[CHANCERY DIVISION]

In re CHAMBERLAIN'S SETTLEMENT.

CHAMBERLAIN v. CHAMBERLAIN.

[1921. C. 183.]

Settlement - War Legislation - Tenant for Life - Income of Trust Fund - "Until some event shall happen whereby the said income if belonging absolutely to him would become vested or charged in some other person or persons or corporation" - Forfeiture - German National - Treaty of Peace with Germany, art. 297 (e) - Treaty of Peace Order, 1919, s. 1, clause (xvi.), s. 2 - Charge - Originating Summons - Attorney-General made Party.

By a settlement dated in 1902 a fund of 5000l. was vested in trustees on trust to invest and pay the income of the trust funds to H. S. C. during his life or until he should become bankrupt or charge it, "or until some event shall happen .... whereby the said income or any part thereof if belonging absolutely to him would become vested or charged in favour of some other person or persons or corporation" and in the event of the determination during the life of H. S. C. of the above trust in his favour the trustees were given a discretion to apply the income for the benefit of all or any the said H. S. C. and his present or any other after-taken wife and his issue and the persons interested for the time being under the ulterior trusts, and, subject thereto, were directed to hold the capital and income of the trust funds upon trust for the benefit of the issue of H. S. C. and in default of issue upon trust for H. S. C.'s nephews and nieces. H. S. C. was born in England of English parents but had resided in Germany since 1906 and had been twice married there to German wives. During the war - namely, on August 8, 1916 - he obtained a certificate of naturalization as a German. In these circumstances a summons was taken out by the trustees to have it determined whether the life interest of H. S. C. in the funds was forfeited by virtue of the charge imposed on property of German nationals in this country on January 10, 1920, by virtue of art. 297 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany or the Treaty of Peace Order, 1919, and how the income accrued since August 4, 1914, ought to be disposed of. It was admitted at the hearing on behalf of H. S. C. that in a German Court applying German law he would be recognized as a German citizen. No question arose as to the income before November 4, 1915, which had been paid over to H. S. C.'s agent:-

Held (following the decision of Russell J. in Stoeck v. Public Trustee, ante, p. 67), that the question whether a person was a "German national" within the meaning of the Treaty and Order fell to be determined exclusively by German municipal law and accordingly that H. S. C. was a German national within the meaning of the Treaty and Order.

Held, therefore, that H. S. C.'s interest under the settlement was forfeited as on January 10, 1920, and that subject to the payment of costs the accumulations of income in the trustees' hands from November 4, 1915, to January 10, 1920, must be paid to the custodian.

Held, also, that as the question raised was one that might effect a large section of the British public, the Attorney-General was a proper party to the proceedings.

ADJOURNED SUMMONS.

By an indenture of settlement dated May 5, 1902, Sir Crawford Trotter Chamberlain who had vested in the plaintiffs the sum of 5000l. directed them (clause 1) to hold the said sum upon trust to pay thereout all costs charges and expenses as therein mentioned and to invest the balance of such sum as therein mentioned and to stand possessed of the said balance and the investments for the time being representing the same (thereinafter called "the trust funds") and the income thereof upon the trusts and with and subject to the powers and provisions thereinafter contained concerning the same. By clause 2 it was provided that the trustees or trustee should pay the income of the trust funds to the defendant Houston Stewart Chamberlain during his life or until he should become bankrupt or should assign or charge or affect to assign or charge the said income or some part thereof or until some other event should happen (other than a consent to any exercise of the power of advancement thereinafter contained) whereby the said income or any part thereof if belonging absolutely to him would become vested in or charged in favour of some other person or persons or a corporation And in the event of the determination during the life of the defendant H. S. Chamberlain of the trust thereinbefore contained of the said income in his favour should during the remainder of his life pay or apply all or any part of the said income unto or for the personal support and benefit of all or any one or more exclusively of the others or other of the following persons namely the defendant H. S. Chamberlain and his then present or any after taken wife and his issue if any for the time being in existence and the person or persons for the time being interested in the trust funds under the trusts thereinafter declared in such shares and in such manner as the trustees or trustee should from time to time in their or his absolute discretion think proper. And subject to such discretionary trusts should

during the remainder of the life of the defendant H. S. Chamberlain hold the said income or so much thereof as should not be applied under such discretionary trusts upon the trusts and for the purposes upon and for which the said income would for the time being be held under the said indenture if the defendant H. S. Chamberlain were then dead. By clauses 3 and 4 it was provided that after the death of the defendant H. S. Chamberlain the trustees or trustee should stand possessed of the trust funds and future income thereof upon trust for his children or remoter issue as therein mentioned. Clause 7 provided that if there should be no child of the defendant H. S. C. who being a son should attain the age of twenty-one years or being a daughter should attain that age or marry then subject and without prejudice to the trusts powers and provisions thereinbefore declared and contained and to the persons by law vested in the trustees or trustee and to every exercise of such respective powers the trustees or trustee should stand possessed of the trust funds and the income thereof or so much thereof as should not then have become vested or been applied under any of the trusts powers and provisions thereinbefore contained or the said statutory powers in trust for all or any of the children or child of the plaintiff Henry Chamberlain who being a son or sons should attain the age of twenty-one years or being a daughter or daughters attain that age or marry under that age if more than one as tenants in common in equal shares.

During the war - namely, on August 8, 1916 - the defendant H. S. Chamberlain obtained a certificate of naturalization as a German.

In these circumstances, the trustees of the settlement, on January 12, 1921, took out the present originating summons asking (inter alia) (1.) that it might be determined whether the trust declared by clause 2 of the settlement for the payment of the income of the trust funds to the defendant H. S. Chamberlain during his life had ceased by virtue of the Treaty of Peace Act, 1919, or of the Orders in Council made thereunder or otherwise, and, if so, from what date; and (2.) that directions might be given as to how the

income of the trust funds received since August 4, 1914, and the accumulations of such income ought to be disposed of or dealt with.

The following facts were alleged in the affidavit filed on behalf of the trustees.

The defendant H. S. Chamberlain was the youngest son of Admiral William Charles Chamberlain (brother of Sir Crawford Trotter Chamberlain) and was born in England on September 9, 1855. In the year 1869 he went for a short time to Cheltenham College leaving there in the following year to go to the Riviera for the sake of his health and he studied there until 1878 under a Prussian tutor named Kuntze. In the spring of 1878 he was married at the British Consulate at Geneva to Anna Horst a German teacher of music and from that time until about 1882 he lived in Geneva and Paris and from 1882 till about 1906 in Vienna. In or about the year 1907 he divorced his wife in Germany and in or about December, 1908, he married the defendant Eva Chamberlain who was a daughter of the composer Richard Wagner and had ever since lived with his wife in the home of Frau Wagner at Bayreuth in Bavaria. He had had no issue by either marriage.

The defendant H. S. Chamberlain was before the war very well known in Germany from his writings on political and other subjects in which he expressed strong pro-Teutonic and anti-Semitic opinions. During the war his views were anti-British.

In February, 1921, the trustees received a letter dated February 7, 1921, from Messrs. Farrer & Co., the solicitors of the defendant H. S. Chamberlain, in which they stated that they had received a letter from him informing them that he had received his certificate of naturalization as a German bearing date August 5, 1916, and adding "that his application for naturalization was originally made the very day the news reached us of England's declaration of war against Germany which forced me to decide once for all between the country of my birth and the country of my adoption, which is also the country of my affections since childhood

and the country which gives me my livelihood. But it is a long business to obtain naturalization in Germany, as each separate state must in turn give its consent so that the documents go wandering from one end of Germany to the other. Besides which, special permission for naturalization during a war has to be obtained from the Chancellor. Hence the delay."

The defendant H. S. Chamberlain filed no evidence but rested his defence solely on his contention that by virtue of his birth in England he was a British subject and that his German nationality was void in English law as having taken place during the war.

On May 25, 1921, the summons came on for hearing and was part heard, but the defendant H. S. Chamberlain's defence being then disclosed by his counsel the trustees' counsel asked for an adjournment to add the Attorney-General as a defendant, to which the defendant H. S. Chamberlain objected.

On June 23, 1921, the judge directed that the Attorney-General should be added as a defendant without prejudice to the defendant H. S. Chamberlain's contention that the Attorney-General was not a proper party.

By the Treaty of Peace, 1919, art. 297: "The question of private property, rights and interests in an enemy country shall be settled according to the principles laid down in this section and to the provisions of the Annex hereto. .... (e) The nationals of Allied and Associated Powers shall be entitled to compensation in respect of damage or injury inflicted upon their property, rights, or interests, including any company or association in which they are interested, in German territory as it existed on August 1, 1914, by the application either of the exceptional war measures or measures of transfer mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Annex hereto. The claims made in this respect by such nationals shall be investigated and the total of the compensation shall be determined by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for in Section VI. or by an arbitrator appointed by that Tribunal. This compensation shall be borne by Germany,

and may be charged upon the property of German nationals within the territory or under the control of the claimant's State. This property may be constituted as a pledge for enemy liabilities under the conditions fixed by paragraph 4 of the Annex hereto. The payment of this compensation may be made by the Allied or Associated State, and the amount will be debited to Germany."

By the Treaty of Peace Order, 1919, s. 1, clause (xvi.) "All property, rights and interests within His Majesty's Dominions or Protectorates belonging to German nationals at the date when the Treaty comes into force (not being property rights or interests acquired under any general licence issued by or on behalf of His Majesty), and the net proceeds of their sale, liquidation or other dealings therewith, are hereby charged -

Provided that any particular property, rights or interests so charged may at any time, if His Majesty thinks fit, be released from the charge so created."

By s. 2: "For the purposes of this Order - .... The

expression 'nationals' in relation to any State includes the subjects or citizens of that State and any company or corporation incorporated therein according to the law of that State and in the case of a Protectorate the natives thereof. ...."

An opinion of Dr. Ernest J. Schuster, taken on behalf of the trustees, was accepted by all parties as correctly stating the German law on the subject. The material part of this opinion was as follows: "In the German official text of the Treaty of Peace the expression 'German national' is translated by the words 'Deutscher Reichsangehöriger' (see for instance Art. 297). According to the German Nationality Statute of 1913 (which came into force on January 1, 1914, and was in force at the date of the said defendant's naturalization) a person naturalized in Germany in the manner shown by the letter of Messrs. Farrer & Co. dated Feb. 7, 1921, by virtue of such naturalization acquires the status of 'Reichsangehöriger' and therefore becomes a 'German national' within the said meaning. There are no different classes of German subjects or citizens. They are all 'Reichsangehörige' whether naturalized or German born. .... The fact that at the date of the application, and up to the date of the grant of the certificate, the defendant was the subject of a State at war with the German Empire did not in any way according to German law, weaken the effect of the naturalization or prevent the said defendant from acquiring the status of a 'German national' for all purposes whatsoever."

Vaisey for the trustees of the settlement.

Owen Thompson K.C. and Roope Reeve for persons entitled under the settlement in default of issue. We do not raise any question as to the income up to November 4, 1915, which was paid to and still stands at the defendant H. S. Chamberlain's account at his bank. It is admitted that Dr. Schuster's opinion correctly states the German law as a German Court applying German law would hold it to be. It follows that within the German Peace Treaty and the Order the

defendant H. S. Chamberlain is a German national, and that his life interest became forfeited on January 10, 1920, by virtue of the charge created by the Treaty and Order: see Treaty of Peace Order, 1919, s. 1, (i.), (ii.), (x.), (xvi.), (xvii.), ss. 2, 4; Treaty of Peace, art. 297, (b), (c), (e), (k), (i), Annex 4. Stoeck v. Public Trustee (1) is a clear decision that for the purpose of determining whether or not a person is a German national within the Peace Treaty resort must be had solely to the question whether or not the German Court would hold him to be such.

The accrued income from November 4, 1915, up to the date of forfeiture has vested in the custodian under the Treaty of Peace charge: In re Levinstein. (2)

Jenkins K.C. and F. E. Farrer for the defendant H. S. Chamberlain and his wife. The Attorney-General is not a proper party to these proceedings and he ought not to be heard. He ought only to be made a party (i.) when the Crown has a proprietary right which is involved; or (ii.) when the proceedings, if successful, will affect rights claimed by the Crown: Esquimalt and Nanaimo Ry. Co. v. Wilson (3); or (iii.) where a claim is made against a servant of the Crown in respect of an act done in that character; or (iv.) when matters of interest to the general public are in question, as in cases relating to highways or markets.

The charge under the Treaty of Peace is for the benefit of a limited class of persons and not of the general public: see Treaty of Peace Order, 1919, s. 1, (xvi.), (xvii.). These rights are properly defended by the custodian who may be a necessary party.

[P. O. LAWRENCE J. The matters in question here affect the entire public, or at any rate, those who are taxpayers, and I will hear the Attorney-General.]

At common law no British natural-born subject could divest himself of his nationality; nor had the King power to license him to divest himself: Cockburn on Nationality, pp. 63, 198; he could be divested only by Act of Parliament.

(1) Ante, pp. 67, 82.

(2) Ante, p. 251.

(3) [1920] A. C. 358.

So strong was the rule that an abjured person to whom it was death to come back to this country without the King's leave did not lose his English allegiance; he lost his fatherland, but not the father of his fatherland: Calvin's Case. (1) No education or residence abroad from early infancy, no state service under a foreign monarch, could divest him of his English nationality: Æneas Macdonald's Case. (2) The Naturalization Act, 1870, replaced by the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, does not allow a British subject in time of war to divest his nationality for that of the enemy: Rex v. Lynch (3); Ex parte Freyberger. (4)

The defendant H. S. Chamberlain's purported naturalization was in British law wholly void. He is and always has been a British subject.

But it is put against him that for the exceptional purposes of the Peace Treaty, a British Court must hold him to be a German national, as a necessary consequence of the German Court holding him to be so. The onus of establishing such a proposition lies on those that allege it. In fact what is suggested is that the British Court is to abdicate in favour of the German Court.

Stoeck v. Public Trustee (5) is no authority for such a proposition. There the only question was whether a German subject by origin had lost his original nationality, and become "sans patrie." In that case there was no conflict, as here, of nationality and law. An English Court cannot possibly know the general German law as to nationality, nor can the German text of the Peace Treaty, on which the German Courts proceed, be read in an English Court: expressedly the only texts that are authentic are the English and French. Suppose the German law were to apply the same principles as did before 1870 the old English common law, then if a German born subject comes to England, lives here, and is formally naturalized as an Englishman here,

(1) (1608) 7 Rep. 9a.

(2) (1749) Foster C. C. 59.

(3) [1903] 1 K. B. 444.

(4) [1917] 2 K. B. 129.

(5) Ante, p. 67.

his property here, on the contention put forward by the opponents, will be taken by the Peace Treaty as being that of a German national.

Again there is good ground for believing that a number of English women caught by the outbreak of the war in Germany and there retained were intimidated into taking up certificates of naturalization as Germans. If they did this for fear of their lives, and at the earliest reasonable opportunity returned to British allegiance, it has been the law from the time of the Plantagenet, that an indictment of them for high treason would fail. Yet if the contention of the opponents is law these guiltless women would lose their property under the Peace Treaty.

It is one thing to say that a person cannot be a German national within the Peace Treaty unless the German Court would hold him such; quite another to say that every one whom the German Court would say was a German national must as a necessary consequence be held to be so by a British Court.

The onus lies on our opponents; they do not discharge it; quite the contrary: see the provision that the English text is to be authentic, and that the liquidation is to be carried out in accord with English law, and the price and compensation ascertained in accordance with English methods: art. 297 (b), (c).

Gavin T. Simonds (Sir Gordon Hewart A.-G. with him) for the Attorney-General.

[P. O. LAWRENCE J. Do you prefer to appear on behalf of the custodian or on behalf of the Attorney-General?]

As the question is one of public interest - namely, whether the property is the subject of the charge, and may affect other cases - I desire to appear on behalf of the Attorney-General. The only claim the Attorney-General makes is that the accumulations of income up to January 10, 1920, are subject to the charge. To show this it is necessary to prove that on January 10, 1920, the defendant H. S. Chamberlain was a German national. It is submitted that a person may be a German national for the purposes of the Peace Treaty,

although he may also be the subject of another State. The Court has to decide what on the construction of the Peace Treaty is the meaning of the expression "German national." Under that Treaty nationality is made the test of a person's fortunes. At the date of the Treaty dual nationality was of constant occurrence, as must be the case where one country adopts the jus soli and another the jus sanguinis. The test is, is the person in question of German nationality according to German municipal law? If he is, then his property is subject to the charge. Here according to German municipal law the defendant H. S. Chamberlain is a German national for the purposes of the Treaty. The conflict only arises because each country claims the same person as its own subject. If the defendant H. S. Chamberlain were standing his trial here for high treason he would be taken to be a British national. I do not quarrel with the statement as to what is the common law on this point. There is power to release any property subject to the charge from the charge. It is submitted therefore that the defendant H. S. Chamberlain must be treated as a German national, both because he is resident in Germany and because his change of nationality has been brought about by his own act.

July 28. P. O. LAWRENCE J. read the following judgment: This summons raises the question whether the respondent, Houston Stewart Chamberlain (hereinafter called the respondent), is a German national within the meaning of the Treaty of Peace (hereinafter called the Treaty), and of the Treaty of Peace Order, 1919 (hereinafter called the Order).

The respondent was born in England on September 9, 1855; he therefore was a natural-born British subject. He was twice married, first to a German teacher of music, whom he divorced in Germany in 1907, and secondly to a daughter of the celebrated German composer, Richard Wagner. Since the year 1908 he has resided with his wife at the house of his mother-in-law at Bayreuth, in Bavaria. His views were

anti-British, and during the war (namely, on August 8, 1916) he voluntarily became naturalized in Germany.

Sect. 2 of the Order provides that for the purposes of the Order the expression "nationals" in relation to any State includes the subjects or citizens of that State.

I agree with the decision of Russell J. in Stoeck v. Public Trustee (1), that the question whether a person is a "German national" within the meaning of the Treaty and Order falls to be determined exclusively by the German municipal law.

In the present case all the parties have accepted the opinion of Dr. Ernest J. Schuster as correctly stating the German law on the subject, and I have accordingly based my findings as to German law upon that opinion.

According to German municipal law the respondent, by virtue of his naturalization, acquired the status of a German subject, although at the time he was the subject of a State at war with the German Empire. Further, in the German official text of the Treaty the word "national" is translated into "Reichsangehöriger," and by the express provisions of the German Nationality Act, 1913, the respondent on naturalization acquired the status of a "Reichsangehöriger," in other words he became a German national.

It is, however, contended by Mr. Jenkins that as the Courts of this country would in the circumstances of this case refuse to recognize the respondent's change of allegiance, and would hold him still to be, and liable to all the obligations of, a British subject (see Rex v. Lynch (2), and Ex parte Freyberger (3)), therefore this Court ought to hold that he is not a "German national" within the meaning of the Treaty and Order.

Although I agree with the premise upon which this contention is founded, I am of opinion that the conclusion attempted to be drawn therefrom is incorrect.

The respondent, by becoming a German subject in time of war, no doubt committed a crime against the laws of this

(1) Ante, p. 67.

(2) [1903] 1 K. B. 444.

(3) [1917] 2 K. B. 129.

country. His act was an offence for which, if he were to come within the jurisdiction and power of this country, he would be liable to our law, and in respect of which his naturalization in Germany would afford no defence.

But whatever decision might be reached by the Courts of this country would not alter the fact that according to German law he did become a German subject. No Court of this country could on the evidence before me properly hold that according to German law the respondent did not in fact become a German subject.

German law does not recognize different classes of subjects or citizens. According to that law the naturalization in Germany of the respondent constituted him a German subject as fully as if he had been a German by birth, notwithstanding that, according to our law, he could not, in time of war, throw off his allegiance to Great Britain and become the subject of an enemy State, and notwithstanding, therefore, that according to our law he still remains a British subject. If, however, I am right in holding that the question whether a given person is a German national within the meaning of the Treaty and Order must be decided exclusively according to German law - and it is on the correctness of this view that my judgment is based - it follows that the respondent is a German national for the purposes of the Treaty and Order, although the Courts of this country would for all other purposes treat his naturalization in Germany as illegal and void.

Bearing in mind that the Treaty is an international agreement, one of the parties to which is Germany, I do not think that there is anything incongruous in holding that the respondent is a German national within the meaning and for the purposes of the Treaty, although for all other purposes the Courts of this country would refuse to recognize his German nationality. To hold otherwise would, in my opinion, lead to the anomalous result that the expression "German national" in the Treaty would bear a different meaning in England from that which it bears in Germany.

The further point, however, has been raised that a German national who has a dual nationality ought not to be held to

be a German national for the purposes of the Treaty and the Order.

In the case of a German national who is also a national of some power other than one of the Allied or Associated Powers, I see no reason whatever for suggesting that on the construction of the Treaty and Order he ought not to be held to be a German national for all the purposes of the Treaty and Order. It would, indeed, be strange if a German national could escape the burdens cast upon him by the Treaty merely because he also happened to be a national of some State other than one of the Allied or Associated States. In the case of a German national who is also a national of one of the Allied or Associated Powers, and especially where he is a British national and his property sought to be affected is in England, the case is not so clear. I can conceive that in such circumstances cases of difficulty might arise, but on the whole I have come to the conclusion that in construing the Treaty and Order no logical distinction can be drawn between German nationals who are also nationals of a non-allied or non-associated Power, and German nationals who are also nationals of an Allied or Associated Power. In neither case could these persons in my opinion avoid the burdens cast upon them by the Treaty merely by proving that they had a dual nationality; I find it difficult to appreciate how proof of that fact would afford an answer to claims made against them under the Treaty as German nationals. It is further argued that the construction which I have placed on the expression "German nationals" cannot be the true construction, because if it were it would result in great hardship being inflicted upon a number of natural-born and naturalized British subjects who also happened to be German nationals according to German law. The answer to this argument, in my opinion, is that no such hardship would necessarily result, because the custodian (acting under the general direction of the Board of Trade) has power to release the property of a German national from the charge created by the Order (see s. 2 of the Treaty of Peace (Amendment) Order, 1920), and this power would no doubt he exercised in all proper

cases, for example, in such a case as was suggested during the argument where a British national who was also a German national had fought in the war on the side of Great Britain.

The existence of dual nationality must have been well known to all the high contracting Powers, and in my opinion it is not to be supposed in the absence of express words to that effect that it was intended to exempt from the operation of the Treaty all persons who might happen to have a dual nationality. I think that the true view of the construction of the Treaty is that the expression "German nationals" includes, and was intended to include, all persons who according to German law answer that description, whether they also had any other nationality or not, and that it was left to each of the Allied and Associated Powers so to regulate matters within its own jurisdiction as to ensure that there should be no injustice or hardship.

In my judgment, therefore, all that has to be proved in a case like the present is that the person concerned is a German national according to German municipal law. If that fact be proved then the person concerned comes within the operation of the Treaty and Order, although he may also be a national of some other State, even though that State be Great Britain and even though according to our law, he would be deemed not to be a German subject.

I therefore hold that the respondent is a German national within the meaning of the Treaty and Order.

The effect of this decision, in my judgment, is that the accumulations in the hands of the trustees representing income which has accrued prior to January 10, 1920, ought to be paid to the custodian and that the income accrued and to accrue on and subsequently to that date is applicable under the discretionary trust which came into operation on that date by virtue of the charge created by the joint operation of the Treaty and Order.

In arriving at this conclusion as to the destination of the past and future income of the trust fund, I have followed the decision of Eve J. in In re Levinstein (1), with which I

(1) Ante, p. 251.

agree and which, in my opinion, covers this case so far as this point is concerned.

In conclusion I desire to say a few words about the objection taken by Mr. Jenkins to the presence of the Attorney-General as a party to these proceedings. When the summons first came before me and I realized that it involved the determination of an important question on the construction of the Treaty and Order, I suggested to the applicants that it might be desirable to add the Attorney-General as a party. This suggestion was welcomed by the applicants and by the respondents, other than the respondent Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and the summons thereupon stood over and was amended by making the Attorney-General a respondent. The Attorney-General has raised no objection to having been made a party; on the contrary he has appeared at the hearing and has assisted the Court by submitting the views of the Crown on the question which has arisen. In my opinion the Attorney-General is a proper party to these proceedings, because the question arising for decision is one which has an important bearing on the carrying into effect of the Treaty of Peace, and, therefore, one which directly concerns the Crown; moreover, I think it is also a question which may affect a large section of the British public. If authority be needed for joining the Attorney-General as a party under such circumstances I think that it is to be found in the decision of the Privy Council in Esquimalt and Nanaimo Ry. Co. v. Wilson. (1) There will be a declaration in accordance with my judgment.

Solicitors for plaintiffs and persons entitled under the gift over in default of issue: Wordsworth, Porter & Shaw, for H. Seymour Chamberlain, Bognor.

Solicitors for defendant H. S. Chamberlain: Farrer & Co.

Solicitor for Attorney-General: Treasury Solicitor.

(1) [1920] A. C. 358.

W. I. C.