COURT OF APPEAL OGDEN v. OGDEN
(OTHERWISE PHILIP). [1908] P. 46 COUNSEL: Sir Edward Clarke, K.C., and Bayford, for the appellant. Middleton, for the petitioner, the respondent on the appeal. SOLICITORS: F. Evelyn Jones; Chester, Broome & Griffiths, for
Crofton, Craven & Worthington, Manchester. JUDGES: Cozens-Hardy M.R., Sir Gorell Barnes, President, and
Kennedy L.J. DATES: 1907 July 26, 27; Oct. 14; Nov. 18. Nullity of Marriage Bigamy Marriage in
England between Englishwoman and Domiciled Frenchman Irregularity by
French Law Decree of Nullity by French Court on Grounds unknown to
English Law Conflict of Laws Lex loci contractus
Jurisdiction. In September, 1898, a ceremony of marriage in English form was
celebrated in England between a domiciled Englishwoman and P., a domiciled
Frenchman. By a decree of the French Court in November, 1901, this marriage was
annulled, on the ground that the consent of the parent, as required by French
law, had not been obtained. P. subsequently married a Frenchwoman in France. In
July, 1903, the Englishwoman instituted a suit in England for the dissolution
of her marriage with P. on the ground of his adultery and desertion. This suit
was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In October, 1904, the Englishwoman went
through a ceremony of marriage in England with O., a domiciled Englishman,
describing herself as a widow:- Held (following Simonin v. Mallac, (1860) 2 Sw. &
Tr. 67, and Sottomayor v. De Barros, (1879) 5 P. D. 94), that the lex loci
contractus must prevail, and that this later marriage was bigamous and must be
annulled at the suit of O. Decision of Bargrave Deane J., [1907] P. 107, affirmed. Quaere whether, in circumstances like the present, the Court ought
not to have assumed jurisdiction in the wifes suit for the
dissolution of her first marriage by treating her as having a domicil in her
own cou7ntry sufficient to support a suit of this kind. APPEAL from a decision of Bargrave Deane J. (1) The question raised by this appeal was the effect of a decree of
nullity of marriage by a French Court on a marriage solemnized in England
between a domiciled Englishwoman and a domiciled Frenchman temporarily residing
in England. The facts as stated by Sir Gorell Barnes in the judgment of the
Court of Appeal were as follows: The appellant, an Englishwoman who was
domiciled in England, and whose maiden name was Sarah Helen Williams, on
September 14, 1898, went through the ceremony of marriage at the registry
office at Prestwich, in the county of Lancaster, with one Léon
Philip, who was a French (1) [1907] P. 107. [*47] subject having a French domicil. At the time of the said ceremony
he was temporarily resident in England in order to study English commerce and
learn the English language. The ceremony took place without the knowledge
either of his parents or of her parents. According to the marriage certificate,
the appellants age appears to have been twenty-five, and
Philips age was stated to have been twenty-two years, but as a matter
of fact he was only nineteen. For a short time after the marriage the parties cohabited
in England, and then it appears that the marriage became known to the
appellants father, who communicated with Léon
Philips father in France. In the result Philips father came
over to this country and took his son to France, where he has ever since
remained. The appellant became pregnant, by Léon Philip, of a
child, which was born on July 7, 1899. Afterwards Léon
Philips father instituted proceedings in France to have the marriage
annulled in accordance with certain provisions of the French Civil Code, to
which it will be necessary to refer hereafter. It is to be gathered from the decree of the French Court that the
appellant made a claim that the marriage should take civil effect, and for
alimony, and also for an allowance for the support of the child. On November 5, 1901, a decree was pronounced in the proceedings at
the Civil Tribunal of First Instance of the Seine, which recorded as to
Léon Philip that, having come of age, he appeared personally in the
proceedings, and, dealing with M. Philip, seniors, application to
annul the marriage, the decree, after reciting that Léon Philip
contracted the marriage in England at the age of nineteen years with Sarah
Helen Williams, aged twenty-five years, on September 14, 1898, and that he
could not by reason of his age marry without the consent of his father, his
only surviving parent, and that he did not ask such consent; that, on the other
hand, the said marriage was not preceded by any publication in France; that it
is certain that such omission was intentional on the part of Léon
Philip and Sarah Helen Williams, and with the object of eluding the
requirements of French law so as to avoid the intended union being known to M.
Philip, senior, and that the said marriage [*48] was therefore null according to articles 148
and 170 of the Code Civil, and that there was nothing to shew that it was
afterwards ratified, either explicitly or implicitly, by M. Philip, senior;
that the application to annul the marriage was admissible, seeing that
Léon Philip declared that he abided by the order of the Court, and
after reciting the application of the respondent, pronounced the annulment of
the marriage of Léon Philip and the appellant with all its legal
consequences, and declared the appellants claim untenable, saving as
concerned the custody of the infant, and nonsuited her as to the same, but gave
her the custody of the infant and ordered Léon Philip to pay a maintenance
of 50 francs a month for the childs support. Although the appellant took the part mentioned in the decree in
the French proceedings through her solicitors, she appears never to have been
in France, and not to have been called as a witness in those proceedings. After the decree Léon Philip married again in France,
and thereupon the appellant, on July 21, 1903, instituted a suit in the
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice against
Léon Philip for a dissolution of her alleged marriage with him on
the ground of desertion and adultery. Her petition also asked for a declaration
that her marriage was annulled. This case came on as an undefended case before
Lord St. Helier (then Sir Francis Jeune) on July 5, 1904, and that learned
judge dismissed the petition on the ground of want of jurisdiction. He appears
to have held that, so far as the claim for divorce was concerned, he had no
jurisdiction on the ground that the respondent to that suit was not domiciled
in England; and, with regard to the claim for a declaration that the said
marriage was annulled, it does not appear that any evidence was gone into as to
the French law, nor as to the question of the validity of the marriage in
England, and there seems to have been no decision whatever on the question of
the validity of the marriage. It may be doubted whether the decision that the
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim for divorce was right, and the
reason for this will be found stated towards the end of the present judgment. On October 29, 1904, the appellant went through the ceremony [*49] of marriage with the
present petitioner, William Henry Ogden, at a parish church in Lancashire,
describing herself as a widow. She lived with Ogden for a time, and had a child
by him. Later, on July 28, 1906, Ogden instituted the present suit against the
appellant to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage on the ground that at the
time of the ceremony of marriage between him and the appellant the said
Léon Philip was alive, and that the marriage of the appellant and
Léon Philip had not been annulled or dissolved for any cause
competent to the law of England. There was upon the evidence in the case a
dispute between Ogden and the appellant as to how much he knew, or was told, at
the time he went through the ceremony of marriage with her, she asserting that
she told him the whole of the facts which had occurred in relation to
Léon Philip, and Ogden disputing this. The appellant by her answer denied that she was lawfully married
to Léon Philip, and pleaded that her marriage with him was declared
null by the aforesaid decree. There was no dispute that at the time of the
ceremony which took place between Ogden and the appellant Léon Philip
was still alive, but according to her evidence she did not know the real age of
Léon Philip at the time of the ceremony with him, and it did not
appear that she had any knowledge of French law; and, as the facts appeared to
the Court of Appeal, it must be taken that she had no such knowledge, and did
not in fact intend to elude the requirements of that law. The present case was heard before Bargrave Deane J., and on
December 10, 1906, he pronounced a decree nisi, declaring the marriage between
the petitioner and the appellant null and void on the ground that the appellant
had a husband living at the time of her marriage with the petitioner. Bargrave
Deane J. followed the cases of Simonin v. Mallac (1), and the decision
of Lord Hannen in the case of Sottomayor v. De Barros. (2) From this
decision the present appeal was brought. The following articles from the French Civil Code were referred to
in the course of the arguments and judgment:– 144. A man before the age of eighteen, and a woman before fifteen
complete, are incapable of contracting marriage. (1) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. (2) 5 P. D. 94. [*50] 148. The son who has not attained the full age of twenty-five
years, the daughter who has not attained the full age of twenty-one years,
cannot contract marriage without the consent of their father and mother; in
case of disagreement, the consent of the father is sufficient. 149. If one of the two be dead, or disabled from manifesting his
or her will, the consent of the other is sufficient. 150. If the father and mother are dead, or if they are disabled
from manifesting their will (1), the grandfathers and grandmothers shall supply
their place. If there be a disagreement between the grandfather and grandmother
of the same line, the consent of the grandfather shall suffice; if the
disagreement be between the two lines, this division shall have the effect of
consent. 151. Where the children of a family have attained the majority
fixed by article 148, they are required previously to contracting marriage to
demand, by a respectful and formal act, the advice of their father and mother,
or that of their grandfathers and grandmothers when their father and mother are
dead, or disabled from manifesting their will. 152. From the majority fixed by article 148 to the age of thirty
years completed for sons, and until the age of twenty-five years completed for
daughters, the respectful act required by the preceding article, and on which
consent to marriage shall not have been obtained, shall be twice more renewed from
month to month; and one month after the third act it shall be lawful to proceed
with the celebration of the marriage. 153. After the age of thirty years, it shall be lawful, in default
of consent given upon a respectful act, to proceed, after the expiration of a
month, with the celebration of the marriage. Articles 165 to 169 contain provisions relating to the
publications directed by article 63. 170. A marriage contracted in a foreign country between natives of
France and between a native of France and a foreigner (1) Fr. dans limpossibilité de
manifester leur volonté. As to the form of the
acte respectueux, see article 154 (modified in 1907). In
article 183 the masculine époux is understood to
include the feminine. A few verbal amendments have been made in the
translation. F. P. [*51] shall be valid if celebrated according to the forms used
in that country, provided that it has been preceded by the publications
prescribed in article 63, under the title Of acts of the civil
power, and that the frenchman has not infringed the regulations
contained in the preceding chapter. 182. A marriage contracted without the consent of the father and
mother, of the ancestors, or of the family council, in cases where such consent
was necessary, can be impeached only by those whose consent was requisite, or
by such of the two married persons as stood in need of that consent. 183. A suit for nullity is no longer maintainable either by the married
persons, or by the relations whose consent was required, in those cases where
the marriage has been approved, either expressly or tacitly, by those whose
consent was necessary; or when a year has elapsed without complaint on their
part, subsequently to their knowledge of the marriage. Such suit is no longer
maintainable by a spouse after the lapse of a year without complaint on his
part subsequently to his having attained the competent age for consenting to
the marriage in his own person. 185. Nevertheless a marriage contracted by parties who have not
yet reached the required age, or of whom one has not attained that age, is no
longer liable to be impeached, first, where six months have expired since the
married person or persons have attained the competent age; secondly, where the
woman not having reached that age has conceived before the expiration of six
months. 201. A marriage which has been declared null is attended,
nevertheless, by civil consequences, as well with regard to the married parties
as to their children, where the marriage has been contracted in good faith. 202. Where good faith exists only on the part of one of the
married persons, the marriage is only attended by civil consequences in favour
of that person, and the children of the marriage. The appeal was heard on July 26 and 27 and October 14. Sir Edward Clarke, K.C., and Bayford, for the appellant. A
marriage celebrated according to the forms required by the local [*52] law is valid
universally unless one or both of the parties is or are by the law of his, her,
or their domicil incapable of contracting such marriage. It follows that a
marriage celebrated in England according to the forms of that country is only
valid if such party thereto is by the law of his or her domicil capable of
celebrating such marriage. [SIR GORELL BARNES, PRESIDENT. The language of your proposition is
ambiguous. Here the man was merely incapable according to the law of his own
country until he got his parents consent. The want of consent is not
incapacity; it is want of compliance with a formality.] It is submitted that under article 148 of the French Civil Code
the man was under a personal incapacity to marry without that consent. In Scrimshire
v. Scrimshire (1) stress is laid upon the importance of a marriage being held
good or bad everywhere, and that decision is recognized in Harford v. Morris. (2) Assuming that
article 148 goes to the question of capacity, Brook v. Brook (3) is in point.
There a marriage contracted abroad by domiciled English subjects was held to be
void because the man was marrying his deceased wifes sister. [SIR GORELL BARNES, PRESIDENT. That is an exception based on
prohibited degrees.] Bargrave Deane J. proceeded upon Simonin v. Mallac (4); but that case is
distinguishable from the present, because there both the parties had attained
the majority fixed by article 148, and the only objection to the marriage was
that they had omitted to ask the consent of their relations, as required by
article 151, although if they had observed the formalities required by that
article they could ultimately marry without such consent: article 152; and this
distinction was pointed out by Cresswell J. in that case. Therefore in that
case there was no such incapacity as there is here. In Sottomayor v. De
Barros
(5) it was originally assumed that both parties were domiciled Portuguese, and
that the marriage, which was celebrated in England, was within the prohibited (1) (1752) 2 Hagg. Cons. 395, 416. (2) (1776) 2 Hagg. Cons. 423, 431. (3) (1861) 9 H. L. C. 193. (4) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. (5) (1877) 2 P. D. 81; 3 P. D. 1; (1879) 5 P. D. 94. [*53] degrees according to the law of Portugal, though not according to
the law of England. On that assumption the case was tried before Sir R.
Phillimore, who felt himself bound by Simonin v. Mallac (1) to hold that the
Court of the place where the marriage was celebrated was not bound to recognize
the incapacities affixed by the law of the domicil on the parties, and he
accordingly declared the marriage valid; but his decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeal, who set aside the marriage, and distinguished Simonin v.
Mallac
(1) on the ground that the question there was one of form, and not of capacity.
The case came on again before Lord Hannen, after it had been proved that the
husband at the date of his marriage was domiciled in England, and that learned
judge held that the marriage was valid. It is submitted that that decision
violated the principles of the previous judgment of the Court of Appeal in the
same case and was wrong, and that the point was really the same as in Mette
v. Mette (2), where the decision was the other way. In the judgment of the
Court of Appeal in Sottomayor v. De Barros (3) it is treated as a settled
principle of law that the question of personal capacity to enter into any
contract is to be decided by the law of domicil. That principle applies here. Simonin
v. Mallac (1) is really inconsistent with it. That case was reluctantly
followed by Sir R. Phillimore, who was reversed on appeal, and was again
followed by Farwell J. in Hay v. Northcote (4); but it has never been followed by
the Court of Appeal, and, unless distinguishable from the present case, it is
submitted that it is wrong and ought to be overruled. Scott v.
Attorney-General (5) and Warter v. Warter (6) are also inconsistent with Simonin
v. Mallac. (1) [KENNEDY L.J. It is noticeable that the character of the
incapacity in this case is such as to render the marriage voidable only, and
not void: article 182. It is not like an incestuous alliance.] Assuming that this marriage was valid by the English law, upon
that marriage the wife acquired her husbands domicil, (1) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. (2) (1859) 1 Sw. & Tr. 416, 423. (3) 3 P. D. 1, 5. (4) [1900] 2 Ch. 262. (5) (1886) 11 P. D. 128. (6) (1890) 15 P. D. 152. [*54] and the marriage has now been declared null and void by a decree
of the French Court. The French Court has jurisdiction to make that decree, and
the wife appeared and submitted to the decision. That was a judgment in rem,
and is valid universally: Harvey v. Farnie (1); Niboyet v. Niboyet (2); Bater v. Bater (3); Pemberton v.
Hughes
(4); Sinclair v. Sinclair.(5) The French Court must be considered quite
as competent with regard to nullity as divorce; and the judgment of a competent
Court must be recognized in this Court. The status of a person must be decided
by the Court of his or her domicil. [SIR GORELL BARNES, PRESIDENT. In a nullity case like this the
decree is only a declaration of the status of the parties in France.] It was a decision on the ground of incompetence under French law,
binding on all parties and on all Courts in all countries. Where the Court of
the husbands domicil has pronounced on the status of the parties,
that decree is recognized as binding in this country: Armitage v.
Attorney-General. (6) In Simonin v. Mallac (7) the question of the effect of the
French decree was not considered, and the question of domicil was not dealt
with. For present purposes there is no distinction between a sentence of
nullity and a decree for divorce; each affects the status of the person, and
status is properly dealt with by the Court of the domicil. Middleton, for the petitioner, the respondent on the appeal. The
lex loci contractus, viz., England, determines the validity of the first
marriage, and that law is to prevail by which the parties intended to be bound,
i.e., the lex loci. There is no reason shewn in the cases on domicil which have
been cited for setting this contract aside. The res was
never in the jurisdiction of the French Courts, and therefore the decree cannot
be a declaration or judgment in rem. Regard will not be had
to the opinion of a foreign Court on an English marriage ceremony: Sinclair
v. Sinclair. (5) That the law of the place where (1) (1882) 8 App. Cas. 43. (2) (1878) 4 P. D. 1. (3) [1906] P. 209. (4) [1899] 1 Ch. 781. (5) (1798) 1 Hagg. Cons. 294. (6) [1906] P. 135. (7) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. [*55] the contract is made is to prevail is clear from a long chain of
authorities, and this is recognized in Scrimshire v. Scrimshire (1), Harford v.
Morris
(2), and Middleton v. Janverin.(3) In nullity cases domicil is not the test:
Linke v. Van Aerde (4) and Roberts v. Brennan (5), which shews that Niboyet v. Niboyet (6) still applies to
nullity cases. Simonin v. Mallac (7) and Sottomayor v. De Barros (8) cover this case,
and are in favour of the petitioner. The respect shewn to the lex loci
contractus is also shewn in Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (9) and Kent v.
Burgess.(10)
That the consent of the parents of Léon Philip was not essential
seems clear from Sottomayor v. De Barros. (8) The lex loci is the governing
rule in deciding upon the validity or invalidity of all personal contracts: Warrender
v. Warrender. (11) The intention of the parties when entering into the
contract must be looked at in order to arrive at the law by which the contract
must be construed: Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery. (12) The cases relied on for the appellant are all distinguishable; in
none of them was the validity of the marriage disputed. Those cases merely shew
that this Court recognizes the authority of a foreign Court to dissolve an
English marriage for some cause which has accrued since the marriage, when also
the domicil of the parties has been changed since the marriage. Sir Edward Clarke, K.C., in reply. If the marriage was not a
nullity from the first, why should the French Court make any declaration of its
nullity, as was done in Andrews v. Ross? (13) In that case their judgment
altered the status of the parties, just as much as a decree for divorce does. The provisions in the French Civil Code against marriage without
consent impose a personal incapacity to contract, and the marriage was invalid
because Léon Philip was incapable of (1) 2 Hagg. Cons. 395, at p. 412. (2) 2 Hagg. Cons. 423. (3) (1802) 2 Hagg. Cons. 437. (4) (1894) 10 Times L. R. 426. (5) [1902] P. 143. (6) 4 P. D. 1. (7) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. (8) 5 P. D. 94. (9) (1811) 2 Hagg. Cons. 54. (10) (1840) 11 Sim. 361. (11) (1835) 2 Cl. & F. 488, at p. 529. (12) [1894] A. C. 202. (13) (1888) 14 P. D. 15. [*56] entering into the marriage contract. Capacity to contract must be
tested by the law of the domicil; and the Court of the domicil has decided that
this marriage was null and void for all purposes everywhere, and that
decree is binding on this Court and all other civilized Courts. Cur. adv. vult. Nov. 18. The judgment of the Court (Cozens-Hardy M.R., Sir Gorell
Barnes, President, and Kennedy L.J.) was delivered by SIR GORELL BARNES, PRESIDENT. This is an appeal in a case of
considerable importance and interest, more especially to persons in this
country who have entered into, or contemplate entering into, matrimonial
relations with foreigners. The facts which give rise to the question are these.
[Having stated the facts as above set out, his Lordship continued:-] The case
was very fully and ably argued by counsel on behalf of the respective parties,
and two points were made for the appellant by her counsel, Sir Edward Clarke;
the first, that her marriage with Léon Philip was not valid,
inasmuch as, although the marriage was celebrated according to the forms
required by the law of England, it was invalid both in this country and in France,
because Léon Philip was, by the law of France, being the law of his
country and his domicil, incapable of contracting the marriage; the second,
that the effect of the French decree was to annul the marriage, both in France
and in this country. If both or either of these points were established in
favour of the appellant, the contention on her part which followed as a matter
of course was that at the time of the ceremony of marriage between herself and
Mr. Ogden she was free to contract a marriage with him, and that, therefore,
her marriage with him was valid, and his petition should be dismissed. Evidence was given at the trial of the French law upon which the
appellant relied. The French Civil Code was put in, and various sections of
that Code were referred to on the argument of this appeal, to some of which it
is necessary to draw attention. By article 1, s. 3, the laws relating to the
condition and privileges of persons govern Frenchmen although residing in a
foreign [*57]
country.
By Title II., s. 63, two publications with an interval of eight days between
them have to be made, containing particulars of the proposed marriage. Title V.
contains (inter alia) provisions which, translated into English, are as
follows. [Having read the articles from the French Civil Code set out above,
his Lordship proceeded:–] It would seem from these provisions that a
marriage without the necessary consent or publication is not made by the Code
void from the outset, but will only be declared void if proceedings for that
purpose are taken by the proper parties in proper time, and will be valid
unless the declaration is made. These being the facts and the points raised, counsel for the
appellant endeavoured to support his first point by urging before the Court
certain propositions which were wider than that which it is necessary to
consider for the purpose of determining the present case. It is not necessary
in this case to consider what are the principles which ought to govern a
decision in England upon the question of the validity in this country of a
marriage celebrated therein between two foreigners domiciled abroad and
incapable by the law of their domicil of marrying each other at all. It is not
even necessary for the decision of this case to consider what has been or ought
to be decided as to the validity of a marriage entered into in England between
two foreigners domiciled abroad where they have come to this country in order
to avoid a difficulty with regard to formalities which are required by the law
of their domicil for the celebration of a valid marriage in their own country. The simple question for determination in the present case upon the
first point is whether or not a marriage taking place in England between an
English person domiciled in England with a foreigner temporarily residing in
this country, which it was not disputed would be held in England to be a valid
marriage if celebrated between two inhabitants of this country, ought to be
held invalid on the ground that the foreigner was by the statute law of his
country subjected to the necessity of complying with certain formalities in
order to be at liberty to enter into the marriage. It is desirable to state
this limited proposition very clearly, because, with regard to questions which
may be raised [*58] as to the validity of marriages in England between persons
domiciled abroad, certain cases have been decided (to which reference will be
made further on in this judgment) which do not necessarily involve the
consideration of the particular point already indicated, or any decision
thereupon; and it is desirable, therefore, to avoid the confusion which appears
to have arisen sometimes between the consideration of the principles which have
been laid down for determining the validity of a marriage where the ceremony
alone was in question, and of those which have been considered, in determining
whether it was lawful for the parties to intermarry at all. Now, the argument for the appellant in the present case was that,
although the marriage between her and Léon Philip was celebrated
according to the forms required by the English law, it was invalid universally
because Léon Philip was a minor in France, and under a disability by
the law of France from contracting such marriage without the consent of his
father, and without complying with the other formalities required by the law of
France. In substance this contention amounted to this that in regard
to entering into a marriage in England with an inhabitant thereof, Léon
Philip carried with him into this country an incapacity, which ought to be
recognized by the law of England, to enter into matrimonial relationship with
such inhabitant without complying with the provisions of the French Code. It
was urged that this principle had been recognized in this country, and cases
were cited which it was said supported the contention. The cases cited,
however, do not support it, and in truth the argument on behalf of the
appellant appears to be based upon views which have been expressed by foreign
jurists, but which have not been adopted in this country, where the English
Courts have not been very ready to admit a personal law of status and capacity
dependent on domicil, and travelling with the person from country to country,
although there has been, perhaps, less unwillingness in later years to give
effect to the lex domicilii to some extent: see, for instance, In re
Goodmans Trusts. (1) It may be doubted whether there is much substantial difference (1) (1881) 17 Ch. D. 266. [*59] of opinion between foreign and English jurists as to the general
rule that between persons sui juris the validity of the marriage is to be
decided by the law of the place where it is celebrated. There are certain
exceptions, as, for instance, when the lex loci celebrationis violates the
precepts of religion, or of public morals, as in the case of bigamy, or where
the marriages are such as are generally recognized as incestuous. When,
however, the competency of the parties to contract marriage is considered,
there appears to be a diversity of opinion, not merely between foreign jurists
and English jurists, but amongst the foreign jurists themselves, certain
foreign jurists, but not all, maintaining that a person who is in his minority
by the law of his native or acquired domicil is to be deemed everywhere in the
same state or condition. This appears to be based upon the conception that the
laws which have for their object the regulation of the capacity of persons are
to be treated as personal laws and of absolute obligation everywhere when they
have once attached upon the person by the law of his domicil. This conception
would appear to result from the application of principles derived from sources
of law different from those from which the English common law has been derived,
and from considerations which have not had the same force in this country as
abroad. Story J., however, notices that many exceptions are admitted to exist
as to the operation of personal laws, and that the practice of nations by no
means justifies the doctrine in the extent to which it is ordinarily laid down
by many foreign jurists. (1) That learned writer discusses this question at
great length in the work to which reference has been made, and makes the
following general observations in s. 76 on the inconvenience of allowing the
law of the domicil to govern contracts made in other countries. He says:
How are the inhabitants of any country to ascertain the condition of
a stranger dwelling among them as fixed by the law of a foreign country where
he was born or had acquired a new domicil? Even Courts of justice do not assume
to know what the laws of a foreign country are; but require them to be proved.
How, then, shall private persons be presumed to have better means of knowledge?
On the other hand, it may be said, with (1) Story on the Conflict of Laws, s. 54. [*60] great force, that contracts ought to be governed by the law of the
country where they are made, as to the competence of the parties to make them,
and as to their validity; because the parties may well be presumed to contract
with reference to the laws of the place where the contract is made and is to be
executed. Such a rule has certainty and simplicity in its application. It ought
not, therefore, to be matter of surprise if the country of the
parties birth should hold such a contract valid, or void, according
to its own law, and that nevertheless, the country where it is made and to be
executed should hold it valid or void, according to its own law. It has been
well observed by an eminent judge that with respect to any ignorance
arising from foreign birth and education, it is an indispensable rule of law,
as exercised in all civilized countries, that a man who contracts in a country
engages for a competent knowledge of the law of contracts of that country. If
he rashly presumes to contract without such knowledge, he must take the
inconveniences resulting from such ignorance upon himself, and not attempt to
throw them upon the other party who has engaged under a proper knowledge and
sense of the obligation which the law would impose upon him by virtue of that
engagement. And again, in s. 75, he quotes from a judgment
of Porter J. in the case of Saul v. His Creditors (1) as follows:
Suppose, as is the truth, that our law placed the age of majority at
twenty-one; that twenty-five was the period at which a man ceased to be a minor
in the country where he resided, and that at the age of twenty-four he came
into this State, and entered into contracts, would it be permitted that he
should, in our Courts and to the demand of one of our citizens, plead as a
protection against his engagements the laws of a foreign country, of which the
people of Louisiana had no knowledge? And would we tell them that ignorance of
foreign laws in relation to a contract made here was to prevent them from
enforcing it, though the agreement was binding by those of their own State?
Most assuredly we would not. And again, in s. 90, he observes:
The difficulty of applying any other rule as to the capacity and
incapacity of the person, in respect to the class of nuptial contracts, will
become still more clear by attending to the great (1) (1827) 5
Martin, N. S. (La.), 569, at pp. 596-8. [*61] extent of the parental power recognized by the Continental nations
of Europe, and derived by them from the civil law. Parental restraint upon the
marriage of minors exists to a very great extent in Germany, Holland, France,
and other civil law countries; to so great an extent indeed that the marriage
of minors without the consent of their parents, or at least of their father, is
absolutely void (sed quaere, should not the learned author have said
voidable; see observations above), and the disability of minority is
in these countries carried to a much greater age than it is by the common law.
In some of these countries majority is not attained until thirty, and until a
very recent period, even in France, the age of majority of males was fixed at
twenty-five and of females at twenty-one. It is now fixed at twenty-one in all
other cases except for the purpose of contracting marriage, and a marriage
cannot even now be contracted in France by a man until twenty-five years of
age, and by a woman until twenty-one, without the consent of their parents, or
at least of their fathers, if the parents differ in opinion. Yet France has
ventured upon the bold doctrine that the marriages of Frenchmen in foreign
countries shall not be deemed valid if the parties are not by its own law
competent to contract by reason of their being under the parental power. There
can be little doubt that foreign countries where such marriages are celebrated
will follow their own law and disregard that of France. It would needlessly lengthen this judgment to set out the passages
from foreign jurists bearing upon this subject, and it is not necessary to
examine at length those cases or those passages in the above-mentioned work or
other commentaries which deal with cases in which a marriage is entirely
prohibited by the laws of the domicil of both or either of the parties, and yet
is permitted by the laws of the place of celebration, for we are concerned in
this case only with the question of a disability imposed by foreign law upon
one of the parties to the marriage in respect only of want of parental consent,
and compliance with certain formalities required by such foreign law. There appears to be no case in this country (certainly no case was
cited to us in argument on this appeal) in which in such a case as last
mentioned the view has been expressed that such a [*62] marriage would be
held invalid in this country. We know of no principle recognized by English law
which would justify the Court in coming to the conclusion that such a marriage
ought to be held invalid; for, although to a certain extent the lex domicilii
is recognized in this country, for instance, in the familiar case where it is
held that mobilia sequuntur personam, yet such recognition appears never to
have been extended to the case of a matrimonial engagement entered into in this
country between an inhabitant of another country and an inhabitant of this
country. In such a case, where there are two different systems of law, one may
well ask, which is to prevail? Why should it be recognized that a person who
comes over to this country and validly enters into a marriage with one of its
inhabitants according to English law should be held unable to do so here
because of the regulations of a foreign system of jurisprudence which places
upon him a personal incapacity to contract unless he complies with formalities
required by the foreign law? It may be observed here that the 3rd section of
article 1 of the French Civil Code ordains that the French laws relating to the
conditions and privileges of persons are to govern Frenchmen although residing
in a foreign country, so that it would seem from this provision that the French
rule as to competency by reason of minority is not based upon domicil, but upon
nationality, and therefore that even in the case of a Frenchman domiciled in
England celebrating a marriage with a domiciled Englishwoman the French Courts
would be at liberty, if the question arose before them, to declare such a
marriage null and void, on the ground that it was governed by the laws of
France, although celebrated in this country; but it could hardly be contended
in England, if both persons parties to a marriage were domiciled in this
country, that our Courts ought to hold such a marriage invalid because one of
the parties by the laws of his or her nationality may not have adequate
competency to enter into the contract. It is necessary now to refer to some of the cases which were cited
in the course of the argument, though none of them when examined can be
considered to support the contention of the appellant upon the first question,
but before doing so it should be observed that the Court has, in a suit for
nullity, by s. 22 of [*63] the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, to proceed
and act and give relief on principles and rules which in the opinion of the
said Court shall be as nearly as may be conformable to the principles and rules
on which the Ecclesiastical Courts have heretofore acted and given
relief. Upon the question, however, of validity of marriage under
consideration there is no reason for supposing that there was any difference
between the principles and rules applicable to the question in the
ecclesiastical Courts and in the Courts of common law. The first case to refer to is Herbert v. Herbert (1), where Lord
Stowell in his judgment said: It being an established principle that
every marriage must be tried according to the law of the country in which it
took place; this is according to the jus gentium: whatever the regulations may
be, according to which the marriage has been had, if they are what the
canonical law of the foreign country supports, the canonical law of this
country must enforce it. The language of this judgment as reported in
2 Hagg. Cons. at p. 271 is not quite the same, but is substantially to the same
effect. The case of Scrimshire v. Scrimshire (2) appears to have
been heard in 1752, but is reported from a manuscript note of Sir Edward
Simpson communicated by Dr. Swabey. The question raised in it was as to the
validity of marriages of British subjects contracted abroad. Sir William Wynne,
in Middleton v. Janverin (3), states that he remembered to have heard that the
judgment was founded on great deliberation, and that Lord Hardwicke L.C. was
consulted on it. In the course of that judgment Sir Edward Simpson said:
From the doctrine laid down in our books the practice of
nations and the mischief and confusion that would arise to the subjects of
every country from a contrary doctrine, I may infer that it is the consent of
all nations, that it is the jus gentium, that the solemnities of the different
nations with respect to marriages should be observed, and that contracts of
this kind are to be determined by the laws of the country where they are made.
If that principle is not to govern such cases, what is to be the rule where one
party is (1) (1819) 3 Phill. 58, at p. 63. (2) 2 Hagg. Cons. 395, 416. (3) 2 Hagg. Cons. 437, at p. 446. [*64] domiciled and the other not? The jus gentium is the law of every
country, and is obligatory on the subjects of every country. Every country
takes notice of it; and this Court, observing that law in determining upon this
case, cannot be said to determine English rights by the laws of France but by
the law of England, of which the jus gentium is part. All nations allow
marriage contracts, they are juris gentium, and the subjects of all nations are
equally concerned in them; and from the infinite mischief and confusion that
must necessarily arise to the subjects of all nations with respect to
legitimacy, successions, and other rights, if the respective laws of different
countries were only to be observed, as to marriages contracted by the subjects
of those countries abroad, all nations have consented, or must be presumed to
consent, for the common benefit and advantage, that such marriages should be
good or not, according to the laws of the country where they are made. It is of
equal consequence to all that one rule in these cases should be observed by all
countries, that is, the law where the contract is made. By observing this law,
no inconvenience can arise; but infinite mischief will ensue if it is
not. And further on: Suppose two French subjects, not
domiciled here, should clandestinely marry, and there should be a sentence for
the marriage, undoubtedly the wife, though French, would be entitled to all the
rights of a wife by our law. But if no faith should be given to that sentence
in France, and the marriage should be declared null because the man was not
domiciled, he might take a second wife in France, and that wife would be
entitled to legal rights there, and the children would be bastards in one
country and legitimate in the other. So that in cases of this kind the matter
of domicil makes no sort of difference in determining them; because the
inconvenience to society and the public in general is the same, whether the
parties contracting are domiciled or not. The terms of article 1, s. 3, of the French Code shew how these
principles differ from those upon which it is based. The principle indicated in this judgment appears to have been
adopted in the judgment of Lord Brougham in the House of Lords in the case of Warrender
v. Warrender. (1) (1) 2 Cl. & F. 488, at p. 529. [*65] The case of Brook v. Brook (1) was much relied upon by the
appellants counsel. That case, however, so far from supporting the
contention of the appellant, is when carefully considered a decision adverse to
her. The case raised a similar point to that which had been raised in Mette
v. Mette (2), with two distinctions first, that the man in the
latter case was not a natural born subject of the realm, although domiciled in
England and naturalized by Act of Parliament; secondly, that the deceased
wifes sister was a native of Frankfort, and until her marriage
domiciled there. The facts in the case of Brook v. Brook (1) are shortly
stated in the head-note to the report as follows: A. and B., British
subjects, intermarried. B. died. A. and C. (the lawful sister of B.), both
being at the time lawfully domiciled British subjects, went abroad to Denmark,
where by the law the marriage of a man with the sister of his deceased wife is
valid, and were there duly, according to the laws of Denmark, married, and it
was held that under the provisions of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 54, the marriage in
Denmark was void. In consequence of the recent Act legalizing marriage with a
deceased wifes sister, these two cases have become unimportant so far
as they affected such a marriage, but the grounds upon which they were decided
are still applicable to marriages within other degrees of consanguinity or
affinity declared void by the aforesaid statute, and on these grounds, in the
case of De Wilton v. Montefiore (3), Sir James Stirling held that a marriage
solemnized abroad according to Jewish rites between a niece and her natural
uncle, both being domiciled British subjects and adherents of the Jewish faith,
was invalid, although it was valid by the law of the place of celebration and
by Jewish law. The decisions in those cases did not depend upon the question
which is now under consideration, but upon whether or not the marriages,
entirely prohibited, at the time, by the law of this country, were to be held
valid because the parties thereto had entered into marriage relationship in a
country where such marriages were permitted. It would not follow from these
decisions that the marriages would have been held invalid in the (1) 9 H. L. C. 193. (2) 1 Sw. & Tr. 416. (3) [1900] 2 Ch. 481. [*66] countries in which they were celebrated. The case of Brook v.
Brook
(1) was a decision binding in this country, but it may be noticed that it has
not met with approval in America, where it was very fully discussed and
criticized in a learned judgment by Gray C.J. in the case of the Commonwealth
v. Lane.
(2) In that case a man, who had been lawfully married in Massachusetts and
whose wife had obtained a divorce from him on the ground of adultery, in which
case he was prohibited by the statutes of the State from marrying again without
the leave of the Court, and who, without having obtained the leave of the
Court, and being still a resident in Massachusetts, was married to another
woman in another State according to its laws, and afterwards cohabited with her
in the State of Massachusetts, the first wife being still alive, was indicted
for bigamy, but was held not guilty without proof that the second wife was
resident in the State of Massachusetts, and that he and she went into the other
State to evade the provisions of the statutes of the State of Massachusetts.
This proof was required by s. 6 of Gen. Sts. c. 106, which would seem to have
been passed with the express object of preventing such second marriages, if
such proof could be given. There are several cases of a similar nature in America, amongst
them Ponsford v. Johnson (3), Van Voorhis and Brintnall (4), and Moore v.
Hegeman.
(5) It is possible that those cases might have been decided upon
principles analogous to those applied in Scott v. Attorney-General (6)
distinguished in Warter v. Warter (7) viz., that the restriction
upon a second marriage was penal in its character, and as such was inoperative
out of the jurisdiction under which it was inflicted. But Gray C.J., in his
judgment in Commonwealth v. Lane (2), appears to have based his decision upon
the broad ground of the second marriage being in accordance with the lex loci
contractus. The reason why the case of Brook v. Brook (1) may be considered
to be adverse to the appellant is that the distinction is (1) 9 H. L. C. 193. (2) (1873) 113 Mass. 458. (3) (1847) 2 Blatchfords Rep. 51. (4) (1881) 86 N. Y. 18. (5) (1883) 92 N. Y. 521. (6) 11 P. D. 128. (7) 15 P. D. 152. [*67] there drawn between the question of the validity of a marriage
absolutely prohibited by the law of the domicil of both parties and the case in
which a marriage, valid by the law of the place of celebration if it took place
between two inhabitants of that place, is called in question because one of the
persons is domiciled abroad, and has not complied with certain forms and
obtained certain consents required by the law of the place of his or her
domicil. The Lord Chancellor (Lord Campbell) said (1): There can be
no doubt of the general rule that a foreign marriage, valid according
to the law of a country where it is celebrated, is good everywhere.
But while the forms of entering into the contract of marriage are to be
regulated by the lex loci contractus, the law of the country in which it is
celebrated, the essentials of the contract depend upon the lex domicilii, the
law of the country in which the parties are domiciled at the time of the
marriage, and in which the matrimonial residence is contemplated. Although the
forms of celebrating the foreign marriage may be different from those required
by the law of the country of domicil the marriage may be good everywhere. But
if the contract of marriage is such, in essentials, as to be contrary to the
law of the country of domicil, and is declared void by that law, it is to be
regarded as void in the country of domicil, though not contrary to the law of
the country in which it was celebrated. Again, in commenting upon the
case of Simonin v. Mallac (2) next hereinafter referred to, Lord
Campbell remarks (3): The objection to the validity of the marriage
in England was merely that the forms prescribed by the Code Napoleon for the
celebration of a marriage in France had not been observed. But there was no law
of France, where the parties were domiciled, forbidding a conjugal union
between them; and if the proper forms of celebration had been observed, this
marriage by the law of France would have been unimpeachable. The case
that is, the case of Simonin v. Mallac (2)
therefore comes into the same category as Compton v. Bearcroft (4) and Steele v.
Braddell (5), decided by Dr. Radcliff. None of these cases can shew the
validity of a marriage (1) 9 H. L. C. 193, at p. 207. (2) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. (3) 9 H. L. C. 193, at p. 218. (4) (1769) 2 Hagg. Cons. 444, n. (5) (1838) Milw. Ecc. Rep. (Ir.) 1. [*68] which the law of the domicil of the parties condemns as
incestuous, and which could not, by any forms or consents, have been rendered
valid in the country in which the parties were domiciled. It was contended that Simonin v. Mallac (1) was wrongly
decided, and therefore it is desirable to refer to it in some detail. It was a
suit for a declaration of nullity of marriage. The ceremony of marriage took
place on June 21, 1854, between the petitioner and Léon Mallac at
the parish church of St. Martins-in-the-Fields, Middlesex,
Léon Mallac being of the age of twenty-nine years, and the petitioner
aged twenty-two. They came over to London for the purpose of being married, and
returned to France the next day. The marriage was not consummated, and the
petitioner asked Mallac to marry her again in France, but he refused, and she
instituted a suit before the Civil Tribunal of First Instance of the Seine to
procure a decree of nullity of the alleged marriage. On December 1, 1854, a
decree was made, by default, against the respondent, who did not appear,
declaring the marriage null and void on the ground that by the words of article
170 of the French Code the marriage ought to have been preceded by the
publication in France prescribed by law, and that there must not have been any
contravention of the provisions of articles 144 and following of the said Code,
and that, although the nullity provided for by article 170 was not absolute, it
ought to be pronounced when an omission of formalities had taken place with the
formal intention of eluding the law, it being the province of the Tribunal to
appreciate the circumstances thereof, and that the marriage was celebrated
without the consent of the parents and without having been preceded in France
by the publications prescribed by article 63 of the Code, and that the parties
were French subjects domiciled in France who had only proceeded to England for
the purpose of contracting a marriage in order to evade the prescriptions of
French law, and that the marriage had not been consummated. Afterwards the
petitioner came to reside in England, and petitioned the Court for Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes for a decree of nullity of marriage. The petition and
citation were served on the respondent at Naples, but he put in no answer, and
the case came on before the Full Court as an undefended case. It was (1) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. [*69] argued by Dr. Phillimore, evidently at great length and with great
learning. Numerous authorities, both English and foreign, were cited, but the
Court, composed of Sir Cresswell Cresswell, Channell J. and Keating J.,
dismissed the petition. In the course of the judgment Sir Cresswell Cresswell
(delivering the judgment of the Court), in dealing with the second question to
be determined viz., whether the marriage was to be held null and
void said that, so far as the Court had been able to ascertain, the
question was one prim3Ú4 impressionis, that no decision upon the point was
cited, and they had not had the benefit of any other diligence save their own
in the attempt to discover precedents for their guidance. The case was a
stronger case in favour of the petitioner than the present case is in favour of
the present appellant, for both the parties in that case were French subjects
and of French domicil. The argument was very much the same as that which was addressed to
this Court, viz., that the law of the country of the domicil placed on the
parties an incapacity to contract marriage without attending to the formalities
prescribed, and that such incapacity travelled with them everywhere, and
rendered them incapable of making a valid contract in any other country,
especially where the intention was to evade the law of their own country. In
the course of the judgment it was noticed that according to the evidence the
incapacity to contract was not absolute, but conditional only, and that the
marriage, having been contracted between a man and woman of the respective ages
of twenty-nine and twenty-two without attending to the formalities prescribed
by the Code Napoléon, articles 151, 152, 153, and 154, might receive
a different consideration from one absolutely prohibited by article 148 by
parties respectively under those ages. The Court, however, dealt with the case
on the broad ground that by the decree of the French Court, as evidenced by the
law of France, the marriage was void, and the question considered was whether
the marriage was to be judged of here by the law of France or by the law of
England. The learned judge said: In general the personal competency
or incompetency of individuals to contract has been held to depend upon the law
of the place where the contract is made. But it was and is contended [*70] that such rule does not extend to contracts of marriage; and that
parties are, with reference to them, bound by the law of their domicil. This
question, of so much importance in all civilized communities, has been largely
discussed by jurists of all nations, but they all apply their observations to
controversies arising, not in the countries where the marriage was celebrated,
but in other countries where it is brought in dispute, and of which the parties
were domiciled subjects. That a marriage good by the law of the country where
solemnized should be held good in all other countries, and the converse, is
strongly maintained as a general rule by nearly all writers on international
law. But, according to the same authorities, it is subject to some few
exceptions, viz., marriages involving polygamy and incest; those positively
prohibited by the public law of a country from motives of policy, e.g., by our
Royal Marriage Act. He then refers to the third exception mentioned
by Story in s. 113A, viz., marriages celebrated in foreign countries
by subjects entitling themselves under special circumstances to the benefit of
the laws of their own country; and continues: In several
instances, learned judges presiding in our Ecclesiastical Courts have stated
the general rule, without mentioning the exceptions, whence it has sometimes
been contended that they meant to controvert their existence. But inasmuch as
none of the cases referred to fell within the exceptions above mentioned, it
cannot justly be inferred that those learned persons intended their words to
bear so extensive a meaning; for they would hardly have repudiated the doctrine
of several learned writers whose works are always received as worthy of great
attention, without condescending to advert to it in terms, and assigning some
reasons for dissenting from it. He proceeded further to refer to the
cases of Scrimshire v. Scrimshire (1) and Middleton v. Janverin (2), and the writings
of some of the jurists, especially Huber, De Conflictu Legum, from which he
quotes, at p. 81, a passage upon which he remarks that Huber does not suggest
the slightest doubt as to the marriages of minors without consent, celebrated
in countries whither they had gone for the purpose of evading the laws of the
country of domicil, being held good in the country where solemnized; but, (1) 2 Hagg. Cons. 395. (2) 2 Hagg. Cons. 437. [*71] with reference to the second class, vindicates the country of the
domicil against the charge of violating the laws of nations by refusing to
recognize them. He then refers to certain other cases, and thus proceeds:
The French tribunal in this case appears to have held the marriage
null and void, not because it was absolutely prohibited by the law of France,
but because the parties contracted it in England with the formal intention of
evading the prescriptions of the French law.
. Every nation has a
right to impose on its own subjects restrictions and prohibitions as to entering
into marriage contracts, either within or without its own territories, and if
its subjects sustain hardships in consequence of those restrictions, their own
nation only must bear the blame; but what right has one independent nation to
call upon any other nation equally independent to surrender its own laws in
order to give effect to such restrictions and prohibitions?
.
Assuming then that a French subject comes to England and there marries, without
consent, the subject of another foreign country by the laws of which such a
marriage would be valid, which law is to prevail? To which country is an
English tribunal to pay the compliment of adopting its law? As far as the law
of nations is concerned each must have an equal right to claim respect for its laws.
Both cannot be observed. Would it not then be more just, and therefore more for
the interest of all, that the law of that country should prevail which both are
presumed to know and to agree to be bound by? Again, assume that one of the
parties is English; would not an English subject have as strong a claim to the
benefit of English law as a foreigner to the benefit of foreign law?
After pointing out the difficulties which would arise if parties were called
upon to prove their ages, the consent of certain relations, or the
non-existence of certain relations, or that they have not come to this country
to evade the laws of their own, and other difficulties, he concludes thus:
The great importance of having some one certain rule applicable to all
cases; the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of having any rule applicable
to all cases, save that the law of the country where a marriage is solemnized
shall in that country at least decide whether it is valid or invalid; the
absence of any judicial decision or dictum, or of even any opposite opinion [*72] of any writer of
authority on the law of nations, have led us to the conclusion that we ought
not to found our judgment in this case on any other rule than the law of
England as prevailing amongst English subjects. France may make laws for her
own subjects, and impose on them all the consequences, good or evil, that
result from those laws; but England also may make laws for the regulation of
all matters within her own territory. Either nation may refuse to surrender its
own laws to those of the other, and if either is guilty of any breach of the
comitas or jus gentium, that reproach should attach to the nation whose laws
are least calculated to ensure the common benefit and advantage of all.
That case is in accordance with the general views to be found expressed in the
English decisions, and has met with approval in this Court and in the House of
Lords, or at least it may be said that where mentioned in those tribunals it
has not been dissented from. The case principally relied on by the appellant was the case of Sottomayor
v. De Barros (1), before Sir Robert Phillimore, and afterwards on appeal
before the Court of Appeal, where the petitioner and respondent, Portuguese
subjects and first cousins, came to reside in England in 1858. In 1866 they
went through a form of marriage before the registrar of the district of the
City of London, and in 1873 they returned to Portugal, and continued to reside
there. By the law of Portugal a marriage of Portuguese subjects, being first
cousins, without dispensation, wheresoever contracted, is invalid. The wife
afterwards, while residing with her parents at Lisbon, filed a petition in this
country for a declaration of nullity of marriage. The respondent appeared, but
did not file an answer, and the matter came on unopposed before Sir Robert
Phillimore, who directed that the papers should be sent to the Queens
Proctor, in order that he might argue the questions raised, and the
Queens Proctor thereupon appeared. The questions were argued, and in
the result Sir Robert Phillimore felt himself bound by prior decisions, and
especially that in Simonin v. Mallac (2), and dismissed the petition. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeal. The judgment (1) 2 P. D. 81; 3 P. D. 1. (2) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. [*73] of the Court, consisting of James, Baggallay, and Cotton L.JJ.,
was delivered by Cotton L.J., and one of the principal arguments addressed to
us upon this appeal was based upon that judgment. The decision of the Court
below was reversed. The basis of that judgment is to be found in the following
sentence at p. 5 of the report: But it is a well-recognized principle
of law that the question of personal capacity to enter into any contract is to
be decided by the law of domicil. It is, however, urged that this does not
apply to the contract of marriage, and that a marriage valid according to the
law of the country where it is solemnized is valid everywhere. This, in our
opinion, is not a correct statement of the law. The law of a country where a
marriage is solemnized must alone decide all questions relating to the validity
of the ceremony by which the marriage is alleged to have been constituted; but,
as in other contracts, so in that of marriage, personal capacity must depend on
the law of domicil; and if the laws of any country prohibit its subjects within
certain degrees of consanguinity from contracting marriage, and stamp a
marriage between persons within the prohibited degrees as incestuous, this, in
our opinion, imposes on the subjects of that country a personal incapacity,
which continues to affect them so long as they are domiciled in the country
where this law prevails, and renders invalid a marriage between persons both at
the time of their marriage subjects of and domiciled in the country which
imposes this restriction, wherever such marriage may have been
solemnized. Now this Court hearing this appeal is bound by the decision of the
Court of Appeal in this case of Sottomayor v. De Barros. (1) It is not
necessary, even if we were at liberty to do so, to consider whether that case
was rightly decided, but it is permissible to point out that the commencement
of the paragraph above set out could scarcely be considered correct in stating
that it is a well-recognized principle of law that the question of
personal capacity to enter into any contract is to be decided by the law of
domicil, for, if so, it would logically seem to follow that that part
of the judgment which indicates that the opinion of the Court was confined to
cases where both the contracting parties (1) 2 P. D. 81; 3 P. D. 1. [*74] were, at the time of their marriage, domiciled in a country, the
laws of which prohibited their marriage, should not have expressed that limitation,
and that the case of Simonin v. Mallac (1) should have been overruled, and
yet that case, according to our reading of the judgment, is approved. The
probability is that that sentence should be read with the context, and be
confined to the case present to the minds of the Court in relation to marriages
which could not be contracted at all by the laws of the country of domicil.
Even then it may be questioned whether that sentence is correct, and whether
the question of capacity is really raised at all in such a case; that is to
say, where both the parties are capable of entering into a marriage but may not
marry each other because such a marriage would be illegal in their own country.
That is rather a question of illegality than of capacity, and it may, perhaps,
not be unreasonable for one country to refuse to recognize a marriage
contracted in it between two persons by the laws of whose domicil a marriage
between them is illegal, and yet it may be quite proper and reasonable for a
country, in which a marriage takes place between persons domiciled in another
country, to recognize it as a valid marriage when it would be legal in such
other country if contracted after compliance with all formalities required in
such other country, and, further, to protect its citizens in all cases of
marriages where one of the contracting parties is domiciled in the country
first referred to that is to say, where the marriage takes place
and the other is domiciled in a foreign country, and there is a
conflict between the laws of the two countries as to the validity of the
marriage. The passage in the judgment expressly confining the decision to the
case then before the Court is as follows: It was pressed upon us in
argument that a decision in favour of the petitioner would lead to many
difficulties if questions should arise as to the validity of a marriage between
an English subject and a foreigner in consequence of prohibitions imposed by
the law of the domicil of the latter. Our opinion on this appeal is confined to
the case where both the contracting parties are, at the time of their marriage,
domiciled in a country the laws of which prohibit their marriage. All persons
are legally bound to (1) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. [*75] take notice of the laws of the country where they are domiciled.
No country is bound to recognize the laws of a foreign State when they work
injustice to its own subjects, and this principle would prevent the judgment in
the present case being relied on as an authority for setting aside a marriage
between a foreigner and an English subject domiciled in England on the ground
of any personal incapacity not recognized by the law of this country. It was upon this passage that, when the case subsequently came
before Lord Hannen, he was able to decide in favour of the marriage being valid
notwithstanding the fact that one of the parties was domiciled in Portugal. The concluding passage in the judgment of the Court of Appeal is
as follows: It only remains to consider the case of Simonin v.
Mallac.
(1) The objection to the validity of the marriage in that case, which was
solemnized in England, was the want of consent of parents, required by the law
of France, but not under the circumstances by that of this country. In our
opinion this consent must be considered a part of the ceremony of marriage, and
not a matter affecting the personal capacity of the parties to contract
marriage, and the decision in Simonin v. Mallac (1) does not, we
think, govern the present case. That may perhaps be considered only a dictum by the learned Lords
Justices, but it is really a very strong statement that Simonin v. Mallac (1) is clearly
distinguishable from the case before them, and we regard it as an approval of
the decision in that case, and, if so, it is an authority adverse to the
contention of the appellant on the present appeal. The case having been thus
argued in the Court of Appeal by the Queens Proctor, under the
provisions of s. 5 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1860, was remitted to the
Probate Division in order that the question of fact raised by the
Queens Proctors plea should be considered. It was then
heard before Lord Hannen, who found, as a fact, that the respondent, the
husband, was domiciled in England, but that the domicil of the petitioner was
Portuguese. In the course of his judgment he pointed out how the passage in
the judgment of the Court of Appeal expressly confining the decision to the
case then before the Court left him free to consider (1) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. [*76] whether the marriage of the respondent, who was domiciled in
England, with a woman subject by the law of her domicil to a personal
incapacity not recognized by English law, must be declared invalid by the
tribunals of this country, and he commented (1) upon the passage in the
judgment which formed the basis of the decision, and remarked that it appeared
to him to put forward a novel principle for which, up to the present time,
there had been no English authority. He then cited the case of Male v. Roberts (2), in which the
contract upon which the defendant was sued was made in Scotland, the defence
being that the defendant was an infant, and where Lord Eldon held the defence
bad, saying, If the law of Scotland is that such a contract as the
present could not be enforced against an infant, that should have been given as
evidence. The law of the country where the contract arose must govern the
contract; and after referring to the cases of Scrimshire v.
Scrimshire (3) and Simonin v. Mallac (4) and other cases, he held that the
marriage between the petitioner and respondent was valid, and dismissed the
petition. It appears to have been suggested that the papal dispensation of
which the law of Portugal recognizes the validity could not be distinguished in
principle from the consent of a parent; but Cotton L.J. stated in his judgment
that it could not, in the opinion of the Court, be held that such a
dispensation is a matter of form affecting only the sufficiency of the ceremony
by which the marriage was effected. Mr. Footes remarks upon this
question in his book on Private International Jurisprudence, 3rd ed. p. 367,
are much in point: Dispensation with a law is, in principle, a very
different thing from compliance with its directions, though in practice the
effect of the two may sometimes be similar. In such a case as Sottomayor v.
De Barros (5) the law of Portugal does not say that, when first cousins
wish to intermarry, they shall obtain the written consent of the Pope to their
doing so. It says they shall not marry at all, and such a prohibition by a
domiciliary law is not the less complete, as far as other tribunals are
concerned, because the same domiciliary (1) 5 P. D. at p. 100. (2) (1799) 3 Esp. 163. (3) 2 Hagg. Cons. 395. (4) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. (5) 2 P. D. 81; 3 P. D. 1. [*77] law, under certain circumstances, allows itself to be dispensed
with. The last case in which the case of Simonin v. Mallac (1) has been referred
to was the case of Hay v. Northcote (2), in which Farwell L.J. (then Farwell J.)
followed that case. In the United States of America the doctrine that the laws of the
country or State where a marriage is celebrated will, in general, govern the
question of its validity has been very clearly expressed. Several cases on the
subject have been mentioned above, and in addition thereto and to the work of
Story J., reference may be made to the cases of Medway v. Needham (3), which was
commented on in Brook v. Brook (4); Stevenson v. Gray (5), Commonwealth
v. Graham (6), and Everett v. Morrison (7); and to Mr. Bishops
Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, ss. 353-370. In s. 359 the
latter writer discusses the inconveniences which arise from applying a
different rule, and after expressing the opinion that the decision of the Court
of Appeal in Sottomayor v. De Barros (8) is contrary to the old ideas of the
supremacy of English law on English soil, he states that: No American
Court has ever yet permitted any classes of foreigners, except Sovereigns and
their diplomatic agents and attendants, to be thus exempt from subjection to
our laws on American soil. He then proceeds to discuss (ss. 371-389)
limitations to the doctrine, which are also referred to in Story J.s
work (ss. 89, 113A et seq.), but do not bear directly upon the question of
minority. He also cites the case of the Commonwealth v. Lane (9), above referred
to, and does not consider that the decision in Brook v. Brook (4) should be
followed in America. After very careful consideration of the present case we have come
to the conclusion that the first point must be decided against the appellant,
and that the marriage between her and Léon Philip must be declared
valid in England. (1) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. (2) [1900] 2 Ch. 262. (3) (1819) 16 Mass. 157. (4) 9 H. L. C. 193. (5) 17 B. Monr. (Ky.) 193, 210. (6) (1892) 157 Mass. 73. (7) (1893) 69 Hum. (N. Y.) 146. (8) 2 P. D. 81; 3 P. D. 1. (9) (1873) 113 Mass. 458. [*78] That leaves for consideration the second question, as to the
effect of the French decree. The argument upon this point for the appellant was
that the decree had an effect similar to that of a decree of dissolution of
marriage in a country in which both parties are domiciled, and that there was
no distinction between the case of a decree of nullity and a decree of
dissolution of marriage in its binding effect. Without doubt it has now been
clearly established that the Courts of this country, wherever a marriage has
been celebrated, recognize a decree of dissolution made by a proper tribunal of
the country in which the parties are domiciled as universally binding and
putting an end to the marriage, and it is no real exception to this principle
that, in cases where a wife has been deserted in the country of the domicil by
her husband in circumstances entitling her to sue for divorce, it has been held
that she might sue in the Courts of the country of the domicil notwithstanding
the fact that the husband has left the country and might possibly have done so
with the intention of acquiring a domicil in another country. The decree in
such a case is justified, either by considering that the husband cannot be
heard to say that he has changed his domicil, or, as some have thought, that
the wife must ex necessitate be entitled to treat the country of the previous
matrimonial domicil as still being the country of her domicil, and to require
its Courts to do justice to her, because otherwise it would be impossible for a
wife so situated to obtain a decree, as the respondent might keep changing his
abode from place to place, asserting that he had abandoned his original
domicil, and any domicil with which it were sought to fix him. But there are differences between suits for dissolution of
marriage, and those in which a declaration of nullity of marriage is claimed.
The question raised in the latter class of suits is whether a valid marriage
ever took place at all. Of course, if it took place, the domicil of the wife
becomes the domicil of the husband. But, if it did not take place, the mere
fact that a ceremony was gone through would not change the domicil of the wife,
and she would not, therefore, necessarily have the same domicil as her intended
husband. The Courts have recognized the distinction in several cases. In the
case of Sinclair v. [*79] Sinclair (1) there was a suit for divorce a mensa et thoro brought
by the wife against the husband by reason of cruelty and adultery, by which he
appeared under protest, alleging in bar of the proceedings that the suit could
not be entertained by the Court, for that the marriage had been celebrated at
Paris, and had been since dissolved by a sentence of the Court at Brussels on
proceedings instituted by him, for nullity and divorce by reason of the
adultery of the wife. It was clear that the Brussels decree was only on the
ground of nullity. Lord Stowell, in giving judgment, said: Something
has been said on the doctrine of law respecting the regard due to foreign
judgments, and undoubtedly a sentence of separation in a proper Court for
adultery would be entitled to credit and attention in this Court; but I think
the conclusion is carried too far when it is said that a sentence of nullity of
marriage is necessarily, and universally, binding on other countries. Adultery
and its proofs are nearly the same in all countries. The validity of marriage,
however, must depend in a great degree, on the local regulations of the country
where it is celebrated. A sentence of nullity of marriage, therefore, in the
country where it was solemnized would carry with it great authority in this
country; but I am not prepared to say that a judgment of a third country on the
validity of a marriage not within its territories, nor had between subjects of
that country, would be universally binding. For instance, the marriage alleged
by the husband is a French marriage. A French judgment on that marriage would
have been of considerable weight; but it does not follow that the judgment of a
Court at Brussels on a marriage in France would have the same authority, much
less on a marriage celebrated here in England. His Lordship,
therefore, declared the protest insufficient, and directed the respondent to
appear absolutely and answer the general charges of the wifes suit.
It seems clear, from this judgment, that Lord Stowell did not consider that a
sentence of nullity in Brussels would have been conclusive. Again, in the case of Simonin v. Mallac (2) the Court did not
regard the French decree as binding upon them, and dismissed the petition for
nullity. (1) 1 Hagg. Cons. 294. (2) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. [*80] In the case of Niboyet v. Niboyet (1) the late Lord
Esher, in his judgment, intimates that, in his opinion, the rule as to
jurisdiction in divorce does not apply to suits for declaration of nullity of
marriage; and the late Lord St. Helier, in Roberts v. Brennan (2), expressed his
view, and decided the case upon that view, that residence, and not domicil, is
the test of jurisdiction in nullity cases. A further distinction is to be noticed between the two classes of
suits, namely, that our Courts regard the Courts of the domicil as having in
general exclusive jurisdiction in a case of divorce, though the Courts of this
country will recognize the binding effect of a decree of divorce, obtained in a
State where the husband was not domiciled, if the Courts of the country or the
State of his domicil will recognize the validity of the decree: Armitage v.
Attorney-General (3); but it has frequently been held that, although the Courts of
the domicil of the parties might entertain the question of the validity of
their marriage, yet that the Courts of the country in which the marriage was
celebrated will also entertain a suit to determine the same question: see Linke
v. Van Aerde. (4) It may possibly be that if a suit were brought for nullity
on the ground of impotence, and the facts were established in favour of the
petitioner, either in the Court of the domicil of the parties or in the Court
of the country in which the marriage was celebrated, it might be reasonable to
hold that such a decree ought to be treated as universally binding, but it does
not at all follow, where the only matter in dispute is whether a marriage ought
to be held valid in the country where it was celebrated, and its validity is
challenged on the ground of want of compliance with the formalities required by
the laws of another country, that the Courts of the former country are to be
bound by a decision on the question of the validity of the marriage given in
the other country, even though it be the country of the domicil of one of the
parties. It certainly would be somewhat startling if this Court, having
come to the conclusion that the marriage in question between the appellant and
Philip was valid in England, should yet hold (1) 4 P. D. 1, at p. 19. (2) [1902] P. 143. (3) [1906] P. 135. (4) 10 Times L. R. 426. [*81] that the French decision that it was not a valid marriage was
binding upon it. The fact is that a conflict of law exists between the laws of
the two countries, owing to the difference between the rules of law adopted,
and, as we hold, reasonably adopted, in England, and the provisions of the
French Code. This is an entirely different case from a case of an application
to dissolve a marriage, which begins with proof that a marriage has been
validly contracted and celebrated, and the question is whether or not, on
account of matters arising subsequently to the marriage, it has been, or can
be, validly dissolved by a particular Court. Moreover, in the present case it is obvious from the terms of the
decree that all that the decree has purported to declare is that the marriage
is null according to articles 148 and 170 of the French Civil Code, which
amounts merely to a declaration that the marriage is null and void where French
law can prevail. In our opinion, therefore, the second point ought to be deter.
mined against the appellant. In arriving at these conclusions we are fully
conscious of the hardship on the appellant, because the effect of them is to
hold that, although Léon Philip is free himself from her in France,
she still remains in England his legal wife, and therefore not the wife of the
petitioner; but we must arrive at the decision of this case by applying general
principles which ought to be considered in any case which may arise where a
marriage has taken place in this country between an English subject domiciled
in England and a foreigner domiciled abroad, and the right remedy to look
forward to is a recognition by the agreement of civilized countries of the principle
that the omission of formalities required by the law of one country, but not by
the law of the country where a marriage is celebrated, ought not to be allowed
to affect the validity of the marriage in the country requiring such
formalities. It was stated that some changes have recently (1) been made in (1) [In 1907. There are alterations in the formalities of
publication and the requirements as to consent. The matrimonial age of majority
is made uniform (21) for both sexes. The acte respectueux
is no longer required from a person more than 30 years old. An account of the
new group of laws affecting marriage, by Mr. George Barclay,
licencié en droit, is forthcoming in the Journal of the Society
of Comparative Legislation. F. P.] [*82] French law, but the exact nature and extent of the changes did not
appear. The observations made in this judgment are directed to questions
arising in connection with the formalities required on entering into a
marriage, and are not to be understood as necessarily advocating an
interference with any views which may be held in any country as to marriages
which are absolutely prohibited by the law of that country. With regard to the decision dismissing the appellants
suit for a divorce, it may be observed that her position after the French
decree and after Philip had left her and married again would be intolerable
unless some remedy in her favour existed, for by reason of the conflict of laws
she would be a wife in England and not a wife in France, and in regard to such
an observation it may not unreasonably be suggested that the remedy may be to
allow her to obtain a divorce in England. She was not allowed to do so, because
it was held that the Court had no jurisdiction in such a case, as Philip was
not domiciled in England, but the real basis for not allowing a divorce suit to
be maintained except in the country where the married couple are domiciled is
that, in order to prevent difficulties, inconveniences, and scandals which may
arise from different decisions in different countries, it is both
just and reasonable (in divorce cases) that the differences
of married people should be adjusted in accordance with the laws of the
commonity to which they belong, and dealt with by the tribunals which alone can
administer those laws: per Lord Penzance, Wilson v. Wilson. (1) This, of course,
assumes the existence of a marriage the validity of which is recognized in the
country where the suit is brought, and that both persons are domiciled there.
Now, if the country of the husbands domicil refuse to recognize the
marriage, and therefore cannot and will not entertain a suit for divorce
against him, the justice and reasonableness of the international rule just
mentioned cease to be apparent, and the wife having no right of suit whatever
against the husband in his country, and having been left in the (1) 1872) L. R. 2 P. & D. 435, at p. 442. [*83] country of her original domicil where the marriage was celebrated
and is recognized as binding upon both her and him, it would seem reasonable to
permit her to sue in the latter country for the dissolution of the tie which is
recognized therein, though not in the foreign country, in case she has grounds
of suit which would entitle her to a divorce if her husband had been domiciled
in her country; in other words, to treat her as having a domicil in her own
country which would be sufficient to support a suit. No general rule of law
would then really be infringed. The necessities of the case would call for the
intervention of the Courts of her own country in order to do her justice and
release her from a tie recognized in the one country though not in the other.
This way of regarding the matter does not seem to have been presented on behalf
of the appellant to Lord St. Helier. From the shorthand notes of the trial
before him there appears to have been a very short discussion, and it seems to
have been treated as if, the domicil of Philip being French, no claim for a
divorce in a suit in this country was possible. It is not necessary to come to a final conclusion on this
important point, which was not discussed before us, for it would not help the
appellant in the present case, as her suit for divorce was dismissed without
any appeal being brought from the decision, and as she has subsequently gone
through the ceremony of marriage with Mr. Ogden without having been released in
this country from her previous tie. In our judgment, therefore, this appeal must be dismissed, but in
the circumstances without costs. Appeal dismissed. |