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S.E.C. v. Bilzerian 131 F.Supp.2d 10; Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. P 91,310 D.D.C.,2001. Jan. 12, 2001 [*12] COUNSEL:
Judith Roxanne Starr, SEC, Div. of
Enforcement, Washington, DC, for plaintiff. Paul A. Bilzerian, Tampa, FL, pro se. OPINION STANLEY S. HARRIS, District Judge. Before the Court are defendant Bilzerian’s submissions in
response to the Court’s August 21, 2000, Opinion and Order setting
temporary conditions for purging the Court’s finding of contempt in
that Order, and plaintiff SEC’s response thereto. [FN1] The Court also
considers Bilzerian’s Motion To Modify the Court’s August 21,
2000, Opinion and Order and the SEC’s response thereto. Lastly, before
the Court is the Receiver’s Notification of defendant’s
recently filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. The Court first finds that the Motion
To Modify is meritless and warrants no discussion. The Court next finds that
defendant has not met the temporary purgation conditions, and therefore orders
that he be incarcerated until he complies with the conditions set in the August
21, 2000, Order. The Court’s reasons for this decision follow. FN1. The Court’s August 21, 2000,
Order set forth a schedule for a submission
from Bilzerian and a response from the SEC. The Order did not provide for a
reply from Bilzerian to the SEC’s response. Nevertheless, on October
30, 2000, Bilzerian sent a reply memorandum to chambers. The Court declines to
address the reply in full, but notes that it contains nothing to alter the
Court’s ultimate conclusions based on the earlier pleadings.
Furthermore, on December 1, 2000, Bilzerian sent a letter to the Court with his
monthly check to the Court registry and an accounting of his income and
expenses from September 27, 2000, to November 30, 2000, and other
documentation. The Court finds little in Bilzerian’s cover letter that
requires a response, other than noting his submission of a $2,500 (instead of
$5,000) check and his request to be relieved of the monthly fine until he gains
other employment. Background As the parties in this case are well familiar with its background,
the Court only briefly sets forth certain relevant facts. In 1991, the Court
found Bilzerian liable for securities fraud. [FN2] In connection with that
liability, the Court ordered Bilzerian to disgorge $33,140,787.07 in profits
from the fraud on January 28, 1993, and on June 23, 1993, ordered him to
disgorge an additional $29,196,812.46 in prejudgment interest (“the
1993 disgorgement orders”). The SEC did not seek to enforce the
roughly $62 million disgorgement judgment for over five years due to protracted
litigation over the possible dischargeability of the judgment in a bankruptcy
proceeding in Florida. In 1998, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the ruling of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida that the
disgorgement judgment against Bilzerian was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. In
re: Bilzerian, 153 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir.1998). FN2. Since the Second Circuit affirmed Bilzerian’s
criminal conviction for securities fraud and conspiracy on January 3, 1991, United
States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir.1991), Bilzerian has been proceeding pro
se. In November 1998, the SEC moved this Court to hold Bilzerian in
civil contempt of the 1993 disgorgement orders because he had not made any
payments on the $62 million judgment. Bilzerian argued that he was unable to
comply with the disgorgement orders essentially because he had no financial
resources. On August 21, 2000, after receiving substantial briefing from the
parties and holding a hearing, the Court found Bilzerian in contempt of its
1993 disgorgement orders. The Court found that (1) Bilzerian had not
demonstrated his financial inability to comply “categorically and in
detail” as required by case law; (2) Bilzerian had not made all
reasonable efforts to comply with the orders; and (3) any financial inability
to comply was self-created because Bilzerian had separated his assets from
himself and funneled them to shell companies, partnerships, and trust entities
(collectively, the “Bilzerian- related entities”) through
outright transfers as well as payment arrangements [*13] made with his
employer, Cimetrix. The Court set a number of conditions which Bilzerian had to
meet in order to purge the contempt. These purgation conditions were set
without prejudice and were only temporary because Bilzerian had not complied
with the Court’s order for a full accounting of his assets; without
the accounting of his assets, the Court could not ascertain the precise amount
of the $62 million judgment Bilzerian is capable of paying. These temporary
conditions required Bilzerian to (1) pay $5,000 on the first day of each month
until further order of the Court, and (2) submit an additional accounting by
October 2, 2000 as detailed in ¶¶ 1-10 of the August 21
Order. The Court indicated that it would set final purgation conditions after
it received Bilzerian’s additional accounting or, if he failed to
submit an accounting, after the deadline for doing so had passed. In its Order,
the Court emphasized that Bilzerian’s failure to comply with the
temporary purgation conditions would result in his incarceration until such
time as he complies with those conditions. On October 2, 2000, the Court received a package from Bilzerian
containing a letter, a $5,000 check, and various documents and declarations
purporting to provide the accounting ordered by the Court. [FN3] The SEC
submitted its response to Bilzerian’s accounting on October 16, 2000.
In his letter, Bilzerian indicated that he intended to be in Europe on business
between October 14 and 24, 2000, and requested a telephonic status conference
before he would depart so that he would know whether the Court intended to
incarcerate him for not complying with the order for an accounting. The Court
denied his request by order dated October 6, 2000. FN3. In this filing, Bilzerian requested the
Court to consider the documents confidential. The SEC does not oppose
maintaining confidential the tax returns of Bilzerian and his wife. The Court
received these same representations during a hearing on March 5, 1999, and agreed
to maintain the tax returns confidential. On October 4, 2000, Bilzerian submitted a motion to modify the
Court’s August 21, 2000, Opinion and Order, which the SEC opposes. On
October 30, 2000, the Court received a reply memorandum from Bilzerian, along with
another $5,000 check, and a request for oral argument. On November 30, 2000,
Bilzerian sent a letter containing a third check, this time for only $2,500, as
well as additional documentation. On December 22, 2000, the Court issued an Order granting an ex
parte motion by the SEC for the appointment of a receiver, Deborah R. Meshulam
(“Receivership Order”). By correspondence dated December 22
and 26, 2000, she served the “Bilzerian Related Entities” and
various related persons and entities with copies of the Receivership Order,
requesting the immediate surrender “of all assets as well as immediate
access to any assets, books, records or other property of Bilzerian in which
the Court has found Bilzerian to have an interest.” On January 2,
2001, Bilzerian filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy again in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida. [FN4] FN4. The Court determined as a matter of
courtesy not to incarcerate Bilzerian during the Christmas season, giving him
an unintended window of time within which to file his second bankruptcy
petition. The Court still shall afford him the opportunity to surrender himself
voluntarily. Analysis Before the Court proceeds with its analysis, the Court denies
Bilzerian’s request for oral argument. Given the nature of the
requested information, the Court can best evaluate its adequacy from the
written submissions and thus sees no reason to delay these proceedings further. A. Jurisdiction of the Court The Court first addresses whether this proceeding is affected by
the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §
362(a), by virtue of Bilzerian’s [*14] recent bankruptcy filing. As a
threshold issue, it is clear that “[t]he court in which the litigation
claimed to be stayed is pending has jurisdiction to determine …
whether the proceeding before it is subject to the automatic stay.” NLRB
v. Sawulksi, 158 B.R. 971, 975 (E.D.Mich.1993). See In re: Montana, 185 B.R. 650, 652
(Bankr.S.D.Fla.1995) (“bankruptcy courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction
in determining the applicability of the automatic stay.”). Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), almost all proceedings against
a debtor are stayed upon declaring bankruptcy. Certain proceedings, however,
are excepted from the automatic stay. The Court finds that this proceeding—currently
in a civil contempt phase—is excepted from the automatic stay for two
reasons: (1) the exception for a governmental unit to exercise its powers under
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) applies, and (2) the Court may conduct proceedings
to uphold the dignity of the Court and to vindicate the authority of the Court
to enforce its orders. 1. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) sets forth certain proceedings that
are excepted from a stay. One such exception is contained in 11 U.S.C. §
362(b)(4), which allows: the commencement or continuation of an action
or proceeding by a governmental unit … to enforce such governmental
unit’s … police and regulatory power, including the
enforcement of a judgment other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or
proceeding by the governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s
… police or regulatory power…. This exception (sometimes referred to as the “police
power exception”) does not apply to governmental actions that are brought
to enforce a money judgment. The Court finds that any order regarding Bilzerian’s
contempt of court until he produces a full accounting of his assets to purge
his contempt of the 1993 disgorgement orders does not constitute enforcement of
a money judgment. A court may go so far as to enter a money judgment, see,
e.g., NLRB v. 15th Ave. Iron Works, Inc. 964 F.2d 1336, 1337 (2d Cir.1992);
however, “anything beyond the mere entry of a money judgment against a
debtor is prohibited by the automatic stay.” SEC v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 71 (2d
Cir.2000). See also 2 Daniel R. Cowans et al., Cowans Bankruptcy Law and
Practice § 11.5 at 517 (1994) (“Steps preparatory to money
collection … have been properly barred as not within the exception .”);
Sawulski, 158 B.R. at 978 (“It is [the] seizure of a
defendant-debtor’s property, to satisfy the judgment obtained by a
plaintiff-creditor, which is proscribed ….”) (quotation
omitted). See, e.g., Brennan, 230 F.3d at 71 (a repatriation order
requiring that a defendant repatriate assets in an offshore trust to the Court’s
registry for distribution by the bankruptcy court was held to be enforcement of
a money judgment); EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir.1986) (the
district court’s entry of a specific payment schedule went beyond the
entry of a money judgment). The Court is not, by this Opinion and its accompanying Order,
requiring payment of the disgorgement or seizing assets. Rather, the Court is
addressing whether Bilzerian has complied with the temporary purgation
conditions insofar as they require an accounting of his assets in the contempt
context. Requiring an accounting of assets does not violate the automatic stay.
See SEC v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 983 F.Supp. 13, 14-15 (D.D.C.1997) (“[T]his
Court can take actions consistent with a civil contempt proceeding. The Court
has the right to determine whether or not defendant Smith has defrauded the
Court by not paying the disgorgement due well before the bankruptcy stay.”) 2. Vindicating the authority of the Court This is part of a civil contempt proceeding against Bilzerian.
There are, [*15] however, two kinds of civil contempt proceedings—those
to enforce payment of a judgment and those to uphold the dignity of the court. Sawulski, 158 B.R. at 975. “Only
contempt orders to uphold the dignity of the court are excepted from the
automatic stay.” Id. A prime example of such a contempt order is
found in US Sprint Communications Co. v. Buscher, 89 B.R. 154
(D.Kan.1988). The court found Buscher in civil contempt of a preliminary
injunction, but before the court sentenced him on that contempt, Buscher filed
for bankruptcy. The court found that the automatic stay provision did not bar
its sentencing (which consisted of civil contempt fines), after finding that: this is not just any judicial proceeding. This court has already
determined that defendant violated two direct orders of this court. It is
within this court’s inherent power to take whatever steps necessary to
ensure those persons within its power comply with its orders. Id. at 156. Similarly, in Sawulski, 158 B.R. at 977, the
Special Master found that proceedings to determine whether defendant had purged
himself of contempt were not barred by the automatic stay, after finding that
the primary purpose of the contempt proceeding was to vindicate the dignity and
authority of the court. See also In re Marini, 28 B.R. 262
(Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1983); In re Gedeon, 31 B.R. 942 (Bankr.D.Colo.1983). The Court finds that this contempt proceeding clearly is to
vindicate the integrity of the Court. The Court has previously found Bilzerian
in contempt of its 1993 disgorgement orders, and, as will be discussed in this
Opinion, he has not complied even minimally with the Court’s temporary
purgation conditions. The Court has inherent power to ensure compliance with
its orders. As the Buscher court stated: The court cannot conceive that Congress intended to strip the
court of this power, and instead permit a party to blatantly violate direct
orders of the court and then seek shelter from a bankruptcy judge. If this were
so, the court’s orders could be rendered almost meaningless. The court
must retain the ability to compel compliance with its orders; a party seeking
relief from his creditors is not free to run rampant in flagrant disregard of
the powers of the court. The Court declines to allow Bilzerian to seek shelter once again
in the bankruptcy court from this Court’s inherent power to enforce
its orders. [FN5] FN5. The Court also notes that while it does
not deem it appropriate to make a finding as to the bad faith nature of
Bilzerian’s second bankruptcy filing (the first having been closed
only some six months ago), it notes that the filing occurred promptly after the
Receiver requested his assets and books or records relating to the assets.
Furthermore, Bilzerian has been found previously to have been involved with a
bad faith attempt to file bankruptcy for the purpose of circumventing another
legal proceeding. See Singer Furniture Acquisition v. SSMC Inc. N.V., 254 B.R. 46, 52
(M.D.Fla.2000) (upholding bankruptcy court’s finding of bad faith in
filing a bankruptcy petition, stating that “ [i]n fact, Bilzerian
admitted that Singer attempted to invoke the automatic stay provisions in order
to evade the pending litigation and trial in Virginia.”) In that case,
Bilzerian was Singer Furniture Acquisition’s sole officer, director,
and employee. Id. at 50. B. Compliance with the August 21, 2000 Order As for the monthly payment requirement, the Court finds that
Bilzerian did comply for the months of October and November, but that his
December monthly payment was only half of the required amount. Bilzerian
explains in his cover letter dated November 30, 2000, that given his financial
circumstances arising from this lawsuit and other lawsuits, he was unable to
make the full $5,000 payment. At this point, the Court merely states that
Bilzerian has not complied strictly with the Court’s requirement for a
December payment, but is unable to determine whether the noncompliance was
legitimately caused by financial hardship or by Bilzerian’s choices in
managing his assets. [*16] The Court finds that Bilzerian has not met the requirement
to submit a full accounting of his finances. The August 21 Order provided in
detail what information Bilzerian was to submit to the Court. The purpose of
that order for an accounting was to enable the Court to determine the amount of
the disgorgement judgment Bilzerian could pay in order to set final purgation
conditions. Bilzerian’s submission is plainly inadequate. First, Bilzerian did not submit copies of the trust instruments of
the Paul A. Bilzerian and Terri L. Steffan Revocable Trust of 1995 (the “Family
Trust”) and the Paul A. Bilzerian and Terri L. Steffan Irrevocable Trust
of 1994 (the “Children’s Trust”) as required by ¶
9 of the order, or copies of the formation documents of Bicoastal Holding
Company, Overseas Holdings Limited Partnership, and Overseas Holding Company,
as required by ¶ 10. [FN6] Nor has Bilzerian provided any financial
records or information with respect to these five entities, as required by ¶¶
2, 5, and 7 of the Court’s order. Bilzerian’s failure to
provide a copy of the Family Trust instrument is particularly egregious because
the Family Trust is at the apex of the structure comprising the
Bilzerian-related entities, and—directly or indirectly—holds
almost every other asset described in the Court’s August 21st Opinion.
See Opinion at 10. Moreover, the Family Trust was created under the laws of the
Cook Islands, which present an attractive environment for the creation of
so-called “asset protection trusts” because they provide a
settlor with significant control over the trust; for example, the law gives the
settlor the power to change the trustee and the trust protector. Without a copy
of the trust instrument, however, it is impossible to ascertain how much
control Bilzerian retains over the Family Trust, such as how easily he could
reinstate himself as trustee and beneficiary of the trust. See August 21, 2000,
Opinion at 22-24. FN6. All of these entities constitute the “Bilzerian-related
entities,” to which Bilzerian has transferred, and by means of which
he appears to be attempting to hide, his assets. [8] Bilzerian’s stated reasons for not providing any of
the formation documents or financial records of the Bilzerian-related entities
are that the trustee and trust protector of the Family Trust—which
directly or indirectly controls all of the other Bilzerian-related entities
save the Children’s Trust—and the trustee of the Children’s
Trust declined to turn the documents over to him, and that he lacks legal
authority to provide them to the Court. These alleged reasons are neither
credible nor sufficient to establish his inability to comply with the Court’s
Order. First, Bilzerian does not allege that he does not have access to the
relevant documents, only that he may not turn them over. [FN7] Second, as the
SEC correctly argues, Bilzerian’s asserted lack of legal authority to
turn over the documents is conclusory and, without any of the formation
documents of the Bilzerian-related entities, it is impossible to evaluate his
claim. See SEC’s Opp’n at 2-3 & n. 2. In short, Bilzerian
has not established that he cannot supply the relevant documents or that he has
made all reasonable efforts to do so. [FN8] FN7. With respect to the Family Trust, the
Court has stated: It is inconceivable that Bilzerian does not
have the ability to provide the Court with a copy of the Trust instrument; he
and his wife were the Trust’s settlors, until recently he was both its
trustee and a beneficiary, its current trustees and Trust protector are members
of the family, and the sole current beneficiary is his wife. Thus, he clearly
has access to the document. Opinion at 22 n. 23. Bilzerian also serves as
President of Bicoastal Holding Company and, thus, has access to its formation
documents and financial records. Bilzerian has provided nothing to rebut the
inference that he has access to the relevant trust and company documents. FN8. With respect to the Children’s
Trust, Bilzerian attaches a letter from Ernest B. Haire, III, the Trustee for
the Children’s Trust, indicating that Mr. Haire would be willing to
provide the Court with the trust documents only under certain conditions
maintaining the confidentiality of the documents. While the Court is doubtful
that any reasonable basis for maintaining these documents confidential exists,
Bilzerian must present any such request in a motion to the Court. If this
concern is in fact a genuine issue, Bilzerian must make an effort to overcome
obstacles in obtaining the documents. The Court will not sua sponte issue any
confidentiality orders based on a statement from a non- party contained in an
attachment. [*17] The second area in which Bilzerian’s compliance
with the Court’s order for an accounting is deficient pertains to his
disclosure of his own finances. Bilzerian states in his declaration that he has
no material assets and that his total assets are less than $5,000, see ¶
1; that he has not received any material assets from any person or entity since
1997 other than $7,000 from Bicoastal for services rendered between 1993 and
2000, all of which—after taxes—he paid into the Court
registry, see ¶ 3; that no expenditures exceeding $1,000 have been
made by him or on his behalf since 1997, see ¶ 4; and that the only
transfer of assets he has made since 1996 was the 1997 transfer of his home by
him and his wife, as tenants by the entireties, to Overseas Holdings Limited
Partnership, see ¶ 5. Bilzerian also provided his personal income tax returns for 1996,
1998, and 1999, as required by the order for an accounting. Although it is hard
to assess Bilzerian’s purported financial resources in a vacuum, his
declaration still appears deficient under the terms of the Court’s
Order. For example, the Court directed him to disclose each account he has with
any financial institution, including the account statements from each
institution. See Order ¶ 1b. Although Bilzerian indicated that he has
an account with Bank of America (containing under $1,500), he did not provide
an account statement because he “ha[s] not received any bank
statements for the account.” Bilzerian Decl. ¶ 1b. The Court’s
order clearly required “the account statements from each financial
institution or brokerage firm,” not simply statements that he happened
to receive. Even if the Court were to believe that Bilzerian has not received
any bank statements, the Court sees no reason preventing Bilzerian from
obtaining statements for his own financial or brokerage accounts. Bilzerian’s
failure to request the statements from his financial institution or brokerage
firm falls far below a reasonable effort to comply with the Court’s
order, and suggests a clear attempt to conceal activity in his accounts. Another example of the deficiency of Bilzerian’s
accounting is his statement that he has not received any “material”
assets from any person or entity since January 1, 1997, apart from the noted
$7,000 transfer last month. See id. ¶ 3. The Order directed Bilzerian to
document all of the assets he has received since January 1, 1997, not only
those qualifying as “material” (a qualifier which Bilzerian
leaves undefined). By including this limitation, Bilzerian may be trying to
conceal relatively small asset transfers that, as a whole, prove to be
significant. It simply strains credulity that Bilzerian could have lived for
three years without receiving any assets. Nor does it appear that his wife
could have supported him during this period because, according to their joint
federal income tax returns for 1996-1999, she (and he) did not earn any income.
While Bilzerian may respond that his living expenses were paid by Bicoastal or
Cimetrix, this draws attention to another possible deficiency of his submission
to the Court: Bilzerian claims that he cannot recall any expenditures exceeding
$1,000 that were made on his behalf during the last three years except for “routine
business expenses made in the ordinary course of business for Cimetrix and
Bicoastal Holding Company and for the benefit of those entities.” Id. ¶ 4. This “routine
business expenses” category appears deliberately vague because what is
for the benefit of Cimetrix and Bicoastal undoubtedly is for the benefit of
Bilzerian as well, and likely covers his living expenses. [FN9] FN9. Relatedly, the SEC argues that Bilzerian
continues to reside in his Florida home, which was valued at over $6.5 million
in 1996, and “is able to fund skiing vacations (Op. at 4), fly to
Washington for the contempt hearing, and expend resources for legal research,
word processing, copying and supplies, in this and his numerous other
litigations. Thus, while Bilzerian has changed the form of ownership of his
assets, he is continuing to have the beneficial enjoyment of them. The only
conclusion that can be drawn from this evidence is that Bilzerian’s
nominal transfers should be disregarded.” SEC’s Opp’n
at 4 (citation omitted). [*18] In sum, Bilzerian’s submission does not satisfy
the Court’s temporary purgation conditions because his accounting with
respect to both his own financial condition and that of the Bilzerian-related
entities is sorely deficient. Bilzerian has not established that he is unable
to comply with these conditions; indeed, with respect to the documents of the
Bilzerian- related entities, he merely asserts that he cannot provide them, but
the Court has found this assertion to be non-credible. C. Incarceration Given Bilzerian’s facially deficient accounting, the only
remedy is to incarcerate Bilzerian until he provides the information covered by
the Court’s order or, at a minimum, until he demonstrates a credible
and good faith effort to do so. The August 21 Opinion and Order clearly warned
Bilzerian that failure to comply with the temporary purgation conditions would
result in his incarceration. Once Bilzerian provides an appropriate accounting,
the Court will set final purgation conditions with respect to its finding that
Bilzerian is in contempt of the 1993 disgorgement orders. [FN10] FN10. As explained above, the August 21
Opinion and Order did not set final purgation conditions because Bilzerian had
not provided a full accounting of his assets; it also stated that even if
Bilzerian did not submit the information required by the order for an
accounting, the Court would set final purgation conditions. The Court will not,
however, set final purgation conditions at this time because it is impractical
to set final purgation conditions without greater knowledge of Bilzerian’s
finances. The Court’s primary concern at this point in time is with
Bilzerian’s failure to provide the requisite financial information.
That concern, coupled with the possibility that Bilzerian may claim that he
will not be entitled to receive his monthly salary, prompts the Court now to
suspend the provision of the August 21st Order requiring him to make monthly
payments of $5,000. [FN11] FN11. The Court notes that although Bilzerian
requests in his November 30, 2000, submission the Court’s “permission”
to resign from Cimetrix, the Court has no power over Bilzerian’s
employment decisions. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that defendant
Bilzerian has not met the temporary purgation requirements. The Court will
incarcerate Bilzerian until such time that he meets the purgation requirements
(excluding the monthly payment provision). An appropriate Order directing
defendant’s incarceration accompanies this Opinion. ORDER For the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, it hereby is ORDERED, that defendant Bilzerian’s Motion To Modify the
Court’s August 21, 2000, Opinion and Order is denied. It hereby
further is ORDERED, that defendant Bilzerian shall surrender to the custody
of the U.S. Marshals Office for the Middle District of Florida, located in the
United States Courthouse, 801 N. Florida Avenue, 4th Floor, Tampa, Florida, by
10:00 a.m. on Friday, January 19, 2001. [FN1] It hereby further is FN1. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4.1(b), “ [a]n
order of civil commitment of a person held to be in contempt of a decree or
injunction issued to enforce the laws of the United States may be served and
enforced in any district.” ORDERED, that the U.S. Marshals Service shall request designation
from the [*19] Bureau of Prisons for the nearest appropriate federal facility
to Tampa, Florida, for defendant’s further incarceration. [FN2] The
Court directs that defendant Bilzerian be incarcerated in a Bureau of Prisons
facility due to the special circumstances of this case. It hereby further is FN2. The U.S. Marshals Service has primary
jurisdiction in federal civil contempt commitments. 28 C.F.R. §
522.11(a). Under 28 C.F.R. § 522.10, federal civil contempt
commitments may be referred to the Bureau of Prisons, Either the U.S. Marshals
Service may request designation from the Bureau of Prisons, or the committing
court may specify a Bureau of Prisons institution as the place of
incarceration. 28 C.F.R. § 522.11(b)—(c). ORDERED, that the U.S. Marshals Office for the Middle District of
Florida shall notify the Court of the fact of defendant Bilzerian’s
appearance or non- appearance on January 19, 2001. It hereby further is ORDERED, that defendant Bilzerian shall remain incarcerated until
such time that Bilzerian has complied with the conditions set forth in the
Court’s August 21, 2000, Opinion and Order, with the exception of
paying $5,000 into the Registry of the Court on the first day of each month, as
determined by further order of this Court It hereby further is ORDERED, that if defendant does not appear voluntarily by 10:00 a
.m. on January 19, 2001, the U.S. Marshals Service shall take him into custody,
and to effectuate the arrest, may enter his residence at 16229 Villareal de
Avila, Tampa, Florida 33613 and use such force as deemed necessary. It hereby
further is ORDERED, that this Opinion and Order shall be served on defendant
Bilzerian at his residence by both Federal Express overnight mail and
facsimile. [FN3] FN3. Bilzerian provided his facsimile number
in a letter to the SEC attached to his submission to the Court dated September
24, 2000. SO ORDERED. |