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Condition(s) for Island Autonomy

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Abstract
The inquiry is focusing on why island autonomy occurs. Our point of departure considers four possible conditions such as geographical distance, ethnicity, GDP/capita and size according to population leading towards island autonomy. We use two sample groups in our study: one encompassing autonomous islands deriving from different parts of the world, with three main islands illustrating what we mean by island autonomy. These consist of the Azores, the Faroe Islands and Isle of Man. The second group consists of so called non-autonomous islands scattered around the world.

The analysis is carried out with a specific technique within the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) family and that is Multi-Value QCA (MVQCA). MVQCA is an extension of the Crisp-Set QCA (CSQCA) and withholds a dichotomous dependent variable, while the possible explanatory variables (independent variables) can have multi-values. As a second technique Fuzzy-Set QCA (FSQCA) is employed as a control technique only. While assessing these techniques we receive combinations of conditions leading to the outcome in question. Results show that with MVQCA we receive four different paths towards island autonomy. Ethnicity as the only explanation is one route towards the outcome. A second path is small or large size. Long geographical distance combined with no ethnic diversity is a third way towards island autonomy. The fourth path is long geographical distance combined with the lower or upper middle income group. All the paths are equally valid.

Keywords
Island autonomy, Geographical distance, Ethnicity, Economy, Population size, Multi-Value QCA (MVQCA)

1. Introduction

Autonomy is a complex concept and used in many disciplines. There is no explicit definition of the word. The most common definition in social sciences is self-rule or self-government. The scope of arrangements that provide some degree of autonomy is almost unlimited; many structures derive from geographic, political, ethnic, linguistic or other differences within a single independent country.[1]

[1] H. Hannum, *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination*, revised edition (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1996) p. 333.

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Autonomy is often seen as a device for conflict management, even though it sometimes can trigger the conflict situation to become worse.[2] Some authors are of the opinion that autonomy allows ethnic or other groups claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct control over affairs of special concern to them, while allowing the larger entity those powers that cover common interests. The arrangements of autonomy can be granted under different legal forms as for example federalism, regionalism, decentralization and the like.[3] Previous research shows that the prospects of establishing autonomy arrangements are strongest when the state undergoes a regime change, or when the international community becomes involved in conflict resolution or when there are several ethnic groups rather than only two. The success of autonomy arrangements is due to traditions of democracy and the rule of law, and where there is no dispute about sovereignty and where the arrangements have been negotiated in a participatory way and not forced upon the population or where careful design of institutional structures have been taken care of.[4] The literature on autonomy can be divided into two categories: those that study the legal aspects of autonomy and thereby focus on the autonomy arrangements and those that focus on which factors or conditions explain the presence of autonomy. Common for both is that most studies focus solely on autonomies, while few or none include both autonomy and non-autonomy arrangements.

In our study we are focusing on territorial autonomy, or more precisely on insular autonomy. Territorial autonomy implies that a certain territory often inhabited by a minority (not always the case) is defined and vested with a special status. This special status can be designed to serve the interests of the minority or it can be designed for political and economical purposes.[5] Recent research shows that autonomies often are insular areas by nature: 36 out of 48 autonomies with special status in the world are islands.[6] Our definition for insular autonomy is *a geographical territory that enjoys a special and unique status including legislative powers, but does not constitute a federal unit or an independent state.* This means that the autonomy should be self-governing and have particular competences to run its own affairs. It is a sub-unit within a state, which has received a higher

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2) Y. Ghai, 'Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis', in Y. Ghai (ed.), *Autonomy and Ethnicity* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000) pp. 1–26.

3) *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.

4) *Ibid.*, pp. 14–25.

5) G. Brunner and H. Küpper, 'European Options of Autonomy: A Typology of Autonomy Models of Minority Self-Governance', in K. Gál (ed.), *Minority Governance in Europe* (Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2002) p. 21.

6) M. Ackrén, *Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie av de självstyrda områdena i världen* (Ålands fredsinstitut, Mariehamn, 2005) p. 72. The figure is a little bit arbitrary since it derives from a different type of study and the definition of autonomy is somewhat different than the definition used in this context. There might thus be more than 36 island autonomies in the world.

autonomy than for example a municipality. Its status should be described in the constitution of the state or in an autonomy act of some kind.

The study will be divided into four parts. The following section deals with the explanatory factors that are assumed to be a path to island autonomy. These are distance, ethnicity, GDP/capita and size.[7] Section 3 deals with an overview over the main islands in our study: the Faroe Islands, the Azores and the Isle of Man. These islands have been chosen since they are dependencies of states with a long tradition of nation building with different legal traditions and since they are situated in different parts of Europe. Section 4 deals with the two control groups. One sample of islands is other autonomous islands and another sample group consists of islands that do not enjoy any special status, hereafter referred to as non-autonomous islands. All entities are chosen according to their status of today. This is due to the wish to ensure comparability between the different control groups. A more thorough discussion about the time perspective takes place further on in the study. The final section deals with the analysis. The analysis will be carried out using Qualitative Comparative analysis (QCA) and Multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (MVQCA)[8] in the TOSMANA (Tool for

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[7] Alternative factors such as regime change, international involvement or other factors are not considered in this study since our study is more of an inductive approach and just partly based on the literature in this case.

[8] MVQCA was first developed by Cronqvist in 2003 and is mainly an extension of QCA, and unlike fuzzy set it retains the original ideas of QCA. In MVQCA the outcome is dichotomized while one or more of the conditions are multi-value variables. Using this technique the original upper case letter to indicate presence and lower case letters to indicate absence cannot be used. Instead the different values are indicated by symbols, x{s} where x indicates the condition and s indicates the set of values of x. If cultural difference were divided into three categories 0, 1 and 2 the cultural condition would be indicated by culture {0}, culture {1} and culture {2}. One of the goals in QCA is to find the shortest possible solution that explains the outcome. By using Boolean minimization we can perform the veristic test of sufficiency. Since the rule of Boolean minimization says that the expressions may only differ in one causal condition this rule must be re-written. Cronqvist suggests that if all *n* multi-value expressions (c0 Φ,…,cn-1 Φ) differ only in the causal condition *c* while all possible values of *c* yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition *c* that distinguishes these *n* expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression Φ. *See* L. Cronqvist, 'Introduction to Multi-Value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (MVQCA)', *COMPASSS didactics paper* no. 4, 2005, p. 5. This implies that if we have a Boolean expression that differs in either C{0}, C{1} or C{2}, then C can be reduced. If we, for example, have three expressions: A{1}·B{1}·C{0}, A{1}·B{1}·C{1} and A{1}·B{1}·C{2}, these differ only in the three possible values of C, and therefore they can be reduced to A{1}·B{1}. As in QCA logical remainders can be included in the reduction to find the shortest possible combination. As a matter of fact if we choose not to include logical remainders this would make the minimization a very short event since there would be a large number of logical remainders due to the fine-graded scales of one or more conditions (pp. 5–6). Cronqvist suggests that the rule for multi-value reduction then should be changed to the following: "If two or more multi-value expressions ci {c_0,…, cin-N} differ only in the causal condition C with n possible values yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition C that distinguishes these n expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression, if there is no expression implied by the new expression Φ producing a different outcome." MVQCA has mainly been developed as a

Small-N Analysis) software programme and fuzzy-set analysis[9] in the fs/QCA (fuzzy set/Quality Comparative Analysis) programme.[10]

2. The Explanatory Factors

Two of the explanatory factors are derived from the literature due to prior investigations done about islands and island autonomies. These are distance and

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response on the critique of dichotomization in QCA. It can be used to solve the problem of information loss that might be a problem with dummy variables, but it may also solve the problem of contradictory configurations. However, the researcher should be careful in using too fine graded variables in MVQCA since this might be an obstacle to meaningful minimization (p. 7).

[9] Fuzzy-set analysis is a technique which combines qualitative and quantitative approaches. The method is used in various disciplines, and it has also been introduced to social sciences as a new tool for developing theories and assumptions and to connect the ideas and evidences in social research. *See* C. C. Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science* (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000) pp. 3–4. Fuzzy-set is derived from set theory within mathematical science. The values used are always in an interval between 0 and 1. *See* P. Pennings, 'Beyond Dichotomous Explanations: Explaining Constitutional Control of the Executive with Fuzzy-sets', 42 *European Journal of Political Research* (2003) p. 542. The value 1 indicates full membership in a class or set, while value 0 indicates full non-membership. Ragin, *supra* within this footnote, p. 6. It is up to the investigator to choose the values in between 0 and 1, but it must always be done openly and explicitly so that other researchers can test and evaluate the whole fuzzy-set table. Ragin, *supra* within this footnote. Fuzzy-set implies both differences in kind and degree at the same time. Ragin, *supra* within this footnote, p. 149, and J. Kvist, 'Welfare Reform in the Nordic Countries in the 1990s: Using Fuzzy-Set Theory to Assess Conformity to Ideal Types', 9:3 *Journal of European Social Policy* (1999) p. 234. The value of 0.5 is applied as the benchmark between what is fully in according with a specific set and what is fully out according to a set. Ragin, *supra* within this footnote, p. 157. To construct a fuzzy-set table it is necessary to specify qualitative benchmarks on a continuum (between 0 and 1). This means that the researcher has to combine fuzzy values with substantive and theoretical criteria. The method's goal is to establish a better fit between theory and data. It enhances the dialogue between ideas and evidences. Ragin, *supra* within this footnote, pp. 160–162. Fuzzy membership scores address the varying degree to which different cases belong to sets, not how cases rank relative to each other on dimensions of open-ended variation. Fuzzy-sets pinpoint qualitative approaches while at the same time assessing varying degrees of membership between full inclusion and full exclusion. In this sense, fuzzy-set can be seen as a continuous variable that has been calibrated to indicate the degree of membership in a defined set. *See* C.C. Ragin and P. Penning, 'Fuzzy Sets and Social Research', 33:4 *Sociological Methods & Research* (May 2005) p. 424. We will use fuzzy-set as a control mechanism in this sense, since we use MVQCA in a rather extreme way. All independent variables are graded into several values, while the dependent variable is held dichotomized in our MVQCA analysis. This calls for control; all the variables are recorded into a fuzzy scale and run as one and a single analysis. We then compare the results to see if we get any diversity between the two forms of analyses.

[10] There are two software programmes developed that deal with QCA. The first one, fs/QCA©, was originally developed by Charles Ragin and Chris Drass but has been updated by Ragin and Sean Davey and deals with QCA crisp-set analysis and fuzzy-set analysis. The second programme, Tosmana, is developed by Lasse Cronqvist and deals with QCA and MVQCA. The analysis will be performed primarily through Tosmana since this programme can handle MVQCA. For the cases with missing values on the GDP/capita variable, the programme tests each possible value for that variable. The software programmes are available online on the COMPASSS homepage and can be downloaded free of charge: <www.compasss.org>.

ethnicity. The other two derive from other factors that are added in for this study. These include economy or GDP/capita and size according to population. Distance and ethnicity are two of the most frequently used factors to explain why some territories enjoy autonomy.[11] The factors are explained and operationalized in the next sections.

2.1. *Distance*

Distance in this context refers to the distance from the island to the mainland. Mainland in this context is the mainland of the nation-state that the island is dependent on. In the case of the Faroe Islands the mainland in this context is mainland Denmark, which is not the closest mainland that would be Norway. An island, island group or archipelago can also constitute mainland. For the Isle of Man the mainland is the United Kingdom, and the closest foreign country would be another island state, Ireland.

How far away must an island be from the mainland to be considered distant? This is indeed a difficult question to answer since distance is often dependent on the context. What might be considered as distant in one case would be regarded as close in another. The ultra peripheral European regions, the Azores, Madeira, the Canary Islands and the French overseas departments must, of course, be considered as distant from the mainland, as are the overseas territories, former colonies, of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the USA. However, in relation to these islands the Channel Islands would not be considered distant from mainland Britain, although all of us would consider the islands to be distant from Britain in relation to the distance from France.

Therefore we need to set up a threshold for what is considered distant. It could be argued that 100 km[12] geographically is distant from the mainland regarding the islands. It would for instance be almost impossible to build a bridge between the island and the mainland if the distance is 100 km or more, especially if we consider that the world's longest bridge today, the Pontchartrain Bridge in New Orleans, USA, is 38.6 km. It could also be agreed that 50 km is not distant from the mainland since theoretically it could be connected to the mainland with a bridge, and what can be connected to the mainland cannot be considered distant. Some of the definitions referring to islands take into account that there should be no connections to the mainland if an island is considered to be an island. Since 50 km cannot be considered distant, it could be appropriate to double this and define distance as 100 km. This is why a distance of 100 km or more will be considered distant and consequently a distance of 99.9 km or less as close.

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[11] *See e.g.* Ackrén, *supra* note 6 and P. M. Olausson, *Autonomy and Islands – A Global Study of the Factors that Determine Island Autonomy* (Åbo Akademi University Press, Åbo, 2007).

[12] For a more thorough elaboration about geographical distances, *see* Olausson, *supra* note 11, pp. 74–75.

The data on distance is found on the websites of the statistical authorities of the island or of the mother country. In those cases where data on distance is not found Google Earth[13] has been used. The distance is calculated from the position of the island (latitude and longitude) and therefore the data must be considered approximations rather than absolute, but it gives an indication on the distance and therefore it can be used in this study. In none of these cases is the distance close to 100 km, and the approximate character of the value has therefore not had any influence on the outcome.

The operationalization of distance will take a three-graded scale as follows: 0 = distance lower than 99.9 km, 1 = distance more than 100 km but lower than 999.9 km; 2 = distance greater than 1000 km. This scale is used since it is believed that 100 km would be regarded as distant from the mainland, everything below this threshold would, consequently, be close to mainland. Since the distance from the mainland varies greatly it is necessary to divide the 'distant group' into two grades. It could be argued that the effect of distance would decrease the higher value it shows. It might not be of crucial importance if the island is situated 9,999 km from the mainland or 17,000 km, while it might be of greater importance if the island is situated 100 km or 1,000 km away.

2.2. *Ethnicity*

The concept of ethnicity has been used within anthropology since the 1960s[14] and is still a central concept in the research. Ethnicity as a concept derives from Greek *ethnos* and *ethnicos*, meaning 'people' or 'heathen'. In social anthropology ethnicity refers to aspects of relations between groups, which think of themselves of being different and are also seen as culturally different by others.[15] Ethnicity is only functional in an interaction between two or more groups, not as cultural characteristics within one group.[16] The concept also has its place within other social and cultural disciplines. Within sociology a similar definition is used, but with a wider meaning. Besides cultural praxis and cultural values, characteristics such as languages, historical heritages, religions, clothing and customs are also

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[13] <www.googleearth.com>.

[14] Anthropology is a discipline about humankind at large and can be divided into several sub-fields such as social and cultural anthropology. The concept of culture is the base of anthropology as we understand it and relates to the systems, norms, rules, standards and patterns implicit in the social structure, behaviours and artifacts of society. In the 1960s it became standard to differ between ethnicity and race within the discipline as a response to the cross-cultural problems of colonial administration. *See e.g.* S. S. Nagel (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Policy Studies 1983* (Marcel Dekker Inc., New York, 1983) pp. 215–216.

[15] T. H. Eriksen, *Ethnicity & Nationalism – Anthropological Perspectives* (Pluto Press, London, 1993) pp. 1–6.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

included.[17] Ethnicity could also refer to a collective consciousness – a 'we-feeling'—that is not followed by the primordial characteristics (such as language, religion, heritage and the like). In this sense ethnicity could be a situational or an instrumental process, where the experience is determined by some kind of common project with a common future. The experience is according to this a subjective feeling of 'we' in contradiction to 'the others'. If the group experiences an external threat, then the ethnic consciousness might be strengthened and would lead to a struggle for material resources and cultural survival. According to this approach an ethnic group is a collection of individuals who organize themselves to reach their specific goals.[18]

The differences in ethnicity can be described with the primordial factors such as language, ethnic origin, cultural traditions and religion. Ethnicity is a deeply rooted component of individual identity as well. It is a disputable topic whether the feeling of belonging to a national or ethnic group is the result of social development or whether it represents a natural tendency of human nature. Both constructivism and primordialism are widely accepted approaches in nationalism studies.[19]

Ethnicity as a broad concept covers a variety of factors that distinguish one group of people from others. Important factors are language, race, religion and colour.[20] National identity is always divided into *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*, especially when it comes to citizenship.

Examples related to islands show that for example on the island of Mauritius there are four ethnic groups defined in the Constitution: Indo-Mauritian, Creole, Sino-Mauritian and Franco-Mauritian. There are seven major languages and three major religions: Hinduism, Catholicism and Islam. The Indo-Mauritians are considered an ethnic group, but they are also divided into Catholics and Muslims and speak several of the Mauritian languages. This is an example of ethnicity, where ethnicity is not only defined by language and religion, but also by the group as such in relation to surrounding groups. The ethnic groups are defined according to ethnic origin, and therefore some groups entail differences in religion and languages. The same is true in the former Yugoslavia, where Serbs and Croats lived together for centuries but were described as incapable of being united in 1991, and today Serbian and Croatian, once called Serbo-Croatian, are considered two different languages.[21]

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17) A. Giddens, *Sociologi*, volume 2 (Studentlitteratur, Lund, 1994) p. 52.
18) B. Hettne, *Etniska konflikter och internationella relationer* (Padrigu Papers, Göteborg, 1990) pp. 22–24.
19) B.Vizi, 'Minority Groups and Autonomy from an International Political Perspective', in Gál, *supra* note 5, p. 41.
20) Ghai, *supra* note 2, p. 4.
21) Eriksen, *supra* note 15, pp. 47–53.

In this analysis we only consider the primordial characteristics such as language, religion and ethnic origin in relation to the mother country. The focus will be on the major ethnic groups on the island and in the mainland, *i.e.*, whether or not ethnicity, expressed as major ethnic groups, differs between the major ethnic group in the mother country and the major ethnic group on the island. The language should have a significant difference to the majority language used in a country. We do not take any dialects into account. The religion should vary in relation to the mother country according to the major religions. It is hard to discern the nuances of different religious communities. Ethnic origin is considered to be a measure of how the population differs from the majority population in a country. If the population in general consists of Europeans, while the population in an autonomous island consists of for example African descent, then the autonomy is considered to have a different ethnic origin.[22]

The operationalization of ethnicity will use a four-graded scale as follows: 0 = no difference, 1 = difference in one of the aspects (language, ethnic origin or religion), 2 = difference in two aspects and 3 = difference in all aspects. This scale is used since it is impossible to say which factor is more important. Language, religion and ethnic origin are considered equally important in this context.

2.3. *Economy*

Small territories often seem to be limited when it comes to economic vitality. Researchers claim that a small market often is open for external shocks, high costs of transportation, absence of economies of scales, lack of know-how, disappearance of aid for infrastructure together with a monocultural production, focusing on one specific goods or service.[23] There are, however, scholars who claim the opposite. A bigger market is not always a guarantee for wealth. Research shows that only two out of ten large states in the world have received prosperity. Many small states have the highest living standards in the world, for example, Luxembourg and San Marino.[24]

Small areas have been able to become prosperous markets. Usually bilateral agreements have been established between regions and countries and of course

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[22] There might be measurement problems since ethnicity is a subjective concept. In this study we take a nationalistic approach, *i.e.*, how the states have defined their minority groups or the different ethnic characteristics. It is not possible to go into more depth in this case. A study about ethnic diversities should then become a study of its own.

[23] G. Baldacchino, 'Jurisdictional Self-Reliance for Small Island Territories', Issue 365 *The Round Table* (2002) p. 351.

[24] D. Milne, 'Ten Lessons for Economic Development in Small Jurisdictions', *Lessons from the Edge*, The North Atlantic Islands Programme, February (2000), IIS, UPEI, Canada, p. 4.

due to the geographical situation. Many territories have even become members in regional free trade areas. An autonomy lying between big countries and important trade areas has a better position than those lying in the periphery.[25] Behind the success are the people themselves, prepared to take the challenges and working collectively for the same goal using legal instruments as their main tools. It is a question of an awareness of the society as an actor, which decides the future destiny.[26]

Self-governing territories and sovereign microstates may have totally different geographical and economical characters. Self-governing territories are often smaller than microstates and many of them are situated in the developing areas. Research nonetheless shows that many of the autonomies have higher GDP/capita than the microstates.[27]

GDP/capita is a measurement mostly used as an indicator for economic wealth in a country or a region. The measurement can be discussed and some authors are of the opinion that it would be better to look at the disposable income instead.[28] The problem of using other indicators is due to the availability of data. GDP/capita is the measurement often used and even available for smaller regions and other sub-units when other indicators are absent. In our study we use GDP/capita as our measurement for the analysis.

The operationalization of GDP/capita will be done according to the World Bank's Atlas method. This method is used for all the countries in the world, and calculations derive from the Gross National Income (GNI, formerly GNP) and GNI per capita in US dollars using the Atlas conversion factor. In our case we only have GDP/capita values for our entities; so we will only use the thresholds from the Atlas method and apply them on our own data. These thresholds categorize the entities in four different groups: low income group, lower middle income group, upper middle income group and high income group. The threshold for the low income group is USD 875 or less, for the lower middle income group it is USD 876 up to USD 3,465, for the upper middle income group the threshold is USD 3,466 to USD 10,725 and finally for the high income group it lies at USD 10,726 or more.[29] Our assumption is that autonomous islands have a higher GDP/capita than non-autonomous islands. We will code the low income group with 0, lower middle income = 1, upper middle income = 2 and high income = 3.

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25) R. Read and H. W. Armstrong, 'The Implications of Increasing Globalisation & Regionalism for the Economic Growth of Small States', paper presented at Islands of the World VII Conference: New Horizons in Island Studies, 26–30 June 2002, UPEI, Canada.

26) Milne, *supra* note 24, pp. 8–9.

27) Read and Armstrong, *supra* note 25.

28) L. Lyck, 'The Small Nordic Jurisdictions', *Working Papers* 1, 1997, NordREFO, pp. 8–10.

29) The World Bank, <www.web.worldbank.org>.

2.4. *Size*

The importance of size in the context of autonomy has not been the subject of any major study. As a matter of fact, a study of the autonomous European islands showed that size as area in square kilometres is not important as an explanation for autonomy.[30] Therefore size in this context will be defined as population. There is no natural threshold for what might be considered small or large in this context. We could all agree that the population of Sicily must be considered large (4,968,991 inhabitants), while the population of Rotuma must be considered small (2,000 inhabitants), but there are several autonomous islands in between that are not as easy to define as the two areas mentioned.

Since there are no given criteria on how to define smallness, we need help from studies on size. If we consider studies on microstates there are several definitions available. In his study on microstates, Anckar uses a fourfold figure to identify small island states.[31] By calculating the mean value of the included islands in terms of both population and territory, Anckar finds four categories: islands with large territory and large population, islands with large territory and small population, islands with small territory and large population and islands with small territory and small population. By repeating this procedure including the islands with small territory and small population and the islands close to the threshold value among the islands with small territory or small population, he is able to identify the island microstates. The analysis shows that a small island is an island with a territory smaller than 1,510 sq km and a population smaller than 200,000. However, despite this definition Anckar also includes islands with a territory smaller than 1,510 sq km but a population larger than one million and islands with a population smaller than 200,000 but a territory larger than 100,000 sq km in his population of microstates in the world.[32]

In her study of the European microstates, Duursma refers to Ehrhardt's definition, covering states with less than 300,000 inhabitants.[33] Duursma herself does not set up any fixed figure but argues that a microstate is an "entity with exceptionally small territory and population".[34] As a consequence, it follows that microstates suffer from limited human and natural resources.[35] In the 1960s

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[30] *See* P. Olausson, 'Aspects of Autonomy – The European Island Regions', unpublished paper presented at the 2nd International Conference on Regional Autonomy and Ethnic Minorities, Uppsala, Sweden, 10–13 June 2004.

[31] D. Anckar, 'Världens små östater: Population jämte jämförelsepopulationer', *Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-statsvetenskapliga fakulteteten vid Åbo Akademi* (Åbo Akademi, Åbo, 1991).

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 11–22.

[33] J. Duursma, *Self-determination, Statehood and International Relations of Microstates: The Cases of Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco, Andorra and the Vatican City* (University of Leyden, Leyden, 1996).

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.

[35] *Ibid.*

the UN acknowledged the problem of microstates. Many member states feared the entrance of microstates since they would, taken together, control two-thirds of the votes in the General Assembly, but only represent four percent of the world's population. A committee of experts failed to come up with a clear definition of a microstate, but the USA seemed to suggest that states with less than 100,000 inhabitants would be defined as a microstate.[36] In her own study, Duursma includes Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican City State. Consequently, she defines the borderline for microstates to be somewhere between the 46,166 inhabitants of Andorra and the 439,539 of Luxembourg, the area between the 464 sq km of Andorra and the 2,586 sq km of Luxembourg.

In their article on 'Lilliput Under Threat', Sutton and Payne[37] define smallness as states with less than one million inhabitants. They also refer to Taylor, who in 1969 defined smallness as a territory smaller than 14,822 sq km and a population less than 2,928,000.[38] In his study on 'The Micro-State Experience', Bartmann uses the same definition of a microstate, *i.e.*, a state with less than one million inhabitants.[39] The number of microstates in the world from that definition would be 46, of which 31 are island states. He also refers to a Whitehall report dated 1958 in which it was stated that territories smaller than Sierra Leone, *i.e.*, less than 2,5 million inhabitants, could not entertain the prospect of self-determination, if that meant independence.

Since this study does not deal with independent countries, it would be difficult to argue that the measure of smallness in this context should be the same as when dealing with entities on a higher level, *i.e.*, independence. Therefore we will not use the most common measure of microstates, *i.e.*, a population less than one million people. On the other hand the definition suggested by the USA with 100,000 inhabitants as a higher limit in defining smallness seems to be too low. What remains are the two definitions given by Anckar using 200,000 and the definition given by Duursma using 300,000. Since the definitions of smallness as well as the variation between the cases are large, we will not give a precise definition of smallness but instead perform a cluster analysis.[40] The general idea in this case is that autonomous islands have a larger number of inhabitants than the

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36) *Ibid.*, pp. 134–142.

37) P. Sutton and A. Payne, 'Lilliput Under Threat: The Security Problems of Small Island and Enclave Developing States', XLI:4 *Political Studies* (1993) pp. 579–593.

38) *Ibid.*

39) B. Bartmann, *The Microstate Experience: Very Small States in the International System* (2000), <www.fo-dk.dk/Baggrund/microstate_experience.htm>.

40) Cluster analysis is a method which is appropriate to use when the members/units of the population are widely scattered geographically. *See e.g.* N. A. Weiss (ed.), *Introductory Statistics*, 7th edition (Pearson Addison Wesley, Boston, 2005) pp. 18–19.

non-autonomous islands. The operationalization of size will be derived from a cluster analysis, where relevant thresholds will be computed.[41]

Before we start analyzing the islands we need to reflect on the comparability of the conditions between the autonomies and the non-autonomies. When collecting data from the different cases we must focus on the data that was important for the autonomies at the time they achieved their special status, and not on the current data from today. This implies that the independent variables must be studied from the day the islands achieved autonomy and backwards in history. This does not have any impact on the geographical data, *i.e.*, distance and closeness. Even though the continental plates do move in different directions, this does not have any influence on the period of time that is under discussion in this study. For two of the independent variables, *i.e.*, size and GDP/capita, data are in some cases hard to find since the statistical data from the post-War period are not always reliable. Therefore size in terms of population and GDP/capita will be measured as of today according to the latest available data. As for cultural conditions, the difference between today and the time when the island achieved its autonomy will be discussed individually. In some cases the language that used to be important for the cultural identity of the island has declined or even ceased to exist, while in other cases the pidgin spoken on the island has developed into a Creole language and the difference between the island and the mainland has increased. The non-autonomous islands will be measured as of today since there is no given time when the islands did not achieve autonomy. Even though this calls for some concern when comparing the autonomies and the non-autonomies and elucidating the results of the comparison, it should not have any major impact on the results.

3. The Main Islands in the Investigation

The main islands in the investigation, the Azores, the Faroe Islands and the Isle of Man, are described and outlined in the next sections. Due to the scope of this chapter it is only possible to concentrate on specific islands and we will in these sections provide empirical evidences of what we mean by autonomous islands in this sense.

3.1. *The Azores*

The Azores have been connected politically to Portugal since the 14th century and gained self-government in 1976. The Azores consist of nine islands, and they

[41] This will be done in the TOSMANA programme. As for distance, mean values are not so suitable in this case since the variations between the cases are large. The cluster analysis will help to sort the cases in various groups or categories since the distances between the cases are considered in this kind of analysis.

are lying in the North Atlantic Ocean about one-third of the way from Europe to America. The area is 2,355 sq km, and the population is 241,763. The islands are spread in west northwest – east southwest direction and Santa Maria and Corvo are situated approximately 600 km apart from each other.

The Spaniards first discovered the Azores during the 14th century, but the islands where colonized by the Portuguese during the 15th century. Since the islands were uninhabited the Portuguese, Prince Henry the Navigator gave an order to populate them.[42]

The inhabitants of the Azores are mainly of Portuguese origin but there are minorities, mainly from other Portuguese colonies, which were moved to the islands as slaves. The language spoken on the islands is a dialect of Portuguese with influences from Flemish, English and African languages. There are nationalists who emphasize the difference between mainland Portuguese and Azorean, arguing that Azorean must be considered a separate language. However, linguists mainly disagree and consider Azorean a Portuguese dialect.[43]

The first demands for autonomy in the Azores were raised during the 1820s when liberals rebelled against the central authorities that in those days were situated on the island of Terceira. It was not autonomy from the mainland Portugal, but more a protest against the central Azorean government, and the Portuguese government agreed to divide the island into three Districts.[44]

The autonomy of the Azores was finally institutionalized in 1895 through the decree of the government during a dictatorship headed by the Azorean Hintze Ribeiro. The autonomy was, however, suffering from constant setbacks due to a lack of interest for the Azorean autonomy among the Portuguese legislators and constant addition of responsibilities without resources to exercise them, and during the 1930s the autonomy was finally abolished and the islands were again made integrated provinces.[45]

After the fall of the military junta following the Portuguese revolution in 1974, the Constituent Assembly was willing to support the demands for autonomy for the Azores and Madeira, partly since it was propitious for innovation, rejecting all the policies of the deposed regime, partly in fear of the threat of Azorean separation that had risen in the aftermaths of the revolution.[46] In the Constitution of 1976 the two autonomous regions are defined together with the distribution of powers between the regional assembly and the Portuguese state. In Article 227 it

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[42] C.P. Amaral, 'Identification of an Autonomous Region – The Azores', in *The Political Administrative Systems of the European Island Regions* (Secretariat Regional da Administração Interna, Ponta Delgada, 1992) pp. 3–4.

[43] J. Dunn, *A Grammar of Portuguese Language* (London, 1930) pp. 81–82, and C. P. Amaral, 'Roots of Azorean Autonomy and Identity', in *An Island Living* (Institute of Island Studies, Prince Edward Island, Canada, 1992) p. 16.

[44] Amaral, *ibid.*, pp. 16–20.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 39–47.

[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 48–51.

is stated that the autonomy of the two regions derives from the "geographical, economic, social, and cultural characteristics and the historic aspirations of the peoples of the islands to autonomy". It is also said that the autonomy "in no way affects the State's full sovereignty and is exercised within the limits of the Constitution". During the 1970s there was a small independence movement on the island, but the activities have declined since the implementation of the autonomy.[47]

The Constitution lists those areas for which the autonomous islands are responsible, including legislation concerning their own regions in different matters such as the regional budget, the regions' economic and social development plan and accounts and to adapt the national fiscal system where needed. Other matters are regulated in the regions' own statutes.

3.2. *The Faroe Islands*

The Faroe Islands have been connected politically to Denmark since the 14th century and gained a high degree of self-government in 1948. The Islands lie in Northern Europe between the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean, about one-half of the way from Iceland to Norway. The area is 1,399 sq km and the population is 47,246 (July 2006 estimate).[48]

The Faroese consider themselves a Scandinavian people, but their language, history and economy are quite different from those of mainland Denmark. The population is speaking and using Faroese as their main language. Danish is used as a governmental language mainly. Faroese nationalism was institutionalized in the 1880s through the Faroese National Movement, whose emphasis was on the importance of Faroese history, culture and language. It was a reaction against the dramatic changes taking place in Faroese society at this time. The traditional agrarian society was disintegrating, while a class of full-time specialist fishers was emerging.[49]

In the beginning of the 1900s political parties emerged in the Islands and the struggle for Faroese political autonomy increased. With the German occupation of Denmark on 9 April 1940, and the British occupation of the Faroe Islands three days later, all connections between Denmark and the Faroes were severed. Faced with this situation, the Faroese *Logting* (the Legislative Assembly) adopted a new constitution empowering it to act as the Faroese government for as long as

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47) R. Aldrich and J. Connell, *The Last Colonies* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998) pp. 268–269.

48) CIA, *The World Factbook 2006*, <www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>.

49) J. H. Goodlad, 'The Faroese Road to Autonomy: An Analysis of the Faroese Political System', reprinted in *Shetland Life* (1987) p. 2.

the war lasted. As a result, the executive powers were transferred from the Danish government to the Danish governor of the Faroes, and a form of legislative power was transferred to the *Logting*.[50]

By the end of the War it was unthinkable that there could be a return to the pre-War constitutional status. Discussions took place at different levels, but no agreement on a new political setting could be reached. Eventually, a referendum was held as a way out of the impasse.[51] The options in the referendum were that of the status quo of 1940 or outright independence. The result was a narrow majority in favour of the independence option. This came as a surprise to the Danish government, which was totally unprepared for such an eventuality. The Danish government panicked, dissolved the *Logting* and demanded a new election.[52] This time a clear majority was against secession and negotiations on the question of Faroese autonomy with the Danish government took place and resulted in the implementation of the Home Rule Act of 1948. The Act established the constitutional arrangements under which the Faroe Islands continue to be governed today (with amendments since 1991 and 2005).[53]

The 1948 Home Rule Act recognizes the Faroe Islands as a "self-governing community within the Kingdom of Denmark". Specific fields of responsibility may accordingly be devolved to the Faroese *Logting* while other matters remain entrenched within the Danish Parliament. The 1948 Act lists those areas for which the Faroese *Logting* would, upon request, assume entire legislative, fiscal and administrative responsibility. These include agriculture, fisheries, education, culture, all taxation, health and social services, all planning matters and internal administration. In addition, a number of other areas are recognized as matters for which the Faroese *Logting* could assume responsibility after negotiations with the Danish government. These include state (Lutheran) church, the police, trade controls, state radio and aviation and mineral rights.[54] Since 1991, several of

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[50] *Ibid.*, p. 9; J. Morkore, 'Class Interests and Nationalism in Faroese Politics', 3:1 *North Atlantic Studies* (1991) p. 62; J. A. Jensen, 'The Position of Greenland and the Faroe Islands Within the Danish Realm', 9:2 *European Public Law* (2003) p. 171.

[51] Goodlad, *supra* note 49, p. 9, and Morkore, *ibid.*, p. 62.

[52] Goodlad, *supra* note 49, p. 10; Morkore, *supra* note 50, p. 62; À. Olafsson, 'Constitutionalism and Economics in the Faroes', in G. Baldacchino and D. Milne (eds.), *Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands: The Resourcefulness of Jurisdiction* (University of Prince Edward Island, New York, St. Martin's Press in association with Institute of Island Studies, Canada, 2000) pp. 124–125.

[53] Goodlad, *supra* note 49, p. 12; Morkore, *supra* note 50, p. 62. *See also Lov nr.* 578, *Om de Færøiske myndigheders overtagelse af sager og sagsområder*, from 24 June 2005, <www.logir.fo/foldb/lov/2005/0000578.htm>, visited on 9 July 2007, and *Lov nr.* 579, *Om Færøernes landsstyres ingåelse af folkeretlige aftaler*, from 24 June 2005, <www.logir.fo/foldb/lov/2005/0000579.htm>, visited on 9 July 2007.

[54] *Lov nr.* 578, *ibid.*

these areas have been transferred.[55] The areas, over which the Faroe Islands have responsibility today, are the church, lawyer associations, industry, criminal justice, aviation, passport, inheritance rights and other legal rights.[56]

Since 1998 a process towards independence has been on the agenda for the Faroe Islands. The democratic process towards independence encompasses four stages: 1) an agreement upon overall political objectives, 2) preparation of relevant reports and discussion papers, 3) negotiations with the Danish authorities, and 4) a parliamentary ratification and people's referendum. The first two steps have been completed. Negotiations between Faroese authorities and Danish authorities are ongoing. The independence process outlined in the proposal establishes a timetable for the Faroe Islands to assume responsibility for all areas still administered by Denmark under the Home Rule Act, with the exception of those few areas deemed to be strictly connected to sovereignty. These areas are legislation of the state, citizenship, Supreme Court, foreign, security and defence politics and currency politics.[57] This process should be completed according to a predetermined schedule by 1 January 2012 at the latest, after which sovereignty will be decided upon via a referendum.[58]

Danish authorities are generally inclined to accept Faroese independence. However, at the same time, they have made it clear to the Faroese government that independence would mean that the economic support for the islands would disappear within a short period of time (four years). The Faroese government, on the other hand, wants economic grants from Copenhagen to be phased out over a 15-year period. An agreement on this issue has not yet been reached.[59]

The goal today is to develop towards more autonomy within the Islands, maturing into either a freely associated state or a federal form of government.[60] Recent developments show more international involvement since the Faroes have signed an agreement with Iceland on 31 August 2005 on a common market between the areas.[61] Another agreement has been struck between the Faroes and Russia concerning customs duty on goods. Negotiations for membership in EFTA (European Free Trade Association) are also underway. This has been possible due to new legislation between Denmark and the Faroe Islands in an

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[55] H. Hannum, *Possibilities for Increased Faroese Autonomy* (1999), available at <www.macmeekin.com/Library/Jurisds/Faroe%20Islands.htm>.

[56] *Lov nr.* 578, *supra* note 53.

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] Føroyiskt Fullveldi (2003), *What We Want and Why We Want It* and *Faroese People to Decide the Future Status of Their Nation*, <www.grundlog.fo>, visited on 11 June 2003, controlled on 9 July 2007.

[59] Jensen, *supra* note 50, pp. 176–178. The transfers from the Danish government cover about two-thirds of the Faroese budget; so this issue is very sensitive.

[60] *Logmannskrivstovan*, <www.tinganes.fo>, visited on 19 January 2005.

[61] This refers to the distribution of powers between Denmark and the Faroes since a new legislation has been adopted by Denmark in 2005.

agreement between the parties, which gives the Faroes the right to enter into international agreements and organizations.[62]

3.3. *The Isle of Man*

The Isle of Man has been connected politically to the British Crown since the 16th century but has for centuries enjoyed a high degree of self-government.[63] The island is located in the middle of the Irish Sea, about 28 km from the British mainland. The area is 572 sq km, and the population is 75,441.[64]

The population on the Isle of Man is a mix of Manx persons and persons from Great Britain and Ireland. The language is English, but there is also a rising interest in Manx Gaelic. Until recently the language was on the point of extinction; in fact the last native speaker died in 1974.[65] However, following the returning prosperity of the island and the rediscovered national identity, there has been a revival of interest in the cultural heritage of the island. The development of the language is lead by the Manx Language Office that has also produced a Development Programme for schools and the Community of the Isle of Man or *Ellan Vannin* as it is called in Manx Gaelic.[66]

The history of the Isle of Man or the history of the autonomy of the Isle of Man can be divided into six periods. First there was the Celtic era that lasted for centuries until the invasion of the Scandinavians during the ninth century.[67] It is unknown when the Celts arrived on the island, but the existence of population on the island has been traced back to 5000 B.C.[68] Second there was the era of the Norsemen, the Vikings that lasted from late tenth century until the Scottish conquest of the island in 1266. In 1079, Godred Crovan established the Kingdom of Man and the Isles, consisting of the Isles of Man, Lewis, Skye, Mull and Islay. The Kingdom was formed as a politically, ecclesiastically and administratively independent entity although it was a suzerainty of the Norsemen.[69]

Third, the island became a Scottish suzerainty after the invasion of Scottish King Alexander III in 1266, and the Kings of Man ruled under the supervision of the Scottish Kings. The Scots maintained their rule over the island for a little more than one hundred years, when the Englishmen conquered the island in 1333.[70]

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62) *Lov nr.* 579, *supra* note 53.
63) M. Solly, *Government and Law in the Isle of Man* (Parallel Books, Castletown, 1994) p. 3.
64) CIA, *The World Factbook 2006*, *supra* note 48.
65) J. L. Mackenzie, 'Western Europe', in C. Moseley and R. E. Asher (eds.), *Atlas of the World Languages* (Routledge, London, 1994) p. 251.
66) Solly, *supra* note 63, p. 11.
67) *Ibid.*, pp. 44–46.
68) R. H. Kinvig, *The Isle of Man: A Social, Cultural, and Political History* (Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 1993) pp. 29–31.
69) *Ibid.*, pp. 58–66.
70) Solly, *supra* note 63, pp. 52–55.

Fourth, was the period of English suzerainty that lasted from 1333 until 1765. Ever since the Scottish conquest of the Isle of Man, the Englishmen had tried to get control over the island, and they finally succeeded in the battle of Halidon Hill, near Berwick on Tweed. The island was made an English suzerainty, and from 1405 the Stanleys ruled the island, first as Kings of Man and from 1504 as Lords of Man, a title that today is held by the British Queen. As suzerainty the island had control over its internal affairs while England was responsible for foreign affairs, defence and taxes.[71] In 1523 the legal status of the island was put on trial in a Chancery case, where it was stated that the Isle of Man was not a part of the realm of England and that the Act of Parliament did not extend to the island, although by special name an Act could extend to the island. The Privy Council later affirmed this in 1598.[72]

The fifth period followed the Revestment Act and the Mischief Act in 1765. The island was of great importance for trade and was famous for its piracy during the 18th and 19th centuries.[73] As an attempt to put an end to this smuggling over the Irish Sea, the United Kingdom government forced the Duke of Atoll to purchase the island for the UK government. The Revestment Act and the Mischief Act placed the administration of the island in the hands of a governor appointed by Whitehall, and the island became a subject of the British Crown, making the British monarch the new Lord of Man. The Tynwald (parliament) had been deprived the control over the island's revenues, but it maintained control over the affairs of the island in many other respects, and the island was never formally annexed by the United Kingdom.[74]

The sixth and final period in the history of the Isle of Man started in 1866 when the first hesitant steps toward a restoration of the self-determination of the island were taken. The Parliament's Isle of Man Customs, Harbours, and Public Purposes Act of 1866 separated the revenues of the Isle of Man from the ones of the United Kingdom, and the Tynwald's House of Keys Election Act of 1866 transformed the House of Keys (the popularly elected and legislative house of Tynwald). The members of the House of Keys had previously been nominated by the existing members and appointed by the governor, but now they were elected by public suffrage.[75] In 1957 the governments of the Isle of Man and the United Kingdom agreed to abolish the UK government's control over the Manx customs revenues, and the Tynwald has since then been in control of the island's finances and customs duties.[76]

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71) *Ibid.*, pp. 48–65.
72) *Ibid.*, pp. 55–59.
73) L. Bennich, 'Rättsystemet i kungadömet Man', *Svensk Juristtidning*, häfte 6 (1988) pp. 497–498.
74) Kinvig, *supra* note 68, pp. 114–115 and Solly, *supra* note 63, pp. 65–68.
75) Kinvig, *supra* note 68, pp. 156–159 and Solly, *supra* note 63, pp. 69–70.
76) Solly, *supra* note 63, pp. 81–83.

As the two Channel Islands (Bailiwicks of Guernsey and Jersey) the Isle of Man chose not to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973.[77] Although the three islands are in strict theory subjected to the authority of the UK Parliament, in practice this is restricted to defence, international relations, customs, postal services, wireless telegraphy, fishery and civil aviation. The three islands all deny the rights of the UK Parliament to legislate for them without the consent of the local parliaments.[78] Since the relations between the three islands and the UK Parliament are mainly regulated by common law and customs, the distribution of power is vague. This could be exemplified by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report in 2000 where 35 tax havens, damaging free trade, were mentioned, including the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. Although the UK government welcomed the report, it is not clear what power it has to force changes.[79]

4. The Control Groups

In this section we deal with our two control groups according to the explanatory factors. They are presented by way of general information since it is impossible to go into depth with every island in this study.

4.1. *Other Autonomies in the World*

Control group one consists of other autonomous islands, which have been chosen from different parts of the world (Table 1). We include islands such as Aruba,[80] Montserrat, Puerto Rico and St Pierre and Miquelon from North America. Other islands included are Niue, Tokelau and Wallis and Futuna from Oceania. From Europe we include islands such as the Balearic Islands and the Åland Islands, and from South America the Falkland Islands are included. Finally, from Africa we have St Helena and its dependencies and Zanzibar. The selection of islands is

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[77] *See* Protocol No. 3 on the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.

[78] O. H. Phillips *et al.*, *Constitutional and Administrative Law* (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001) pp. 767–769.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 769. *See also* European Court of Human Rights, *Tyrer* v. *The United Kingdom*, 25 April 1978, ECHR, no. 5856/72, Series A, no. 26, paras. 13–16, in which the United Kingdom was held responsible for a violation of Article 3(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights because a whipping punishment, amounting to degrading treatment, had been imposed and executed under the criminal law of the autonomous Isle of Man, legislation that the Parliament of England could not affect.

[80] *See* G. Oostindie, 'Dependence and Autonomy in Sub-National Island Jurisdictions: The Case of the Kingdom of the Netherlands', 95:386 *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* (2006) pp. 609–626 for recent developments regarding Aruba and the Netherlands' Antilles.

based on the perspective of including islands from all over the world, to get a broad geographical dispersion. It is, of course, impossible in this short study to map all autonomous islands in the world. We derive from a Most Different Systems Design approach, and therefore we have included as different islands as possible. We think that a sample of 12 islands is enough to get a picture of how autonomous islands have occurred. Our main islands in the study are represented with bold characters in the Table. These islands are chosen because they represent different colonial backgrounds and different aspects on other factors included in the analysis.

The Table shows that there are four islands that show no distance from the mainland: the Balearic Islands, the Isle of Man, Zanzibar and the Åland Islands. All the other islands are more than 1,000 km away from the mainland. Within this group, the Falkland Islands and Wallis and Futuna are more than 10,000 km away from the mainland.

As for ethnicity, the Table shows that the islands have some variations. Most of the islands have one diverse factor in form of language or religion or ethnic origin.

Table 1 Other Autonomous Islands in the World

Autonomy	Distance	Ethnic diversity	GDP/Capita (USD)	Population size
Aruba	7 954	1	21 800 (2004)	71 891
Balearic Islands	80	1	24 260 (2004)	993 202
Falkland Islands	12 263	0	25 000 (2002)	2 967
Montserrat	3 208	1	3 400 (2002)	9 439
Niue	2 337	2	5 800 (2003)	2 166
Puerto Rico	1 600	2	18 700 (2005)	3927 188
St. Helena and dependencies	7 295	1	2 500 (1998)	7 502
St. Pierre and Miquelon	3 790	0	7 000 (2001)	7 026
Tokelau	3 290	2	1 000 (1993)	1 392
Wallis and Futuna	16 019	2	3 800 (2004)	16 025
Zanzibar	35	1	303 (2004)	984 625
Åland Islands	70	1	35 690 (2000)	26 530
Azores	**1 593**	**0**	**13 250 (2000)**	**241 763**
Faroe Islands	**1 352**	**1**	**22 000 (2001)**	**47 246**
Isle of Man	**28**	**1**	**28 300 (2003)**	**75 441**

This relates to eight of the islands. Niue, Puerto Rico, Tokelau and Wallis and Futuna have differences in two aspects in relation to their respective metropolitan state. These four islands have some combination of two of the three factors available. Falkland Islands, St. Pierre and Miquelon and the Azores have no differences according to ethnicity in relation to their respective mother country.

GDP/capita varies between 303 (Zanzibar) and up to 35,690 (Åland Islands) in US dollars. There are huge differences between poor and rich regions. The most prosperous islands are found in North America, Caribbean and Europe.[81] Most of the poorer regions are found in Oceania and Africa.

The size of the population varies between 1,392 (Tokelau) and 3,9 million (Puerto Rico). Even here there are huge differences between the islands. Most islands are small in size, but there are few exceptions like Puerto Rico, the Balearic Islands and Zanzibar. An interesting feature is that these larger islands are situated in different parts of the world. Puerto Rico lies in North America, the Balearic Islands in Europe and Zanzibar in Africa.

4.2. *Non-Autonomous Islands*

Non-autonomous islands are also selected from different parts of the world and according to the same logic as above (Table 2). We include islands such as Barbuda, Cheju Island, Christmas Island, Crete, Gotland, Grand Bahama, Isla de Juventud, Islas de la Bahia, Mafia Island, Palawan, Principé and Temotu.[82] Of these, Barbuda, Grand Bahama, Isla de Juventud, Islas de la Bahia and Mafia Island lie in North America. Cheju Island, Christmas Island and Palawan lie in Asia. From Europe we have Crete and Gotland. From Africa comes Principé, and finally Temotu lies in Oceania.

The non-autonomous islands are in general closer to their mainland. Only the Christmas Island is more than 1,000 km away from the mainland, while Grand Bahama, Palawan, Principé and Temotu are more than 100 km away from the mainland. Consequently, there are seven islands that show no distance from mainland. The non-autonomous islands are also much more homogeneous in their characteristics in comparison with the autonomous islands. There are only two islands, *i.e.*, Christmas Island and Islas de la Bahia that differ in two aspects in relation to their respective mother country. Christmas Island differs in religion and ethnic origin, and Islas de la Bahia differs in language and ethnic origin.

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81) Sources: Ackrén, *supra* note 6, pp. 77, 106–107; CIA, *The World Factbook 2006*, *supra* note 48; Olausson, *supra* note 11.

82) Sources: Olausson, *supra* note 11; CIA, *The World Factbook 2006*, *supra* note 48; <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeju>; <www.explorecrete.com/>; <www.gotland.se/imcms/25327>; <www.letsgohonduras.com/islasdelabahia_eng.html>; <www.britannica.com/eb/article-9049956>; <www.interkriti.org/intro.htm#economy>; <www.eurisles.com/>.

Table 2 Non-Autonomous Islands

Non-Autonomous Islands	Distance	Ethnic diversity	GDP/Capita (USD)	Population size
Barbuda	40	0	Not available (NA)	1 500
Cheju Island	70	0	15 000 (2006)	513 000
Christmas Island	1 533	2	NA	1 493
Crete	95	0	NA	609 131
Gotland	90	0	30 300 (2003)	57 381
Grand Bahama	180	0	NA	46 994
Isla de Juventud	70	0	NA	86 600
Islas de la Bahia	56	2	NA	38 073
Mafia Island	16	0	NA	40 557
Palawan	586	0	NA	755 412
Principé	146	0	NA	5 966
Temotu	555	0	NA	18 912

A clear pattern is the lack of data when it comes to GDP/capita. This could have a natural explanation since all these islands are integrated parts with their mother countries and have not received any special status (at least not yet). The regions might be too small to be considered own economical areas. There are, however, some figures available for Cheju Island, Crete and Gotland, which indicates that Gotland, which lies in Europe, is the most prosperous region of the three. Cheju Island and Crete reach approximately the same level.

The size factor shows huge variations between the islands. Christmas Island is the smallest island with only 1,493 inhabitants, and Palawan is the biggest island with 755,412 inhabitants. Most of the islands lie between 38,000 and 86,600 inhabitants. There are only three islands that reach over the 500,000 limit. These islands are Cheju Island, Crete and Palawan. Cheju Island and Palawan lie in Asia, while Crete lies in Europe.

5. Analysis

The analysis will be carried out in two steps. We start by explaining the analysis of autonomous islands as contrasted with non-autonomous islands. This procedure is carried out by the TOSMANA software programme using the Multi-Value QCA technique. This analysis will give us different paths towards island autonomy. The different combinations of the variables/explanatory factors are relevant

in this case. In the programme we are using it is possible to include so-called logical remainders, which we will do, since we use sample groups and not the total number of entities. When including logical remainders in the analysis, it is possible to get all combinations available in a theoretical point of view. The problem is, of course, that all combinations might not exist in reality, but on the other hand we will get an approximation of the real world.

The analysis indicates that the paths towards autonomy are four in number. Ethnic diversity in one of the aspects of ethnic origin, language or religion is one path towards island autonomy. A second path is small or large size. Long distance combined with no ethnic diversity is a third way, which leads to autonomy. The fourth, and last path, is long distance combined with the lower middle income group or the upper middle income group. The paths are all of equal importance in this analysis. We cannot tell which path is more accurate in comparison with one or the other. On the other hand it seems that long distance has a major impact since this factor emerges in two of the combinations. These results are shown in Appendix 1 in more detail.[83] The Tosmana programme found no contradictions in our dataset, which might suggest that there are no specification problems. However, by using the opportunity to diversify all the conditions (explanatory variables), we have chosen to use MVQCA in an extreme way that it perhaps was not meant for.

The Appendix also shows how the programme is dealing with missing values, *i.e.*, it tests all possible combinations for those entities where the lack of values occurs.

We have also tested the combinations for the negative outcome, *i.e.*, non-autonomy in this case. Running this test in the Tosmana programme found no contradictions either. On the other hand we received a lot of different options for the outcome of non-autonomy, which indicate that it is not as easy to interpret which paths that are leading towards non-autonomy. The control group of non-autonomous islands seems to be more diverse than the group of autonomous islands.

We achieved four different paths with all explanatory variables available. This indicates that we might not have chosen the most sophisticated variables available in the literature or by inductive thinking. Some conclusions might be made. First of all, our three major examples in the study show the same pattern as other autonomous islands; so there are only small variations between the entities. Even though islands have different legal traditions, our assumption about various traditions leading to different autonomy arrangements cannot be verified.

Second, what do the paths mean in this context? We have argued that long distance, ethnic diversity, large size and/or a high degree of GDP/capita would be influential for autonomous islands to occur. As we can see from our analysis, the

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83) *See* Appendix 1.

assumptions might not hold as strong as we believed. It is possible to achieve autonomy without long distance, without ethnic diversity, without large size and without a high level of income. There are no clear results of which indicators that are truly leading to autonomy. The only thing we can be certain about is that the world is complex and there are different ways to achieve autonomy.

The next step in our analysis is to create a control mechanism with fuzzy-set analysis. In this case we have to include a third control group with the extreme form of autonomy, *i.e.*, outright independence. We will here include 12 island microstates in the world so that the comparison follows the pattern used in the article. These states have a population under one million inhabitants; so they are akin to the autonomous or non-autonomous islands according to size. The ethnic diversity will here be compared to microstates' former colonial powers since these states are all former colonies. The same measurement is used for the distance factor. GDP/capita will be measured according to the latest figures. See Table 3 below.

The Table indicates that none of the independent islands are closer than 1,000 km from the mainland of their former colonial power. It also shows that the microstates are more heterogeneous in their characteristics in relation to their former colonial powers. All of the microstates differ somehow in one or more factors according to language, religion and/or ethnic origin.

GDP/capita varies between USD 600 (Comoros) and USD 35,600 (Iceland). Most of the microstates are very poor countries and would be considered as third world countries, but some are fairly rich such as Bahamas, Cyprus, Iceland and Malta.

Table 3 Microstates

Microstate	Distance	Ethnic diversity	GDP/Capita (USD)	Population size
Bahamas	6 492	1	20 200 (2005)	303 770
Belau (Palau)	10 380	3	7 600(2005)	20 579
Cape Verde	3 925	1	6 200 (2005)	420 979
Comoros	5 037	3	600 (2005)	690 948
Cyprus	3 043	3	21 600 (2005)	784 301
Grenada	6 542	2	5 000 (2002)	89 703
Iceland	1 681	1	35 600 (2005)	299 388
Kiribati	14 531	2	800 (2001)	105 432
Maldives	8 095	3	3 900 (2002)	359 008
Malta	2 239	3	19 900 (2005)	400 214
St. Lucia	6 352	2	4 800 (2005)	168 458
Vanuatu	16 103	2	2 900 (2003)	208 869

The population size varies between 20,579 (Belau or Palau) and 784,301 (Cyprus). The variation in size is not as huge as it is for autonomous or non-autonomous islands. Most of the microstates have a population over 100,000 inhabitants.

This analysis will be carried out with the fs/QCA programme.[84, 85] We will test the microstates against the autonomous and non-autonomous islands to see if there are other paths that constitute in the form of autonomy. The analysis will give us possible necessary and sufficient conditions in this case.[86]

The result of this analysis is that we receive ethnic diversity as the main explanation why islands have become sovereign states. The analysis shows us the result for the extreme form of autonomy; so here the paths towards sovereignty are in question. This tells us that ethnic diversity explains up to 68 per cent of the cases in the investigation. (See Appendix 3 for details according to the fuzzy-set

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84) Source: CIA, *The World Factbook 2006*, *supra* note 48.

85) For more information about this technique, *see* Appendix 2. *See also* Appendix 3.

86) As in all analysis it is important to test for necessity and sufficiency, *i.e.*, which, if any, variable or variables that are necessary conditions for the outcome and which are sufficient. A necessary cause is one that is always present in all combinations that produce a certain outcome. Necessary causes thereby works backwards. First one must isolate the cases that produce the same outcome and then look for any condition that is present in all the cases. In this context this would imply an analysis of all the autonomous islands to see whether or not there are one or more conditions that is present in all cases. There are two ways of testing for necessity: veristic and probabilistic. The veristic way allows no discordant outcomes and is performed directly from the truth table. By dividing the cases into two groups one can easily identify whether or not there are any conditions that are common for all cases. The probabilistic way is based on the same principle as statistical analysis. First one needs to set up benchmarks for the test. Ragin identifies three possible benchmarks; "more necessary than not" (.5), "usually necessary" (.65) and "almost always necessary" (0.80). Ragin, *supra* note 9, pp. 131–132. A sufficient cause is one that only produces one outcome. In contrast to necessary causes, sufficient causes work forward. The researcher needs to identify the conditions or combination of conditions that only produces one outcome. If a combination produces both autonomy and non-autonomy it is thereby not a sufficient combination. In this test all possible combinations must be tested, with our five conditions this means that $3^4 - 1 = 80$ combinations must be tested to find which ones only produce one single outcome. As the necessity test, the sufficiency test can be performed in a veristic and a probabilistic way. The probabilistic way or the z-test involves, as for the necessity test, a one-tailed test at 0.05 significance level for testing "almost always sufficient".The researcher needs to set up a proportion for cases showing the outcome to see if it is "almost always sufficient" (.80), "usually sufficient" (.65) or "more sufficient than not" (.50). (Ragin, supra note 9, pp. 132–133). The veristic sufficiency test uses either frequency thresholds to evaluate the strength of the evidence, or Boolean minimization. The latter one is used to reduce the primitive expressions and simplify the complexity. Ragin states, in C. C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1987) p. 93, that "[i]f two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression". Boolean minimization is used in order to find the lowest common denominator that explains the development of autonomy, *i.e.*, Abc combined with ABC produces A and ABC and AbC produce AC. Ragin, *Comparative Method, supra* within this footnote, pp. 85–101, and Ragin, *supra* note 9, pp. 133–134. The extension of this rule for MVQCA has already been discussed.

analysis.) The solution coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome that is explained by the complete solution. The solution consistency on the other hand measures how often membership in the solution is a sub-set of membership in the outcome. To be sure about our results we would need to take all islands into account which have reached independence if we tried to test if ethnicity could be seen as a cause for island sovereignty. This would, of course, call for another investigation.

6. Conclusion

Our point of departure for this article was to investigate why island autonomy occurs by focusing on three European autonomous islands: the Azores, the Faroe Islands and the Isle of Man. The islands were compared with three control groups: other autonomous islands, non-autonomous islands and island microstates from different parts of the world. Our four conditions, which we had as explanatory factors in this case, were geographical distance, ethnic diversity, GDP/capita and size according to population. As a summary we can say that the main islands in the investigation show the same pattern as other autonomous islands in the world. Azores and the Faroe Islands have a long distance in relation to their respective mother country, while the Isle of Man has a short distance towards its mother country. This follows the pattern since some autonomous islands have a long distance while others have a short distance in relation to their metropolitan state. When it comes to ethnic diversity the same pattern implies. The Faroe Islands and the Isle of Man vary in language, and the Azores does not differ in any respect. Most autonomous islands differ in one or two of the primordial aspects, while a few do not vary in any sense. GDP/capita shows high values for most of the autonomous islands, and this reflects also our main islands. This could be a consequence of the high degree of autonomy and is therefore not a good estimation as a way to reach autonomy as such. Size according to population shows small numbers, and this is a very usual feature amongst autonomous islands. They are small in nature. There are, of course, some exceptions like Puerto Rico, the Balearic Islands and Zanzibar, which reach the level of microstates.

The analyses of the autonomous islands in comparison with non-autonomous islands and microstates gave us vague results, but four paths emerged in the MVQCA analysis (where only autonomous islands and non-autonomous islands were included). These paths were ethnic diversity in one aspect, small or large size, long distance combined with no ethnic diversity and long distance combined with the lower middle income group or the upper middle income group. When including the third control group with various island microstates of the world, ethnic diversity explained most of the cases. It seems that the conclusion of geographical distance as the main factor explaining why autonomous islands

have occurred remains the strongest explanation (this in comparison with non-autonomous islands). A long distance from the metropolitan centre might call for special arrangements since the communications otherwise towards the centre are marginal. The life of islands is isolated and therefore unique arrangements are necessary for the survival of the island communities.

Critical points are, of course, the selection of cases in the control groups and the selection of explanatory variables. Our investigation could be seen as a more experimental one in relation to more normative and descriptive investigations in the theme of autonomy research. We hope that we have managed to illustrate how different approaches could be used in the study of autonomies, and we also call for more research in the comparative area. There is still a huge gap in the literature about autonomies and their specifics.

Appendix 1 The Tosmana Report from the Tosmana Programme

Algorithm: Graph-based Agent
Settings: Minimizing value 1
Including R

Truth Table

Island	Distance	Ethnicity	GDP/Capita	Size	Autonomy
Aruba, Montserrat, Faroe Islands	2	1	3	0	1
Balearic Islands	0	1	3	1	1
Falkand Islands, Azores	2	0	3	0	1
Montserrat, St Helena and dependencies	2	1	1	0	1
Niue, Wallis and Futuna	2	2	2	0	1
Puerto Rico	2	2	3	4	1
St Pierre and Miquelon	2	0	2	0	1
Tokelau	2	2	1	0	1
Zanzibar	0	1	0	1	1
Åland Islands, Isle of Man	0	1	3	0	1
Cheju, Crete, Gotland, /Barbuda (GDP/Capita:3)/, /Grand Bahama (GDP/Capita:3)/, /Isla de Juventud (GDP/Capita:3)/, /Mafia Island (GDP/Capita:3)/	0	0	3	0	0
/Barbuda (GDP/Capita:0)/, /Grand Bahama (GDP/Capita:0)/, /Isla de Juventud (GDP/Capita:0)/, /Mafia Island (GDP/Capita:0)/	0	0	0	0	0
/Barbuda (GDP/Capita:1)/, /Grand Bahama (GDP/Capita:1)/, /Isla de Juventud (GDP/Capita:1)/, /Mafia Island (GDP/Capita:1)/	0	0	1	0	0

Truth Table

Island	Distance	Ethnicity	GDP/Capita	Size	Autonomy
/Barbuda (GDP/Capita:2)/, /Grand Bahama (GDP/Capita:2)/, /Isla de Juventud (GDP/Capita:2)/, /Mafia Island (GDP/Capita:2)/	0	0	2	0	0
/Christmas Island (GDP/Capita:0)/	2	2	0	0	0
/Christmas Island (GDP/Capita:3)/	2	2	3	0	0
/Islas de la Bahia (GDP/Capita:0)/	0	2	0	0	0
/Islas de la Bahia (GDP/Capita:1)/	0	2	1	0	0
/Islas de la Bahia (GDP/Capita:2)/	0	2	2	0	0
/Islas de la Bahia (GDP/Capita:3)/	0	2	3	0	0
/Palawan (GDP/Capita:0)/, /Principé (GDP/Capita:0)/, /Temotu (GDP/Capita:0)/	1	0	0	0	0
/Palawan (GDP/Capita:1)/, /Principé (GDP/Capita:1)/, /Temotu (GDP/Capita:1)/	1	0	1	0	0
/Palawan (GDP/Capita:2)/, /Principé (GDP/Capita:2)/, /Temotu (GDP/Capita:2)/	1	0	2	0	0
/Palawan (GDP/Capita:3)/, /Principé (GDP/Capita:3)/, /Temotu (GDP/Capita:3)/	1	0	3	0	0

Result: (all)

Ethnicity {1}+Size {1,4}+Distance {2}Ethnicity{0}+Distance{2}GDP/Capita{1,2} (Aruba,Faroe Islands+Balearic Islands+Montserrat, St Helena+Zanzibar+Åland, Isle of Man)(Balearic Islands+Puerto Rico+Zanzibar)(Falkland Islands,Azores+St Pierre)(Montserrat,St Helena+Niue, Wallis and Futuna+St Pierre+Tokelau)

Appendix 2 Fuzzy-Set Table for the fs/QCA Analysis

Islands	Distance	Ethnic diversity	GDP/Capita (USD)	Population size	Outcome
		Autonomies			
Aruba	1	0.33	1	0	0.5
Balearic Islands	0	0.33	1	0.75	0.5
Falkland Islands	1	0	1	0	0.5
Montserrat	1	0.33	0.33	0	0.5
Niue	1	0.67	0.67	0	0.5
Puerto Rico	1	0.67	1	1	0.5
St Helena and dependencies	1	0.33	0.33	0	0.5
St Pierre and Miquelon	1	0	0.67	0	0.5
Tokelau	1	0.67	0.33	0	0.5
Wallis and Futuna	1	0.67	0.67	0	0.5
Zanzibar	0	0.33	0	0.75	0.5
Åland Islands	0	0.33	1	0	0.5
Azores	1	0	1	0.25	0.5
Faroe Islands	1	0.33	1	0	0.5
Isle of Man	0	0.33	1	0	0.5
		Non-Autonomies			
Barbuda	0	0		0	0
Cheju Island	0	0	1	0.5	0
Christmas Island	1	0.67		0	0
Crete	0	0	1	0.5	0
Gotland	0	0	1	0	0
Grand Bahama	0.5	0		0	0
Isla de Juventud	0	0		0	0
Isla de la Bahia	0	0.67		0	0
Mafia Island	0	0		0	0
Palawan	0.5	0		0.75	0
Principé	0.5	0		0	0
Temotu	0.5	0		0	0
		Microstates			
Bahamas	1	0.33	1	0.25	1
Belau (Palau)	1	1	0.67	0	1
Cape Verde	1	0.33	0.67	0.5	1
Comoros	1	1	0	0.5	1

Truth Table

Islands	Distance	Ethnic diversity	GDP/Capita (USD)	Population size	Outcome
Cyprus	1	1	1	0.5	1
Grenada	1	0.67	0.67	0	1
Iceland	1	0.33	1	0.25	1
Kiribati	1	0.67	0	0.5	1
Maldives	1	1	0.67	0.5	1
Malta	1	1	1	0.5	1
St Lucia	1	0.67	0.67	0.25	1
Vanuatu	1	0.67	0.33	0.25	1

Key: Distance is coded according to three values: 0 indicating distance lower than 100 km, 0.5 = distance over 100 km but under 1,000 km and 1 = distance over 1,000 km. Ethnic diversity is coded as follows: 0 = no difference, 0.33 = difference in one of the characteristics, 0.67 = difference in two of the aspects and 1 = difference in all aspects. GDP/Capita is coded according to the following thresholds: 0 = under USD 875, 0.33 = between USD 876 and USD 3,456, 0.67 = between USD 3,457 and USD 10,725 and 1 = over USD 10,726. Population size is coded according to the following thresholds: 0 is under 100,000 inhabitants, 0.25 = over 100,000 but under 350,000 inhabitants, 0.5 = over 350,000 but under 500,000, 0.75 = over 500,000 but under one million and 1 = over one million.

Appendix 3 Fuzzy-Set Report from the fs/QCA Programme

Model: AUTONOMY = DISTANCE + ETHNICITY + GDP/CAPITA + SIZE

Rows Read: 8
Valid: 8 (100.0 %)
Missing: 0 (0.0 %)
0 Cases: 5 (62.5 %)
1 Cases: 3 (37.5 %)
- Cases: 0 (0.0 %)

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1
0 Matrix: 0-C
Don't Care: Remainder

Truth Table Summary

	Configs	%
0 Terms	5	62.5
1 Terms	3	37.5
- Terms	0	0.0
C Terms	0	0.0
Total	8	100.0
Dropped	0	0.0

Truth Table Solution

	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
ETHNICITY	0.682564	0.682564	0.951394

Solution coverage: 0.682564
Solution consistency: 0.951394