

Unitary states following federal principles: Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Åland Islands compared

Jan Sundberg, University of Helsinki & Maria Ackrén, Ilisimatusarfik/University of Greenland

jan.sundberg@helsinki.fi

maac@samf.uni.gl

Abstract

This paper discusses the elements of federal principles that unitary states of Denmark and Finland include deriving from the autonomous regions of the Faroe Islands, Greenland and the Åland Islands. We show how these islands can be considered federacies and how this is politically anchored both at the national as well as the regional level. We focus on the impact of electoral systems and political parties. Data derives both from pro-home rule/self-government and post-self-government and how this has affected the islands. The shift from *de facto* to *de jure* autonomy shows that the islands have been able to establish their own party systems and defined themselves as own political entities. An interesting feature is that the Danish islands score higher when it comes to voter turnout than the Åland Islands. This shows the same pattern as on the national level, where Denmark has a higher voter turnout than Finland. The study shows that the formation of a separate party system around separate parliaments boosts divergence in federacies between the unitary mainland and the autonomous regions.

Draft, please do not cite!

To be presented at the panel *Self-Determination in the Arctic - Regional Autonomy and Ethnic Tensions*. ECPR General Conference 2015, Montreal 26-29 August.

Introduction

Mainland Denmark and Finland are unitary states but fulfill the role of federacies in relation to the autonomous insular regions of the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and the Åland Islands. The aim of this paper is to compare how this solution is politically anchored as well on the regional as on the national level.

Federacy is a federal arrangement which means that there are different applications of federal principles, such as, among others associated state arrangements and confederations. Daniel Elazar defines federacy arrangement when a larger power and a smaller power is linked asymmetrically in a federal relationship and the latter has a greater autonomy than other segments of the former, in return, has a smaller role in the governance of the larger power. The relationship between them is more like that of a federation than a confederation and can be dissolved only by mutual agreement (Elazar 1987, 7). Ronald Watts has a similar definition, and more interesting, he counts the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and the Åland Islands as typical examples of federacies (Watts 1999, 11).

Daniel Elazar claims that the world is in the midst of a paradigm shift from a world of states to a world of diminished state sovereignty and increased interstate linkage of a constitutional federal character. Alongside those federations are numerous asymmetric federal arrangements where the federate power has a constitutional connection with a smaller federate unit with a different basis than the ordinary federal state relationship (Elazar 1996, 417-429). Federations are a deliberate creation where legal sovereignty is shared between the national (federal) government and the state (province) government. The legal function of the federal government includes external relations and some domestic functions as the currency. The state functions often include education, local government, and law enforcement. In almost all federations, states have a guaranteed representation in the upper chamber where states have equal representation.

In federations – the federacies Denmark and Finland being cases of this – there is no upper chamber to balance the voice of territorial units. These states are organised as unitary states except for their autonomous regions. Before autonomy was introduced the centralised power had not to take formal notice of these regions. In contrast to federal states the creation of autonomous regions was not at the outset a result of deliberative processes. Both Denmark and Finland were more or less forced to accept territorial autonomy within their borders. Autonomy was more a result of conflict than of a deliberative process. The MPs elected from the autonomous regions represented a tiny minority in the Parliament with no chances to win a conflict with the majority. It was an odd situation as the autonomous regions differed in terms of sovereignty from other regions but still had only very modest influence in national decision-making.

Formal and informal asymmetry

William Livingston wrote that federalism is a sociological phenomenon. By this statement he expressed a view that federalism is concerned with many other problems than those of legal nature. In addition, he emphasized different diversities in society like economic, religious, racial and historical. When diversities are grouped in particular geographical areas and organised on territorial basis the result may be a federal society (Livingston 1952, 81-95). Later studies have shown that classifications can be made where legislation has a central role, but still giving much space for diversities. According to Robert Agranoff federal systems pose special constitutional and non-constitutional challenges. The constitutional mechanisms include divided rule, concurrent and separate competencies, assurance of democratic or republican forms of government, dependence of the general government on subnational governments, and participation of the subnational governments in general governments (Agranoff 1999, 13-14). The non-constitutional challenges lies in Livingston's argumentation in the basic diversity or integration of society itself.

Asymmetry is found in all constitutional as non-constitutional federal arrangements. However, Charles Tarlton was not a friend of asymmetry. In his view elements of similarity of a federal system must predominate over existing elements of diversity to function at an optimal level of harmony. On the other hand, if a system is highly asymmetric, then a harmonious federal system is unlikely to develop (Tarlton 1965, 861-874). Tarlton was a friend of strong harmonious government where asymmetry was a potential source to secessionism. Later on, this conclusion has strongly been criticised. Where asymmetry has been applied it has in most cases resulted in success, though, in some cases it has not (Burgess and Gress 1999, 54-55). It has been implemented as an alternative to secession, and serves as an alternative to conflict and violence (Agranoff 2004, 26-65). The latter option is a well-known alternative taken by authoritarian states.

Ronald Watts lists ten different types of federal arrangements of which federacy are one (Watts 1999, 6-9). Asymmetry prevails at least to some degree in all these forms of arrangements. However, asymmetric relations are of different kinds and the outcomes of different degree. In addition, it is important to distinguish between *de facto* and *de jure* asymmetry. The former refers to economic, social, cultural, ethnic, territorial, and demographic patterns, whereas the latter refers to formal asymmetry where a region, province or state is treated differently under the law and constitution (Burgess 2006, 215-221). *De facto* asymmetry, at least to some extent, is the common practice in all forms of federal arrangements. Some states or provinces are bigger and wealthier than others; others share a different culture and ethnic composition, some are located in the centre while some in the periphery. *De jure* asymmetry prevails when a given state or province accommodates some legal privileges like Quebec, Bavaria or some autonomous regions in Spain.

De jure asymmetry is the result of historical events, territorially based ethnic or cultural conflicts, and even conflicts between nation states. Nations have to balance between integration and disintegration, and *de jure* solutions can give birth to tensions among those provinces not subject to special legal treatment (Watts 1996, 353-371). Studies show that federal states or the like (Spain) face that kind of conflicts. Much less is said about federacies which compound a dominant unitary state who shares a legal relation to one or more autonomous regions. Compared to the rest of the nation state their population is small but they differ subsequently in terms of territorial legal rights. They have achieved a mini-sovereignty within the borders of the unitary state. Difference in terms of *de facto* is huge concerning population size, ethnicity, economic resources, and political influence on national politics. Similarly Difference is huge in terms of *de jure* as no other region in the unitary state has an autonomous status except for the Faroe Islands and Greenland in Denmark, and the Åland Islands in Finland. Divergences in federacies are therefore of a much more extensive magnitude compared to asymmetry in federations, but much less studied.

Diversity and homogeneity in unitary states

Federal systems follow a non-centralized organisation where the powers of government are diffused among many centres mostly guaranteed in the constitution

The nation state developed a range of agencies of unification and standardisation, which penetrate the local culture. A gradually widening of governmental activities made for a more complex system of alignments. Territorial oppositions and waves of counter mobilisation threatened the unity of the nation and set limits to nation-building (Rokkan 1970, 101). Democratic consolidation may be more difficult in multinational or multicultural states and dealing with issues of stateness is for some incompatible with democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996, 29-30). In democracies it is the magnitude and intensity of territorial opposition which challenge standardisation based on national institutions and laws. The implicit objective of a homogeneous state is unification and standardisation of the nation and deviations in terms of institutional arrangements and/or legislation will meet resistance.

According to Lijphart one can distinguish between homogenous and plural societies. In the former, increased contact are likely to lead to mutual understanding and homogenisation, while close contacts in plural societies might lead to strain and hostility (1977, 88-89). To deal with such problems in a democratic manner two types of solution are available. A nation state can respond to demands of secession by reducing or eliminating ethnic differences (assimilation) from the majoritarian national order. Such actions tend, however, to generate the opposite effect. Plural democracies tend to introduce some form of federal or confederal system rather than to incorporate the differences. According to Easton "In systems of multiple nationalities, if the relevant members feel that each group recognizes

respect, and is willing to consider seriously the major need and demands of others, the probability of eliciting support for a common community is increased” (Easton 1965, 250). If ethnic and geographic diversity is being recognized, it contributes to the development of a stable democracy. Will Kymlicka has many years later found that the best way to ensure loyalty of such national minorities against secession has been to accept rather than to attack their distinct nationality (Kymlicka 2000, 183-212; Kymlicka 2010, 97-112). However, he points out that multination federations can fail if the feelings between the groups are tinged with resentment and annoyance, or if the majority population feel the minority group is ungrateful, have unreasonable expectations, and are impossible to satisfy (Kymlicka 2002, 7-16).

Neither mainland Denmark nor Finland is homogenous states, though Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and the Åland Islands are excluded. Southern Jutland also has a small German-identifying minority close to the German border. Since 1977 the German minority has not been represented in the Folketing, although the German Minority Party has previously argued that its special character should provide for special arrangements (Elklit 1981; Elklit 2002, 63). Finland is according to the constitution bilingual, but in practice it is only in the Southern and Western coastal areas that Swedish is visible (and audible) in daily life. The electoral system does not recognise the Swedish electorate with any special measures, and the Swedish People’s Party compete for votes and seats as other contesting parties. Thus, neither Denmark nor Finland gives room for ethnic differences in electoral laws.¹ The electoral systems are in reality aimed at national homogenisation.

Homogeneity in terms of people and territory were the key elements of nation-building in Denmark and Finland, so combining territory with an ethnic group different from the nation was not in line with an idea of a unitary state. Therefore, the constitution and the electoral system were construed to work in this direction and it was dramatic events like war and occupation which broke the principles of unitary state. In the Finnish case, the constitution had to be amended to secure territorial autonomy for the Åland Islands, while it in Denmark was more complicated as the constitution is quite difficult to amend. Therefore, the regulation of autonomy for the Faroe Islands and – later – Greenland has taken the form of special legislation. By these means a region adds a *de jure* dimension to its *de facto* regional status. The latter of these concepts refers to practice and the former to the legal processes where units of the state are treated differently before law (Burgess 2006, 215-217). States with autonomous regions have adopted certain federal solutions though the vast majority of the territory and population follow the principles of a unitary state. The phenomenon is defined as federacies or special autonomous regions. They are exempt from the country-wide constitutional framework and they receive special constitutional treatment (Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2010, 29-31). Federacies are sometimes used for both *de facto* and *de*

¹ It should not be forgotten, however, that the German minority party can participate in parliamentary elections without having to collect supporting signatures (as other un-represented parties have to).

jure regions, but the term is most accurate when it refers to autonomous regions (i.e. *de jure* regions).

In all three cases the initiative and mobilisation for separate regional dispensations came from the regions, not from national government. The shift from *de facto* to *de jure* regions came with changes in the constitution (or in Denmark special legislation *almost* to the same effect).

The Problem

Difference can be measured in terms of distribution of legal power and finances between the autonomous regions and the national government. Other types of difference prevail as well including size, ethnicity, geographical location, and political power. In this paper we will focus on the impact of electoral systems and political parties. Behind the written rules of federal arrangements in Denmark and Finland electoral rules and party life can either enhance national unity or deepen differences in these two federacies.

Ronald Watts found that differing electoral systems have had an impact upon processes generating federal cohesion, the representation of regional and minority views, and the relative stability of governments (Watts 1999, 90). If this is true in federations what lessons can be drawn from federacies like Denmark and Finland? Does electoral laws differ between the nation state and the autonomous regions, if yes, who took the initiative and with what impact on national cohesion and regional representation?

In federal states William Riker notes that there is a correlation between decentralised parties and relatively decentralised federations. This correlation seems to be applied in reverse where highly centralised federations correlate with centralised parties. He could not state what causes what, but concluded that it seems to be a reciprocal enforcement (Riker 1975, 133-136). Political parties are vehicles defending and promoting differences, and as such are a function of symmetry and asymmetry (Burgess and Gress 1999, 52-53). The regional parties in Quebec is the most known of the latter whereas symmetry more or less prevails in federations like the US or Germany.

Organisational relationship between the federal and provincial level in parties is essential in federations. In federacies like Denmark and Finland the organisational party structure is centralised on the mainland. The only exception is the small German and Swedish minority parties with regional strongholds but lacking a distinct territorial base. What are the organisational connections to the national parties on the mainland before and after the three regions won regional autonomy? Are politicians from the autonomous regions excluded from a career in national government or have they been included? Is there a difference in party alignments and voting turnout?

In this paper we will examine these matters in order to measure to what extent party life in these federacies have turned towards more diversity or not and with what impact. Following Riker we assume that our results can show the current status of autonomy in these three autonomous regions, and the prospects for the near future.

Moves of electoral incorporation

In comparing electoral systems on the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and the Åland Islands we have to consider to what extent they were in line with the national standard before and after the regions won autonomy. Unitary states seek to uniform electoral systems within the borders of the nation state which is not necessary the best option for neither *de facto* or *de jure* regions. In addition, a large representation in the national parliament can be desirable for the autonomous regions to enhance political influence whereas the nation state wants to minimise it. No access, on the other hand, could violate national cohesion.

Starting with the latter, the Faroe Islands and Greenland had guaranteed representation in Danish Parliament before winning autonomy in 1948 and 1979. The Faroe Islands had a status of county with special arrangements for its remote location, whereas Greenland was a Danish colony until 1953 with no access to the Parliament (Harhoff 1993, 50-70; Lidegaard 1991, 179-228). The Åland Islands, on the other hand, got autonomy in 1921 but continued to be included in the Åbo south constituency on the mainland. This arrangement continued until the election 1948 when the Åland Islands were separated to a single member constituency and thus guaranteed one seat in the Finnish Parliament (Sundberg 2011, 163-204).

Distance, different culture, language, and bad communications (the Faroe Islands) combined with colonial status (Greenland) separated these islands from the mainland which gave them a *de facto* regional recognition not possible to integrate fully in the Danish nation. The Åland Islands, in contrast, was only partly different concerning culture and language as the neighbour island communes were Swedish as well, but different in culture and language to the vast majority of the distant Finnish nation. The distance from mainland Åland to Sweden was short and so was the close cultural ties fuelled with shared language. Åland got international recognition as a *de facto* region already in 1856, when the islands were demilitarised in the Treaty of Paris. Its strategic position was a threat to the heart of Sweden as Åland opened the entrance to Stockholm if a hostile state located naval bases and troops on the islands.

Representation in the national Parliaments has not been a main issue neither in the Faroe Islands, Greenland nor in the Åland Islands. More attentions has been paid to enhance difference, either by increasing autonomy (all three), total independence (the Faroe Islands and later Greenland) or succession with a neighbour state (the Åland Islands). Electoral laws

have therefore been of less concern for them, at least in the outset. Total exclusion from the national Parliaments is, on the other hand, not a well taken strategy for the nation states. Iceland was offered representation in the Danish Parliament from the mid-19th century, but they rejected the offer (Harhoff 1993). Access to political power is a method of incorporation and integration into the nation state. The Icelanders were well aware of this threat; their aim was to win independence which they finally managed to win in 1944. None of our three cases have chosen the Icelandic strategy, except for Åland who boycotted the 1919 and 1921 elections by not nominating any candidates. As a result Åland was excluded from information and influence in legislation and from the budgetary process when tax revenues were distributed to the region.

Incorporation in terms of electoral laws may take different forms with different outcomes. Most important in this context is how the constituencies are territorially defined, magnitude in terms of seats, and how votes are transformed to seats. Firstly, does the territorial borders of constituencies and the autonomous region fit or is the latter a part of larger electoral entity? Secondly, according to what principles are seats distributed to the autonomous regions? Thirdly, are votes transformed to seat following a majoritarian or proportional method in national elections? Fourth, how the electoral system of electing the regional Parliament is organised?

The most inclusive form is exclusively enacted by the national government where the autonomous region is integrated into a large multimember constituency giving no secure output in terms of seats. Åland was included in the big Åbo South constituency from the first general election in 1907. Nothing changed when Åland got its autonomy in 1921. However, after years of uncertainty Åland proposed after WW II to be separated from this big 15 (in 1945) member constituency. A single member constituency was established in 1948. Åland qualified for one seat according to the Hare –Niemeyer formula where the population of the constituency is divided with the population in all constituencies multiplied with 200. Following this formula Åland is qualified to get 1.05 seats in 2011. The Hare – Niemeyer formula is used to adjust all multimember districts in Finland prior to Parliament elections, Åland excluded and the multiplier is therefore 199.

Greenland, in contrast, was denied representation in the Danish Parliament prior to 1953, because of the island's colonial status. There was not much discussion 1951-52 about the general issue of what the relationship between Greenland and Southern Denmark should be in the future. One reason was the generally accepted need for a modernization of Greenland another was the simultaneous discussion in the UN about the future for areas with colonial status, and a third the post-WWII development of home rule in the Faroe Islands. When it became clear – in the elected Consultative Assembly on Greenland and as presented in various committees and commissions by the representatives from Greenland – that there in Greenland was a strong wish of full integration in the Danish realm (i.e. not

some kind of independence or autonomy plus representation in parliament), this was easily agreed on (DIIS, 2007: 247ff).

So the decision to give Greenland two seats in the new *Folketing* was easy, also because the parallels to the other county in the North Atlantic – the Faroe Islands – were so obvious. But the shift from colonial status to something else had only started recently, and political parties had not yet developed in Greenland, which meant that there was no point in introducing PR (as on the Faroe Islands 1947-48). Consequently, two SMDs were established in Greenland. But based on recommendations from the Consultative Council, sparsely populated and less developed Northern and Eastern Greenland were not integrated in the new electoral set-up, so one SMD constituency covered the Northern part of Western Greenland and another constituency the Southern part.

The electoral incorporation of Faroe Islands fall between the Åland Islands and Greenland as the Faroe Islands were very early given access to Parliament within a separate constituency. At the 1814 Peace Accord in Kiel – after the Napoleonic wars – it was decided that the Faroe Islands should be part of the Danish monarchy and not follow Norway to become part of a united Swedish-Norwegian state. Subsequently, the islands were in 1816 made a Danish county, on par with the other counties, even though the islands' special geographical position had to be taken into consideration.

Despite the fact that the islands were part of the Danish monarchy, the 1849 Constitution was only implemented – as far as national elections are concerned – in mid-1851, partly because of the need for special legislation reflection, the weather-dependent transport conditions in the North Atlantic. The special act on national elections on the Faroe Islands was only passed in late December 1850 and it is fascinating to study the parliamentary debate in both houses on the proposed legislation (in particular the committee report in the upper house and the debate in the lower house (RT, FT, 1850, II, cols 2866-2561 and 2893-2974)).

It was a quite principled debate focusing on how to combine the view of the Faroese as an independent nation with the fact that the islands had now become an integral part of the Danish realm, covered also by the constitution of 1849. How could one vote for a piece of legislation about the representation of the islands in Parliament without consulting the islanders? But then, the answer was who should one consult when there was not yet an elected, more or less representative, body to consult? And would it be acceptable that a MP elected on the islands might have the casting vote on Danish legislative issues (as the balance in the house was sometimes close)? The arguments *pro et con* sound familiar for a modern reader, but the government's proposed law was in any case enacted through a 35:2 vote in the upper house, and then 51:20 in the lower house.

Contrary to the rest of Denmark, voting in the Faroese SMDs should not be in only one central place, but simultaneously in the seven parishes, i.e. on the main islands, in order to

reduce the need for travelling in small boats in sometimes very rough weather.² Among the private proposals in the *Folketing*, one was to give the islands two or three members as well as delayed implementation until after consultation with the population on the islands. Both these proposals were, however, rejected.

In sum, it seems evident that economical and racial concerns were considered when Greenland was excluded from access to the Danish Parliament until 1953. Full access was provided to the Faroe Islands and the Åland Islands according to principles of the unitary states, i.e., they were considered equal to the rest of the nation, and therefore they should be incorporated and treated by similar means as other regions in the electoral process. However, in the outset, practical circumstances as distance and bad communications raised barriers, and later a counter mobilization for independence at Faroe Islands paved the way to autonomy. Although the counter mobilization on the Åland Islands failed; instead of a merge with Sweden they had to cope with autonomy. In all three cases, these counter mobilizations were supported by certain international or cross national actors when the islands got *de jure* autonomy. Representation in the national Parliaments was of much less concern for them in the mobilization process. In the long run, however, territorial borders of constituency and representation in national Parliament grew in importance. This was not an act of willingness to be incorporated but rather a move to get information and insight in national legislation and budgeting.

Electoral laws matter

As the magnitude is small in the three regional constituencies measures had to be taken to fit into the national system with minimal exceptions. Parliament elections are organised by the nation state not by the autonomous regions. Plural as well as proportional voting are familiar systems in Denmark and Finland. In Denmark plural voting was in use from 1849 until 1918, and in Finland from 1907 until the 1936 election in northern Lapland. Denmark shifted to proportional voting in multimember districts in 1918 and Finland from the very beginning in 1907 with exception of northern Lapland. However, the Faroe Islands continued to use plural voting in one single member constituency until the region won autonomy. After that in 1947-48 Faroe Islands became a two-member constituency using proportional representation.

In Greenland only independent candidates were allowed and it sometimes happened that candidates (often the incumbent MP) were returned unopposed. In 1973, the Consultative

² An example: Southern Denmark had ordinary *Folketing*-elections in November 1873, but on the Faeroe Islands the election could only take place on January 9, 1874. However, elections could only be conducted in four parishes, and the incumbent MP was therefore returned on the basis of only 57 votes for and nil against his re-election.

Council suggested that individual candidates should be allowed to register a kind of apparentement and that PR should be introduced, as on the Faroe Islands. The *Folketing* legislated on this in 1974, and it is interesting that one of the two MPs from Greenland accepted the proposal outright, while the other – the more radical of the two – was against it because – as he claimed – it would make it more difficult to hold individual MPs accountable in their SMDs.

The act foresaw the development of political parties in Greenland, so it allowed candidates to run for a Greenlandic political party (defined as a party represented in the Consultative Council), even though, it was still individual candidates who registered and ran for election. It took until 1979 before the candidates for parliamentary election could formally register their partisan affiliation. Candidates could also register an apparentement agreement, where it from the first election became the pattern that two “candidate coalitions” were formed, one with two center-right candidates and one with two center-left candidates. Each candidate coalition then got one seat, which went to the candidate with most personal votes.

The reform prior to the 1948 election in Åland was made in conjuncture with the preparation of a new self-government law implemented in 1951. Prior to this Åland and Finland faced dramatic events. The Soviet Union in the autumn of 1944 required the right to establish a military base at Porkkala outside Helsinki. The Finnish Government panicked, Cape Hangö and Åland were mentioned, it leaked to Åland, and preparations were made to merge with Sweden (Spiliopoulou Åkermark 2007, 20-33). The Finnish Government denied such attempts but offered an extended law of self-government. Without these dramatic events, the delimitation of a single member constituency would probably not have been possible. Åland was now separated from the Åbo South county constituency which had 15 seats in the 1945 election. The size of the population corresponded to one deputy in parliament, and one mandate was now guaranteed and plurality implemented.

A problem arose because what should be done in case of a vacancy as by-elections were not foreseen in the legislation (Vallag 1906), as that is not a real problem with proportional elections. After two elections the system was changed and from the 1954 election to the last plurality election in 1983 all candidates on the list had a deputy. The 1975 election and the year after became crucial for the future of plurality elections as the elected candidate died and his deputy was appointed MP. This caused a discussion because the popular support of the deputy candidate had not been measured. According to this interpretation, the main candidate and her/his deputy candidate is not a collective, but rather two individual single candidates, which means that the deputy candidate has never had his support in the electorate measured. However, this former deputy's electoral support was counted in 1979, when he was elected by a plurality of votes.

The reform committee appointed to look into the matter concluded that the nomination procedure was too significant, while the voters had too little (or no) influence, as

compromises between factions in the relatively unstructured party field were common during the nomination process. The committee in the end favoured a proportional system for the election of the single member to parliament (PM 1977). No demands were raised to increase the size, i.e., the number of members elected from the constituency. However, proportional systems purport that votes are translated to seats in a proportional way. Proportional systems require multi-member constituencies. Proportional elections in single member districts are unheard of in the literature of electoral systems (Sartori 1997, 7-10; Farrell 2001, 68-96). At Åland dominating political interests did not pay much notice to such arguments at that time and nor do they today.

In preparing the government bill in 1985 three arguments were raised to support the change of electoral rules on Åland: 1) the number of candidates will increase, 2) voting turnout will increase, and 3) the electoral support to the deputy member will be measured (Tarasti 1998, 407-408). Nothing is said about disproportionality and the electoral threshold which is related to the former. The reform had a discrepancy as the constitution stated that where local conditions demand deviation from proportional representation, one or two single member districts might be established (Riksdagsordningen 1928/7). According to the provision in the new constitution all members of Parliament are elected in proportional elections. Åland is mentioned as the sole constituency with a proportionally elected MP in a single member district (Finlands grundlag 1999/731).

In none of the three cases changes of electoral laws were a huge issue for the autonomous regions. It was more a concern for the national governments to minimise the parliament influence from the islands as MPs from the islands participate in all national decisions whereas MPs from the mainland are excluded from decisions written in the act of autonomy. In addition, concerns were met that incumbents from the islands could hold the balance of power. The electoral systems are now standardised to resemble the system on the mainland. Proportional voting is implemented, though the system on the Åland islands is odd as the system of proportional voting is implemented in a single member constituency.

Party alignment and voter turnout

Electoral laws are legislated by national parliaments encompassing all types of political elections except for elections concerning the autonomous parliaments and local elections in the regions. The one or two elected incumbents from the islands are formally involved in decision making concerning the entire nation, although in practice they have not much to say if they lack collaborating parties. Non-island incumbents in national parliament, on the other hand, are excluded from the legislation process devolved to the island parliaments. There is no formal hinder that an incumbent elected from the autonomous islands could be included in national cabinet, yet it has not happened. A silent agreement keeps them out as it could give too much advantage to the autonomous regions which is not in line with a

unitary state. Fears have been raised in Denmark that the four incumbents from the two autonomous regions could utilize their mandate if the two party blocks in parliament are of equal strength.

Although the role of island incumbents in national parliaments can be discussed, they fulfill an important mission for their regions. As members of parliament they get up to date information about coming and ongoing legislation, budgetary process, and the discussion in the house. In addition, the incumbents are assisted and backed by “mini island embassies” in respective capital Copenhagen and Helsinki. That would not be the case if the role of island incumbents had been neglected or considered superfluous. Compared to incumbents from other national constituencies the island incumbents have a more strategic role as they are legislators in the national parliament and simultaneously representing the policy of legislators in the autonomous island parliaments. What effect will it have on voter turnout? Does it have a mobilizing effect on the electorate on who will be given the mandate to represent the autonomous islands or is national politics too remote for ordinary islanders?

Table 1 (About here) Voter turnout: Nationwide compared to island votes (see appendix 1)

Generally voter turnout is higher in Denmark than in Finland which tends to have a slight mobilizing effect on the island electorate. Nevertheless, it is obviously clear that all three autonomous islands follow a similar pattern. National politics does not trigger islanders to the ballot box in the same manner as in the rest of Denmark and Finland. The difference is large with some occasional exceptions when the difference is less than ten per cent. Generally the gap is 20 or more than 30 per cent. Only once has the island voters been more active. It happened on the Åland Islands in 1939 when the island was integrated in the south west constituency and had to compete with the mainland electorate to win mandate. The separation to an Åland constituency 1948 calmed down the activity. In addition, separate island constituencies sorted out national party candidates from the election. National parties lost their grip on the island due to changes in electoral law. None socialist parties directly, others (the small Social Democrats and Communist) later on. It makes sense when constituency borders and the island territorial borders fit. It gives more political fuel to make distance to the nation state. How the elections are organised or how the islands are splinted in small constituencies is of less importance.

Comparing the three autonomous islands it looks evident that voter turnout is generally higher on the Faroe Islands than in Greenland and the Åland Islands. Geographical distance to the national mainland seems not matter. The eastern archipelago of Åland is close to Finland and the main island even closer to Sweden. Faroe Islands are far away from

Denmark and so is Greenland which is close to Canada. It has more to do with internal political life which we will come back to.

Elections to the island parliaments

All three autonomous regions are governed by legislative assemblies elected by enfranchised citizens of the islands. The introduction of island parliaments and devolution of sovereignty differs from the making of federations as this was not a result of a deliberative process. In all three cases it was shadowed by crisis and deep conflicts between islanders and the national government. Unitary states prefer to centralize and standardize not to decentralize. In that perspective the scarcely populated islands did not have good options to win *de jure* autonomy. However, the islands were backed by international actors as their position on the map were and still is of strategic importance in times of war and conflict. Given that perspective and the weakness of the two unitary states at the international arena sovereignty was introduced as a compromise instead of a merger to Sweden (Åland), independence (Faroe Islands), and later on independence (Greenland).

Compromises do not automatically give legitimacy to island parliaments by the population. The fundamental question of the island status is not in the hands of the island parliaments. Policy can be formed and issues discussed in these parliaments but their function is to govern and legislate on internal affairs under the monitoring eyes of the national state. The introduction of parliament and government is an easier task than to build up an administration to prepare and implement decisions taken by the government. A wide range of skilled officials are needed including economists for the budgetary process and the treasury, juridical experts capable of formulating the text to enacted laws. At least in the outset the difference in competence was huge between the national state administration and the small island administration that had to start more or less from scratch.

To get a grip on the oldest election result between WW I and WW II from Åland reminds of problems facing party research. In lack of resources no official election statistics is available as persons in charge to do statistics is not heard of. National election data gathered on the island from the same period is official and accurate made by the Statistical bureau in Helsinki. A similar phenomenon but of less magnitude was visible on Faroe Islands after the war and in the beginning of Greenland autonomy. The Statistical bureau in Copenhagen was skilled and had resources which the islands had to adopt. It is problematic to conclude whether it was lack of legitimacy to the island governments or lack of resources to produce electoral data that caused the problem. Probably a combination of both but problems of legitimacy faded with increasing resources to govern the islands and a belief that the incumbents can best handle their common destiny.

Table 2 (About here) Voter turnout in island parliament elections (see appendix 2)

Autonomous Åland has the longest experience from island parliament elections starting 1922. No reliable data is available before 1948, only a note indicating that in 1928 about 20 percent voted (Wrede 1981, 18). Faroe Islands, on the other hand, got its Home Rule in 1948 and reliable statistics about voting turn out is available from the early days of autonomy and in fact from 1945 when Faroe strived for independence from Denmark (Adler-Nissen 2014, 58-61). Greenland got its Home Rule in 1979 and the first election to the island parliament was held the same year (Ackrén and Lindström 2012). Reliable statistics is available from the very beginning.

The Åland islands, the smallest populated with about 20 000 inhabitants during the pre WW II period, deeply disappointed of not been integrated in Sweden. The offered autonomy was not welcomed at all which explains its lack of legitimacy among people on the Åland Islands. The start was different on Faroe Islands and in Greenland as they from the very beginning had confidence to stand on their own feet. After late 1940s Åland definitely dropped all speculations of becoming integrated with Sweden and put full focus on developing the self-ruling government.

The response from voters in terms of activity is a measure of the importance of self-rule and their collective belief in the island political potential. Generally speaking voter turnout is higher in island parliament elections than in national elections (see Table 1). In national elections one or two island incumbents has not much to say in the eyes of voters, whereas decisions made in the island parliament is clearly visible to the voters. The distance between the voter and incumbents is short and the same is true between government and the administration which implements decisions taken. If decisions are not well taken by the islanders the response to government is immediate and corrections can be made on a short basis. A similar smooth way of responsive government is none heard of in the island relation to the national government.

Voters on Åland are less active at the polls compared to Faroe Islands and Greenland. The voter turnout has increased over a long period, but never reached 70 per cent. To be sure, this has nothing to do with legitimacy or parliament efficacy, rather the question is related to party competition which we will discuss later on. In Greenland the electorate is more active than on Åland but fluctuations are considerable ranging from 55.8 percent at lowest to 76 percent at highest. Greenland is a newcomer but the electorate found confidence with its own government from the very beginning. Faroe Islands stands out with its most active electorate compared to Greenland and Åland. Disappointment after not winning independence shadowed the 1950 election when only 61.3 percent of the electorate voted. It was an exception, very soon confidence was back and in two elections turnout has exceeded 90 percent.

The conclusion is evident. The beginning of self-rule was complicated but when it was settled and no other immediate options were at hand the own island government was the best guarantee to decide of their own destiny. Voters responded and flocked to the polls to give mandate to their incumbents. For them island parliament elections was the most important and national parliament elections became a second hand election. Still national elections are important to the islands but the main focus and identity is assembled around their own government. There is no way back to integrate the islands closer to the mainland, the only feasible way is to continue the process of devolution which bolsters tensions as well on the mainland as on the islands.

Independent party system

Federal parties nominate candidates in all states/provinces in United States and Canada. Regional parties may flourish as well behind the dominating federal ones. Parties with a nationwide organization knit together the federation and fulfill the function of nationalizing politics. In our cases such efforts from parties on the mainland goes back to the era before introduction of *de jure* autonomy. National parties have no grip on parties and party systems at the autonomous islands. The linkage to nationalize politics on the islands is missing. In internal party life no delegates from islands have mandate on party congresses or are elected to the party executive. Party policy in programs and manifestos does not tie up party members at the islands. Party headquarters in Copenhagen and Helsinki have nothing to say and have no control of how party life is developed on the islands. In contrast, parties on these islands miss economic resources and professional assistants provided to the sub-national party organizations at the mainland.

Representative systems need organized activity to nominate candidates in elections. According to a loose definition it can be named a party if the nomination process is coordinated and the assembled activists have a formulated idea of what the aim is with their representation in the elected body. A party system develops when two or more groups of activists nominate competing lists of candidates. In small island communities social cleavages are not unheard of, though large scale industries are lacking. However, social cleavages were not on the top of agenda when the first embryo of a party system was born, it was the relation to the mainland. Views divided between full secession or strengthened self-rule and the means of how it should be achieved. Still these divergent views shadow political cleavages and there are no signs that the self-rule or independence issue will fade, rather the opposite.

If the birth of a federation is said to be the result of a deliberative process, coercion between a single state/province and the federal government happens. The likelihood grows if the state/province differs in terms of ethnicity, culture and/or economic development. In our cases of federacies coercion is permanently latent and can easily escalate to a manifest

conflict with the mainland. However, in Denmark the relation to the autonomous islands is more relaxed. Devolution is seen as a natural way of “decolonization”. The unitary state in Finland is strict and devolution is met with skepticism and sometimes open resistance from the Finns. The gap between incumbents in unitary state parliaments and island incumbents is wide in terms of how to cope with a self-ruled region that totally differs from the rest of the mainland regions. It gives fuel to island parties of which some prefer to follow a tough policy against the mainland whereas others prefer appeasement as the best means to fulfill their aims. Even the aims differ between parties; the more radical strive for independence the more moderate extended self-rule under the mainland realm.

From the beginning to the end of WW II Åland strived for reunification with Sweden, autonomy was seen as something imposed to the population. At that time there was no clear cut cleavages for different parties to emerge which does not mean politics had faded from Åland. In contrast, mistrust and discontent with the situation to be placed under Finnish realm dominated politics. Independence like on Faroe Islands was not an issue at all. Geopolitics was different on Faroe Island and in Greenland. Faroe Islands was far away in the Atlantic with a language not spoken elsewhere. Greenland’s neighbor Canada only scarcely populated with Inuits in the Arctic north. Both Faroe Islands and Greenland had no other realistic option than to stay on their own from the very beginning. The political issue was whether to lean on Denmark and its financial support under self-rule or to go for independence.

A party system emerged and was institutionalized on Åland in 1970s after decades of personified politics. A five party system is now well established. All parties strive for more devolution from Finland which is not an easy task. Åländsk Framtid (Åland’s Future) with three seats out of 30 is the only party who openly pledge for independence. A reunification with Sweden is no longer a realistic option, though in practice Sweden influences daily life in contrast to the more unilingual Finnish speaking Finland. Speech disabilities and distrust does not enhance closer cooperation with Finland, people turn to neighbour Sweden with whom they share same culture and language. At the Faroe Islands a party system was in place when autonomy was introduced. Starting with four to five parties the number is now seven in their regional parliament. Four parties competed in the first Greenlandic election. At the moment five parties are represented in the regional parliament.

Changes in electoral laws opened the way for party systems in Faroe Islands and Greenland. Three different party systems now flourish under Danish realm: One on the mainland Denmark, one on Faroe Islands, and one in Greenland. The unitary state of Denmark is formally diversified but in practice all three live their separate life governed by the own parliament and cabinet. Similarly, in Finland two party systems run simultaneously. However, according to a strict regulation of parties, *de facto* parties at Åland do not qualify as *de jure* parties in Finland. In practice, the Ålandic political parties act as parties, though they are not accepted in Finland, but allowed to be named political associations.

Concluding discussion

The shift from *de facto* to *de jure* autonomy institutionalized partly sovereign regions with defined borders from the mainland. In our cases the borders go through the sea which for their provision is as important as arable land is for the farmer. Devolved legislative power to the islands gave birth to self-rule and elected governments with the sovereign right to legislate and implement decisions within the given territory. Still, the autonomous islands hesitate to stand totally alone based on two main reasons. First, it is a huge risk to cut off economic support from the mainland. Second, a unitary state does not easily give away territory they once have controlled.

The establishment of island parliaments with legislative power within their own territory enhances difference between us and them. In addition, island governments are based on a strong popular support among citizens. Trust in their government is nothing given automatically. As the Åland case shows, the hope of reunification with Sweden was deeply rooted among the citizens; autonomy under Finnish realm was met with suspiciousness imposed on them against their own will. After WW II when autonomy was the sole option, trust in its own government and self-rule won smoothly popular support. Autonomy or independence was from the very beginning the demand from Faroe Islands and Greenland. It cannot be accomplished without a massive popular support.

It is against this background voter turnout to the island parliaments on the Faroe Islands and Greenland scored higher than on the Åland Islands. More important, it is as well a manifestation of citizens' trust to the island government including its administrative capacity. Elections to the national parliaments in Copenhagen and Helsinki are of less concern for voters on the islands. After decades with separate parliaments and a separate party system political issues of relevance in elections tend to take different directions on the islands as compared to voters on the unitary mainland. Still representation in the national parliament is important but the seat(s) are guaranteed. Mobilization of the electorate is not needed if not the competition is boosted by internal party disputes.

Our study shows that the formation of separate party systems around separate parliaments boosts divergence in federacies between the unitary mainland and the autonomous regions. National parties have no grip on the island parties who can independently formulate their policy and internal party life. Parties have succeeded in mobilizing voters to polls which is a manifestation of popular support for independent policy formulated by parties. The way seems open for independence. However, islands are still dependent on financial support from the mainland and territorial defense. Full independence needs a huge administration and skilled personnel to take over all functions needed in a welfare state. If Scots and Quebecois hesitate, no wonder that the small Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland cannot come to terms with it.

References

- Ackrén, Maria and Lindström, Bjarne 2012, Autonomy development, irredentism and secessionism in a Nordic context. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* Vol. 50
- Adler-Nissen, Rebecca 2014, The Faroe Islands: Independence dreams, globalist separatism and the Europeanization of postcolonial rule. *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 49
- Agranoff, Robert 2004, Autonomy, Devolution, and Intergovernmental Relations. *Regional and Federal Studies*, Vol. 14.
- Agranoff, Robert 1999, Power Shifts, Diversity and Asymmetry. In *Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States*, ed. Robert Agranoff. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft
- Burgess, Michael. 2006. *Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge.
- Burgess, Michael and Gress, Franz 1999, Symmetry and Asymmetry Explored. In *Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States*, ed. Robert Agranoff. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft
- DIIS . 2007. *Afvikling af Grønlands kolonistatus 1945-54. En historisk udredning*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
- Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Elazar, Daniel. 1996. From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift. *International Political Science Review* 17.
- Elazar, Daniel 1987, *Exploring Federalism*. Alabama: The University of Alabama Press
- Elklit, Jørgen. 1981. *Det tyske mindretals parlamentariske repræsentation*. Århus: Institut for Statskundskab.
- _____. 2002. The Politics of Electoral system Development and Change: the Danish Case. In *The Evolution of Electoral and Party Systems in the Nordic Countries*, eds. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, 15-66. New York: Agathon Press
- _____. 2010. Denmark. In *Elections in Europe. A Data Handbook*, eds. Dieter Nohlen , and Philip Stöver, 501-564. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Farrell, David. 2001. *Electoral Systems*. Houndmills: Palgrave. 2nd edition 2011.
- Finer, Samuel E. 1975. State- and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military. In *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Finlands grundlag (The Constitution of Finland). 11. 6. 1999/731.

- Harhoff, Frederik. 1993. *Rigsfællesskabet*. Århus: Klim
- Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks, Schakel, Arjan 2010, *The Rise of Regional Authority*. London: Routledge
- Jansson, Gunnar. 2007. Introduction. In *Autonomy and Demilitarisation in International Law: The Åland Islands in a Changing Europe*, eds. Lauri Hannikainen and Frank Hornk. The Hague: Kluwer Law International
- Johansen, Ove. 1980. Udviklingen af et grønlandsk hjemmestyre. *politica* 12 (4): 1-28.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1998. Is federalism a viable alternative to secession? In *Theories of Secession*, ed. Percy Lehning. London: Routledge.
- _____. 2000. Nation-building and minority rights: comparing West and East. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 26: 183-212.
- _____. 2002. Multiculturalism and Minority Rights: West and East. *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 4: 1-25.
- _____. 2010. The rise and fall of multiculturalism? New debates on inclusion and accomodation in diverse societies. *International Social Science Journal* 61: 97-112.
- Kleist, Kuupik. 2011. Grundlovsdebat i Grønland handler ikke særlig meget om Danmark. *Politiken*, October 9, section 2, 15.
- Kommittébetänkande 1906: 12, till Hans Kejslerliga Majestät från representationsreformkomitén underdånigst. Helsingfors: Senaten.
- Lidegaard, Mads.(1991. *Grønlands historie*. Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Livingston, William 1952, A Note on the Nature of Federalism. *Political Science Quarterly* 67
- McGarry, John and Brendan O'Leary. 1993. Introduction. The macro-political regulation of ethnic conflict. In *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, eds. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Nordengaard, J.P. 1949. *Valgene til Rigsdagen gennem 100 Aar indbefattet Valgene til Den grundlovgivende Rigsforsamling 1848*. Roskilde: eget Forlag.
- PM 1977, Promemoria angående valsättet för Ålands riksdagsmans suppleant. B.D. 2044/215-77.

Riker, William 1975, Federalism. In *Governmental Institutions and Processes. Handbook of Political Science Vol. 5* eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company

Rokkan, Stein. 1970. *Citizens, Elections, Parties*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Skaale, Sjurdur. 2011. Færøerne er ét stort grundlovsbrud, *Politiken*, October xx. Section 2, 11.

Skorini, Heini i. 2011. Tiggere og riddere, *Weekendavisen*, December 2, 5.

Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Sia. 2007. Hembygdsrättens framväxt från Ålandsöverenskommelsen till 1951 års självstyrelselag – och idag? In Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark (ed.), *Den åländska hembygdsrätten*, ed. Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark. Mariehamn: Ålands Lagting & Ålands Fredsinstitut.

Sartori, Giovanni . 1997. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering*. Houndmills: MacMillan Press.

Suksi, Markku. 2005. *Ålands konstitution*. Åbo: Åbo Akademis förlag.

Sundberg, Jan. 2005. *Svenskhetens dilemma i Finland*. Helsingfors: Finska Vetenskaps-Sociteten

Sundberg, Jan. 2011. Riksdagsval på Åland. In *Språk och politisk mobilisering*, ed. Kimmo Grönlund. Helsingfors: Svenska Litteratursällskapet i Finland.

Söderlund, Peter. 2008. Partisystemets utveckling på Åland, *Politiikka* L.

Tarasti, Lauri. 1998. *Suomen vaalilainsäädäntö*. Helsingfors: Edita.

Tarlton, Charles 1965, Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation. *Journal of Politics*, 27

Tilly, Charles. 1975. Reflections on the History of European State-Making. In *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Törnudd, Klaus. 1968. *The Electoral System of Finland*. London: Hugh Evelyn.

Vallag För Storfurstendömet Finland. Given i Peterhof, den 26 juli 1906/26.

Watts, Ronald 1999, *Comparing Federal Systems*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill – Queen's University Press

Watts, Ronald 1996, Canada, Three Decades of Periodic Crisis. *International Political Science Review* Vol 17.

Wrede, Casper. 1981. *Politisk deltagande på Åland*. Åbo: Svenska Litteratursällskapet i Finland Nämnd för Samhällsforskning N:o 39.

Wrede, Magnus. 1976. *Partibildning och politik på Åland*. Åbo: Svenska Litteratursällskapet i Finland Nämnd för Samhällsforskning N:o 25.

Zuber, Christina Isabel. 2011. Understanding the Multinational Game: Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical Federalism. *Comparative Political Studies* 44 (5): 546-571.

Åländsk Utredningsserie 2010:2, *Betänkande från parlamentariska kommittén om förslag till reformering av självstyrelselagen för Åland*.

Appendix 1

Table 1: Voter turnout: Nationwide compared to island votes

| Year | Finland | Åland | Year | Denmark | Faroe Islands | Greenland |
|------|---------|-------|------|---------|---------------|-----------|
| 1945 | 74.87% | 55.6% | 1945 | 86.29% | - | - |
| 1948 | 78.25% | 45.9% | 1947 | 85.78% | - | - |
| 1951 | 74.58% | 38.8% | 1950 | 81.87% | - | - |
| 1954 | 79.90% | 33.1% | 1953 | 80.80% | 20.0% | - |
| 1958 | 74.99% | 38.6% | 1957 | 83.73% | 37.6% | - |
| 1962 | 85.09% | 51.6% | 1960 | 85.64% | 57.1% | - |
| 1966 | 84.94% | 50.7% | 1964 | 85.81% | 50.2% | - |
| 1970 | 82.23% | 60.9% | 1966 | 88.61% | 48.8% | - |
| 1972 | 81.40% | 51.5% | 1968 | 89.28% | 56.6% | - |
| 1975 | 73.80% | 58.5% | 1971 | 87.16% | 56.8% | - |
| 1979 | 75.31% | 56.2% | 1973 | 88.72% | 54.6% | - |
| 1983 | 75.73% | 56.0% | 1975 | 88.23% | 56.4% | - |
| 1987 | 72.06% | 52.8% | 1977 | 88.70% | 62.9% | 70.0% |
| 1991 | 68.39% | 50.8% | 1979 | 85.62% | 65.4% | 50.3% |
| 1995 | 68.58% | 52.1% | 1981 | 87.77% | 55.4% | 61.0% |
| 1999 | 65.27% | 54.8% | 1984 | 88.44% | 61.0% | 64.0% |
| 2003 | 66.71% | 60.3% | 1987 | 86.74% | 68.9% | 44.9% |
| 2007 | 65.02% | 57.0% | 1988 | 85.70% | 70.3% | 57.9% |
| 2011 | 67.37% | 51.1% | 1990 | 82.85% | 54.4% | 50.8% |
| 2015 | 66.85% | 57.9% | 1994 | 84.25% | 62.3% | 58.7% |
| | | | 1998 | 85.95% | 66.2% | 63.4% |
| | | | 2001 | 87.15% | 80.0% | 61.5% |
| | | | 2005 | 84.54% | 73.0% | 59.6% |
| | | | 2007 | 86.59% | 66.8% | 64.5% |
| | | | 2011 | 87.74% | 59.8% | 57.5% |
| | | | 2015 | 85.89% | 66.2% | 49.9% |

Source: IDEA (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance),

<http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=74>; <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=63> (visited 14 August 2015); Folketingsvalg på Færøerne siden 1953,

http://www.ft.dk/Folketinget/Oplysningen/Valg/Valgresultater_Faeroerne.aspx (visited 14 August 2015);

Folketingsvalg i Grønland siden 1977,

http://www.ft.dk/Folketinget/Oplysningen/Valg/Valgresultat_Groenland.aspx (visited 14 August 2015); ÅSUB,

<http://www.asub.ax/text.con?iPage=261>; http://www.asub.ax/files/riksdagsval_2015.pdf (visited 14 August 2015); ÅSUB,

ÅSUB,

http://pxweb.asub.ax/PXWeb/pxweb/sv/Statistik/Statistik_VA/VA008.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=b911eedb-3596-4162-bb57-8f5ab57afbfc (visited 16 August 2015).

Appendix 2

Table 2: Voter turnout in island parliament elections

| Year | Åland | Year | Faroe Islands | Year | Greenland |
|------|-------|------|---------------|------|-----------|
| 1948 | | 1945 | 75.5% | 1979 | 69.6% |
| 1951 | | 1946 | 73.3% | 1983 | 75.1% |
| 1955 | | 1950 | 61.3% | 1984 | 66.8% |
| 1959 | | 1954 | 66.9% | 1987 | 69.6% |
| 1963 | | 1958 | 71.0% | 1991 | 67.5% |
| 1967 | | 1962 | 74.0% | 1995 | 69.6% |
| 1971 | 60.8% | 1966 | 80.0% | 1999 | 76.0% |
| 1975 | 62.3% | 1970 | 80.0% | 2002 | 55.8% |
| 1979 | 60.0% | 1974 | 80.0% | 2005 | 74.9% |
| 1983 | 64.4% | 1978 | | 2009 | 71.3% |
| 1987 | 64.3% | 1980 | | 2013 | 74.2% |
| 1991 | 62.4% | 1984 | | 2014 | 72.9% |
| 1995 | 62.5% | 1988 | | | |
| 1999 | 65.9% | 1990 | 87.5% | | |
| 2003 | 67.6% | 1994 | 82.5% | | |
| 2007 | 67.8% | 1998 | 88.2% | | |
| 2011 | 66.9% | 2002 | 91.6% | | |
| 2015 | | 2004 | 92.1% | | |
| | | 2008 | 89.2% | | |
| | | 2011 | 86.6% | | |
| | | 2015 | | | |

Source: Ålands Lagting, <http://www.lagtinget.ax/text.con?iPage=51&m=126> (visited 16 August 2015); ÅSUB, <http://www.asub.ax/text.con?iPage=286> (visited 16 August 2015); *Årsberetning 1973*: Rigsombudsmanden på Færøerne, p. 14; *Årbog for Færøerne 1975*: Færøernes landsstyre, Rigsombudsmanden på Færøerne, p. 16; Færøernes statistik; *Hvidbog* (1999): Føroya Landsstýri, p. 36; Færøernes Statistik; Rigsombudsmanden på Færøerne: Lagtingsvalgene i perioden 2002-2011; Henrik Skydsbjerg (1999). *Grønland 20 år med hjemmestyre*. Nuuk: Forlaget Atuagkat; Grønlands statistik (www.stat.gl/); Valg 2002-2013 and 2014 at www.valg.gl/.