minister or of the Attorney-General to interfere with the
administration of the Commission by causing the cancellation of a liquor
permit. That was something entirely outside his legal functions. It involved
the exercise of powers which, in law, he did not possess at all. 97 Is
the position altered by the fact that apparently he thought it was his right
and duty to act as he did? I do not think that it is. The question of whether
or not his acts were done by him in the exercise of his functions is not to be
determined on the basis of his own appreciation of those functions, but must be
determined according to law. The respondent apparently assumed that he was
justified in using any means he thought fit to deal with the situation which
confronted him. In my view, when he deliberately elected to use means which
were entirely outside his powers and were unlawful, he did not act in the
exercise of his functions as a public official. 98 The
principle which should be applied is stated by Lopes J. in Agnew v.
Jobson[FN18]. That was an action for assault against a justice of the peace who
had ordered a medical examination of the person of the plaintiff. There was no
legal authority to make such an order, but it was admitted that the defendant
bona fide believed that he had the authority to do that which he did. The
defendant relied on absence of notice of the action as required by 11 & 12
Vic., c. 44. Section 8 of that Act provided that "no action shall be
brought against any justice of the peace for anything done by him in the
execution of his office" unless within six calendar months of the act
complained of. Section 9, the one relied on by the defendant, provided that
"no such action shall be commenced against any such justice" until a
month after notice of action. Lopes J. held that "such justice" in s.
9 referred to a justice in execution of his office in s. 8. He held that s. 9
did not provide a defence to the defendant in these words (p. 68): I am of opinion that the defendant Jobson is not entitled to notice of
action. There was a total absence of any authority to do the act, and although
he acted bona fide, believing he had authority, there was nothing on which to
ground the belief, no knowledge of any fact such a belief might be based on. 99
Similarly here there was nothing on which the respondent could found the
belief that he was entitled to deprive the appellant of his liquor permit. 100 On
the issue of liability, I have, for the foregoing reasons, reached the
conclusion that the respondent, by acts not justifiable in law, wrongfully
caused the cancellation of the appellant's permit and thus cause damage to the
appellant. The respondent intentionally inflicted damage upon the appellant
and, therefore, in the absence of lawful justification, which I do not find, he
is liable to the appellant for the commission of a fault under art. 1053 of the
Civil Code. 101 I now turn to the matter of
damages. 102 The
learned trial judge awarded damages to the appellant in the sum of $8,123.53,
made up of $1,123.53 for loss of value of liquor seized by the Commission,
$6,000 for loss of profits from the restaurant from December 4, 1946, the date
of the cancellation of the permit, to May 1, 1947, the date when the permit
would normally have expired, and $1,000 for damages to his personal reputation.
No objection is taken by the appellant in respect of these awards, but he
contends that he is also entitled to compensation under certain other heads of
damage in respect of which no award was made by the learned trial judge. These
are in respect of damage to the good will and reputation of his business, loss
of property rights in his permit and loss of future profits for a period of at
least one year from May 1, 1947. Damages in respect of these items were not
allowed by the learned trial judge because of the fact that the appellant's
permit was "only a temporary asset". 103 The
appellant contends that, although his permit was not permanent, yet, in the
light of the long history of his restaurant and the continuous renewals of the
permit previously, he had a reasonable expectation of renewal in the future,
had not the cancellation been effected in December 1946. He contends that the
value of the good will of his business was substantially damaged by that
cancellation. 104 His
position on this point is supported by the reasoning of Duff J. (as he then
was) in McGillivray v. Kimber[FN19]. That was an action claiming damages for
the wrongful cancellation of the appellant's pilot's licence by the Sydney
Pilotage Authority. At p. 163 he says: The statement of defence seems to proceed upon the theory that for the
purpose of measuring legal responsibility the consequences of this dismissal
came to an end with the expiry of the term and that I shall discuss; but for
the present it is sufficient to repeat that the dismissal was an act which
being not only calculated, but intended to prevent the appellant continuing the
exercise of his calling had in fact this intended effect; and the respondents
are consequently answerable in damages unless there was in law justification or
excuse for what they did. Per Bowen L.J., Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q.B.D.
598. 105 The
statement by Bowen L.J. to which he refers appears at p. 613 of the report and
is also of significance in relation to the appellant's right of action in this
case. It is as follows: Now, intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary
course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that
other person's property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or
excuse. 106 The
evidence establishes that there was a substantial reduction in the value of the
good will of the appellant's restaurant business as a result of what occurred,
apart from the matter of any loss which might have resulted on the sale of the
physical assets. It is difficult to assess this loss and there is not a great
deal of evidence to assist in so doing. The appellant did file, as exhibits,
income tax returns for the three years prior to 1946, which showed in those
years a total net income from the business of $23,578.88. The profit- making
possibilities of the business are certainly an item to be considered in
determining the value of the good will. 107
However, in all the circumstances, the amount of these damages must be
determined in a somewhat arbitrary fashion. I consider that $25,000 should be allowed
as damages for the diminution of the value of the good will and for the loss of
future profits. 108 I
would allow both appeals, with costs here and below, and order the respondent
to pay to the appellant damages in the total amount of $33,123.53, with
interest from the date of the judgment in the Superior Court, and costs. Cartwright J. (dissenting): 109
This appeal is from two judgments of the Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal
Side) for the Province of Quebec[FN20], of which the first allowed an appeal
from a judgment of MacKinnon J. and dismissed the appellant's action, and the
second dismissed a cross-appeal asking that the damages awarded by the learned
trial judge be increased. 110 The
respondent is, and was at all relevant times, the Prime Minister and
Attorney-General of the Province of Quebec. 111 The
appellant on December 4, 1946, was the owner of an immovable property, known as
1429 Crescent Street in the City of Montreal, where he had for many years
successfully carried on the business of a restaurant and cafe. He was the
holder of liquor permit no. 68 granted to him on May 1, 1946, for the sale of
alcoholic liquors in his restaurant and cafe pursuant to the provisions of the
Alcoholic Liquor Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 255, hereinafter referred to as "the
Act". This permit would normally have expired on April 30, 1947. The
business carried on by the appellant had been founded by his father in 1912 and
had been licensed uninterruptedly from that time until 1946. Prior to December
4, 1946, the appellant had complied with all the requirements of the Act and
had carried on his restaurant business in conformity with the laws of the
Province. 112 The
appellant was at all relevant times a member of a sect known as "The
Witnesses of Jehovah" and from some time in 1944 up to November 12, 1946,
had on about 390 occasions, acted as bailsman for numbers of his co-
religionists prosecuted under by-laws of the City of Montreal for distributing
literature without a licence. None of those for whom he acted as bailsman
defaulted in appearance, and all of them were ultimately discharged upon the
by-laws under which they were charged being held to be invalid. 113
About the 24th or 25th of November 1946 members of the sect commenced
distributing copies of a circular entitled "Quebec's burning hate for God
and Christ and Freedom is the shame of all Canada". Copies of this
circular are printed in the record, the English version being exhibit D7 and
the French version exhibit D11. The then senior Crown Prosecutor in Montreal,
Mtre Oscar Gagnon, formed the opinion that the circular was a seditious libel
and that its distribution should be prevented. It results from the judgment of
this Court in Boucher v. The King[FN21] that the learned Crown Prosecutor was
in error in forming the opinion that the circular could be regarded as
seditious. It, however, can hardly be denied that it was couched in terms which
would outrage the feelings of the great majority of the inhabitants of the
Province of Quebec; and the same may be said of a number of other documents
circulated by the sect, copies of which form part of the record in the case at
bar. 114 The
evidence does not show that the appellant took part in the distribution of any
of the circulars mentioned or that he was a leader or chief of the sect. He did
not act as bailsman for any member of the sect charged in connection with the
distribution of the circular, "Quebec's burning hate". 115 On
November 25, 1946, pamphlets, including copies of "Quebec's burning
hate" were seized in a building in the City of Sherbrooke owned by the
appellant and leased by him to a congregation of Witnesses of Jehovah as a
"Kingdom Hall" or place of worship. The appellant was not aware that
the pamphlets were in this building. 116
From his investigations and the reports which he received M. Gagnon
concluded that the distribution of the pamphlets "convergeait autour de M.
Roncarelli ou de personnes qui étaient près de lui" and he so informed M.
Edouard Archambault, the manager of the Quebec Liquor Commission. It may well
be that M. Gagnon reached the conclusion mentioned on insufficient evidence. M.
Gagnon also informed M. Archambault that the appellant had acted as bailsman
for a great number of Witnesses of Jehovah. 117 On
receiving this information from M. Gagnon, M. Archambault read the circular,
"Quebec's burning hate" and had a conversation with M. Paquette, the
Recorder-in-Chief at Montreal, who confirmed the statements as to the appellant
furnishing bail. 118 At
this point M. Archambault formed the opinion that he should cancel the permit
held by the appellant, but before taking any action he telephoned the
respondent at Quebec, told him what information he had received and that he
proposed cancelling the permit. The respondent told him to be careful to make
sure that the Roncarelli who had furnished bail was in fact the appellant. M.
Archambault satisfied himself as to this through the report of an agent
"Y3", in whom he had confidence, and thereupon, according to his
uncontradicted evidence, decided to cancel the permit. The reasons which
brought him to this decision were stated by him as follows: D. Alors, à ce moment-là, vous aviez déjà décidé d'enlever cette
licence? R. Oui. D. Vous basant, je suppose, sur les rapports que vous aviez déjà reçus
de monsieur Oscar Gagnon et du recorder-en-chef Paquette que monsieur
Roncarelli avait fourni des cautionnements? R. Oui; et, à part de cela, de la littérature que j'avais lue. D. Et le pamphlet auquel vous avez référé: "Quebec's Burning
Hate"? R. Oui, monsieur. M. Archambault then telephoned the respondent. The substance of the
two telephone conversations between M. Archambault and the respondent is
summarized by the former as follows: D. Maintenant, ce jour-là où vous avez reçu une lettre, le 30 novembre
1946, avez-vous décidé, ce jour-là, d'enlever la licence? R. Certainement, ce jour-là, j'avais appelé le Premier Ministre, en
l'occurrence le procureur général, lui faisant part des constatations, c'est-
à-dire des renseignements que je possédais, et de mon intention d'annuler le
privilège, et le Premier Ministre m'a répondu de prendre mes précautions, de
bien vérifier s'il s'agissait bien de la même personne, qu'il pouvait y avoir
plusieurs Roncarelli, et coetera. Alors, quand j'ai eu la confirmation de Y3 à
l'effet que c'était la même personne, j'ai rappelé le Premier Ministre pour
l'assurer qu'il s'agissait bien de Frank Roncarelli, détenteur d'un permis de
la Commission des Liqueurs; et, là le Premier Ministre m'a autorisé, il m'a
donné son consentement, son approbation, sa permission, et son ordre de
procéder. 119 The
evidence of the respondent is also that the suggestion of cancelling the permit
was made by M. Archambault, and there is no evidence to the contrary. 120
There has been a difference of opinion in the Courts below as to whether
what was said by the respondent to M. Archambault amounted to an order to
cancel or merely to an "approbation énergique" of a decision already
made. I do not find it necessary to choose between these conflicting views as I
propose to assume for the purposes of this appeal that what was said by the
respondent was so far a determining factor in the cancellation of the permit as
to render him liable for the damages caused thereby to the appellant if the
cancellation was an actionable wrong giving rise to a right of action for
damages. 121 All
of the Judges in the Courts below who have dealt with that aspect of the matter
have concluded that the respondent acted throughout in the honest belief that
he was fulfilling his duty to the Province, and this conclusion is supported by
the evidence. 122 The
opinion of M. Archambault and of the respondent appears to have been that a
permit to sell liquor under the Act is a privilege in the gift of the Province
which ought not to be given to, or allowed to continue to be enjoyed by, one
who was actively supporting members of a group of persons who were engaged in a
concerted campaign to vilify the Province and were persistently acting in
contravention of existing by-laws. Once it is found, as I think it must be on
the evidence, that this opinion was honestly entertained, I have reached the
conclusion, for reasons that will appear, that the Court cannot inquire as to
whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant its formation or as to whether
it constituted a reasonable ground for cancellation of the permit. 123 The
permit was cancelled on December 4, 1946, without any prior notice to the
appellant and without his being given any opportunity to show cause why it
ought not to be cancelled. It is clear that the appellant suffered substantial
financial loss as a result of the cancellation. 124 In
determining whether the cancellation of the permit in these circumstances was
an actionable wrong on the part of the commission or of M. Archambault, its
manager, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Act. These
appear to me to be as follows: S.5 A Commission is by this act created under the name of "The
Quebec Liquor Commission", or "Commission des liqueurs de
Québec", and shall constitute a corporation, vested with all the rights
and powers belonging generally to corporations. The exercise of the functions, duties and powers of the Quebec Liquor
Commission shall be vested in one person alone, named by the Lieutenant-
Governor in Council, with the title of manager. The remuneration of such person
shall be determined by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council and be paid out of
the revenues of the Liquor Commission. . . . . . S.9 The function, duties and powers of the Commission shall be the
following: . . . . . d. To control the possession, sale and delivery of alcoholic liquor in
accordance with the provisions of this act; e. To grant, refuse, or cancel permits for the sale of alcoholic
liquor or other permits in regard thereto, and to transfer the permit of any
person deceased; . . . . . S.32 No permit shall be granted other than to an individual, and in
his personal name. The application for a permit may be made only by a British subject,
must be signed by the applicant before witnesses, and must give his surname,
Christian names, age, occupation, nationality and domicile, the kind of permit
required and the place where it will be used, and must be accompanied by the
amount of the duties payable upon the application for the permit. The applicant
must furnish all additional information which the Commission may deem expedient
to ask for. If the permit is to be used for the benefit of a partnership or
corporation, the application therefore must likewise be accompanied by a
declaration to that effect, and duly signed by such partnership or corporation.
In such case, the partnership or corporation shall be responsible for any fine
and costs, to which the holder of the permit may be condemned; and the amount
thereof may be recovered before any court having jurisdiction, without
prejudice to imprisonment, if any. All applications for permits must be addressed to the Commission
before the 10th of January in each year, to take effect on the 1st of May in
the same year. . . . . . S.34 1. The Commission may refuse to grant any permit. 2. The Commission must refuse to grant any permit for the sale of
alcoholic liquor in any municipality where a prohibition by-law is in force. Subsections 2 to 6 of s. 34 enumerate special cases in which the
Commission must refuse a permit. S.35 1. Whatever be the date of issue of any permit granted by the
Commission, such permit shall expire on the 30th day of April following, unless
it be cancelled by the Commission before such date, or unless the date at which
it must expire be prior to the 30th of April following. The Commission may cancel any permit at its discretion. 2. Saving the provisions of subsection 4 of this section, the
cancellation of a permit shall entail the loss of the privilege conferred by
such permit, and of the duties paid to obtain it, and the seizure and
confiscation by the Commission of the alcoholic liquor found in the possession
of the holder thereof, and the receptacles containing it, without any judicial
proceedings being required for such confiscation. The cancellation of a permit shall be served by a bailiff leaving a
duplicate of such order of cancellation, signed by three members of the Commission,
with the holder of such permit or with any other reasonable person at his
domicile or place of business. The cancellation shall take effect as soon as the order is served. . . . . . S.35 4. If the cancellation of the permit be not preceded or followed
by a conviction for any offence under this act committed by the holder of such
permit while it was in force, the Commission shall remit to such holder. a. Such part of the duties which such person has paid upon the
granting of such permit, proportionate to the number of full calendar months
still to run up to the 1st of May following; b. The proceeds of every sale by the Commission, after the seizure and
confiscation thereof, of beer having an alcoholic content of not more than four
per cent, in weight, less ten per cent of such proceeds; c. The value, as determined by the Commission, of the other alcoholic
liquor seized and confiscated, less ten per cent of such value. 5. Save in the case where a permit is granted to an individual on
behalf of a partnership or corporation, in accordance with section 32, the
Commission must cancel every permit made use of on behalf of any person other
than the holder. S.36 The Commission must cancel a permit: 1. Upon the production of a final condemnation, rendered against the
permit- holder, his agent or employee, for selling, in the establishment,
alcoholic liquor manufactured illegally or purchased in violation of this act; 2. Upon the production of three final condemnations rendered against
the permit-holder for violation of this act; 3. If it appears that the permit-holder has, without the Commission's
authorization, transferred, sold, pledged, or otherwise alienated the rights
conferred by the permit. 125 On
a consideration of these sections and of the remainder of the Act I am unable
to find that the Legislature has, either expressly or by necessary implication,
laid down any rules to guide the commission as to the circumstances under which
it may refuse to grant a permit or may cancel a permit already granted. In my
opinion the intention of the legislature, to be gathered from the whole Act,
was to enumerate (i) certain cases in which the granting of a permit is
forbidden, and (ii) certain cases in which the cancellation of a permit is
mandatory, and, in all other cases to commit the decision as to whether a
permit should be granted, refused or cancelled to the unfettered discretion of
the commission. I conclude that the function of the commission in making that
decision is administrative and not judicial or quasi- judicial. The submission
of counsel for the respondent, made in the following words, appears to me to be
well founded: Under the Statute, no one has a pre-existing right to obtain a permit,
and the permit being granted under the condition that it may be cancelled at
any time, and no cause of cancellation being mentioned and no form of procedure
being indicated, the cancellation is a discretionary decision of a purely
administrative character. 126 I
accept as an accurate statement of the distinction between a judicial and an
administrative tribunal that adopted by Masten J.A. in giving the judgment of
the Court of Appeal for Ontario in re Ashby et al[FN22]: The distinction between a judicial tribunal and an administrative
tribunal has been well pointed out by a learned writer in 49 Law Quarterly
Review at pp. 106, 107 and 108: A tribunal that dispenses justice, i.e. every judicial tribunal, is
concerned with legal rights and liabilities, which means rights and liabilities
conferred or imposed by 'law'; and 'law' means statute or long-settled
principles. These legal rights and liabilities are treated by a judicial
tribunal as pre- existing; such a tribunal professes merely to ascertain and
give effect to them; it investigates the facts by hearing 'evidence' (as tested
by long- settled rules), and it investigates the law by consulting precedents.
Rights or liabilities so ascertained cannot, in theory, be refused recognition
and enforcement, and no judicial tribunal claims the power of refusal. In contrast, non-judicial tribunals of the type called
'administrative' have invariably based their decisions and orders, not on legal
rights and liabilities, but on policy and expediency. Leeds (Corp.) v. Ryder (1907) A.C. 420, at 423, 424, per Lord Loreburn
L.C.; Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) A.C.
275, at 295; Boulter v. Kent JJ., (1897) A.C. 556, at 564. A judicial tribunal looks for some law to guide it; an
'administrative' tribunal, within its province, is a law unto itself. 127 In
re Ashby the Court found that the statute there under consideration set up
certain fixed standards and prescribed conditions on which persons might have
their certificates revoked by the board, and accordingly held its function to
be quasi-judicial; in the case at bar, on the contrary, no standards or
conditions are indicated and I am forced to conclude that the Legislature
intended the commission "to be a law unto itself". 128 If
I am right in the view that in cancelling the permit M. Archambault was
performing an administrative act in the exercise of an unfettered discretion
given to him by the statute it would seem to follow that he was not bound to
give the appellant an opportunity to be heard before deciding to cancel and
that the Court cannot be called upon to determine whether there existed
sufficient grounds for his decision. If authority is needed for this conclusion
it may be found in the judgment of the Judicial Committee, delivered by Lord
Radcliffe, in Nakkuda Ali v. M.F. De S. Jayaratne[FN23] and in the reasons of
my brother Martland in Calgary Power Limited et al v. Copithorne [FN24]. The
wisdom and desirability of conferring such a power upon an official without
specifying the grounds upon which it is to be exercised are matters for the
consideration of the Legislature not of the Court. 129 If,
contrary to my conclusion, the function of the commission was quasi-judicial,
it may well be that its decision to cancel the permit would be set aside by the
Court for failure to observe the rules as to how such tribunals must proceed
which are laid down in many authorities and are compendiously stated in the
following passage in the judgment of the Earl of Selborne in Spackman v.
Plumstead Board of Works[FN25]: No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the person
who is to decide is to proceed, the law will imply no more than that the
substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in
the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of
being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give
notice when he will proceed with the matter, and he must act honestly and
impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom
the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind.
There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were
anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice. But even if it were assumed that the function of the commission was
quasi- judicial and that its order cancelling the permit should be set aside
for failure to observe the rules summarized in the passage quoted, I would be
far from satisfied that any action for damages would lie. 130 If
that question arose for decision it would be necessary to consider the
judgments delivered in this Court in McGillivray v. Kimber[FN26], the cases
cited in Halsbury, 2nd ed., vol. 26, pp. 284 and 285, in support of the
following statement: Persons exercising such quasi-judicial powers ... in the absence of
fraud, collusion, or malice, are not liable to any civil action at the suit of
any person aggrieved by their decisions... and the judgment of Wilmot C.J., concurred in by Gould J. and
Blackstone J., in Bassett v. Godschall[FN27]: The legislature hath intrusted the justices of peace with a
discretionary power to grant or refuse licences for keeping inns and alehouses;
if they abuse that power, or misbehave themselves in the execution of their
office or authority, they are answerable criminally, by way of information, in
B.R. I cannot think a justice of peace is answerable in an action to every
individual who asks him for a licence to keep an inn or an alehouse, and he
refuses to grant one; if he were so, there would be an end of the commission of
the peace, for no man would act therein. Indeed he is answerable to the public
if he misbehaves himself, and wilfully, knowingly and maliciously injures or
oppresses the King's subjects, under colour of his office, and contrary to law:
but he cannot be answerable to every individual, touching the matter in
question, in an action. Every plaintiff in an action must have an antecedent
right to bring it; the plaintiff here has no right to have a licence, unless the
justices think proper to grant it, therefore he can have no right of action
against the justices for refusing it. 131 For
the above reasons I have reached the conclusion that the heavy financial loss
undoubtedly suffered by the appellant was damnum sine injuria. The whole loss
flowed directly from the cancellation of the permit which was an act of the
commission authorized by law. I have formed this opinion entirely apart from
any special statutory protection afforded to the commission or to its manager,
M. Archambault, as, for example, by s. 12 of the Act. 132 The
case of James v. Cowan[FN28] relied upon by counsel for the appellant as
supporting the existence of a right of action for damages seems to me to be
clearly distinguishable. In that case the right of action asserted was for
damages for the wrongful taking of the plaintiff's goods. The only
justification put forward was an order held to be ultra vires and therefore
void. It may be mentioned in passing that if, contrary to my view, the decision
of the commission in the case at bar was made in the exercise of a judicial
function, its failure to follow a rule of natural justice would appear to
render the order voidable but not void; Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal
Proprietors[FN29]. 133 Having
concluded that the act of the commission in cancelling the permit was not an
actionable wrong, it appears to me to follow that the respondent cannot be
answerable in damages for directing or approving, as the case may be, the doing
of that act. 134 As
it was put by Bissonnette J.[FN30]: D'où il découle, en saine logique, que si dans l'exercice de son
pouvoir discrétionnaire, il (M. Archambault) ne commettait ni faute, ni
illégalité, personne n'est justifié à chercher à atteindre, au delà de sa personne,
un conseiller, voire un chef ou supérieur politique, pour le motif que sans la
faute du premier, celle qu'on veut imputer au second ne peut exister. 135 On
this branch of the matter, I should perhaps mention that there is, in the
record, no room for any suggestion that the respondent coerced an unwilling
Commission into making a decision contrary to the view of the latter as to what
that decision should be. 136 For
the above reasons it is my opinion that the appeal fails and it becomes unnecessary
for me to consider the alternative defence as to lack of notice of action,
based upon art. 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the question of the
quantum of damages. 137 The
appeal, as to both of the judgments of the Court of Queen's Bench, should be
dismissed with costs. Fauteux J. (dissenting): 138
L'appelant se pourvoit à l'encontre de deux décisions majoritaires de la
Cour du banc de la reine[FN31], dont la première infirme un jugement de la Cour
supérieure condamnant l'intimé à lui payer une somme de $8,123.53 à titre de
dommages-intérêts, et dont la seconde rejette l'appel logé par lui- même pour
faire augmenter le quantum des dommages ainsi accordés. 139 Les
faits donnant lieu à ce litige se situent dans le cadre des activités
poursuivies dans la province de Québec, au cours particulièrement des années
1944, 1945 et 1946, par la secte des Témoins de Jéhovah. Ces activités
prenaient forme d'assemblées, de distribution de circulaires, de pamphlets et
de livres, et de sollicitation, dans les rues et à domicile. Dirigée
ouvertement contre les pratiques des religions professées dans la province et,
plus particulièrement, de la religion catholique, les enseignements de cette
secte étaient diffusés dans un langage manifestement, sinon délibérément,
insultant et, par suite, provoquèrent dans les cités et les villages où ils
étaient propagés, des troubles à la paix publique. Il y eut bris d'assemblées,
assauts de personnes et dommages à la propriété. De plus, et partageant
l'opinion généralement acceptée que cette campagne provocatrice était l'oeuvre
de la licence et non de la liberté sous la loi, plusieurs autorités civiles
refusaient d'accorder la protection recherchée par les membres de la secte ou
adoptaient des moyens pour paralyser ces activités considérées comme une menace
à la paix publique. L'intimé, comme Procureur Général, eut en son ministère, où
des plaintes nombreuses affluèrent, tous les échos de cette situation. Devant
les tribunaux, actions ou poursuites se multiplièrent. A Montréal, les
arrestations pour distribution de littérature, sans permis, atteignirent et
dépassèrent plusieurs centaines. Devant la Cour du Recorder, où furent traduits
ceux qu'on accusait de violer le règlement municipal, on plaidait l'invalidité
ou l'inapplication du règlement et attendant le prononcé d'un tribunal
supérieur sur le bien-fondé de ces prétentions, on ajournait les causes.
C'était l'appelant, l'un des membres de la secte, qui, dans la plupart de ces
arrestations, à Montréal, fournissait le cautionnement garantissant la
comparution des accusés. Une entente était même intervenue entre lui et les
avocats chargés des poursuites, suivant laquelle on le considérait en quelque
sorte comme la caution officielle des membres de la secte. L'appelant continua
d'agir comme caution jusqu'au 12 novembre 1946 alors que les autorités de la
Cour du Recorder, s'inquiétant de la congestion du rôle des causes résultant de
la progressive multiplication des arrestations, aussi bien que du fait que le
temps de nombre de constables était absorbé par ces enquêtes et ces poursuites,
au préjudice de leurs autres devoirs, tentèrent de décourager les activités de
la secte en exigeant des cautionnements en argent et plus substantiels, soit de
$100 à $300. 140
Deux semaines après cette décision, apparut dans la province une
nouvelle publication de la secte, intitulée: "La haine ardente du Québec
pour Dieu, le Christ et la liberté." Ce livre, publié en français, en
anglais et en ukrainien, étant, dans les termes les plus provocateurs, une
attaque dirigée particulièrement contre les pratiques religieuses de la
majorité de la population et contre l'administration de la justice dans la
province, fut soumis par la police à la considération de l'avocat en chef de la
Couronne, à Montréal, Me Gagnon, c.r., lequel émit l'opinion que cette
publication constituait, au sens de la loi criminelle, un libelle séditieux. 141
Ajoutons immédiatement que le mérite de cette opinion fut par la suite
judiciairement considéré avec le résultat qui suit. Un certain Aimé Boucher,
distributeur de ce livre dans le district judiciaire de St-Joseph de Beauce,
fut accusé sous les articles 133, 134 et 318 du Code Criminel et fut trouvé
coupable par un jury dont le verdict fut confirmé par une décision majoritaire
de la Cour du banc du roi en appel[FN32]. Sur un pourvoi subséquent devant cinq
des membres de cette Cour, une majorité, trouvant justifiés les griefs fondés
sur l'adresse du juge au procès, mais étant d'opinion qu'il était loisible à un
jury légalement dirigé de juger cette publication séditieuse, ordonna un
nouveau procès. Sur une seconde audition du même appel, — cette fois
devant les neuf Juges de cette Cour[FN33] — ces vues furent partagées
par quatre des membres de cette Cour. Les cinq autres, d'autre part,
acquittèrent l'accusé, en déclarant en substance, suivant le sommaire fidèle du
jugé, qu'en droit: Neither language calculated to promote feelings of ill-will and
hostility between different classes of His Majesty's subjects nor criticizing
the courts is seditious unless there is the intention to incite to violence or
resistance to or defiance of constituted authority. En somme, la majorité écarta, comme étant la loi en la matière, la
définition de l'intention séditieuse, donnée à la page 94 de la 8e édition de
Stephen's Digest of Criminal Law, dans la mesure où cette définition différait
de la loi telle que précisée au sommaire ci-dessus. Boucher v. His Majesty the
King[FN34]. Ainsi appert-il que l'opinion émise par le représentant du
Procureur Général à Montréal lors de l'apparition de ce livre en fin de 1946,
fut par la suite partagée par une majorité de tous les juges qui eurent à
considérer la question mais rejetée par ce qui constitute, depuis 1951, le
jugement de cette Cour sur la question. 142
Ayant donc formé l'opinion que cette publication constituait un libelle
séditieux, Me Gagnon participa à l'enquête faite pour en rechercher les
distributeurs et les traduire en justice. Vers le même temps, la police saisissait
en la cité de Sherbrooke, un nombre considérable de pamphlets, livres, y
compris le livre en question, dans un établissement appartenant à l'appelant et
par lui loué aux membres de la secte. Un examen de la situation et du rôle joué
par l'appelant dans les procédures mues devant la Cour du Recorder à Montréal,
amena Me Gagnon à conclure à sa participation dans la distribution. Apprenant,
en la même occasion, que ce dernier était propriétaire d'un restaurant et
détenteur de permis de la Commission des Liqueurs pour y vendre des spiritueux,
il communiqua les faits ci-dessus à M. Archambault, alors gérant général de la
Commission des Liqueurs. Après avoir conféré avec le recorder en chef de la
cité de Montréal et Me Gagnon, M. Archambault téléphona au Procureur Général
pour lui faire part de ces agissements des membres de la secte, et de
l'appelant en particulier, et de son intention d'annuler le permis en faveur de
l'appelant. L'intimé demanda à M. Archambault de bien s'assurer que le
détenteur du permis était bien la même personne qui, au dire de M. Archambault,
"multipliait les cautionnements à la Cour du Recorder de façon
désordonnée, contribuait à désorganiser les activités de la police et à
congestionner les tribunaux". Et l'intimé ajouta: — "Dans l'intervalle,
je vais examiner les questions avec des officiers légaux, je vais y penser, je
vais réfléchir et je vais voir à ce que je devrai faire." M. Archambault
vérifia l'identité de l'appelant et, de son côté, le Procureur Général étudia
le problème, la Loi de la Commission des Liqueurs et ses amendements, discuta
de la question au Conseil des Ministres et avec des officiers en loi de son
ministère. Quelques jours plus tard, M. Archambault téléphona au Procureur
Général confirmant l'identité du détenteur de permis et, témoigne M.
Archambault, "là, le Premier Ministre m'a autorisé, il m'a donné son
consentement, son approbation, sa permission et son ordre de procéder". 143 A
la suite de cette conversation téléphonique, le permis fut annulé et tous les
spiritueux du restaurant furent confisqués. En raison de la perte d'opérations
résultant de l'absence de permis, l'appelant, quelques mois plus tard, vendait
ce restaurant, licencié pour vente de spiritueux depuis nombre d'années et
exploité par son père, d'abord, et lui, par la suite. C'est alors que
l'appelant institua la présente action en dommages contre l'intimé
personnellement, invoquant en substance que, dans les circonstances, le fait de
cette annulation constituait, suivant les dispositions de l'art. 1053 du Code
Civil, un fait dommageable, illicite et imputable à l'intimé et, dès lors,
donnant droit à réparation. 144 En
défense, et en outre des moyens plaidés sur le mérite de l'action, l'intimé
invoqua spécifiquement le défaut de l'appelant de s'être conformé aux
prescriptions de l'art. 88 du Code de procédure civile, lequel conditionne
impérativement l'exercice du droit d'action contre un officier public à la
signification d'un avis d'au moins un mois avant l'émission de l'assignation. 145
Après considération attentive de la question et pour les motifs donnés
ci-après, je suis arrivé à la conclusion que ce moyen est bien fondé. Il
convient de dire, cependant, que n'eûe été ce défaut de l'appelant, j'aurais,
au mérite, conclu au bien-fondé de son action et ce, pour des raisons qu'il
suffit, dans les circonstances, de résumer comme suit. Personne ne met en doute
que le fait invoqué au soutien de l'action en dommages, c'est-à-dire
l'annulation du permis, ait constitué un fait dommageable pour l'appelant. De
plus, et suivant la preuve au dossier, il est manifeste que ce fait est
imputable, et exclusivement imputable, à l'intimé. Sans doute, lorsque le
gérant général de la Commission des Liqueurs téléphona au Procureur Général
pour le mettre au courant des faits ci- dessus, il lui indiqua au même temps
son intention d'annuler le permis. Il y a loin, cependant, de l'indication
d'une intention à la réalisation de cette intention; et à la vérité, dès cette
première conversation téléphonique, c'est le Procureur Général qui prit
l'entière responsabilité. Tel que déjà indiqué, il demanda à M. Archambault de
vérifier l'identité de personne, l'avisant que, pendant ce temps-là, il
étudierait le problème et verrait ce que lui devait faire. C'est d'ailleurs
précisément pour décider de l'action à prendre qu'il examina la loi et discuta
de l'affaire au Conseil des Ministres et avec ses officiers en loi. Lorsque,
subséquemment, M. Archambault le rappela pour lui affirmer qu'il s'agissait de
la même personne, "c'est là", dit le gérant général, que le Procureur
Général "m'a autorisé, il m'a donné son consentement, son approbation, sa
permission et son ordre de procéder". Le Juge de la Cour supérieure et
tous les Juges de la Cour d'Appel n'ont jeté, et je crois avec raison, aucun
doute sur la bonne foi du Procureur Général, pas plus qu'on n'en saurait avoir
sur celle du gérant général de la Commission des Liqueurs. Ni l'un ni l'autre
n'ont agi malicieusement. Mais, en témoignant que l'intimé l'avait autorisé, lui
avait donné son consentement, son approbation, sa permission et son ordre de
procéder, le gérant général de la Commission a bien indiqué, à mon avis, que,
dans un esprit de subordination, il avait, dès la première conversation
téléphonique, abdiqué, en faveur du Procureur Général s'en chargeant, le droit
d'exercer la discrétion, qu'à l'exclusion de tous autres, il avait suivant
l'esprit de la Loi des Liqueurs Alcooliques. Il a exécuté, mais non rendu, une
décision arrêtée par le Procureur Général. D'ailleurs, ce dernier ne s'en est
pas caché; il s'en est ouvert au public par la voix des journaux. En prenant
lui-même cette décision, comme Premier Ministre et Procureur Général, il s'est
arrogé un droit que lui nie virtuellement la Loi des Liqueurs Alcooliques; il a
commis une illégalité. Dans l'espèce, l'annulation du permis est exclusivement
imputable à l'intimé et précisément pour cette raison, constitute, dans les
circonstances, un acte illicite donnant droit à l'appelant d'obtenir réparation
pour les dommages lui en résultant. 146
L'article 88 du Code de procédure civile. — Cet article se lit
comme suit: Nul officier public ou personne remplissant des fonctions ou devoirs
publics ne peut être poursuivi pour dommages à raison d'un acte par lui fait dans
l'exercice de ses fonctions, et nul verdict ou jugement ne peut être rendu
contre lui, à moins qu'avis de cette poursuite ne lui ait été donné au moins un
mois avant l'émission de l'assignation. Cet avis doit être par écrit; il doit exposer les causes de l'action,
contenir l'indication des noms et de l'étude du procureur du demandeur ou de
son agent et être signifié au défendeur personnellement ou à son domicile. Vu la forme prohibitive de la disposition et la règle de droit édictée
en l'art. 14 du Code Civil, le défaut de donner cet avis, lorsqu'il y a lieu de
ce faire, emporte nullité. Cette règle de droit est ainsi exprimée: 14. Les lois prohibitives emportent nullité, quoiqu'elle n'y soit pas
prononcée. De plus, et en raison de la prescription que "...nul verdict ou
jugement ne peut être rendu...", ce défaut limite la juridiction même du
tribunal. Aussi bien, non seulement, comme il a été reconnu au jugement de
première instance, ce défaut peut-il être soulevé dans les plaidoiries, mais la
Cour elle-même doit agir proprio motu et se conformer à la prescription. 147 En
l'espèce, il est admis qu'aucun avis ne fut donné au Procureur Général.
L'intimé a plaidé spécifiquement ce moyen dans sa défense et il l'a invoqué
tant en Cour supérieure et en Cour d'Appel que devant cette Cour. Le juge au
procès en disposa dans les termes suivants, dont les soulignés sont siens: Defendant is not entitled to avail himself of this exceptional
provision as the acts complained of were not "done by him in the exercise
of his functions", but they were acts performed by him when he had gone
outside his functions to perform them. They were not acts "in the exercise
of" but "on the occasion of public duties". Defendant was
outside his functions in the acts complained of. En Cour d'Appel[FN35], seul le Juge dissident, M. le Juge Rinfret, se
prononce sur la question. S'inspirant, je crois, de l'interprétation donnée par
la jurisprudence à l'expression "dans l'exécution de ses fonctions",
apparaissant à l'art. 1054 C.C. et plus particulièrement du critère indiqué
dans Plumb v. Cobden Flour Mills[FN36], il prononce d'abord comme suit, sur le
mérite même de l'action: L'action du défendeur, on l'a vu, ne peut pas être classifiée parmi
les actes permis, par les statuts, au procureur général, ni au premier
ministre; elle ne peut pas être considérée comme ayant été faite dans
l'exercice ou dans l'exécution de ses fonctions comme telles; elle entre dans
la catégorie des actes prohibés, des actes commis hors les limites des fonctions,
et comme telle, elle engendre la responsabilité personnelle. puis, précisant que l'art. 88 C.P.C. pose comme condition que le
défendeur soit poursuivi "à raison d'un acte par lui fait dans l'exercice
de ses fonctions", déclare que l'art. 88 n'a pas d'application en
l'espèce. 148 Les
juges de la majorité ont référé à ce moyen sans cependant s'y arrêter vu que
dans leur opinion l'action, de toutes façons, était mal fondée. 149
D'où l'on voit que le droit de l'intimé à l'avis dépend uniquement, dans
la présente cause, de la question de savoir si l'acte reproché a été fait par
lui "dans l'exercice de ses fonctions" au sens qu'il faut donner à
ces expressions dans le contexte de l'art. 88 C.P.C., et suivant l'esprit et la
fin véritables de cet article. 150
L'article 1054 C.C. prescrit que les maîtres et les commettants sont
responsables du dommage causé par leurs domestiques ou ouvriers dans
l'exécution des fonctions auxquelles ces derniers sont employés. On est dès
lors porté à donner aux expressions, plus ou moins identiques, apparaissant à
l'art. 88 C.P.C., le même sens que donne la jurisprudence sur l'art. 1054 C.C.
La règle d'interprétation visant la similarité des expressions n'établit qu'une
présomption; cette présomption étant que les expressions similaires ont le même
sens lorsqu'elles se trouvent, — ce qui n'est pas le cas en l'espèce,
— dans une même loi. On accorde, d'ailleurs, peu de poids à cette
présomption. Maxwell, On Interpretation of Statutes, 9e ed., p. 322 et seq. Les
considérations présidant à l'établissement, la fin et la portée de l'art. 88
C.P.C., d'une part, et de l'art. 1054 C.C., d'autre part, sont totalement
différentes. Sanctionnant la doctrine Respondent superior, l'art. 1054 C.C.
établit la responsabilité du commettant pour l'acte de son préposé, ce dernier
étant considéré le continuateur de la personne juridique du premier. L'intimé,
agissant en sa qualité de Procureur Général, n'est le préposé de personne. Il
n'a pas de commettant. La fonction qu'il exerce, il la tient de la loi.
L'article 88 C.P.C. n'affecte en rien la question de responsabilité. Il
accorde, en ce qui concerne la procédure seulement, un traitement spécial au
bénéfice des officiers publics en raison de la nature même de la fonction. Les motifs
apportés par la jurisprudence pour limiter le champ de l'exercice des
fonctions, quant à la responsabilité édictée en l'art. 1054 C.C., sont
étrangers à ceux conduisant la Législature à donner, quant à la procédure
seulement, une protection aux officiers publics. Aussi bien, et en toute
déférence, je ne crois pas que la portée de cette protection soit assujettie
aux limitations de la responsabilité frappant les dispositions de l'art. 1054
C.C. L'article 8 du c. 101 des Statuts Refondus du Bas Canada, loi-source de
l'art. 88 C.P.C., établit péremptoirement à mon avis que, in pari materia, un
officier public n'est pas tenu comme ayant cessé d'agir dans l'exercice de ses
fonctions du seul fait que l'acte reproché constitue un excès de pouvoir, ou de
juridiction, ou une violation à la loi. La version française de cette loi
n'étant pas en disponibilité, je cite de la version anglaise qu'on trouve dans
Consolidated Statutes, Lower Canada, 1860, l'art. 8: Protection to extend to the magistrate only etc., and in what cases to
him. 8. The privileges and protection given by this Act, shall be given to
such justice, officer or other person acting as aforesaid, only, and to no
other person or persons whatever, and any such justice, officer and other
person shall be entitled to such protection and privileges in all cases where
he has acted bona fide in the execution of his duty, although in such act done,
he has exceeded his powers or jurisdiction, and has acted clearly contrary to
law. 151
L'article 88 C.P.C. assume que ceux au bénéfice desquels il est établi
se sont rendus coupables d'une illégalité pour laquelle ils doivent répondre.
Tout doute qu'on pourrait avoir sur le point est dissipé par le texte même de
l'art. 429 C.P.C. lequel, pourvoyant à un changement de venue dans le cas du
procès d'un officier public, édicte: 429. Dans toute poursuite en dommages contre un officier public, à
raison de quelque illégalité dans l'exécution de ses fonctions, le juge peut
ordonner que le procès ait lieu dans un autre district, s'il est démontré que
la cause ne peut être instruite avec impartialité dans le district où l'action
a été portée. On doit donc se garder d'associer au droit à l'avis toute idée de
justification pour l'acte reproché ou de déduire du seul fait que l'officier
public doive au mérite d'être tenu personnellement responsable, qu'il ait perdu
tout droit à l'avis. Dans Beattey v. Kozak[FN37], ou la nécessité d'éviter
cette confusion se présentait, une semblable observation est faite par notre
collègue M. le Juge Rand. Il faut ajouter, cependant, que cette décision n'est
d'aucune autre assistance sur la question qui nous intéresse; le litige
portait, en droit, sur l'interprétation d'une loi différente et fut décidé en
donnant effet à la jurisprudence d'un droit également différent sur
l'incidence, en la matière, du rôle de la bonne foi. 152
L'incidence du rôle de la bonne foi de l'officier public dans la
commission d'un acte reproché, en ce qui concerne la portée de l'art. 88
C.P.C., et non en ce qui a trait au mérite de l'action, a fait, dans la
province de Québec, depuis le jour où la disposition fut établie par l'art. 22
du Code de procédure civile de 1867, dont les termes sont reproduits à l'art.
88 du Code de 1897, l'objet d'un conflit dans la jurisprudence. Suivant
certains jugements, la bonne foi conditionnait le droit à l'avis et dès que la
déclaration contenait une allégation de mauvaise foi, le défendeur se voyait
privé du droit d'invoquer le défaut de l'avis, même si, au mérite, la preuve,
révélant que cette allégation était mal fondée, on devait alors rejeter
l'action parce que l'avis n'avait pas été donné. Suivant d'autres jugements, on
tenait le droit à l'avis absolu dans tous les cas. La bonne foi, disait-on, en
s'appuyant sur le principe sanctionné par l'art. 2202 C.C., est toujours
présumée et cette présomption ne peut être écartée par une simple allégation
mais par une preuve de mauvaise foi. On jugeait qu'une simple allégation aux
plaidoiries ne pouvait virtuellement abroger le droit au bénéfice de l'art. 88.
Considérant que cet article conditionnait l'exercice même du droit d'action, on
décidait que ce droit d'action devait être nié ab initio et non à la fin du
procès. Ce conflit n'existe plus. Depuis plus de vingtcinq ans, la Cour d'Appel
y a mis fin en décidant que l'incidence de la bonne ou de la mauvaise foi n'a
aucune portée sur le droit à l'avis et que, dans tous les cas, il doit être
donné. Acceptant les arguments déjà exprimés en ce sens, la Cour d'Appel s'est
particulièrement basée sur la source historique de cette disposition et sur la
modification qui y fut apportée lors et par suite de son insertion au Code de
procédure civile. Les sources de l'article sont indiquées dans Dame Chaput v.
Crépeau[FN38] par M. le Juge Bruneau et les modifications faites à la situation
antérieure par l'insertion de l'article dans le Code, afin d'en généraliser
l'application à tous les officiers publics, sont indiquées dans cette
jurisprudence définitivement arrêtée par la Cour d'Appel dans Charland v.
Kay[FN39]; Corporation de la Paroisse de St-David-de-l'Auberivière v. Paquette
et autres [FN40] et Houde v. Benoît[FN41]. 153 En
somme, et comme le note M. le Juge Hall dans Corporation de la Paroisse de
St-David-de-l'Auberivière v. Paquette et autres, supra, l'art. 22 du Code de
procédure de 1867, prédécesseur de l'art. 88 du Code de 1897, a sa source dans
la Loi pour la protection de juges de paix, c.101 des Status Refondus du Bas
Canada. Le premier article de cette loi prescrivait l'avis d'action, alors que
dans les autres dispositions, d'autres privilèges étaient établis, y compris
celui fixant la prescription à six mois. L'article 8 conditionnait le droit aux
privilèges y accordés, à la bonne foi. Lors de la confection du Code de
procédure, la disposition ayant trait à l'avis fut extraite de la loi pour
devenir l'art. 22 du Code de procédure et être déclarée applicable à tous les
officiers publics. Dans le procédé, cependant, on laissa la disposition
touchant la bonne foi dans la Loi pour la protection des juges de paix et on
évita de l'inclure dans l'art. 22 C.P.C. comme condition de l'opération de cet
article. D'autres considérations, tel, par exemple, le changement apporté par
la Législature, le 4 août 1929, à l'art. 195 C.P.C. par la Loi 19 George V, c.
81, ayant pour effet de prohiber toute ordonnance de preuve avant faire droit
qui jusqu'alors réservait au mérite les questions soulevées par l'inscription
en droit, militent en faveur de ces vues. C'est ce changement, je crois, qui a
provoqué l'occasion amenant la Cour d'Appel à fixer définitivement la
jurisprudence. Les motifs déjà mentionnés suffisent pour partager les vues
exprimées par la Cour d'Appel dans les causes précitées et pour conclure, comme
M. le Juge Dorion dans Charland v. Kay, supra, qu'il faut s'en tenir au texte
de la loi et lui donner son effet. 154 En
assumant l'exercice d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au gérant général par
la loi, l'intimé a commis une illégalité mais aucune offense connue de la loi
pénale et aucun délit au sens de l'art. 1053 C.C. Il a fait ce qu'il n'avait
pas le droit de faire, fermement et sincèrement convaincu, a-t-il affirmé sous
serment, que non seulement il en avait le droit, mais qu'il y était tenu pour
s'acquitter de ses responsabilités comme Procureur Général chargé de
l'administration de la justice, du maintien de l'ordre et de la paix dans la
province et de ses devoirs comme conseiller juridique du gouvernement de la
province. Il n'a pas pris occasion de sa fonction pour commettre cette illégalit.
Il ne l'a pas commise à l'occasion de l'exercice de ses fonctions. Il l'a
commise à cause de ses fonctions. Sa bonne foi n'a pas été mise en doute, et
sur ce fait, les Juges de la Cour d'Appel, qui ont considéré la question, sont
d'acord avec le Juge de première instance. Suivant les décisions considérées
par cette Cour dans Beatty v. Kozak, supra, on retient, sous un droit différent
de celui de la province de Québec, l'incidence de la bonne foi lorsque celle-ci
se fonde sur l'erreur de fait, ou sur l'erreur de fait et de droit à la fois,
sinon uniquement sur l'erreur de droit, pour décider du caractère exculpatoire
de l'illégalité commise, voire même du droit à l'avis. Exclusivement compétente
à légiférer sur la procédure civile, la Législature de Québec, par l'art. 88
C.P.C., n'a pas voulu assujettir le droit à l'avis d'action à l'incidence de la
bonne ou de la mauvaise foi. Dans les circonstances de cette cause, je suis
d'opinion que l'illégalité commise par l'intimé l'a été dans l'exercice de ses
fonctions et que, de plus, ce serait faire indirectement ce que l'art. 88
C.P.C. ne permet pas, suivant l'interprétation de la Cour d'Appel, que de
s'appuyer sur la bonne ou la mauvaise foi, que ce soit au sens vulgaire ou
technique du mot, pour conclure que l'intimé est sorti de l'exercice de ses
fonctions, au sens qu'ont ces expressions dans l'art. 88 C.P.C., et qu'il ait
perdu le droit à l'avis d'action. 155
Pour ces raisons, l'appelant aurait dû être débouté de son action. Je
renverrais les appels avec dépens. Abbott J.: 156 In
his action appelant claimed from respondent the sum of $118,741 as damages
alleged to have been sustained as a result of the cancellation of a licence or
permit for the sale of alcoholic liquors held by appellant. The action was
maintained by the learned trial judge to the extent of $8,123.53. From that
judgment two appeals were taken, one by respondent asking that the action be
dismissed in its entirety, the other by appellant asking that the amount
allowed as damages be increased by an amount of $90,000. The Court of Queen's
Bench[FN42] allowed the respondent's appeal, Rinfret J. dissenting, and
dismissed the action. The appeal taken by appellant to increase the amount of
the trial judgment was dismissed unanimously. The present appeals are from
those two judgments. 157 The
facts are these. On December 4, 1946, appellant was conducting a restaurant
business in the City of Montreal, a business which he and his father and mother
before him had been carrying on continuously for some thirty-four years prior
to that date. The restaurant had been licensed for the sale of alcoholic
beverages throughout the entire period. 158 In
1946 and for many years prior thereto, persons operating establishments of this
kind and selling alcoholic beverages had been required to obtain a licence or
permit under the Alcoholic Liquor Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 255. Unless granted for
a shorter period, these were annual licences and expired on April 30 in each
year. Moreover, s. 35, subs. 1., of the Act provides as follows: The Commission may cancel any permit at its discretion. The Commission referred to is the "Quebec Liquor Commission"
established as a corporation under the Act in question and, generally speaking,
it has been entrusted by the Legislature with the responsibility of directing
and administering the provincial monopoly of the sale and distribution of
alcoholic beverages. 159 On
December 4, 1946, without previous notice to the appellant, his licence to sell
alcoholic beverages was cancelled by the Quebec Liquor Commission, and at about
2 p.m. on that date the stock of liquor on his premises was seized and removed.
The licence was not restored and after operating for some months without such a
licence, in 1947 appellant sold the restaurant and the building in which it was
located. 160
Appellant learned from press reports either in the afternoon of December
4 or early the following day, that his licence had been cancelled and the stock
of liquor seized because he was an adherent of a religious sect or group known
as the Witnesses of Jehovah. It soon became clear from statements made by the
respondent to the press and confirmed by him at the trial as having been made
by him, that the cancellation of the licence had been made because of the
appellant's association with the sect in question and in order to prevent him
from continuing to furnish bail for members of that sect summoned before the
Recorder's Court on charges of contravening certain city by-laws respecting the
distribution of printed material. 161 It
might be added here that in December 1946 and for some time prior thereto the
Witnesses of Jehovah appear to have been carrying on in the Montreal district
and elsewhere in the Province of Quebec, an active campaign of meetings and the
distribution of printed pamphlets and other like material of an offensive
character to a great many people of most religious beliefs, and I have no doubt
that at that time many people believed this material to be seditious. 162 The
evidence is referred to in detail in the Courts below and I do not propose to
do so here. I am satisfied from a consideration of this evidence: First: that
the cancellation of the appellant's licence was made for the sole reason which
I have mentioned and with the object and purpose to which I have referred;
Second: that such cancellation was made with the express authorization and upon
the order of the respondent; Third: that the determining cause of the
cancellation was that order, and that the manager of the Quebec Liquor
Commission would not have cancelled the licence without the order and
authorization given by the respondent. 163
There can be no question as to the first point. It was conceded by
respondent in his evidence at the trial and by his counsel at the hearing
before us. As to the second and third points, I share the view of the learned
trial judge and of Rinfret J. that both were clearly established. 164 The
religious beliefs of the appellant and the fact that he acted as bondsman for
members of the sect in question had no connection whatever with his obligations
as the holder of a licence to sell alcoholic liquors. The cancellation of his
licence upon this ground alone therefore was without any legal justification.
Moreover, the religious beliefs of the appellant and his perfectly legal
activities as a bondsman had nothing to do with the object and purposes of the
Alcoholic Liquor Act, and the powers and responsibilities of the manager of the
Quebec Liquor Commission are confined to the administration and enforcement of
the provisions of the said Act. This may be one explanation of the latter's
decision to consult the respondent before taking the action which he did to
cancel appellant's licence. 165 At
all events a careful reading of the evidence and a consideration of the
surrounding circumstances has convinced me that without having received the
authorization, direction, order, or "approbation énergique" of the
respondent — however one chooses to describe it — the manager
of the Quebec Liquor Commission would not have cancelled the licence. 166 The
proposition that in Canada a member of the executive branch of government does
not make the law but merely carries it out or administers it requires no
citation of authority to support it. Similarly, I do not find it necessary to
cite from the wealth of authority supporting the principle that a public
officer is responsible for acts done by him without legal justification. I
content myself with quoting the well known passage from Dicey's "Law of
the Constitution", 9th ed., p. 193, where he says ...every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a
collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without
legal justification as any other citizen. The Reports abound with cases in
which officials have been brought before the courts, and made, in their
personal capacity, liable to punishment, or to the payment of damages, for acts
done in their official character but in excess of their lawful authority. A
colonial governor, a secretary of state, a military officer, and all
subordinates, though carrying out the commands of their official superiors, are
as responsible for any act which the law does not authorize as is any private
and unofficial person. 167 In
the instant case, the respondent was given no statutory power to interfere in
the administration or direction of the Quebec Liquor Commission although as
Attorney-General of the Province the Commission and its officers could of
course consult him for legal opinions and legal advice. The Commission is not a
department of government in the accepted sense of that term. Under the
Alcoholic Liquor Act the Commission is an independent body with corporate
status and with the powers and responsibilities conferred upon it by the
Legislature. The Attorney-General is given no power under the said Act to
intervene in the administration of the affairs of the Commission nor does the
Attorney-General's Department Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 46, confer any such
authority upon him. 168 I
have no doubt that in taking the action which he did, the respondent was
convinced that he was acting in what he conceived to be the best interests of
the people of his province but this, of course, has no relevance to the issue
of his responsibility in damages for any acts done in excess of his legal
authority. I have no doubt also that respondent knew and was bound to know as
Attorney-General that neither as Premier of the province nor as Attorney-
General was he authorized in law to interfere with the administration of the
Quebec Liquor Commission or to give an order or an authorization to any officer
of that body to exercise a discretionary authority entrusted to such officer by
the statute. 169 It
follows, therefore, that in purporting to authorize and instruct the manager of
the Quebec Liquor Commission to cancel appellant's licence, the respondent was
acting without any legal authority whatsoever. Moreover, as I have said, I
think respondent was bound to know that he was acting without such authority. 170 The
respondent is therefore liable under art. 1053 of the Civil Code for the
damages sustained by the appellant, by reason of the acts done by respondent in
excess of his legal authority. 171
Respondent also contended that appellant's action must fail because no
notice of such action was given under art. 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which reads as follows: 88. No public officer or other person fulfilling any public function
or duty can be sued for damages by reason of any act done by him in the
exercise of his functions, nor can any verdict or judgment be rendered against
him, unless notice of such action had been given him at least one month before
the issue of the writ of summons. Such notice must be in writing; it must state the grounds of the
action, and name of the plaintiff's attorney or agent, and indicate his office;
and must be served upon him personally or at his domicile. 172
None of the learned judges constituting the majority in the Court of
Queen's Bench has given as a reason for dismissing appellant's action, the
failure to give such notice. The learned trial judge and Rinfret J. held that
respondent is not entitled to avail himself of this exceptional provision since
the act complained of was not "done by him in the exercise of his
functions" but was an act done by him when he had gone outside his
functions to perform it. I am in agreement with their views and there is little
I need add to what they have said on this point. In this connection, however,
reference may usefully be made to the decision of the Court of Appeal in
Lachance v. Casault [FN43]. In that case a bailiff had attempted to take
possession of books and papers in the hands of a judicial guardian without
preparing a procès-verbal of the articles seized, as called for by the order of
the Court requiring the guardian to give up possession to the seizing creditor.
When the bailiff's action was resisted by the guardian as being unauthorized,
the bailiff caused the guardian to be arrested. The charge having been
subsequently dismissed, the bailiff was sued in damages for false arrest and
malicious prosecution. It was held that, even assuming such bailiff was a
public officer within the meaning of art. 88 C.C.P., he was not entitled to
notice under the said article since at the time the act complained of was
committed, he was not "dans l'exercice légal de ses fonctions". 173 In
my opinion before a public officer can be held to be acting "in the
exercise of his functions", within the meaning of art. 88 C.C.P., it must
be established that at the time he performed the act complained of such public
officer had reasonable ground for believing that such act was within his legal
authority to perform; Asselin v. Davidson[FN44]. In the instant case, as I have
said, in my view the respondent was bound to know that the act complained of
was beyond his legal authority. 174 I
now deal with the second appeal asking that the amount awarded to appellant by
the trial judge be increased by an amount of $90,000. This amount is claimed
under three heads, namely: Damages to goodwill and reputation
of business .... $50,000 Loss of property rights in liquor
permit ............................... $15,000
Loss of profits for a period of
one year, May 1st, 1947 to May 1st, 1948
................................................... $25,000
_______
$90,000
175 The licence to sell alcoholic beverages
was, of course, only an annual licence subject to revocation at any time and
the renewal of which might have been properly refused for a variety of reasons.
Nevertheless, in my view, appellant could reasonably expect that so long as he
continued to observe the provisions of the Alcoholic Liquor Act his licence
would be renewed from year to year, as in fact it had been for many years past. 176
There can be no doubt that cancellation of appellant's licence without
legal justification resulted in a substantial reduction in the value of the
goodwill and profit making possibilities of the restaurant business carried on
by him at 1429 Crescent St., Montreal, and in a pecuniary loss to him for which
in my opinion he is entitled to recover damages from respondent. 177 The
restaurant business is probably no less hazardous than most other businesses,
and damages of this sort are obviously difficult to assess, the amount being of
necessity a more or less arbitrary one. The learned trial judge awarded
appellant the sum of $6,000 as loss of profits for the period from December 4,
1946, to May 1, 1947, the date on which the licence would have expired, and
this would appear to be supported by the evidence. I have reached the
conclusion that the amount awarded to the appellant by the learned trial judge
should be increased by an amount of $25,000, as damages for diminution in the
value of the goodwill of the business and for loss of future profits. 178 In
the result, therefore, I would allow both appeals with costs here and below,
and modify the judgment at the trial by increasing the amount of the damages to
$33,123.53 with interest from the date of the judgment in the Superior Court. Appeals allowed with costs, Taschereau, Cartwright and Fauteux J.J.
dissenting. Solicitors of record: Attorneys for the plaintiff, appellant: A.L. Stein and F.R. Scott,
Montreal. Attorneys for the defendant, respondent: L.E. Beaulieu and Edouard
Asselin, Montreal. FN1. [1956] Que. Q.B. 447. FN2. [1956] Que. Q.B. 447. FN3. (1933), 54 Que. K.B. 377. FN4. (1937), 62 Que. K.B. 140. FN5. [1943] Que. K.B. 713. FN6. [1951] S.C.R. 265, 2 D.L.R. 369, 11 C.R. 85, 99 C.C.C. 1. FN7. [1949] Que. K.B. 238. FN8. (1915), 52 S.C.R. 146, 26 D.L.R. 164. FN9. 98 E.R. 1021. FN10. [1898] A.C. 1. FN11. [1956] Que. Q.B. 447. FN12. [1956] Que. Q.B. 447. FN13. [1891] A.C. 173 at 179. FN14. [1947] A.C. 109 at 122. FN15. [1951] A.C. 66. FN16. (1885), 10 App. Cas. 229 at 240. FN17. (1934), 72 Que. S.C. 112. FN18. (1877), 47 L.J.M.C. 67, 13 Cox C.C. 625. FN19. (1915), 52 S.C.R. 146, 26 D.L.R. 164. FN20. [1956] Que. Q.B. 447. FN21. [1951] S.C.R. 265, 2 D.L.R. 369, 11 C.R. 85, 99 C.C.C. 1. FN22. [1934] O.R. 421 at 428, 3 D.L.R. 565, 62 C.C.C. 132. FN23. [1951] A.C. 66. FN24. [1959] S.C.R. 24, 16 D.L.R. (2d) 241. FN25. (1885), 10 App. Cas. 229 at 240. FN26. (1915), 52 S.C.R. 146, 26 D.L.R. 164. FN27. (1770), 3 Wils. 121 at 123, 95 E.R. 967. FN28. [1932] A.C. 542. FN29. (1852), 3 H.L. Cas. 759, 10 E.R. 301. FN30. [1956] Que. Q.B. 447 at 457. FN31. [1956] Que. Q.B. 447. FN32. [1949] Que. K.B. 238. FN33. [1951] S.C.R. 265, 2 D.L.R. 369, 11 C.R. 85, 99 C.C.C. 1. FN34. [1951] S.C.R. 265, 2 D.L.R. 369, 11 C.R. 85, 99 C.C.C. 1. FN35. [1956] Que. Q.B. 447. FN36. [1914] A.C. 62. FN37. [1958] S.C.R. 177 at 188, 13 D.L.R. (2d) 1, 120 C.C.C. 1. FN38. (1917), 57 Que. S.C. 443. FN39. (1933), 50 Que. K.B. 377. FN40. (1937), 62 Que. K.B. 143. FN41. [1943] Que. K.B. 713. FN42. [1956] Que. Q.B. 447. FN43. (1902), 12 Que. K.B. 179 at 202. FN44. (1914), 23 Que. K.B. 274 at 280. END OF DOCUMENT |