Marshall against Critico.

 

IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH.

 

Original Printed Version (PDF)

 

Original Citation: (1808) 9 East 447

English Reports Citation: 103 E.R. 643

 

Monday, May 23d, 1808.

 

Referred to, Musurus Bey v. Godban [1894], 1 Q. B. 541; 2 Q. B. 352.

 

 

Marshall against Ceitico. Monday, May 23d, 1808, One who had been appointed Consul General from the Porte, but was dismissed several months before from his employment, and another person~~resident here appointed in his room, is not at any rate privileged from arrest, though at the time of the arrest he had not received any official notification of his dismissal, or of the appointment of the other.

 

Burrough moved to discharge the defendant from an arrest, on filing common bail, on the ground of his privilege, under the stat. 7 Ann. c. 12, as being Consul General

644 DOE V. THE EARL OF LTTCAN 9 EAST.448.

from the Porte, and invested with a superintending authority over the Turkish Consuls in the different sea-port towns, and not an ordinary consul or agent for commercial purposes; in which respect he distinguished this from Barbouit's case (a). But he also stated from the affidavit, that some months previous to the arrest, the defendant had in fact been dismissed from bis employment, and another person of the name of Natali, who was before residing here, had been appointed in his place; but the defendant had then received no official notification of his dismissal, and continued in fact to exercise his office here until after the arrest. And he contended that the defendant's privilege did not cease until notification at least of his dismissal, and reasonable time to depart the kingdom if he thought fit. It did not however appear that he had had any intenĮtion of departing.

Lord Ellenborough C.J. This is not a privilege of the person, but of the State which he represents. And [448] that State having some months before devested him of the character in which he claims the privilege, and appointed another person here to exercise it; there is no just reason why the defendant should not be subject to process as other persons; nor for the State, by which he had been so dismissed from his employment, to take offence at his arrest.

Per Curiam. Motion denied.