

or unappreciated forty years ago. Moreover, recent work on Chinese foreign policy has appeared to confirm the United States's fears. Both Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-75* (2000; rev. *ante*, xxiii [2001], 219) and Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (2001; rev. *ante*, xxiv [2002], 710) provide much evidence from Chinese and Western sources to prove that, up to the end of 1965, China would have intervened on North Vietnam's behalf had the United States escalated the war in a way that encroached upon China's territory or severely threatened its interests.

Most crucially, Walton does not adequately explain why the United States felt it necessary to intervene in South-East Asia in the first place, claiming that the issue 'is beyond the scope of this work' (p. 13). The question is instead answered, briefly and insufficiently, with reference to the cold war mentality of US officials and the fact that the United States's 'credibility as a protecting power was a serious matter' (p. 14). The relevance of whether the Vietnam War could have been won militarily is, however, entirely dependent upon whether the conflict was justifiable. In the abstract, the question of whether a strategically shrewd United States could have defeated the quasi-industrial, poverty-stricken Communist states of East and South-East Asia is easily answered: absolutely. But was it worth it? Even before 1965, much of the world community was against the war, and in a conflict that was as much about ideas as it was about weapons, as the cold war surely was, waging a vastly enlarged and intensified war would have likely triggered a different sort of anti-American domino effect. Kennedy and Johnson understood this well, and it is why they escalated the conflict as gradually as they did. Their mistake, then, was not one of unwarranted caution but of original sin: waging war in the first place.

Nonetheless, despite these shortcomings, Walton has provided diplomatic and military historians with a provocative and creative view of the Vietnam War. His chapter-length examination of US strategy on the ground in South Vietnam is especially good. At the least, the book should spur debate on the causes of the United States's military failure in South-East Asia.

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PETER GOLD. *Europe or Africa? A Contemporary Study of the Spanish North African Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000; dist. Portland: ISBS. Pp. xv, 192. \$44.95 (us).

THIS WORK DEALS with the relations between Morocco and Spain, and the international aspects of the debate over the cities of Melilla and Ceuta, Spanish enclaves on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco, overlooking the Straits of Gibraltar. Peter Gold, the author of *A Stone in Spain's Shoe: The Search for a Solution to the Problem of Gibraltar* (1994; rev. *ante*, xviii [1996], 733), has a deep understanding of this area of prime strategic interest in the western Mediterranean.

The book opens with a discussion of the impact of the 'enclaves' on Spanish-Moroccan relations in the twentieth century, and then turns to internal politics, structured around four aspects of recent history: the debate surrounding autonomy, the evolution of the political scene, immigration law and its impact on relations between the enclaves and their hinterland, and the question of migration flows in the region.

The first chapter is a detailed chronicle of Spanish-Moroccan relations between 1975 and 2000. The political ambivalence towards Morocco shown by Spain since 1956 is reflected in the political and economic disparities between the countries: 'the relationship even without the dispute over Ceuta and Melilla was destined to be an uneasy one. Spain is an important economic partner for Morocco, although given their different stages of economic development and different economic profiles it is hardly a partnership of equals' (p. 30). For Gold, this economic gap explains why other arguments – territorial and Moroccan immigrants in Spain – are discussed during economic negotiations, thereby complicating relations. Gilles Delmote, in *Ponts et frontières entre Espagne et le Maghreb* (2001), stresses that Spain's entry into the European Economic Community created the need for a global policy towards the Maghreb, expanding the scope of relations between Spain and Morocco.

The chapters dealing with the history of the call for autonomy and the evolution of politics in the enclaves are of great interest. But the reliance on articles published in the Spanish newspaper *El País* and in international press agencies, not in the local press, leads to a lack of detail on local political parties, for example, the Citizens of Ceuta Movement's Manifesto to the President of the Spanish Government in August 1994 (see Ana I. Planet, *Melilla y Ceuta, espacios-frontera hispano-marroquíes*, 1998). To compensate, Gold compares these movements for autonomy to those in other regions of Spain.

Gold analyses the role of parties in the parliament, and the general lack of interest in politics, which translates into rates of political participation far lower than in other areas, and the emergence onto the political scene of the Independent Liberal Group in the municipal-autonomous community elections of 1999. He compares the political scenes in the cities, highlighting differences in internal political dynamics (pp. 87-8).

The problems in Melilla and Ceuta and in Spanish-Moroccan relations deriving from the alien's law of 1985, which forbid most Muslims from living in the two cities, represent the first stage of complex developments arising from emigration to and through the enclaves.

The last two chapters, which attempt to respond to the question posed in the book's title, provide little material for reflection. Evidently, the fact that the cities are Spanish and, as such, European, makes the question rhetorical. The comparison with Gibraltar is limited to a short discussion of the similarities and differences, closing with a comment which could give rise to a lengthy debate:

However, one major difference between Gibraltar and the enclaves is that demographic changes are minimal in the former but potentially significant in the latter. Although the origins of Gibraltarians may be diverse, the modern population is quite stable. That population has set its mind collectively and firmly against becoming part of Spain, and there is no apparent reason why that should alter. By contrast, not only has there been an influx of Moroccans who settled in the enclaves during the last century, but the birth-rate of those Muslim Spaniards now living there is much higher than that of the *cristiano* population. There may therefore come a day when the Muslim population is in the majority, and while there is no incentive for them to want to become part of Morocco as long as there remains a significant differential in the standard of living between Morocco and the enclaves, if and when the differential is sufficiently narrowed that situation could change (p. 165).

That the cities are subject to radical demographic changes, and that this provides grounds for new arguments in an analysis of their future, is true. However, a broader discussion of the political identity of the population and of future relations between Spain and Morocco would be required in order not to give demographics an overriding role.

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THOMAS G. MOORE. *China in the World Market: Chinese Industry and International Sources of Reform in the Post-Mao Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xviii, 344. \$65.00 (us), cloth; \$24.00 (us), paper.

THIS EXCELLENT BOOK deserves to be both read and pondered. It deserves to be read for the unexpected findings about the Chinese textile and shipbuilding industries in the post-Mao era. It deserves to be pondered for the implications of those findings, some of which Thomas G. Moore explicitly draws, others he suggests, and others again may be extrapolated by readers according to their fields. This review will look briefly at the narrower findings and their wider implications.

The changes in the textile and shipbuilding industries in post-Mao China are analysed in the categories of reform, restructuring, and rationalization, terms which are carefully defined and are by no means synonymous. Reform denotes primarily deregulation by the state. Restructuring, the centre of focus, refers to up-marketization (for example, from bulk carriers and basic tankers to sophisticated container ships, specialized tankers, and on-off car ferries) and diversification of both products and markets. Rationalization denotes internal changes: mergers and demergers, reallocation of resources, and increases in labour or capital productivity. In these three senses, textiles and shipbuilding were outstanding among Chinese industries for their degree of change, despite their contrasts in structure – the first light and old, initially large, and labour intensive, the second heavy and new, initially small, and capital intensive – and though neither was given high priority by Beijing. Moore finds the explanation in the international economic context, notably the Multifibre Arrangement operative in textiles and the global