[QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.]

SMITH v. HUGHES.

SAME v. CAIELS.

TOLAN v. HUGHES.

SAME v. CAIELS.

SAME v. THOMAS.

SAME v. MACKINNON.

Vagrancy - Prostitution - "In a street" - Soliciting from house, men passing in street - Whether soliciting "in a street" - Street Offences Act, 1959 (7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 57), s. 1 (1).

Two common prostitutes, standing on a balcony or behind windows in their house, severally solicited men passing in the street by tapping on the balcony rail or window pane, attracting their attention and inviting them into the house. Informations were preferred against each prostitute charging that she, being a common prostitute, did solicit in a street for the purpose of prostitution contrary to section 1 (1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959.¹ The prostitutes were convicted. On appeal:-

Held, dismissing the appeals, that on the true construction of section 1 (1), taking into consideration the mischief at which the Act of 1959 was aimed, it mattered not where a prostitute stood (whether on a balcony, or in a room behind a closed, or open, or half-open window), if her solicitation was projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the street, she was guilty of an offence against section 1 (1).

CASES STATED by Mr. Graham Rogers, metropolitan magistrate at Bow Street.

Police officers preferred two informations against Marie Theresa Smith and four informations against Christine Tolan alleging that on various dates, they, being common prostitutes, did solicit in a street for the purpose of prostitution contrary to section 1 (1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959.

The magistrate found the following facts in relation to the first information against Smith. The defendant was a common prostitute who lived at No. 39 Curzon Street, London, W., and used the premises for the purposes of prostitution. On November 4, 1959, between 8.50 p.m. and 9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men passing in the street, for the purposes of prostitution, from a first-floor balcony of No. 39 Curzon Street (the balcony being some 8-10 feet above street level). The defendant's method of soliciting the men was (i) to attract their attention to her by tapping on the balcony railing with some metal object and by hissing at them as they passed in the street beneath her and (ii) having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them to come inside the premises with such words as "Would

1 Street Offences Act, 1959, s. 1 (1): "It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution."

you like to come up here a little while?" at the same time as she indicated the correct door of the premises.

It was contended on behalf of the defendant, inter alia, that the balcony was not "in a street" within the meaning of section 1 (1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, and that accordingly no offence had been committed.

It was contended on behalf of the prosecutor, inter alia, that the soliciting had taken place "in a street" within the meaning of section 1 (1).

The magistrate was of opinion that the soliciting had taken place "in a street" within the meaning of section 1 (1), and, accordingly, convicted the defendant and fined her £5 and 5 guineas costs.

On the second information against Smith the magistrate found, inter alia, that on January 9, 1960, between 12.40 a.m. and 1.0 a.m. the defendant solicited men passing in the street for the purposes of prostitution from a closed ground-floor window of No. 39 Curzon Street (the window being some 3 feet from some 4 feet high railings which bounded the pavement on the side of the premises). The defendant's method of soliciting the men was (i) to attract their attention to her by tapping on the window pane with some metal object as they passed in the street in front of her and (ii) having so attracted their attention, to invite them in for a price which she indicated by extending three fingers of her hand and indicating the correct door of the premises. On one occasion the price so indicated by the defendant was agreed and the man entered the premises, leaving some 15 minutes later. On another occasion, the price so indicated by the defendant was not agreed by the man concerned who, in his turn, made a counter-proposal as to price by extending two fingers of his hand. That counter-proposal was not accepted by the defendant and that man walked away.

In that case the magistrate came to the same conclusion, convicted and fined the defendant £5.

In the four informations preferred against Tolan the magistrate found similar facts. In the first one Tolan was found to be soliciting men from a half-open ground-floor window; in the second from a partly-open first-floor window, in the third and fourth from a closed ground-floor window. The magistrate found all the offences proved, in the first case he fined her £5 with five guineas costs, in the second £10, in the third £10 and in the fourth £5.

The defendants appealed in each case.

Michael Beckman for the defendants.

Paul Wrightson for the prosecutors.

The following cases were cited in argument McQuade v. Barnes²; Dereham v. Strickland³; Wilson v. Skeock.⁴

2 [1949] 65 T.L.R. 65; 1 All E.R. 154, D.C.

3 (1911) 75 J.P. 300.

4 (1949) 65 T.L.R. 418; 113 J.P. 294, D.C.

LORD PARKER C.J. These are six appeals by way of case stated by one of the stipendiary magistrates sitting at Bow Street, before whom informations were preferred by police officers against the defendants, in each case that she "being a common prostitute, did solicit in a street for the purpose of prostitution, contrary to section 1 (1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959." The magistrate in each case found that the defendant was a common prostitute, that she had solicited and that the solicitation was in a street, and in each case fined the defendant.

The facts, to all intents and purposes, raise the same point in each case; there are minute differences. The defendants in each case were not themselves physically in the street but were in a house adjoining the street. In one case the defendant was on a balcony and she attracted the attention of men in the street by tapping and calling down to them. In other cases the defendants were in ground-floor windows, either closed or half open, and in another case in a first-floor window.

The sole question here is whether in those circumstances each defendant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of section 1 (1) of the Act of 1959 are in this form: "It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution." Observe that it does not say there specifically that the person who is doing the soliciting must be in the street. Equally, it does not say that it is enough if the person who receives the solicitation or to whom it is addressed is in the street. For my part, I approach the matter by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way, it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half open; in each case her solicitation is projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the street. For my part, I am content to base my decision on that ground and that ground alone. I think the magistrate came to a correct conclusion in each case, and that these appeals should be dismissed.

HILBERY J. I agree. 39 Curzon Street, from the papers in front of us, appears to be let to prostitutes who practise their profession from that address, and the way of practising it is shown by the cases stated, as my Lord has said, and in one case by tapping on the window pane with some metal object as men passed by in the street in front of her, and then openly inviting them into her room. In the other cases it was done by tapping on the windows of various rooms occupied by these prostitutes and then, if the window was open, giving invitations by way of solicitation or signals representing solicitation. In each case signals were intended to solicit men passing by in the street.

They did effect solicitation of the men when they reached those men. At that moment the person in the street to whom the signal was addressed was solicited and, being solicited in the street, I agree with the conclusion of my Lord and for these reasons I have intimated I agree that these appeals must be dismissed.

DONOVAN J. I agree with both the judgments which have been delivered.

Solicitors: S. Cook & Green; Solicitor for the Metropolitan Police.

C. J. E.