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[COURT OF APPEAL] |
In re VANDERVELL'S TRUSTS WHITE AND OTHERS v. VANDERVELL TRUSTEES LTD. AND INLAND REVENUE COMMISSIONERS |
[1968 V. No. 935] |
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Practice
- Parties - Joinder - Revenue - Dispute between executors and trustees
- Result entailing tax consequences - Revenue willing to be party to
decision having tax consequences - Application for joinder opposed by
defendant trustees - Whether commissioners' presence "necessary to
ensure ... all matters in dispute ... effectually and completely
determined and adjudicated upon" - |
Crown
- Joinder - Proceedings between subjects - Whether jurisdiction to join
"as necessary party" - Crown consenting and one party objecting -
Fiscal issue - |
In October, 1968, the executors obtained leave from the master under R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 6 (2) (b)1 to join the Inland Revenue Commissioners as second defendants to the originating summons against the trustees. The commissioners consented to be joined, but the trustees objected. Buckley J. |
1 R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 6 (2): "At any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter the court may on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application ... (b) order any person who ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence before the court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon be added as a party." |
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granted an application by the trustees to have the commissioners struck out. |
On appeal by the executors:- |
Held, allowing the appeal, (1) that the court had jurisdiction under R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 6 (2) (b) to order that the commissioners be added as a party to the proceedings in order that the issue whether the dividends belonged to the executors (thereby involving a fiscal liability in which the revenue was interested) or to the trustees might be "effectively and completely" determined by a decision binding on the commissioners; and as it was authoritatively settled that there was now no obstacle to joining the Crown as a party where the commissioner had consented to the joinder, the court should so order. |
Per curiam. The rule which gives the court power to join "any person whose presence ... is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute ... may be ... completely determined" should be liberally interpreted in order to give effect to the intention of the Judicature Acts that all parties whose rights would or might be affected should be brought before the court in one proceeding by which all would be bound, thereby avoiding a multiplicity of actions, the saving of costs, and the risk of differing conclusions on the selfsame issue (post, pp. 56E,57H - 58A, 60G). |
Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd. [1956] 1 Q.B. 357; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 372; [1956] 1 All E.R. 273 disapproved on this point. |
(2) That in the instant case the court's jurisdiction to allow the commissioners to be joined was not ousted by reason of the fact that a special procedure for determining fiscal issues between the subject and the Crown was provided by the Income Tax Acts, for the executors, who alone had an interest in electing to adopt that procedure in relation to the surtax claim, could waive and had waived that procedure, and as the trustees had no tax axe to grind, their objection to the present proceedings was unsustainable. |
Barraclough v. Brown [1897] A.C. 615, H.L.(E.) distinguished. |
Decision of Buckley J. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 437; [1969] 1 All E.R. 1056 reversed. |
The following cases are referred to in the judgments: |
Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd. [1956] 1 Q.B. 357; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 372; [1956] 1 All E.R. 273. |
Argosam Finance Co. Ltd. v. Oxby [1965] Ch. 390; [1964] 3 W.L.R. 774; [1964] 3 All E.R. 561, C.A. |
Asher v. London Film Productions Ltd. [1944] 1 K.B. 133; [1944] 1 All E.R. 77, C.A. |
Attorney-General v. Avelino Aramayo & Co. [1925] 1 K.B. 86, C.A. |
Blaise v. Blaise [1969] P. 54; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 1047; [1969] 2 All E.R. 1032. C.A. |
Fire, Auto and Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Greene [1964] 2 Q.B. 687; [1964] 3 W.L.R. 319; [1964] 2 All E.R. 761. |
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Gurtner v. Circuit [1968] 2 Q.B. 587; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 668; [1968] 1 All E.R. 328, C.A. |
Leek, decd., In re [1967] Ch. 1061; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 576; [1967] 2 All E.R. 1160; [1969] 1 Ch. 563; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 1385; [1968] 1 All E.R. 793, C.A. |
Pilkington's Will Trusts, In re [1959] Ch. 699; [1961] Ch. 466; [1961] 2 W.L.R. 776; [1961] 2 All E.R. 330, C.A. |
Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1958] 1 Q.B. 554; [1960] A.C. 260; [1959] 3 W.L.R. 346; [1959] 3 All E.R. 1, H.L.(E.). |
Riches v. Westminster Bank Ltd. [1947] A.C. 390; [1947] 1 All E.R. 469, H.L.(E.). |
Vandervell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1967] 2 A.C. 291; [1967] 2 W.L.R. 87; [1967] 1 All E.R. 1, H.L.(E.). |
Westminster Bank Executor and Trustee Co. (Channel Islands) Ltd. v. National Bank of Greece S.A., July 24, 1968, unreported; [1969] 3 W.L.R. 468, C.A. |
The following additional cases were cited in argument: |
Abrahams' Will Trusts, In re [1969] 1 Ch. 463; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1198; [1967] 2 All E.R. 1175. |
Midwood's Settlement, In re [1968] Ch. 238; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1014; [1967] 3 All E.R. 291. |
Result, The [1958] P. 174; [1958] 2 W.L.R. 725; [1958] 1 All E.R. 839. |
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL from Buckley J. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 437. |
In 1949 the settlor, Guy Anthony Vandervell, made a settlement in favour of his children. In 1958, wishing to make a gift of £150,000 to the Royal College of Surgeons, he caused to be transferred to them 100,000 "A" shares in Vandervell Products Ltd., a private company manufacturing engineering products, of which he was chairman, managing director, and principal shareholder. The Royal College of Surgeons, on December 1, 1958, granted an option for five years to the trustees of the settlement, Vandervell Trustees Ltd., to purchase the shares for £5,000. It was intended that the £150,000 gift to the college was to be in the form of dividends paid on the shares held by the college. |
On October 11, 1961, after amounts in excess of £150,000 had been paid to the Royal College of Surgeons as dividends, the trustees exercised the option and the shares were transferred to them. The £5,000 was paid by the trustees out of the funds of the 1949 settlement with the settlor's knowledge and approval. |
In respect of the period between October 11, 1961 (the date of the |
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exercise of the option), and January 19, 1965, the trustees received dividends on the shares amounting to £1,256,458 gross. |
By a deed dated January 19, 1965, after reciting, inter alia, that doubts had arisen as to whether or not the settlor had divested himself of all the interest in the shares, and that the deed was being executed for the resolution of such doubts, the settlor assigned and released to the trustees all such right, title or interest (if any) as he might have to or in the option or the shares, and to or in the dividends or income, to be held by the trustees upon the trusts of the 1949 settlement. |
By a will dated January 27, 1967, the settlor appointed the plaintiffs as his executors. He died on March 10, 1967. |
By an originating summons dated May 31, 1968, the executors claimed from the trustees payment of the net sum of £765,016 received by the trustees by way of dividends and capital distribution on the 100,000 "A" shares in Vandervell Products Ltd. in respect of the period October 11, 1961, to January 19, 1965, after deduction of the sum payable under the option with interest thereon. Alternatively, the executors sought a declaration that they were entitled to all moneys received by the trustees by way of dividend on the shares, an account of the dividends received, and payment of the amount found due. They contended that the trustees held the shares in respect of the period between October 11, 1961, and January 19, 1965, in trust for the settlor absolutely and that his estate was, therefore, entitled to the dividends received. |
The Inland Revenue, on the basis that the settlor had not divested himself of the shares until January 19, 1965, made an assessment on the estate for surtax, in respect of the dividends for the period October 11, 1961, to January 19, 1965, amounting to £628,229. The executors gave notice of appeal against the assessment but, by agreement, the determination of those appeals was stood over pending the determination of the action against the trustees. |
By a letter dated August 9, 1968, the Inland Revenue Commissioners consented to being joined as defendants in the action, and on October 23, 1968, Master Heward, on the application of the executors, made an order under R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 6 (2) (b), authorising the addition of the commissioners as defendants. The trustees issued a summons to strike out the commissioners as defendants. The summons was adjourned into court by the master. |
Buckley J. on January 30, 1969 [1969] 1 W.L.R. 437, granted the trustees' application to have the commissioners struck out on the grounds (1) that the issues raised in the summons could properly be determined between the executors and trustees without the commissioners' presence and that the commissioners were, therefore, not persons who "ought to have been joined as a party" to the proceedings within the rule; and (2) that as the interests of the executors and the commissioners were largely identical and as the executors were disputing the case put forward by the trustees it could not be said that the commissioners' presence was "necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute ... may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon," so that the case did not fall within R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 6 (2) (b), and the master should not have made the order. |
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The executors appealed on the grounds that the judge was wrong in law in holding (1) that the commissioners were not persons whose presence before the court was necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter might be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon, and (2) that, therefore, there was no jurisdiction under R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 6 (2) (b), for the master's direction of October 23, 1968. |
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B. L. Bathurst Q.C. and Michael Miller for the trustees. The point on the trustees' acquiescence in the master's order should not be entertained on the appeal since it is not a ground of appeal. The trustees in fact never consented. The application to the master was made with only two solicitors' clerks present and Buckley J. declined to treat the fact that the matter was not argued before the master as an effective consent by the trustees to the joinder. |
The main and sole issue is whether the revenue should be joined as a party to the proceedings between the executors and trustees. The trustees, who are not bound by the House of Lords decision in favour of the revenue, object to the joinder. They do not seek to challenge the House of Lords decision in the proposed action where the subject matter is a different set of dividends for a different period and involving surtax for different years. |
The proposed action raises one question only: Do the dividends for the years 1961 to 1965 belong to the estate or to the trustees of the family settlement? That is a straight issue between subjects; and the only possible interest of the revenue is that if the executors win they will face a large claim for surtax and a smaller claim for estate duty. The interest of the revenue will be adequately safeguarded by the executors and their advisers. They should not be separately represented or joined when they have no separate interest requiring to be determined in these proceedings. |
Though the matter comes before the court in interlocutory form it raises a wide and very important matter of principle, for in almost every action in which there is a dispute as to the ownership of property the revenue have an interest in the result. For example, if there is a question whether the income from a trust belongs to A or B and A is rich and B is poor, there may be a large surtax claim if A wins and no tax claim at all if B wins. Are the revenue to be joined as a party because they can claim such an "interest" in the result? Even in a divorce petition the revenue may have an interest in the tax element because the income of a husband and wife are aggregated for tax purposes. In the present proceedings no relief is claimed against the revenue and they are not even a party to the appeal so that they are not properly before the court. |
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Two questions arise for decision: (1) Is there any jurisdiction to add the revenue as a party in a case like the present? (2) If there is jurisdiction, is this a case in which they should be added, having regard to the words of the rule? Buckley J. found it unnecessary to deal with (1) because he decided under (2) that they were not "necessary" parties within the words of the rule because the interest of the executors and the revenue were the same. |
[SACHS L.J. There are many cases where the Crown agrees to be bound by a judicial decision in order to take a short cut.] |
If there is jurisdiction to add the revenue under the rule, this is not a case in which it should be done. Three conditions have always been satisfied before the revenue are joined as a party: (1) all the parties must consent to their being brought in; (2) there must be no question of fact in dispute; and (3) no party to the proceedings should have an interest in arguing a point which might assist the revenue. Applying those conditions here: (i) the trustees do not consent; (ii) there are a number of facts in issue. As the House of Lords decision does not bind the trustees the executors cannot rely on the facts in that decision to support their case against the trustees but must prove the facts on which they rely to the satisfaction of the court; (iii) the only interest of the revenue is that the executors shall succeed: if they do, it will be on the footing that the 1961-65 dividends belonged to the deceased V. in his lifetime and the estate would then be liable for the surtax. |
The trustees are entitled to stand on their rights and they say that the revenue's presence is not necessary. The most important consideration is |
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J. P. Warner for the commissioners. The attitude of the commissioners on the question whether they should be joined as defendants is neutral; but the revenue approach and practice should be made clear. |
First, the revenue does not automatically accept the effect of the court's decision in every case between subjects. They look at each case to make sure that no piece of evidence which should have been put in was left out and that every point of law which should have been argued was argued; and though in general they incline to accept a decision made in their absence that acceptance is not automatic. |
The requirement of consent is not a matter of Crown privilege. The |
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The matter does not turn upon whether there is a dispute of fact between the subjects. Indeed, such cases may be those in which joinder is most valuable. |
The surtax appeal is already on foot before the special commissioners. It would be very unsatisfactory if there were conflicting findings of fact in the two sets of proceedings. There are three possible cases: a pure point of law; a point of construction; and an issue of fact. In the pure point of law case where no facts are in issue, the position, if the trustees' submissions are right, would nonetheless be that there could be an originating summons as between the executors and the beneficiaries and an appeal by case stated from the special commissioners as between the Crown and the executors, and both could come on for hearing before the same judge at the same time. In the point of construction case a halfway house between an issue of fact and one of law - the outcome may depend not only on the wording of the document but also on the surrounding circumstances at the time it was executed. In such a case there might be nuances between the ways in which the facts as to the surrounding circumstances were expressed in the evidence on an originating summons and in a case stated, and the judge might be faced with a situation where his conclusion would differ according to those nuances. If a distinction is to be drawn, as the trustees say, between cases raising issues of primary fact and those raising issues of construction or law, it is difficult to see how it would work out in practice. It is a matter of degree. |
While the revenue do not wish to depart from their basic attitude of neutrality, they do want to save this consent jurisdiction for other cases, and their approach is summarised as follows: (1) the consents required are the consents of those entitled to use the statutory procedure and of no others: (2) no distinction is to be drawn between cases where there is an issue of fact and those where there is not, and (3) the revenue may be joined even where there is already a party having the same interest as that of the revenue. |
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Balcombe Q.C. in reply. |
That is precisely in point. The taxpayer and the revenue here have the right to use the statutory procedure for surtax and their consent is necessary if that procedure is waived. They have elected to waive it in this case. The trustees cannot rely on the existence of the statutory procedure because it does not concern them. |
On the trustees' objection that the revenue have an economic interest in almost every property case, the practical answer is that the revenue would not consent to be added unless their presence is necessary to ensure that justice is done. There is no fear of the floodgates being opened. The figures given by the revenue show that consent is given about twice a year. The revenue are properly before the court on the present appeal since notice of appeal was served on them by the executors. |
The suggestion that the revenue will normally accept a decision of the court in proceedings to which they are not a party is refuted by the present summons, for if the revenue would assure the executors that they would accept the decision of the court about the ownership of the dividends there would be no need for the present appeal. One good reason why the revenue would not accept a decision to which they were not a party is that they have a House of Lords finding in their favour. That will again be in issue though in relation to different years, for the trustees will say that the option was always vested in the children's settlement. The executors want the revenue a party so as to be bound if the executors lose against the trustees, and the revenue's presence is necessary to ensure that the right to the dividends shall be effectually determined and so prevent a multiplicity of actions and save costs. |
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The practical position here is that there is a live issue between the executors and the trustees which will be fought to a finish. The revenue has confidential information about the testator's tax affairs which they cannot disclose; but they are willing to assist the executors in any way the executors wish; and if the trustees succeed, it is most unlikely that the revenue will not accept the result. |
LORD DENNING M.R. Twenty years ago, in 1949, the late Mr. Vandervell made a settlement on trust for his children and descendants. The trustees were a company now known as Vandervell Trustees Ltd. Ten years later, in November 1958, Mr. Vandervell transferred 100,000 "A" Ordinary shares in a company of his called Vandervell Products Ltd. to the Royal College of Surgeons. A day or two later, on December 1, 1958, the Royal College of Surgeons gave Vandervell Trustees Ltd. an option to purchase those 100,000 shares for £5,000. The option was not exercised at the time by the trustees. During the next two or three years, from 1958 to 1961, the dividends on those 100,000 shares were received by the Royal College of Surgeons. These dividends came to £250,000. On October 11, 1961, Vandervell Trustees Ltd. exercised the option. They paid £5,000 to the Royal College of Surgeons, and the shares were transferred to Vandervell Trustees Ltd. Thenceforward for the next four years, from 1961 till 1965, the dividends were paid to Vandervell Trustees Ltd. They came to £11/4m. gross, before tax. In 1965 Mr. Vandervell executed a deed by which he assigned any interest which he might have in the option or the shares to Vandervell Trustees Ltd. upon trust for the children under the settlement which he had arranged as far back as 1949. Then on March 10, 1967, Mr. Vandervell died. |
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revenue say that that decision governs the position subsequent to 1961 until 1965: so that Mr. Vandervell himself was entitled beneficially to the dividends which were paid to the trustees between 1961 and 1965. They came to £1¼ million. The revenue say that Mr. Vandervell was liable to pay surtax on that £11/4m., and, now that he has died, the executors should pay it. |
But Vandervell Trustees Ltd. claim that these £1¼ million were their dividends. They were received by them from 1961 to 1965. They held them as trustees, they say, for the children, and they, as trustees, are not liable to pay surtax. |
Those issues have resulted in two separate sets of proceedings against the executors: on the one hand, the revenue claim against the executors for surtax on the dividends of £1¼ million, on the ground that they belonged to Mr. Vandervell. They have made an assessment on the executors: and the executors are appealing against it. On the other hand, the Vandervell Trustees Ltd. claim that, as between them and the executors, the dividends belong to the Vandervell Trustees Ltd. The executors have issued an originating summons in Chancery so as to determine to whom the dividends belong. |
So Mr. Vandervell's executors are being shot at by two marksmen. They are being shot at by the revenue for surtax on the basis that the dividends belong to Mr. Vandervell. And they are being shot at by Vandervell Trustees Ltd. On the basis that the dividends belong to Vandervell Trustees. It is plain that there ought not to be two separate proceedings running alongside one another in which the selfsame issue is involved. If they go along separately, neither contestant would be bound by the other decision. The revenue would not be bound by a decision as between the executors and Vandervell Trustees; and the trustees would not be bound by the decision as between the revenue and the executors. If each of those proceedings were allowed to go on separately, it is quite possible that there might be different results. |
In order to avoid any such situation, the executors of Mr. Vandervell in this originating summons have made an application for the Inland Revenue Commissioners to be joined as defendants, so that they may be bound by the decision and so that it may be decided as between the three parties concerned whether the dividends belonged to Mr. Vandervell and hence to his executors, or whether they belonged to the trustees. |
"I have often thought that in cases of this kind it is extremely inconvenient that the Crown (which is vitally interested) cannot, under the existing procedure, be made a party, or otherwise appear." |
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there was no machinery by which the revenue could be joined in a proceeding between subjects, however just and convenient it might be. |
It is apparent, therefore, that the inconvenience noted by Lord Greene M.R. in 1944 has been remedied. The joinder is permitted by R.S.C., Ord. 15. Rule 6 (2) (so far as material) says that: |
"At any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter the court may on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application ... (b) order any person ... whose presence before the court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon be added as a party, ..." |
Those words should be given a liberal construction. Lord Esher M.R. said as much in Byrne v. Brown (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 657, 666: |
"One of the chief objects of the Judicature Acts was to secure that, wherever a court can see in the transaction brought before it that the rights of one of the parties will or may be so affected that under the forms of law other actions may be brought in respect of that transaction, the court shall have power to bring all the parties before it, and determine the rights of all in one proceeding. It is not necessary that the evidence in the issues raised by the new parties being brought in should be exactly the same; it is sufficient if the main evidence, and the main inquiry, will be the same, and the court then has power to bring in the new parties, and to adjudicate in one proceeding upon the rights of all the parties before it." |
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inconsistent results. It would be a disgrace in this very case if the special commissioners should come to one result and a judge in the Chancery Division should come to another result as to who was entitled to these dividends. Such different and inconsistent results are to be deplored and avoided. It can be done by bringing all parties before the court so as to have the issue finally decided between all of them and so that all be bound. |
I say nothing as to what the position would be if the commissioners did not consent. But I am not to be taken as saying that the court would have no jurisdiction. The court may have jurisdiction, even without their consent, for the rule is wide enough to permit it. Suffice it that here the commissioners consent to be joined. The taxpayers - the executors of Mr. Vandervell - want them to be joined. It is true that the Vandervell trustees do not agree and indeed firmly object. But their objection should be overruled. The just and convenient course is for the issue - to whom do these dividends belong - to be decided by the courts in one proceeding. That can be done by joining the commissioners as parties. It is to be noted that no relief is specifically claimed against them. But the importance of joining them is that they will be bound by the result. For instance, if the Vandervell trustees won the case, the revenue could not afterwards come down on the executors for surtax. I would allow the appeal accordingly, and allow a joinder. |
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(1889) 22 Q.B.D. 657, 666, as to the necessity of adopting a broad view of the construction of Order 15, rr. (4) and (6). I would venture to add that Lord Esher in the course of his judgment also said: |
"Another great object was to diminish the cost of litigation. That being so, the court ought to give the largest construction to those Acts in order to carry out as far as possible the two objects I have mentioned." |
In the instant case the same issues arise as between the plaintiffs and the defendants, on the one hand, and the plaintiffs and the Inland Revenue, on the other. As regards the plaintiffs and the Inland Revenue, the issues affect the plaintiffs' liability as executors in three matters: the first, surtax payable by the deceased; the second, estate duty payable in respect of the deceased's estate; and, thirdly, to a smaller extent, a matter of stamp duty. It would indeed be no tribute to our legal system if those issues could not be determined in the course of a single set of proceedings as between the plaintiffs, the defendants and the revenue. |
As regards estate duty I understand that any question of liability as between the plaintiffs and the Inland Revenue can in the normal course of events be determined by process commenced in the Chancery Division, neither the subject nor the Crown being bound to adopt some special code of procedure. Thus, taking the estate duty position on its own to start with, to my mind none of the reasons advanced by the Vandervell Trustees Ltd., whom I will call the trustees, seem to me to establish that the court has no jurisdiction to order that the Inland Revenue be joined as a defendant. I adopt in that behalf the reasoning of my Lord, the Master of the Rolls. |
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in Pilkington's case [1961] Ch. 466 and in Leek's case [1969] 1 Ch. 563, was fully justified. |
Mathew J. decided the point of law against the undertakers and on appeal by them the Court of Appeal affirmed his decision. When, however, the matter came before the House of Lords the jurisdiction point was raised by their Lordships during the submissions on behalf of the undertakers. (The owners were not called upon.) Lord Herschell said, at p. 620: |
"I do not think the appellant can claim to recover by virtue of the statute, and at the same time insist upon doing so by means other than those prescribed by the statute which alone confers the right." |
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"that, when the legislature has designated a particular tribunal, such as a jury or [justices], to determine a case, the appellate court must not debar the litigant from having that tribunal's determination." |
That statement flowed from an examination of Bray v. Ford [1896] A.C. 44, and the speech therein of Lord Watson who referred, at p. 49, to the constitutional and legal rights of litigants. |
In the instant case, however, Mr. Warner, on being pressed on this point, was able to assure the court that so far as surtax was concerned, there was no issue that the trustees could take to the commissioners. Moreover, Mr. Bathurst at no stage in his careful submissions suggested that there was a point which he wished to take or should take to the commissioners in relation to surtax. Accordingly there is nothing as regards the instant case in the existence of this special code of procedure to prevent the court exercising its discretion if it thinks fit under Ord. 15, r. 6, to order a joinder. |
Turning finally to the question of discretion, each of the factors put forward by Mr. Bathurst naturally requires to be given consideration and due weight - not least that raised as to the incidence of extra costs and the possibility that the presence of the Inland Revenue might lead to additional appeals. Points which might on other sets of facts result in an order for joinder being refused or only being granted on special conditions do not seem to me to weigh sufficiently in this particular case to prevent the joinder being ordered. |
There may be other cases where relatively small sums are involved. Here, however, the sums involved are of real magnitude and the costs which may flow from the litigation recede in importance compared with the advantages gained by the joinder which is sought by the plaintiffs. In any event the courts have a discretion as regards costs and would and should exercise it with great care in framing orders relating to the subsequent costs of this type of litigation so as to ensure that the unwilling party to a joinder is not unnecessarily penalised. On the facts of this case it appears to me that the order striking out the second defendants should be reversed and the appeal allowed. |
KARMINSKI L.J. I agree, and only desire to add a very few observations of my own. First, I would like to look once more at the operative rule, namely, Ord. 15, r. 6 (2) (b), which lays down the test that it is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined. I would like to emphasise my respectful concurrence with all that has fallen from my Lord, the Master of the Rolls, about the need for a liberal construction of those words. If all the facts and the necessary law relevant to those facts are before the court in a dispute, whether it be of a tax matter or any other issue in litigation, it seems to me that not only is it convenient but it is necessary to ensure that the court is likely to arrive at a correct conclusion; or if that is too ambitious a test, to be less likely to be led into error. In my view, therefore, |
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applying either test, it seems to me abundantly clear here that it is desirable and indeed necessary that the Inland Revenue should be parties to this litigation. |
I agree that this appeal must be allowed. |
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Solicitors: Allen & Overy; Culross & Co.; Solicitor, Inland Revenue. |
M. M. H. |
[HOUSE OF LORDS] |
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Petition for leave to appeal to the House of Lords from the decision of the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) in In re Vandervell's Trusts, ante, p. 44. |
The Appeal Committee allowed the petition. |