

In conditions where the mainland state has numerous reasons to be worried about the enclave either in terms of sovereignty threats or in terms of unsatisfactory economic development, there are reasons to employ specific measures to ensure the mainland's control. Direct governance might be seen by the mainland's government as a necessary measure to resist separatist inclinations but also to ensure the proper management of governmental aids and transfers. On the other hand, the central government may consider it beneficial to provide the enclave with as much self-autonomy as possible. Hence, there are three strategies, which they may opt for:

1. Less autonomy for the enclave than for the comparable regions on the mainland. Direct governance.
2. The same level of autonomy. Treating the enclave as an ordinary territory.
3. Providing the enclave with more autonomy. Self-governance.

DIRECT GOVERNANCE IN THE UK SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS IN CYPRUS

I am asked now and then, why the British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in Cyprus are included on the enclaves and exclaves' list while the U.S. Guantánamo Bay military base, similar in function, is not. The answer is straightforward, since sovereignty forms the decisive criterion. The British SBAs are under British sovereignty, while Guantánamo Bay is legally under Cuban sovereignty. The British Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia comprise those parts of Cyprus that stayed under British jurisdiction and remained British sovereign territory when the independent Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960. They cover 98 square miles (250.9 km²) in total, including 47.5 (121.6 km²) around Akrotiri, the Western Sovereign Base Area, and 50.5 (129.3 km²) around Dhekelia, the Eastern Sovereign Base Area. The Akrotiri Base is surrounded on land by Cyprus, whereas the Eastern Base (Dhekelia) borders on both Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot-administered area, so it is a mere exclave.

The total Cypriot population of the SBAs totals some 7,000. In addition, approximately 7,800 military and UK-based civilian personnel and their dependents live on the Sovereign Base Areas. Thus, the UK citizens form just a slight majority of the SBA's residents. Neither parliamentary nor assembly elections are held in the SBAs. Residents vote either in the Republic of Cyprus, or in the UK.

The SBAs' legal status and legal system are specific. The Sovereign Bases in Cyprus are an overseas territory, but instead of having a governor, like other such territories, they have an administrator responsible to the Ministry of Defence. The administration is in effect the civil government of the SBAs. Its

range of interest is that of any civil government, but many of its functions, particularly in respect of the Cypriot inhabitants of the SBAs, are carried out by the officials of the Republic of Cyprus on behalf of the administration under delegated powers. The administration itself carries out those minimum functions directly related to the exercise of sovereignty—the enactment of legislation, maintenance of law and order, and the control of immigration and development. The administrator, who is also the commander of British forces Cyprus, has all the executive and legislative authority of the governor of a dependent territory. The administration of the bases is driven by three main policy objectives: effective use as a military base; full cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus; and protection of those resident or working in the bases.

The SBA legal system and SBA law are separate from those of the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom. The administration has its own court system to deal with civil and criminal matters. Civilian laws are enacted by the British civilian authorities, but are patterned on those of the Republic of Cyprus.² When the Republic of Cyprus gained independence, it was agreed that the laws applicable to the Cypriot population in the SBAs would be as far as possible the same as the laws of the republic.

The SBAs maintain a rather liberal entry policy. There is certain disorientation when entering the military parts of a sovereign base area. Unlike Guantánamo Bay, there are roads running through the territory and even through the military camps themselves, which are open to traffic from Cyprus. In particular, the road names in the military camps are all very English, for example "Worcester Road."

In most cases, enclaves are treated just as any other region on the mainland, although some enclaves, such as Gibraltar, most of them former colonies, were granted a very wide autonomy by the mainland state. Others have received a relatively wide autonomy, however restricted, due to various considerations. Ceuta and Melilla have insisted for a long time on a certain level of autonomy. After decades of procrastination, the respective bill was finally passed on February 15, 1995. The bill provided *ceutís* and *melillenses* with the status of autonomous towns but not autonomous communities. It meant an effective enlargement of rights but still no legislative power comparable to provinces on the mainland. Gold (2000, 49) notices that the statutes may not have satisfied all the aspirations of the inhabitants but nor were they likely to cause any permanent upset in Morocco, and it was clear that *realpolitik* required Moroccan concerns to carry greater weight in Madrid than those of the enclaves (see chapter 4 for more details). Finally, in most cases mainlands prefer to treat enclaves as ordinary territories, neither restricting their rights nor enlarging them in comparison to regions on the mainland. This is not to say that there is no special treatment: while spe-