

secessionism. Gibraltarians, while having evolved into a unique nation, do not strive to be independent. On the contrary, they employ all means available to side with Great Britain. Three other current cases where the population coincides with neither the mainland nor the surrounding state are Shakhimardan, Sokh, and Kalacha. All of them appeared in 1991 in the Fergana Valley. They are surrounded by Kyrgyzstan while belonging to Uzbekistan. Their peculiarity is that their population is composed of Tajiks, nationals of a third state lying nearby.

### WHY WAS VERENAHOF EXCHANGED AND BUESINGEN WAS NOT?

Apart from Buesingen (7.63 km<sup>2</sup>, 1,500 inhabitants), there was another German enclave in Switzerland lying nearby, Verenahof. Unlike Buesingen, Verenahof was disenclaved in 1967 in a process of land exchange. Why was Verenahof exchanged while Buesingen remained German?

By 1967, Verenahof, a tiny enclave of 43 hectares, had only three households engaged in farming and a long history of attempted disenclavements. Having emerged in the Middle Ages, the enclave was offered for sale by the Counts of Tengen to Schaffhausen in 1522 for 8,300 guilders. Schaffhausen did not take up the offer. In contrast, Switzerland tried to obtain the village in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, to no avail. Another attempt, also unsuccessful, was undertaken in 1839. Finally, Verenahof was transferred to Switzerland in 1967. The enclave's inhabitants, all of them of Swiss nationality, greeted the decision with enthusiasm.

Buesingen has an even richer history of attempts to change its status. Schaffhausen had undertaken several attempts to buy the enclave, all unsuccessful. Then, after World War I, when Buesingen was covered by the Swiss rationing system, the enclave community explicitly expressed its wish to join the surrounding state. As a result of a local referendum in 1918, 96 percent of *Büsingers* were in favor of integration with Switzerland. The negotiations began but no suitable object for an exchange of land was found. Six years later, in 1924, Buesingen petitioned the mainland once again. The land authorities (Baden) responded by threatening that members of the local administration supporting such demands would be punished administratively. Another petition followed in 1925. This time the answer was, "the political sovereignty of Buesingen to Baden cannot be touched upon; with this all attempts to pull Buesingen away from Germany are hopeless."<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, the *Büsingers* petitioned again in 1931, this time with no reply at all. Switzerland, for its side, was always extremely cautious on the issue. It was keen not to use the temporary weakness of Germany in order to create



Figure 5.4. *Nei danke!!* Illustration from 1945.

Source: [www.buesingen.de](http://www.buesingen.de). The Briton offers two children, one of them carrying an inscription "Buesingen" on his pants (the second is apparently Verenhof). The Swiss, with a life-asserting grin on his face, responds: "No, thanks!"

ground for future conflicts. Switzerland's long tradition of neutrality made it generally cautious of any land acquisitions whatsoever. Besides, negotiations in the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s between Switzerland and Germany over the necessity of land exchange faltered on the issue of exactly what land to exchange, as no territory acceptable for both sides could be found (Bolli 1954, 253).

Shortly after the end of the World War II, a British MP made a proposal that Buesingen and Verenhof should be given to Switzerland. The Swiss Bundesrat refused the proposal with alacrity. Again, it was a matter of Swiss neutrality and the desire not to exploit the weakness of its greater neighbor, Germany, for fear of possible future conflicts.

The enclave dwellers repeated their attempt to be integrated with Switzerland again in the years after World War II. A committee for the "Re-unification of Buesingen with Switzerland" was set up (Bolli 1954, 273).

The cases of these two German enclaves in Switzerland fully correspond to the conclusion made in chapter 4 on the national composition of the enclave as the primary factor of an enclave's sovereignty. While the dwellers of Verenhof were all Swiss by nationality, the large majority of *Büsing* are German (although there is a large Swiss minority and a very significant number of German-Swiss marriages). The coinciding of national composition causes strong mainland-exclave ties. Despite the hopes of the enclave population and its strong economic dependence on Switzerland, the mainland was reluctant to give away the enclave, as any national state is reluctant to lose a part of its territory, even though there may be the prospect of an adequate land exchange. Further, finding suitable land for an exchange proved very complicated. It seems to have been a serious obstacle for the negotiations after World War I, when an exchange was the most viable. Buesingen is relatively large: it was not possible to find land parcels of equivalent value to be exchanged. Even more important was the size of the population. While it is possible to exchange Verenhof with its three families or Pogiry with only one household, the exchange of an enclave with more than a thousand inhabitants is intrinsically more complicated. Finally yet importantly, Switzerland consistently showed reluctance to acquire the enclave because of its tradition of neutrality and a desire to keep good relations with a powerful northern neighbor.

### WILL CEUTA BECOME MOROCCAN, GIBRALTAR SPANISH, AND KALININGRAD INDEPENDENT?

The primary importance of national (ethnic) composition is one of the cornerstones of the theory of enclaves. It also has practical implications as it can suggest some possible outcomes for the future of enclaves and exclaves. Concerning the Ceuta and Melilla, Gibraltar, and Kaliningrad cases, it is possible to draw precise conclusions for each of these cases. According to the theory, on the primary importance of the national factor, one can say with confidence that Kaliningrad will remain Russian, with other alternatives not reconcilable with the theory. Ceuta and Melilla will continue to belong to Spain for the foreseeable future, despite their large Moroccan minorities. This situation will not change even if the Moroccan population becomes equal to the Spanish population. As the economic divide between the mainland and the surrounding country is vast, Spain is able to provide the enclaves with an attractive economic policy, subventions, and so forth in order to keep them