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SPINNEY'S (1948) LTD., SPINNEY'S CENTRES S.A.L. AND MICHEL DOUMET, JOSEPH DOUMET AND DISTRIBUTORS AND AGENCIES S.A.L. v. ROYAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (COMMERCIAL COURT) [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 406 HEARING-DATES: 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 June, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12 July, 2 November 1979 2 November 1979 CATCHWORDS: Insurance (Fire) -- Exceptions -- Insureds' property in Beirut covered for fire, riot, explosion and malicious risks -- Insureds' premises looted and damaged during disturbances in Lebanon -- Whether issured could claim under policy -- Whether insurers could rely on exceptions in policy to avoid liability. HEADNOTE: The three plaintiffs owned and carried on business in Beirut, Lebanon. The first plaintiffs carried on business as retail grocers and household merchants at shops in Rue Verdun and Rue Chouran (Rue Verdun shop and Pigeon Rocks shop) and operated a substantial wholesale business from a tower block in Jnah, Ramlet el Baida (Spinney's Centre), where they occupied depots and cold stores in the basement and offices on two floors. The second plaintiffs operated a supermaket and department store and occupied storage space and offices in Spinney's Centre and the third plaintiffs owned the building at Spinney's Centre and occupied offices on the upper floors. During 1975, the plaintiffs entered into eight contracts of insurance with the defendants in respect of their property, the insurances covering the following interests: (1) The first plaintiffs were covered in respect of (a) the contents of the three premises and stock in trade against fire, explosion and malicious act; (b) stocks in cold store against all risks and (c) four motor vehicles against various perils including theft fire and malicious act; (2) the first and second plaintiffs were covered in respect of loss of money against all risks. (3) The second plaintiffs were covered in respect of (a) the contents, stock-in-trade and cold store at Spinney's Centre against fire, riot, explosion and malicious act and (b) consequential loss resulting from fire, explosion, riot or malicious act. (4) The third plaintiffs were insured in respect of the buildings comprising Spinney's Centre against fire, riot, explosion and malicious act. The contracts of insurance (the policy) were in essence standard forms of fire insurance to which the remainder of the cover had been added by printed endorsements which provided inter alia: Riot and Strike Endorsement. ... It is hereby agreed... that... the insurance under this Policy shall extend to cover Riot and Strike damage which for the purpose of this endorsement shall mean (subject always to the Special Conditions...) Loss of or damage to the property insured directly caused by: 1. The act of any person taking part with others in any disturbance of the public peace... not being an occurrence mentioned in Condition 6 of the Special Conditions... Special Conditions. ... Condition 6. This insurance does not cover any loss or damage occasioned by or through or in consequence directly or indirectly of any of the following occurrences: (a)... civil war; (b)... civil commotion assuming the proportions of or amounting to a popular rising... insurrection, rebellion, revoluntion military or usurped power or any act of any person acting on behalf of or in connection with an organisation with activities directed towards the overthrow by force of the Government de jure or de facto or to the influencing of it by terrorism or violence. In any action... where the company alleges that by reason of the provision of this Condition any loss or damage is not covered by this insurance, the burden of proving that such loss or damage is covered shall be upon the Insured... Malicious Damage Endorsement. ... It is hereby agreed... that... Malicious Damage... shall mean loss of or damage to the property insured directly caused by the malicious act of any person... not being an act amounting to or committed in connection with an occurrence mentioned in Special Condition 6 of the... Riot and Strike Endorsement. The standard explosion endorsement contained the specific exception which also appeared in special condition 6 of the riot and strike endorsement. For several months before January, 1976, the Republic of Lebanon and in particular the city of Beirut had been suffering from internal political strife accompanied by violence and destruction on a large scale. On Jan. 18 and 19, 1976, a group or groups of persons broke into the Rue Verdun shop and looted it. The Pigeon Pocks shop and Spinney's Centre suffered the same fate on Jan. 21 and Jan. 22 to 23, 1976 respectively. The wholesale and retail businesses were stripped of all their stocks, virtually the whole of the furniture and fittings were taken away and most of what remained was smashed. The internal structures of the buildings were damaged, and the basement of Spinney's Centre was damaged by fire. The external structure of the building also suffered damage though on a small scale. As a result of these events, the plaintiffs suffered financial loss which they estimated at £1,400,000 and claimed under the policy in addition to claims made under the fire policy, all risks policy vehicles and loss of money policies. The defendants argued that although prima facie the losses fell within the cover conferred by the policy, the were relieved from liability by one or more of the exceptions contained in the policy. Held, by Q.B. (Com. Ct.) (MUSTILL, J.), that (A) (1) since the issue was not whether the events in Lebanon were recognised by the U.K. as amounting to a civil war in the sense in which the term was used in Public International Law but was whether there was a civil war within the meaning of the policy, a pronouncement by the Secretary of State on one would not suffice to decide the other (see p. 426, col. 1); and since answering the question would require the Secretary of State to ascertain the meaning of the words used in the policy, unless the Court could be sure that the Secretary of State and the Court were adopting the same interpretation the exercise would serve only to confuse (see p. 426, col. 2); (2) the defendants could not bring the reverse burden clause in condition 6 into play simply by asserting that the loss was excluded by a particular exception and challenging the plaintiffs to prove the contrary but had to produce evidence from which it could reasonably be argued that (a) a state of affairs existed or an event occurred falling within an exception and (b) the excepted peril directly or indirectly caused by the loss (see p. 426, col. 2); (B) as to the exception of "civil war" (1) the expression "civil war" was part of the contemporary speech and there was no reason to suppose that it was introduced into the policy with the intent of calling up the ancient doctrine of constructive treason, and the test of treason could not provide a conclusive answer since it was possible to commit treason without approaching anywhere near to the waging of civil war (see p. 429, col. 1); (2) to bring the exception into play the words ?civil war" were given their ordinary and the literal meaning which were the same and meant a war which had the special characteristics of being civil, i.e. internal rather than external since without that there was a war not simply internal strife on a massive scale (see p. 429, col. 2), and a decision on whether such a war existed involved consideration of three questions (a) could it be said that the conflict was between opposing "sides"? (b) what were the objects of the sides and how did they set about promoting them? and (c) what was the scale of the conflict, and of its effect on public order and the life of the inhabitants? (see p. 429, col. 2); (3) in January, 1976, there were no "sides" which could be identified as being engaged in a civil war in the more usual sense of the term, i.e. in a struggle by one side to wrest power from the other (see p. 431, cols. 1 and 2); although the fighting in Lebanon was serious the violence was sporadic and there was nothing to suggest that by January, 1976, matters had advanced beyond massive civil strife and virtual anarchy to the stage of a civil war (see p. 432, col. 1); and if the other characteristics of a civil war had been present, there would have been a finding for the defendants on this issue (see p. 431, col. 1); (C) as to whether the loss or damage was "occasioned by... usurped power" (1) one of the tests for a usurped power was whether the acts in question amounted to constructive treason and it was unnecessary to show in order to bring the exception into effect that the events amounted to a rebellion or the acts of a de facto government; and since the usurpation consisted of the arrogation to itself by the mob of a law-making and lawenforcing power, which properly belonged to the sovereign there was no reason why the test should not be applied in the present case (see p. 435, col. 1); and as "usurped power" was an English term of art appearing in a policy which could be assumed to be governed by English law, the words had to be given the meaning established by the English cases (see p. 435, col. 1); Drinkwater v. The Corporation of the London Assurance, (1767) 2 Wils. 363, Langdale v. Mason, (1780) 2 Park on Ins. 965, Rogers v. Whittaker, [1917] 1 K.B. 942 and Curtis & Sons v. Mathews, [1918] 2 K.B. 825 considered. (2) those participating in the events which occurred, i.e. the trained militia and those armed civilians who were temporarily fighting on their side, had a sufficiently warlike posture, organisation and universality of purpose to constitute them an usurped power (see p. 435, col. 2; p. 436, col. 1); by side-stepping the government and proceeding to direct action, the citizen groups arrogated to themselves the proper functions of the state and exercised an usurped power within the meaning of the exception (see p. 436, col. 1); (D) the defendants' contention, that on about Jan. 19, 1976, a Palestinian brigade, which was affiliated to the Syrian army moved across the border and thus constituted an invasion within the meaning of the exception in sub-cl. (b) of special condition 6 would be rejected in that the defendants had failed to make out any case for a causal connection whether direct or indirect between the supposed invasion and the loss (see p. 436, cols. 1 and 2); (E) as to the exceptions of "rebellion" and "insurrection" the events which occurred in Lebanon before and at the time in question did not constitute either a rebellion or an insurrenction (see p. 436, col. 2; p. 437; col. 1); (F) there was no state of war to rebellion in Lebanon at the relevant times nor were acts such as the capture of Damour (a small town south of Beirut) and the clearing of Qarantina and Maslakh (Moslem slums in the north eastern corner of Beirut just to the west of the Beirut Riv er) sufficiently close to whatever civil war might ultimately have come into existence in Lebanon to form part of a series of acts of belligerency and neither the exception of "hostilities" nor "warlike operations" applied (see p. 437, cols. 1 and 2); (g) As to the exception of loss covered by "civil commotion assuming the proportions of or amounting to a popular rising" (1) the words "civil commotion" must be wide enough to cover the violence, death and destruction prevailing in Lebanon otherwise they would be meaningless (see p. 437, col. 2); and there was nothing in the authorities compelling the Court to hold that a civil commotion necessarily involved a revolt against the government although the disturbances had to have sufficient cohesion to prevent them from being the work of a mindless mob, and since this requirement was satisfied there was in January 1976 and for months before a state of civil commotion prevalent in Lebanon (see p. 438, col. 2); (2) the disturbances in Lebanon did not amount to a popular rising but did involve a really substantial proportion of the populace, and there was tumult and violence on a large scale so that the disturbances were "assuming the proportions of a popular rising" and the exception therefore applied (see p. 438, col. 2); (H) the specific exception contained in condition 6 and the standard explosions endorsement would be construed in the narrower sense in that the exception related to the acts of members of terrorist organisations in furtherance of their organisations' aims and the concluding words of the clause formed part of the description of the organisation and could not be read as descriptive of the acts which constituted the excepted perils (see p. 439, cols. 1 and 2); (I) as regards causation (1) the plaintiffs had to face the assertion that the turbulence and collapse of public order attendant upon the civil commotion permitted and encouraged the acts of looting and vandalism and unless rebutted would be sufficient to establish that the loss was occasioned indirectly (if not directly) by, though or in consequence of the civil commotion (see p. 442, col. 2; p. 443, col. 2; p. 444, col. 1); there was some evidence for the assertion and since there was no basis upon which the plaintiffs could rebut it, the claim under the policy failed (see p. 442, col. 2; p. 444, col. 1; and the same conclusion applied to the exception of usurped power (see p. 442, col. 2; p. 444, col. 1); (2) although it was unnecessary to consider the problem of causation raised by the specific exception at the end of sub-cl. (b) of condition 6, on the narrow interpretation of the clause, i.e. that it related only to terrorist acts, the loss could not be regarded as directly caused by the excepted peril (see p. 442, col. 2); the loss and damage of items other than food were due to the general breakdown of order (see p. 443, col. 1); and the plaintiffs had failed to show that the connection between the attack on Qarantina and the theft of food from Spinney's was too tenuous and speculative to qualify as an indirect link and had therefore failed to satisfy the requirements of the clause (see p. 443, cols. 1 and 2); (J) the plaintiffs' claims in respect of the fire, all risks, vehicles and loss of moneys policies failed (see p. 442, col. 2) and the claims under all the policies failed and would be dismissed (see p 444, col. 2). CASES-REF-TO: Amy Warwick, The, (U.S. Ct.) 67 U.S. 635 (1862); Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. King, [1917] 1 K.B. 307; Board of Trade v. Hain Steamship Co. Ltd., (H.L.) (1929) 34 Ll.L. Rep. 197; [1929] A.C. 534; Britain Steamship Co. v. The King, (H.L.) (1920) 4 Ll.L. Rep. 245; [1921] A.C. 99; (C.A.) [1919] 2 K.B. 695; Brown v. Hiatt, (U.S. Ct.) 4 Fed. Cas. 384 (1870); Clan Line Steamers Ltd. v. Liverpool and London War Risks Insurance Association Ltd., (1943) 73 Ll.L. Rep. 165; [1943] K.B. 209; Cooper (Richard W.) v. The General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd., (H.L.) (1922) 13 Ll.L. Rep. 219; (1923) 128 L.T. 481; Curtis & Sons v. Mathews, [1918] 2 K.B. 825; Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan, (C.A.) [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 223; Diab v. Attorney General, (Israel Ct.) (1952) 19 I.L.R. 550; Drinkwater v. The Corporation of the London Assurance, (1767) 2 Wils 363; 95 E.R. 863; Insurance Co. v. Boon, (U.S. Ct.) 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 117 (1877); Jurando v. Taylor, (U.S. Ct.) 13 Fed. Cas. 1179 (1818); Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Bantham Steamship Co. Ltd., (C.A.) (1939) 63 Ll.L. Rep. 155; [1939] 2 K.B. 544; Langdale v. Mason, (1780) 2 Park on Ins. 965; Levy v. Assicurazioni Generali, (P.C.) (1940) 67 Ll.L. Rep. 174, [1940] A.C. 791; Lindsay & Piries v. The General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd; (South Africa Ct.) (1914) S.A.R. (App. D.e 574; London and Manchester Plate Glass Co. Ltd. v. Heath, [1913] 3 K.B. 411; Luigi Monta of Genoa v. Cechofracht Co. Ltd., [1956] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 97; [1956] 2 Q.B. 555; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Bennion, (U.S. Ct.) 158 F.2d. 260 (1946); New York Life Insurance Co. v. Durham, (U.S. Ct.) 166 F.2d 874 (1948); Pan American World Airways Inc. v. The Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., (U.S. Ct.) [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 77; Resquerias y Secaderos de Bacalao de Espana, S.A. v. Beer, (1949) 82 Ll.L. Rep. 500; Rep. 500; R. v. Gordon, (1781) 21 St. Tr. 485; Republic of Bolivia v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Co. Ltd., [1909] 1 K.B. 785; Rogers v. Whittaker, [1917] 1 K.B. 942; Salisbury Hubbard & Co. v. Harnden Express Co., (U.S. Ct.) 10 R.I. 244 (1872); Swinnerton v. Columbian Insurance Co., (U.S. Ct.) 37 N.Y. 174; 93 AM Dec. 560 (1867). INTRODUCTION: This was an action by the plaintiffs Spinney's (1948) Ltd., Spinney's Centres S.A.L. and Michel Doumet, Joseph Doumet and Distrbutors and Agencies S.A.L. (Societe en Participation) claiming inter alia £1,400,000, financial loss in respect of their premises in Beirut which had been insured with the defendants, Royal Insurance Co. Ltd., and which had been looted and damaged during the disturbances in Lebanon in January, 1976. The defendants contended that they were relieved from liability by one or more of the exceptions in the policy. The further facts are stated in the judgment of Mr. Justice Mustill. COUNSEL: Johan V. Steyn, Q.C., and V. V. Veeder and Professor R. Higgins for the plaintiffs, Michael Wright, Q.C., Stephen Desch and Anthony Edward-Stuart for the defendants. JUDGMENT-READ: Judgment was reserved. Friday, Nov. 2, 1979 PANEL: Before Mr. Justice MUSTILL JUDGMENTBY-1: Mr. Justice MUSTILL JUDGMENT-1: Mr. Justice MUSTILL: During 1975, the plaintiffs entered into eight contracts of insurance with the defendants in respect of their property in Beirut. Between them, the three plaintiffs owned and carried on business at a tower block in Jnah, Ramlet el Baida, a shop in Anis Assaf Building, Rue Verdun, and another shop in Khadijeh El Fadel Building, Rue Chouran. I will call these premises the Spinney's Centre, the Rue Verdun shop, and the Pigeon Rocks shop, respectively. The first plaintiffs, Spinney's (1948) Ltd; carried on business as retail grocers and household merchants at the Rue Verdun and Pigeon Rocks shops. These were quite small concerns, employing a total of about 20 people. In addition, the first plaintiffs operated a substantial wholesale business from Spinney's Centre, where they occupied depots and cold stores in the basements, and offices on two floors of the tower block. The second plaintiffs, Sinney's Centres S.A.L., operated a supermarket and department store in the tower block, where they also occupied storage space and offices. The third plaintiffs were the owners of the building at Spinney's Centre, and occupied offices on the upper floors. For several months before January, 1976, the Republic of Lebanon, and in particular the capital city of Beirut, had been suffering from internal political strife accompanied by violence and destruction on a large scale. On Jan. 18 and 19, 1976, a group or groups of persons broke into the Rue Verdun shop and looted it. The Pigeon Rocks shop and the Spinney's Centre suffered the same fate on Jan. 21, and Jan. 22 to 23, 1976, respectively. The wholesale and retail businesses were stripped of all their stocks. Virtually the whole of the furniture and fittings were taken away, and most of what remained was smashed. The internal structures of the buildings were damaged -- in the case of the basement at Spinney's Centre, by fire. The external structure of the buildings also suffered damage, although on a small scale. As a result of these events, the plaintiffs suffered financial loss which they estimate at approximately £1,400,000. They now seek recovery of their losses by virtue of the various contracts of insurance. The insurances covered the following interests: (i) The first plaintiffs were covered in respect of: (a) The contents of the three premises, except stock-in-trade and stocks in cold store: against fire, riot, explosion and malicious act. (b) Stock-in-trade: against fire, riot, explosion and malicious act. (c) Stocks in cold store: against all risks. (d) For motor vehicles: against various perils, including theft, fire and malicious act. (ii) The first and second plaintiffs were covered in respect of loss of moneys: against all risks. (iii) The second plaintiffs were covered in respect of: (a) The contents, stock-in-trade and cold store stocks at Spinney's Centre: against fire, riot, explosion, and malicious act. (b) Consequential loss resulting from fire, explosion, riot or malicious act. (iv) The third plaintiffs were insured in respect of the building comprising Spinney's Centre against: fire, riot, explosion, and malicious act. The defendants do not deny that prima facie the losses fall within the cover thus conferred, but maintain that they are relieved from liability by one or more of the exceptions contained in the policy. Although the issues raised by this defence are broadly the same in relation to each policy, there are differences in the wording of the various exceptions. The position is complicated, but is very clearly summarised in a schedule presented by the plaintiffs. Although it will be necessary in due course to refer to each policy individually (or, more accurately, to each contract, since certain of the insurances were never made the subject of formal documents, but were effected by means of informal agreements to endorse the cover on to existing policies), it is convenient for the time being to concentrate on the contracts under which the major part of the claim is brought. Fortunately, these are all in the same terms. I will refer to them collectively as "the policy". The policy is in essence a standard form of fire insurance, to which the remainder of the cover has been added by printed endorsements. The basic fire insurance is made subject, by condition 6, to a series of war and civil strife exceptions. These are different from the exceptions imposed upon the additional cover conferred by the endorsements around which the dispute principally revolves. Unfortunately, condition 6 cannot be left out of account altogether, since there was some fire damage at the Spinney's Centre. I will, however, postpone discussion of this comparatively minor issue and will for the time being concentrate on the three endorsements by virtue of which was added the cover against riot, explosions and malicious damage. They were in the following terms: RIOT AND STRIKE ENDORSEMENT ... It is hereby agreed and declared that notwithstanding anything in the within written Policy contained to the contrary the insurance under this Policy shall extend to cover Riot and Strike damage which for the purpose of this endorsement shall mean (subject always to the Special Conditions hereinafter contained) Loss of or damage to the property insured directly caused by: 1. The act of any person taking part together with others in any disturbance of the public peace (whether in connection with a strike or lock-out or not) not being an occurrence mentioned in Condition 6 of the Special Conditions hereof. 2. The action of any lawfully constituted authority in suppressing or attempting to suppress any such disturbance or in minimising the consequences of any such disturbance. . . . SPECIAL CONDITIONS For the purposes of this Endorsement but not otherwise there shall be substituted for the respectively numbered Conditions of the Policy the following: . . . Condition 6. This insurance does not cover any loss or damage occasioned by or through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the following occurrences, namely: (a) War, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities or warlike operations (whether war be declared or not), civil war. (b) Mutiny, civil commotion assuming the proportions of or amounting to a popular rising, military rising, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power, or any act of any person acting on behalf of or in connection with any organisation with activities directed towards the overthrow by force of the Government de jure or de facto or to the influencing of it by terrorism or violence. In any action, suit or other proceeding, where the Company alleges that by reason of the provisions of this Condition any loss or damage is not covered by this insurance, the burden of proving that such loss or damage is covered shall be upon the Insured... MALICIOUS DAMAGE ENDORSEMENT ... It is hereby agreed and declared that the insurance under the said Riot and Strike Endorsement shall extend to include MALICIOUS DAMAGE which for the purpose of this extension shall mean Loss of or damage to the property insured directly caused by the malicious act of any person (whether or not such act is committed in the course of a disturbance of the public peace) not being an act amounting to or committed in connection with an occurrence mentioned in Special Condition 6 of the said Riot and Strike Endorsement. but the Company shall not be liable under this extension for any loss or damage by fire or explosion nor for any loss or damage arising out of or in the course of burglary, housebreaking, theft or larceny or any attempt thereat or caused by any person taking part therein. Provided always that all the conditions and provisos of the said Riot and Strike Endorsement shall apply to this extension as if they has been incorporated therein. STANDARD EXPLOSION ENDORSEMENT ... It is hereby agreed and declared that the insurance under this Policy shall, subject to the Special Conditions hereinafter contained, extend to include: Loss of or damage to the property insured by fire or otherwise directly caused by explosion, but excluding loss of or damage to boilers, economisers, or other vessels, machinery or apparatus in which pressure is used or their contents resulting from their explosion. PROVIDED always that all the conditions of this Policy (except insofar as Condition No. 7(h) is hereby expressly varied) shall apply as if they had been incorporated herein and for the purpose hereof any loss or damage by explosion as aforesaid shall be deemed to be loss or damage by fire within the meaning of this Policy. SPECIAL CONDITIONS (1) The Company shall not be liable, under this extension, for loss or damage occasioned by or through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any act of any person acting on behalf of, or in connection with, any organisation with activities directed towards the overthrow by force of the Government "de jure" or "de facto" or to the influencing of it by terrorism or violence. In any action, suit or other proceeding, where the Company alleges that by reason of the provisions of this Condition any loss or damage is not covered by this insurance, the burden of proving that such loss or damage is covered shall be upon the Insured... I have underlined the words with which the argument has been principally concerned. I have reproduced the explosion endorsement since it may throw light on the meaning of the specific exception therein contained, which also appears in special condition 6 of the riot and strike endorsement. It does not however call for separate discussion, since I am not satisfied that the plaintiffs suffered any measurable loss by reason of explosions within the meaning of the endorsement. It will be observed that the list of occurrences in special condition 6 affect the cover in two ways. First, occurrences of this type are declared not to be "riots", for the purposes of that part of the endorsement which confers the positive cover. Second, the insurers are relieved conservative Sunni groupings, and an ad hoc opposition built up. led by Mr. Said Salan and Mr. Karami, who allied themselves with Mr. Raymond Edde, a liberal Maronite Christian whose political ideas did not fit readily into any recognised category. The internal security position in Lebanon had been deteriorating for several months before February, 1975. Not only political violence, but also blood feuds and straightforward criminal activity had become a feature of the scene, exacerbated by clashes between Palestinian commandos and Lebanese troops. On Feb. 26, there occurred an incident which may be regarded as the start of the crescendo of conflict which has given rise to the present dispute. A group of fishermen demonstrated in Sidon against the establishment of a new company, which they saw as a threat to their livelihood. A riot took place, in the course of which a local leader was killed. Demonstrations of sympathy took place in Sidon and Beirut. The army intervened. Deaths were caused. Political opinion became polarised. The radicals criticised the army for helping capitalists to oppress the workers. On this occasion the orthodox Moslem establishment agreed. It was time that the army was reorganised so as to give Moslems an equal participation in command. Only then could the army be relied upon to safeguard the interests of the county as a whole. On the other hand, Christian opinion acclaimed the part played by the army which (on this view) had upheld law and order against disorders fermented by the Palestinians. The dispute simmered down for a while but broke out again with greater force on Apr. 13, 1975. Mr. Gemayel had come to the Christian suburb of Ain-el Rumaneh to attend the consecration of a new church. After a dispute, armed men shot dead two Phalangist irregulars and the bodyguard of Mr. Gemayel. Later on the same day a group of Palestinians on their way by bus to the camp at Tel Zataar imprudently passed through Ain-el Rumaneh. Persons believed to be Phalangist irregulars ambushed the bus and killed all the passengers. This immediately led to a serious outburst of violence. Firing with rockets and other weapons was exchanged between Tel Zataar and Christian suburbs; fighting took place in other suburbs; looting of shops and homes occurred in Christian neighbourhoods; the southern roads to Beirut became impassable. Eventually, a cease-fire was agreed, although sniping and other violence continued to take place.On the political front, the incident had its most serious consequence when, on Apr. 26, Mr. Jumblatt announced that his supporters would no longer take part in a government of which the Phalange formed part. In due course the Cabinet of Mr. al-Sulh found itself unable to remain in power, and on May 15, he resigned. The problem was now to find a successor. To many, the obvious choice was Mr. Rashid Karami, an experienced and respected Sunnite leader. He had the direct support of the Salan/Edde faction. Even the Phalange did not object. However, Mr. Karami had two powerful opponents: President Franjieh and Mr. Chamoun, who were personally at odds with Mr. Karami. The move to have him appointed premier was therefore blocked. Mr. Jumblatt's insistence that he would not support an administration which included Phalangists, and the Phalange's equal insistence that they would oppose any government which left them out, led to total deadlock. Eventually, President Franjieh called on a retired general to head a cabinet which was largely composed of military men. This was not a military coup d'etat. The president had the right to nominate any Sunni he chose, subject to the approval of Parliament. The decision was acclaimed by the Phalange, and by Mr. Chamoun, but virtually every other political faction in Lebanon rose in wrath -- in terms of both political and physical action. Fighting which had been going on sporadically since the Ain-el Rumaneh incident, notably in the Moslem slums of Qarantina and Maslakh, and in the Phalange strongholds of Al-Dikwaneh and Sinn-el Fil, increased in intensity. The pressure was too much for the new regime, which resigned after three days. The presidnet accepted the situation, and invited Mr. Karami to form a government. This task was no formality, since, as previously mentioned, the Phalange and the supporters of Mr. Jumblatt were deadlocked on the composition of the government. The weeks dragged on, during which random violence continued to occur in Beirut. Finally, on June 30, Mr. Karami was able to announce a cabinet, excluding the Phalange and the Jumblattists, but including Mr. Chamoun, the recent opponent of Mr. Karami. With this there ended the third of what were often called the "rounds" of struggle in Lebanon. The past few weeks had cost hundreds of deaths. There followed two months of relative calm; but at the end of August the fourth "round" of conflict began. A dispute broke out in the predominantly Christian town of Zahleh in East Lebanon over a game in a pin-table saloon. Shot were exchanged. Violence blossomed. Fighting in Zahleh between Shi'ites and Christians spread to Tripoli. On Sept. 7, 12 Moslem passengers were taken off a bus on the Tripoli road, and shot dead by armed men from Zgharta. of which Israel could take advantage. Israel on the other hand was widely suspected of supporting the "Christian right". Apart from Lebanon's immediate neighbours, other countries were plausibly believed to be meddling in Lebanese polities.For example, the Arab world was by no means united on the role which Lebanon should play. Certain of the more "radical" Arab states saw Lebanon as the natural front-line of the perennial struggle against Israel, and supported those within Lebanon who favoured an aggressive stance. The rulers of other states were however suspicious of what they regarded as the subversively "leftist" and secular ideas of these latter, and therefore tended to favour those within the Lebanon who sought to conserve the existing order. On a still wider front, it was generally believed that other world powers with interests in the Middle East were covertly supporting the various factions. Certainly the quantity of expensive armaments employed during the conflict by the various groups leaves no room for doubt of foreign assistance on a very large scale. Another source of conflict was the growth of Pan-Arabist ideas elsewhere in the Middle East. Lebanon had always occupied a special position in the Arab world: never fully integrated, yet formally declaring itself to be part of it, by accession to the Baghdad pact, attendance at Arab summits and similar gestures. This ambivalence was reflected in Lebanese politics. Some political elements identified themselves with the cause of Arab unity. Others -- not all of them Christian -- felt that Lebanon had its own special identity and traditions, and should not allow itself to be submerged in a wider grouping of which it was not truly part. Finally, and of great importance, there was the influence of the Palestine liberation movement. The presence of Palestinians within the Lebanon was no novelty. Ever since the ending of the Mandate, refugees had made their way into Lebanon in large numbers, and had settled in camps, mostly on the outskirts of Beirut. By the 1970s the refugees had achieved a fair degree of social and economic integration with the indigenous population. Originally, the refugees in Lebanon were no more politically organised than elsewhere in the Palestinian dispersion. During the 1960s, however, matters began to change. In 1964 the Arab League procured the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, which was to be the official focus of Palestinian nationalism, with the Palestinian Liberation Army as its military emanation. The Palestinian movement gained impetus after the disaster of the Arab/Israeli war. Now the movement took on a predominatly nationalist rather than Pan-Arabist character. New groups and fragments of groups came into existence. Some, such as El-Fatah, had no specific ideological Commitment. Others had explicit political or religious orientations. All were dedicated to the creation of a Palestinian state, and all were prepared to use force to that end. At the outset, Lebanon had concurred in the formation of the P.L.O. and P.L.A., but had insisted that the new army was not to establish a base in Lebanon. The existence of a substantial immigrant minority, newly provided with Pan-Arab political backing was serious enough, without the possibility of an autonomous military presence as well. In the event, this stipulation was not honoured. Repeated clashes between the army and Palestinian commandos, coupled with pressure on Lebanon from Arab states sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, led to a compromise agreement made in 1969 between the regime and the P.L.O. under which the various Palestinian militias were given the right to establish armed units within the refugee camps in Lebanon, and to operate from bases in South Lebanon, on terms that Lebanese sovereignty was maintained free from internal interference by the Palestinian forces. Full advantage was taken of this concession, for the P.L.A. and other para-military groupings had need of bases in Lebanon, since there were few other places where they could establish themselves. The Syrians had come to terms with the problem by organising a commando unit known as al-Saiqa, and treating it as an offshoot of the Syrian army. But Syria would not tolerate the use of its own territory as a base for direct attacks on Israel, since this would inevitably provoke reprisals. The Palestinian movement established itself for a time in Jordan, but it came to be seen as dangerously strong, and after violent clashes with the army the commandos were finally expelled from the country in 1971. Thereafter, Lebanon became the centre of active operations against Israel, and notwithstanding the agreement of 1969 the refugee camps became fortified autonomous pockets of Palestinian territory, effectively free from government control. Subsequently an Arab summit in 1974 endorsed the P.L.O. as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. This strengthened the political position of the P.L.O. and its off-shoots in Lebanon, and enhanced the risk of confrontation with Israel, which refused to have any dealings with the P.L.O. These developments caused deep resentment among what may be called "the Christian right". There were three reasons for this. First, the presence of armed forces within the camps, 1860 bitter fighting between Maronite Christians and Druzes in Mount Lebanon had led to many thousands of deaths. This episode was only brough to an end by European intervention. The new constitutional arrangements then imposed by the European powers, which involved the virtual hiving-off from the Ottoman Empire of the community in Mount Lebanon, involved a distribution of power on sectarian lines. The tendency towards religious friction was enhanced as various European powers, seeking to establish spheres of influence in the Levant, lent their support to individual sectarian groups within the Lebanon. Later, when the boundaries of the country were redrawn in the 1920s, there were brought into the new state substantial populations of Sunni and Shia Moslems, of a generally lower cultural and economic status. This disturbed the existing sectarian balance, and diminished the cohesiveness of the country. Nor was the possibility of religious strife confined to a dispute between Christians and Moslems considered as blocks, for within each religious group there were several confessional subgroups, not by any means sharing a unity of though and purpose. The risk of political fragmentation was clearly recognised, and when the unwritten "National Pact" was entered into in 1943, a solution was found which acknowledged the sectarian divisions within Lebanese society, and sought to bridge them conferring on each group a distinct and identifiable right to participation in the legislative and administrative processes of the state. This solution proved a success, at least for a time, but it could not disguise the fact that deep religious divisions did exist. In a country prone to sudden flarings-up of local violence, the possibility of sectarian conflict was always there; and indeed many of the incidents in recent Lebanese history seem to bear the marks of straightforward religious antipathy uncomplicated by broader political motives. On the political side, the national pact, which for a while had been a powerful instrument of unity, was in more recent years becoming a source of discontent. The pact prescribed that the president of the Republic should always be a Maronite; the president of the Chamber of Deputies a Shi'ite Moslem; and the prime minister a Sunni Moslem. Seats in the Parliament were apportioned on a religious basis in the ratio of 6 to 5 in favour of Christians. The commander of the armed forces was a Maronite, and in practice most of the higher ranks in the army were occupied by Christians. Posts in the civil service were distributed on sectarian lines. Moslem dissatisfaction with this system appears to have been concentrated on two of its aspects. First, it was seen as a relic of the days when the Christians were numerically and economically the major element of the population. This was no longer the case. The Moslem share of the population had increased so that the Christians amounted to no more than 50 per cent., and possibly less. Furthermore, the economic status of at least part of the Moslem population was now closer to balance with that of the Christians. In the result, the Moslems felt themselves under-represented by the existing arrangements. Second, the Sunni Moslem prime minister had tended to play a secondary role to that of the president. The Moslem electorate felt that the country was really being run by the Christian president and those standing behind him, rather than by a genuine democratic process. The social tensions in the Lebanon echoed in some degree those created by religion and politics. Lebanon was one of the last homes of thoroughgoing laissez-faire capitalism. Government interference in commercial life was minimal. The rich grew richer, and the middle class lived comfortably. But the growing prosperity of the country did not penetrate to all levels. Although there were faltering attempts at the establishment of social services on Western European lines, the gap between the "haves" and the "have nots" became more conspicuous, the more so because of the close proximity between the bidonvilles of the poor, and the hotels, villas and apartments of the well-to-do. The latter class had traditionally been associated with the Maronite Christian community. By the 1960s this had become an oversimplification, for there were many large fortunes among the Moslems. Nevertheless although it would be mistaken to identify the Christians with the "haves", it seems plain that the "have nots" were mainly comprised of Moslems, and in particular of Shi'ite Moslems. I return to these sources of tension at a later stage, but will next deal with some of the principal divisive forces imposed from outside. First among these were the activities of foreign powers, who used Lebanon as a stage for playing out their political and strategic ambitions. Most obvious was the conflict between Israel and the Arab world, with Lebanon sandwiched between them, a natural battleground for armed conflict. But this struggle was also reflected by more or less overt interference of other states in Lebanese internal politics. Syria, for example, made no secret of its close concern with Lebanese affairs: althouth that country had to reconcile an ambition to advance the Palestinian cause with a desire at all costs to avoid a Lebanese collapse of which Israel could take advantage. Israel on the other hand was widely suspected of supporting the "Christian right". Apart from Lebanon's immediate neighbours, other countries were plausibly believed to be meddling in Lebanse politics. For example, the Arab world was by no means united on the role which Lebanon should play. Certain of the more "radical" Arab states saw Lebanon as the natural front-line of the perennial struggle against Israel, and supported those within Lebanon who favoured an aggressive stance. The rulers of other states were however suspicious of what they regarded as the subversively "leftist" and secular ideas of these latter, and therefore tended to favour those within the Lebanon who sought to conserve the existing order. On a still wider front, it was generally believed that other world powers with interests in the Middle East were covertly supporting the various factions. Certainly the quantity of expensive armaments employed during the conflict by the various groups leaves no room for doubt of foreign assistance on a very large scale. Another source of conflict was the growth of Pan-Arabist ideas elsewhere in the Middle East. Lebanon had always occupied a special position in the Arab world: never fully integrated, yet formally declaring itself to be part of it, by accession to the Baghdad pact, attendance at Arab summits and similar gestures. This ambivalence was reflected in Lebanese politics. Some political elements identified themselves with the cause of Arab unity. Others -- not all of them Christian -- felt that Lebanon had its own special identity and traditions, and should not allow itself to be submerged in a wider grouping of which it was not truly part. Finally, and of great importance, there was the influence of the Palestine liberation movement. The presence of Palestinians within the Lebanon was no novelty. Ever since the ending of the Mandate, refugees had made their way into Lebanon in large numbers, and had settled in camps, mostly on the outskirts of Beirut. By the 1970s the refugees had achieved a fair degree of social and economic integration with the indigenous population. Originally, the refugees in Lebanon were no more politically organised than elsewhere in the Palestinian dispersion. During the 1960s, however, matters began to change. In 1964 the Arab League procured the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, which was to be the official focus of Palestinian nationalism, with the Palestinian Liberation Army as its military emanation. The Palestinian movement gained impetus after the disaster of the Arab/Israeli war. Now the movement took on a predominantly nationalist rather than Pan-Arabist character. New groups and fragments of groups came into existence. Some, such as El-Fatah, had no specific idelogical commitment. Others had explicit policical or religious orientations. All were dedicated to the creation of a Palestinian state, and all were prepared to use force to that end. At the outset, Lebanon had concurred in the formation of the P.L.O. and P.L.A., but had insisted that the new army was not to establish a base in Lebanon. The existence of a substantial immigrant minority, newly provided with Pan-Arab political backing was serious enough, without the possibility of an autonomous military presence as well. In the event, this stipulation was not honoured. Repeated clashes between the army and Palestinian commandos, coupled with pressure on Lebanon from Arab states sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, led to a compromise agreement made in 1969 between the regime and the P.L.O. under which the various Palestinian militias were given the right to establish armed units within the refugee camps in Lebanon, and to operate from bases in South Lebanon, on terms that Lebanese sovereignty was maintained free from internal interference by the Palestinian forces. Full advantage was taken of this concession, for the P.L.A. and other para-military groupings had need of bases in Lebaon, since there were few other places where they could establish themselves. The Syrians had come to terms with the problem by organising a commando unit known as al-Saiqa, and treating it as an offshoot of the Syrian army. But Syria would not tolerate the use of its own territory as a base for direct attacks on Israel, since this would inevitably provoke reprisals. The Palestinian movement established itself for a time in Jordan, but it came to be seen as dangerously strong, and after violent clashes with the army the commandos were finally expelled from the country in 1971. Thereafter, Lebanon became the centre of active operations against Israel, and notwithstanding the agreement of 1969 the refugee camps became fortified autonomous pockets of Palestinian territory, effectively free from government control. Subsequently an Arab summit in 1974 endorsed the P.L.O. as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. This strenghened the political position of the P.L.O. and its off-shoots in Lebanon, and enhanced the risk of confrontation with Israel, which refused to have any dealings with the P.L.O. These developments caused deep resentment among what may be called "the Christian right". There were three reasons for this. First, the presence of armed forces within the camps, 1860 bitter fighting between Maronite Christians and Druzes in Mount Lebanon had led to many thousands of deaths. This episode was only brought to an end by European intervention. The new constitutional arrangements then imposed by the European powers, which involved the virtual having-off from the Ottoman Empire of the community in Mount Lebanon, involved a distribution of power on sectarian lines. The tendency towards religious friction was enhanced as various European powers, seeking to establish sheres of influence in the Levant, lent their support to individual sectarian groups within the Lebanon. Later, when the boundaries of the country were redrawn in the 1920s, there were brought into the new state substantial populations of Sunni and Shia Moslems, of a generally lower cultural and economic status. This disturbed the existing sectarian balance, and diminished the cohesiveness of the country. Nor was the possibility of religious strife confined to a dispute between Christians and Moslems considered as blocks, for within each religious group there were several confessional subgroups, not by any means sharing a unity of thought and purpose. The risk of political fragmentation was clearly recognised, and when the unwritten "National Pact" was entered into in 1943, a solution was found which acknowledged the sectarian divisions within Lebanese society, and sought to bridge them conferring on each group a distinct and identifiable right to participation in the legislative and administrative processes of the state. This solution proved a success, at least for a time, but it could not disguise the fact that deep religious divisions did exist. In a country prone to sudden flarings-up of local violence, the possibility of sectarian conflict was always there; and indeed many of the incidents in recent Lebanese history seem to bear the marks of straightforward religious antipathy uncomplicated by broader political motives. On the political side, the national pact, which for a while had been a powerful instrument of unity, was in more recent years becoming a source of discontent.The pact prescribed that the president of the Republic should always be a Maronite; the president of the Chamber of Deputies a Shi'ite Moslem; and the prime minister a Sunni Moslem. Seats in the Parliament were apportioned on a religious basis in the ratio of 6 to 5 in favour of Christians. The commander of the armed forces was a Maronite, and in practice most of the higher ranks in the army were occupied by Christians. Posts in the civil service were distributed on sectarian lines. Moslem dissatisfaction with this system appears to have been concentrated on two of its aspects. First, it was seen as a relic of the days when the Christians were numerically and economically the major element of the population. This was no longer the case. The Moslem share of the population had increased, so that the Christians amounted to no more than 50 per cent., and possibly less. Furthermore, the economic status of at least part of the Moslem population was now closer to blance with that of the Christians. In the result, the Moslems felt themselves underrepresented by the existing arrangements. Second, the Sunni Moslem prime minister had tended to play a secondary role to that of the president.The Moslem electorate felt that the country was really being run by the Christian president and those standing behind him, rather than by a genuine democratic process. The social tensions in the Lebanon echoed in some degree those created by religion and politics. Lebanon was one of the last homes of thoroughgoing laissez-faire capitalism. Government interference in commercial life was minimal. The rich grew richer, and the middle class lived comfortably. But the growing prosperity of the country did not penetrate to all levels. Although there were faltering attempts at the establishment of social services on Western European lines, the gap between the "haves" and the "have nots" became more conspicuous, the more so because of the close proximity between the bidonvilles of the poor, and the hotels, villas and apartments of the well-to-do. The latter class had traditionally been associated with the Maronite Christian community. By the 1960s this had become an oversimplification, for there were many large fortunes among the Moslems. Nevertheless although it would be mistaken to identify the Christians with the "haves", it seems plain that the "have nots" were mainly comprised of Moslems, and in particular of Shi'ite Moslems. I return to these sources of tension at a later stage, but will next deal with some of the principal divisive forces imposed from outside. First among these were the activities of foreign powers, who used Lebanon as a stage for playing out their political and strategic ambitions. Most obvious was the conflict between Israel and the Arab world, with Lebanon sandwiched between them, a natural battleground for armed conflict. But this struggle was also reflected by more or less overt interference of other states in Lebanese internal politics. Syria, for example, made no secret of its close concern with Lebanese affairs: although that country had to reconcile an ambition to advance the Palestinian cause with a desire at all costs to avoid a Lebanese collapse 2. The action of any lawfully constituted authority in suppressing or attempting to suppress any such disturbance or in minimising the consequences of any such disturbance. . . . SPECIAL CONDITIONS For the purposes of this Endorsement but not otherwise there shall be substituted for the respectively numbered Conditions of the Policy the following: . . . Condition 6. This insurance does not cover any loss of damage occasioned by or through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the following occurrences, namely: (a) War, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities or warlike operations (whether war be declared or not), civil war. (b) Mutiny, civil commotion assuming the proportions of or amounting to a popular rising, military rising, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power, or any act of any person acting on behalf of or in connection with any organisation with activities directed towards the overthrow by force of the Government de jure or de facto or to the influencing of it by terrorism or violence. In any action, suit or other proceeding, where the Company alleges that by reason of the provisions of this Condition any loss or damage is not covered by this insurance, the burden of proving that such loss or damage is covered shall be upon the Insured... MALICIOUS DAMAGE ENDORSEMENT ... It is hereby agreed and declared that the insurance under the said Riot and Strike Endorsement shall extend to include MALICIOUS DAMAGE which for the purpose of this extension shall mean Loss of or damage to the property insured directly caused by the malicious act of any person (whether or not such act is committed in the course of a disturbance of the public peace) not being an act amounting to or committed in connection with an occurrence mentioned in Special Condition 6 of the said Riot and Strike Endorsement. but the Company shall not be liable under this extension for any loss or damage by fire or explosion nor for any loss or damage arising out of or in the course of burglary, housebreaking, theft or larceny or any attempt thereat or caused by any person taking part therin. Provided always that all the conditions and provisos of the said Riot and Strike Endorsement shall apply to this extension as if they had been incorporated therein. STANDARD EXPLOSION ENDORSEMENT ... It is hereby agreed and declared that the insurance under this Policy shall, subject to the Special Conditons hereinafter contained, extend to include: Loss of or damage to the property insured by fire or otherwise directly caused by explosion, but excluding loss of or damage to boilers, economisers, or other vessels, machinery or apparatus in which pressure is used or their contents resulting from their explosion. PROVIDED always that all the conditions of this Policy (except insofar as Condition No. 7(h) is hereby expressly varied) shall apply as if they had been incorporated herein and for the purpose hereof any loss or damage by explosion as aforesaid shall be deemed to be loss or damage by fire within the meaning of this Policy. SPECIAL CONDITIONS (1) The Company shall not be liable, under this extension, for loss or damage occasioned by or through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any act of any person acting on behalf of, or in connection with, any organisation with activities directed towards the overthrow by force of the Government "de jure" or "de facto" or to the influencing of it by terrorism or violence. In any action, suit or other proceeding, where the Company alleges that by reason of the provisions of this Condition any loss or damage is not covered by this insurance, the burden of proving that such loss or damage is covered shall be upon the Insured... I have underlined the words with which the argument has been principally concerned. I have reproduced the explosion endorsement since it may throw light on the meaning of the specific exception therein contained, which also appears in special condition 6 of the riot and strike endorsement. It does not however call for separate discussion, since I am not satisfied that the plaintiffs suffered any measurable loss by reason of explosions within the meaning of the endorsement. It will be observed that the list of occurrences in special condition 6 affect the cover in two ways. First, occurrences of this type are declared not to be "riots", for the purposes of that part of the endorsement which confers the positive cover. Second, the insurers are relieved conservative Sunni groupings, and an ad hoc opposition built up, led by Mr. Said Salan and Mr. Karami, who allied themselves with Mr. Raymond Edde, a liberal Maronite Christian whose political ideas did not fit readily into any recognised category. The internal security position in Lebanon had been deteriorating for several months before February, 1975. Not only political violence, but also blood feuds and straightforward criminal activity had become a feature of the scene, exacerbated by clashes between Palestinian commandos and Lebanese tropps. On Feb. 26, there occurred an incident which may be regarded as the start of the crescendo of conflict which has given rise to the present dispute.A group of fishermen demonstrated in Sidon against the establishment of a new company, which they saw as a threat to their livelihood. A riot took place, in the course of which a local leader was killed. Demonstrations of sympathy took place in Sidon and Beirut. The army intervened. Deaths were caused. Political opinion became polarised. The radicals criticised the army for helping capitalists to oppress the workers. On this occasion the orthodox Moslem establishment agreed. It was time that the army was reorganised so as to give Moslems an equal participation in command. Only then could the army be relied upon to safeguard the interests of the country as a whole. On the other hand, Christian opinion acclaimed the part played by the army which (on this view) had upheld law and order against disorders fermented by the Palestinians. The dispute simmered down for a while but broke out again with greater force on Apr. 13, 1975. Mr. Gemayel had come to the Christian suburb of Ain-el Rumaneh to attend the consecration of a new church. After a dispute, armed men shot dead two Phalangist irregulars and the bodyguard of Mr. Gemayel. Later on the same day a group of Palestinians on their way by bus to the camp at Tel Zataar imprudently passed through Ain-el Rumaneh. Persons believed to be Phalangist irregulars ambushed the bus and killed all the passengers. This immediately led to a serious outburst of violence. Firing with rockets and other weapons was exchanged between Tel Zataar and Christian suburbs; fighting took place in other suburbs; looting of shops and homes occurred in Christian neighbourhoods; the southern roads to Beirut became impassable. Eventually, a cease-fire was agreed, although sniping and other violence continued to take place. On the political front, the incident had its most serious consequence when, on Apr. 26, Mr. Jumblatt announced that his supporters would no longer take part in a government of which the Phalange formed part. In due course the Cabinet of Mr. al-Sulh found itself unable to remain in power, and on May 15, he resigned. The problem was now to find a successor. To many, the obvious choice was Mr. Rashid Karami, an experienced and respected Sunnite leader. He had the direct support of the Salan/Edde faction. Even the Phalange did not object. However, Mr. Karami had two powerful opponents: President Franjieh and Mr. Chamoun, who were personally at odds with Mr. Karami. The move to have him appointed premier was therefore blocked. Mr. Jumblatt's insistance that he would not support an administration which included Phalangists, and the Phalange's equal insistence that they would oppose any government which left them out, led to total deadlock. Eventually, President Franjieh called on a retired general to head a cabinet which was largely composed of military men. This was not a military coup d'etat. The president had the right to nominate any Sunni he chose, subject to the approval of Parliament. The decision was acclaimed by the Phalange, and by Mr. Chamoun, but virtually every other political faction in Lebanon rose in wrath -- in terms of both political and physical action.Fighting which had been going on sporadically since the Ain-el Rumaneh incident, notably in the Moslem slums of Qarantina and Maslakh, and in the Phalange strongholds of Al-Dikwaneh and Sinn-el Fil, increased in intensity. The pressure was too much for the new regime, which resigned after three days. The president accepted the situation, and invited Mr. Karami to form a government. This task was no formality, since, as previously mentioned, the Phalange and the supporters of Mr. Jumblatt were deadlocked on the composition of the government. The weeks dragged on, during which random violence continued to occur in Beirut. Finally, on June 30, Mr. Karami was able to announce a cabinet, excluding the Phalange and the Jumblattists, but including Mr. Chamoun, the recent oppoinent of Mr. Karami. With this there ended the third of what were often called the "rounds" of struggle in Lebanon. The past few weeks had cost hundreds of deaths. There followed two months of relative calm; but at the end of August the fourth "round" of conflict began. A dispute broke out in the predominantly Christian town of Zahleh in East Lebanon over a game in a pin-table saloon. Shots were exchanged. Violence blossomed. Fighting in Zahleh between Shi'ites and Christians spread to Tripoli. On Sept. 7, 12 Moslem passengers were taken off a bus on the Tripoli road, and shot dead by armed men from Zgharta. There was looting of Christian properties in Tripoli, and attacks on other Christian areas in the North. The Christian population began to move out. Usually, the army was sent in to establish a buffer zone. In the process, a number of Moslems were killed. Protests followed, and on Sept. 15 violent fighting broke out in the Chiyah/Ain-el Rumaneh area of Beirut. During the following days Phalangists who were established on the eastern side of the Place des Martyrs bombarded the souk area to the west of the square. Before long, the shopping area, which had formed a neutral zone between West Beirut and the predominantly Christian East Beirut, had been destroyed. Pausing at this stage four points may briefly be made. First, so far as it is possible to make any sense of the fighting, it appears to have been predominantly sectarian in character. The "confessional" militias who had been accumulating arms during the summer were now taking the opportunity to use them.Second, the Palestinians had not become deeply involved in the fighting, if indeed they were involved at all. Third, Mr. Karami remained unwilling to commit the army to restore peace, except in the isolated instance previously mentioned.He preferred to attempt persuasion. Fourth, the fighting was still occurring largely in the traditional areas of tension where Christian and Moslem communities abutted, although the Phalangist bombardment of the souk had extended the damage beyond the dividing line between East and West Beirut. The next step was an intervention by Syria, whose Foreign Minister came to Lebanon to mediate; for Syria could not afford to have a disintegrating Lebanon as her neighbour. This initiative resulted in the formation of a Committee for National Reconciliation, on which all the major religious groups were represented. Although the president was not a member, there were grounds for optimism in That Mr. Jumblatt and Mr. Gemayel had agreed to sit on the same committee. But the discussions soon broke down. The groups for whom Mr. Jumblatt spoke wished for priority to be given to the secularisation of the constitution and Civil Service and the reorganisation of the army, while the Phalange insisted that violence must cease before reforms could be discussed. An attempt at mediation by the arab League failed, and Lebanon slid back into violence. There was fighting in Tripoli between supporters of President Franjieh and those of his prime minister. In Beirut there was gunfire and looting. A ceasefire failed to last, and as fighting broke out again, the Christian militias moved westward across the northern end of the informal boundary between East and West Beirut (which lay roughly along the line of the Damascus Road) into the hotel area, and up to the outskirts of Ras Beirut. This latest outbreak of violence marked a qualitative shift in the fighting in Beirut in two respects. First, whereas the fighting had hitherto been mainly confined to static positions such as suburbs and camps, held by the various groups, the Phalangists were now attempting to gain territory -- perhaps to seize a line which could be held on the next cease-fire. Secondly, there was evidence that Palestinian guerrillas were involved, albeit on a small scale, in the battle for the hotel area. This appears to have been the first occasion on which Palestinian units took any substantial part in the conflict. The upturn in violence, and the proximity to the more fashionable areas, led to an exodus of foreigners, in addition to the numerous refugees leaving the country via the Syrian border. It is impossible to give reliable figures for the latter, but there were certainly many thousands. The fighting in Beirut died down again. During November, 1975, it was punctuated by prolonged ceasefires. Life began to return to normal. Mr. Karami made a further attempt to achieve a reconciliation between the communities. Unable to raise a quorum in Parliament, he retired to the Serail (a government residence in Beirut) and announced the formation of another committee. This was even less successful than the last, since few of the nominated persons put in more than a token appearance. Mr. Karami therefore made it clear that he would remain in the Serail until a solution was found to the crisis. In due course, he received assurances of support from the leadership of the Palestinian commeandos, and also from the Syrian Foreign Minister. Encouraged, he left the Serail, and arrived at an accord with the president, whom he had recently criticised in public for his failure to co-operate. This was followed by the establishment of yet another committee, whose efforts led to the ceasefires which I have previously mentioned. Another cause for optimism was an invitation by the Syrian president to Mr. Gemayel, the leader of the Phalange, to visit Damascus for talks. Unfortunately, these favourable signs were misleading. After outbreaks of fighting in Zahleh and Tripoli, the worst violence so far began in Beirut on Dec. 6. As a reprisal for a previous incident, Phalangists kidnapped at least 200 Moslems, many of whom were subsequently murdered. Heavy fighting broke out at once, and the Moslem militias attacked the Phalangists in the hotel area and elsewhere. After a brief and unsuccessful intervention by the army, the Moslems drove the Phalangists out of the hotel area, and pushed them back to their original position near the Place des Martyrs. The fighting in the hotel area was particularly heavy. After five days of violence the Moslem and radical representatives (possibly urged by Syria and the P.L.O.) rejoined the Higher Co-ordinating Committee, which they had recently boycotted. A cease fire was called, and fighting gradully came to a stop, bringing with it the end of the fifth "round". During the first days of January, 1976, trouble broke out again in the vicinity of Tel Zataar and Jisr el Pasha. Palestinians blocked the main road to the East at Mkalles, and the Phalange moved to reopen it. Christian residents in that area and in the vicinity of Tel Zataar and Jisr el Pasha fled for safety. Because of these incidents -- or, alternatively, using them as a pretext -- the Phalange laid siege to the camps at Tel Zataar and Jisr el Pasha, and on Jan. 6, stopped a convoy of trucks carrying food to Tel Zataar. The Palestinian guerrillas now began their first large-scale involvement in the Lebanese crisis. Mr. Yasir Arafact, the leader of the P.L.O., made it plain that the siege of Tel Zataar would be raised, if necessary by force. The sixth "round" began with heavy fighting in the Chiyah/Tel Zataar area between Phalange and Palestinians.The Christians at first made gains, although the opposing forces pushed north-west to establish a bridgehead with the Moslem suburb of el Nabaa in East Beirut. Fighting also resumed in the hotel area and in the corridor which linked that area to the predominantly Christian territory of East Beirut. Later, Christian militias surrounded the Palestinian camp at Dibaya, which soon fell. The outbreak of fighting in Beirut was echoed by violence elsewhere in Lebanon. Once again, there was fighting between Moslems (this time backed by Palestinians) centred on Tripoli and Maronites from Zahleh, and in the neighbourhood of Zgharta. More important, Palestinian commandos and also Druzes laid siege to Damour and Jiyya, small towns south of Beirut, of Christian orientation, in what was predominantly a moslem area. Refugees fled from there to Saadiyat, where Mr. Chamoun had his home and headquarters. Saadiyat was evacuated, but the two other towns resisted for a while, ultimately being overrun and destroyed on Jan. 17 -- but not before three aircraft of the Lebanese air force had attacked the besiegers, an action which was strongly condemned by all the Palestinian and leftist leaders. Meanwhile, on Jan. 15 the Phalangists commenced an attack on Qarantina and Maslakh, in the north-eastern corner of Beirut, just to the west of the Beirut river. Two reasons have been suggested for this attack. First, as previously mentioned, the districts commanded the bridge over the river which carried the road to the north, an important part of the Christian lines of communication, since other roads leading from Beirut were under pressure from the Palestinian camps. Second, as in the case of their earlier push westward towards the hotel area and Ras Beirut, the Phalangists may have wished to seize and consolidate fresh areas of ground, which could be incorporated into "their" territory in the event of a lasting ceasefire. The attacks did not meet with any great resistance, and the occupation and virtual destruction of the two districts was completed on Jan. 18. Many of the former inhabitants then made their way to beaches not far from the Spinney's Centre where they established themselves in huts and similar makeshift accommodation. While the last inhabitants fled from Qarantina, Mr. Karami laboured to arrange yet another ceasefire, the 21st (or 22nd: people seem to have lost count) since the beginning of October, 1975. The terms were that the Phalangists and Chamounists were to lift the siege of Tel Zataar and Jisr el Pasha, and to withdraw from Dibaya camp; in exchange the Palestinian/Moslem forces were to withdraw from Damour and Jiyya, and from Saadiyat, where Mr. Chamoun was still beleaguered. But the ceasefire began to crumble almost as soon as it began. At last events proved too much for Mr. Karami, who resigned in despair -- he announced that the state had become "ineffective in all its institutions", and that he could do no more. This created a dangerous vacuum, for it was hard to visualise a Sunni Moslem who would consent to succeed Mr. Karami, and the population does not seem to have been conviced the President Franjieh would provide the leadership, energy and devotion to the task of healing the rifts in the nation, which had caused Mr. Karami to win the confidence of the less committed majority of the population. Furthermore, it was becoming difficult for Mr. Arafat to hold the comparatively moderate line which he had apparently been pursuing, in face of the Phalangists' attacks and of the increasing pressure from the more extreme factions of the Palestinian movement. It was no doubt on the basis of considerations such as these that Syria decided to intervene. The intervention was both military and political. On Jan. 19/20, the Yarmouk brigade of the P.L.A. (which, as previously mentioned, was affiliated to the Syrian Army) moved across the border into the Beqa valley, where it seized the crossroads at Shtoura. At this point, the brigade appears to have halted, at least for the time being. On Jan. 20, a Syrian political delegation, led by the Foreign Minister, arrived at the presidential palace. Talks followed, which led to the formation of a joint Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian military commission, whose first task was to be the ending of violence and the restoration of normal life. After a period of resistance by Mr. Chamoun, the new accord received the support of all important factions. In due course the ceasefire did become effective, but not before there had been a period of looting, in which the Spinney's Centre was one of the sufferers. At about the same time, P.L.A. units from Syria entered Beirut, and embarked on the task of restoring order. Exactly when or how this happened does not emerge clearly from the evidence, but it seems that the P.L.A. troops first made their presence felt on the streets on Jan. 22, the day on which the looting of Spinney's began. These events appear to have given fresh heart to Mr. Karami, who withdrew his resignation. An unusually long period of calm followed, in the course of which the hostile factions, under pressure from President Assad of Syria, negotiated towards a political settlement, which was ultimately reached in the shape of a new National Covenant, announced by President Franjieh on Feb. 14, 1976. In essence this agreement provided that: (1) The confessional allocation of the three highest offices of state sould be retained. (2) Parliamentary seats would be divided equally between Christians and Moslems. (3) The confessional distribution of offices in the civil service would be greatly diminished, although not abolished. (4) There would be an effort to secure general social justice through fiscal, economic and social reform. (5) The Cairo agreement regarding the position of the Palestinian guerrillas and camps would be enforced. While this agreement may have appeared satisfactory to the Syrians, and to those who took part in the negotiations, there were many who were thoroughly discontented -- notably the more radical among the Moslems, who felt that the reforms went nowhere near far enough, particularly since they (with Palestinian help) had come out of the fighting better than the Christian forces. From another standpoint the Christians felt that while it was no doubt satisfactory to have a declaration that the Cairo agreement should be enforced as a prerequisite to social reform, there was no certainty that in practice it would actually be put into effect. Discontent grew, and the country began to slip back into conflict. The most serious feature of events this time was the progressive disintegration of the Lebanese army. Whatever internal strains it may have been suffering, at least it had kept the appearance of unity -- if only because it had, in the main, been withheld from intervention in the sectarian fighting. But now it began to break apart. First on the Moslem side, and later on the Christian, units began to secede and join forces with the militias operated by their co-religionists. On the Moslem side, many units allied themselves with "Lebanese Arab Army", a small band led by a Lieutenant Khatib, which now increased in size and importance. A number of garrisons were seized in the South and elsewhere. By the middle of March, 1976, the Lebanese army had virtually ceased to exist as a unified force. Meanwhile the new covenant was foundering politically. Mr. Jumblatt and other redical leaders refused to join a government of national unity, and on at least two occasions the Syrian mediators gave up their task and returned to Damascus. On Mar. 11, 1976, events took a wholly new turn, when Brigadier Ahdab, the Moslem military commander of the Beirut area, announced on television the imposition of a state of emergency and demanded the resignation of President Franjieh and his government. The president refused to resign, notwithstanding a petition signed by 68 out of the 99 members of Parliament. Moslem forces thereupon began to move in strength against the presidential palace. Before full-scale fighting could develop, the opponents were parted by units of the P.L.O. and of Saiqa. It may well be surmised that this intervention was inspired by Syria. Brigadier Ahdab's attempt to impose a military solution on the crisis came to an end. At this stage it seems that the participants in the struggle might with much simplification be grouped as follows: on one side, the Christians, now united and militant in support of the status quo; on the other, the radicals led by Mr. Jumblatt, disenchanted with Syria, and in alliance with some of the more extreme Palestinian elements. Roughly in the middle, there were the conservative Moslems, supported by the "mainstream" Palestinian movements, and by Syria. It is unnecessary to enter in any detail into subsequent events. The radical/Moslem groups launched a military offensive to impose their political views by force. Fighting Took place between radical/Moslems and Christians, and between the extremist Palestinian groups and the Syrian-backed mainstream Palestinians. Violence became worse than ever, particularly since artilley and other armaments carried off by the seceding regular army troops were now brought into use by the irregulars. Visualising total collapse in the Lebanon, the Syrians made a further military intervention, entering the country with several thousand troops and about 200 tanks, and occupied much of the eastern part of Lebanon, after heavy fighting with Palestinian forces. Encouraged by the Syrian action, the Christian forces went on the offensive, and set out to eliminate the three remaining Palestinian enclaves in their much-diminished heartland. The last of these, Tel Zataar fell, after a siege lasting 52 days. Later in the year, after political effort had failed, the Syrians attacked and over-ran Palestinian and leftist positions in the (originally Christian) Lebanese mountains. Thereafter, a series of summit meetings during October, 1976, led to the establishment of an Arab peace-keeping force. Calm returned to a Lebanon, which was now divided between the traditional Christian areas, held by Maronite and other troops, and the remainder of the country, ostensibly controlled by the peace-keeping forces. Unfortunately, peace has not prevailed, but the sad course of events which followed is beyond the scope of the present action. FINDINGS OF FACT. I now proceed to make findings on various areas of fact which were the subject of controversy at the trial. The army. The army was subject to the same internal stresses as afflicted Lebanese society as a whole: No doubt rendered more conspicuous by the fact that Christians tended to occupy the higher ranks. The seeds of the disintegration which took place from March, 1976, onwards must have been present for many months previously, and some defections on a relatively small scale took place during that period. But I cannot find on the evidence that mutinies and desertions had by mid-January achieved anything approaching what happened during March, 1976. The Lebanese army still remained in being. On the other hand, although the army continued to exist, it was never used effectively or on any scale during the period in question. Apart from the comparatively minor involvement at Damour, the air and naval forces were not committed at all, and the involvement of the army was very limited: as witness the fact that when the January, 1976, disturbances were brought to an end, this was achieved by the P.L.A., not by the army. The withholding of the army was in part due to Mr. Karami's reluctance to take any step which could put out of reach the political and sectarian equilibrium which he was hoping to achieve; but there can be little doubt that he was also influenced by the risk that the lower ranks might refuse to act against their fellow Moslems, or against Palestinians with whose general aims they were in broad sympathy. The police. The police force remined in being, but was little in evidence. While it appears to have attempted to perform at least some of its normal "civilian" functions, its only involvement in the conflict was to defend, not always successfully, its own barracks, police stations and prisons, The police were not sufficiently numerous, or well enough trained or equipped, to intervene in the violence, or to bring to justice those responsible for the numerous murders which took place as part of, or under cover of, the general conflict in the Lebanon. To some degree the functions of the police were performed by the militias and the commandos, who on occasions intervened to prevent unlicensed fighting and looting. There is evidence that on occasion they accepted protection money from the better off. The fire brigade. The Beirut fire brigade attracted widespread praise for its courage and zeal But it could not be everywhere, and crews were fired on when attempting to carry out their duties. The civil service. In Beirut, the headquarters of the various ministries continued to function, but on a much reduced scale. Often civil servants could not reach work, or dared not try. Exactly what work was done, and how effectively, is impossible to say. It is a fair inference that the ministries continued on routine matters to operate under their own momentum, but that few initiatives were taken, and even then with limited practical result. The evidence is insufficient to justify any finding as to the way in which the civil service functioned at local level, inside or outside Beirut. The Courts. Here again the evidence is limited and conflicting. I think it probable that the Courts did remain open, even in Beirut, but that the business transacted was much reduced and of diminished utility, because of the restrictions imposed by the violence on travel and communications. There is no trace of the Courts having played any effective part in the curbing of violence. Hospitals. Hospitals remained open, but were overcrowded and short of supplies. Daily life. It is hard to form a clear picture of life in Lebanon, or even in Beirut, at the time in question. The distinguished Lebanese gentlemen who gave evidence for the plaintiffs were men of position and substance, who inevitably saw matters from their own standpoint, and could have no exact knowledge of how life was lived, for example, in a working-class Moslem suburb. Conversely, the work performed by the journalists and television reporters required them to make comparatively brief forays to the places where the more dramatic events were occurring. They would have only limited opportunities to assess the quality of life in the quieter areas of the city. I do not in the slightest degree suggest that those who gave oral evidence, or who wrote the newspaper reports which were put in evidence at the trial, were attempting to give anything other than a balanced picture of events. But the information is patchy, particularly in regard to what happened during the intervals between fighting, and in localities where no fighting was taking place. I also formed the view that the evidence from the journalists, if read in isolation, tended to give a rather heightened impression of the scale of events, and that the opposite applied to some of the Lebanese witnesses for the plaintiffs. It must also be noted that conditions varied greatly from time to time, and indeed from day to day. The findings which follow are made with these reservations in mind. Apart from the fighting itself, the most conspicuous feature of life in Beirut was the difficulty of communications. Even in areas where there was no large scale violence, random firing would make streets unsafe -- in particular those running east and west.Elsewhere, roads might be blocked, or passage might be interrupted by checkpoints, established sometimes for no apparent reason by irregulars or armed civilians. In times of tension it could be dangerous to be caught at such a checkpoint bearing documents which showed that the holder was of the "wrong" religious denomination. These events were sufficiently common to make it worth while for one radio announcer to institute regular bulletins of areas or streets that were unsafe. Passage from East to West Beirut, across the informal demarcation along the Damascus Road could often be effected only at one point and even there crossing could be troublesome -- as happened, for example, with the journalists who used to change taxis there when passing from one part of Beirut to the other. These features meant that it would often (although not always) be necessary to take a circuitous route between places that were not far apart. Other forms of communication were also impaired. Telephones and telex were subject to interruption. The posts often arrived late, if at all. Public transport, never Beirut's strongest point, seems to have been little in evidence. Even the ubiquitous taxis were affected. Frequent curfews were another impediment to free movement, although they may to some extent have been academic, since in times of tension the inhabitants were reluctant to leave home after dark, and would not venture outside their own neighbourhoods in the evening. It is impossible on the evidence to assess the effect of the conflict on the business life of Beirut. Work in the port was interrupted for long periods of time. Companies dependent on international commerce must have been badly hit by the difficulties in communications, the flight of expatriate staff, the shortages of office workers due to the problems of getting to work, the closure of the port of Beirut, and other factors -- quite apart from the destruction or evacuation of offices. Concerns carrying on substantial domestic business in Beirut are likely to have suffered from similar impediments: for example, the head offices of the banks in the Hamra district seem to have been closed for much of the time, although not necessarily the outlying branches. So also with life in the legal, teaching and other professions: such evidence as exists suggests that this was severely curtailed, but not brought to a complete standstill. People would leave for home in the early afternoon. How the smaller-scale businesses fared is quite impossible to say. On the domestic side, many of the premises in the central shopping areas had been destroyed or abandoned and looted. To some extent the shops were replaced by itinerant street traders. There is no evidence of how matters went in less fashionable areas. Food was in short supply from time to time, and the poorer sections of the population may have suffered real hardship -- quite apart, of course, from those who were forced out of their homes. But there is no firm evidence of starvation at the time in question and certainly nothing remotely approaching the widespread famines which have recently been the sombre accompaniment of internal strife in other parts of the world. As with the communications services there were interruptions of electricity and water supplies; but in general these public utilities continued to function. All of these findings relate to Beirut. Outside the city there were, as already narrated, towns and camps which suffered serious destruction accompanied by casualties and forced evacuation. Apart from these instances, and those occasions on which there was localised violence of some intensity, there is little evidence of widespread interference with ordinary life outside Beirut. Events took a very different turn later, but I do not find any solid evidence that in the countryside the way of life was fundamentally altered, although it was subject to tension, inconvenience, and some degree of risk. The scale and character of the violence. Reliable statistics on this topic do not exist. It is probable that the number of more or less trained and organised irregulars did not exceed 20,000, to which must be added many armed civilians who joined in the fighting from time to time. It is unlikely that even a majority of the irregulars were simultaneously involved in action on any occasion before the end of January, 1976. It is not known how many trained Palestinian commandos were present in Lebanon, but they must certainly have rivalled the militias in numbers and equipment. Their commitment in force had however only recently begun, at the time when the Spinney's shops were looted. A large volume of arms had been acquired by civilians and irregulars.These included modern rapid-firing small arms; heavy machine guns (many mounted on trucks); mortars; rifle-propelled grenades; and shoulder-aimed self-propelled anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons (it is probable that the "rockets" and "cannon" which are mentioned in many reports refer to the shoulder-aimed weapons, and not to larger armaments). In addition, certain units employed armoured personnel carriers, and a few home-made armoured cars. Tanks and field pieces did not come into use until a later stage of the conflict. Various estimates have been made of the casualties suffered between April, 1975, and January, 1976. The number of those killed was probably of the order of 10 thousand, many of whom were civilians. Material damage occurred on a large scale.The figures quoted for the resultant financial loss are so various that it is pointless to attempt an estimate, although it may well have amounted to hundreds of millions of pounds sterling. The militias varied greatly in organisation, competence and discipline. Some units wore approximations to uniform. Others had nothing more than arm-bands to identify them, and were subject to the loosest of disciplines. On occasion bizarre costumes and masks were adopted. The Phalangist militia most closely resembled regular troops, but on occasion even these units were admitted by their leadership to have gone out of control. The irregulars were not the only persons who took part in the violence. Armed civilians joined in on their side and in addition there were: (a) Criminals who used the prevailing violence and collapse of civil order as an opportunity for gang warfare, or individual murders, robbery and theft. (b) Civilians who were encouraged or provoked by the existing conditions to pursue clan or sectarian grudges or to pay off personal scores, independently of the organised military groupings. (c) Civilians who took advantage of the fighting to loot buildings which had been deserted or were lightly guarded, or to carry out gratuitous acts of destruction. (d) Young people who were happy to find that they could obtain advanced weapons, and had the opportunity to use them. There were wide variations in the degree of planning and political direction in the instances where the militias were involved in fighting. Some incidents must have been planned at a high level of command: e.g. the clearing of Quarantina and Maslakh, the attack on Damour, and the Phalangist push into North-West Beirut. But I think it probable that there were other occasions on which the leadership merely unleashed their followers, or did nothing to prevent them from taking spontaneous initiatives; and others again where the leaders could not have held back their followers even if they had wished to do so. Even in those instances where organised militias were involved, the fighting had not by January 1976 acquired to any great degree those characteristics which are often associated with a war. Thus: (1) Most of the exchanges of fire took place between static positions, whose location was already predetermined by the religious or political orientation of the inhabitants. The larger weapons appear simply to have been loosed-off in the general direction of "the other side", without any precise tactical objective. At this stage, there were comparatively few attempts to seize and hold additional territory: although the Qurantina, Damour and hotel area episodes can be seen as examples of such activities. There were comparatively few set-piece engagements, or feats of arms on any scale. The occupation of Qarantina and Maslakh was largely unopposed. There was undoubtedly fierce fighting in the hotel area, but the number of men actually involved appears to have been comparatively small. (3) There was very little in the way of a front line, even in Beirut, in the sense of a continuous boundary between the troops of one side and those of the other. True, there was a boundary between the two halves of the city, roughly along the line of the Damascus Road. But even if one looks at the conflict in purely sectarian terms, West Beirut was still very much a mixed area, and there were very substantial Moslem enclaves in East Beirut. Outside Beirut one could (as before) identify areas where are group predominated. But the presence of troops in such areas was due to the fact that, in times of stress, each place would tend to sprout militia of the appropriate persuasion. At this stage there were no sharp geographical delineations brought about by military force alone. Partition. One of the issues discussed at the trial was whether any of the armed factions had as its objective the achievement of partition in Lebanon along sectarian lines: either by the creation of a new federated state, or by the outright splitting-off of part of the territory to form a new independent republic. Such a partition would in essence involve the consolidation of the Christian population into its old heartlands, together with East Beirut. One might then expect to see the Sunni falling back into the Syrian sphere of influence, if not into Syria itself; with, perhaps, Israel moving into the vacuum in the South. One or two likely reactions to the idea of partition in Lebanon can be asserted with reasonable confidence. Syria could only suffer from it. The reaction of that country was bound to be hostile, as was proved both by the subsequent interventions in strength, and by what was said (for example in a speech made by President Assad during the summer of 1976) by her leaders. Equally, there were several reasons why partition would be unacceptable to Pan-Arabists both inside and outside Lebanon. Again, Palestinian nationalists could not, on the face of it, be expected to enthuse about the creation of an independent Christian nation so close to the non-denominational state which they hoped to establish. Against this, there were undoubtedly rumours prevailing at about the material time that the Maronite leaders nourished ideas of partition and that the prospect would not be unwelcome to Israel. These rumours were taken seriously in the British and American press. Whether there was any substance in them is quite impossible to say on the evidence available to the Court. How partition could have been achieved in the early part of 1976, even if anyone had wanted it, I do not know. True, there had been substantial exchanges of population on sectarian lines, and certain enclaves such as Qarantina and Damour had been eliminated (although the primary motives appear to have been tactics and revenge, respectively). But the population was still very mixed, and anyone attempting by force to parcel up the country on religious lines would have faced a most formidable problem. Possibly certain Christian leaders felt that if all else failed a partition would be better than the progressive erosion of what they saw as the distinctive character and sovereignty of Lebanon by the pressures of Pan-Arabism and Palestinian nationalism. But no faction was fighting under the banner of partition, and whatever exactly may have been in the minds of the leadership, the prime and avowed object of the Christian groups was to keep the Lebanon as it was. EXCEPTED PERILS. General questions. I now turn to consider, in the light of the facts so found, whether a state of affairs existed in Lebanon which fell within any of the exceptions in the policy. It is necessary to begin by discussing three questions which were the subject of argument at the trial. First, should the Court invoke the assistance of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in ascertaining the position in the Lebanon at the relevant time, and in deciding whether the words of exception were applicable? Second, how should the clause which reverses the burden of proof be operated in practice? Third, what (if any) weight should be given to the way in which the words of exception are grouped together in special condition 6? The first question arises from a request by the plaintiffs that the Court, or plaintiffs themselves with the authority of the Court, should address to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a series of questions concerning events in Lebanon, and the interpretation which should be put upon them. I need not set out the letter at length. The fourth question read: Whether the situation in the Lebanon during the period January 18th -- January 25th, 1976, was in the view of Her Majesty's Government a civil war in the normal sense of the term, including the sense attributed by international law. I did not accede to the plaintiffs' application. There are, of course, well-recognised situations in which it is the practice of the Court to consult the Secretary of State, and on which his response is treated as conclusive. These are mainly, if not exclusively, cases in which the state of the United Kingdom's diplomatic relations forms an integral part of the issue in suit. Such cases include those where the issue is whether the United Kingdom recognises a person as a foreign sovereign, or whether the United Kingdom is at war with a foreign state, or whether the United Kingdom has recognised the existence of a state of belligerency between two foreign nations. By analogy, the Court will consult the executive of a foreign state where the issue is whether that state is at war with another: Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan, [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 223. The present case is not in this category. The issue is not whether the events in Lebanon were recognised by the United Kingdom as amounting to a civil war in the sense in which the term is used in Public International Law with the corollary that this country would, if the occasion had arisen, have accorded to the participants the rights and demanded of them the duties appropriate to belligerents. The question here is whether there was a civil war within the meaning of the policy. The two questions are not the same, and a pronouncement by the Secretary of State on one will not suffice to decide the other: see Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Bantham Steamship Co. Ltd., (1939) 63 Ll.R. Rep. 155; [1939] 2 K.B. 544, Luigi Monta of Genoa v. Cechofracht Co. Ltd., [1956] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 97; [1956] 2 Q.B. 555; also New York Life Insurance Co. v. Bennion, 158 F. 2d. 263 (1946) and New York Life Insurance Co. v. Durham, 166 F.2d 874 (1948). It is true that the Court will, on occasion, invite the opinion of the Secretary of State on questions of fact not directly connected with formal acts of recognition by the United Kingdom, and it might be said that since there is far from an abundance of evidence on what was happening in Lebanon at the relevant time, it would be sensible for the Court to avail itself of the Executive's own special sources of information in order to fill the gaps. I do not agree. When deciding whether the excepted perils apply, the ascertainment of primary facts is only one step in the process. The real problem is to interpret what was happening, in the light of the words used in the policy. This would involve the Executive in expressing in public a formal opinion on the acts and motives of persons, groups and states, many of whom are still engaged in the political life of this very sensitive area of the world. This might very will be a source of constraint and I do not consider that the Court should ask the Executive to engage upon such a task unless satisfied that some really solid benefit would ensue. I am far from satisfied of this. Answering the question would require the Secretary of State to ascertain the meaning of the words used in the policy, and unless the Court could be sure that the Secretary of State and the Court were adopting the same interpretation, the exercise would serve only to confuse: a difficulty recognised by the Secretary of State in K.K.K.K. v. Bantham, sup. The only way to achieve this would be to inform the Secretary of State in advance what is meant by "civil war", in the context of the policy. I do not consider it practical to define such an elusive term in the abstract, with sufficient precision to serve the purpose. Next, there is the question how the Court should apply the reverse burden clause. The validity of the clause is not in doubt: Levy v. Assicurazioni Generali, (1940) 67 Ll.L. Rep. 174; [1940] A.C. 791, but it should not be construed in such a sense as to make the policy unworkable. In my judgment, the insurers cannot bring the clause into play simply by asserting that the loss was excluded by a particular exception, and challenging the insured to prove the contrary.They must produce evidence from which it can reasonably be argued that -- (a) a state of affairs existed or an event occurred falling within an exception, and (b) the excepted peril directly or indirectly caused the loss. It is only when an arguable case of this nature is made out that the insured is required to disprove it. It may be noted that each of the exceptions, apart from the last, is concerned with a state of affairs rather than an event. When considering whether such an exception operates to exclude a claim it is not necessary to investigate whether the acts and events constituting a state of affairs were actually heppening at the time and place of the loss. A temporary lull in the violence alleged to be (for example) a civil commotion does not disentitle the insurer from relying on the exception, provided that there is a sufficient causal connection between the state of affairs and the loss: see Richard W. Cooper v. The General Accident, Fire, and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd., (1922) 13 Ll.L. Rep. 219; (1923) 129 L.T. 481, and Lindsay & Pirie v. The General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd., (1914) S.A.R. App. D. 574, at 598. Finally, it is necessary to bear in mind the relationship of each exception to the other words of the policy. Mr. Steyn, Q.C. for the plaintiffs, rightly insisted that the Court should not take a broad view of special condition 6 by assuming that the draftsman had intended to exclude all types of large scale civil violence, with the result that if the events in question could not be brought within one particular exception, they could safely be taken to fall within another. The defendants had chosen to define the exclusions in terms of a series of specific terms, to each of which a specific meaning must be given. There is no general "sweeping-up" provision such as is found, for example, in the standard form of Lloyd's marine policy. On the other hand, the presence of other expressions in the policy should not be ignored. For example, it must be borne in mind that the policy is intended to insure against "riot" and "malicious damage", and that the exceptions must not be so widely construed as to take too much of this cover away. Again, note must be taken of the grouping of perils in sub-cll. (a) and (b) of special condition 6, and of the fact that sub-cl. (a) appears to be concerned with events which either are or were close to wars, whereas sub-cl. (b) (apart perhaps from the last few lines) seems to bring together a group of situations involving internal strife on an appreciable scale and (it might be said) some degree of coherence. Civil war. The first relevant exception is "civil war". I will begin with the reported cases. The first in time was Curtis & Sons v. Mathews, [1918] 2 K.B. 825. Premises in Dublin were insured against loss and damage ... directly caused by war, bombardment, military or usurped power... and fire... directly caused by... the foregoing... During the Easter Rising of April, 1916, various persons proclaimed a Provisional Government, and occupied with armed forces, estimated at 2000 men, various public buildings in Dublin, including the General Post Office. The military forces of the Crown intervened, and after five days of house and street fighting, the rising collapsed. During the period of fighting, the forces of the Crown shelled the Post Office with field guns. A fire broke out, spread across an improvised barricade, and ultimately destroyed the plaintiffs' premises. In their proclamation, the Provisional Government had claimed the support of "gallant allies in Europe" -- i.e., the Central Powers, then at war with the United Kingdom. Mr. Justice Roche held that the claim lay within the policy, and this decision was upheld in the Court of Appeal, where Lords Justices Warrington and Scrutton expressed agreement with the judgment of Mr. Justice Roche, and Lord Justice Bankes delivered a short judgment of his own. Most of the discussion in that part of Mr. Justice Roche's judgment which dealt with the question whether the events of Easter week fell within the words of the policy was concerned with the meaning of "usurped power". It was, however, contended in the present case that Curtis v. Mathews also sheds light on the characteristics of a civil war. In my opinion, the ratio decidendi of Mr. Justice Roche's decision is to be found in the following sentence, which Lord Justice Bankes cited and endorsed: ... I am satisfied that Easter week in Dublin was a week not of mere riot but of civil strife amounting to warfare waged between military and usurped powers and involving bombardment. One possible view of this passage is that the learned Judge was using "warfare" in a colloquial sense, without specific reference to the cover against losses caused by "war", and that the case is a decision solely on the words "bombardment" and "usurped power". On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that in Pesquerias y Secaderos de Bacalao de Espana, S.A. v. Beer (Pysbe), (1949) 82 Ll.L. Rep. 500, where one of the issues was whether the words "excluding war risk" were apt to exclude a civil war, Lord Porter cited Curtis v. Mathews as a decision that they were. Lords du Parq and Normand agreed with the speech of Lord Porter. The Pysbe case must therefore be treated as establishing that in Curtis v. Mathews the Court of Appeal had held the events of Easter week to be a civil war. Even on this basis, however, the decision does not provide a definition of "war" and "civil war", since the meaning of these expressions was not discussed; but it does furnish the only illustration in the English cases of the type of situation which is capable of amounting to a civil war. The next case relied upon was Republic of Bolivia v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Co., Ltd., [1909] 1 K.B. 785. The insured goods were shipped for carriage for a river transit up the Amazon to a place far inland. The destination lay in a part of Bolivia near to the frontier with Brazil. It seems that a proportion of the inhabitants, previously Brazilian, did not wish to be governed by Bolivia and had purported to establish a free republic in the locality. The Bolivian Government sent an expedition to take possession of the territory. The insured goods were intended as supplies for the expedition. The vessels carrying the goods were stopped by the revolutionary force, and the goods were seized. The rebels were subsequently defeated. The insurance was in the terms of the ordinary Lloyd's policy, with the "f.c. & s." clause included. Before Mr. Justice Pickford, at first instance, the only issue was whether the loss fell within the word "pirates" in the Lloyd's form. The learned Judge held that it did not. On appeal, the argument was broadened to include a submission that if the acts of the insurgents did not constitute piracy, at least they were close enough to piracy to fall within the general words "all other perils, losses and misfortunes", at the end of the list of perils specifically insured. Lord Justice Vaughan Williams held that since the f.c. & s. clause excluded perils similar to piracy, it was impossible to say that the "all other perils" provision covered risks ejusdem generis with piracy. Lord Justice Farwell held that the state of affairs could properly be described as a "civil commotion" and therefore fell directly within the exception in the f.c. & s. clause. Lord Justice Kennedy did not specifically deal with this point. None of the Lords Justices placed reliance on the words "warlike operations, whether before or after declaration of war" in the f.c. & s. clause. But Lord Justice Farwell did point out that there were often various stages, including riot and civil commotion, on the way to civil war, and that if the adventure of those who seized the goods had been more successful, it might have developed into a civil war. In the course of this discussion, Lord Justice Farwell quoted the following passage from a work on the history of the American Civil War: A civil war... is never formally declared: it becomes such by its accidents -- the number, power and organisation of the persons who originate, and carry it on.When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory, have declared their independence, have cast off their allegiance, have organised armies, have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerents and the contest as a war. In my view, Lord Justice Farwell did not intend, when citing this passage (which summarised decisions of the American Courts) to adopt it as an exclusive definition of a civil war for the purposes of a policy of insurance. The citation helped to illustrate his thesis that the disturbances had passed far enough along the road to civil war to rank as a civil commotion. But the Lord Justice did not to my mind convey that a civil war so described was the only kind of civil war which could be recognised as such by the Court: nor would such a proposition have been necessary to the decision at which he arrived. The third authority relied upon was the Pysbe case, sup. The issue was whether events in Spain had progressed to the stage of a civil war at the time of the loss. The issue was essentially one of fact, and there was no dispute that if the interpretation of events in Spain put forward on behalf of the underwriters was correct, a civil war had indeed come into existence. The speeches and judgments do not contain any discussion of the characteristics of a civil war which helps to solve the present problem. In addition to these three decisions, reliance was placed on a number of judgments (such as that of Lord Justice Farwell in the Republic of Bolivia case) in which Courts have identified various stages through which civil strife can pass as it becomes progressively worse: the suggestion being that if one can establish an order of ranking with civil war at the top, and if the characteristics of a peril lower down the list can be established, it can safely be assumed that a civil war must possess all these characteristics together with some others. I have not found this approach very productive. Even if a ranking could be devised, it would not be invariable. In certain instances, some of the steps would be omitted. Furtherm ore, I am not convinced that all the listed perils lie in a straight line with riot at the bottom and civil war at the top. Some appear to stand rather to one side. In any event, the argument makes the task unnecessarily complicated. What has to be done is to ascertain the ordinary business meaning of "civil war", and I believe that one should tackle the problem directly, without construing a number of other words en route and then comparing them with the expression under consideration. Next, I must refer to an argument based on certain ancient authorities on the nature of treason. As I understand their argument, the defendants maintained that all civil wars would be treason under English law, if the events happened in England, and that an examination of events in Lebanon to see if they were treasonable would help the Court to decide whether they constituted a civil war. I do not accept this argument, although it will require close study in the context of the exception of "usurped power". The expression "civil war" (unlike "usurped power") is part of the contemporary speech, and I cannot see any reason to suppose that it was introduced into this policy with the intent of calling up the ancient doctrine of constructive treason. Furthermore, the test of treason cannot provide a conclusive answer to the problem, since it is possible to commit treason without approaching anywhere near to the waging of civil war. Next, reliance was placed on a group of decisions by the United States Courts, delivered in connection with the American Civil War. These included The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635 (1862); Swinnerton v. Columbian Insurance Co., 37, N.Y. 174; 93 AM Dec. 560 (1867); Brown v. Hiatt, 4 Fed. Cas. 384 (1870); and Salisbury Hubbard & Co. v. Harnden Express Co., 10 R.I. 224 (1872). Reference was also made to Jurando v. Taylor, 13 Fed. Cas. 1179 (1818), and to a decision of the Supreme Court of Israel, Diab v. Attorney General, (1952) 19 I.L.R., 550. Many of the judgments in these cases are of great learning and authority. Nevertheless, their reasoning cannot be transferred uncritically to the present dispute, for the following reasons: (a) The question in issue was whether there was a state of belligerency, when viewed from the standpoint of public law. The disputes were concerned with matters such as the civil immunity of persons engaged in a war of secession; the rights of a belligerent to impose a blockade which a neutral must respect; and the status of persons as "foreign enemies", for the purpose of an implied exception in a contract of carriage. The Courts were not called on to construe the words "civil war" when used in a private contract. (b) When proposing a definition of a civil war, the Court was in each case establishing criteria which would enable it to decide the particular case in hand. Thus, for example, when in The Amy Warwick, Judge Grier described the following as "the true test" of a civil war: ... when the regular course of justice is interrupted by revolt, rebellion, or insurrection, so that the Courts of Justice cannot be kept open, civil war exists... the learned Judge cannot properly be understood as laying down a test which would hold good in all circumstances for all time, and which can be applied directly to the words wherever they appear in a contract: for such a test would manifestly be too narrow. (c) Methods of pursuing political aims and of waging an armed struggle do not stand still. A situation existing today might fall outside a definition formulated in the past, not because the Judge or scholar who proposed it considered that the situation should be exluded but simply because the possibility that it might exist had not crossed his mind (see K.K.K.K. v. Bantham at pp. 183 and 556). It does not follow from this that the reported cases should be ignored. They are helpful in pointing out factors to which the Court should have regard; but they cannot be relied upon as creating an exclusive list of criteria. The same comment applioes to a collection of materials relating to Public International Law assembled and deployed with great care, on which the plaintiffs placed considerable weight. The words under construction are to be given their ordinary business meaning, which is not necessarily the same as the one which they bear in Public International Law. The statements of jurists are a useful source of insights, but they do not provide a direct solution. In these circumstances, I consider that the right course is to look directly at the words "civil war" to see what is their ordinary meaning -- although not the metaphorical sense in which the expression is often used. In my judgment, the ordinary and the literal meaning of the words are the same: a civil war is a war which has the special characteristic of being civil -- i.e. internal rather than external. This special characteristic means that certain features of an international war are absent. Nevertheless, a civil war is still a war. The words do not simply denote a violent internal conflict on a large scale. There is nothing in the context of special condition 6, or in the words creating the positive cover, which is inconsistent with this reading. On the contrary, sub-cll. (a) and (b) of the special conditions tend to support it. Sub-clause (a) brings together a series of perils involving events which either are wars, or form part of wars, or are the prelude to wars. It is in sub-cl. (b) that one finds a series of expressions denoting internal struggles of a less coherent nature. When considering a civil war, one is looking for events which have the same general conformation as those of a war in the international sense. What are these characteristics of an armed conflict which make it a war, albeit of an internal character? I do not propose to attempt any general definition of a civil war. It does, however, seem to me that a decision on whether such a war exists will generally involve a consideration of three questions: (1) Can it be said that the conflict was between opposing "sides"? (2) What were the objectives of the "sides", and how did they set about pursuing them? (3) What was the scale of the conflict, and of its effect on public order and on the life of the inhabitants? As regards the first element, I find it difficult to visualise a war of any kind which is not fought between sides. International jurists have started with the concept of war as an armed conflict between states, and have given the same general meaning to a civil war, regarding the latter as concerned either with a conflict between the state and a body of inhabitants who have a sufficient cohesion and apparatus of government to merit recognition as a kind of quasi-state, or with a conflict between two such quasi-states, each claiming to be the state itself. I believe that in ordinary speech the expression "civil war" has a wider meaning than this. Nevertheless it must to my mind be possible to say of each fighting man that he owes allegiance to one side or another, and it must also be possible to identify each side by reference to a community of objective, leadership and administration. It does not necessarily follow that the objectives of all those on any one side must be identical. There may be considerable differences and even animosities between allies. But there must be some substantial community of aim, which the allies have banded together to promote by the use of force. Nor in my view need there always be only two sides. Two factions might fight one another, and also the state, in order to seize power. This would still be a civil war. But if the factions are too numerous, the struggle is no more than a melee, without the clear delineation of combatants which is one of the distinguishing features of a war. The second matter for consideration is the nature of the objectives for which the sides are fighting. The classical opinion of the international lawyers is that the parties must be either the existing authorities and a faction striving to seize complete deminion over the whole or part of the state; or two factions striving against each other to seize power, with the existing rulers either fighting both factions at once, or standing impotently by. This concept is most clearly expressed in the fine passages from Vattel on the Laws of Nations which are cited in several American authorities. But where the term is used in ordinary speech I am not convinced that a desire to seize or retain the reins of state is the only motive which can ever put the contestants into a state of civil war. If all the other requirements are satisfied, I believe that there would be a civil war if the objective was not to seize complete political power, but (say) to force changes in the way in which power is exercised, without fundamentally changing the existing political structure. Again, other requirements being satisfied, I believe that there would be a civil war if the participants were activated by tribal, racial or ethnic animosities. Nevertheless, one should, in my view, always begin by enquiring whether the parties have the object of seizing or retaining dominion over the whole or part of the state. If it is found that they do not, there may still be a civil war; but it will then be necessary to look closely at the events to see whether they display the degree of coherence and community of purpose which helps to distinguish a war from a mere tumultuous internal upheaval. Finally, there is the character and scale of the conflict, and its effect on public order and on the life of the inhabitants. It was suggested in argument that certain requirements must be satisfied before there can be said to be a civil war -- for example, the holding by each faction of a substantial portion of territory. Although there is some warrant for this view in the books, I do not consider that it is correct. Civil wars vary greatly in character. The abundant presence of some elements may compensate for the comparative absence of others. For example, a small body of men occupying a modest amount of ground can nevertheless be engaged in civil war, if united by an explicit purpose to produce far-reaching political changes, possessed of a high degree of discipline, skill and weaponry, and backed by substantial popular support. (Curtis v. Mathews, sup., provides an example of the way in which an uprising on a comparatively modest scale may be converted by other factors into a civil war.) Nevertheless, it is possible to build up a list of matters which, among others, should be considered when deciding upon whether internal strife has reached the level of civil war. I would include -- the number of combatants; the number of casualties, military and civilian; the amount and nature of the armaments employed; the relative sizes of the territory occupied by the opposing sides; the extent to which it is possible to delineate the territories so occupied; the degree to which the populace as a whole is involved in the conflict; the duratioon and degree of continuity of the conflict; the extent to which public order and the administration of justice have been impaired; the degree of interruption to public services and private life; the question whether there have been movements of population as a result of the conflict; the extent to which each faction purports to exercise exclusive legislative, administrative and judicial powers over the territories which it controls. In the present case if the factors just listed had been the only ones which were relevant, the defendants would have had strong grounds for asserting the existence of a civil war, even as early as January, 1976. It is true that the scale of the struggle, and its effect on life in Lebanon as a whole may well have been, at that stage, rather less far-reaching than a first reading of (say) the newspaper reports might suggest. Nevertheless, the fighting was indeed serious, and I would not have found against the defendants on this issue if the other characteristics of a civil war had been present. But in my judgment they were not. One may begin by asking whether one can identify, in January 1976, "sides" who were engaged in a civil war in the more usual sense of the term -- i.e. in a struggle by one side to wrest power from the other. I consider that there was not. No faction was engaged in a struggle to seize power by violence -- wherever one regards power as being situated. The president had been the subject of criticism (whether justified or not) for lack of activity and for partiality towards the Maronite cause. The view had been expressed that it would be preferable for him to resign, or at least curtail his term of office. But here had at this stage been no attempt to remove him by force, such as occurred later in the year. The prime minister was widely respected and had broad support among Lebanese of many different political and sectarian views. No solid evidence was adduced that any faction was fighting with the object of removing him from power. The same can be said of the other Ministers, of the members of parliament, and of the adminisrative apparatus of state. These may have been poorly regarded in some quarters, and their functioning was badly impaired by the fighting. It may not be unfair to say that the government had been reduced to the level of an ineffectual spectator, standing powerless on the sidelines. But none of the participants (or at least of the major groupings) was at this stage fighting to supplant it; and still less did they claim already to have supplianted it, by establishing a government of their own (notwithstanding certain isolated evidence of the occasional use of phrases such as "provisional government", which can hardly be taken at their face value). Nor were the combatants setting out to establish a separate state, split off from the existing territory of the Lebanon. As I have said, partition was not in January, 1976, a live political issue. It might, however, be argued that even if there was no attempt to suppeant the persons who governed the country, nevertheless the institutions of state themselves were under violent attack. I do not accept this. It is true that the Moslems wished to see the distribution of office and representation placed on a footing which better reflected their changed numberical and economic share in the life of the nation, while the radicals aimed to eliminate the sectarian aspects of the unwritten constitution altogether. It is also true that thee groups came into violent conflict with others of the opposite opinion. But this conflict was a reflection of the views held, not a means of imposing them on the nation as a whole. The pressure was indirect, not direct. The factions opposed to the Maronite establishment knew the direction which they wished the nation to take. The prevailing chaos may well have ben seen as a medium in which their plans for constitutional change were likely to a prosper. But of one asks whether the Moslems and radicals were engaged in an all-out concerted effort to change the constitution by force, it seems to me plainly that they were not. Thus, I do not find in the Lebanese struggle, in the shape which it possessed in January, 1976, the indicia of a civil war, in the more usual sense of the term. There still remains the question whether there were in existence "sides", such as I have described, engaged in a struggle between themselves independent of any attempt to impose their will on the state. I cannot find that there were. Perhaps one can identify two or three sides (or even more) later in 19769 Even in January, one might be able to say that there was in a broad sense one side, in the shape of a loose alliance between the Phalange, the Chamounists, and the smaller groups of he extreme right wing -- although even here, there is little sign of a common leadership and unanimity of purpose, beyond a shared desire to resist by force any other group which sought to impose any radical change on the existing state of affairs. On the left, the position was even more fragmented. The older and more conservative Sunni Moslems, the young radicals, the Nasserites, the Pan-Arabists, the religious enthusiasts, the Syrian-backed militias, the diverse Palestinian movements, and so on, all had different objectives even if, from time to time, some of them found themselves pointing in the same general direction. For all that Mr. Jumblatt appears on occasion to have been presented as their spolesman, he was a point of intersection of converging views rather than the leader of a united front. Nor can there be any certainty that the leaders spoke for their followers. In the months leading up to mid-January, 1976, the opposing leaders had on a number of ocasions brought themselves together, with a view to finding a common solution to the crisis. They failed, but there is no justification for supposing that their efforts were other than genuine. Yet the ceasefires never lasted, and the fighting invariably broke out afresh. I cannot believe that this happened because the leaders willed it, and I infer that the leaders had only an imperfect control over what happened at street level. This inference is supported by such direct evidence as exists, as to the way in which the fighting was conducted. Moreover, the violence itself was of a sporadic and incoherent nature.There were a few pitched battles, but most of the fighting appears to have broken out, died out and flared up again, either spontaneously or by way of reaction to some other act of violence. Similarly, although one can in the later stages find a boundary or boundaries in Beirut separating areas where one faction or another was present in strength, it was not a front line in the sense that there was continuous organised fighting between troops on the two sides of it. Elsewhere the lines of the fighting (and in many cases even of the social and religious dissensions which underlay the fighting) are impossible to draw. For these various reasons, I cannot find that by January, 1976, matters had advanced between massive civil strife and virtual anarchy to the stage of a civil war. Perhaps they did later, but that is not for decision here. "Usurped power". I now turn to consider whether the loss or damage was -- ... occasioned by... any of the following occcurrences, namely... usurped power. This strange expression has long been recognised as ambiguous. "Power" seems capable of three meanings -- (a) a body of persons exercising authority (as in "foreign power"); (b) a lawful authority to do something (for example, the power of legislation); (c) the possession or use of force sufficient to achieve a purpose. Judgments on "usurped power" appear to proceed on different assumptions as to the way in which the word "power" is used. The task of interpretation is not made easier by the use of the past tense in "usurped", by the description of usurped power as an "occurrence", and by the presence of the word "military" as well as "usurped" in the subclause. The exception plainly has some connection with events in the course of which someone seeks to arrogate to himself something which belongs to another. It can reasonably be assumed that the victim of the usurpation is the state. The context suggests that the usurper is to be a body or a body of persons acting with violence; that the events to which the exception relates have some feature which distinguishes them from a riot or civil commotion; and that they do not necessarily have those aspects of a more formalised conflict which seem to be common to the perils listed in sub-cl. (a). Beyond this, mere inspection of the words gives little help, and recourse must be made to the authorities. Before discussing those reported cases which are directly in point it is necessary to say something about their historical context. By the Treason Act, 1351, various offences were declared to be treason. In particular it was treason "if a man do levy war against our lord the King in him realm". By Tudor times it had come to be realised that the list of offences, construed literally, was insufficient to serve the requirements of public order, particularly in the absence of any developed body of law relating to violent assemblies. This gap was partly filled by the invention of a doctrine which rendered treasonable not only the actual waging of war against the King, but also such conduct as amounted to a "constructive" waging of war. This concept may be ilustrated by the following passages from the authorities: If any levy war to expulse strangers, to deliver men out of prisons, to remove counsellors, or against any statute, or to any other end, pretending reformation of their own heads, without warrant; this is levying of war against the King: because they take upon them royal authority, which is against the King. [3 Co. Inst. Cap. 1 (14).] All risings in order to effect... innovations of a publick and general concern by an armed force are, in construction of law, high treason, within the clause of levying war: for though they are not levelled against the person of the King, they are against his Royal Majesty... Insurrections likewise for redressing natural grievances... or for the reformation of real or imaginary evils of a public nature and in which the insurgents have no special interest -- risings to effect these ends by force and numbers are, by construction of law, within the clause of levying war: for they are levelled at the King's Crown and Royal Dignity. [Foster's Crown Cases, Chap. II, 4.] Those also who make an insurrection in order to redress a public grievance, whether it be a real or pretended one, and of their own authority attempt with force to redress it, are said to levy war against the King, although they have no direct design against his person, inasmuch as they insolently invade his prerogative, by attempting to do that by private authority which he by public justice ought to do... [Hawkins P.C. I, 2, 25.] ... if this multitude assembled with intent, by acts of force and violence, to compel the legislature to repeal a law, it is high treason... [R. v. Gordon, (1781) 21 St. Tr. 485, at 643, per Lord Mansfield, C.J.]. As the result of various decisions, which it is unnecessary to cite, it became established that acts were not treasonable unless the persons were "in a posture of war", a fact easily proved if they were bearing arms; and also that assembly for the redress of private grievances was a riot, but not treason. Private grievances included not only those which existed between one person and another -- for example, where the great nobles were in conflict -- but also where, although a group of persons shared the grievance, their objective was of a limited nature, being shared for example only by persons living in the same locality or practising the same trade. This distinction proved difficult to draw in practice.In addition the cases established that it was material to consider whether the object which the participants sought to achieve lay within the prerogatives of the King (and Parliament); for if not, the acts, however much in breach of the King's peace, were not committed in usurpation of his powers. In 1710 the gap in the legislation was partially filled by the enactment of the Riot Act, which made it a felony for a riotous assembly not to disperse within one hour after the empowered officer had read the proclamation. It was now possible to see an even sharper distinction between a riotous mob, and one whose larger scale and objectives made the participants guilty of treason. An extreme case of the latter was, of course, a rebellion; an instance of which ocurred with the rising of the Old Pretender in 1715. These events must have been present to the mind of the draftsman of the first fire policy issued by the London Assurance in 1720, which contained a proviso excluding losses caused by "invasion, foreign enemy, or any military or usurped power whatsoever". It is equally clear that the same events, and the rising of the '45, formed the background to the argument when the first case on the proviso came before the Court in 1767, in the shape of Drinkwater v. The Corporation of the London Assurance, (1767) 2 Wils. K.B. 363; 95 E.R. 863. Unrest had arisen in Norwich about the high price of provisions. A mob assembled and destroyed a quantity of flour. The proclamation was read, and the mob dispersed. Subsequently another mob formed, and burnt down the plaintiff's malting house. The plaintiff claimed on his fire policy, and the defendants relied upon the proviso. By a majority, the Court of Common Pleas upheld the claim. Unfortunately the judgments of Mr. Justice Gould and Mr. Justice Bathurst are reported in such a compressed form that it is hard to be sure on what grounds the learned Judges proceeded, although if the summary of the latter's judgment is reliable, it can certainly be understook as holding that nothing short of rebellion will suffice to make a "usurped power". The judgment of Chief Justice Wilmot is reported at length. The following passage contains the reasoning of the learned Judge: My idea of the words burnt by usurped power, from the context, is, that they mean burnt, or set on fire by occasion of an invasion from abroad, or of an internal rebellion, when armies are employed to support it. When the laws are dormant and silent, and firing of towns is unavoidable, these are the outlines of the picture drawn by the idea which these words convey to my mind. The time of the incorporation of this Society of the London Assurance Company was soon after a rebellion in this kindgdom, and it was not so remantic a thing to guiard against fire by rebellion as it might be now; the time therefore is an argument with me that this is the meaning of these words. Rebellious mobs may be also meant to be guarded against by the proviso, because this corporation commended soon after the Riot-Act; and if common mobs had been in their minds, they would have made use of the word mob. the words "usurped power" may have great variety of meanings, according to the subject matter where they are used, and it would be pedantic to define the words in all their various meanings; but in the present case they cannot mean the power used by a common mob. It has not been said, that if one or fifty persons had wickedly set this house on fire, that it would be within the meaning of the words usurped power. It hath been objected that here was an usurped power to reduce the price of victuals, and that this is part of the power of the Crown, and therefore it was an usurped power; but the King has no power to reduce the price of victuals, the difference between a rebellious mob and a common mob is, that the first is high treason, the latter a riot or a felony. Whether was this a common mob or a rebellious mob? The first time the mob rises the magistrates read the proclamation, and the mob disperse; they hear the law, and immediately obey it: the next day another mob rises upon the same account, and damages the houses of two bakers; thirty people in fifteen minutes put this army to flight, and they were dispersed and heard of no more. Where are the species belli which Lord Hale describes? This mob wants a universality of purpose to destroy, to make it a rebellious mob, or high treason. Hale's Pl. Coron. 135, there must be a universality, a purpose to destroy all houses, all inclosures, all bawdy-houses &c. Here they fell upon two bakers and a miller, and the mob chastized these particular persons to abate the price of provisions in a particular place; this does not amount to a rebellious mob. When the laws are executed with spirit, mobs are easily quelled. Sometimes a courageous act done by a single person, will quell and disperse a mob, and sometimes the wisdom of an individual will do the same. [-- Here the Chief Justice cited a passage from Vergil --] But amongst armies, great guns and bombs, the laws are silenced, and the wisdom or courage of an individual will signify nothing. The next case was Langdale v. Mason, 2 Park on Ins. 965. The plaintiff was a Catholic distiller whose premises and stock were destroyed during the Gordon riots of 1780. By this time the Sun Fire-office, upon whose policy he sued, had added the words "civil commotion", to the exceptions in the proviso. The direction to the jury of Lord Mansfield was primarily concerned with the new words, but the judgment also included the following passages: What is meant by military or usurped power? They are ambiguous, and they seem to have been the subject of a question and determination (viz. Drinkwater v. London Assurance, supra). They must mean rebellion, where the fire is made by authority: as in the year 1745, the rebels came to Derby, and if they had ordered any part of the town, or a single house, to be set on fire, that would have been by authority of a rebellion. That is the only distinction in the case -- it must be by rebellion, got to such a head, as to be under authority... I think a civil commotion is this; an insurrection of the people for general purposes, though it may not amount to a rebellion, where there is an usurped power. I will return to these passages at a later stage, and will merely pause to observe that a reading of the summing-up as a whole shows Lord Mansfield to have had well in mind the distinction between public and private aims which is drawn in the law of treason, and which is also to be found in the directions which the Chief Justice gave to the jury in R. v. Gordon, sup., during the following year. There is no reported decision in England on "usurped power", afer Langdale v. Mason, until 1917, when Mr. Justice Sankey in Rogers v. Whittaker, [1917] 1 K.B. 942, was called upon to decide whether the word "military" in "military or usurped power" included the forces of a foreign state. Holding that it did, the learned Judge expressed the opinion that -- ... military and usurped power suggest something more in the naure of war and civil war than riot and tumult. The last in the line of English decisions was Curtis & Sons v. Mathews, sup. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Bankes declined to attempt a definition of what constituted "usurped power", and agreed with the conclusion expressed by Mr. Justice Roche in the sentence which I have previously quoted. The Lord Justice did, however, state that: Uisurped power seems to me to mean something more than the action of an unorganised rabble... There must probably be action by some more or less organised body with more or less authoritative leaders. The two other members of the Court agreed with the judgment of Mr. Justice Roche. Turning to that judgment, it is plain that the learned Judge understood "power" to mean "body of persons", rather than one of the other possible meanings mentioned above. He spoke of the Dublin events as civil strife "between military and usurped powers" and observed that riot does not become a war "or a caucus a usurped power" merely because grandiloquent words are used to describe them. The learned Judge discussed the two cases which I have cited. As regards Drinkwater v. London Assurance, he said that the gist of the decision was that -- ... the acts were the acts of a common mob dispersed in less than an hour and acting feloniously but not treasonably. As to Langdale v. Mason he drew attention to the view plainly intimated by Lord Mansfield that an insurrection of the extent then occurring which involved attacks on government buildings, much firing, and loss of life and property was both a civil commotion and also a levying of war upon the King by an usurped power. Mr. Justice Roche went on to find that the Dublin rising was not merely felonious, but treasonable -- and hence to hold that the strife was between military and usurped powers. It is convenient at this stage to mention a line of American decisions on the meaning of military or usurped power. In many instances a study of the United States authorities on the law of insurance is of great value, but this particular point is an exception, since it is clear that the two systems of law have diverged. I need cite only two of the case. In Insurance Co. v. Boon, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 117 (1877), the words were equated to an internal armed force in rebellion sufficient to supplant the law of the land and displace the constituted authorities. Mr. Justice Roche in Curtis v. Mathews, sup., expressed the view that if this was intended as a definition, the did not agree with it: and his opinion carries the authority of the Court of Appeal. More recently, in Pan American World Airways Inc. v. The Aetna Casualty & Surely Co., [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 77, Circuit Judge Hays delivering the judgment of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals said: We hold that to constitute a military or usurped power the power must at least be that of a de facto government. I do not, of course, question the correctness of this statement as a summary of the American authorities, but it is not the law of England. None of the cases which I have cited places the test as high as this. Returning to the English cases, they clearly establish the proposition that one of the tests for a usurped power is whether the acts in question amounted to constructive treason. (Other types of treason may, of course, occur without there being a usurped power.) The usurpation consists of the arrogation to itself by the mob of a law-making and law-enforcing power which properly belongs to the sovereign. I can see no reason why this test should not be applied in the present case. Although the words appear in a rather more elaborate clause than those previously considered by the Courts, the new context does not suggest that the words were intended to bear any special meaning. Furthermore, although it is certainly strange that a decision on the status of events occurring in Lebanon during 1976 should depend on an English statute of 1352, as interpreted by decisions now hundreds of years old, the fact remains that "usurped power" is an English term of art, appearing in a policy which (there having been no suggestion to the contrary) can be assumed to be governed by English law. The words must therefore be given the meaning established by the English cases. There remains the much more difficult question whether constructive treason is the only test for usurped power. Is it enough to show a mob in posture of war, acting with a common intent and some degree of leadership, in pursuance of aims which properly lie within the prerogative of the sovereign" Or are there other requirements: in particular that the events should amount to a rebellion or insurrection? It seems to me that in the present context the answer must be "No". Arguments based on overlapping and redundancy must be approached with caution when construing a commercial document, particularly where the clause under consideration is a patchwork of expressions which the draftsman has collected from a variety of sources.Nevertheless, I do not think it right to give the words "usurped power" a meaning which would entail that they entirely duplicated other express exceptions: as would be the case if the narrower interpretation were adopted. I can, however, go further than this, for I consider that even in isolation "usurped power" does not necessarily connote a rebellion or insurrection. It is true that the latter expressions appear in the passages already cited from the summing-up in Langdale v. Mason, sup. In my judgment, however, the summing-up as a whole was concerned to explain to the jury that if there had been a rebellion or insurrection (perils not specifically excepted in the policy sued upon) the events would have fallen within the exception of usurped power; but that the jury need not concern themselves with this, because "civil commotion" was a wider exception, of which rebellion was not an ingredient. I do not read Lord Mansfield as saying that usurped power must always be a rebellion, stricti sensu. Nor do I conside that this is the sense of Chief Justice Wilmot's judgment in Drinkwater v London Assurance, sup. The Chief Justice specifically refers to the need for "universality of purpose"; and it is evident that if he had found such a universality -- akin to "a purpose to destroy all houses, all enclosures, all bawdyhouses, etc." -- the events would have constituted usurped power. This is the language of constructive treason, not of rebellion in its ordinary sense: for nobody could regard the riotous apprentices and workmen who had previously been the subject of the prosecutions for treason as in a state of "rebellion", so understood. Nor were the Gordon rioters seeking to take over power, as distinct from forcing the redress of a particular grievance. The distinction which underlies the judgment is between the "common mob" and the "rebellious mob": and the touchstone of the latter is guilt of constructive treason. This analysis accords with the views of Mr. Justice Clive, as very briefly summarised by the reporter. Whether it is consistent with those of Mr. Justice Bathurst is impossible to say, in the absence of a full record of the judgment.Possibly it is not, but if so, then it appears to me that on this point Mr. Justice Bathurst although agreeing in the result, was in the minority in giving a narrower meaning to the exception. Applying this conclusion to the fact of the present action one must ask whether those participating in the events which occurred at the time in question had a sufficiently warlike posture, organisation and univesality of purpose to constitute them an usurped power. So far as concerns casual lootes, armed men settling personal scores, young people firing off guns for the sake of it, the answer is "No". But for the trained militia, and those armed civilians who were temporarily fighting at their side, the answer is, in my opinion, "Yes". The objectives were not identical: but the words of exception do not require this. "Univesality of purpose" is used in the reported cases to point to a contrast with purposs of a private nature. The various militias and their supportes had grievances which lay in the public domain. Some favoured changes and othes opposed changes in the sectarian structure of the constitution. Some wished to promote and others to weaken the Palestinian presence and influence in the country.Some were making efforts, albeit still on a small scale, to displace sections of the population from the areas in which they lived. Some asserted the right to prevent people from moving freely about the city and countryside. Others took it on themselves to use violence in order to impose peace. All these were acts within the prerogative of the government to perform, if they were to be performed at all. By side-stepping the government and proceeding to direct action the citizen groups arrogated to themselves the proper functions of the state, and thereby exercised (or constituted) an usurped power, within the meaning of the exception. Invasion. It will be recalled that on about Jan. 19, 1976, units of the Palestinian Yarmouk Brigage crossed the border, and took up positions in the Beqa Valley. The defendants contend that this was an "invasion" within the meaning of the exception in sub-cl. (b) of special condition 6. This raises an interesting wuestion. The incursion was in some strength; there is no reason to doubt that the troops would have used force, if challenged; and the foray undoubtedly had the backing of the Syrian government. On the othe hand, the attack was only part of a wider Syrian initiative to stop the fighting in Leganon, and to stabilise Leanese internal politics. It was not designed to crush Lebanon, or to annex Leganese territory or to force a change of government; and it was of an altogether different character from the renewed Syrian interventions later in 1976. Furthermore, it is fr from clear that the Syrian move was unwelcome to President Franjieh -- although no doubt there was little that he could have done to prevent it, even if he had wished to do so. It is no means say to decide whether the entry of what was presented as being (and appears in fact to have been) a peace-keeping force ranks as an invasion for the purposes of the policy. It is, however, unnecessary to reach a conclusion on this point, since it is to my mind clear that the defendants have failed to make out any case for a causal connection, whether direct or indirect, between the supposed invasion and the loss. Not only is there no substantial evidence that the P.L.A. played any part in the looting in Beirut, but such evidence as exists suggests that their role, during the third week in January, 1976, was to do their best in upholding order. The defendants advanced an argument which, if I understood it correctly, was to the effect that the Yarmouk Brigade's incursion had so provoked the populace as to put them into a state of exasperation which caused the looting of the Spinney's Centre. With due respect, I must say that this argument appears quite fanciful. How the much-tried Beirutis reacted to the appearance in their country, and subsequently (it would seem) on their streets, of the Yarmouk Grigade it is impossible to say. But there is no warrant at all for the view that it produced eithe a specific resentment against Spinney's, a concern which had no connection with either Syria or the P.L.A., or a general xenophobia, or hatred of the better-off, sufficient to provoke people into an attack on the plaintiffs' property. I have no hesitation in rejecting this aspect of the defendants' case. "Rebellion"; "Insurrection". In my judgment the events which occurred in Lebanon before and at the time in question did not constitute either a rebellion or an insurrection. These words have several shades of meaning. I consider that they are used here in their most narrow sense, and not in the wider and more metaphorical way in which they are employed (as I shall later suggest) in some of the reported cases. As regards "rebellion" I adopt the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary (Murray) -- ... organised resistance to the ruler or government of one's country; insurrection, revolt. To this I would add that the purpose of the resistance must be to supplement the existing rulers or at least to deprive them of authority over part of their territory. The dictionary defines "insurrections" in a similar manne, but also suggests the notion of an incipient or limited rebellion. I believe that this reflects the distinction between two exceptions as they are used in the present clause, subject to the rider that a lesser degree of organisation may also mark off an insurrection from a rebellion. But with each exception there must be action against the government with a view to supplanting it.Since, on the findings which I have made, none of the factions had the intent, at the time with which we are concerned, to force a change of government by acts of violence, the exceptions do not apply. "Hostilities"; "Warlike Operations". The defendants also relied upon the exceptions of "hostilities" and "warlike operations" although they were not put in the forefront of the defendants' case. Both expressions have been given a comparatively restricted meaning. The term "hostilities" refers to acts or operations of war committed by belligerents; it presupposes an existing state of war: see Britain Steamship Co. v. The King, (1920) 4 Ll.L.Rep. 245; [1919] 2 K.B. 695; [1921] 1 A.C. 99 at pp. 114 and 133; Board of Trade v. Hain Steamship Co. Ltd., (1929) 34 Ll.L.Rep. 197; [1929] A.C. 534 at pp. 199 and 538. There seems no reason to doubt that the exception applies to acts committd in the course of a civil war; and perhaps also to an organised armed rebellion: cf. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. King, [1919] 1 K.B. 307 at p. 310. "Warlike operations" has a wider meaning, and includes such operations as belligerents have recourse to in war, even though no state of war exists (Arnould on Marine Insurance, 15th edn., par. 904).Nevertheless, the acts must be done in the context of a war. I adopt the following summary by Mr. Justice Tkinson (in Clan Line Steamers, Limited v. Liverpool and London War Risks Insurance Association, Ltd., (1943) 73 Ll.L.Rep. 165; [1943] K.B. 209 at pp. 172 and 221) of the authorities on this exception: ... warlike operation in one which forms part of an actual or intended belligerent act or series of acts by belligerent forces. It may be performed preparatory to the actual act or acts of belligerency, or it may be performed after such act or acts, but there must be a connection sufficiently close between the act in question and the belligerent act or acts to enable a tribunal to say, with at least some modicum of Lord Dunedin's common sense, that it formed part of acts of belligerency. if i am right in the views expressed elsewhere in this judgment, neither of these exceptions applies to the present case. There was no state of war or rebellion in Lebanon at the relevant time, nor were acts such as the capture of Damour and the clearing of Qarantina and Maslakh sufficiently close to whatever civil war may ultimately have come into existence in Lebanon to form part of a series of acts of belligerency. "Civil commotion...". I now turn to the exception of loss caused by "civil commotion assuming the proportions of or amounting to a popular rising". The latter part of this phrase is a comparatively recent addition to the exception of "civil commotion", which has been current in nonmarine policies since 1727. I will begin by considering the meaning of "civil commotion". If there were no authority on the matter and "civil commotion" were to be construed according to its natural meaning, the application of the words to the present case could scarcely be a question for serious argument. If the violence, death and destruction prevailing in Lebanon did not amount to a civil commotion, the words would be meaningless. Whatever their precise connotation, they must be wide enough to cover the event which I have described. The only issue is whether the context in which they are used, or the decisions of the Courts, require them to be given some narrower technical meaning. The context does not call for a contrary view. Certainly the nature of the positive cover and of the other exceptions in sub-cl. (b) shows that civil commotion connotes something consideably more serious than a mere leadeless mob.But even so construed, the words are apt to cover the present case. Is there anything in the reported cases which points to a different conclusion" The most recent, and most authoritative, discussion of civil commotion is to be found in Levy v, Assicurazioni Generali, (1940) 67 Ll.L.Rep. 174; [1940] A.C. 791, where Lord Justice Luxmoore, delivering the advice of the Board said that the words referred to -- ... an insurrection of the people for general purposes, though not amounting to rebellion; but it is probably not capable of any very precise definition. The element of turbulence or tumult is essential... This statement was drawn from a passage in Welford & Otter-Barry on Fire Insurance, which was in turn based on the suming-up of Lord Mansfield in Langdale v. Mason, sup., from which I have already quoted. In London and Manchester Plate Glass Co. Ltd. v. Heath, [1913] 3 K.B. 411, it is emphasised that the mening of the words had always been regarded as authoritatively settled by Lord Mansfield. It is thus to the summing-up in Langdale v. Mason that a Court must look, when deciding what events are sufficient to rank as a civil commotion. Quite plaintly, these cases do not equate civil commotion with rebellion (see also per Lord Cave, L.c./ in Cooper v. General Accident Fire, and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd., (1922) 13 Ll.L.Rep. 219; (1923) L.T. 481 at p. 483). But is it necessary for there to be an "insurrection" in the narrower sense, to which I have already alluded: so that the exception does not apply unless the pesons engaged in the disturbance have some degree of common purpose to bring down the government" It would be odd if this were so, since the policy already specifically excludes insurrection. But does the language employed by Lord Mansfield nevetheless compel this interpretation" I do not think that it does. My reasons for this opinion are so exactly expressed by the judgment of the Court in Lindsay & Pirie v. The General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd., (1914) S.A.R. (App. D.) 574, delivered by Mr. Justice Solomon, that I can do no better than quote from it. After pointing out that the exception in the policy with which Lord Mansfield had to deal did not expressly exclude insurrection, so that the argument on redundancy (which I have just mentioned) did not arise, the learned Judge went on to say: Again, I do not think that we are justified in supposing that Lord Mansfield intended in his summing up to the jury to give an exhaustive definition of the term "civil commotion", but rather that he was explaining the words in reference to the facts of the particular case which he was trying. And lastly, even if we accept his definition as an exhaustive one, I do not think that he could possibly have used the word insurrection in its ordinary sense of a rising of the people in open resistance against established authority with the object of supplanting that authority. On the contary, it would appear from the rest of his language that he used the word in its strictly etymological sense of "rising", and that the effect of his direction to the jury was that a rising of the people (by which I presume he meant a considerable number of the population), for purposes of general mischief amounted to civil commotion within the sense of the exception to the insurance policy. And that something of that kind must have been his meaning is shown by the fact that the jury in the case of Langdale v. Mason found that there had been civil commotion, though it could scarcely be said that there had been an insurrection within the usual meaning of that term. For the history of the period makes it clear that the Gordon Riots, which began as a rising against Roman Catholics, eventually degenerated into mere destruction and plunder, and that there was never an insurrection with the object of overthrowing the Government of the country. This interpretation of what Lord Mansfield said is consonant with the opinion of Mr. Justice Bucknill, approved by Lord Justice Vaughan Williams, in London and Manchester v. Heath, sup., that the Gordon Riots involved "a general rising up of the people to do terrible things". In these circumstances I find nothing in the authorities compelling the Court to hold that a civil commotion must involve a revolt against the government, although the disturbances must have sufficient cohesion to prevent them from being the work of a mindless mob.Confused and fragmentary as the violence in the Lebanon may appear, this requirement was satisfied, and I hold that there was in January, 1976, and for months before, a state of civil commotion prevalent in Lebanon. It still remains to be considered whether the civil commotion assumed the proportions of or amounted to a popular rising. The latter words have no recognised technical meaning. Often they must mean the same as "insurrection". Where there is a distinction, it probably lies in the greater spontaneity and looser organisation of a popular rising. But I would still be inclined to consider that there must be some unanimity of purpose among those participating, and also that the purpose must involve the displacement of the government. I doubt whether a violent attack by one section of the population on the other on grounds, for example, of religion or race, would be described as a rising.Adopting this interpretation, I would not say that the disturbances in Lebanon amounted to a oular rising. But were they "assuming the proportions of" such a rising" The word "proportions" is sometimes used to mean shape or configuration. I do not think that it has this sense here.To my mind, the word signifies "dimensions". So one must identify the dimensions of a popular rising. This cannot be done precisely. All one can say is that it must inolve a really substantial proportion of the populace, although obviously not all the population need participate, and that there should be tumult and violence on a large scale. On the findings which I have made, the events in Lebanon satisfied this test, and the exception therefore applies. The specific exception. Finally, it is necessary to conside the following words: ... any act of any person acting on behalf of or in connection with any organisation with activities directed towards the overthrow by force of the Government de jure or de factor or to the influencing of it by terrorism or violence. Those words raise a short but difficult question of construction. It was not disputed in argument that most if not all the militias were organisations of the type referred to -- which for brevity may be called terrorist organisations, although I imagine that few of their members would accept the description. Essentially, the problem is this. Does the exception relate to the acts of members of terrorist organisations in furtherance of the organisations' airms, or only to the terrorist acts of such members? (It is convenient to express the problem in this way, although the words "in connection with" extend the persons whose acts are excepted beyond those who are members of the organisations.) If the latter interpretation is correct, the plaintiffs clearly have a much more straightforward task when causation comes to be considered than if the alternative view is accepted. Viewed purely from the standpoint of language, the defendants' interpretation is more easy to sustain. The concluding words of the exception form part of the description of the organisation, and I cannot see how it is grammatically possible to read them as descriptive of the acts which constitute the excepted perils. Furthermore, as Mr. Wright, Q.C., has pointed out for the defendants there would be little difficulty in formulating a clause which accurately expressed the idea for which the plaintiffs contend. On the other hand, the repetitious use of "act", "acting" and "activities" can fairly by regarded as deliberate, which points towards an intention that the excepted acts and the organisation's activities shall be of the same kind. I have come to the conclusion that this latter interpretation, grammatically strained though it may be, is to be preferred for the following reasons: (i) There is no acceptable reading of the clause which does not do some violence to the literal meaning of the words. Any act of "any" person acting on behalf of or in connection with the organisation (not, it will be noted, in connection with the organisation's activities) would let in a range of events which even the defendants accept is wider than the exceptions which the draftsman intended to confer. Some limitation in the scope of the clause has to be inferred whichever interpretation is correct. (ii) Violence to the property of another is either the context of the act, or the act itself, which forms the positive cover under the riot and strife and malicious damage endorsements. This suggests that the exceptions also are likely to be concerned with violence. This is indeed the case with the other exceptions in sub-cl. (b) -- and if one asks what kind of violence, it can well be said that the answer is supplied (so far as concerns the terrorist exception) by the terms of the exception itself. (iii) The explosion endorsement, unlike the other two endorsements, does not incorporate special condition 6. But it does contain the terrorist exception, written out in full. In this context there are strong grounds for assuming that the exception is concerned with terrorist acts, and it is reasonable to give it the same meaning in special condition 6. (iv) It is easy to see why terrorist acts should have been included among the exceptions, when the line was being drawn between the cover of riots and the warlike risks which it was desired to exclude; and a specific reference would be necessary, because not all such acts fall within the remaining words of sub-cl. (b). But there appears no reason why the framers of the clause should have wished to exclude acts not of a specifically terrorist nature which would otherwise have fallen within the cover simply because they are designed to help a terrorist gang. (v) It is in my view legitimate to take into account while deciding what types of loss the draftsman was aiming to exclude, the fact that the exception was introduced after -- and one might reasonably surmise, because of -- the Irgun Zuei Leomi attack on the King David Hotel. (vi) Where there is a specially drafted clause inserted in the defendants' standard form of endorsement, not in the nature of a term of art, it is to my mind legitimate to apply the contra proforentem rule, and to construe the exceptions in the narrower of the alternative senses. I feel that the use of the rule is particularly justified in the present case, where the protection afforded to the insurers is so greatly increased by the provision admitting indirect causes of loss, and by the reverse burden clause. Such a wide exemption, if sought, ought to be very clearly expressed. For these reasons, I have with considerable hesitation come to the conclusion that the narrower reading of the exception is to be preferred. CAUSATION Before discussing the group of issues which arise in relation to the cause of the losses, it is necessary to describe the circumstances in which the losses took place. Not surprisingly, there are no full eyewitness accounts of what happened. The narrative which follows is put together from oral evidence and written statements and reports from various sources, namely, the written statements and oral evidence of Mr. Hanna Hakim (the manager of Spinney's (1948) Ltd.), His son Mr. Khalil Hakim, Mr. Charles Sifri (the manager of Spinney's Centres S.A.L.), the oral evidence of Mr. Castriades and Mr. Sells (respectively newspaper and television reporters who were present briefly during the attack on Spinney's Centre), certain contemporary telex reports from the local manager of Spinney's, various photographs, the reports of police and fire brigades and of surveyors, and a diary kept by Mr. Hakim's son. I have thought it better not to rely in relation to these issues upon the kind of secondhand evidence which perfectly properly formed the basis of much newspaper reporting, and which was drawn upon by both sides to support their propositions about what was happening in the Lebanon at large. At the request of the parties I will not refer to names, except where it is necessary to make the story intelligible. The shop in the Rue Verdun was the first to be looted. It sold mainly groceries and household goods. There had already been some looting in the neighbourhood during the previous evening.On Jan. 18, 1976, in the evening, Mr. Hakim Snr. received a report from the manager of the shop that looting was taking place. the following morning he visited the shop. By this time all the stock had gone; people were busy carrying away furniture and fittings. Eventually the shop was completely stripped, with nothing left except a few battered fitments which had proved too difficult to remove. The police made no attempt to prevent the looting, and were not even able to visit for the purpose of making a report. According to Mr. Hakim, the people who were engaged in the looting were of no particular economic class. Some seemed well off and none were obviously poor. On Jan, 20 the leaders of an armed organisation approached the manager of the Pigeon Rocks grocery, which was similar to but rather smaller than the business in the Rue Verdun, asking to be given food for those recently evacuated. The manager was authorised to offer food of considerable value, but the men were not satisfied and on the following morning they came back and helped themselves to goods off the shelves. Their example was followed by a crowd which had gathered outside. Once again the stock was removed, but on this occasion the fittings seem to have suffered rather less from theft and damage. During the week leading up to these events, Spineey's had received visits from representatives of various organisations and districts in Beirut, asking for contributions of money and food in aid of the needy. Donations of moderate size were given to representatives of Saiqa, the Morabitoun (the military arm of the independent Nasserite movement), and other organisations. On the morning of Jan. 22, 1976, Mr. Hakim Snr. and Mr. Sifri had an interview with two men from Saiqa who asked for provisions to feed the refugees from Qarantina, who had fled from that quarter a few days earlier, and had settled on the beaches not far away from Spinney's Centre. Mr. Hakim and Mr. Sifri offered a van-load of cheese, with a promise of more on the following day. The men appeared dissatisfied and left.Later on the same morning Spinney's heard that Saiqa would be satisfied to receive money in place of food, and at a rendezvous by the International Hotel the large sum of LL25,000 was handed over to an intermediary. This was regarded by the Spinney's men as protection money. Not long afterwards the two previous callers returned and repeated their demands. Mr. Sifri protested, and a call was made to a person high in the Saiqa command, who confirmed that the request for provisions had been dropped, and that the safety of the centre was assured. The two men left, only to re-appear demanding money for themselves. The managers were able to put together LL3000, which they handed over. Meanwhile. business had been proceeding normally at the supermarket and department store, which closed (as was then customary) in the early afternoon, leaving only the watchmen on duty. At about 2 30 p.m. Mr. Sifri was told that a crowd was gathering in the Zerdaneyah quarter (some distance to the north of the Centre) and that there was talk of invading places where consumer goods were stored, including Spineey's. He therefore telephoned Mr. Hakim Snr., who was living in a flat from which it was possible to see a parking area at the back of the Centre, although the front entrance of the building was not visible. He had noticed a numer of cars arriving at or near the parking area, and had gone downstairs to a flat occupied by a leader of the Morabitoun. Some of the latter's men reassured him by saying that the cars were there for a motor rally or possibly a funeral. Within half an hour the cars moved away. By 3 30 p.m. the cars had started to build up again, and people were beginning to gather on foot at the front of the Centre. Mr. Hakim noticed this and sent a message to the Morabitoun leader, asking him to send his bodyguard over to the building. In fact about half a dozen armed Morabitoun did proceed to the centre in a home-made armoured car but they were sent away by the chief watchman who did not want armed men there who might provoke shooting. The crowd continued to build up, and before long there were several hundred people around the Centre, accompanied by large numbers of cars. At about 5 p.m. an entry was forced into the building at the front and the back. Looting then began, and there was a procession of vehicles throughout the evening, driving away with articles taken from the Centre. There was nothing which the watchmen, unarmed and few in number, could do to prevent the looting. The police were nowhere to be seen. During the evening the watchmen switched off the electricity supply to the basement depots, in the hope of discouraging the crowd from stealing there, but some of the crowd lit paper in order to see. A fire then broke out. The fire brigade arrived but were unable to extinguish it. The disturbance died down somewhat during the night, but looting resumed on the following morning, Jan. 23. Either then, or previously, crowds entered the offices in the upper storeys of the Centre, and wrecked them. Fires broke out again in the basement on this and the following day, at which the fire brigade again attended. On the occasion of the fire on the morning of Jan. 23, the brigade was summoned by "armed men". It is unnecessary to describe in detail what the employees of Spinney's found when they regained access to the building; it is sufficient to say that the stock of the supermarket, department store, cold store and depots had completely disappeared. So had the bulk of the furniture and moveable fittings, the reemainder being badly damaged. Papers were scattered everywhere.Windows and partitions, etc., were also damaged, but the main structure of the building was substantially intact. Certain aspects of the incidents at Spinney's were the subject of controversy at the trial. On these I make the following findings: (1) Some shooting took place durig the incidents, intermitteltly and on a small scale. There was nothing in the shape of a pitched battle between looters and organised defenders. There is evidence from a reliable witness (Mr. Castriades) that some shots were exchanged between looters and persons trying to keep them out of the building, and also between the looters themselves. (2) The shots which were fired came from small arms. Heavier weapons were not employed. The building was not fired upon, although damage to the walls was caused so that the looters could remove stolen objects. (3) The P.L.A. took no part in the looting. On the contrary, when they appeared on the scene they tried to prevent it. (4) It is probable that armed members of certain militias were present during the incident, and some of them may have taken part in the looting. (5) The looting of Spinney's was probably organised, in the sense that the initial entry did not happen spontaneously, but began with an attack by a number of people acting in concert.There is no evidence that the organsation was the work of any particular militia. (6) Many of the looters, who included a substantial proportion of women and children, were not there as part of a plan, but simply took advantage of the opportunity created by those who had initiated the attack. (7) There was no sectarian motive for the attack on Spinney's, althought it is probable that most of the participants were Moslem. (8) The possibility that some of the looters came from the beach encampments where the former inhabitants of Qarantina and Maslakh had settled cannot be excluded. However, in view of the descriptions of the persons involved which the eyewitnesses have given, I find that the refugees did not either initiate, or form the main body of participants in, the looting. At least some of these participants arrived from the north -- i.e. from the opposite direction to the beach -- but if the looters had any common origin, which I doubt, there is no basis for deciding what it was. I now turn to the question whether there was a sufficient causal connection between the operation of the excepted perils and the losses which I have described. The type of connection required is defined by the causation clause, and the mode of proof by the reverse burden clause. The meaning of the former was the subject of citation and argument at the trial. I do not find it necessary to discuss the reported decisions on the meaning of various individual words of the clause, for whatever they may mean on their own, it is quite clear that the draftsman has gone to great lengths to ensure that the doctrine of proximate cause does not apply. Plainly, there must be some limit on the application of the clause, for the chain of causation recedes infinitely into the past. The draftsman must have intended to stop somewhere: and that place must be the point at which an event ceases to be a cause of the loss, and becomes merely an item of hitory. The draftsman has not explained how that point is to be identified, nor indeed do I believe that words can be found to do so. It is, eventually, a matter of instinct -- but an instinct guided by the fact that this is a policy which (unlike others in which similar clauses can be found) expressly insures against violent acts. In essence, the task is to assess whether the particular act of violence simply takes place against the background of a "warlike" state of affairs, or whether it has itself (even if in a rather remote way) a warlike aspect of its own. One point calls for specific mention in relation to the malicious damage endorsement. It might appear on first reading that this differs significantly from special condition 6, in that the test for causation is direct only, and does not embrace losses indirectly caused by the excepted perils. On this reading, the plaintiffs would be in a stronger position as regards the part of the claim relating to damage suffered by their property than in relation to the loss resulting from the theft of their goods. In my view, this is not the correct interpretation of the endorsement. As previously mentioned, the "occurrences" appear twice in special condition 6: once when they are excised from the events which constitute the insured peril, and again when their direct and indirect consequences are declared to be irrevocable. What the malicious damage endorsement does is to repeat the first part of this exercise, in relation to the exclusion of such damage from the insured perils. The second part is not expressly repeated, but the concluding words of the endorsement call up the whole of the riot and strike endorsement. Since this includes special condition 6, it follows that the provisions as regards causation are the same for the two endorsements, and it is unnecessary to distinguish between the two types of loss. The position is not the same as regards the explosion endorsement, but this need not be discussed since, as I have already said, I do not find that any substantial amount of damage to the plaintiffs' property was caused by an explosion. (Possibly a hole was blown in the wall of the Centre, to facilitate the removal of a safe. If this did happen, the loss fell within the malicious damage, not the explosion, section of the cover.) I now turn to the question of causation in relation to the individual excepted perils which I have held to have been in operation at the material time. As regards civil commotions the position is in my opinion quite plain. I would if necessary have been prepared to hold that the events at the two shops and the Centre were themselves part of a continuous state of civil commotion. But there is no need to go as far as this. The plaintiffs have to face the assertion that the turbulence and collapse of public order attendant upon the civil common permitted and indeed even encouraged the acts of looting and vandalism of which the incidents at Spinney's were examples. Unless rebutted, this would in my view be sufficient to establish that the loss was occasioned indirectly (if not directly) by, through or in consequence of the civil commotion. This assertion appears to me justified on the facts, so far as they are known; but in any event I cannot see any basis upon which Spinney's could begin to rebut it. On this ground, therefore, I hold that the claim under the policy must fail. I have reached the same conclusion as regards the exception of "usurped power". It seems to me that for the purposes of causation one looks at all the facts which constitute the existence of the peril, and not merely at those which give the disorder its usurpatious character. On this view, there is no difference, so far as causation is concerned, between the exception of civil commotion and that of usurped power, and the claim fails on the grounds of both. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider in detail the problem of causation raised by the specific exception at the end of sub-cl. (b), although I will express a view upon it. On the narrow interpretation which I have given to the clause, namely, that it relates only to terrorist acts, the loss plainly cannot be regarded as directly caused by the excepted peril. But was it indirectly occasioned by, through or in consequence of it? There were undoubtedly many terrorist acts being performed by "terrorist ganga" (i.e. organisations with activities directed towards the influencing of the government by terrorism or violence); but much of the violence came from other sources. The only such act specifically relied upon by the defendants was the razing of Qarantina dn maslakh. The chain of causation which the defendants challenged the plaintiffs to disprove is as follows. The Quarantina and Maslakh incidents led to the descent of numerous hungry and destitute Moslems on to the beaches within a few hundred yards of the centre; these persons were so much in need that they stormed the centre in order to obtain provisions; alternatively, organised gangs or altruistic individuals removed goods in order to supply the needy. The argument elicits the obvious response that neither the unfortunate refugees nor their supposed benefactors can have thought that gain would accrue from the removal of shop and office furnishings and fitments, or the general wrecking of the premises. To this the defendants reply that the persons who were responsible were given opportunity and encouragement to enter the store by those who broke in to obtain food, and that they may also have been motivated by indignation at the events which had happened at Qarantina: on either view, it is said, an indirect causal link is present. I reject the last stage of this argument. Indignant as people no doubt were about the razing of Qarantina, the defendants have put forward no reason why they should have chosen the Centre as a target for revenge: for there was no suggestion in the evidence that Spinney's had associations with the Phalange or any other faction, and the Centre had previously carried on business whtiout attack, notwithstanding its proximity to various concentrations of Moslem and Palestinian influence. In my view, the loss and damage of items other than food was due to the general breakdown of order, and was not even indirectly referable to the incidents at Qarantina and Maslakh. Turning to the theft of good, I have felt some doubt whether the attack on Qarantina by the Phalangists falls within the exception at all.The activities of the Phalangists were not directed to the overthrow of the government, but to preserving it. Nor am I convinced that their activities had the aim of influencing the government, but rather of stirking blows at their opponents which (they may have though) would have been struck by the government itself if it had not been too supine to do so. Nor is the quality of the act itself so clear, for there is certainly evidence that the prime object was tactical, in order to clear out a Moslem pocket (possibly concealing irregulars and Palestine militias) which covered the exit from East Beirut towards other Christian areas, and was not directly political in nature. This point was not, however, explored at the trial. The main thrust of the plaintiffs' case was that the connection between the attack on Qarantina and the theft of good from Spinney's was too tenuous and speculative to qualify as even an indirect link. If the burden of proof had been on the defendants, as would normally be the case with a party relying on an exceptions clause, this argument would have had much force. But in my view it cannot survive the reverse burden clause. One cannot say that the plaintiffs have no case to rebut. There is some evidence that the initial attack may have been concernted, if not organised; that the militias had previously been trying to extort food for the refugees; that there were armed and uniformed men present at the scene, and that there was some shooting. True, Spinney's had paid protection money to one group, and had received some token help from another. But this does not eliminate the possibility that yet another group bestirred itself on behalf of the refugees. In the absence of any concrete evidence to eliminate this possibility, or to show how much of the looting was simply for the purpose of private gain, I am constrained to hold that the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the requirements of the clause as regards the losses of food. I would have arrived at the same conclusion, with fewer doubts, if the special exception had been given the wider meaning, so as to include all acts done in furtherance of the aims of the terrorist organisations. So construed, the exception would have extended to thefts of food for the benefit of the organisation itself, a further hypothesis which the plaintiffs would have had no means to disprove. FURTHER ISSUES Fire. The insurance against loss by fire was on different terms from the cover against riot and malicious acts. The relevant exception is condition 6 of the standard policy, not special condition 6 of the riot and stike endorsement. This excludes: (a) The same perils as under subcl. (a) of special condition 6. (b) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power, martial law or state of siege or any of the events or causes which determine the proclamation or maintenance of martial law or state of siege. The burden of proof under condition 6 is governed by the following provision: Any loss or damage happening during the existence of abnormal conditions (whether physical or otherwise) which are occasioned by or through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the said occurrences shall be deemed to be loss or damage which is not covered by this insurance, except to the extent that the Insured shall prove that such loss or damage happened independently of the existence of such abnormal conditions. In any action, suit or other proceedings where the Company alleges that by reason of the provisions of this condition any loss or damage is not covered by this insurance, the burden of proving that such loss or damage is covered shall be upon the Insured. I have already stated reasons for concluding that the events in Lebanon did not fall within the first group of exceptions. As regards the second group, I have already held that there was no insurrection, rebellion or revolution, and have indicated the view (which I repeat for the purposes of this exception) that the events did not constitute a popular rising, although they "assumed the proportions of" one. Neither martial law nor a state of siege existed in Lebanon at the relevant time, nor were there events which "determined" a martial law or state of siege. The exclusion of "riot" was nullified by the endorsement. The only operative exception was "usurped power", which I have already held was in existence at the relevant time. It is not necessary to discuss the question of causation at length, for the relevant provisions in condition 6 are even more unfavourable to the insured than those in the special conditions. Abnormal conditions were occasioned by the "usurped power", and the loss happened during the existence of such conditions. The plaintiffs must therefore prove that the loss happened independently of the existence of the abnormal conditions. It seems to me clear that, on the evidence tendered at the trial, the plaintiffs have failed to discharge this burden. For these various reasons, the claims under those policies which are in the terms set out at the beginning of this judgment must fail and are dismissed. This conclusion applies to the first plaintiffs' contents and stock-in-trade insurances; to the second plaintiffs' insurances in respect of contents, stock-in-trade and cold store stocks at Spinney's Centre; to the third plaintiffs' building insurance on the Spinney's Centre. The second plaintiffs' consequential loss policy is in slightly different terms, but the issues are the same, and the claim under this policy must also fail. The all riske policy This policy covered loss by "any accident or misfortune", and excluded losses directly or indirectly caused by or contributed to by or arising from -- (a) war invasion act of foreign emeny (whether war be declared or not) civil was rebellion insurrection military or usurped power. Here again, only the words "usurped power" are relevant. In the absence of a reverse burden clause, the question of causation is more evenly balance. Nevertheless, in respect of this policy also, I come to the same conclusion as before, on the ground that the turnbulence and collapse of public order was at least an indirect cause of the loss. Vehicles policy. Four vehicles were lost during the incident at Spinney's. Precisely how, it is impossible to say. The cover included losses by "theft" and "malicious act". The exceptions are in a rather complicated form. For present purposes it is sufficient to say that, in the result, (a) Losses by (inter alia) "usurped power" are excluded. (b) Losses by riot or civil commotion are excuded, except where the riot or civil commotion involves persons taking part in disturbances or persons of malicious intent on behalf of or in connection with any political organisation, and even then only if the loss is not caused by (interalia) usurped power. One therefore comes back to the same question as before, except that on this occasion the insured has to prove that the loss was not "directly or indirectly proximately or remotely occasioned by or contributed to by or traceable to or arising out of or in connection with" the excepted peril. This places on the insured the most onerous burden of all those created by the Policies now under consideration. In my judgment, the plaintiffs have failed to discharge it. Loss of moneys policy. The loss of moneys policy covered all risks, with an exception of: ... any loss or damage arising directly or indirectly from or contributed to by War, Inveasion, Act of Foreign Enemy, Hosilities (whether war be declared or not) Civil War, Rebellion, Revolution, Insurrection, or Military or Usurped Power. The various exceptions are brought together in a rather different combination from those previously discussed, Nevertheless, I do not consider that this requires them to be given any different meaning. I reach the same conclusion as regards the application of the various exceptions, and causation, as in respect of the claims on the other policies. CONCLUSION. In the result, I conclude that the claims under all the policies fail and are dismissed. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the care and skill which were devoted to the preparation of the written submissions upon which Counsel based their final addresses. These have proved to be of the greatest value when considering the numerous issues raised by this difficult case. (After discussion on costs) Mr. Justice MUSTILL: I think that costs ought to follow the event. If it is true that the plaintiffs had won on a very important issue and if I had thought that it was possible to separate the costs of that issue from the remainder, then I would have considered very carefully whether some special order for costs should be made. But on the meaning that rightly or wrongly I have given to the two exceptions on which the defendants have won, I find it hard indeed to see how any of the evidence which was led in this case and very carefully prepared could have been dispensed with. In the circumstances, I think that the defendants having won, they should have their costs. SOLICITORS: Biddle & Co.; Ponsford & Devenish, Tivendale & Munday.