

EXCLAVES¹

G. W. S. ROBINSON

The University of Southampton

EXCLAVES are not important phenomena in political geography. They are rare and mostly small. But their special status is of value in illustrating the relations of states in difficult geographical circumstances and in illuminating the importance of uninterrupted territory to present-day states. This paper might have taken the form of a detailed analysis of one or two exclaves, and some readers might prefer it so. It is the author's conviction that in geography too often an example has been taken to prove a case; geographers have in general been slow to look around for exceptions to their rules. In this study, therefore, the world population of exclaves has been used as the field, and the attempt has been made to say what could be said about exclaves as a class of phenomena, treating in turn form, origin, and function, but emphasizing especially the functional conditions, the way in which things are done differently and life is lived differently in exclaves. These small, specialized territories naturally bring to mind those better-known small, specialized territories, the tiny countries; and a comparison between conditions in exclaves and tiny countries has been adumbrated in the final section.

An exclave is a part of the territory of one country entirely surrounded by the territory of another country.

Normal exclaves are not common. They occur in four places, all in Europe. They are all small, under 10 square miles in area, and none has a population of over 1,500. The normal exclaves at Llivia, Campione, and Büsingen (N 1,2,3 on Figs. 1 and 2)² each

¹ The author wishes to thank those who have helped to satisfy his curiosity in the exclaves and tiny countries he has visited. He is also grateful for information given him by the Office for All-Berlin Questions, Berlin; the Home Office, Berlin; the Home Office, Munich; the Ministry of Finance, The Hague; the Police Commissioner, Dublin; the Revenue Commissioners, Dublin; the Office of Works, Innsbruck; the Home Office, Stuttgart.

² L. Pedreschi, "L'exclave italiano in terra Svizzera di Campione d'Italia," *Rivista Geografica Italiana*, Vol. LXIV (1958), pp. 23-40. In addition to Büsingen there is a second German exclave in the Canton of Schaffhausen, the single farm "Verena Hof," which lies a quarter of a mile within Swiss territory in the north of the canton.

consist of a single village with its lands. But the fourth, at Baarle in North Brabant (N 4 on Figs. 1 and 2)³ is far more complicated. Atlas maps which show here an exclave of Belgium within Holland have severely simplified the situation. This "exclave" consists in fact of at least 33 exclaves (not to mention Dutch counter-exclaves), most of them within the built-up area of the village and quite indistinguishable to the stranger. Some plots are even claimed by both countries, and the church and churchyard are generally reputed common ground.

Pene-exclaves are parts of the territory of one country that can be approached conveniently—in particular by wheeled traffic—only through the territory of another country. These areas usually function fully as exclaves, though they have not the formal territorial isolation of normal exclaves. In Europe there are eight pene-exclaves known to the author, six of which are concentrated on the Austro-German and Irish frontiers (P 1-8 on Figs. 1, 3a and 3b).⁴ Pene-exclaves are separated from their home countries to various degrees and in various ways. Direct access may be hindered by the difficulty of the terrain, as in the Vallée Etroite (P 7); or by the narrowness of the territorial isthmus, as at Drumully (P 5); or by both, as at Jungholz (P 3). This Tyrolean village is connected to its home country by a hundred-yard-wide neck of territory on top of a 5,000-foot-high mountain: it is in fact *all but* a normal exclave. Most pene-exclaves could, however, at some expense be connected to their home countries by the construction of special roads or tunnels. At least one pene-exclave, Balderschwang (P 1), should cease to exist before long when the planned German Alpine road is constructed through the village.

Quasi-exclaves are those exclaves which for one reason or another do not in fact function as exclaves today. There are two of these. By the Treaty of Versailles, Belgium was awarded not only the Prussian districts of Eupen and Malmédy but also the whole of the railroad

³ C. Kramer, *Baarle-Nassau en Baarle-Hertog* (Baarle-Nassau, 1952).

⁴ The author would be pleased to hear of pene-exclaves outside Europe, which he has not studied.




FIG. 1. Location map. *Normal exclaves*: N1, Llivia; N2, Campione; N3, Büdingen and Verena Hof; N4, Baarle-Hertog. *Pene-exclaves*: P1, Balderschwang; P2, Klein Walsertal; P3, Jungholz; P4, Hinterriss; P5, Drumully; P6, Termon Valley; P7, Vallée Etroite; P8, Bagni di Craveggia. *Quasi-exclaves*: Q1, Raeren-Weywertz railroad zone; Q2, Nagar Haveli and Dadra. *Virtual exclaves*: V, Vatican exclave. *Temporary exclaves*: T1, West Berlin; T2, Mount Scopus. *Tiny countries*: A, Andorra; L, Liechtenstein; M, Monaco; V, Vatican City State; CI, Channel Islands; IM, Isle of Man; SM, San Marino.

from Raeren to Weywertz (Q 1 on Figs. 1 and 4). This line passes beyond the Belgian frontier into Germany in five places, each time leaving German territory cut off to the west of the line. In fact the railroad is now used by the Belgians solely for through traffic, and they leave movement across it into the de-

tached parts of German territory entirely free from restrictions. The Portuguese territories behind Daman (Q 2 on Figs. 1 and 4), Nagar Haveli and Dadra, are classed as quasi-exclaves for a very different reason. The whole area (some 200 square miles) was occupied by forces of the Indian Republic in 1954, and




FIG. 2. Normal exclaves in detail. N1, Llvia, Spain. N2, Campione, Italy. Access from Italy is via Chiasso by the road shown. The country between the exclave and the nearest point of Italian territory is too steep for roads. N3, Büsingen and Verena Hof, Germany. Singen is the nearest market town in Germany. N4, Baarle-Hertog, Belgium, and Baarle-Nassau, Holland, showing the concessionary road for access from Belgium. The black areas are Belgian exclaves.

has naturally not functioned as an exclave since.

Virtual exclaves are areas treated as the exclaves of a country of which they are not in the strictest legal sense an integral part. By the Lateran Treaty of 1929, which created the Vatican City State (V on Fig. 1),⁵ certain

⁵ U. Toschi, "The Vatican City State," *Geographical Review*, Vol. XXII (1931), p. 529.

lands and buildings in and near Rome were declared extraterritorial from the point of view of the Kingdom of Italy. While these do not in law form part of the Vatican City State, they function as if they did and are effectively under Vatican administration.

Temporary exclaves are created where what was one state has been divided by an avowedly temporary or provisional line, such as an




FIG. 3a. Pene-exclaves in detail. P1, Balderschwang, Bavaria. Land over 1,200 meters is stippled; access roads are shown. P2, Klein Walsertal, Vorarlberg. Land over 1,700 meters is stippled. Road from Oberstdorf. P3, Jungholz, Tyrol, showing roads. Land over 1,300 meters is stippled. P4, Hinterriss, Tyrol. Land over 1,500 meters is stippled. Roads shown in pecked lines are suitable for jeep traffic only.

armistice line or an occupation-zone limit, which leaves islands of one zone within another. At present there are temporary exclaves in two places. The armistice in Palestine allowed for a demilitarized area on Mount Scopus, including the Hebrew University buildings and others (T 2 on Figs. 1 and 5). The area is divided into two parts, one occupied by the Jews, the other by the Arabs. As the whole area is surrounded by Arab-occupied territory, the Jewish part is effectively

isolated from the home country as a temporary exclave. The other example is by far the most important exclave in the world today, West Berlin (T 1 on Figs. 1 and 5)⁶—critical not

⁶ G. W. S. Robinson, "West Berlin, the Geography of an Exclave," *Geographical Review*, Vol. XLIII (1953), p. 540. As West Berlin was at first defined (i.e., by reference to prewar administrative areas) it included in addition to the main territory 9 small additional exclaves, varying in area from one-half to 80 acres. Six were uninhabited, and all these, along with one more with a population of 15, were handed




FIG. 3b. Pene-exclaves in detail. P5, Drumully, Ulster, showing road and rail systems. P6, Termon Valley, Ulster, showing road system. Land over 500 feet is stippled. P7, Vallée Etroite, France. Land over 2,000 meters, heavy stipple; land between 1,500 and 2,000 meters, light stipple. International frontier as it was before 1947 is shown by dotted line. Stairway at the Col de l'Echelle also indicated. P8, Bagni di Craveggia, Italy, showing roads. Land over 1,500 meters is stippled.

only on account of its size and prestige, but also because it occupies a position not merely between two countries, but between two over to the Russians early in the occupation. As this surrender was made without reservations, these areas cannot now be classed as quasi-exclaves. The remaining two, Steinstückchen (40 acres, pop. 600) and Papenberger Wiesen (12 acres, weekend pop.), are still functioning exclaves. For a complete list and map, see Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 546-47.

worlds. Strictly speaking, West Berlin is not an integral part of Western Germany and so does not fall within the definition of an exclave given here. Seen in a broader view, however, it must be admitted that West Berlin functions as far as it can as if it were a part of Western Germany, and it certainly forms an outpost of the "West" entirely surrounded by the territory of the "East."




FIG. 4. Quasi-exclaves in detail. Q1, Raeren-Weywertz railroad zones, Germany. The entire railroad is in Belgium. Q2, Nagar Haveli and Dadra, Portuguese India.

ORIGINS

The exclaves that survive in the world today have no common origin; they do not even date from a single period. Several come down from the Middle Ages; the most recent was created in 1949.

So far as our mediaeval exclaves are concerned, what calls for explanation is rather their survival today than their existence in the Middle Ages. In those days the face of Europe was peppered with exclaves; they could almost be described as a normal feature of the landscape.⁷ At least two survivals can be traced to personal interventions. Baarle-Hertog⁸ would certainly have been included in the Dutch Republic at the Peace of Westphalia, as were several similar neighboring exclaves, had it not been preserved by the interest of its Lady, who happened to be a person of exceptional interest at court in The Hague at the time. Similarly, when the Hapsburgs sold the suzerainty over the Hegau to Schaffhausen in 1723, they withheld that over Büsingen through

⁷ The same is true of the tiny states; most of them date from the same period.

⁸ In the twelfth century the Duke of Brabant leased the hunting rights of Baarle to the Lord of Breda, but he expressly excluded the cultivated land and houses of the village, which at that time took the form of scattered oases in the heathlands. The Lord's hunting rights have matured into Dutch sovereignty, the Duke's overlordship of fields and houses into Belgian.

pique over the high-handed treatment handed out 30 years before by the town to the Lord of Büsingen in defiance of their own intervention as suzerains. Campione escaped the Swiss conquest of Tessin through the respect it commanded as a fief of the Monastery of St. Ambrose at Milan, a status which did nothing to save it from incorporation in the Italian dominions of Napoleon.⁹

British India was, like mediaeval Europe, a welter of exclaves and enclaves; but all were subject to the paramount power, and all were reduced to the level of administrative inconveniences, where they were not abolished, after the attainment of independence. After that there remained only the exclaves of the colonies of other European powers. Pondicherry until its extinction in 1954 comprised no less than 12 distinct parts. The two exclaves awarded to the Portuguese of Daman as indemnification for Mahratta piracy are the sole survivors of the *ancien régime*, and even these have been reduced to the status of quasi-exclaves (Q 2 on Figs. 1 and 4).

Exclaves can also result from carelessly drawn-up treaties. The best-known case is that of Llivia. The Treaty of the Pyrenees allocated to France 33 villages in the Cerdagne to link her territories in Conflent with those in Val Carol. Though lying directly in

⁹ G. W. Schneider, *Ueber die politischen Grenzen der Schweiz* (Berne, 1923).






FIG. 5. Temporary exclaves in detail. *T1*, West Berlin. Access roads, railroads and canals. Air corridors are stippled. Small subsidiary exclaves are shown in black. *T2*, Mount Scopus. Armistice lines appear as a double frontier. The Mount Scopus demilitarized zone is divided into a north, Israel-held sector and a southern, Jordan-held sector. Buildings in these areas are shown in black.

the way, Llvia could not be included in the 33 because it had the status not of a village but of a *town*.

Not dissimilar is the condition that can result when an existing administrative boundary or cease-fire line is hastily accepted as a makeshift political divide, which then hardens into a frontier and possibly survives for decades. The convolutions of County Fermanagh in Ireland, the petty exclaves around Berlin and the deserted university buildings on Mount Scopus are all results of this kind of frontier-making.

Recent treaties and agreements have also

deliberately created exclaves and pene-exclaves for prestige and tactical reasons. Prestige largely explains the occupation of Berlin by the Western powers; tactical advantages were supposed to accrue to Belgium from the Raeren-Weywertz railroad and to France from the Vallée Etroite. In both cases the quasi- or pene-exclave was a device to secure this advantage without unnecessarily extensive annexations.

SURVIVAL

The survival of an exclave depends on the continued acquiescence of three parties: the

home country, the neighbor country, and the exclave.

The home country is naturally the one most interested in the maintenance of the *status quo*. We have, however, seen the British and Americans renounce seven small exclaves around Berlin (T 1 on Fig. 5)—one inhabited by 15 persons—on account of the practical impossibility of administering them.

The exclaves themselves are not normally in a position to alter their international status by their own action; but they can agitate for changes, and some have done so. Both Büsingen and Campione have petitioned for cession to Switzerland, the latter not since the Risorgimento, but the former as recently as the two World Wars. The Swiss have consistently declined to accept the offer, on the same grounds as in the case of Vorarlberg—what has been taken from a weakened neighbor may well be reclaimed by a strengthened one. The Swiss and German governments did in fact discuss the *exchange* of Büsingen for equivalent Swiss territory; but an equivalent could not be found.

The principal threat to survival comes from the neighbor state, and it may be expressed peacefully or violently. The Swiss strove for centuries to absorb their exclaves peacefully. Apart from recent attempts at exchange, they importuned both Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna for outright cession, but without success; and before that Schaffhausen had made repeated attempts to buy the suzerainty over Büsingen from the Hapsburgs. Other neighbors have shown less concern for the feelings of others. Direct occupation was the method favored by the Indian Republic against the undefended French and Portuguese exclaves. Similar methods were tried by the Russians against Steinstücken (see T 1 in Fig. 5) in 1952; but a five-day Russian occupation ended in a withdrawal forced by counter-measures against vulnerable Russian interests in West Berlin. Against the West-Berlin exclave itself, the Russians have so far been unable to proceed by the direct use of force for fear of precipitating a general war. Instead they have resorted to blockade—always a natural weapon ready for use against an exclave. West Berlin has proved less vulnerable to this kind of attack than most, because it is big enough to contain three aerodromes, and it was possible to counter the

blockade by an air-lift unprecedented for scale and duration in time of peace. Blockade has been resorted to by Switzerland as well, but a limited blockade with limited objectives. When the Italians opened a casino at Campione with the obvious intention of circumventing Swiss laws against gambling, Swiss gendarmes surrounded the area and no visitors were allowed in until the Italian authorities agreed to impose a five-franc limit on gambling by Swiss citizens.

COMMUNICATIONS

The essential element in the condition of an exclave is that it is in direct contact with its neighbor country, but can communicate with its home country only across the territory of the neighbor. Critical for the exclave, then, are the arrangements in force for communication with the home country.

The device which would seem most obviously convenient, a recognized neutral or concessionary road, is in fact rather rare. The only true instance is the neutral road of Llvia (N 1 on Fig. 2) spanning the mile-wide gap between Llvia and the nearest point of the Spanish "mainland." It is established by convention that neither country exercises jurisdiction on this road; so that Llvia enjoys contact with Spain unfettered by French controls. The air corridors from Western Germany to Berlin are another version of the "neutral road" established by convention at the time the exclave was created, and the *Autobahn* from Helmstedt to Berlin has functioned in something of the same way.

A rather less secure link results from unilateral concessions by the neighbor country. These may be broad, well defined and permanent, like the Dutch concessions for Baarle-Hertog, which date from 1754 and allow practically free provisioning of Baarle-Hertog from Belgium, though the whole trade is checked by the Dutch customs at the frontier; Belgium has no *rights* over the road. Much more recent arrangements of a very similar nature exist at Balderschwang and Hinterriss, and the Irish and Roman exclaves are run more informally on the same principles.

Movement of persons between exclave and home country is controlled by the neighbor country everywhere except over the neutral road to Llvia and the air route to Berlin. Ireland is an exception of a rather different kind,

since personal movement is normally uncontrolled everywhere between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. It is only in the case of the temporary exclaves that the control exercised by the neighbor country is in fact irksome. The insecurity of the surface route to Berlin is notorious. Free access to Steinstücken is restricted to residents; others must be provided with a special pass as troublesome and expensive to obtain as an international passport. Communication between Israel and Mount Scopus is reduced to a fortnightly convoy escorted by Jordanian troops.

ADMINISTRATION

The home country is in every case eager to make the administration of exclaves conform as closely as possible to the pattern on the "mainland." The most bizarre effects of this policy are to be seen at Baarle, where every public service and every branch of the administration is duplicated right down to the telephone cables and water mains.

Almost always neighbor countries allow access to officials and make reasonable arrangements for the conveyance of the mails, etc., across their territory, sometimes, as in Ireland, informally, in other cases by formal agreement. The exception is Steinstücken. The East Zone authorities allow passports for access to this hamlet to neither policemen nor civil servants, so that the inhabitants enjoy by accident a degree of freedom from official supervision undreamt of elsewhere in Europe today.

There do arise, however, occasions when an exclave is in a position to choose between rival *régimes* in the home country; and if it rejects that prevailing in the part nearest itself, there is no way it can be brought into line without the consent of the neighbor country, and in troubled times this is liable to be withheld. Thus after the Armistice of 1943 Mussolini set up his puppet "Social Republic" in Upper Italy. Campione simply declared its continuing allegiance to the Kingdom of Italy, and maintained contact with the Royal government in the South through its legation at Berne. In fact the Commune of Campione found itself left to run its own public services (which it largely still does), and was reabsorbed into the Swiss economy. So thorough were both processes that the commune was

forced to issue its own postage stamps valued in francs, Italian stamps being unobtainable and Italian currency of no importance in the economy of Campione. There was a precedent for this situation from Baarle-Hertog, which remained unoccupied by the Germans in the First World War, and was administered by the Belgian government-in-exile through its embassy at The Hague. Büsingen, however, did not escape the occupation of Germany in 1945, because there was this time no alternative home government to which to turn.

There seems no reason why an exclave should not become the seat of an *émigré* government approved of by the neighbor country. There was talk of such a development at Llivia at the end of the Spanish Civil War; but neither there nor elsewhere has an exclave in fact ever played such a part.

ECONOMY

It is normal for an exclave to be tied to the home country not only politically but economically as well. This calls, of course, for efficient communication between the two, and this may be achieved by a neutral road, as at Llivia; by concessionary through traffic, as at Hinterriss, Balderschwang, and Jerusalem; by a set-back of the customs line, as at Drumully; by lapse, as on the Raeren-Weywertz railway; or even by the use of a lower grade of transport—for instance, some jeep traffic uses the direct but dangerous all-Austrian track from Scharnitz into Hinterriss (P 4 on Fig. 3a), and the Onsernone valley (Bagni di Craveggia, P 8 on Fig. 3b) is usually approached from Italy on foot over the passes. Approach "over the passes" was also normal in earlier times in the Klein Walsertal, at Balderschwang, and at Hinterriss, and helps to explain their present status as pene-exclaves, which derives from *later* improvement of communications valleywards towards neighbor countries.

But some exclaves have followed the opposite line of development, and have become economically assimilated to their neighbors, Jungholz and Klein Walsertal to Germany, Campione and Büsingen to Switzerland. This means in each case that the exclave falls behind the customs fence of the neighbor country and outside that of its home country, and that the neighbor's currency alone is used in the exclave and its general economic orientation is towards the neighbor; though the

positive economic measures of the neighbor (crop bounties, trade schools, etc.) will not of course be extended to the exclave. The direct taxes usually continue to be paid to the home country, but the indirect go to the neighbor. At the post office one sees Austrian stamps sold for German marks and Italian or German stamps sold for Swiss francs.

The two Austro-German pene-exclaves are each the subject of a definite nineteenth-century convention, handing over the customs and currency to German control. The Swiss have never treated Campione as foreign territory in an economic sense.¹⁰ The only attempt at economic assimilation to Italy was made by the Fascists, and it failed badly. Büsingen lived for centuries in a kind of insecure international limbo. It lies so close to Schaffhausen that German policy has never succeeded in re-orienting its economy, and it prospered only with the help of variable and uncertain Swiss customs concessions until 1947, when at last the French Occupation Authority agreed to its admittance behind the Swiss customs fence and the exclusive use of Swiss currency.

Baarle and Berlin fall together into an intermediate class. This is because Baarle-Nassau (Holland) and Baarle-Hertog (Belgium) still form one village; and East and West Berlin, for all their rivalry and contrast, still form one city. Though Baarle-Hertog and Baarle-Nassau are provisioned from Belgium and Holland, respectively, the inhabitants buy retail from either source without distinction and both Belgian and Dutch currencies circulate freely. In Berlin the ties between East and West were very close at the beginning of the occupation. They have loosened progressively since; but there remains normally uncontrolled movement of persons between the two parts of the city (but not beyond) as well as several shared urban services. Though the two currencies are confined to their own parts of the city, many Easterners shop widely in West Berlin and over 45,000 workers commute between the two halves of the city daily.

¹⁰ The Vallée Etroite has also never belonged economically to its present home country, France. The land remains the property of the inhabitants of Mélezet, the Italian village to which the valley belonged politically before 1946, and it is exploited by the proprietors without hindrance from the French authorities.

CONDITIONS OF LIFE IN EXCLAVES AND A
COMPARISON WITH TINY COUNTRIES
AND NEUTRAL TERRITORIES

The unusual conditions of life that may be encountered in an exclave might be expected to be shared by other small territories with special status. Those which it is proposed to consider especially are the very small independent countries in Europe¹¹—Monaco, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Vatican City State—together with the condominium of Andorra and the independent appanages of the British crown—the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands—and neutral territories—the Moresnet and Kuwait zones in particular.¹² Very small dependent territories and colonies are not included, though comparisons might be made in some particulars with such places as Basutoland, the Canal Zone, or Macau.

The special conditions of life in exclaves may arise from three circumstances: (1) a special relation with the home country, (2) a special relation with the neighbor country, or (3) a special *régime* within the exclave itself. It is the second and third circumstances which may also affect tiny countries; in neutral territories the first and second are of course indistinguishable.

So long as life in an exclave is oriented towards the home country, it is liable to suffer from the length and fragility of the link with the "mainland." Transport between exclave and home country is not only liable to interruption in most cases at the whim of the neighbor country, but also has to be effected by prescribed routes, along which there is no chance of picking up or unloading part-freights. This can of itself raise the cost of living in the exclave by increasing the price of provisions there, and this happens at both Hinterriss and Balderschwang. But the effects can be even more serious where the exclave relies on selling its products in highly competitive markets. It is the remoteness and difficult access of home-country market towns that have driven Büsingen into the arms of Schaffhausen. The situation of West Berlin is more acute still. Prewar Berlin specialized, among other things, in those metropolitan

¹¹ G. Playfair and C. Fitzgibbon, *The Little Tour* (London, 1954).

¹² A. Melamid, "The Economic Geography of Neutral Territories," *Geographical Review*, Vol. XLV (1955), p. 359.

industries that thrive on a rapid, efficient, and flexible net of communications and transport such as normally centers on a capital city. The whole economy of West Berlin now suffers from its isolation at the end of a precarious and unremunerative haul of 80 miles through unfriendly territory, while its competitors lie embedded in the West-German and West-European markets and in constant easy touch with their clients.

It is obvious that every exclave is vulnerable to pressure or even attack from the neighbor country. The fate of Nagar Haveli and Dadra has been mentioned, as well as the attempts on West Berlin and Steinstücken and the pressure exerted against Campione in the matter of the casino. The Italian authorities learned their lesson from the Campione episode; and when an attempt was made by the government of San Marino (SM on Fig. 1) to set up a casino in the republic (which is entirely surrounded by Italian territory), they organized a blockade in their turn, and forced the abandonment of the venture. However, when the French attempted to impose their will on Andorra (A on Fig. 1) by rather similar methods, they were only partly successful. Andorra is not, like San Marino, a simple enclave. Not only does it lie geographically between two countries, it is also subject to a joint sovereignty; so that it always has in an appeal to the other co-sovereign a political back-door for escape from interference from either side.

But the changing policy of a neighbor country may affect life in an exclave even when it is not aimed at coercion. There are innumerable examples of this kind of thing from Berlin, where the changing policy of the Russians or their puppets in East Berlin with regard to freedom of movement across the sector-boundary, shopping facilities, and currency regulations constantly impinge on life in West Berlin as well. Land use in Büsingen has long depended on the customs policy of Switzerland.¹³ In 1895 heavy duties were imposed on the movement of grain, and the arable acreage in Büsingen consequently declined, though much arable land was also turned over to potatoes. In 1914 potatoes became dutiable as well, and the Büsingers were forced to develop their grassland and rely on a stock-

raising economy. Since the village passed behind the Swiss customs fence in 1947, the high prices paid for grain in Switzerland have led to a great extension of the arable land.

Some exclaves are dependent on their neighbors not merely for the sale of their produce, but even for the employment of their population. Neither Campione nor Büsingen is able to support all its inhabitants from the resources of its own territory. Many must go to work in Switzerland. But there they find themselves at a disadvantage; as foreigners they are the first to be thrown out of work when times are bad, and they are unable to profit from the Swiss trade-schooling without which they cannot hope to rise to the better-paid posts in the Swiss economy. West Berlin used to be in much the same position. In 1952 between 40 and 50 thousand West Berliners worked in East Berlin, while 24 thousand Easterners worked in the West. The tables have since been turned—the 1956 estimates were 15 and 33 thousand, respectively.

The curious and expensive duplication of services in Baarle-Hertog and Baarle-Nassau has its parallels—equally curious and equally expensive—in tiny countries and of course in neutral territories. The shared suzerainty over Andorra has led to duplication in both politics and administration, parallel representation, parallel schools, and parallel public services. In the Kuwait Neutral Zone the oil companies have been compelled to duplicate port facilities in order to maintain the balance between the sovereigns.

But while both exclaves and tiny states may be victims of encirclement by their neighbors, they are also in a position to be thorns in their neighbors' sides and can profit from a situation which places them inside a neighbor's territory but outside his jurisdiction. At first sight one would suppose that every exclave was a smugglers' paradise. In fact few are. Some clandestine shifting of goods goes on in backyards at Baarle it seems; but apparently not much, because it is quite legal for the inhabitants at least to buy from Dutch or Belgian sources as they please. Apart from this there seems to be little evidence that enclaves encourage much smuggling. Several are eliminated from consideration, of course, by being merged with their neighbor countries for customs purposes. In other cases the revenue men find an exclave perhaps easier to manage

¹³ M. Bolli, "Die Enklave Büsingen," *Geographica Helvetica*, Vol. IX (1954), p. 225.

than other places; they can so easily check what goes in from the home country that leakage beyond that point is not difficult to detect. The exceptions are at Llvia and West Berlin, the two exclaves with an uncontrolled line of access to their home country. East Germans and East Berliners may shop freely in West Berlin, but they still have to pass the customs control between Eastern and Western territory. So heavy is the inter-sector movement, however, that evasion is general, and Western money-changing bureaus can be seen hard at work all day providing Western marks for shoppers from the East. At Llvia the Spanish customs keep no representative in the exclave, and the French control the frontier only spasmodically. The result is that the little town has become a regular shopping center for the surrounding French villagers, who come in on foot after every kind of commodity that sells cheaper in Spain than in France. Even the shop names in Llvia are bilingual, as if the shopkeepers expected as many customers from over the border as from their own country. The tiny countries that are not in a customs union with their neighbors are really better placed for smuggling than are exclaves, especially where they lie between two countries or on the high seas. Andorra is notorious in this respect, and the Channel Islands (C I on Fig. 1) had once a similar reputation. But in fact any small territory under separate sovereignty can serve the smuggler's turn— independence is not essential. Small colonies, like Goa or Gibraltar or St. Pierre, can be very convenient, and a "free zone" like old Tangiers is another obvious choice.

Gambling is another weakness of the neighbor state that can be exploited by the exclave or tiny state. Since the spectacular success of Monte Carlo, practically all the tiny states have dreamed of setting up as gambling hells. They have failed usually because their independence was incomplete. Andorra is actually subject to the co-sovereignty of the Bishop of Urgel and the French Republic, and their veto has been effective in this respect. Any of the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man would probably find the disapproval of Her Majesty's Privy Council equally effective. Even sovereign status can in some circumstances be insufficient to prevent interference, as was demonstrated by the Italian blockade of San Marino. The case of Campione shows that

force can be effective against an exclave too; but more important usually is the attitude of home countries, most of which limit gambling on their territories, which of course include the exclave as well. The gambling laws of Belgium are, however, rather less rigid than those of Holland, so that groups of "sporting" Dutchmen can club together to hire a coach which takes them without frontier formalities to Baarle for a little flutter on Belgian territory, incidentally providing the commune of Baarle-Hertog with a useful regular income from licences.

More serious can be the political role of the exclave; and here Berlin is pre-eminent. West Berlin serves quite consciously as the shop window of the West in Eastern Germany, a constant reminder of another way of life, of an alternative. More specifically it is no doubt an important nest of espionage, and is certainly a center for propaganda, and particularly radio propaganda, which can be broadcast from such a position regardless of disapproval and discouragement from the neighbor country. No other exclave is far enough from its "mainland" to make such development worth-while; but it is quite a specialty of tiny states (Radio Andorra, Radio-Télévision Monte Carlo—even perhaps Radio Luxembourg and Vatican Radio), though usually on a commercial rather than a political plane.

West Berlin is a refugee center too. The exclave attracts the dissatisfied East German like a magnet. In times of crisis as many as 4,000 a day have sought refuge there; but perhaps more significant is the fact that the drain is continuous. Of course, were West Berlin a tiny state acting on its own, it would have burst with the strain long ago. But precisely because it is an exclave, it is able to function as a funnel for the refugees, continually passing them on to its "mainland" farther west. Andorra received large numbers of refugees from both sides during the Spanish Civil War, but the same was true of many quite normal French towns along the Pyrenean frontier. San Marino, on the other hand, has as a matter of policy extended its hospitality to the refugee for centuries; and its isolation has enabled it to do so in circumstances where no other country could help. The most recent occasion was the Second World War; but the most memorable was in 1849, when Garibaldi was

given sanctuary in the face of the combined armies of France, Austria, Spain, and Naples.

It is obviously in the relative autonomy of their internal arrangements that the tiny states differ most from exclaves; and in this respect there are several peculiarities of tiny states that are not normally shared by exclaves. A steady stream of postage stamps provides an important part of the revenue of all tiny states that are in a position to take advantage of it (Monaco, San Marino, Liechtenstein, Vatican).¹⁴ Especially low taxation and freedom from compulsory military service may attract residents (Channel Islands, Monaco, Moresnet), or may make a privileged class of those entitled to them (Monaco). Low customs duties may lower the cost of living (Channel Islands, Isle of Man, Andorra, Vatican). Exclaves are normally disqualified from the enjoyment of these advantages because they lack the degree of sovereignty which is in most instances necessary. Campione's brief hour of glory as a "stamp-issuing country" brought little profit and was born of genuine necessity. West Berlin issues its own stamps because it is, as explained above, technically *not* an exclave of Western Germany, but only behaves in most important respects as if it were. It is here the exception which proves the rule.

Most tiny states have recently found a new source of income in the tourist. The tiny states all lie, it is true, in regions that lend themselves to development of this kind—the Riviera, Rome, the Alps, and Pyrenees, the beaches of the Adriatic and the Bay of St. Malo (see Fig. 1) are already tourist areas in their own right. In competition with neighboring resorts the tiny countries can usually offer the visitor something unique. The Casino of Monte Carlo is the oldest and most successful lure. Other countries can offer cheap dutiable goods, which are usually the kind of

luxury articles which appeal to people on holiday (Andorra, Channel Islands, Isle of Man). Recently they have all tended to discover also that their political setup itself, with its quaint trappings of sovereignty and its Ruritanian atmosphere, is sufficient to attract year after year a steadily increasing volume of tourists. No exclave can compete with this. Several of them are in unexciting environments, it is true; there are in any case few visitors to the plains of Brabant or Ulster or the quiet banks of the middle Rhine. But Llivia, which lies in the finest valley in the Pyrenees, if not in Europe, has still only one visitor for every 10,000 who go to Andorra, not thirty miles away. Only Campione and the Klein Walsertal have really succeeded in attracting the tourist. Campione depends principally on the casino-tripper from Lugano; the Klein Walsertal has exploited its position inside the German economy, which it owes to its status as a pene-exclave. Mountain valleys of its caliber have a scarcity value in Germany which they completely lack in Austria.

Of course Ruritania costs money, and this kind of expense most exclaves avoid. Campione, however, is still fiscally practically an independent territory: the taxes go in to the mayor's office and he provides the essential services at village level. On a larger scale West Berlin, being an entity somewhere between a state and an exclave, has to provide its own keep, and in particularly difficult circumstances. Of course it cannot succeed; and here the advantage of the exclave status is revealed. Though the meretricious profits of sovereignty are denied, there is always a home country to fall back on when the situation is desperate and help is needed at all costs—as it always is in Berlin. Apart from this assurance of support in real need, it must be admitted that the exclave shares most of the disabilities of isolation with the tiny state but can reap few of the rewards that can compensate for it, because those rewards depend on the exercise of some degree of sovereignty, which the exclave normally does not have.

¹⁴ The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man are excluded from this benefit because the postal services are in the hands of the British Post Office; Andorra is excluded because the joint suzerains each operate a postal service of their own.