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[HOUSE OF LORDS] |
THE ATLANTIC STAR |
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AND |
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Practice - Stay of proceedings - Admiralty - Collision in Belgian waters involving Dutch and Belgian vessels - Report by surveyor appointed by Belgian Commercial Court - Multiple claims against Dutch owners begun in Antwerp court - Action in rem by one claimant started in English Admiralty Court - Motion to stay English action - Antwerp most appropriate forum - Whether plaintiff entitled to bring action in forum of his choice - International Convention on Certain Rules Concerning Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision, art. 1 (1) (2) (3) (Brussels, May 10, 1952)1 |
Ships' Names - Atlantic Star |
In January 1970 the Dutch container vessel AS, when attempting in sudden dense fog and without the help of tugs to enter a lock in Belgian river waters, collided with the Dutch-owned barge B lying moored outside a Belgian barge against the quay wall. Both barges were sunk with their cargoes, two men were drowned, and port installations were damaged. The two barge owners applied to the Antwerp Commercial Court for the appointment of a court surveyor who reported on the circumstances and causes of the collision in February 1971. The trend of his report was that the collision was due to the difficulties caused by sudden fog. |
1 See post, p. 472C-E. |
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The owners of the Belgian barge and the insurers began actions in the Antwerp court; but in June 1971, when the AS was due at Liverpool, the owner of the Dutch barge B elected to begin an action in rem in the Admiralty Court in England against the AS. Her owners, to avoid arrest, accepted service of the writ, entered a conditional appearance, arranged security in respect of the claim, and in July 1971 issued a notice of motion to stay the action. Before the motion was heard four actions were pending in the Antwerp court and a fifth was anticipated. In January 1972 the Dutch barge owner initiated proceedings in Antwerp against the AS owners solely to preserve the Belgian time limit if his English action were stayed; but at the hearing before Brandon J. in March 1972 he undertook to discontinue the Belgian action if the English action were allowed to proceed. Brandon J., though finding that for five practical reasons the Antwerp court was the more appropriate forum for the trial, refused the shy in the exercise of hits discretion and on the established principles on the ground that to stay it would deprive the plaintiff of an advantage which he reasonably believed the trial of his claim in England would give him, and that the defendants had not shown that the inconvenience to them would be oppressive. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that decision. |
The defendants appealed:- |
Held, allowing the appeal (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest and Lord Simon of Glaisdale dissenting), (1) that although the criterion for staying proceedings was whether the continuance of the action would be "vexatious" or "oppressive" to the defendant, those words were pointers rather than boundary marks, which illustrated but did not confine the courts' general jurisdiction; that in applying the test it was a pertinent consideration that a plaintiff should not lightly be denied the right to sue in an English court, if jurisdiction was rightly founded, even in actions between foreigners, and that the court must take into account (i) any advantage to the plaintiff, (ii) any disadvantage to the defendant. |
(2) That the fact that proceedings related to the Admiralty jurisdiction, whilst a potent factor in a plaintiff's favour especially where the proceedings were in rem, was not conclusive in every case for the right to bring an action in rem in England was by statute conferred in the same terms as the right to bring any other type of action, namely, by conferring on the court a residual right to decline to exercise its jurisdiction. |
(3) That applying the above criterion to the circumstances of the present case the defendants had clearly shown that they ought not to be required to litigate here as well as in Antwerp, and that accordingly the English action would be stayed. |
Decision of the Court of Appeal [1973] Q.B. 364; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 746; [1972] 3 All E.R. 705 reversed. |
The following cases are referred to in their Lordships' opinions: |
Adams v. Adams (Attorney-General intervening) [1971] P. 188; [1970] 3 W.L.R. 934; [1970] 3 All E.R. 572. |
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Arantzazu Mendi, The [1939] A.C. 256; [1939] 1 All E.R. 719, H.L.(E.). |
Canada Malting Co. Ltd. v. Paterson Steamships Ltd. (1932) 285 U.S. 413. |
Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren (1855) 5 H.L.Cas. 416, H.L.(E.). |
Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert doing business as Gilbert Storage & Transfer Co. (1947) 330 U.S. 501. |
Ionian Bank Ltd. v. Couvreur [1969] 1 W.L.R. 781; [1969] 2 All E.R. 651, C.A. |
Metropolitan Bank Ltd. v. Pooley (1885) 10 App.Cas. 210, H.L.(E.). |
Mobil Tankers Co. S.A. v. Mene Grande Oil Co. (1966) 363 F. 2d 611. |
St. Pierre v. South American Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd. [1936] 1 K.B. 382, C.A. |
Sheaf Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Company Transmediterranea, 1930 S.C. 660. |
Sociˇtˇ du Gaz de Paris v. La Sociˇtˇ Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs Fran¨ais," 1926 S.C.(H.L.) 13, H.L.(Sc.). |
Soya Margareta, The [1961] 1 W.L.R. 709; [1960] 2 All E.R. 756. |
Telford Panel & Engineering Works Pty. Ltd. v. Elder Smith Goldsbrough Mort Ltd. [1969] V.R. 193. |
The following additional cases were cited in argument: |
Banco, The [1971] P. 137; [1971] 2 W.L.R. 335; [1971] 1 All E.R. 524, C.A. |
Bank of America National Trust & Banking Association v. Poyet [1955] 1 D.L.R. 680. |
Birdie (Maharani of) v. Wildenstein [1972] 2 Q.B. 283; [1972] 2 W.L.R. 1077; [1972] 2 All E.R. 689, C.A. |
Boys v. Chaplin [1971] A.C. 356; [1969] 3 W.L.R. 322; [1969] 2 All E.R. 1085, H.L.(E.). |
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Eleftheria, The [1970] P. 94; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 1073; [1969] 2 All E.R. 641. |
Fehmarn, The [1958] 1 W.L.R. 159; [1958] 1 All E.R. 333, C.A. |
Launchbury v. Morgans [1973] A.C. 127; [1927] 2 W.L.R. 1217; [1972] 2 All E.R. 606, H.L.(E.). |
Marinero, The [1955] P. 68; [1955] 2 W.L.R. 607; [1955] 1 All E.R. 676. |
Rutt v. Metropolitan Underwriters (Australia) Ltd. [1929] S.A.S.R. 426. |
Sealey (orse. Callan) v. Callan [1953] P. 135; [1953] 2 W.L.R. 910; [1953] 1 All E.R. 942. |
Sociˇtˇ Gˇnˇrale de Paris v. Dreyfus Brothers (1887) 37 Ch.D. 215, C.A. |
APPEAL from the Court of Appeal. |
This was an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal (Lord Denning M.R., Phillimore and Cairns L.JJ.) dated July 27, 1972, affirming an order of Brandon J., dated March 7, 1972, dismissing the appellants' motion to stay or set aside an action in rem in the Admiralty Court commenced by the respondent, the owner of the motor vessel Bona Spes,against the appellants, the owners of the motor vessel Atlantic Star, on June 13, 1971, subject to the respondent's undertaking that he would discontinue his action against the appellants in Belgium as soon as possible. |
These proceedings arose as a result of a collision in dense fog on the night of January 27, 1970, between the Dutch motor vessel Atlantic Starand the Dutch motor barge Bona Spes in a channel of the River Schelde leading to one of the locks at Antwerp. Bona Spes was lying moored outside a Belgian dumb barge, Hugo van der Goes, which was moored to the quay on one side of the channel. As a result of the collision Hugo van der Goes was crushed between Bona Spes and the quay, and both barges sank with their cargoes. The skipper and a sailor on Hugo van der Goes were drowned. |
On January 29, 1970, the owners of Hugo van der Goes and on February 16, 1970, the respondent, the owner of Bona Spes, applied to the Commercial Court of Antwerp for the appointment of a court surveyor, according to the normal Belgian practice, to investigate the circumstances and causes of the collision. The surveyor appointed took statements from witnesses and collected various reports and documents. The parties concerned were represented by Belgian lawyers at the hearings before the surveyors. |
On January 12, 1971, the owners of Hugo van der Goes began an action against the appellants in the Commercial Court of Antwerp. In February 1971 the surveyor made his report which inclined to the view |
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that the collision was caused by the difficulties inherent in the dense fog and the site of the collision and that Atlantic Star was not to blame. On May 25, 1971, Belgian insurers who had become liable to make payments to the dependants of the two deceased crew members of Hugo van der Goes exercised their rights of subrogation and claimed damages against the owners of Atlantic Star in the Commercial Court of Antwerp. |
On June 15, 1971, the respondent learnt that Atlantic Star was due in Liverpool and began an action in rem against the appellants in the Admiralty Court. To avoid arrest of the ship, the appellants accepted service of the writ and gave a guarantee of £80,000 for the claim. On July 1, 1971, the appellants entered a conditional appearance and on July 20, 1971, issued a notice of motion to set aside the writ or stay the action. |
On August 12, 1971, and on December 2, 1971, the owners of part of the cargo on Hugo van der Goes and the insurers of the cargo of Bona Spes respectively started proceedings against the appellants in the Commercial Court of Antwerp. At this time, therefore, there were four actions arising out of the collision in the Commercial Court of Antwerp. |
On January 21, 1972, the respondent began an action against the appellants in the Commercial Court of Antwerp. It was conceded that the respondent began this action only in order to preserve the time limit in case the action in the Admiralty Court should be stayed. |
On March 17, 1972, Brandon J. in the exercise of his discretion refused a stay and dismissed the appellants' motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that decision. |
Robert Goff Q.C. and Michael Thomas for the appellants. The question in issue is: if proceedings are commenced in England in a case where the English courts clearly have jurisdiction, but the dispute has otherwise no connection with England and there is another forum which has more to do with the case (which is freely available) and there are a number of proceedings pending in the other forum against the defendant in relation to the same subject matter, will the English court hear the proceedings or stay them? If the proceedings are not stayed, the evidence of witnesses, none of whom are in this country, will have to be given over again and there is a danger of conflicting decisions. |
The issue can be approached from different points of view. From the plaintiff's point of view it may be said that he is entitled to bring proceedings here provided by so doing he does not obtain an undue advantage over the defendant, for example, by being able to bring undue pressure on the defendant to settle. From the defendant's side it may be said: true the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing jurisdiction in England, but where the defendant is only casually here, he would be gravely inconvenienced by the proceedings in England. There is a middle way: the court in deciding whether to grant a stay looks at the matter objectively in the interests of justice; it has to balance the interest of the parties. The objective interests of justice require that the case be tried by the forum with which it has the most connection. This is a general principle and is not confined to shipping cases. The appellants concede that there must be a clear balance in favour of the foreign forum before the English court will |
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grant a stay. That is, the English court will only grant a stay if plainly there is a balance of convenience in favour of the foreign forum and the plaintiff will not suffer any grave injustice, some denial of principle relating to substantive law by the proceedings being brought in the foreign jurisdiction. |
The appellants support the middle view. The majority of the English cases support the plaintiff's view, but most of them are consonant with the middle view. To revert to the facts of the instant case, there is no comparable English case in the books where there is such a multiplicity of causes pending in the foreign jurisdiction. So the House should recognise that the discretionary power of the English courts to grant a stay of proceedings should be exercised where England is a forum non convenience. The following matters should be regarded as providing guidance to the courts in the exercise of their discretion: (i) The interests of justice ordinarily require that an action should be tried in that forum which is the most appropriate to the case. (ii) For a stay to be granted, there must exist another forum that is clearly appropriate to the case: a slight balance in favour of a foreign forum where neither forum is particularly appropriate is not of itself sufficient to justify a stay. (iii) In deciding whether there is a forum which is more appropriate to the case, the courts consider all the circumstances that are special to the case, that is the place where the cause of action arose, the applicable law, the availability of witnesses, the connection of the parties with the place where the cause of action arose, and the saving of costs. (iv) Where an incident gives rise to several claims involving the same subject matter, the nature of those claims and the choice of forum of other claimants are circumstances which must also be considered and given particular weight, because it is undesirable that courts should appear to compete against one another to retain jurisdiction over the same subject matter with duplication of costs and the risk of conflicting decisions. (v) Where the plaintiff can show that it would be unjust to deprive him of his right of action in England, a stay may be refused even where a foreign forum is the most appropriate to the case. (vi) A stay may be refused if the plaintiff proves that he is unlikely to receive a fair trial in the foreign forum that is the most appropriate to the case, for example, because of political factors, or of deficiencies in the substantive law or remedies available there that would amount to a denial of justice. (vii) The fact that the plaintiff values his right of action in England more highly than his right of action in the most appropriate forum is not enough of itself to justify the refusal of a stay: to hold otherwise would, contrary to international committee, encourage "forum shopping" and would unfairly tilt the scales of justice in favour of plaintiffs. (viii) No factor should be regarded as conclusive, but all relevant factors should be weighed by the court in deciding whether a stay should be granted. (ix) The granting of a stay preserves the plaintiff's right of action in case it should subsequently appear that his claim cannot fairly be tried and remedied in the most appropriate forum. |
There is a difference in approach between the English courts on the one hand and the Scottish courts and the courts of the United States on the |
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other. The English courts favour the plaintiffs view. The Scottish courts adopt the principle of forum non convenience and the American principle is similar to the Scottish. |
Section 41 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 preserves the power of the courts to stay Proceedings which is part of its inherent power to control its own proceedings. R.S.C., Ord. 18, r. 19 is one application of this power. But the House is not precluded by statute or by rules of court from considering the present question as a question of common law. For an enumeration of some of the cases relating to the court's power to stay, see The Supreme Court Practice 1972, vol. 2, p. 918. |
An examination of the concept of the appropriate forum shows that |
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there are a number of reasons for adopting it: (i) It is better for the parties themselves that the case should be tried in the appropriate forum because costs are likely to be saved. (ii) Witnesses are more likely to be compellable. (iii) The parties or either of them are nationals of the appropriate forum and the lawyers speak that language. (iv) The court is part of the political and legal system of the country to which the parties belong. (v) Generally speaking, the parties will have greater confidence in the courts of their own country. (vi) The judges are likely to speak the same language as the witnesses and the documents will be written in the language of the forum and the judges are better able to understand the local law, and moreover, they are likely to know the locus in quo and previous cases concerned with similar facts. (vii) In addition, there is the question of international committee. The discouraging of forum shopping is an aspect of international committee. Apart from this, forum shopping is unjust to defendants and if a plaintiff forum shops, the defendant should be entitled to a stay of proceedings. (viii) Where there are related actions pending in the court of the appropriate forum, the defendant is subject to a double trial and the risk of conflicting decisions which is of pertinent consideration on the matter of international committee. |
As to the reasons for adopting the Scottish rule: (i) It recognises and gives effect to the principle that a stay should be granted where for the interest of the parties and for the ends of justice the cause may more suitably be tried elsewhere. (ii) The English rule unduly favours the plaintiff, whereas the Scottish rule holds a balance between the parties. (iii) The Scottish rule discourages forum shopping. (iv) The Scottish rule reduces the possibility of competition with foreign courts. (v) The Scottish rule discounts the hearing of cases where the parties are by accident in Britain. |
On the facts of the present case Brandon J. has given cogent reasons why the Court of Antwerp is the more appropriate forum. |
In Logan v. Bank of Scotland (No. 2) [1906] 1 K.B. 141 a stay was sought and granted on the grounds of vexation and oppression. The |
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It would appear that there is no case which raises the question whether the English court would grant a stay where the defendant is exposed to a multiplicity of proceedings and no case where it has been urged that the principle recognised in the English cases should be broadened into a general doctrine of forum non convenience. Accordingly, the House is considering the matter res integra. |
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For an English case where the court adopted the principle of forum convenience, see The Eleftheria [1970] P. 94 and The Fehmarn [1958] 1 W.L.R. 159 where there was an exclusive jurisdiction clause. |
J. F. Willmer Q.C. and Nicholas Phillips for the respondent. The reasons for dismissing this appeal can be put under five heads: (1) To allow the appeal would necessitate the House overruling a long line of English decisions and altering principles on which the English courts have hitherto acted. In particular, it would entail altering the principle that has always been accorded by English courts that any plaintiff who can serve the defendant in this country and acts in good faith ought not to be turned away. This principle is also applied in Commonwealth countries. (2) To allow the appeal would be contrary to the principles underlying the Admiralty jurisdiction in rem particularly in view of the existence of maritime liens because it will reduce the value of a foreign ship owner having recourse to the Admiralty court if he cannot enforce his lien here. (3) The principle which the appellants seek to be applied would not truly be in accordance with committee, for committee necessitates the English courts recognising the International Convention of 1952. (4) It is not now appropriate to try to bring English law into line with that of Scotland and the United States for the following reasons: (i) There has always been a separate development of English law and Scots law on this topic which has always been recognised in the time when English law was being developed. (ii) Circumstances in the United States have in some respects been very different. (iii) It would make English law out of line with the other Commonwealth countries applying Commonwealth principles. (5) On the facts it would not be right to stay this action whatever principle be applied. |
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As to whether the English authorities cited by the appellants would have been decided differently if the doctrine of forum non convenience had been applied, the difficulty is that in almost all of them, there is an element of lis alibi pen dens and they were not a pure stay of proceedings. |
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As to the enforcement of foreign judgments, at common law from the 17th to the 19th centuries, the practice grew up of enforcing a foreign judgment in this country on the grounds of committee. The old decisions show, however, that two conditions had to be satisfied: (i) it had to be for a debt or sum certain; and (ii) the foreign court must have similar concepts to the English court on the question of jurisdiction. |
There also grew up in the same period the practice of allowing a defendant to rely on a foreign judgment as evidence that the debt had been satisfied or a judgment had been given in his favour. [Reference was made to the Judgments Extension Act 1868, the Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcements) Act 1933.] |
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There can be fewer longer or stronger lines of cases than the present. There is no case in this House which is inconsistent with this line of cases. There was a chance of the House making a resolution on this line in the two decisions which came before the House in 1885. The present line of authorities has now been settled and it would be wrong for the House to interfere. The appellants are seeking a radical departure from the procedure in this type of case. If it be thought that it is necessary for such a radical change, it should be the subject of legislation. For the House to intervene now would be tantamount to legislation. Futhermore, to make a change of this nature would be to put English law out of line with Commonwealth decisions which have followed the English cases hitherto. Except for one Canadian case, there appears to be a uniformity of approach on the English line of authority. |
The New Zealand cases do not add anything to the principle. |
In Admiralty actions the right to assert a jurisdiction in rem where service is effected on a vessel in territorial waters is one which has long been recognised, not only in England, but in other maritime nations. This is particularly so when the plaintiffs' claim gives rise to a maritime lien, as it does in this case. Such a lien follows the vessel anywhere in the world and may even survive a change of ownership. The plaintiff can bring an action and enforce his lien in any country where he can arrest the ship, however convenient or inconvenient to the defendant ship owner. Any ship owner must be well aware of this risk. The right to bring |
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proceedings in rem to enforce a maritime lien has existed in the English Admiralty court for centuries and is now expressly conferred by section 3 (3) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956. It is clear from this provision, which is in accordance with the general practice of maritime countries, that a plaintiff can sue in the Admiralty court whether or not there is any connection with this country other than the fact that it has been visited by the defendant's ship. |
The law enshrined in the above Admiralty cases is consistent with the |
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Administration of Justice Act 1956 which implicitly approves it. Section 1 (4) which relates to claims brought in the Admiralty court for damage has express application to foreign ships (paragraph (a)) and it also relates to claims arising in foreign territorial waters (paragraph (b)). Section 3 is relevant to the present case. It concerns the Admiralty jurisdiction in rem and there are no restrictions as to the place where the collision occurred or the residence of the parties nor is there a necessity for a party discontinuing any proceedings started elsewhere before proceeding here. But in section 4 concerning actions in personam there are restrictions. See subsections (2) and (7) for example. The respondents emphasise the contrast between actions in personam and actions in rem. The contrast points to the fact that in relation to actions in rem it was the legislature's intention that there should not only be jurisdiction, but that it should be exercised. Section 3 indicates that in relation to actions in rem, there should only be a stay in extreme circumstances. Attention is also drawn to section 5 (2) in relation to the Admiralty court entertaining jurisdiction relating to wages. |
As to the International Convention of 1952, this provides a strong indication of what has been agreed between the high contracting parties. It does not have the force of law except insofar as it is incorporated in municipal legislation. It is somewhat extraordinary if the Convention allows the plaintiff to choose his jurisdiction, but that the plaintiff can then be met with the objection that he will not be allowed to proceed in the chosen jurisdiction. It must be conceded on the construction of the Act of 1956 for which the respondents contend that it has failed to deal adequately with proceedings in Scotland. |
It is to be observed that the Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act 1958, section 5, appears to be envisaging a case such as the present. It gives the ship owner a right to apply to the court for release of his ship provided that he can show that adequate security has been given in another jurisdiction. Parliament is envisaging that where actions in rem are commenced in this country, the ship owner must submit to the jurisdiction of the English court to adjudicate on the plaintiff's claim. This supports the respondent's submission that in cases of action in rem, the courts should not thereafter stay the action. This section would prevent the defendants saying here that there are proceedings pending in Antwerp. Section 5 recognises the difference between English and Scots law; the section would prevent the extension of the Scottish doctrine of forum non convenience to English law. |
As to the courts of the United States, there are further reservations relating to the doctrine. In relation to inter-State disputes, different considerations arise than in this country. True, so far as foreign actions |
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In conclusion, it would be a change of policy for this House to adopt the doctrine of forum non convenience. As to questions of policy, see Launchbury v. Morgans [1973] A.C. 127. |
The central issue is whether the House should recognise the courts have power to stay proceedings because there is a more appropriate forum. The respondents rely on the authorities. It is conceded from the outset that there is a long line of authorities since 1882. The additional authorities that have been cited in this House only highlight the extreme lengths to which the principle stated in the St. Pierre case [1936] 1 K.B. 382 has been taken. Commonwealth authorities merely follow the English cases and there is no separate analysis of the relevant principles. The House is free to consider the principles anew. There is no question of vested rights involved. This is a pure question of policy, especially is this so where questions of committee are involved. It is undesirable that courts in Scotland and England should have a different approach on a question of policy, especially since both countries have now joined the European Economic Community. |
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have granted a stay in the present circumstances. If there be in English law a doctrine of forum convenience then this is an overwhelming case for granting a stay. The fact that the plaintiff believes that he is more likely to win here is not a reason for the House refusing to grant a stay. This is a case of forum shopping and of a plaintiff coming here because he considers he is more likely to win here. |
Their Lordships took time for consideration. |
April 10. LORD REID. My Lords, in this case the appellants ask us to review the law regarding stay of proceedings in an English court in cases where proceedings with regard to the same matter have been or will be brought in a foreign court. This case arises out of the arrest in an English port of a Dutch vessel, the Atlantic Star, belonging to the appellants who are large and well-known Dutch ship owners. The respondents are a Dutch company who owned a barge which was sunk in Belgian waters in a collision with the Atlantic Star. They allege that this was due to the fault of the appellants' vessel and in order to recover damages they arrested the appellants' vessel in this country. Thereby they founded jurisdiction against the appellants in England and on release of the vessel obtained ample security to cover thicker claim. They were entitled to do this but the appellants seek a stay of their action in England because the Belgian court is the proper forum to deal with the respondents' claim. |
The facts have been fully, accurately and clearly stated by Brandon J. in his judgment in the Admiralty Court [1972] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 534 and I shall only state such of the facts as are relevant to the determination of the question now before your Lordships. |
The collision occurred in dense fog in the Schelde on the night of Jaunty 27, 1970. Three vessels were involved. The third vessel began proceedings in Belgium on January 29. It appears that the normal course in Belgium is for the court to appoint a court surveyor to inquire into the circumstances and causes of the collision and this was done. On February 16, 1970, the respondents were joined in the inquiry. The surveyor took statements from witnesses and collected various reports and documents. The respondents' lawyers were present. In February 1971, the surveyor made his report. It appears to point to a conclusion that the Atlantic Star was not at fault. Apparently the Belgian court generally agrees with the surveyor's reports, so the respondents might well fail if their case against the appellants proceeds in Belgium. |
So in June 1971, when the Atlantic Star was calling at an English port, |
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they began proceedings in England where they think for various reasons that they have a better chance of success. |
Brandon J. said: "I have no doubt at all that, so far as convenience is concerned, the Commercial Court of Antwerp is by far the more appropriate forum" (p. 539). He gave five main reasons for this, including the place of collision, the fact that the case is governed by Belgian law and local regulations, the fact that five other claims arising out of the collision are pending in Antwerp, the fact that by reason of an offer made by the appellants full security will be available there; and he said: "the case has absolutely no connection with England, except that, because the defendants' ship trades from time to time to an English port, she is liable to arrest here" (p. 539). |
But following the trend of modern authority he felt bound to refuse to stay this action, and this decision was upheld in the Court of Appeal. The authorities are dealt with by my noble and learned friend, Lord Wilberforce, and I shall not repeat that examination. They support the general proposition that a foreign plaintiff, who can establish jurisdiction against a foreign defendant by any method recognised by English law, is entitled to pursue his action in the English courts if he genuinely thinks that that will be to his advantage and is not acting merely vexatiously. Neither the parties nor the subject matter of the action need have any connection with England. There may be proceedings on the same subject matter in a foreign court. It may be a far more appropriate forum. The defendant may have to suffer great expense and inconvenience in coming here. In the end the decisions of the English and foreign courts may conflict. But nevertheless the plaintiff has a right to obtain the decision of an English court. He must not act vexatiously or oppressively or in abuse of the process of the English court, but these terms have been narrowly construed. |
It is said that the right of access to the Queen's court must not be lightly refused. In the present case Lord Denning M.R. said [1973] Q.B. 364, 381G, 382C: |
"No one who comes to these courts asking for justice should come in vain. ... This right to come here is not confined to Englishmen. It extends to any friendly foreigner. He can seek the aid of our courts if he desires to do so. You may call this 'forum shopping' if you please, but if the forum is England, it is a good place to shop in, both for the quality of the goods and the speed of service." |
My Lords, with all respect, that seems to me to recall the good old days, the passing of which many may regret, when inhabitants of this island felt an innate superiority over those unfortunate enough to belong to other races. |
It is a function of this House to try, so far as possible, to keep the development of the common law in line with the policy of Parliament and the movement of public opinion. So I think that the time is ripe for a re-examination of the rather insular doctrine to which I have referred. |
The appellants' counsel first referred to the law of Scotland, where for a very long time the plea of forum non convenience has been recognised as valid. No doubt it is a desirable objective to diminish remaining differences between the laws of the sister countries. But we must proceed with all |
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due caution. That plea is particularly important in connection with the peculiar Scottish method of founding jurisdiction by arrestment ad fundandem jurisdictionem. I cannot foresee all the repercussions of making a fundamental change in English law and I am not at all satisfied that it would be proper for this House to make such a fundamental change or that it is necessary or desirable. |
So in my opinion we should seek any change within the existing framework of English law. The existing basis is that the plaintiff must not be acting vexatiously, oppressively or in abuse of the process of the court. Those are flexible words and I think that in future they should be interpreted more liberally. |
There was a time when a judgment obtained in one country was of little use in any other. There was a time when it could reasonably be said that our system of administration of justice, though expensive and elaborate, was superior to that in most other countries. But today we must, I think, admit that as a general rule there is no injustice in telling a plaintiff that he should go back to his own courts. |
So I would draw some distinction between a case where England is the natural forum for the plaintiff and a case where the plaintiff merely comes here to serve his own ends. In the former the plaintiff should not be "driven from the judgment seat" without very good reason, but in the latter the plaintiff should, I think, be expected to offer some reasonable justification for his choice of forum if the defendant seeks a stay. If both parties are content to proceed here there is no need to object. There have been many recent criticisms of "forum shopping" and I regard it as undesirable. |
I think that a key to the solution of the problem may be found in a liberal interpretation of what is oppressive on the part of the plaintiff. The position of the defendant must be put in the scales. In the end it must be left to the discretion of the court in each case where a stay is sought, and the question would be whether the defendants have clearly shown that to allow the case to proceed in England would in a reasonable sense be oppressive looking to all the circumstances including the personal position of the defendant. That appears to me to be a proper development of the existing law. |
So I turn to the present case. I would not regard a foreigner who arrests a ship in England as necessarily forum shopping. The right to arrest a ship is an ancient and often a necessary right. Not only may there be difficulty otherwise in establishing jurisdiction in an appropriate forum, but the arrest gives to the arrester what may be a very necessary security. |
In the present case, however, that is not so. Proceeding in the appropriate Belgian forum offers no difficulty and the appellants have offered to provide security there. I reject the technical argument that we are not entitled to consider an offer of security made after proceedings have commenced. That may have to be considered when awarding costs, but we must, I think, take account of the position when the stay is asked for. |
It is true that looking to the resources of the appellants there would be no great hardship in requiring them to litigate here, but that is only one element in considering whether on the whole it would be oppressive to require them to litigate here. On the whole I think that the appellants have |
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shown clearly enough that they ought not to be required to litigate here as well as in Antwerp. |
There is one other matter to which I must refer. In 1952 there was an International Convention by which the parties including this country agreed certain rules regarding civil jurisdiction in matters of collision. Article 1 provides: "(2) It shall be for the plaintiff to decide in which of the courts referred to in (1) of this article, the action shall be instituted." That includes the court of the place where an arrest had been effected. |
The convention only purports to deal with jurisdiction and no one disputes that the English court has jurisdiction to deal with this case. But the respondents argue that this article must have been intended to have a wider effect because it would be a mockery to allow the plaintiff to choose the English court and then to make that choice ineffective by staying his action. |
But this argument proves too much. If right, it would prevent the English court from staying the action on any ground except perhaps bad faith. We cannot read into the article some qualification such as "provided that his decision is reasonable." There are some very limited grounds on which an English court can under present practice stay an action arising out of a collision, e.g., where the ship has already been arrested in another jurisdiction and security obtained there. So if this is the meaning of the convention there would have to be some change in English law. |
Still more there would have to be a change in the law of Scotland: the plea forum non convenience would have to be entirely excluded in collision cases. |
A treaty does not become part of our law except in so far as it is embodied in an Act of Parliament. The Administration of Justice Act 1956 was obviously intended to bring the laws of the United Kingdom into line with the convention. But I can find nothing in it to alter either the law of England or the law of Scotland so as to restrict the power of the courts of either country to stay an action. Parliament and those advising it must have thought that the convention dealt solely with jurisdiction and had nothing to do with power to stay an action. In this I think they were right. So in my opinion the terms of the convention ought not to affect our judgment with regard to the staying of an action and I have left it out of account in reaching my decision. |
For the reasons which I have given I would allow this appeal. |
LORD MORRIS OF BORTH-Y-GEST. My Lords, following a collision, in a channel of the River Schelde leading to one of the locks at Antwerp, between a Dutch motor vessel, the Atlantic Star, owned by the Holland America Line and a Dutch motor barge, the Bona Spes, the owner of the latter desires to litigate in this country. He has commenced proceedings here. It is beyond question that he was entitled to do so. The English court has jurisdiction to hear the suit. But the owners of the former ship wish to have the litigation in Belgium. Which of the two Dutch owners should prevail? |
The situation here arising (that is to say, a situation where a plaintiff has chosen to sue here and under our law has every right to do so but where a defendant has reasons for asking that the case be tried in another country) |
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But the motion was decided and had to be decided both by the learned judge and by the Court of Appeal on the basis of English law and of the principles laid down in a long line of English cases. Only, I think, if there is a departure from these cases could the present appeal be allowed. The appellants contend that there should be an "expansion of the relevant principles into a doctrine of forum non convenience." Broad questions of judicial policy are, therefore, involved. Should the principles which are clearly to be found in the English cases now be basically altered? Should they be so altered in cases where jurisdiction rests upon a firm recognition and acceptance of the existence of maritime liens? Should they be altered by this House in a case which will have been brought in the English courts on the basis of the pronouncements which have indicated the only circumstance in which jurisdiction which is available and which has been invoked will be denied? The learned judge exercised his discretion, as did concurrently the members of the Court of Appeal, on the basis of those pronouncements. |
The Admiralty court differs from courts in which the suits and the suitors are predominantly domestic. It is a court to which suitors from a range of maritime countries have been accustomed or content to resort. No chauvinism is involved in recognizing as a fact that it has been at the choice of many ship owners from other countries, as it was in the present case, that Admiralty cases have been brought in the English Admiralty Court. Ought a fundamental change of policy to be made by a decision of this House? If some change were thought to be desirable, ought it to be made, not by judicial decision, but rather in some other way and possibly only after processes of consultation which might lead to a common acceptance of policy by the maritime countries principally concerned? |
A study of the English cases reveals a consistent approach. Benefit is to be derived rather from considering what has been the general line of that approach than from considering the particular decisions reached on particular facts. The cases show that if there is jurisdiction in the court and if a plaintiff becomes enabled to invoke it and chooses to do so he may nevertheless in some circumstances not be allowed to do so. In the decisions which indicate what those circumstances are certain words constantly emerge. They are such words as "vexation" or "oppression." Thus in |
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"the general principle that the court can and will interfere whenever there is vexation and oppression to prevent the administration of justice being perverted for an unjust end." |
"It seems to me we have no sort of right, moral or legal, to take away from a plaintiff any real chance he may have of an advantage. If there is a fair possibility that he may have an advantage by prosecuting a suit in two countries, why should this court interfere and deprive him of it?" |
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In cases since 1936 the test as to whether proceedings are vexatious has been the test applied. Thus in The Soya Margareta [1961] 1 W.L.R. 709, 716 Hewson J. said: |
"Though convenience is a matter not lightly to be discarded, I do not think that such a preponderance of convenience in the getting together |
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of the evidence necessary in this case makes this action so vexatious that I ought to prevent the plaintiffs from following the course they have chosen." |
In the earlier case of The Quo Vadis [1951] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 425, Pilcher J. regarded it as axiomatic that a stay would not be granted unless proceedings were oppressive or vexatious. |
In my view, if the present motion is to be decided according to the principles which have for a long time guided and indeed bound learned judges and the Court of Appeal then I think that this appeal must fail. The proceedings brought in this country by the Dutch owner against the Holland America Line cannot, in my view, be regarded as vexatious or oppressive. They were not instituted in order to harass the defendants. There was no bad faith. There was no improper motive. The owner of the Bona Spes considers that as his vessel when lying moored was run into and sunk by the Atlantic Star he has a good cause of action. Rightly or wrongly he believes that in the advancement or for the protection of his legitimate financial interests his prospects of success are better in this country than in Belgium. It is not our province to decide whether he is right or wrong. But his good faith cannot be assailed. We are told that the report of the court surveyor in Belgium indicates his view that the Atlantic Star was not to blame. We are further told that though the report will not bind a Belgian court at a trial it will carry much weight with it: a court will in most cases accept the findings of fact of a surveyor: as to the views on responsibility of a surveyor a court is more likely to accept them than to depart from them. In view of this the respondent believes that this claim might fail in Belgium and that in England he will have a better chance of success. The learned judge said [1973] Q.B. 364, 369: "Whether his beliefs in these respects are right or wrong it would, in my view, be difficult to say that there were no reasonable grounds for his holding them." |
I see no reason to suggest that there was any error in their exercise of discretion either by the learned judge or by the numbers of the Court of Appeal. In my view, only if the law as hitherto propounded be now changed could their exercise of discretion be overturned. |
In his judgment the learned judge accurately reviewed and stated the law which bound him and then proceeded to consider how he should exercise his discretion. His conclusions were expressed as follows, at p. 372: |
"If, therefore, a finding that the Commercial Court of Antwerp was by far the more convenient forum was sufficient of itself to justify me in granting a stay, I should have no hesitation in doing so. As I have indicated, however, I do not consider that the authorities permit me to adopt that approach. I turn to consider, therefore, whether the plaintiff has any good reason for suing here, so that a stay would prejudice him; and whether the difficulties which the defendants would meet as a result of having to defend the action here would be so great |
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as to cause them injustice. On the first point, I do not think that it can justly be said that the plaintiff's motive in suing here is in any way improper. He is suing here because he thinks that he is more likely to succeed here. He has reasons for thinking so, which cannot fairly be categorised as either nugatory or unreasonable. In these circumstances I am of opinion that he would be prejudiced by a stay in the sense that he would be deprived of an advantage which he genuinely and reasonably believes trial of his claim in England would give him. On the second point, while it is inconvenient and expensive for the defendants to have to defend the plaintiff's claim here, while at the same time having to defend at least five other claims in Belgium, I do not consider that the degree of inconvenience and expense is so great as to make it unjust to the defendants to oblige them to do so." |
In the Court of Appeal Lord Denning M.R. accepted the findings of the learned judge as to convenience and said, at p. 384: |
"But, given all that convenience, the judge refused to stay the action in this country: and I agree with him. It is plain that the plaintiff honestly believes that there are substantial advantages to him in taking proceedings in England." |
Phillimore L.J. agreed in dismissing the appeal while saying that if the problem could be treated as res integra he would have wished to allow the appeal. Cairns L.J. said, at p. 388: |
"I can conceive of cases where inconvenience might be so great as to amount to oppression. I cannot see that the inconvenience here is of that degree. It is by no means uncommon for different causes of action arising out of the same casualty to lead to two actions in different countries. I cannot see that the multiplicity of actions at Antwerp adds much to the inconvenience to the defendants. The fact that witnesses are not within the jurisdiction of the English court and may not be compellable to give evidence here is a common enough feature of Admiralty actions. In my view any inconvenience to the defendants here falls far short of oppression or vexation or injustice." |
He further said that he could not accept that there was no real or substantial advantage to the plaintiff in suing in England. |
I entirely agree with Cairns L.J. that there may be cases where the measure of inconvenience which is caused to a defendant is so great as to amount to oppression. There are very many cases which could be brought either in one jurisdiction or in another. In such cases it could be said that the proceedings within whichever is the chosen jurisdiction are "unnecessarily" brought. But "oppression" is not thereby proved. |
The circumstances which determine whether a court has jurisdiction are not those which govern the question whether there should be a stay of proceedings. Only where there is jurisdiction will the decision have to be taken whether an application to stay should be made. But where by the law of a country it is proclaimed that a certain jurisdiction is available and may be "invoked" there will not lightly be a withholding or a withdrawing of that which in the first place is held out. The Admiralty Court is in a somewhat special position because of the existence of maritime liens. |
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Whatever may have been their origin in law the Admiralty Court has exercised the right to arrest a ship on the basis that after an event such as a collision a maritime lien attaches to the offending ship for the damage caused. More strictly perhaps it can be said that the lien attaches to a ship that is alleged to have offended. |
"reasonable and salutary rule that when a ship is so carelessly navigated as to occasion injury to other vessels which are free from blame, the owners of the injured craft should have a remedy against the corpus of the offending ship, ...": |
see also the judgment of Gorell Barnes J. in The Ripon City [1897] P. 226. |
No suggestion was advanced that it is today no longer necessary and desirable to maintain the long-standing system under which arrest can be made wherever the ship is found. If such suggestion was advanced it would not I think raise a matter for the decision of the judicial authorities. The system has lasted for a very long time and is accepted and recognised. The result is that a ship owner knows that in the course of maritime commerce his ship (if a maritime lien attaches to it) may be liable to arrest in many different places. It follows that the decision as to the place of arrest will be made by someone who is to be plaintiff in the proceedings which will follow. It is natural and inevitable and, indeed, is an inherent feature of the recognised system that a plaintiff will choose the place where he considers that his legitimate interests will be best advanced. A ship owner knows this and expects it just as a potential plaintiff knows it. If a plaintiff chooses to sue in England and becomes enabled and entitled to sue he knows that the proceedings may be stayed but will only be stayed if they are oppressive or harassing or are brought in bad faith and for no legitimate reason. If the law of one country is more favorable than the law of another country, is a plaintiff to be criticised for choosing the former? If because of any one of many features such, for example, as that of time limitation he will win if he goes to one country but lose if he goes to another should he be deprived of his right of choice? It is suggested that the matter should be looked at objectively with the interests of justice as the aim to be achieved. But this is only to side-step the problem. It can be assumed that the court in any country will be animated by a desire to do justice. It can be assumed that the court in any country will do justice according to law. But there may be, and presumably are, variations in the law and practice of different countries. As a result there may be advantage for a plaintiff if he proceeds in one country rather than another. |
It may well be that maritime nations will decide to have some new and common or uniform provisions of law. But so long as they have not, it is inevitable that a plaintiff who has a maritime lien will exercise his rights in |
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such manner as he deems best calculated legitimately to advance his interests. All concerned with maritime commerce will know this. |
It is, I think, important to note some of the provisions relating to Admiralty jurisdiction which are contained in the Administration of Justice Act 1956. These were enacted subsequently to an International Convention on Certain Rules Concerning Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision. It is clear from section 1 of the Act of 1956 that included in the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court are claims for damage done by or received by ships "(4) (a) ... whether British or not and whether registered or not and wherever the residence or domicile of their owners may be." Claims "wheresoever arising" are included [section 1 (4) (b) ] . The Act makes provision for the mode of exercise of Admiralty jurisdiction. It recognises the distinction between actions in rem and actions in personam. By section 3 (3), it is recognised that in a case in which there is a maritime lien on a ship the Admiralty jurisdiction may be invoked by an action in rem against that ship. The Admiralty jurisdiction may be invoked by an action in personam but subject to certain limitations. Thus, if there is a claim for damage arising out of a collision between ships (see section 4 (7)) no court in England and Wales can entertain an action in personam unless the defendant has his habitual residence or place of business within England and Wales or unless the cause of action arose within inland waters or the limits of a port or unless an action arising out of the same incident or series of incidents is proceeding in the court or has been heard and determined in the court. It is further provided that no court in England and Wales is to entertain an action in personam to enforce a claim to which section 4 applies until any proceedings previously brought by the plaintiff in any court outside England and Wales against the same defendant in respect of the same incident have been discontinued or ended: see section 4 (2). In section 5 (2), it is provided: |
"Nothing in this Part of this Act shall be construed as limiting the jurisdiction of the court to refuse to entertain an action for wages by the master or a member of the crew of a ship, not being a British ship." |
While there is nothing in the Act which limits the power of the Admiralty court to stay an action in rem which is within its jurisdiction so also there is nothing in the Act requiring the court to exercise its power to stay on principles differing from those which had for so many years prior to 1956 been recognised. The authorities which have established those principles may not be binding on this House but they have been consistent in what they have laid down and have for long been accepted. Particularly in reference to a court whose doors have been held widely open to those concerned in international maritime trade I consider that if any change is to be made it should be made by some process other than that of judicial pronouncement. |
For the reasons which I have given I would dismiss the appeal. |
LORD WILBERFORCE. My Lords, at first instance, Brandon J. held that, so far as convenience was concerned, the Commercial Court of Antwerp was by far the more appropriate forum to try the claim in this action. This holding was justified by the following facts: |
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1. The collision took place in a channel of the River Schelde leading to the port of Antwerp. |
2. Four other proceedings arising out of the collision were pending before the Commercial Court of Antwerp. [A fifth action has been begun there by the respondents, in order to preserve the time limit.] |
3. A court surveyor appointed by the Commercial Court of Antwerp, on the application of the respondent, had made a comprehensive report on he collision: the surveyor soon after the event interviewed all witnesses directly or indirectly involved: he took a number of statements which are set out in the report. The respondent was represented by a Belgian lawyer before the surveyor: there is a right, which was exercised, to cross-examine witnesses. Normally this report would be considered at a court hearing in the Commercial Court of Antwerp but only, of course, if proceedings were brought by a claimant. |
4. The rights and liabilities of those involved depend, at least in part, on Belgian law and port regulations. |
In addition: |
5. Neither the Atlantic Star nor the Bona Spes is British or British owned - both are Dutch vessels, owned by Dutch nationals. |
6. The only connection of any element in the action with England is that the present suit was begun in rem against the Atlantic Star when the vessel was expected in Liverpool. She would no doubt have been arrested if the appellants had not given a guarantee of £80,000 for the respondent's claim. I shall comment later upon this aspect of the matter, and upon the nature of the advantage to the respondent of continuing the action here. |
The case for staying this English action and remitting the respondent to his remedy in Antwerp is therefore a strong one. If the question whether it should be stayed is a matter of judicial discretion, there would seem to be very good reasons for doing so. So the first question must be whether the discretion exists, and if so whether it is a free discretion or one limited in any way by any rule of law. |
I dispose first of some arguments which, if accepted, might exclude the discretion. |
1. The jurisdiction of the High Court in Admiralty matters is now governed by the Administration of Justice Act 1956. This Act re-states, but does not, as I understand it, in any respect relevant to the present issue, extend the previous law as stated in the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1925. It confers jurisdiction to entertain actions in rem in respect of damage done by a ship whether the defendant ship is British or not and wherever the residence or domicile of its owners may be. It refers (section 3 (3)) to cases where there is a maritime lien (the present is such a case) and provides that in such a case the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court "may be invoked" by an action in rem against the ship in question. |
The Act thus establishes beyond question the court's jurisdiction, i.e., power to try the suit. In my opinion, it does no more. It does not oblige the court to I proceed with any case: it does not affect any matter of procedure, nor in terms or by implication affect the court's power, inherent or statutory, to stay proceedings. It leaves the court, as it was under the Act of 1925, and as it was before the Act of 1925, master of its own procedure: it imposes no fetter upon any discretion it may have. |
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2. Reference was made in argument and in the judgments of the Court of Appeal to an international convention signed at Brussels on May 10, 1952, concerning civil jurisdiction in matters of collision. It seems clear that the Act of 1956 was passed in order, in certain respects, (e.g. clause 3 (4)) to employment this convention. There is no question here of referring to the text of the convention in order to interpret the Act: the terms of the Act are clear, and I have dealt with them. And the convention has no independent relevance in this case. It does not represent, or constitute, customary international law: it is a limited agreement between its parties. It has no legal effect in a private suit in England except so far as incorporated in our law. Even if it could be looked at, it could not avail the respondent who is a citizen of the Netherlands, not a party to the convention: and, though Belgium is a party, no Belgian subject is concerned in the action. I shall make no further reference to this convention. |
My Lords, I am of opinion that this is a course which we cannot take. It is clear, from decisions to which I shall refer, that for some 100 years the law of England has taken a divergent path with its own rules, defined and adjusted in numerous cases, some of high authority. This same path has been followed in other Commonwealth jurisdictions - Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand. The arguments in favour of "forum non convenience" as a general rule are not so overwhelming that we should now make a radical change of direction: indeed there is much to be said for the English rule, provided that it is not too rigidly applied. I would not therefore favour accepting the radical solution. |
Of the early cases before the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, it is only useful to cite the decision of this House in Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren (1855) 5 H.L.Cas. 416. |
This was concerned with a subject matter very different from the present and suitable enough for chauvinistic treatment, namely, an administration |
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action in the English Chancery Court, the question being whether an injunction should be granted against the appellant, a Scottish company, restraining proceedings in Scotland. Sir John Romilly M.R. had granted an injunction but this was set aside by a majority in this House. The reasons given were, in general terms, that where there is litigation here, in which complete relief may be given, it may be vexatious for a party to commence foreign proceedings and he may be restrained from continuing them: but that this is not necessarily so in every case. Lord Cranworth L.C. at p. 438, refers to interfering: |
"on principles of convenience, to prevent litigation, which it [was] considered to be either unnecessary, and therefore vexatious, or ... ill-adapted to secure complete justice," |
but recognizing that there were limits to this principle he set the injunction aside, and Lord Brougham agreed. Lord St. Lanyards, dissenting, argued for a wider rule, that the court has power to act as the ends of justice require, and with that view to order parties to take or omit to take any steps and proceedings in any other court of justice, whether in this or in a foreign country. If this argument had prevailed, English law might have developed closer to the Scottish doctrine of forum non convenience: but it was not the view of the House and was not taken up in later authorities. |
Before the next important decision there was passed the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873. That Act (section 24 (5)) removed the power to restrain proceedings before the High Court by injunction, but in the same subsection recognised the courts' inherent power to stay. The terms in which it did so are of interest: |
"... nothing in this Act contained shall disable [the court] from directing a stay of proceedings in any cause or matter pending before it if it shall think fit; and any person, ... who would have been entitled, if this Act had not passed, to apply to any court to restrain the prosecution thereof, ... shall be at liberty to apply ... for a stay of proddings in such cause or matter, either generally, or so far as may be necessary for the purposes of justice; ..." |
The Act, further, provided in a Schedule initial rules of court which were to take effect until altered under power conferred by the Act. The initial rules contained no reference to vexation or oppression in relation to the court's power to stay. |
The form of section 24 (5) was evidently such as to secure that whatever special powers might be defined by rules of court, the inherent and general power of the High Court to stay proceedings should remain. This has been generally accepted since 1873. Section 24 (5) has itself been replaced by section 41 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, which is in similar form: and though there is now in the rules a provision relating to cases of vexation or oppression it has never been contended that the power of the court to stay is limited to such cases. |
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brought by the same plaintiff jointly with another person. The Court of Appeal dealt with it as a matter of general jurisdiction and refused to stay tho English action. Each member of the distinguished Court of Appeal is found using the word "vexatious" but as a word of illustration rather than limitation: for the widest range of considerations is taken into account and carefully weighed. Bowen L.J.'s words are well known and, to my mind, sum up the basis of the decision (22 Ch.D. 397, 407): |
"... it would be most unwise, unless one was actually driven to do so for the purpose of deciding this case, to lay down any definition of what is vexatious or oppressive, or to draw a circle, so to speak, round this court unnecessarily, and to say that it will not move outside it. ... they [vexation and oppression] must vary with the circumstances of each case." |
All the Lords Justices emphasise that there is power to stay an English action, if there is concurrent litigation abroad - Bowen L.J. at p. 409 says that the court could do it "if necessary for the purposes of justice," - but the jurisdiction is to be exercised cautiously - special circumstances must exist. |
It is obvious that this important case depends upon a principle quite distinct from "forum non convenience." It recognises an exceptional power capable of being described by reference to "vexation" and "oppression" but shows that these words are to be widely interpreted in relation to the circumstances and in the light of the fact that the court's discretion is general. |
"When a plaintiff comes into an English court he asks for justice. The court is bound therefore not to refuse to hear his case, or to put him under difficulties in the way of having his action brought to a conclusion. Of course that rule does not mean that a plaintiff, under the pretence of asking for justice, is to do that which is oppressive and vexatious, and the courts have always at common law, with which I am more familiar, and no doubt in equity also, interfered to prevent a plaintiff under colour of asking for justice from harassing others. Therefore, when that which he is asking for is frivolous, or sometimes when he is asking for it in a way which necessarily involves injustice, the courts have interfered." |
It is quite certain that, in these words, he had no intention of going beyond what he had said in McHenry v. Lewis, 22 Ch.D. 397 or placing |
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"The English courts are freely open to persons foreign to this country seeking to enforce their rights against our corporations, companies and citizens, in cases in which the courts can properly exercise jurisdiction, but, while I think we ought to be careful not to check this freedom, I am of opinion that we ought not to allow this hospitality to be abused. ... The court should, on the one hand, see clearly that in stopping an action it does not do injustice, and, on the other hand, I think the court ought to interfere whenever there is such vexation and oppression that the defendant who objects to the exercise of the jurisdiction would be subjected to such injustice that he ought not to be sued in the court in which the action is brought, to which injustice he would not be subjected if the action were brought in another accessible and competent court." |
"The true rule about a stay under section 41, so far as relevant to this case, may I think be stated thus: (1) A mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of prosecuting his action in an English court if it is otherwise properly brought. The right of access to the King's court must not be lightly refused. (2) In order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive and the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the court that the continuance of the action would work an injustice because it would be oppressive ar vexatious to him or would be an abuse of the process of the court in some other way; and (b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff. On both the burden of proof is on the defendant. These propositions are, I think, consistent with and supported by the following cases: |
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This clear and emphatic statement has proved its usefulness over the years. It has been applied by judges, without difficulty, to a large variety of cases. I should be most reluctant, even if I were capable, of replacing it by some wider and more general principle. But too close and rigid an application of it may defeat the spirit which lies behind it. And this is particularly true of the words "oppressive" and "vexatious." These words are not statutory words: as I hope to have shown from earlier cases, they are descriptive words which illustrate but do not confine the courts' general jurisdiction. They are pointers rather than boundary marks. They are capable of a strict, or technical application: conversely, if this House thinks fit, and as I think they should, they can in the future be interpreted more liberally. In my opinion, the passage cited embodies the following principles - all of which have been discussed in earlier authorities. |
First, a plaintiff should not lightly be denied the right to sue in an English court, if jurisdiction is properly founded. The right is not absolute. The courts are open, even to actions between foreigners, relating to foreign matters. But they retain a residual power to stay their proceedings. I may add that, in relation, inter alia, to Admiralty suits, the existence of this power has been explicitly affirmed in the United States of America. Mr. Benedict, a writer of acknowledged authority, says: |
"Admiralty courts have jurisdiction of Admiralty suits entirely between foreigners when proper service can be had or property attached, but it is discretionary with the court whether it will accept such jurisdiction or not." |
Secondly, in considering whether a stay should be granted the court must take into account (i) any advantage to the plaintiff; (ii) any disadvantage to the defendant: this is the critical equation, and in some cases it will be a difficult one to establish. Generally this is done by an instinctive process - that is what discretion, in its essence, is. But there are perhaps some elements which it is possible to disengage and make explicit. In the first place, I do not think it would be right to say that arty advantage to the plaintiff is sufficient to prevent a defendant from obtaining a stay. The cases say that the advantage must not be "fanciful" - that a "substantial advantage" is enough. I do not even think that one can say that the advantage must be substantive (i.e. in the existence in English law of some more favorable substantive rules than would apply elsewhere) rather than adjectival, though more weight might be given to the former. An example given by Lord Denning M.R. illustrates this: a motor collision in Italy between two Italian citizens, one of whom catches the other here and sues him. Lord Denning M.R. says that this would be purely Italian and so |
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(inferentially) should be stayed. But if this is right, it must follow that advantage to a plaintiff is not in itself decisive for the suit may well have been brought here because our courts give higher damages, or damages under broader heads: so if a stay is to be granted it must be because the court can additionally consider the nature of the case, and the disadvantage to the defendant. A bona fide advantage to a plaintiff is a solid weight in the scale, often a decisive weight, but not always so. |
How, then, should these principles be applied to the present case? Before I attempt to apply them I must consider whether there is any special factor relevant to the Admiralty jurisdiction which should impose some modification on the general rule. There are several points to bear in mind. |
First, the Admiralty court in this country is one with a long history and a wide international reputation. It is one to which resort is made from all over the world in matters having no intrinsic connection with England. The proportion (we were supplied with figures researched by counsel) of purely foreign suits which it entertains is substantial. It is a forum of choice often selected by parties to contracts: it is accustomed to applying foreign law, it is well-equipped to take expert advice which itself has a high repute. While all of these considerations still obtain today, there are now in existence, in other maritime countries, courts with Admiralty jurisdiction with comparable, if not equal, experience and I think it would be right that weight should be given to this when one of such courts is presented as the alternative forum. |
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where a plaintiff is (properly as to jurisdiction) suing here and that the mere fact that there are proceedings abroad is not enough. |
Thirdly, the present case, as many other Admiralty suits, is an action in rem, with a view to arrest. It is a case in which, by virtue of the collision, a maritime lien exists on his ship. These circumstances, it is said, provide a strong reason for retaining the action in the English court: they provide, in themselves, a strong point of connection with an English forum. |
So I do not think that, in the circumstances of this case, which may be exceptional, the nature of the action adds anything of weight to the arguments against a stay of proceedings. Where, then does the balance lie, on the equation as I have stated? On the plaintiff's side, beyond the initial fact - which always requires displacement - that he is suing here in a court whose doors are open to him, there is beyond his ipse digit no demonstrated advantage. As regards security, he will have all that he needs if he sues in Antwerp. He cannot point to any real, solid, advantage, procedural or substantive, in suing here. He says - or it is said in support of his case - that by suing here he will get the advantage of English procedure - oral, adversary, experienced. But beyond the fact that this may be different from Belgian procedure and that our courts have confidence in their own, there is nothing solid here. It may well be that to sue in Belgium may be cheaper and speedier: an English trial will not happen till years after the event: some witnesses may be unavailable. As to substantive law some suggestion was made that, by suing here, the plaintiff would be able to take advantage of a presumption which arises when a ship in motion collides with a ship at anchor. But it was not shown that this "presumption" after all a matter of common sense - would |
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I need not repeat the latter - they are disadvantages real and strong. The defendants, certainly are a powerful company, which on any result can support financial detriment. But I do not think that to compel them to submit to proceedings here, starting, after a long interval, from the beginning with undoubted difficulty of obtaining witnesses, after they have been exposed on the respondent's application to a full inquiry in Belgium and, if both actions proceed, with the risk of conflicting decisions in the two courts, is essentially just. |
I would allow the appeal. |
LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALE. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest. I agree with it so entirely that I add a few words of my own only because of the importance of the issue before your Lordships - your Lordships being invited to interfere with the basis of jurisdiction of the English Admiralty court, one of the most famous and historic courts in the world and one of international jurisdiction not only by public law but also by general commercial recourse: |
(1) Your Lordships are here faced with two irreconcilable, and each entirely respectable, legal stances; though, since every obverse has its reverse, each has concomitant disadvantages. On the one hand, there is the principle of forum convenience. According to this doctrine, whatever the law may say about jurisdiction, the parties will be compelled, through the court's exercise of its inherent or statutory power to stay proceedings, to litigate in the forum which in all the circumstances seems to the court the most appropriate one. On the other, there is the doctrine that, if a court has jurisdiction which is invoked by a plaintiff, it will not deny him justice. (2) The former doctrine - that of the forum conveniences apparently part of Scots and U.S. law; and it obviously has much to be said for it. The latter doctrine - that a plaintiff who founds jurisdiction will not be denied a hearing unless he is misusing the forensic process so as to perpetrate injustice - has also much to be said for it; and it is clearly the doctrine established in English law. It may, indeed, be merely a particular application of the promise made at Runnymede that "to no one will We deny justice." (It would be an inadequate performance of such a promise to say, "You can get perfectly satisfactory justice elsewhere.") |
(3) "Forum-shopping" is a dirty word; but it is only a pejorative way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of jurisdictions, he will naturally choose the one in which he thinks his case can be most favorably presented: this should be a matter neither for surprise nor for indignation. |
(4) English courts are normally confined to examining the statutes giving effect to a treaty or international convention, and precluded from scrutinising the treaty itself. But where public policy and international committee are |
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(5) Article 1 of the International Convention on Certain Rules Concerning Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision, signed at Brussels on May 10, 1952, by a number of states, including Great Britain and Belgium, reads as follows: |
"(1) An action for collision occurring between sea-going vessels, or between sea-going vessels and inland navigation craft, can only be introduced: (a) either before the court where the defendant has his habitual residence or a place of business; (b) or before the court of the place where arrest has been effected of the defendant ship or of any other ship belonging to the defendant which can be lawfully arrested, or where arrest could have been effected and bail or other security has been furnished; (c) or before the court of the place of collision when the collision has occurred within the limits of a port or inland waters. |
"(2) It shall be for the plaintiff to decide in which of the courts referred to in (1) of this article, the action shall be instituted. |
"(3) A claimant shall not be allowed to bring a further action against the same defendant on the same facts in another jurisdiction, without discontinuing an action already instituted." |
(6) This country duly ratified the 1952 convention; and was thereupon bound to give effect to it in municipal legislation. This was done by the Administration of Justice Act 1956. All that the Act of 1956 had to do (and did) in this respect was to confine the English Admiralty jurisdiction in personam so as to conform with article 1 (1) (a) and (c) of the convention (section 4) and to extend the English Admiralty jurisdiction in rem to a sister ship in accordance with article 1 (1) (b) of the convention (section 3 (4) (b)). |
(7) To covenant in article 1 (2) that it shall be for the plaintiff to decide in which of the various courts open to him the action shall be instituted, and then to proceed to stay his action if he chooses the one most convenient to himself but not to every one else, is to take back with one hand what we are by international treaty bound to give him with the other. |
(8) Ships are elusive. The power to arrest in any port and found thereon an action in rem is increasingly required with the custom of ships being owned singly and sailing under flags of convenience. A large tanker may by negligent navigation cause extensive damage to beaches or to other shipping: she will take very good care to keep out of the ports of the "convenient" forum. If the aggrieved party manages to arrest her elsewhere, it will be said forcibly (as the appellants say here): "The defendant |
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has no sort of connection with the forum except that she was arrested within its jurisdiction." But that will frequently be the only way of securing justice. |
(9) "Forum-shopping" is, indeed, inescapably involved with the concept of maritime lien and the action in rem. Every port is automatically an admiralty emporium. This may be very inconvenient to some defendants, but the system has unquestionably proved itself on the whole as an instrument of justice. |
(10) If, as I believe, English law does not know the doctrine of forum convenience, but rather allows any plaintiff bona fide seeking relief to have unrestricted access to the seat of judgment, it would, in my respectful submission, be wrong to hinder such access by marginal alteration of the criteria hitherto prevailing. That would be to admit by the back door a rule that your Lordships consider cannot be welcomed at the front. |
(11) My own view is, I confess, that the rule which, as my noble and learned friend, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, has shown, is firmly established in English law is, on balance, the one best suited to general advantage and justice. But, certainly, it has sufficient to commend it, it is so firmly settled, and it is so intricately involved with this country's international obligations, that, if it is to be changed, it must be for Parliament and not for the courts to make the change. |
I would therefore dismiss the appeal. |
LORD KILBRANDON. My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Wilberforce, with which I entirely agree: it is therefore not necessary that I should give my views at length. First, the circumstances in which the application for an order to stay is made must be briefly set outage because it is upon their distinctive character that the decision will depend. |
As a consequence of a collision in the River Schelde between the ship Atlantic Star (the appellants), and two moored barges, the Bona Spay (the respondents), and the Hugo van der Goes, all Dutch vessels, there are now pending the following actions against the Atlantic Star: |
A. In the Commercial Court at Antwerp: |
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B. In the High Court in London: |
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It is agreed that action A (v) was brought after B (i), but only in order to protect the plaintiff against the running of the Belgian time limitation, and that, should B (i) be allowed to proceed, A (v) will be abandoned. Actions A (i) to A (iv) cannot be abandoned with a view to the claims in them being adjudicated in London, since they are now time-barred here. So they will in any event have to go on in Antwerp. As between the respondent and the appellants, the Belgian and the British courts have unimpeachable |
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jurisdiction, the former arising from the place of the accident, the latter in consequence of the Atlantic Star having given bail in order to avoid arrest. No doubt all the actions could also have been prosecuted in the courts of the Netherlands, the forum of the owners of the Atlantic Star, the Holland America Line. |
One other feature must be mentioned because it is important. On January 29, 1970, that is, two days after the accident, the Hugo van der Goes made application to the Commercial Court at Antwerp for the appointment of a surveyor. This functionary, an experienced master mariner, is charged with the duty of investigating the circumstances of an accident, with the assistance of legal representatives of those who have been concerned in it, who have the right to question in his presence witnesses who may be called by him in order to give evidence as to what happened. A day or two later the respondent, in ignorance that a prior application had already been made, also applied for a surveyor to be appointed. The consequence was that the surveyor, Captain Van Clemen, made a full and careful investigation, in which the legal advisers to the present parties were participants, and reported to the Commercial Court his conclusions, including those concerning salvage, on February 23, 1971 (Appendix p. 19), that is within one year and one month of the accident. The affidavit evidence of Belgian law leads us to understand that, if the experience of precedent is a guide, it is probable that the Commercial Court at Antwerp will accept the opinion arrived at by the surveyor. That opinion appears to be favorable to the Atlantic Star. |
Ignoring action A (v), which, if the stay asked for is refused, is of an ephemeral character, it will be seen that in all but a technical sense the merits of the dispute between the present parties are the subject matter of lis alibi pendens - but not technically so, since that subject matter is to be debated alibi between non-identical parties. There has thus been set up the possibility, if not the probability, of contradictory decisions being arrived at on the same facts in two different courts of competent jurisdiction: the mere statement of that situation should be enough to invite the contemplation of some remedy for it. The question is, should the action B (i) be stayed to await the decision of the Antwerp actions? |
It is with such cases of double, or multiple, jurisdiction as this that the plea of forum non convenience is concerned in some jurisdictions. The idea lying behind the plea is that it is desirable, in such circumstances, to find some way of reconciling the general rule that, jurisdiction being for any reason exercisable by a particular court, the judge of that court cannot refuse to exercise it, with another general rule, that the plaintiff ought to pursue the defendant in the court to which the defendant is normally subject, possibly because of his physical presence within reach of the judge's arm, or perhaps ratione domicillii. Obviously this conflict is likely to occur where one of the competing, jurisdictions has been constituted in some court which would have had no jurisdiction over the defendant but for some special power conferred through the presence of his property within the jurisdiction. Examples are, by arrestment ad fundandem jurisdiction em in Scotland, or, in the several countries in which such a procedure is competent, arrestment in rem to found jurisdiction against a ship, and thus against her owners. |
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"I do not see how one can guide oneself profitably by endeavoring to conciliate and promote the interests of both these antagonists, except in that ironical sense, in which one says that it is in the interests of both that the case should be tried in the best way and in the best tribunal, and that the best man should win. The real proposition is, I think, that the court has to consider how best the ends of justice in the case in question and on the facts before it, so far as they can be measured in advance, can be respectively ascertained and served. ... The object, under the words 'forum non convenience' is to find that forum which is the more suitable for the ends of justice, and is preferable because pursuit of the litigation in that forum is more likely to secure those ends." |
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"The argument that such clauses are improper because they tend to 'oust' a court of jurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction. It appears to rest at core on historical juridical resistance to any attempt to reduce the power and business of a particular court and has little place in an era when all courts are overloaded and when businesses once essentially local now operate in world markets. It reflects something of a provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other tribunals." (p. 320) |
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"(a) the defendant must satisfy the court that the continuance of the action would work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or would be an abuse of the process of the court in some other way; and (b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff." |
There are plenty of earlier examples of the use of the words "oppressive" and "vexatious" in this context. But the words have, at all events today, certain shades of meaning which make it difficult to accept an uncritical construction as appropriate to all circumstances in which guidelines - and they are nothing more - may be required. "Oppressive" is an adjective which ought to be, and today normally is, confined to deliberate acts of moral, though not necessarily legal, delinquency, such as an unfair abuse of power by the stronger party in order that a weaker party may be put in difficulties in obtaining his just rights. "Vexatious" today has overtones of irresponsible pursuit of litigation by someone who either knows he has no proper cause of action, or is mentally incapable of forming a rational opinion on that topic. Either of these attitudes may amount to an abuse of the process of the court, but in my opinion a defendant miring for a stay cannot be compelled to bring the plaintiff's conduct within the scope of one of these grave allegations. |
In the present case, Brandon J. has pointed out that as far as convenience is concerned, the Commercial Court at Antwerp is by far the most convenient forum; the position of Phillimore L.J. is that, had it not been for the weight of authority, he would have held "that in the interests of justice regarded objectively a stay should be granted so that this case in all its aspects can be disposed of in the Commercial Court at Antwerp." These opinions support me in my view that (a) the competing claims in that court, (b) the fact that in a real sense the respondents, by asking for the appointment of a surveyor, appealed to that jurisdiction (I ignore the Belgian action at their instance for the reasons I have given), (c) the usual averments as to convenience of witnesses and parties, (d) the entirely unnecessary expense to which the English action whaled subject the appellants, (e) the total absence of physical connection between England and the subject matter of the action, are factors which |
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can, and in this case do, make the continuance of the case in England oppressive or vexatious to the defendants, within the morally neutral meaning which these words should, I think, in this context bear. |
It was said that to grant an application to stay proceedings was to drive a plaintiff from the judgment seat. Of course that is true, and the grounds upon which it can be done are very narrowly circumscribed. But the literary character of the phrase reminds one that when Gallio drove the Jews from his judgment seat he did so, not as a declinature of jurisdiction, which would have been unlikely in a judge in his position, but because he thought another forum was more appropriate for the determination of "a question of words and names, and of your law." "See ye to it," said he: Acts 18, vv. 14-16. |
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Finally, reference was made to the International Convention Concerning Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision. In my opinion the invention does not touch the present controversy. It is concerned solely with jurisdiction, as its name implies, and as its terms indicate; the existence of two or more competent fora each with jurisdiction to hear a particular dispute is a condition precedent to an application to stay being entertained. The convention itself (to which the Netherlands are not a party) is of no standing in a municipal matter such as the present. No doubt the Administration of Justice Act 1956 goes some way towards giving statutory effect to the provisions of the invention, but it has no reference to motions to stay, nor could it have without amendment to section 41 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925. |
On the other topics which were discussed I agree with my noble and learned friend and have nothing to add. |
I would allow this appeal. |
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Solicitors: Clyde & Co; Alsop, Stevens, Batesons & Co. |
J. A. G. |