UNCLASSIFIED
NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE
Newport,
R.I.
FORUM
SHOPPERS BEWARE THE MISMATCH BETWEEN THE
MILITARY
TRIBUNAL OPTION AND UNITED STATES NATIONAL
SECURITY
STRATEGY
by
Ralph H. Kohlmann
Lieutenant
Colonel, United States Marine Corps
The contents of
this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by
the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.
1
March 2002
[*2]
Introduction
Americans reacted to the events of September 11, 2001
in true American fashion. First, individuals on the scenes of the attacks at
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
engaged in heroic and selfless rescue efforts on behalf of those injured or in
harms way.
Next, as the dust settled, and as lifetimes of mourning began, we started
planning and
acting to prevent further acts of international terrorism, to identify the
wrongdoers and
administer justice. On November 13, 2001 President Bush surprised most
observers by
announcing the authorization of military tribunals for the trial of
crimes associated with
terrorism against the United States by members, aiders or abettors, or
coconspirators of
the organization known as al Qaeda.[1] Support for the presidents overall handling of
the
terrorist crisis has been extremely high. The executive order regarding
the tribunal
option, however, has engendered ongoing criticism.[2] Immediate concerns were raised by
domestic experts from a variety of disciplines concerning the
constitutionality of the
prospective tribunals and their implications with regard to civil
liberties in the United
States. Subsequently, the debate expanded to include international concerns
about both
the fairness of the prospective proceedings, and the treatment of potential
defendants held
by United Stales forces in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.[3] [*3]
Since announcing the tribunal authorization, the White
House has campaigned steadily on behalf of the operational necessity of the
tribunal option, and the Department of
Defense has described evolving tribunal rules that will provide substantially
more
procedural safeguards than were originally envisioned by tribunal critics.
Considerable
effort has also been expended to convince onlookers that the treatment of
detained
suspects s appropriate in light of practical security concerns. Unfortunately,
the
procedural fairness of the prospective tribunals arid the precise conditions
of the suspects pretrial confinement are
transient concerns that may he obscuring policymakers view of
matters of more enduring importance.
With all the fuss about matters ranging from rules
of evidence to curtains for jail cells, little discussion has been afforded to
the fundamental
mismatch between the proposed ad hoc nationalistic proceedings and the United States
broader National Security Strategy.
One cause of this non-discussion
is the fact that the Bush Administration has not clearly defined its national
security strategy in classical terms. Analysis of the
United
States method of operation in the international arena in
the recent past, however,
describes a de facto strategy of cooperative selective engagement In accordance with
this
pattern, President Bushes call for international unity against terrorism
implies an intent to
both help and depend on other nations to address a long-term
transnational problem. A
unilateral, decision to employ nationalistic military tribunals on the other
hand is more
reflective of a national security strategy of primacy. And while the United
States can
surely do as it wishes with regard to the impending prosecution
of al Qaeda terrorists,
American policy makers should more fully consider whether the benefits of
self-interest
in this case will justify jeopardizing the potential for international
cooperation in the
[*4] difficult times ahead,
National
Security Strategy and the War Against Terrorism
The decision concerning the proper forum for
prosecuting allegation of misconduct
associated with international terrorism is simultaneously driven by specific
circumstances
and broader questions of national security affairs. If the
campaign against international
terrorism is viewed as a war effort, then several fundamental concepts of
military theory
are relevant to the analysis. Foremost is the precept that in wartime decision
making,
furtherance of policy aims must dominate over expedience in the
realm of operational
strategy.[4] Stated differently, plans for dealing with specific situations, even
extraordinary
situations, must be in accord with broader concepts of war aims that transcend
the factual
boundaries of any single operation or campaign. This is
especially true if the war aims
are extensive, or if the war is expected to be lengthy in nature, or if the
war involves
collaboration with other nations who enter a coalition with their own varied sets
of
political expectations and pressures. History provides ready examples of
arguably good
strategic decisions that proved disastrous to war efforts because of a
mismatch between
the effects of situational strategic action and the broader aims of the implementing
nation [*5]
or coalition.
For example, the Japanese decision to bomb Pearl
Harbor reasonably furthered Japans strategic interest in severely
damaging the American battle fleet. By late 1941, military
officials in Japan had determined that war with
the United States was inevitable.
Japanese leaders assumed that their program of expansion in order to Secure
the resources
of Southeast Asian territories would soon prompt a military response in
defense of Anglo-American interest in that same area. Japan had previously
defeated a nation of superior
size and resources in the Russo-Japanese war following a surprise attack of
the Russian
fleet at Port Arthur. That surprise attack was followed by a relatively short
war, of
limited effort, that led to a negotiated peace on terms very
favorable to Japan. With this
blueprint for success apparently validated, the Japanese decided that a strong
first strike at
Pearl Harbor could lead to a similarly short war and negotiated settlement
with the United
States.
Unfortunately for the Japanese, they failed to
recognize that several factors made a
limited engagement and negotiated settlement with the United States a fanciful
outcome.
First, the Japanese had allied themselves with the Nazi regime that was
pursuing a war of
unlimited aims against the United States and its allies. Additionally, well
before Pearl
Harbor, the United States had agreed with the British at the ABC Conference
that in the
event of war with both Germany and Japan, the Anglo-American alliance
would pursue complete defeat of their enemies before agreeing to
termination of hostilities.[5]
The same historical setting also provides an example
of how subordination of [*6] immediate strategic preferences in the name of adherence to collective
war aims has redounded to the benefit of the United States. Following the
bombing of Pearl Harbor
there via; significant interest in military, political and popular circles for
an immediate
and full effort against the Japanese in the Pacific theater. Despite these
pressures, however, President Roosevelt abided by the agreements previously
made with the British at the ABC Conference to work together to
defeat Germany first before engaging in full scale offensive operations in the
Pacific. Adherence to this larger war aim, despite the shock and resulting
anger occasioned by the Pearl Harbor attack, is credited by historians as being
a key factor in the Grand Alliances ability to prevail over the
combined forces and considerable momentum of the axis of evil in World War II.[6]
Regardless
of the forum choice, the trial of alleged terrorists is not an end unto itself.
Any prosecution of Osama Bin Laden, or any number of
his associates or followers, should be considered for what is would be, that
is, one small part of a larger war against the phenomena of international
terrorism. In the grand scheme of things, al Qaeda is the current symptom, and
international terrorism is the disease. At this point, al Qaeda may be an
essentially vanquished foe. The threat to national security posed by
international terrorism, however, persists.[7] As such, any decisions for dealing with the prosecution of al Qaeda
members should not be dealt with as an end unto themselves, but rather as a
small piece of the larger problem Additionally, actions with regard to the
terrorists as an immediate concern must be in accord with the national security
strategy for dealing with [*7] the terror threat in the long term.
Four generally recognized grand strategies compete in
the public discourse to describe
the United States approach to international security issues: neo-isolationism;
selective
engagement; cooperative security; and primacy.[8] None of these rand strategies provide a
template for determination of subsequent strategic choices in the face
of unfolding world
events. Identification of a national grand strategy does, however, provide a
helpful
compass bearing to facilitate unity of effort between military, diplomatic and
economic
instruments of state and prevent counterproductive action in the
name of international
expedience. Without reference to an identified grand strategy, security
mailers arc more
likely to be dealt with sequentially, incrementally and, alas, inconsistently.[9]
As was the case with the Clinton administration and
his fathers administration, the current President Bush has avoided
articulation of a national security strategy in classic grand strategy terms.
Positive spinmeisters for the administration might argue
this non-policy allows for appropriate strategic flexibility in a complex
world. Unfortunately, such deliberate ambiguity provides little in the way of a
guiding principle for real life matters
such as military procurement decisions, or when to employ the use of military
forces or
whether to conduct ad hoc
nationalistic tribunals for alleged acts of criminal misconduct associated with
international terrorism.
The words of the past several administrations do not
provide a clear description of the [*8] United States grand strategy. Analysis of the United
States method of operation in the
international arena over the past several years, however, describes a de
facto national
security strategy of cooperative selective engagement. In cases ranging from
Iraqs
invasion of Kuwait to ethnic and nationalistic wars in the
former Yugoslavia and Kosovo,
to the current operations in Afghanistan, the United States bas chosen to use
military
force only in eases affecting United States national interest and only within
the
framework of a coalition of nations. Given the vast disparity in
resources between the
United Stales and most of its coalition partners, often the United
States most significant
gain in a coalition agreement comes in the form of international
legitimization for its
course of planned operations. For while the United
States may have sufficient resources -
to periodically conduct a wide range of limited operations, we have apparently
been
unwilling to risk the cost of major regional confrontations that might result
if we acted
without proper political isolation of our chosen adversaries.
Selective engagement strategy is realist in nature in
that it recognizes that defense resource are scarce. As a practical matter, it
is not economically feasible for the United
States to muster sufficient
power to unilaterally maintain international stability for a
sustained period of time.[10] Pursuing a selective engagement strategy in a collaborative fashion
recognizes that that Americans would be unwilling to sufficiently
increase
contributions in terms of lives or money such that the United
States could assume global
police duties or single-handedly dominate the world to force acceptance of
sustained [*9]
United States primacy.[11] Accordingly, the United States has chosen to conduct military operations
by coalition as a matter of routine.
By design, the modern coalition system is more
responsive and flexible than earlier generations of cooperative alliance
systems. And while movement away from a structured set of alliances arguably
lessens the possibility of a nation being dragged into
an unwanted conflict,[12] the flexibility of ad hoc
coalition politics carries with it the need
to remain sensitive to the concerns of potential coalition partners. This is
especially true
in the case or the looming long-term effort against
international terrorism wherein the list
of potential coalition partners spans a broad range of political, cultural and
religious fault
lines.[13]
Noted political scientist James N. Rosenaus
funnel of causality theory described five general
categories of factors that influence a nations foreign policy
decision making They are: the external (global) environment; the societal
environment of the nation; the governmental setting; the roles played by the
central decision-makers; and the individual characteristics of the foreign
policy making elites.[14] The external environment category draws attention to the reality that
United States behavior will be viewed by other nations
through different lenses than through those which
it is perceived by members of the American society. This theory also
recognizes, and should remind us, that policy
decisions in the international realm affect a variety of stakeholders whose
interests and [*10]
responses often extend well beyond the apparent
boundaries of a current policy issue.
The foreign policy decision making process operates
best when the combination of
societal, governmental role and individual sources bring a full range of
viewpoints into a
debate that are considered along with the predicted
responses of external actors The
emotionally charged events of September 11th have created an extraordinary
level of
political unity within the United States. Unfortunately, what may be descried
as a
powerful blend of domestic anger, urgency, solidarity and
determination have also
introduced a damaging measure of group think and narrow-sightedness into the
decision
making process. Reasonable concerns that should exist about international
disapproval of
an ad hoc military
tribunal process have been swept aside or lost in less valid debates
over the legality of such proceedings under United States law or the
classification of the
potential defendant during their pretrial detention in Cuba.
Its
Better to Look Good Than to Feel Good
The United States operates effective criminal and
military justice systems that have
been constructed and improved over the course of hundreds of years. Yet at a
time when
international credibility is a valuable commodity, the Bush administration has
directed
creation of an ad hoc
trial process whose results will certainly be criticized regardless
of
their actual efficacy. Putting the relatively ancient cases of Nazi saboteurs
and Lincoln
assassins aside, the idea of trying alleged terrorists at military, tribunals was
lust raised by
then Attorney General William Barr following the 1989 bombing of Pan Am Flight
103
[*11] over Lockerbie, Scotland.[15] At that time, however, prospect of military tribunals was never a
realistic possibility. Even when the suspects were identified as Libyan
intelligence agents, they remained under Libyan protection for years until an
agreement was reached that the trial be conducted by a panel of Scottish judges
at a neutral national site in the Netherlands. Importantly, however, a negotiated
international agreement on a trial forum was reached and ultimately a joint
trial was concluded in January, 2001 with one of the. suspects being found
guilty of charges related; to the bombing and one suspect being found not
guilty.[16] The convicted terrorist received a 20-year prison sentence.
The military tribunal option was also not employed for
the prosecution of the first World Trade Center bombing suspects. Following the
February, 1993 truck bomb attack, six co-conspirators hailing from several
middle eastern nations were prosecuted in New
Yorks Federal District Court. MI six were convicted of charges
stemming from the
conspiracy, and all received the same 240-year prison term and $10 million
dollar fine.[17]
In the wake of the September 11th attacks, the Former
Attorney General again floated
the military tribunal option through his contacts in the younger President
Bushs
administration.[18] The tribunal option was seen as a vehicle to address several
concerns
associated with possible prosecution of alleged terrorists in the
forthcoming campaign
against international terrorism. Given the nature of the likely
defendants al Qaeda
connections, it was feared that a federal district court trial would place
judges and civilian [*12] jurors at too great a risk.[19] Concerns were also raised about the admissibility of
evidence
gathered b the intelligence community and the ability of Federal Prosecutors
to secure
convictions within the framework of the Federal Rules of Evidence.[20] Finally, there was
a concern that disclosure of intelligence
information in an open court would compromise
the long-term anti-terrorism campaign.[21]
It is unclear what level of staffing preceded the adoption of the tribunal
executive order. It is clear, however, that the administration rushed to get
the initial announcement of the option in place. By the beginning of November
2001, President Bush was pressing
his staff to get the tribunal process rolling before things started
going well [in
Afghanistan.][22] Although it is reportedly the final product of 18 preliminary drafts,
the
tribunal authorization order displays a striking lack of concern for the
appearance of propriety in the contemplated trial process. After a brief
restatement of the obvious that
international terrorism poses a continuing
threat to the United Slates and its allies, the President simply states
that it is not practicable to apply in military commissions under
this order the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized
in the trial of criminal cases in the United Stales district courts.[23] This is not a measured proclamation that certain rules of law and
practice will have to give way to unusual
concerns that may be presented in the trial of alleged terrorists. To the
contrary, the order essentially states that even basic notions of due process
(the legal word for fundamental fairness) will not be a required element in the
tribunal process. [*13]
In a special report issued shortly after the
announcement of the tribunal option, David Scheffer critiqued what he viewed as
the eight viable options for prosecuting international terrorists.[24] The options include: U.S. Federal Court; U.S. Military Court
(Courts-Martial); U.S. Military Commission (the tribunal option; Foreign
National Court (like
the use of the Scottish courts for the Pan Am Flight 103 cases); United
Nations Security
Council Ad Hoc
International Criminal Tribunal (like the on-going proceedings arising
from events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda); a coalition treaty-based
criminal
tribunal (like the Nuremberg or Tokyo tribunals following World War II); a
special Islamic Court; or UN administered courts in Afghanistan.[25]
Scheffers report describes the benefits and
di.cu1ties associated with each of the forum options. He properly points out
that an analysis of a forum option includes not only an assessment of the
effectiveness of a trial system, but also a determination of the
political implications of its use. For example, although there is great appeal
in extending
the jurisdiction of the existing United Nations war crime: tribunals to
encompass the
prosecution of alleged al Qaeda terrorists, there would be enormous
pressure from
certain governments to (then extend jurisdiction of the terrorist
tribunal to all coalition [*14] military actions in the campaign against terrorism and to the conduct
of Israel in the Middle East.[26] Similarly, even if a special Islamic court could provide reliable
assurances of effective prosecutions in the current situation, United States
acceptance of such a forum could prove problematic if that court then sought to
apply its jurisdiction to United States or Israeli citizens for alleged
terrorist activities.
A full discussion of the various forum options is
beyond the scope of this essay. Scheffers report concludes that the
practical and political problems associated with the United Nations, coalition
and foreign court options leave the United States national court
options as the most viable alternatives for potential
prosecutions.[27] While that conclusion
may be happily in accord with United States policy makers wishes to retain as
much
control over the proceedings as possible, the political implication screening
discussed
above should still be applied to the selection of a particular
United States national trial
process. In this regard, debates about the ultimate or actual fairness of
these proceedings
largely miss the point.[28] The current campaign against terrorism is not about any single
case or set of cases that may be prosecuted
in the days to come. Instead, the issue at hand
is a contest between the worlds civilized societies and lawless
organizations who seek to
disrupt the coalescence of different cultures into a peaceful and productive
world
community. Accordingly, it is not sufficient that the guilty axe
convicted in a relatively [*15] fair trial in order for a long-term victory over terrorists to be
achieved, the trial process
must appear to be fair and not simply the result of the United
States obvious ability to
have its way.
Even
a Good Military Tribunal is a Bad Idea
Whether alleged terrorists are tried in U.S. military
courts, or military commissions, or U.S. Federal District Court, claims of
hometown or victors justice are sure to
be attached to the proceedings. That being said, the platform of likely critics
of American action in this regard can be significantly weakened by selecting
the national forum least
susceptible to serious jurisprudential criticism. The United States
Federal District Courts
are the best option emerging from this sort of analysis.
The Bush Administration argument in favor of the
tribunal option appears to be most
firmly rooted in an understandable desire to secure the conviction of people
who really
are guilty of serious crimes and a concurrent desire to
safeguard classified information.
Any lawyer would agree that there is a risk of litigation
inherent in any trial process.
Assuming, however, that each of the established United
States justice systems conduct
effective trials, the results of prosecutions in the several national forum
options should be
largely the same. As a practical matter, the military rules of evidence used
in courts-
martial practice are a near verbatim reflection of the federal
rules of evidence used in
federal district courts. In turn, notwithstanding the tribunal executive
orders ill-advised
repudiation of the applicability of principles of law and generally recognized
rules of
evidence, it is likely that the rules finally adopted for the
conduct of any U.S. military [*16] tribunal will be largely in accord with fundamental jurisprudential
principles.[29] For
example, preliminary reports about draft tribunal rules indicate that:
defendants will have
the right to counsel, defendants will have
the right to appeal; the presumption of
innocence will apply until an accused is proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt; and
that except for portions wherein classified material will be discussed,
tribunal sessions
will be open to the public.[30] The public trial aspect of civilian proceedings
also gives
way in the case of classified material: Classified information is already
protected from
disclosure in civilian trials by the Classified Information Procedures Act.[31]
One specific concern voiced about conducting the al
Qaeda prosecutions in federal
district court has to do with the admissibility of evidence gathered by
intelligence
agencies. The argument suggests that much intelligence information is
inadmissible
hearsay ad that the government might have
a hard time proving its case in an
established national court forum.[32] As a practical matter however, the application of the
hearsay rule in United States courts has become increasingly flexible. There
are
numerous longstanding exceptions to the rules general
prohibition against the use of out
of court statements. Additionally the now codified residual hearsay exception
common to
both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Military Rules of Evidence
provides for the
admission of evidence that would have at one time been considered hearsay but
is: (A) [*17]
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) more probative on point for which
it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the interests of justice will be best served by
admission of the statement into evidence.[33] Given the increasingly open nature of United States trial practice in
this
regard, one former federal prosecutor has commented: Its
almost inconceivable that a
military tribunal could allow evidence to be admitted more easily and still
claim to be fair.[34]
Beyond the rules issue, tribunal advocates also
suggest that civilian judges and juries
should not be endangered by participation
in a trial process involving international
terrorists; This sort of argument cannot survive even superficial scrutiny.
The successful
use of civilian judges and juries in years of organized crimes prosecutions,
not to mention
the first World Trade Center bombing case, suggests that the
existing United States
criminal justice system does not have to be put aside simply because the
potential
defendants have scary friends. For when the Executive Branch substitutes a
panel of
military officers in the civilian judge or jurys role as
trier of fact, a number of irrefutable
appearance issues are created.
If one is unsure about whether military tribunals will
have credibility problems in the international community, one need only
consider the plight of traditional military justice practice in our own
country. The United States court martial system is a virtual mirror of federal
district court in terms of its rules of evidence and burden of proof. The rules
of [*18]
procedure governing United States courts-martial are created by the Congress
and have been regularly validated during appeals of courts-martial cases to the
United States Supreme Court However, despite the sound institutional foundation
and certification of the United States courts-martial practice, the system is
still subject to chronic criticism
and mistrust within our own country because of the lack of clear
systemic independence for military judges.[35] Military judges are appointed by the judge advocates general of
the
respective armed service and operate outside normal military chains of
command during
their judicial assignments. However, all military judges are subject to return
to duty
under the authority of the same commanders against whom some of their rulings
may
have been rendered. Not insignificantly, these commanders also comprise
much of the
pool of senior officers who sit on promotion boards that will consider the
military judges
records for promotion during or after the officer? judicial assignments have
been
completed. This same apparent lack of independence will exist for any
military officers
appointed as judges or panel members for the prospective military tribunals.
In reality, there is no evidence that the military
judge appointment and evaluation
system has any actual effect on the
fairness of military trials or the decision making
process of military judges. However, despite the Department of
Defenses own
confidence in the integrity and professionalism of ifs military judges, this
aspect of the
military justice system is repeatedly attacked by critics of
the system.[36] Once this
discussion is taken beyond the friendly confines of the United States, this
sort of criticism [*19] will only increase On the other hand, although it is still a national
trial process, the Federal District Court system has a significant leg up on
any sort of military adjudication
system in that Federal District Court judge have lifetime tenure, Similarly,
civilian
juries who are selected from and return to private lives are immune
from claim of
working for the same company as the prosecutor. It should be stressed that
none of this
suggests that Federal District Court proceedings are any fairer, or better
than a military
court-martial. But in the world of international politics
and coalition building, improper
perceptions and appearances are a reality that cannot be dismissed simply due
to a lack of
evidence.
Just
Because You Can, Doesnt Mart You Should
Unnecessary use of military tribunals in the face of
reasonable international criticism is an ill-advised move toward unilateralism
at a time when the long term campaign against international terrorism requires
more than United States leadership. The shock of September 11th may reasonably
cause policymakers to view international terrorism through a lens of temporal
urgency. But the solution is not as simple as finding and
punishing, or even killing, Osama Bin Laden and all the people associated
with
perpetrators of the events of September 11th. In dealing with the terrorists de
jure, we
must not allow currents operations to compromise our ability to deal with a
broad range of
international partners in the cases of other existing or future terrorist
entities.
Although not clearly defined by the Bush
administration, Americas de facto grand
strategy for crisis resolution of national security issues is one of selective
engagement
[*20] supported and
legitimized by formation of ad hoc
international coalitions. Our continuing ability to attract support from
nations across a wide cultural and political
spectrum rest on the credibility of the United States as a fair and benign
super power.
Commentators have noted that part of the reason why a remarkable
trans-cultural
international coalition was able to be quickly constructed
in the wake of September 11th
was the perceived integrity of the United States in its stated intention to
bring suspects to
justice in courts of law.[37] This sort of credibility should be neither squandered, nor
taken
for granted.
Given the inextricable linkage between the war against
terrorism and the prosecution of captured suspects, the forum choice for the
trial of alleged terrorists should not be discussed as an issue unto itself.
Credibility in international politics is often premised
upon a series of apparently
unrelated policy choices. For example one may reasonably
argue that Americas ability to gain the cooperation of moderate
Islamic States such as
Pakistan in the current anti-terror campaign was in large measure due to the
elder
President Bushs adherence to the limited Desert Stoma
coalition goals of expelling Iraqi
forces from Kuwait From an operational perspective, it is clear that on 27
February
1991, Gulf War coalition forces were well positioned to pursue fleeing enemy
forces into
Iraq and possibly even to occupy Baghdad and attempt to force
the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Instead, the hostilities were halted
on what some authorities
perceive to be unnecessarily favorable terms for Iraq that allowed Saddam
Hussein to remain in power as e continuing threat to stability in the region.
After the war, the elder Scheffer, supra note 24 at 2.
[*21]
President Bush himself stated that he had
miscalculated in thinking that the crushing defeat suffered by Iraqi forces and
the domestic upheaval within Iraq would lead to the toppling of
Saddams government without further action by the United States.
However, this sort of Monday morning quarterbacking overlooks a number of
points that made the Gulf War a successful limited war and a stable foundation
for other limited actions by the United States in cooperation with Muslim
nations.
As will hopefully be the case in the terror war, a
significant aspect of the United States success in the Gulf War was
the formation arid maintenance of a coalition that spanned abroad political,
religious and ideological spectrum. The Gulf War coalition was an unlikely
collaboration of effort, based on pursuit of limited objectives that did not
include the removal of Saddam Hussein from power or the invasion of Iraqi
territory.[38] Even though the United States may have wished for more; agreement on
these objectives obtained world-wide political legitimacy for the
coalitions efforts and isolation of Iraq from its hoped for
supporters.
On 27 February 1991, Saddam Hussein agreed to the
demands issued by the relevant United Nations Security Counsel Resolutions.[39] The Iraqis had been evicted from Kuwait and the sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait had been restored. If the
United States had decided to unilaterally proceed into Iraq in March of 1991,
it would have moved beyond its well formed plan of limited war in response to
Iraqi aggression, and away from its well constructed scheme of United States
led friends [*22] versus
an isolated Iraq.[40] The elder President Bush correctly resisted the temptation
of
operationally logical pursuit of retreating Iraqi forces in order to adhere to
the limits of
the Desert Storm coalitions stated wax aim of expelling Iraqi forces
from Kuwait.
Shortsighted critics may persist in describing that decision as a missed
opportunity. A
Longer view of events, however, suggests that United States restraint in that
instance
established a measure of credibility in the Islamic world that has
proved valuable in
attracting the support of moderate regimes in nations such as Pakistan w
Operation
Enduring Freedom. It is likely that moderate Muslim State cooperation would
have been
less forthcoming if the United States had undertaken unilateral pursuit
into Iraq at the end
of Operation Desert Storm.
Conclusion
Careful
students of world politics know that hegemony has never proven to be a
winning
strategy.
Until recently, American policymakers have acted as 1f
the United States is
somehow exempt from this pattern. But if recent events
are any indication. this is wishful
thinking.[41]
Just as the United States had the power to proceed
into Iraq in March of 1991, it now has the power to prosecute suspected
terrorists in ad hoc military tribunals, And
just as there was potential benefit in a unilateral offensive into Iraq,
convictions might be more [*23] easily secured arid secrets more easily guarded in trials conducted by
military tribunals. However, if we view international terrorism as a world
issue in which we expect the assistance of others, we should resist the easy
solution of conducting ad hoc
proceedings
just because we can. If we elect to conduct national trials instead of seeking
an
international forum, we should seek to maximize the appearance of fairness
so as to limit
avenues for complaint of victors justice. The appearance of fairness
may best achieved
by prosecution of terrorist suspects in United States Federal District Courts.
The members of al Qaeda may or may not
deserve[42] trials in a time-tested and jurisprudentially sound forum. However, the
world-respected reputation of United States
criminal courts has no been built nor maintained for the benefit of any evil
person. For
the benefit of rigorous due process is reaped not only by those
that stand accused in our
courts, but also by the larger portion of our society that never stand
accused., but have
trust and confidence in the fact that the government is both protecting them
arid being as
fair as possible. The use of an established court system at
this critical time should not be
viewed as a action on behalf of accused terrorists, but rather as a
representation to needed
international partners that the course of our ship of state is steady, and
properly charted
for the rough waters ahead.
[1] President Issues
Military Order; Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
War Against Terrorism,
White House News Release, (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html) January 17, 2002.
[2] The criticism has
transcended traditional party and ideological lines. See generally, Walter Shapiro.
Bushs
Military Tribunal Order Needs More Polish (www.USAToday.com/news/e98/shapiro) January 17,
2002). Former President Carter also added his yoke to those criticizing the
executive order, stating that he
was deeply concerned the United States could weaken its
international reputation and its ability to work
for peace following the Afghanistan conflict. Ben Fox, Former
President Carter Criticizes Military
Tribunal Plan, The Sacramento Bee,
December 6, 2001.
[3] Mackubin Thomas Owens, Consider
the Latrunculi: Detainees or Prisoners of War? The Providence Journal,
January 25, 2002.
[4] Carl von Clausewitz, one
of the founders of modern strategic studies wrote: Strategy is the
use of the
engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an
aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with
its purpose. in other words, be will draft the plan
of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to
achieve it: in fact, shape the
individual campaign and, thin these, decide
on the individual engagements. Carl von Clausewitz, On
War, translated and edited
by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976,
p. 177. See generally. Mackubin Thomas Owens Thinking About Strategy,
Chapter 28 of Strategy and Force Planning, 3d ed., Newport, Naval War College
Press, 2000.
[5] See
generally, Richard Overy. Why the Allies Won,
New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1995. pp. 248-
55.
[6] Id at 314-25.
[7] Although
al Qaeda is not a typical participant in a classical war scenario, concern for
the post war
implications of the victors actions should still exist. We should
recall Carl Von Clausewitzs observation that the results of war are
never final. See Clausewitz, On War, supra note 4 at 80.
[8] Barry
R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, Competing Visions for U.S.
Strategy, International Security,
21:3,
Winter 1997, reprinted in Strategy and Force Planning, 3d Edition, Naval War College Press, Newport
Rhode Island, 2000, p. 137.
Professors Poses and Ross provide a full description of these four
classic
grand strategies and suggest that selective engagement is the proper choice
for the United States in the post
cold war era.
[9] Id at 138.
[10] Id. at 145.