|
106 F.3d 302, 97
Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 895, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1329 United States Court of
Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Curtis A. PHANEUF,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, a Foreign State; National Defense
Security Council of the Republic of Indonesia—Jakarta, an Agency or
Instrumentality of a Foreign State; H.A. Chalid Mawardi, Defendants-Appellants. No. 95-17131. Argued and Submitted
Nov. 4, 1996. Decided Feb. 7, 1997. [*303] COUNSEL: Carolyn B.
Lamm, Christopher M. Curran, Francis A. Vasquez, Jr., White & Case,
Washington, DC, Janice A. Wezelman, Miller, Pitt & McAnally, P.C., Tucson,
AZ, for defendants-appellants Republic of Indonesia, National Defense Security
Council of the Republic of Indonesia and H.A. Chalid Mawardi. William B. Blaser, Tucson, AZ, for plaintiff-appellee. [*304] Appeal from the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona, William D. Browning, District Judge, Presiding. D.C.
No. CV-94- 00746-WDB. JUDGES: Before: RONEY, [FN*] Senior Circuit
Judge, BEEZER and TROTT, Circuit Judges. FN* The Honorable Paul
H. Roney, Senior Circuit Judge for the Eleventh Circuit sitting by designation. OPINION BY: BEEZER, Circuit Judge: The Republic of Indonesia, the National Defense Security Council
of the Republic of Indonesia and H.A. Chalid Mawardi (collectively
“defendants”) appeal the district court’s order denying
the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity
and for lack of venue. We have jurisdiction over the district court’s
denial of the motion to dismiss pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Schoenberg
v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V., 930 F.2d 777, 779
(9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1018, 115 S.Ct. 581, 130 L.Ed.2d 496
(1994). Jurisdiction does not exist to review the district court’s
refusal to dismiss for lack of venue. American Concrete Agric. Pipe
Ass’n v. No-Joint Concrete Pipe Co., 331 F.2d 706, 709
(9th Cir.1964). We reverse and remand. I Plaintiff Curtis A. Phaneuf holds several promissory notes
allegedly issued by the National Defense Security Council of the Republic of
Indonesia (“NDSC”). These notes are part of approximately 505
promissory notes created by several then-members of the NDSC and valued at over
three billion U.S. dollars (“NDSC notes”). The notes bear the
signatures of two NDSC members and the NDSC crest. The principal maker of the
notes, Ibnu Hartomo, traded the “NDSC notes” for promissory
notes issued by Hassan Zubaidi, a Syrian based financier. In August 1985,
defendant Mawardi, then Indonesia’s ambassador to Syria, participated
in a signing ceremony in Damascus. At the ceremony Mawardi purportedly
confirmed that Hartomo represented the Indonesian government and that the
“NDSC notes” were “Official/Governmental.”
Zubaidi’s notes were later discovered to be worthless. The Republic of Indonesia claims that it did not know about the
“NDSC notes” until late in 1985, at which time it promptly
determined that these notes were unauthorized and invalid under Indonesian law.
In January 1986, the NDSC’s Secretary General informed Bank Indonesia
that neither the NDSC nor any of its officials had authority to issue
promissory notes and that the “NDSC notes” were invalid. Bank
Indonesia then sent communications to financial institutions advising that
Indonesia had detected unauthorized promissory notes allegedly issued by the
NDSC. In April 1987, the NDSC issued a press release which disavowed NDSC responsibility
for the notes, stating that responsibility lay with the persons who signed the
notes. Bank Indonesia has continuously refused to honor the notes. Phaneuf brought this action to enforce payment on the notes in his
possession. The defendants moved to dismiss based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). The
district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, stating that
defendants had not established a prima facie case of immunity under the FSIA. Defendants contend that the district court erred in denying their
motion to dismiss because: (1) they established a prima facie case of immunity
under the FSIA; (2) the commercial activity exception to the FSIA does not
apply to Phaneuf’s claim; and (3) venue is improper in the District of
Arizona. II The FSIA is the sole basis of subject matter jurisdiction over
suits involving foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities. Randolph
v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 97 F.3d 319, 323 (9th Cir.1996). Under the
FSIA, foreign states are immune from suit unless one of the enumerated
exceptions to the Act applies. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1604-05. The existence of subject matter jurisdiction [*305] under the FSIA is a question of law
reviewed de novo. Randolph, 97 F.3d at 323. III The district court held that it currently had subject matter
jurisdiction, but stated that it might revisit the issue later in the trial
based on further discovery. Subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA,
however, must be decided before the suit can proceed. Security Pac.
Nat’l Bank v. Derderian, 872 F.2d 281, 283-84 (9th Cir.1989).
Immunity under the FSIA is not only immunity from liability, but immunity from
suit. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion v. United States Dist. Court, 859 F.2d
1354, 1358 (9th Cir.1988). The district court improvidently postponed its final
determination of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. IV The district court denied the defendants’ motion to
dismiss holding that the defendants had not established a prima facie case of
immunity. The district court relied on a footnote in Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina in determining the prima facie requirements
for sovereign immunity. See 965 F.2d 699, 708 n. 9 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Meadows
v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 522 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 976, 108 S.Ct. 486, 487, 98 L.Ed.2d 485 (1987)), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 1017, 113 S.Ct. 1812, 123 L.Ed.2d 444 (1993). Footnote nine of Siderman
de Blake states: Where … the
plaintiff alleges in his complaint that his claim is based on a foreign
state’s strictly commercial acts, the defendant must establish a prima
facie case that it is a sovereign state and that the plaintiff’s claim
arises out of a public act. This proof establishes a presumption that the
foreign state is protected by immunity. Id. In its order, the district court stated that defendants failed to
show that the “acts complained of arise out of a public act.”
Defendants had argued to the district court that the commercial activity
exception to the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), did not apply
because they had not participated in the issuance of the promissory notes. The
district court concluded that the defendants could not “consistently
argue that they are entitled to immunity (as a foreign sovereign for their
sovereign acts) [under] the FSIA and, at the same time, argue that the acts
alleged were not sovereign so as to defeat its exceptions.” We, however, have never required a defendant to establish that a
plaintiff’s claim arose from a public act. We did not engage in a
public act inquiry in either Siderman de Blake or Meadows v.
Dominican Republic, upon which Siderman de Blake relies,
because neither case concerned whether the defendants had demonstrated a prima
facie case of immunity. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 707-08
(discussing whether plaintiffs met their burden of production that exceptions
to the FSIA applied); Meadows, 817 F.2d at 523 (holding that the defendants had
not met their final burden of persuasion that the commercial activity exception
did not apply). The suggestion in Siderman de Blake and Meadows that the FSIA
prima facie case includes a public act requirement is dicta, and as such holds
no precedential value. In other existing precedent, defendants have established their
prima facie entitlements to sovereign immunity by proving only that they
qualified as “foreign state[s]” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(a)-(b). We did not require these defendants to
demonstrate that the plaintiffs’ claims arose from a public act.
Export Group v. Reef Indus., 54 F.3d 1466, 1470 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Meadows,
817 F.2d at 522-23); Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457,
1459-60 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869, 116 S.Ct. 187, 133 L.Ed.2d 124
(1995); cf. Randolph, 97 F.3d at 324 (discussing the shifting of
the burden of production under the FSIA without addressing a prima facie public
act requirement and citing Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 707-08). Further, the FSIA dictates that “a foreign state shall be
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607.” 28 U.S.C. § 1604;
see Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 859 F.2d at 1359 (“We lack both
statutory subject matter and personal jurisdiction over any claim against a
[*306] foreign sovereign unless one of the Act’s exceptions applies….”).
Sections 1605 through 1607 of Title 28 outline the only exceptions to the Act.
Requiring a foreign state to prove a public act conflicts with the plain
language of the statute: a foreign state is immune from suit unless one of the
enumerated exceptions applies. There is no exception for non-public acts. The legislative history of the FSIA also does not compel the
conclusion that a defendant must prove a public act to establish a prima facie
case of immunity. The suggestion in Meadows of a public act requirement was based,
in part, on a House Report which states: [T]he burden will
remain on the foreign state to produce evidence in support of its claim of
immunity. Thus, evidence must be produced to establish that a foreign state or
one of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities is the defendant in the
suit and that the plaintiff’s claim relates to a public act of the
foreign state-that is, an act not within the exceptions in sections 1605-1607. H.R.Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d sess. This legislative history,
however, clarifies only that the defendant bears the burden of establishing its
immunity, including the burden of proof that no exception applies. It does not
necessitate a prima facie showing of a public act. The phrase “public
act” is used to describe acts that do not fall within the enumerated
exceptions to the FSIA. Moreover, requiring a prima facie showing of a public act would
prevent the defendants here from asserting a valid argument against the
application of the commercial activity exception. The language of the
commercial activity exception requires not only that there be
“commercial activity”, but also that there be commercial
activity “of the foreign state.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2). Defendants should be permitted to argue against
the application of the exception on the grounds that they did not act: that
there was no “commercial activity of the foreign state.”
Id. (emphasis added). We conclude that the FSIA does not require the defendants to prove
a public act to establish a prima facie case of immunity. Instead, they are
entitled to a presumption of immunity if they are foreign states within the
meaning of the Act. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1459-60; Export Group, 54 F.3d at 1470. As conceded by Phaneuf, both Indonesia and the NDSC qualify as
foreign states under the FSIA. [FN1] The district court erred in determining
that the Republic of Indonesia and the NDSC had not established a prima facie
case of sovereign immunity. FN1. A
“foreign state” includes “a political subdivision of
a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.”
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). An “agency or
instrumentality” of a foreign state is defined as an entity: (1) which is a separate
legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof … and (3) which is neither a
citizen of a State of the United States … nor created under the laws
of any third country. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(b). The Republic of Indonesia is a foreign state and
the NDSC meets the definition of an “agency or
instrumentality” of a foreign state. We consider Mawardi’s entitlement to a presumption of
immunity separately. The district court held that Mawardi was not entitled to a
presumption of immunity because he, along with the other defendants, had failed
to establish a public act. As discussed above, the district court erred in
requiring the defendants to prove a public act. Nonetheless, Mawardi may not be
entitled to a presumption of immunity if he was acting outside the scope of his
official authority. In Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand E.
Marcos Human Rights Litig.), we held that the FSIA applies to a foreign
official acting in an official capacity, but does not apply to an official
acting beyond the scope of the actor’s authority. 978 F.2d 493, 497
(9th Cir.1992) (citing Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d
1095, 1103-06 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that government officials fall within the
definition of an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state”)),
cert. denied, 508 U.S. 972, 113 S.Ct. 2960, 125 L.Ed.2d 661 (1993). In Trajano,
we defined “beyond the scope of the official’s
authority” to include anything the sovereign has not empowered the
official to do. Id. Because the district [*307] court did not make
any factual findings as to either Mawardi’s actions or the scope of
his authority, we remand this issue to the district court. If the district
court finds that Mawardi’s actions were within the scope of his
authority, then Mawardi is entitled to a presumption of immunity under the
FSIA; if Mawardi acted without authority, the FSIA cannot shield him from suit
in his individual capacity. [FN2] FN2. Phaneuf is suing
Mawardi in his official capacity and not as an individual. V Because the defendants, with the exception of Mawardi, have
established a prima facie case of immunity, the burden of production shifts to
the plaintiff to offer evidence that an exception applies. See Randolph, 97 F.3d
at 324. Phaneuf submitted affidavits and other evidence to support the theory
that the NDSC members had either actual or apparent authority to issue the
promissory notes. Phaneuf asserts that defendants’ actions fall within
the third clause of the commercial activity exception. That provision states
that a foreign sovereign is not immune from jurisdiction when the action is
based: upon an act outside
the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). Because Phaneuf offered evidence that the commercial activity
exception applies, the defendants bear the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the exception does not apply. See Randolph, 97 F.3d at
324; Joseph v. Office of Consulate General of Nigeria, 830 F.2d
1018, 1021 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905, 108 S.Ct. 1077, 99
L.Ed.2d 236 (1988). The issuance of sovereign debt is a commercial act which falls
within the exception claimed by Phaneuf. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,
Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612-617, 112 S.Ct.
2160, 2165-68, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992). Defendants concede this issue. Defendants maintain, however, that the commercial activity
exception does not apply because they are not responsible for the issuance of
the notes. They contend there was no “commercial activity of the
foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (emphasis
added). Defendants argue they are not bound by the actions of the former NDSC
members or Ambassador Mawardi because these government officers exceeded the
scope of their authority in issuing and certifying the validity of the notes.
The question is whether an agent of a foreign state must have acted with actual
authority to invoke the commercial activity exception against a foreign state,
or whether apparent authority suffices. [FN3] FN3. We distinguish
the issue here from the inquiry undertaken to determine whether an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state is the “alter ego” of the
foreign state. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio
Exterior de Cuba, 462
U.S. 611, 627-633, 103 S.Ct. 2591, 2600-03, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983)
(“Banec”); Gates, 54 F.3d at 1460 n.
1. Normally, we accord a presumption of independence to an agency or
instrumentality of the foreign state; this presumption can be overcome,
however, when the level of state control is such that the acts of the
governmental agency are in effect the acts of the state. Banec, 462 U.S.
at 629-34, 103 S.Ct. at 2601-04 (applying presumption in liability context);
Gates, 54 F.3d at 1460 n. 1. Our concern here,
however, is not the level of control a foreign state must exercise over an
agency before we will attribute the misdeeds of that agency to the foreign
state. Rather, we focus on whether the action of an agent that exceeds the
scope of his authority should be attributable to the foreign state. In interpreting the FSIA, we first look to the plain meaning of
the language employed by Congress. Straub v. A P Green, Inc., 38 F.3d
448, 452 (9th Cir.1994). The language of the commercial activity exception
compels the conclusion that only evidence of actual authority can be used to
invoke that exception. All three clauses of the exception require “a
commercial activity of the foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(2) (emphasis added). “[C]ommercial activity of the foreign
state “ clearly entails commercial activity in which the foreign state
engaged. Because a foreign state acts through its agents, an agent’s
deed which is based on the actual [*308] authority of the foreign state
constitutes activity “of the foreign state.” When an agent acts beyond the scope of his authority, however,
that agent “is not doing business which the sovereign has empowered
him to do.” Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1106 (quoting Larson
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682, 689, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1461, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949)). If the
foreign state has not empowered its agent to act, the agent’s
unauthorized act cannot be attributed to the foreign state; there is no
“activity of the foreign state.” We assume that “the ordinary meaning of [the statutory]
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Export
Group, 54 F.3d at 1473 (internal quotations omitted). We are not to
imply exceptions. Id. If Congress had intended the commercial
activity exception to apply to an agent’s acts committed without
actual authority it could have so indicated in the language of the exception.
Instead, the plain meaning of the language “commercial activity of the
foreign state” illustrates that Congress intended for the exception to
apply only in cases of actual authority. Our holdings in Chuidian and Trajano support
this conclusion. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1103, 1106; Trajano, 978 F.2d
at 497-98. In Chuidian we held that an agent of a foreign state
acting outside the scope of his authority is not entitled to immunity under the
FSIA. 912 F.2d at 1106. A corollary to this principal must be that the foreign
state retains its immunity when its agent acts outside the scope of his
authority. “ ‘Where an officer’s powers are limited …
his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not
sovereign actions.’ “ Id. (quoting Larson, 337 U.S.
at 689, 69 S.Ct. at 1461). Further, in Trajano we held that the defendant was not entitled to
immunity because the acts were taken without official mandate and thus could
not “have been acts of an agent or instrumentality of a foreign state
within the meaning of the FSIA.” 978 F.2d at 498. Therefore,
unofficial acts are also not acts of a “foreign state.” 28
U.S.C. § 1603(a) (defining “foreign state” to
include an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state”). The
language “commercial activity of the foreign state” excludes
an agent’s unofficial acts, i.e., acts taken without
actual authority. Chuidian drew support for its conclusion by references to the
sovereign immunity of the United States. Chuidian, 912 F.2d
at 1101-02, 1106. Further comparison to United States immunity buttresses the
reading of an actual authority requirement into the commercial activity
exception of the FSIA. When dealing with a purported agent of the United
States, the third party bears the risk that the agent is acting outside the
scope of the agent’s authority, Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S.
380, 384, 68 S.Ct. 1, 3, 92 L.Ed. 10 (1947), even if the third party reasonably
believes the agent has authority. Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank, 650 F.2d
1093, 1100 (9th Cir.1981). Moreover, the government can be estopped from
asserting immunity only when its agent has acted within the scope of authority.
Saulque v. United States, 663 F.2d 968, 976 (9th Cir.1981). These
precedents support the conclusion that evidence of apparent authority should
not be sufficient to invoke the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. We hold that an agent must have acted with actual authority in
order to invoke the commercial activity exception against a foreign state.
[FN4] We express no opinion as to whether the issuers of the “NDSC
notes” or Ambassador Mawardi acted with actual authority. We remand to
the district court to determine whether the commercial activity exception
applies to the defendants. FN4. Our conclusion
that the commercial activity exception may be invoked against a foreign state
only when its agents have acted with actual authority contradicts a Second
Circuit case, First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Government of Antigua &
Barbuda—Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir.1989). In that
case the court instructed the district court to hold on remand that
jurisdiction existed over the foreign state if the district court found that
the foreign state’s ambassador acted with apparent authority. Id. at
194-96. The court, however, seems to have assumed the appropriateness of
invoking the commercial activity exception based on apparent authority. The
court gave no analysis or explanation of its statements regarding apparent
authority. [*309] VI Defendants also argue that venue is improper in the District of
Arizona. Phaneuf claims venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(1).
[FN5] Although neither party disputes appellate jurisdiction over this issue,
we consider our jurisdiction sua sponte. Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d
825, 830 (1994). FN5. Section
1391(f)(1) provides that venue is proper “in any judicial district in
which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of that of the
action is situated.” In American Concrete Agric. Pipe Ass’n v. No-Joint
Concrete Pipe Co., we held that an order denying a motion to dismiss for want
of venue is interlocutory and not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
331 F.2d at 709. We do not have jurisdiction over the district court’s
order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of venue. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Briefs and Other Related Documents • 1996 WL 33487349 (Appellate Brief) Brief for
Appellee (Apr. 22, 1996)Original Image of this Document (PDF) View and print document
in PDF format exactly like the original filing • 1996 WL 33487350 (Appellate Brief) Brief for
Appellants (Mar. 06, 1996)Original Image of this Document with Appendix (PDF)
View and print document in PDF format exactly like the original filing Direct History Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302, 97 Cal. Daily Op.
Serv. 895, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1329 (9th Cir.(Ariz.) Feb 07, 1997) (NO.
95-17131) Appeal After Remand: Phaneuf v. Government of Indonesia, 18
Fed.Appx. 648 (9th Cir.(Ariz.) Sep 13, 2001) (Not published in Federal
Reporter, No. 00-15459) Certiorari Denied, 535 U.S. 987 (Apr 15, 2002) (No.
01-1164) Declined to Follow by:
Dale v. Colagiovanni, 337 F.Supp.2d 825 (S.D.Miss. Sep 22, 2004) (NO.
CIV.A.3:01 CV 663BN) U.S. Appellate Petitions, Motions and Filings Curtis A. PHANEUF, a single man, Petitioner, v. THE GOVERNMENT OF
INDONESIA, A Foreign State; the Republic of Indonesia Defense Security Council,
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state; H. A. Mawardi, Ambassador of
the Republic of Indonesia, Respondents., 2001 WL 34115893 (Appellate Petition,
Motion and Filing) (U.S. Jan. 23, 2001) Petition for Writ of Certiorari (NO.
01-1164) Curtis A. PHANEUF, Petitioner, v. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA, A
Foreign State; the Republic of Indonesia Defense Security Council, an Agency or
Instrumentality of a Foreign State; H.A. Mawardi, Ambassador of the Republic of
Indonesia, Respondents., 2002 WL 32134418 (Appellate Petition, Motion and
Filing) (U.S. Mar. 15, 2002) Brief in Opposition for Respondents (NO. 01-1164) Curtis A. PHANEUF, a single man, Petitioner, v. THE GOVERNMENT OF
INDONESIA, A Foreign State; The Republic of Indonesia Defense Security Council,
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state; H. A. Mawardi, Ambassador of
the Republic of Indonesia, Respondents., 2002 WL 32134419 (Appellate Petition,
Motion and Filing) (U.S. Mar. 26, 2002) Brief in Reply for Petitioner (NO.
01-1164) Appellate Briefs REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, National Defense Security Council of the
Republic of Indonesia and H.A. Chalid Mawardi, Appellants, v. Curtis A.
PHANEUF, Appellee., 1996 WL 33487350 (Appellate Brief) (C.A.9 Mar. 06, 1996)
Brief for Appellants (NO. 95-17131) REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, National Defense Security Council of the
Republic on Indonesia and H.A. Chalid Mawardi, Appellants, v. Curtis A.
PHANEUF, Appellee., 1996 WL 33487349 (Appellate Brief) (C.A.9 Apr. 22, 1996)
Brief for Appellee (NO. 95-17131) Curtis A PHANEUF, a single man, Plaintiff - Appellant, v.
GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA A FOREIGN STATE; The Republic of Indonesia Defense
Security Council, and Agency or Instrumentality of a Foreign State; H A.
Mawardi Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia, Defendants - Appellees. 2000
WL 33985110 (Appellate Brief) (C.A.9 Sep. 15, 2000) Brief for Appellant (NO.
00-15459, CV-94-00746-WDB) Curtis A. PHANEUF, a single man, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA A FOREIGN STATE; The Republic of Indonesia Defense
Security Council, and agency or instrumentality of a foreign state; H. A.
Mawardi Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia, Defendants-Appellees., 2001 WL
34097169 (Appellate Brief) (C.A.9 Jan. 17, 2001) Reply Brief for Appellant (NO.
00-15459, CV-94-00746-WDB) |