

North Atlantic Euroscepticism

**The rejection of EU membership
in the Faroe Islands and Greenland**

CHRISTIAN REBHAN

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The rejection of EU membership in the Faroe Islands and Greenland

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Preface

The North Atlantic has held a special fascination for me ever since my first trip to the Faroe Islands in 2003. In 2003, I began to study politics, history and law, but also Icelandic. In 2004, I travelled to Iceland for the first time, in 2005 for a second time. In 2005, I also participated in the Faroese Summer Institute. From 2006 until 2008, I studied a master in international relations at the University of Iceland, which corresponded exactly with my interest in the politics of the small nations at the Northern edge of Europe.

During my studies, it struck me that only a few researchers had dealt with Euro-scepticism in the Faroe Islands and Greenland. This was particularly surprising for me, since the Faroes and Greenland had been able to remain outside the EU despite being a part of Denmark. Greenland had even become one of the very few nations to withdraw from the EU. Thus, when I contemplated doing a PhD in 2009, I knew very soon that I wanted to write about the rejection of EU membership in the Faroe Islands and in Greenland.

In 2009, I was accepted as a PhD student in a joint-PhD arrangement at the Humboldt University of Berlin and the University of Iceland. This allowed me to spend alternating study periods in Berlin and in Reykjavík. Between 2009 and 2013, I carried out the main part of the research for this book. For my research, I travelled to Tórshavn in August 2011, to Copenhagen in February and March 2012 and to Nuuk in May 2013. In September 2014, I defended the PhD thesis at the University of Iceland.

This book is the outcome of this PhD project. It gives an overview of the EU membership debate in the Faroe Islands and Greenland from 1959 until 2015. I hope that it sheds some light on the question of why the Faroe Islands and Greenland opted to stay outside the EU at a time when nearly all European countries were attracted to the project of European integration and the EU was not yet shaken by a financial and migrant crisis, increasing right-wing populism and opt-out debates.

A lot of people have contributed in one way or another to make this book possible. I owe deep gratitude to Baldur Thorhallsson and Bernd Henningsen for supervising my PhD project. A warm thank you also goes to Maximilian Conrad, Guðmundur Alfreðsson, Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, Gestur Hovgaard, Lea Sgier and Andrew Bennett for their valuable academic input. Moreover, I would like to thank the State of Berlin for financing this PhD project through an Elsa-Neumann-Scholarship.

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Finally, I am grateful to my friends, colleagues and students at the Department for Northern European Studies at Humboldt University, the Department for Political Science at the University of Iceland and at the Research Group for Northern European Studies (FOR:N) for enlightening discussions and their great company. I would like to thank in particular Michael Penk, Doreen Reinhold, Matthias Weingard, Tobias Etzold, Jan Hecker-Stampehl and Lill-Ann Körber.

This book is dedicated to my father, Rainer Rebhan, who I could always count on.

Christian Rebhan

List of acronyms

A	<i>Atassut</i> («Togetherness») [Greenlandic party]
AP	<i>Akulliit Partiiat</i> («Centre Party») [Greenlandic party]
APK	<i>Avataasiutinik Piginneqatigiiffiit Kattuffiat</i> («Greenland's Distant-Water Fisheries Association»)
A/G	<i>Atuagagdliutit / Grønlandsposten</i> [Greenlandic newspaper]
CFP	Common Fisheries Policy
CCT	Common Customs Tariff
D	<i>Demokraatit</i> («Democrats») [Greenlandic party]
DGAP	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik</i> («German Council on Foreign Relations»)
DNAG	<i>Den Nordatlantiske Gruppe i Folketinget</i> («North Atlantic Group in the Folketing»)
EAGGF	European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
EAS	<i>EF-imut Atáinarnigssamik Sulekatigígfik</i> («Place where one is for EC membership») [Greenlandic pro-EC movement]
EC	European Communities
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ECU	European Currency Unit
EDF	European Development Fund
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EIB	European Investment Bank
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union
ERDF	European Regional and Development Fund
ESF	European Social Fund
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
F	<i>Framsókn</i> («Progressive Party») [Faroese party]
FB	<i>Føroya Framburðsflokkur</i> («Faroese Progressive Party») [Faroese party]
FF	<i>Fólkaflokkurin</i> (People's Party) [Faroese party]
FP7	Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development of the European Union
FT	<i>Folketingstidende</i> [Parliamentary proceedings of the <i>Folketing</i>]
FTA	Free Trade Agreement

GLRF	<i>Grønlands Landsråds Forhandlinger</i> [Parliamentary proceedings of the <i>Landsråd</i>]
GLTF	<i>Grønlands Landstings Forhandlinger</i> [Parliamentary proceedings of the <i>Landsting</i>]
IA	<i>Inuit Ataqaigiit</i> («Human Brotherhood») [Greenlandic party]
IP	<i>Issittup Partiiat</i> («Polar Party») [Greenlandic party]
IWC	International Whaling Commission
JF	<i>Javnaðarflokkurin</i> («Social Democratic Party») [Faroese party]
KGH	<i>Den Kongelige Grønlandske Handel</i> («Royal Greenland Trading Department»)
KNAPK	<i>Kalaalit Nunaanni Aalisartut Piniartullu Kattufiat</i> («Greenland's Fishermen and Hunters' Association»)
KP	<i>Kattusseqatigiit Partiiat</i> («Association of Candidates») [Greenlandic party]
KrF	<i>Kristligi Fólkaflokkurin, Føroya Framburðs- og Fiskivinnuflokkur</i> («Christian People's Party, Faroese Progressive and Fisheries Party») [Faroese party]
LI	Liberal intergovernmentalism
LT	<i>Løgtingstíðindi</i> [Parliamentary proceedings of the <i>Løgting</i>]
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MF	<i>Miðflokkurin</i> («Centre Party») [Faroese party]
MP	Member of Parliament
NAPP	<i>Nuummi Aalisartut Piniartullu Peqatigiit</i> («Nuuk Hunters' and Fishermen's Association»)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORA	Nordic Atlantic Cooperation
NPP	Northern Periphery Programme of the European Union
OCT	Overseas Country and Territory of the European Union
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PI	<i>Partii Inuit</i> («Inuit Party») [Greenlandic party]
PN	<i>Partii Naleraq</i> («Point of Orientation Party») [Greenlandic party]
QDA	Qualitative Document Analysis
S	<i>Siumut</i> («Forward») [Greenlandic party]
SB	<i>Sambandsflokkurin</i> («Unionist Party») [Faroese party]
SF	<i>Sjálvstýrisflokkurin</i> («Self-Government Party»), since 2015 <i>Nýtt Sjálvstýri</i> («New Self-Government») [Faroese party]
SIK	<i>Sulinermik Inuussutissarsíuteqartut Kattuffiat</i> («Greenland's Employees' Organisation»)
SP	<i>Sulissartut Partiat</i> («Labour Party») [Greenlandic party]
TAC	Total Allowable Catch
TF	<i>Tjóðveldisflokkurin</i> («Republican Party»), since 2007 <i>Tjóðveldi</i> («Republic») [Faroese party]
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

UNCLOS United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
US United States
VF *Verkamannafylkingin* («Workers' Movement») [Faroese party]
WTO World Trade Organization

Extending research on North Atlantic Euroscepticism: From Iceland to the Faroe Islands and Greenland

In May 2009, Iceland's government, consisting of the social democratic Alliance (*Samfylkingin*) and the Left-Green Movement (*Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð*), became the first Icelandic government to ever propose that Iceland should apply for membership in the European Union (EU). This move followed a severe financial crisis, which challenged Iceland's traditional Euroscepticism. It ousted Iceland's main governing party, the conservative Independence Party (*Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn*) from power. In a historic vote in July 2009, the *Alþingi* (the Icelandic national parliament) voted in favour of accession negotiations on EU membership. But the left-wing government was unable to conclude the negotiations and was ousted from office four years later.

In the elections to the *Alþingi* in April 2013, the old elites returned to power. In March 2015, Iceland's new Foreign Minister of the centre-agrarian Progressive Party (*Framsóknarflokkurinn*) handed the EU an official letter stating that Iceland would no longer be a candidate country. It looked, as if things had returned to their normal state again. Although there was a chance that a new government would take up accession negotiations again at some point in the future, it was not very likely that Iceland would join the EU any time soon. All was quiet again on the North Atlantic front. Iceland's Euroscepticism had proven strong enough to survive even a fundamental financial and societal crisis.

1.1. Three North Atlantic outsiders

It tends to be forgotten that Iceland is not the only North Atlantic nation¹ to remain outside the EU. The Faroe Islands and Greenland also remain outside the EU, although they are a part of Denmark, an EU member state. In 1948, the Home Rule Act made the Faroes a »self-governing community« within the Danish Realm

¹ Treating an independent, sovereign state and two autonomous regions that are not independent and fully sovereign as an entity brings with it the linguistic difficulty to find a term that refers to all. For the purpose of this book, the term »North Atlantic nations« will be used when speaking of Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands as one entity. Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland are all recognised as nations with their own culture, language and traditions. However, Iceland is the only »nation-state«.

(*rigsfællesskabet*).² From now on, the Faroese people, through their elected representatives in the *Løgting* (the Faroese parliament) and the *landsstýri* (the new Faroese government, presided over by a prime minister, called *løgmaður*), took control over a number of policy matters. According to the Home Rule Act, foreign policy remained a prerogative of the Realm. Nevertheless, the Danish government was ready to let the Faroese Home Rule authorities decide exclusively Faroese foreign policy matters themselves if they were restricted to economic matters such as trade and fisheries with geographically close neighbours and did not challenge the functioning of the state.³ For the Danish government, Faroese participation in Denmark's applications for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC)⁴ in 1961 and the European Communities (EC) in 1967 met these criteria.⁵ Therefore, the Faroese Home Rule institutions took the decision on Faroese EC membership themselves. In 1974, they decided to remain outside the EC and did not reconsider this decision any time later.

Devolution of Denmark's decision-making prerogatives on EC membership to the Faroese Home Rule institutions also set precedence for Greenland. Greenland did not have Home Rule when Denmark discussed membership in the EC for the first time. Thus, it was up to the Danish authorities to decide whether Greenland should be part of Denmark's EC membership. Greenland's regional parliament, the *Landsråd*, only had advisory powers. The Danish authorities eventually decided that Greenland should join the EC. This happened in 1973 against the will of the *Landsråd* and the Greenlandic people. However, the Danish government promised that Greenland would be granted the same decision-making rights on EU membership as the Faroe Islands, once it achieved an equal constitutional status. This happened with the establishment of Home Rule in 1979.⁶ As with the Faro-

2 See for this paragraph: DANISH PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (1948): »Lov om Færøernes Hjemmestyre«, Lov nr 137 af 23/03/1948 (<https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/r0710.aspx?id=45897>, 3 February 2014).

3 Lise LYCK (1996): »The Faroese Home Rule Act as a Framework for the Faroese Economy«, in: Lise Lyck (ed.): *Constitutional and Economic Space of the Small Nordic Jurisdictions*. Stockholm: NordREFO [Nordic Institute of Regional Policy Research], pp. 137-147, here: p. 140. Cf. Lise LYCK (1996): »Home Rule in Greenland in Theory and Practice«, in: Lise Lyck (ed.): *Constitutional and Economic Space of the Small Nordic Jurisdictions*. Stockholm: NordREFO [Nordic Institute of Regional Policy Research], pp. 148-161, here: pp. 154-155.

4 Denmark applied for and later became a member of three European institutions, the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The three institutions were referred to as the European Communities (EC) after the Brussels Treaty of 1965, when their political institutions merged. After the establishment of the European Union (EU) with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the EEC, ECSC and EURATOM kept their independent legal status, but were increasingly incorporated in the term »EU«. The ECSC phased out in 2002. The remaining European Communities except for EURATOM merged into the EU after the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. In this book, the term »EEC membership« is used in the 1960s (chapters 3-4), the term »EC membership« in the 1970s and 1980s (chapters 5-7) and the term »EU membership« in the 1990s and 2000s (chapters 8-9). The term »EU membership« is used when referring to the European institutions in general.

5 Until the Treaty of Maastricht, EEC membership was largely restricted to economic and trade matters. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Danish government was not aware that integration would eventually spill over to other policy fields such as foreign policy, defence, or monetary policy.

6 DANISH PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (1978): »Lov om Grønlands hjemmestyre«, Lov nr 577 af

ese people, the Greenlandic people now obtained control over a number of policy matters through its elected representatives in the *Landsting* (the new Greenlandic parliament) and *Grønlands Landsstyre* (the new Greenlandic government, presided over by a prime minister, called *landsstyreformand*). Thus, Greenland was able to place its inclusion in Denmark's EC membership up for review and withdrew from the EC in 1985, becoming and remaining the first ever and only region in Europe to vote explicitly to leave the EC.⁷ It never reconsidered this decision at a later point.

Today, both the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule institutions enjoy far-reaching competences and can take control over all policy matters from the Danish Realm except for constitutional matters, citizenship, highest jurisdiction, foreign policy, security and defence policy and currency and monetary policy.⁸

Euro-scepticism in Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland is remarkable in a number of ways. First, the three North Atlantic nations should have found it hard to remain aloof from the European integration process. As small states, they are more open and vulnerable to developments in the international economy.⁹ They need to import a wide range of goods because they do not offer the necessary economies of scale to a number of the sectors that are absolutely essential for the functioning of a modern economy. Moreover, small domestic markets lead them to seek specialisation and economies of scale in export markets. The more of their trading partners that join the EU, the more trade dependent they become on the EU market.¹⁰ In order for their economic products to remain competitive, their demand for membership should have constantly increased throughout the last decades. In 2014, 57.0 per cent of all Faroese, 59.6 per cent of all Icelandic and 75.3 per cent of all Greenlandic trade (imports and exports) were within the EU.¹¹ However, this trade dependence did not make them reconsider EU membership.

29/11/1978 (hjemmestyreloven) (<https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/r0710.aspx?id=87176>, 3 February 2014).

7 Algeria also withdrew from EEC membership in 1962 after gaining independence from France. Saint-Barthélemy withdrew from EU membership in 2012 after seceding from Guadeloupe, an overseas department of France. However, there was no referendum in both nations on whether or not to remain in the EU. In 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) could follow in Greenland's footsteps, if a majority of its people votes for leaving the EU in a referendum.

8 These exceptions are explicitly mentioned in §1 of the Faroese Takeover Act. See DANISH PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (2005): »Lov om de færøske myndigheders overtagelse af sager og sagsområder«, Lov nr 578 af 24/06/2005 (Overtagelsesloven) (<https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/r0710.aspx?id=20991>, 3 February 2014). With regard to Greenland, these exceptions are only made indirectly, since these matters are excluded from chapter 2 of Greenland's new Self-Government Act on »the Self-Government authorities' assumption of fields of responsibility«. See DANISH PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (2009): »Lov om Grønlands Selvstyre«, Lov nr 473 af 12/06/2009 (Selvstyreloven) (<https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=125052>, 3 February 2014).

9 See for this paragraph: Peter J. KATZENSTEIN (1985): *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 80-87.

10 Frank SCHIMMELFENNIG and Ulrich SEDLMAIR (2005): »The Politics of EU Enlargement: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives«, in: Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedlmair (eds.): *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches*. London and New York: Routledge, p. 13.

11 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2015): »European Union, Trade in Goods with Iceland« (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113389.pdf, 29 December 2015); EUROPEAN COM-

Second, together with Norway and Switzerland, the three North Atlantic nations belong to the very few nations in Europe that have so far voluntarily chosen to remain outside the EU. All these nations could join the EU if they wanted, while other European nations in Central and Eastern Europe have not been able to join, although they would want to. EU membership of the North Atlantic nations would not raise cultural issues or lead to debates in the EU member states about where Europe ends as in the cases of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and in the future maybe even Russia.¹² Their political system would not give any reason for concern as those of Belarus, Moldova and the Ukraine would. Faroese and Greenlandic EU membership would not provide a challenge to the EU's institutional framework as the membership of microstates like Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino or the Vatican would, because Greenland and the Faroe Islands still belong to Denmark. And last but not least, their membership would not require periods of huge economic transition as in the cases of the candidate states on the Balkan Peninsula. On the contrary: EU member states would only too happily welcome the Faroe Islands and Greenland into their community. They are ideal candidates, already part of the culture of the European mainstream, to some extent integrated with the EU's institutional framework, economically viable, stable democracies, and with some of the highest standards of living in the world.

Third, the North Atlantic nations have been the only nations in Europe in which it was not a Eurosceptic public that thwarted EU membership, but political elites that did not consider it necessary to seek membership in the first place – in Iceland at least until 2009. Thus, the North Atlantic cases challenge the portrayal of European integration as predominantly an »elite process«.¹³ Baldur Thorhallsson found that Euroscepticism was even greater within Iceland's political elite than among the general public.¹⁴ Political opposition to EU membership in all three nations crossed political divides so that there were only six parties in 2015, the Alliance, the Pirates (*Píratar*) and the social liberal party Bright Future (*Björt Framtíð*) in Iceland, the Unionist Party (*Sambandsflokkurin*) in the Faroes and Atassut and the Democrats (*Demokraatit*) in Greenland that were in principal open to investigating EU membership as a potential policy option. Opposition to EU membership is nearly unanimous in all three North Atlantic nations, while in most other European

MISSION (2015): »European Union, Trade in Goods with Faroe Isles« (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/january/tradoc_147271.pdf, 29 December 2015); EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2015): »European Union, Trade in Goods with Greenland« (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/january/tradoc_147287.pdf, 29 December 2015).

12 While Greenland's »Europeanness« is self-evident for the EU, there is definitely a debate about their »Europeanness« among Greenlanders themselves.

13 Cf. Max HALLER (2008): *European Integration as an Elite Process: The Failure of a Dream?* New York and London: Routledge; Paul TAGGART and Aleks SZCZERBIAK (2008): »Conclusion: Opposing Europe? Three Patterns of Party Competition over Europe«, in: Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak (eds.): *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, Volume 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 348-363.

14 Baldur THORHALLSSON (2002): »The Sceptical Political Elite versus the Pro-European Public: The Case of Iceland«, in: *Scandinavian Studies* 74 (3), pp. 349-378.

nations it has remained a minority position of political parties on the periphery of the political spectre.¹⁵

1.2. Findings from the Icelandic case

Despite the remarkable extent of Euroscepticism in all three North Atlantic nations, only Iceland has been examined in depth. While rational approaches have focused on economic interests and cost-benefit calculations to explain the European policy choices of Icelandic governments, constructivists have also included collective norms and identities in their analysis. Both theoretical approaches have been applied to study the motivation of Icelandic governments for their European policy choices.

What makes the Icelandic case so special – according to Christine Ingebritsen – is the leading role of its fisheries sector in national politics.¹⁶ Fish has been the main source of income in Iceland and still made up 41.3 per cent of Icelandic exports in 2014.¹⁷ In 1970, the EC adopted its first regulations for a common fisheries policy (CFP), based on equal access of EC fishermen to the fishing grounds of all member states.¹⁸ It was a principle tailored to the needs of the six founding members of the EC that had only small coastlines, but great distant-water fishing industries. This principle was in opposition to the international trend at the time towards extended exclusive fishing limits. An increasing number of states extended their limits in the early 1970s.

Iceland was a forerunner of this development and at first unilaterally extended its fishing limit to 50 miles in 1972 and to 200 miles in 1975. After the participants of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) declared their support for Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of 200 miles, they were introduced all over the world from 1977 onward. EC member states also extended their fishing limits in 1977, but in contrast to the other nations they only received exclusive exploitation rights in their EEZs towards third states, but not towards other EC members. Vis-à-vis other EC members, the CFP regulations from 1970 only allowed EC member states exclusive fishing limits of six to twelve miles, depending on the significance of fisheries for a particular region within a member state. Thus, the 188 to 194 outer miles of their EEZs became part of an extensive Community pond. This made it necessary for the EC to supplement the equal access principle with a fisheries management system that would regulate the total allowable catch (TAC) in the Community pond. In 1978, the Commission proposed TACs for the main fish stocks of commercial interest based on scientific

15 TAGGART and SZCZERBIAK (2008): »Conclusion«, p. 349.

16 Christine INGEBRITSEN (1998): *The Nordic States and European Unity*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 126-129.

17 STATISTICS ICELAND (2015): »Útflutningur eftir vinnslugreinum 1999-2014« (http://px.hagstofa.is/pxis/pxweb/is/Efnahagur/Efnahagur__utanrikisverslun__1_voruvidskipti__04_utflutningur/UTA02106.px, 29 December 2015).

18 Cf. for this and the following paragraphs: Robin CHURCHILL and Daniel OWEN (2009): *The EC Common Fisheries Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press; Michael LEIGH (1983): *European Integration and the Common Fisheries Policy*. London and Canberra: Croom Helm; Mark WISE (1984): *The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Community*. London and New York: Methuen.

advice, which would then be divided into quotas allocated to individual member states. Since 1976, it has also negotiated TACs for joint stocks extending the Community waters with the countries concerned, acting as a single body.

Due to the United Kingdom (UK)'s rejection of the Commission's proposals, fisheries policy in the EC remained in legal limbo until 1982. Only in 1983, was the reformed CFP finally implemented. It legally established the Community practice of setting annual TACs based on the principle of »relative stability«. Setting the TACs for a specified fisheries zone, the Commission would take into account the historic catch performance of a member state. It would have to guarantee preferential treatment for member states and regions particularly dependent on fisheries. And it would have to find ways to compensate member states for catch losses resulting from exclusion from the waters of third states. The Council would act as the final decision-maker and would be able to adopt TACs by qualified majority. The reformed CFP also granted all EC member states exclusive limits of twelve miles. But they would have to recognise the historic rights of EC fishermen within six to twelve miles. Moreover, it confirmed the Commission as a single actor in fisheries matters with third states.

For Ingebritsen, it is clear that Iceland did not join the EU because its fisheries sector rejected EU membership, as it did not want to share its fisheries resources with other European states.¹⁹ This was in line with the findings of Andrew Moravcsik, the founder of what he himself refers to as the »baseline« theory of European integration, liberal intergovernmentalism (LI).²⁰ Moravcsik claims that integration was a consequence of national leaders pursuing

economic interests, primarily commercial interests of powerful economic producers and secondarily the macroeconomic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions – that evolved slowly in response to structural incentives in the global economy.²¹

Ingebritsen's assumption is also credible because the CFP has been anything other than a success story. The Commission itself consistently recognised that it had not been able to prevent overfishing, to reduce fleet overcapacity or to ensure a more sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources in general.²² Since the early 1990s, repeated and on-going reform processes have not brought any major improvements.²³

19 INGBRITSEN (1998): *The Nordic States*, pp. 126-129.

20 Andrew MORAVCSIK and Frank SCHIMMELFENNIG (2009): »Liberal Intergovernmentalism«, in: Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (eds.): *European Integration Theory* (second edition). New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 67-87, here: pp. 67, 85-86.

21 Andrew MORAVCSIK (1998): *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, p. 3.

22 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2001): »Green Paper on the Future of the Common Fisheries Policy«, COM(2001) 135, 20 March 2001 (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0135:FIN:EN:PDF>, 3 February 2014); EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2009): »Green Paper: Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy«, COM(2009)163, 22 April 2009 (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0163:FIN:EN:PDF>, 3 February 2014).

23 Tim GRAY and Jenny HATCHARD (2003): »The 2002 Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy's System of Governance – Rhetoric or Reality?« In: *Marine Policy* 27 (6), pp. 545-554; Jesper RAAKJÆR

To name just a few problems:²⁴ TACs were set at levels considerably above those recommended by fisheries scientists in order to satisfy the demands of EU fishermen. Fish catches that exceeded TACs could not be landed lawfully and made discarding an attractive option. Fishermen abused the quota system by registering their ships in another member state in order to use the latter's quota, while landing the fish in their home countries – so-called »quota hopping«. Moreover, there was poor compliance with the CFP's legislation in general as its enforcement was delegated to member states, who often had a low interest in following up on the activities of their fishermen. Also, the structural measures to reduce the substantial overcapacity in fishing fleets proved inadequate.

Baldur Thorhallsson and Hjalti Thor Vignisson confirm Ingebritsen's hypothesis for Iceland in principle.²⁵ They also believe that the implications for Iceland's fishing industry of the country's possible accession to the CFP constituted a »key factor in the position of all political parties« regarding EU membership. However, they doubt that the position of the fisheries sector has in fact been »the controlling factor« for Iceland's rejection. Thorhallsson is convinced that an analysis of Iceland's European policy must take other factors into account as well, such as Iceland's special relationship with the United States (US), special characteristics of the political elite such as its realist concept of foreign policy, its peripheral placement in Europe and its domestic power base in the regions outside Reykjavík, the smallness of Iceland's administration in a country with merely 320,000 inhabitants and its particular emphasis on national sovereignty.

However, except for the peculiar emphasis on national sovereignty, none of these factors strongly challenge the primacy of fisheries interests for Iceland's European policy. Even if Icelandic governments had fewer incentives to join the EU for security and defence reasons due to Iceland's close relationship with the US, the latter did not present a strong political obstacle to Iceland's EU membership either. Moreover, it is doubtful whether one could still speak of a »special relationship« after the end of the Cold War, although Iceland's bilateral defence agreement with the US from 1951 is still in place today.²⁶ Beyond that, it is also doubtful whether a peculiar elite scepticism and a small administration can be treated as independent variables. A

(2009): *A Fisheries Management System in Crisis – the EU Common Fisheries Policy*. Aalborg: Aalborg University Press; Setareh KHALILIAN, Rainer FROESE, Alexander PROELSS and Till REQUATE (2010): »Designed for Failure: A Critique of the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union«, in: *Marine Policy* 34 (6), pp. 1178-1182.

24 See for this paragraph: CHURCHILL and OWEN (2009): *The Common Fisheries Policy*, pp. 18-21, 129-244.

25 See for this and the following paragraph: Baldur THORHALLSSON and Hjalti Thor VIGNISSON (2005): »Life is First and Foremost Saltfish«, in: Baldur Thorhallsson (ed.): *Iceland and European Integration: On the Edge*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 67-102.

26 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Icelandic government became painfully aware of its decreased geopolitical significance for the US. The US began to reduce its military presence in Iceland from year to year, until it finally shut down its military base in Keflavík completely in 2006. See Valur INGIMUNDARSON (2008): »Öryggissamfélag Íslands og Bandaríkjanna, 1991-2006: Frá óvissu til upplausnar«, in: Valur Ingimundarson (ed.): *Uppbrot hugmyndakerfis: Endurmótun íslenskrar utanríkisstefnu 1991-2007*. Reykjavík: Hið íslenska bókmenntafélag, pp. 1-66; Guðni Th. JÓHANNESSON (2004): »To the Edge of Nowhere? U.S.-Icelandic Defense Relations during and after the Cold War«, in: *Naval War College Review* LVII (3/4), pp. 115-137.

small administration and a countryside-based political elite – the consequence of an unequal distribution of seats in the Icelandic parliament in favour of the countryside – are not factors against EU membership *per se*. They only became relevant in the Icelandic case because they were able to further strengthen the pivotal role of the fisheries sector in Iceland's European policy.²⁷ The same can be said about the realist concept of foreign policy, which was likely less an independent variable than a consequence of the emphasis on national sovereignty.

Therefore, only the peculiar emphasis on national sovereignty provides a strong challenge to the primacy of fisheries resources in the rejection of EU membership in Iceland. Iceland's nationalist movement struggled for increased independence from the middle of the nineteenth century onward.²⁸ Iceland achieved legislative power for its parliament in 1874, Home Rule with an Icelandic minister in Reykjavík in 1904 and full sovereignty in 1918 with the establishment of an Icelandic state in a union with Denmark. During this period *politics* became synonymous with *the struggle for independence*. This fact has not changed much until today, although Iceland cut all links with Denmark and proclaimed an Icelandic republic in 1944.

Guðmundur Hálfðanarson and Eiríkur Bergmann claim that Icelandic politicians feel that protecting the freedom and sovereignty of the Icelandic nation is an eternal struggle and the fundamental objective of Iceland's policy in the past, present and in the future.²⁹ Thus, it would be difficult for them to advocate Iceland's participation in the European integration process, since it would entail the transfer of parts of a

27 Due to their small administration, Icelandic ministries have often relied to a great extent on information from the fisheries sector for their position on EU membership. *Alþingi* MPs from the periphery have had closer links to the fisheries sector than MPs from Reykjavík. Therefore, their over-representation in the *Alþingi* and in important positions in Iceland's political parties increased the influence of the fisheries sector on Icelandic politics. See Baldur THORHALLSSON (2004): »Towards a New Theoretical Approach«, in: Baldur Thorhallsson (ed.): *Iceland and European Integration: On the Edge*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 185-208, here: pp. 192-194.

28 For Icelandic nationalism and the Icelandic struggle for independence cf. Jón Th. THÓR, Daniel THORLEIFSEN, Andras MORTENSEN and Ole MARQUARDT (eds.) (2012): *Naboer i Nordatlanten: Færøerne, Island og Grønland. Hovedlinjer i Vestnordens historie gennem 1000 år*. Tórshavn: Faroe University Press, pp. 395-414; Jón Th. THÓR (2003): »Fra biland til republik: Et kortfattet oversigt over Islands vej til selvstændighed«, in: Daniel Thorleifsen (ed.): *De vestnordiske landes fælleshistorie. Udvalg af indledende betragtninger over dele af den vestnordiske fælleshistorie* (= Inussuk: Arktisk forskningsjournal 2/2003). Nuuk: Greenland's Home Rule government, Ministry of Culture, Education, Research and Church Matters [Direktoratet for Kultur, Uddannelse, Forskning og Kirke], pp. 55-62; Guðmundur HÁLFÐANARSON (2001): *Íslenska þjóðríkið – uppruni og endimörk*. Reykjavík: Hið íslenska bókmenntafélag; Gunnar KARLSSON (1995): »The Emergence of Nationalism in Iceland«, in: Sven Tägil (ed.): *Ethnicity and Nation Building in the Nordic World*. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 33-62; Birgir HERMANNSSON (2005): *Understanding Nationalism: Studies in Icelandic Nationalism, 1800-2000* (= Stockholm Studies in Politics 110). Stockholm: Stockholm University, Department of Political Science.

29 Eiríkur BERGMANN (2009): »Hið huglæga sjálfstæði þjóðarinnar: Áhrif þjóðernishugmynda á Evrópuþjefnu íslenskra stjórnvalda. Reykjavík: University of Iceland, Faculty of Political Science, pp. 91-93; Guðmundur HÁLFÐANARSON (2007): »Glatast fullveldið við inngöngu í Evrópusambandi?« In: Sílja Bára Ómarsdóttir (ed.): *Ný staða Íslands í utanríkismálum: Tengsl við önnur Evrópulönd*. Reykjavík: University of Iceland Press, pp. 123-133, here: pp. 123-124; Guðmundur HÁLFÐANARSON (2004): »Discussing Europe: Icelandic Nationalism and European Integration«, in: Baldur Thorhallsson (ed.): *Iceland and European Integration: On the Edge*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 128-144, here: pp. 131-132.

state's sovereign rights to a supranational institution.³⁰ Bergmann argues that the preservation of Iceland's independence remained the ultimate rationale in each debate on European integration he analysed, whether it was membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) from 1967 to 1970, membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) in the early 1990s or EU membership between 2000 and 2003.³¹ Thorhallsson also believes that the emphasis in Iceland on national sovereignty explains why Iceland's politicians did not investigate potential EU membership as a solution to the problems of the fisheries sector.³² The CFP has been a welcome excuse to prevent any discussion on membership.

1.3. The relationship between fish and sovereignty

In Iceland, both the rejection of the CFP and the significance of national sovereignty have had a great effect on the European policy choices of Icelandic governments. But which factor plays a more prominent role? Bergmann would hardly be able to convince a liberal intergovernmentalist scholar that Iceland's emphasis on national sovereignty is sufficient to explain Iceland's European policy choices. Moravcsik admits that geopolitical ideology must have played some role in the European policy choices of national governments, but he believed that the

dominant motivations of governments in the EC decisions [...] reflected not geopolitical threats or ideals but pressures to coordinate policy responses to rising opportunities for profitable economic exchange, in particular growing intra-industry trade and capital movements.³³

Moravcsik only expected a leading role for political ideas where the material consequences of membership were »nearly incalculable«:

Economic interests [...] determined the circumstances under which geopolitical ideology could influence policy. Only where economic interests were weak, diffuse, or indeterminate could national politicians indulge the temptation to consider geopolitical goals.

Thus, Moravcsik would not necessarily deny that the struggle for the preservation of sovereignty was the ultimate rationale for the European policy choices of

30 HÁLFDANARSON (2004): »Discussing Europe«, p. 130; Eiríkur BERGMANN (2009): »Sense of Sovereignty: How National Sentiments Have Influenced Iceland's European Policy«, in: *Stjórnsmál og stjórnsýsla* 5 (2), pp. 203-223 (<http://skemman.is/stream/get/1946/9112/23980/1/a.2009.5.2.1.pdf>, 3 February 2014), here: pp. 220-221.

31 BERGMANN (2009): »Hið huglæga sjálfstæði«, pp. 311-314. Cf. Eiríkur BERGMANN (2011): *Sjálfstæði þjóð: Trylltur skrill og landráðalýður*. Reykjavík: Veröld, pp. 296-298.

32 Baldur THORHALLSSON (2001): »The Distinctive Domestic Characteristics of Iceland and the Rejection of Membership of the European Union«, in: *European Integration* 23 (3), pp. 257-280, here: pp. 258-259; THORHALLSSON and VIGNISSON (2004): »Life is Saltfish«, pp. 97.

33 See for the following: MORAVCSIK (1998): *The Choice for Europe*, pp. 6-7. Cf. Andrew MORAVCSIK (1999): »The Future of European Integration Studies: Social Science or Social Theory?« In: *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 28 (2), pp. 371-391, here: pp. 376-377.

Icelandic governments. But he would argue that the only reason why Icelandic governments could afford to emphasise national sovereignty in their European policy choices in the first place was the absence of a clear economic incentive for membership. According to LI, an economic interest to support or reject membership should be a sufficient (though not necessary) condition to explain Iceland's European policy. On the contrary, political interests should neither be a necessary nor a sufficient condition for doing so.

Ingebritsen supports this interpretation in her analysis of Nordic European policies. She maintains that it was a »luxury« for Norway to raise issues such as »who we are in relation to Europe« that would be reserved for nations whose leading economic sectors opposed EC membership.³⁴ Nations whose leading economic sectors anticipated benefits from closer political cooperation with the EU could not afford such a luxury such as in Sweden and Finland. Hálfðanarson also claimed that a small country such as Iceland, with a fairly narrow economic base, would at times have to concede ground for very material and practical concerns, such as market access, despite the traditions that formed its political discourse and ideals.³⁵

Sieglinde Gstöhl was more sceptical as to the sufficiency of economic interests to explain the European policy choices she analysed of the Norwegian, Swedish and Swiss governments.³⁶ Other than Moravcsik and Ingebritsen, she believed that material and ideational factors needed to be considered as equal, coexisting factors. Her hypothesis, which followed logically from that, was that »the lower the economic incentives and the higher the political impediments to integration are, the more reluctant a country's integration policy will be«. But – other than LI – her hypothesis made it impossible to take a clear position on what Iceland's European policy choice would be if – for example – it had a high economic incentive to join the EU, but a high political incentive to remain outside.

Bergmann did not take a clear position on whether Icelandic governments would also have emphasised national sovereignty to the same extent if Iceland had had a stronger economic incentive to join the EU. But it was quite evident from his analysis that he considered the struggle for the preservation of national sovereignty to be sufficient to explain Iceland's European policy. Iceland's EU membership application, which was put on hold in 2015 despite strong interest in the economic benefits of membership, seemed to confirm his hypothesis. But it also raised an important question: why should national sovereignty have played a more important role in Iceland than in other states? Why should it have been more significant in Iceland than for example in Norway, whose political elites twice attempted to lead Norway into the EU?

While liberal intergovernmentalists would blame a weak, diffuse or indeter-

34 Christine INGEBRITSEN (2001): »When Do Culture and History Matter? A Response to Neumann and Tiilikainen«, in: *Cooperation and Conflict* 36 (1), pp. 99-103, here: p. 101. Cf. INGEBRITSEN (1998): *The Nordic States*, p. 43.

35 HÁLFÐANARSON (2004): »Discussing Europe«, p. 138.

36 See for this paragraph: Sieglinde GSTÖHL (2002): *Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden and Switzerland in the Process of European Integration*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 5-14.

minate economic interest with regard to EU membership, Bergmann focused on another explanation. He believed that the preservation of national sovereignty played a more important role in Iceland's European policy choices than elsewhere because it was inextricably connected to preserving sovereignty over Iceland's most important source of income, its fisheries.³⁷ Bergmann believed that

the oft-used argument that Iceland cannot join the EU because of its Common Fisheries Policy is not simply an economic argument but a vital part of Iceland's independence. Complete control over the fishing zone becomes in a way a sign of the free and independent Icelandic nation.

Thus, the problem would not so much be an economic one – that Iceland would have to share some of its fisheries resources with other European states. The problem would be political – that the decisions on who was allowed to catch what kind of fish in Iceland's EEZ were to be taken in Brussels and not in Reykjavík. Thorhallsson also assumed that the outright opposition of all political parties to allow foreign vessels to fish in Icelandic waters might have »as much to do with nationalism and the newly-gained control over its fishing grounds as with the interests of the fisheries sector«. ³⁸ Magnús Árni Magnússon therefore wondered whether one could actually characterise the rejection of the CFP as an *economic* impediment to EU membership:

It is by no means unthinkable that it would not change much if decisions on the size of fishing quotas in Icelandic waters were formally taken in Brussels, rather than Reykjavík, or if parties other than Icelandic nationals were allowed to invest in the Icelandic fishing industry [...]. On the other hand, on nationalistic grounds, these scenarios are harder to swallow.³⁹

Úlfar Hauksson's findings support this interpretation. He argues that – in fact – little or nothing would change in practice if the final decision on TACs in Icelandic waters was taken in the Council of Ministers, because it would be based on the CFP's principle of »relative stability«. ⁴⁰ Since Iceland had been the only nation to exploit marine resources in its waters for decades, it was likely that it would be granted nearly exclusive catching rights in its own waters. Moreover, since Iceland

37 BERGMANN (2009): »Hið huglæga sjálfstæði«, p. 336; BERGMANN (2009): »Sense of Sovereignty«, pp. 219-220.

38 THORHALLSSON (2004): »New Theoretical Approach«, p. 189.

39 Magnús Árni MAGNÚSSON (2011): *The Engagement of Iceland and Malta with European Integration: Economic Incentives and Political Constraints*. Reykjavík: University of Iceland, Faculty of Political Science, p. 181.

40 See for this paragraph: Úlfar HAUKSSON (2002): *Gert út frá Brussel? Íslenskur sjávarútvegur og Evrópusambandið: Sjávarútvegsstefna ESB rannsökuð út frá hugsanlegri aðild Íslands að sambandinu*. Reykjavík: University of Iceland Press, p. 158-166. Cf. Úlfar HAUKSSON (2007): »Hvalreki eða skipbrot? Örlög íslensks sjávarútvegs í ESB«, in: Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir (ed.): *Ný staða Íslands í utanríkismálum: Tengsl við önnur Evrópulönd*. Reykjavík: University of Iceland Press, pp. 135-151.

had also exploited its fisheries resources in a sustainable way, the Icelandic government should be able to argue successfully that EU member states should not be allowed to fish in Icelandic waters beyond the levels granted by existing bilateral treaties. Iceland should even be able to prevent quota hopping by implementing regulations similar to the UK and obliging fishing vessels based in Iceland to land their catches in Icelandic ports.

Hence, it seemed that the Euroscepticism of Icelandic governments was more than just a consequence of a limited economic interest in membership, which enabled them to focus on the preservation of national sovereignty. In Iceland, there seemed to be a peculiar emphasis on national sovereignty because it was essential for Icelandic governments to preserve national control over Iceland's fisheries resources.

1.4. The Faroe Islands, Greenland and European integration

The findings of Bergmann, Hauksson, Magnússon and Thorhallsson for Iceland raise an interesting research question: if national sovereignty actually was able to play such a decisive role in the Icelandic EU membership debate because it was inextricably connected to control over Iceland's fisheries resources, should this not have been similar in the Faroe Islands and Greenland? Not only have the Faroes and Greenland also remained outside of the EU, but are also islands in the North Atlantic periphery with a small population, a colonial history with Denmark and an extreme dependence on their fisheries resources.

The Faroe Islands are a group of 18 small islands, northwest of the Shetland Islands, southeast of Iceland and southwest of Norway. Their population descends from Viking settlers and numbers approximately 48,000 inhabitants.⁴¹ Greenland is the largest island in the world, with 81 per cent of its surface constantly covered by ice. The Inuit population that settled in Greenland in the thirteenth century lives predominantly on Greenland's West Coast and numbers approximately 56,000 inhabitants. Table 1 perfectly illustrates the extreme dependence of the Faroe Islands and Greenland on fisheries. In 2010, fish products made up 91.5 per cent of the total export income in the Faroes and 87.6 per cent of the total export income in Greenland. Moreover, the Faroe Islands and Greenland also had the highest capture production per capita of all of Europe's fishing nations.

41 For key figures in the Faroe Islands and Greenland see STATISTICS FAROE ISLANDS (2015): »Faroe Islands in Figures 2015« (http://www.hagstova.fo/sites/default/files/Faroe_Islands_in_figures_2015.pdf, 29 December 2015); STATISTICS GREENLAND (2015): »Greenland in Figures 2015« (<http://www.stat.gl/publ/kl/GF/2015/pdf/Greenland%20in%20Figures%202015.pdf>, 29 December 2015).

Table 1: Dependence on fisheries: Europe's largest fishing nations (total catch >200,000t) in 2010⁴²

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Nation</i>	<i>Total capture production (t)</i>	<i>Population (1,000)</i>	<i>Capture production (t) per capita (1,000)</i>	<i>Export income (per cent)</i>
1	Norway	2 675 292	4 883	548	6.6
2	Iceland	1 060 640	318	3 335	39.3
3	Spain	968 662	46 217	21	1.0
4	Denmark	828 016	5 565	149	2.8
5	UK	612 655	62 247	10	0.5
6	France	426 514	64 877	7	0.3
7	Faroe Islands	393 875	49	8 038	91.5
8	Netherlands	389 357	16 623	23	0.6
9	Ireland	318 942	4 451	72	0.4
10	Italy	234 101	60 575	4	0.2
11	Portugal	222 944	10 642	21	1.5
12	Germany	222 771	81 636	3	0.1
13	Sweden	212 035	9 394	23	1.7
14	Greenland	209 446	56	3 740	87.6

As a Norwegian fiefdom, the Faroes became part of the Danish Kingdom in 1380 when the kingdoms of Norway and Denmark were united. Although the Danish king had to cede Norway to Sweden in 1814, the Faroes remained under Danish control. In 1816, they became a Danish county (*amt*) and, in 1851, they were integrated in the Danish constitution (*grundlov*). Greenland became a part of the Danish Kingdom after its rediscovery through the Danish-Norwegian missionary Hans Egede in 1721. Like the Faroes, it remained under Danish control when the Danish King ceded Norway to Sweden in 1814. However, Greenland was only integrated as a county into the Danish constitution in 1953. Both nations experienced strong national movements just as in Iceland, but at very different points of time.

In the Faroe Islands a national movement emerged in the latter decades of the 19th century.⁴³ It split in 1906 when there was disagreement on a proposal by the

42 Own table: Data for the total capture production and population is based on FAO fishery and agriculture statistics from 2010, the capture production per capita is based on own calculations and the income of fisheries as percentage of the total export income is based on data from national statistical institutes from 2010.

43 For Faroese nationalism and the Faroese struggle for self-determination see THÓR et. al. (2012): *Naboer i Nordatlanten*, pp. 415-433; Jóan Pauli JOENSEN (2003): »Opfindelsen af det færøske folk, kultur og nation«, in: Daniel Thorleifsen (ed.): *De vestnordiske landes fælleshistorie. Udvalg af indledende betragtninger over dele af den vestnordiske fælleshistorie* (= Inussuk: Arktisk forskningsjournal 2/2003). Nuuk: Greenland's Home Rule government, Ministry of Culture, Education, Research and Church Matters [Direktoratet for Kultur, Uddannelse, Forskning og Kirke], pp. 39-54; Hans Jacob DEBES (2001):

Danish King for a higher degree of self-government for the islands. The critics of this proposal subsequently founded the Unionist Party, which advocated continuously close political relations with Denmark, while the supporters organised themselves in the Self-Government Party (*Sjálvstýrisflokkurin*), which wanted increased political responsibility for the Faroes. Due to the German occupation of Denmark, the Faroes were largely self-governing during the Second World War. When the Danish government relinquished control over the islands after the war, Faroe Islanders were given the option to choose between the retention of the status of 1940, with some minor adjustments, and separation from the Danish Realm. In a referendum in 1946, a small majority unexpectedly voted for separation. However, the Danish King dissolved the *Løgting* when it wanted to accept the outcome of the referendum as binding. The opponents of separation won the next election and subsequently resumed negotiations with Denmark on the future constitutional status of the Faroe Islands within the Realm.

In 1948, the *Løgting* adopted the Home Rule Act, which is still in place today.⁴⁴ Disagreement about the desirability of the Faroese constitutional status has remained the main political cleavage in the Faroes. Since 1948, and in fact ever since 1906, about half of the Faroese population has wished for a greater degree of independence, while the other half of the Faroese population sees the preservation of its status as a national minority within the Danish Realm as sufficient, as long as it can preserve and develop its particular national characteristics. Nevertheless, the overall tendency since 1948 has been to realise an ever-greater degree of independence by taking more and more policy areas into Faroese control.

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- Færingernes land – historien om den færøske nutids oprindelse*. Copenhagen: Multivers, pp. 148-289; Tom NAUERBY (1996): *No Nation is an Island. Language, Culture and National Identity in the Faroe Islands* (= North Atlantic Monographs 3). Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, pp. 29-69; Hans Jacob DEBES (1995): »The Formation of a Nation: The Faroe Islands«, in: Sven Tägil (ed.): *Ethnicity and Nation Building in the Nordic World*. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 63-85; Vagn WÄHLIN (1989): »Faroese History and Identity: National Historical Writing«, in: *North Atlantic Studies* 1 (1), pp. 21-32; Jonathan WYLIE (1987): *The Faroe Islands: Interpretations of History*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
- 44 For Faroese political history since the introduction of Home Rule see Uffe ØSTERGAARD (2008): *Færøerne i det danske Rigsfællesskab – nation uden stat eller med?* Working Paper No. 44. Frederiksberg: Copenhagen Business School (<http://openarchive.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10398/7360/wp%20cbp%202008-44.pdf?sequence=1>, 3 February 2014); Hans Andrias SØLVARÁ (2002): *Løgtingið 150 – Hátíðarrit I*. Tórshavn: Løgtingið, pp. 291-385; Jákup THORSTEINSSON and Sjúrdur RASMUSSEN (1999): »Rigsfællesskabet mellem Færøerne og Danmark«, in: Ole Stig Andersen et. al. (eds.): *Folketingets Festskrift i anledning af Grundlovens 150 års jubilæum*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, pp. 492-532; Jógvan MØRKØRE (1996): »The Faroese Home Rule Model – Theory and Reality«, in: Lise Lyck (ed.): *Constitutional and Economic Space of the Small Nordic Jurisdictions*. Stockholm: NordREFO [Nordic Institute of Regional Policy Research], pp. 162-191; Lise LYCK (1996): »The Danish Home Rule Model: Principles, History, and Characteristics«, in: Lise Lyck (ed.): *Constitutional and Economic Space of the Small Nordic Jurisdictions*. Stockholm: NordREFO [Nordic Institute of Regional Policy Research], pp. 122-136; John H. GOODLAD (1987): *The Faroese Road to Autonomy: An Analysis of the Faroese Political System*. Lerwick: Shetland Life. For a unionist perspective see Anja ANDREASEN (2006): *Sambandsflokkurin í 100 ár: Tættir úr søgu Sambandsflokksins*. Tórshavn: Sambandsflokkurin. For a constitutional analysis of the Faroese position in the Danish Realm see Frederik HARHOFF (1993): *Rigsfællesskabet*. Aarhus: Forlaget Klim.

Greenland's national movement only emerged after increased contact with Danish rule in the middle of the twentieth century.⁴⁵ After its integration into the Danish constitution in 1953, Denmark wanted to put Greenland on an equal status with the rest of the Danish provinces. It built up a Greenlandic fishing industry, invested heavily in infrastructure, health and education, and opened up investment for private Danish capital. However, Greenlanders faced difficulties in adjusting to these changes and increasingly perceived them as »Danification«. They followed their own economic development from the sidelines, while decisions on their behalf were taken in Copenhagen and carried out by Danish envoys in Greenland.

From the 1970s onward, a new generation of Greenlanders wanted to free Greenland from Danish dominance and campaigned for increased self-determination. In 1979, a great majority of Greenland's electorate voted for the introduction of Home Rule. But the struggle for increased self-determination continued.⁴⁶ In 2009, the Home Rule Act was extended to a Self-Government Act, which widened Greenland's autonomy in a number of policy areas and outlined the process towards Greenland's potential independence. Since Greenland's Self-Government Act in 2009, the Greenlandic Self-Government authorities have only been referred to by their Greenlandic names, *Naalakkersuisut* for the Self-Government and *Inatsisartut* for Greenland's parliament. However, for a matter of simplification, Greenland's government is referred to in this book as »Home Rule government« and Greenland's parliament as *Landsting* also after 2009.

The Faroe Islands and Greenland have been difficult to classify in international relations due to their complex constitutional status as self-governing territories within an EU member state which are, however, able to remain outside the EU. This might explain why they have tended to be overlooked in studies of European integration, except for some single case studies mentioned below. They have not been included in the growing literature on how small states and microstates have

45 For Greenlandic nationalism and the Greenlandic struggle for self-determination see THÓR et. al. (2012): *Naboer i Nordatlanten*, pp. 435-462; Daniel THORLEIFSEN (2003): »Kampen for etnisk identitet og krav om eksternt selvbestemmelsesret: Bevæggrunde for grønlandske ønsker om selvstyre, 1950-2000«, in: Daniel Thorleifsen (ed.): *De vestnordiske landes fælleshistorie. Udvalg af indledende betragtninger over dele af den vestnordiske fælleshistorie* (= Inussuk: Arktisk forskningsjournal 2/2003). Nuuk: Greenland's Home Rule government, Ministry of Culture, Education, Research and Church Matters [Direktoratet for Kultur, Uddannelse, Forskning og Kirke], pp. 105-115; Axel Kjær SØRENSEN (1995): »Greenland: From Colony to Home Rule«, in: Sven Tägil (ed.): *Ethnicity and Nation Building in the Nordic World*. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 85-105.

46 For Greenland's political history before and after Home Rule see Axel Kjær SØRENSEN (2007): *Denmark-Greenland in the Twentieth Century* (= Man & Society 34). Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, Museum Tusulanum Press; Natalia LOUKACHEVA (2007): *The Arctic Promise: Legal and Political Autonomy of Greenland and Nunavut*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; Henrik SKYDSBJERG (1999): *Grønland: 20 år med hjemmestyre*. Nuuk: Forlaget Atuagkat; Jakob JANUSSEN (1999): »Rigsfællesskabet set fra grønlandsk side«, in: Ole Stig Andersen et. al. (eds.): *Folketingets Festskrift i anledning af Grundlovens 150 års jubilæum*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, pp. 469-489; LYCK (1996): »Home Rule in Greenland«, Mads FÆGTEBORG (1991): »Between Global and Local Politics: The Dilemma of Greenlandic Home Rule«, in: *North Atlantic Studies* 1 (2), pp. 32-38; HARHOFF (1993): *Rigsfællesskabet*; Jens DAHL (1986): *Arktisk selvstyre – historien bag og rammerne for det grønlandske hjemmestyre*. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag.

reacted towards the challenges of European integration.⁴⁷ They have not been included in the extensive literature on the different approaches of the Nordic states to European integration.⁴⁸ And they have not been included in studies on the various combinations of so-called »reluctant Europeans«⁴⁹, which have largely focused on Norway and Switzerland, but also on Iceland and Malta.⁵⁰

In summary, there have not been any cross-national comparisons on European integration that include the Faroe Islands and Greenland apart from a bachelor thesis at the University of Iceland.⁵¹ The few existing studies on Faroese and Greenlandic European policy have all been single case studies and all of them have been nearly exclusively located within Danish academia. Moreover, even the most extensive among them have been restricted in time and scope. However – just as

47 E.g. Robert STEINMETZ and Anders WIVEL (eds.) (2010): *Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities*. Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate; Hans MOURITZEN and Anders WIVEL (eds.) (2005): *The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration*. London and New York: Routledge; Clive ARCHER and Neill NUGENT (2002): »Introduction: Small States and the European Union«, in: *Current Politics and Economics of Europe* 11 (1), pp. 1-10; William WALLACE (1999): »Small European States and European Policy-Making: Strategies, Roles, Possibilities«, in: William Wallace (ed.): *Between Autonomy and Influence: Small States and the European Union* (= Arena Report No. 1/99). Oslo: ARENA [Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-State], pp. 11-26; Laurent GOETSCHÉL (ed.) (1998): *Small States Inside and Outside the European Union*. Boston, Dordrecht and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers; Kenneth HANF and Ben SOETENDORP (eds.) (1998): *Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union*. London and New York: Longman; Peter J. KATZENSTEIN (1997): »The Smaller European States, Germany and Europe«, in: Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.): *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 251-304; Hans MOURITZEN, Ole WÆVER and Håkan WIBERG (eds.) (1996): *European Integration and National Adaptations: A Theoretical Inquiry*. New York: Nova Science Publications. On microstates in particular see Jorri C. DUURSMA (1996): *Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States: Self-Determination and Statehood*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

48 E.g. Christine INGEBRITSEN (2013): *The Scandinavian Way and its Legacy in Europe*. Austin: Sentia Publishing; Helge HØIBRAATEN and Jochen HILLE (eds.) (2011): *Northern Europe and the Future of the EU/Nordeuropa und die Zukunft der EU* (= Nordeuropäische Studien 23). Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag; Stephan Michael SCHRÖDER (2010): »Leitbild Norden« statt »Leitbild Europa«? Die Gründe der nordeuropäischen Europaskepsis«, in: Jürgen Elvert and Jürgen Nielsen-Sikora (eds.): *Leitbild Europa? Europabilder und ihre Wirkungen in der Neuzeit* (= Historische Mitteilungen, Beihefte 74). Stuttgart: Steiner, pp. 193-207; Carsten SCHYMIK (2006): *Europäische Anti-Föderalisten: Volksbewegungen gegen die Europäische Union in Skandinavien*. Berlin/Leipzig: Edition Kirchhof & Franke; Christine INGEBRITSEN (2006): *Scandinavia in World Politics*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; Lene HANSEN and Ole WÆVER (eds.) (2002): *The Nordic States and European Integration*. London and New York: Routledge; Clive ARCHER (2000): »Eurocepticism in the Nordic Region«, in: *Journal of European Integration* 22, pp. 87-114; INGEBRITSEN (1998): *The Nordic States*; Lee MILES (ed.) (1996): *The European Union and the Nordic Countries*. London and New York: Routledge; Toivo MILJAN (1977): *The Reluctant Europeans: The Attitudes of the Nordic Countries Towards European Integration*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

49 This term goes back to MILJAN (1977) and was later taken up again by GSTÖHL (2002).

50 MAGNÜSSON (2011): *Iceland and Malta*; Jochen HILLE (2005): *Gute Nation oder Europa? Euroskeptizismus in Norwegen und in der deutschsprachigen Schweiz*. Berlin: Humboldt University; GSTÖHL (2002): *Reluctant Europeans*; Sieglinde GSTÖHL (2002): »Scandinavia and Switzerland: Small, Successful and Stubborn towards the EU«, in: *Journal of European Public Policy* 9 (4), pp. 529-549; Sieglinde GSTÖHL (1998): »Switzerland, Norway and the EU: The Odd Ones Out?« In: Miroslav N. Jovanovic (ed.): *International Economic Integration: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy 4: Integration Schemes*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 321-343.

51 Jóhannes VOLLERTSEN (2009): *Norrænu sjálfstjórnarsvæðin og Evrópusambandið*, BA thesis. Reykjavík: University of Iceland, Faculty of Political Science.

in Iceland – all of them have addressed the rejection of the CFP and the emphasis on national sovereignty and self-determination as main factors for the European policy choices of Faroese and Greenlandic governments.

Kristjan á Neystabø analysed Faroese European policy between 1959 and 1974.⁵² He concluded that the eventual rejection of EC membership in the Faroe Islands was predominantly motivated by economic concerns with the CFP's equal access principle. According to Neystabø, the preservation of national sovereignty played a role in the Faroese rejection as well. But he was convinced that it would not have been strong enough to prevent EC membership if the Faroese Home Rule government had been able to preserve an exclusive fishing limit of twelve miles. In his study of Faroese fisheries and economic policy in the 1970s, Kurt Johannesen came to the same conclusion.⁵³

None of the follow-up studies on Faroese EU policy questioned their standpoint.⁵⁴ The European Commission itself believed that the Faroese rejection of EC membership in 1974 had been related to uncertainty about future fisheries policy in the North Atlantic.⁵⁵ However, Árni Ólafsson attributed a slightly greater role to nationalist sentiment, claiming that »the strong feeling of national identity of the Faroese« was the first factor which came to his mind when asked about the reasons for the Faroes not joining the EC.⁵⁶ Jens Helgi Toftum and Durita Lamhauge Jóansdóttir supported his view, although Jóansdóttir affirmed that only the opposition focused on national sovereignty, while the Home Rule government emphasised economic concerns.⁵⁷ Ólafsson also believed that nationalist sentiment had not been able to make an impact because »another much more practical issue intervened«, the CFP.

Einar Lund Jensen analysed the change of preferences of Greenland's political elite

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- 52 See for this paragraph: Kristjan á NEYSTABØ (1984): *Færøerne og EF*. Copenhagen: Villadsen & Christensen, pp. 73-76.
- 53 Kurt JOHANNESSEN (1980): *Færøsk fiskeri- og markedspolitik i 70'erne*, MA thesis. Aarhus: Aarhus University, Department of Political Science and Government, pp. 74-98.
- 54 Jákup Sverri KASS (2006): *The Faroe Islands and Future European Integration*, MA thesis. Aarhus: The Aarhus School of Business, p. 30; Niklas FAGERLUND (1996): »Autonomous European Regions Enjoying a Special Relationship with the European Union«, in: Lise Lyck (ed.): *Constitutional and Economic Space of the Small Nordic Jurisdictions*. Stockholm: NordREFO [Nordic Institute of Regional Policy Research], pp. 90-121, here: p. 95; MØRKØRE (1996): »The Faroese Home Rule Model«, pp. 179-188; Jógvan MØRKØRE (1993): »Interessegrupper og strategier inden for det færøske fiskerierhverv – økonomiske og politiske implikationer«, in: Sámal T. F. Johansen, Rógvi Johansen and Gestur Hovgaard (eds.): *Krisen på Færøerne: Problemstillinger og perspektiver* (= NORS-skrifter No. 26). Roskilde: Roskilde University Centre, Institute of Geography and Computer Science, pp. 63-90, here: pp. 79-83.
- 55 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1976): *Føroyar, Danmark og EF*. Copenhagen: EC Press and Information Centre.
- 56 Árni ÓLAFSSON (1983): »The Faroe Islands – A Parallel Case«, in: Hjalte Rasmussen (ed.): *Greenland in the Process of Leaving the European Communities*, Report from the Conference organized by the Danish Society for European Studies held on Kollekølle, Copenhagen, on January 14-15, 1983. Copenhagen: Forlaget Europa, pp. 56-65, here: pp. 57-58.
- 57 Jens Helgi TOFTUM (1989): *EF og Færøerne: Forvaltning av fiskeressurser og utveksling av kvoter 1977-1989*, MA thesis. Tromsø: University of Tromsø, Norwegian College of Fishery Science, pp. 30-31; Durita Lamhauge JÓANSDÓTTIR (2007): *Færøerne og EF – en kompliceret affære: En analyse af de politiske problemstillinger bag det færøske nej til EU*, MA thesis. Aarhus: University of Aarhus, Institute of History and Area Studies, pp. 38-39.

from support to rejection of EC membership between 1967 and 1975.⁵⁸ He believed that it was a consequence of both increasing economic concerns with the CFP's equal access principle and the strong political request for increased self-determination. Hans R. Krämer explained Greenland's rejection of EC membership in 1972 with a »widespread suspicion vis-à-vis the EEC fisheries policy in the making«.⁵⁹ On the contrary, Axel Kjær Sørensen believed that Greenland's economic concerns with the CFP in 1972 were merely »technicalities« that could have been overcome, while »the real issue was the political one of being tied up to Brussels just at a time when all the endeavours were to be less tied up to Copenhagen«.⁶⁰

Frederik Harhoff also argued that Greenland's Home Rule government withdrew from EC membership in the early 1980s first and foremost because it wanted to exercise its right to self-determination.⁶¹ He believed that Greenland's withdrawal illustrated the »enormous gap and lack of understanding between European integration and non-European Greenland self-determination«. As an »eskimo society with substantially different norms, culture, climate, ethnicity, social structure, economy, industrial pattern, infrastructure and basis of existence,« Greenland would not »fit well into the European integration«. ⁶² At the same time, Harhoff stated that Greenland's withdrawal was motivated in particular by »the need to obtain full and autonomous control over fishery in its waters«. ⁶³ The German diplomat Werner Ungerer added that fisheries had a high »emotional and political significance« for Greenland. ⁶⁴ This would make it difficult for Greenlanders to come to terms with fishing quotas in Greenlandic waters being decided in Brussels. Ove Johansen, Carsten Lehmann Sørensen and Hans R. Krämer came to the same conclusions regarding Greenland's withdrawal. ⁶⁵ Other researchers focused on the legal aspects of Greenland's withdrawal. ⁶⁶

58 Einar Lund JENSEN (1977): *Grønland og EF: En undersøgelse af EF-debatten i Grønland og dens sammenhæng med den grønlandske debat om hjemmestyre frem til februar 1975*. Vedbæk: Kragstedet.

59 Hans R. KRÄMER (1982): »Greenland's European Community (EC)-Referendum, Background and Consequences«, in: *German Yearbook of International Law* 25, pp. 273-289, here: p. 277.

60 SØRENSEN (2007): *Denmark-Greenland*, pp. 143-145. Cf. SØRENSEN (1995): »Greenland«, p. 103.

61 Frederik HARHOFF (1983): »Preface«, in: Hjalte Rasmussen (ed.): *Greenland in the Process of Leaving the European Communities*, Report from the Conference organized by the Danish Society for European Studies held on Kollokole, Copenhagen, on January 14-15, 1983. Copenhagen: Forlaget Europa, pp. 5-8, here: pp. 7-8.

62 Frederik HARHOFF (1983): »Greenland's Withdrawal from the European Communities«, in: *Common Market Law Review* 20 (1), pp. 13-33, here: p. 22.

63 Ibid, p. 32.

64 Werner UNGERER (1984): »Der »Austritt« Grönlands aus der Europäischen Gemeinschaft«, in: *Europa-Archiv: Zeitschrift für Internationale Politik* 39 (11), pp. 345-352, here: p. 346.

65 Ove JOHANSEN and Carsten Lehmann SØRENSEN (1982): *Grønlands vej ud af EF*. Aarhus: University of Aarhus, Department of Political Science and Government, pp. 18-19; Carsten Lehmann SØRENSEN (1980): »Det grønlandske EF-medlemskab«, in: *Politica* 12 (4), pp. 97-118, here: p. 118; Hans R. KRÄMER (1983): *Grønland und die Europäische Gemeinschaft* (= Kieler Diskussionsbeiträge 93). Kiel: Institut für Weltwirtschaft, pp. 2-3, 25-26.

66 Friedl WEISS (1985): »Greenland's Withdrawal from the European Communities«, in: *European Law Review* 10 (3), pp. 173-185; Gudmundur ALFREDSSON (1982): »Greenland and the Law of Political Decolonization«, in: *German Yearbook of International Law* 25, pp. 290-308; Frederik HARHOFF (1982): »Grønland, Danmark og EF«, in: *Tidsskriftet Grønland* 30 (4), pp. 120-124.

Durita Lamhauge Jóansdóttir and Jákup Sverri Kass examined the continued rejection of EU membership in the Faroes in the new millennium. Both believed that political parties in the Faroes continued to be opposed to EU membership because of the CFP.⁶⁷ Jóansdóttir argued that Faroese politicians feared that German, Spanish or Portuguese trawlers would deplete Faroese fish stocks once the Faroes had joined the EU. Moreover, Faroese politicians were convinced that the Faroese fisheries management system was better suited to protect Faroese fish stocks than the CFP.⁶⁸

However, Jóansdóttir also found that some Faroese parties rejected EU membership because of the transfer of sovereignty.⁶⁹ Substituting Danish control for control by EU institutions would reverse the long-standing attempts to secure Faroese sovereignty over more policy areas. Moreover, EU membership would be intrinsically connected to the unresolved debate about the constitutional status of the Faroe Islands. Essentially, the Faroe Islands would have two possibilities to become a member of the EU: either as part of Denmark or as an independent state. For those parties willing to preserve the union, the first possibility would be unthinkable; for those parties favouring separation, the second. They particularly feared that the Faroe Islands would not be adequately represented in the EU's institutions as a part of Denmark. Any discussion of EU membership in the Faroes was therefore doomed to fail from the outset, since it first required agreement on the islands' constitutional status, which had not been reached in more than sixty years.⁷⁰

Interestingly, Jóansdóttir developed a similar hypothesis for the Faroe Islands as Bergmann did for Iceland when she maintained that the political problem with the transfer of sovereignty to the EU was connected to control over fisheries resources. She mentioned that Faroese control over its fish would need to be seen as a »symbol of what Home Rule has achieved«, and what it could lose again if the Faroes joined the EU.⁷¹ Transferring national sovereignty over their fisheries resources to the EU would therefore be out of question for the Faroes, since fish were their »only natural resource of meaning«.

1.5. The research project and its scientific value

The similar political and economic background of the North Atlantic nations and their similar European policy choices suggest that Faroese and Greenlandic governments might have been driven by the same or at least similar interests in

67 See for the following: JÓANSDÓTTIR (2007): *Færøerne og EF*, pp. 78-102; KASS (2006): *The Faroe Islands*, pp. 44-46.

68 For an overview of the Faroese fisheries management system in place since 2004 see Stig S. GEZELIUS (2008): »From Catch Quotas to Effort Regulation: Politics and Implementation in the Faeroese Fisheries«, in: Stig S. Gezelius and Jesper Raakjær (eds.): *Making Fisheries Management Work: Implementation of Policies for Sustainable Fishing* (= Reviews: Methods and Technologies in Fish Biology and Fisheries 8). Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 99-129.

69 See for the following: JÓANSDÓTTIR (2007): *Færøerne og EF*, pp. 65-77.

70 Ibid, p. 106.

71 Ibid, pp. 78-79, 82.

their European policy choices as Icelandic governments. As outlined above, the few existing studies already show that European debates in the Faroe Islands and Greenland revolved around similar matters as in Iceland – economic concerns with the CFP and political concerns with the transfer of national sovereignty.

This book provides the first overall and in-depth analysis of the European policy choices of the governments in the Faroe Islands and Greenland over a period of more than 50 years. The core objective is to find out whether the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments based their position on membership in the EEC, the EC and the EU since 1959 on their economic or political interests. The research questions are:

- (1) What drives European policy in the Faroe Islands and Greenland?
- (2) Were economic or political interests the determining factor behind the European policy choices of Faroese and Greenlandic governments?

In this context, Bergmann's hypothesis of the peculiar role of national sovereignty in Iceland's European policy choices due to the importance of control over its fisheries resources deserves special attention. Can a similar hypothesis be developed for the European policy choices of Faroese and Greenlandic governments as well?

- (3) Was the rejection of the CFP more a political problem – that the Faroes and Greenland wanted to remain in control of their single most important source of income – than an economic one – that they had to preserve the fish stocks in their waters to protect their own fishermen?

Jóansdóttir assumes that this could be the case in the Faroe Islands, but she does not weigh the economic and political interests, which she makes responsible for the European policy choices of Faroese governments. Moreover, it is also clear from her findings that – other than in Iceland – sovereignty has yet another dimension in the Faroes and in Greenland because both nations are not independent from Denmark. Ungerer also hints at the political importance of being in charge of one's single most important resource in the case of Greenland's Home Rule government.

However, it would be relatively easy to simply prove that there is some supporting evidence that national sovereignty plays a peculiar role in the Faroes and Greenland as well. This would be an »exceptionally weak standard that almost any plausible conjecture can meet« and it would most certainly also be met in this case.⁷² Moreover, the analysis would then have to exclude the first European policy debates in the Faroe Islands and Greenland, which had already taken place before the introduction of the equal access principle in 1970 and the establishment of a fisheries management system on EU level between 1977 and 1983.

Therefore, this book takes liberal intergovernmentalism as a theoretical starting point. Moravcsik's theory has not acquired the status of a »baseline theory«

72 MORAVCSIK (1998): *The Choice for Europe*, p. 77.

for nothing. Most European integration scholars would agree that its theoretical soundness, empirical power, utility and not least »the apparent accuracy of the substantive assumptions and empirical predictions it advances about European politics« make it an »essential first cut explanation against which other theories are often compared«. ⁷³ This should not be different with regard to the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Bergmann must be criticised for excluding LI as a valid explanation for Iceland's Euroscepticism beforehand, because neither Thorhallsson nor other scholars had empirically established that LI might *not* be able to explain the European policy decisions of Iceland's governments after all. Yet, this does not mean either that Bergmann could not have been right that Iceland rejected EU membership due to the significance of preserving the nation's sovereignty over its fisheries resources, irrespective of the economic aspects of membership.

According to LI, economic interests should have been a sufficient condition for explaining each of the varying European policy choices of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments. In order to assess whether this was the case, the congruence method will be applied. ⁷⁴ This means that it will be tested as to whether there actually was a causal relationship between the economic interests of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments and their European policy choices. Furthermore, their political interests should have only played a leading role for the Faroese and Greenlandic governments if their economic interests had been weak, diffuse or indeterminate. If this was the case, it would not only do LI's status as baseline theory of European integration justice, but also mean that national sovereignty does not play a peculiar role in the European policy choices of the Faroes and Greenland, which might again raise doubts with regard to the validity of Bergmann's assumptions for the Icelandic case. Neystabø and Johannesen, for example, are convinced that the Faroese government based its decision against EC membership in 1974 upon an economic cost-benefit calculation and remained unaffected by political concerns. ⁷⁵

However, if the political interests of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments tipped their European policies in one direction, irrespective of economic interests, this outcome would strongly reject LI's assumptions. Harhoff, Krämer, Johansen and Sørensen all claim that Greenland's Home Rule government deliberately sacrificed the economic benefits of EC membership when it withdrew from EC membership in order to be able to exercise its right to self-determination. ⁷⁶ In this case, one would have to take a closer look at the hypothesis that political interests such as the struggle for national sovereignty actually weighed more than economic interests and that this might have been the case in the Faroes and in

73 MORAVCSIK and SCHIMMELFENNIG (2009): »Liberal Intergovernmentalism«, p. 83.

74 Cf. Alexander L. GEORGE and Andrew BENNETT (2004): *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (= BCSIA Studies in International Security). Cambridge and London: MIT Press, pp. 181-204.

75 NEYSTABØ (1984): *Færøerne og EF*, pp. 73-76; JOHANNESSEN (1980): *Færøsk fiskeri- og markeds-politik*, pp. 95-98.

76 HARHOFF (1983): »Greenland's Withdrawal«, p. 32; KRÄMER (1983): *Grønland und die Europäische Gemeinschaft*, pp. 29-30; JOHANSEN and SØRENSEN (1982): *Grønlands vej*, p. 19.

Greenland because of the peculiar importance of preserving national sovereignty over their fisheries resources.

It is not argued that the findings in this book should be generalised for other European states. In the social sciences there is a huge debate about whether one should generalise from qualitative research at all. Due to its extensive scope, qualitative research usually focuses on small groups and does not systematically generalise to some wider population.⁷⁷ According to George and Bennett, qualitative researchers should therefore

sacrifice the parsimony and broad applicability of their theories to develop cumulatively contingent generalizations that apply to well-defined types or subtypes of cases with a high degree of explanatory richness.⁷⁸

Consequently, those qualitative researchers who have attempted to generalise from their research have been prone to criticism.⁷⁹ Having said that, it would certainly increase doubt regarding the primacy of economic interests for the European policy choices of national governments in Europe if the Faroe Islands and Greenland and maybe the whole North Atlantic region chose national sovereignty over the economic benefits of EU membership. Moreover, it would reveal structural conditions under which the assumption of an elite consensus on EU membership could at least be called into question. Then, it would be possible to speak of North Atlantic Euroscepticism.

This book does not analyse *public* Euroscepticism in the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Of course, elite and public Euroscepticism often go hand in hand because elites are always affected by the opinion of their citizens on EU membership, on whom they depend for re-election. In this respect, public Euroscepticism indirectly plays a role. But the experiences of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden and of other states in Europe also show that low public support did not always prevent political elites from taking significant steps towards EU membership.⁸⁰ This difference between public and elite Euroscepticism plays a minor role in the Faroe Islands, since the public never participated directly in European policy-making. However, with respect to Greenland, this book will only provide an answer as to why the majority of Greenland's political elites wanted Greenland to withdraw from EC membership, but not necessarily as to why Greenland's people decided to follow its course in two referendums.

It is important to state that this book is safely grounded in positivist epistemology. This means that the attempt is to uncover causal relationships between economic interests, such as market access, and political interests, such as the preservation of national sovereignty, and the European policy choices of the Faroese

77 Joseph A. MAXWELL (2002): »Understanding and Validity in Qualitative Research«, in: *Harvard Educational Review* 62 (3), pp. 279-300, here: pp. 293-295.

78 GEORGE and BENNETT (2004): *Case Studies and Theory Development*, p. 31.

79 MORAVCSIK (1998): *The Choice for Europe*, p. 79.

80 INGEBRITSEN (1998): *The Nordic States*, pp. 167-169.

and Greenlandic governments. These factors are defined more closely in chapter 2. One can of course agree with poststructuralist researchers that these economic and political interests do not automatically arise from nature, but are constructed in political discourses.⁸¹ However, this book is not interested in uncovering the underlying discourses that explain why Faroese and Greenlandic governments constructed their economic and political interests in a certain way. For example, one can certainly accept that the unique understanding of national sovereignty in the Faroe Islands and Greenland as being directly opposed to EU membership was constructed. But, for the purpose of this book, the question is not why it was constructed in that peculiar way. The focus is on how this existing construction affected the European policy choices of the Faroese and Greenlandic governments.

1.6. Structure of the book

Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter introduces the research design and discusses the dependent and independent variables and their interplay. Moreover, it gives an overview of the source material and the methodological premises. Chapters 3-9 provides an analysis of the Faroese and Greenlandic European policies since 1959. Chapter 3 examines the motivation behind the Faroese government's support for EEC membership (1959-63). Chapter 4 investigates the support for EEC membership of Greenland's elite (1959-68). Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the change of preferences from support to rejection of EC membership in the Faroe Islands (1970-74) and Greenland (1971-72). Chapter 7 analyses the motivation of Greenland's elite and its first Home Rule government to withdraw from EC membership (1972-85). Chapters 8 and 9 focus on the reconsideration, but continued rejection of EU membership by the Home Rule governments in the Faroe Islands (1989-) and Greenland (1989-).

Chapter 10 summarises the research findings and provides an outlook on future Faroese and Greenlandic European policy in order to make the analysis more relevant for policy-makers. It assesses LI's explanatory power for the European policy choices of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments and discusses to what extent one can speak of a particular role of national sovereignty in the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The chapter also takes a position on whether or not it is justified to speak of North Atlantic Euroscepticism and on whether or not it is plausible to question the elite consensus on European integration and the primacy of economic interests. Moreover, it estimates to what extent the current European policy of the Faroe Islands and Greenland is tenable in the long run. Based on this assessment, it identifies the main factors for the possibility of European policy change in the Faroe Islands and Greenland.

81 Thomas DIEZ (1999): »Riding the AM-track through Europe; or, The Pitfalls of a Rationalist Journey Through European Integration«, in: *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 28 (2), pp. 355-369, here: pp. 361-362; Thomas DIEZ (2001): »Europe as a Discursive Battleground: Discourse Analysis and European Integration Studies«, in: *Cooperation and Conflict* 36 (1), pp. 5-38, here: p. 9; Lene HANSEN (2002): »Introduction«, in: Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.) (2002): *The Nordic States and European Integration*. London and New York: Routledge, p. 5.

Analysing Faroese and Greenlandic European policy

2.1. Seven European policy choices since 1959

This book explains the European policy choices of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments that led to their rejection of EU membership. The dependent variables are therefore all decisions of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments on membership of the EEC, the EC and the EU since 1959. These decisions can be divided into seven cases of European policy choices, which can both be grouped into two longitudinal nation case studies and three different time periods for cross-national comparison. This means that, in this book, the positions of Faroese and Greenlandic governments on EEC/EC/EU membership are studied both as single cases over time with inter-cases and cross-nationally at three different time periods.

Dividing Faroese and Greenlandic European policy in seven different European policy choices helps to avoid the typical selection bias of research projects selected on the dependent variable.⁸² Of course, the Faroe Islands and Greenland have been chosen as cases for this study on European integration because of their remarkable Euroscepticism, reflected in their overall rejection of EU membership so far. The problem is only that this book would not be able to explain what caused this rejection if there was no variation in the European policy outcome, i.e. if this book did not include other cases in the analysis, in which the same or other causes led to support for EU membership.

Dividing Faroese and Greenlandic European policy in several inter-cases creates the necessary variation on the dependent variable. In 1961, the Faroese Home Rule government supported EEC membership. In 1961 and 1967, Greenland's political elite did so as well. Although these declarations of support did not result in eventual EEC membership, this variation over time makes it possible to identify the factors which really mattered and which remained stable in both nations over time in contrast to other factors, which tended to give way. Moreover, cross-national comparisons help to identify commonalities in the European policy choices of Faroese and Greenlandic governments at certain points in time. To give an example: if both the Faroese and Greenlandic governments turned from being supporters to

82 Cf. Gary KING, Robert O. KEOHANE and Sidney VERBA (1994): *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Interference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton and Chichester: Princeton University Press, pp. 129-132.

opponents of EC membership after the introduction of the equal access principle in the CFP in 1970, it would strengthen the claim that there could be something like a common North Atlantic Euroscepticism, based on the rejection of the CFP.

All major European policy decisions in the Faroe Islands and Greenland are included in the case selection for this book. In the 1960s, both the Home Rule government in the Faroe Islands (case 1) and Greenland's political elite in the *Landsråd* and in the *Folketing* (the Danish parliament) (case 2) supported EEC membership. However, French President De Gaulle's veto of the UK's application prevented Denmark's, the Faroes' and Greenland's accession to the EEC. In the 1970s, the Faroese Home Rule government and Greenland's political elite turned from supporting to opposing EC membership. All political parties in the Faroes (case 3) and a great majority of the *Landsråd* and of Greenland's electorate (case 4) rejected the inclusion of the Faroe Islands and Greenland in Denmark's EC membership. However, only the Faroes could remain outside. Greenland was forced to join the EC together with Denmark, since the total Danish vote in the referendum was in favour of EC membership. After the introduction of Home Rule in 1979, the Greenlandic government took the EC matter up for revision (case 5). In another referendum in 1982, a majority of 52 per cent voted against Greenland's continued membership. In 1985, Greenland withdrew from the EC. In the early 1990s, EU membership became an issue again in the Faroes and in Greenland for some political parties, but the Faroese (case 6) and Greenlandic (case 7) Home Rule governments continued to reject it.

Table 2: Seven inter-cases at three time periods

<i>Time period</i>	<i>Case</i>	<i>Inter-case</i>	<i>European policy outcome</i>
EEC debate (1960s)	Faroe Islands	1959-1968	Support for EEC membership
	Greenland	1959-1968	Support for EEC membership
EC debate (1970s, 1980s)	Faroe Islands	1970-1974	Rejection of EC membership
	Greenland	1971-1972	Rejection of EC membership
	Greenland	1972-1985	Withdrawal from EC membership
EU debate (since 1989)	Faroe Islands	1989-	Rejection of EU membership
	Greenland	1989-	Rejection of EU membership

2.2. The Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments

In this book, the term »Home Rule government« is defined in a broad sense. It does not only include government officials (prime ministers, ministers and their administrative staff), but also members of the political parties in general that are represented in government, in particular MPs and party leaders. Moreover, the analysis also includes in part the position of leaders and MPs of opposition parties, and of economic interest groups and other societal actors for triangulation purposes.

In the Faroe Islands, the analysis therefore focuses predominantly on the political parties that formed the Faroese Home Rule government and have been represented


in the *Løgting* since the establishment of Home Rule in 1948.⁸³ These parties have been divided nearly accurately in half for over a century between those who support the continued union with Denmark (unionists) and those who support increased autonomy or even complete separation from Denmark (separatists). Unlike the party systems of other Nordic states, the party system in the Faroe Islands has therefore been characterised by a double dichotomy, the cleavage between unionism and separatism on the one hand and the traditional left-right cleavage on the other.

The Unionist Party (*Sambandsflokkurin*, SB) has the strongest emphasis on the continued union with Denmark and a liberal-conservative profile (unionist/rightist). The Social Democratic Party (*Javnaðarflokkurin*, JF) has also been in favour of the continued union with Denmark, but focuses rather on social democratic policies than on the constitutional question (leftist/unionist). The People's Party (*Fólkaflokkurin*, FF) supports an increased degree of Faroese autonomy from Denmark and aims at as little interference of the state into the economy as possible (rightist/separatist). It has strong roots in the Faroese business community. The Republican Party's (*Tjóðveldi*, until 2007 *Tjóðveldisflokkurin*, TF) main objective has been to separate from Denmark and to establish an independent Faroese republic based on a socialist ideology (separatist/leftist). From the middle of the 1950s onward, these four parties have traditionally shared between 15 and 25 per cent of the vote.

In the double dichotomy of the Faroese political system, the four larger parties have represented the four opposing corners, while smaller parties have traditionally occupied the centre ground, where the dichotomies cross each other (see figure 1). The smaller parties are the Self-Government Party (*Nýtt Sjálvstýri*, until 2015 *Sjálvstýrisflokkurin*, SF), the Faroese Progressive Party (*Føroya Framburðsflokkur*, FB), renamed into Christian People's Party, Faroese Progressive and Fisheries Party in 1984 (*Kristligi Fólkaflokkurin*, *Føroya Framburðs- og Fiskivinnuflokkur*, KrF), the Centre Party (*Miðflokkurin*, MF), and the Progresssive Party (*Framsókn*, F). FB/KrF was represented in the *Løgting* between 1958 and 1998, MF has been represented since 1994 and *Framsókn* entered parliament for the first time in 2011. Between 1994 and 1998, the Workers' Movement (*Verkamannafylkingin*, VF), a splinter group of JF, was also represented in the *Løgting*.

83 For the following overview of the political parties in the Faroe Islands see: LØGTINGIÐ (2008): »The Faroese Parliament« (http://www.logting.fo/files/File/2008/faldari_EN_web.pdf, 3 February 2014), p. 8; Jógvan MØRKØRE (1991): »Class Interests and Nationalism in Faroese Politics«, in: *North Atlantic Studies* 3 (1), pp. 57-67; Zakarias WANG (1989): *Stjórn málafrøði* (second edition). Hoyvík: Stíðin, ch. 11; GOODLAD (1987): *The Faroese Road*, pp. 9-13.

Figure 1: The Faroese party system⁸⁴



These parties never achieved more than ten per cent of the vote. However, they have usually been in a key position in Faroese politics because they have been able to tip the balance in Faroese politics in favour of a unionist, separatist, left-wing or right-wing government.⁸⁵ The postcolonial divide in Faroese politics between unionism and separatism gradually weakened in the latter half of the twentieth century. All parties have shifted closer to the centre. This has enabled previously unthinkable centre coalitions since the 1970s, most strikingly between FF, TF and SB between 1989 and 1991.

Although not the main object of investigation, the analysis also in part accounts for the position of important economic interest groups, social movements and other societal actors. In the Faroes, these are most importantly Faroe Seafood (until 1995 *Føroya Fiskasøla*), the Faroese Fishermen's Association (*Føroya Fiskimannafelag*) and the Faroese Shipowners' Association (*Føroya Reiðarafelag*). Moreover, in the

84 Own figure: Parties in bold are represented in the *Løgting* in 2015. The dates in brackets illustrate the periods, in which the parties were represented in the *Løgting*. Parties without dates in brackets were continuously represented in the *Løgting* between 1959 and 2015. Cf. MØRKØRE (1991): »Faroese Politics«, pp. 63, 66; JOHANNESSEN (1980): *Færøsk fiskeri- og markedspolitik*, p. 52.

85 SØLVARÁ (2002): *Løgtingið*, p. 327.

European debates in the early 1970s and 1990s, the People's Movement against the EEC/EU (*Fólkaþýlkingin móti EEC/EU*) also played an important role.

In Greenland, there was no Home Rule government before 1979. For the analysis of the position of Greenland on EEC and EC membership before 1979, the focus is therefore on Greenland's political elite. It is defined on the one hand as the MPs of the *Landsråd*, which – except for its chairman who was the highest-ranking Danish state official in Greenland (*Landshøvding*) until 1967 – were elected by the Greenlandic electorate and were ethnic Greenlanders,⁸⁶ and on the other hand as the two Greenlandic MPs in the *Folketing* after 1953, which – except for Mikael Gam (1960-63) – were also all ethnic Greenlanders. Representatives of the *Landsråd*, the two Greenlandic *Folketing* MPs and *Folketing* MPs from Denmark's largest parties also sat together in the *Grønlandsråd* (Greenland Council). From 1964 until 1979, this institution was responsible for making recommendations with regard to the planning and coordination of Denmark's Greenland policy and is partly included in the analysis as well.


After 1979, the analysis focuses on the political parties that were established shortly before the introduction of Home Rule and were then represented in Greenland's Home Rule government and the *Landsting*. The relationship with Denmark and the position on Greenland's EC membership became the main dividing points in the emerging party system.⁸⁷ Siumut (S, Greenlandic for »forward«), established in 1977, was very critical of Denmark's Greenland policy and fought for Greenland's self-determination and the introduction of Home Rule with a socialist profile. Inuit Ataatigiit (IA, Greenlandic for »human brotherhood«), established in 1978, was a more radical version of Siumut. It demanded even greater independence of Greenland from Denmark and rejected the capitalist system as such. The Labour Party (*Sulissartut Partiat*, SP) was established as the political wing of Greenland's Employees' Organisation (*Sulinermik Inuus-sutissarsiuteqartut Kattuffiat*, SIK) in 1979 and merged with IA in 1983. Atassut (A, Greenlandic for »togetherness«) also supported the introduction of Home Rule and greater self-determination for Greenland, but attached great importance to preserving the unity between Denmark and Greenland as well. In the 1980s, Siumut was the dominant political power in Greenlandic politics, but relied at times on the support of IA. Atassut became the main opposition party. It was the only party to support EC membership.

86 Jørgen Borchersen (1963-64) and Kaj Narup (1967-68) were the only ethnic Danes to be represented in the *Landsråd* between 1945 and 1972. See GOLDSCHMIDT (1976): *Fra integration til hjemmestyre*, p. 2.

87 For the following overview of the political parties in the Greenland see: Lise Jakob JANUSSEN (2004): »Demokratiets vilkår i Grønland«, in: Gorm Winther (ed.): *Demokrati og magt i Grønland*. Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, pp. 39-54; Thomas ANDERSEN and Ole TONSGAARD (2004): »Vælgermagt i Grønland«, in: Gorm Winther (ed.): *Demokrati og magt i Grønland*. Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, pp. 55-79; Lise LYCK (1998): *Valg og politik i Grønland med fokus på bæredygtighed*. Ballerup: Nordic Press; DAHL (1986): *Arktisk selvstyre*; FÆGTEBORG (1991): »Global and Local Politics«, pp. 32-38; Johannes MICHELSEN (1979): »Grønland – et partisystem under udvikling«, in: *Politica* 11 (3), pp. 46-75.

Before the establishment of Home Rule, Greenland's electorate elected independent candidates without party platforms to the *Landsråð*. This tradition clearly affected the emerging party system. It meant that – even at the beginning of the 21st century – the overwhelming majority of Greenland's electorate voted for individuals rather than for party lists and it also meant that MPs did not feel to bound to party discipline to a great extent. They often changed their allegiances and entertained their own proposals in the *Landsting*, which did not always correspond to general party lines. Thus, it has been difficult to place Greenland's political parties on a traditional left-right scale (see figure 2). Since their foundation, Siumut, IA and Atassut have moved a lot into the centre of the political spectre and do no longer differ essentially from each other in great policy matters.

Figure 2: The Greenlandic party system⁸⁸



88 Own figure: Parties in bold are represented in the *Landsting* in 2015. The dates in brackets behind AP, D, IP, KP, SP, PI and PN illustrate the periods, in which these parties were represented in the *Landsting*. A (1979-), IA (1983-) and S (1979-) have been continuously represented in the *Landsting*. In order to illustrate how difficult it is to place them on a left-right, unionist-separatist continuum, the figure shows their positions in 1979 and 1983 and their positions in 2015.

Support for Siumut remained stable until 2014. However, IA has developed from a splinter party into Siumut's main opponent for the Prime Minister's office. On the contrary, Atassut has gradually turned from Siumut's main opposition into a small party, dropping from 46.6 per cent in 1983 to 6.5 per cent in 2014. The decline of Atassut also led to the repeated establishment of new parties in the political centre since the 1990s. The Polar Party (*Issittup Partiiat*, IP), represented in the *Landsting* from 1987 until 1994, was the political wing of Greenland's Fishermen and Hunters' Association KNAPK (*Kalaalit Nunaanni Aalisartut Piniartullu Kattuffiat*), the Centre Party (*Akulliit Partiiat*, AP), represented in the *Landsting* from 1990 until 1998, was a splinter group of Atassut. Both parties emphasised the need for an increased privatisation of Greenland's economy. Since 2002, the social liberal Democrats (*Demokraatit*, D) have filled the centre-right gap in the *Landsting*. Moreover, some additional independent candidates were elected to the *Landsting* between 1999 and 2013 as well. From 2005 until 2013, they were organised in the Association of Candidates (*Kattusseqatigiit Partiiat*, KP).

The latest additions to Greenland's party system have been two splinter groups from IA and Siumut. Disappointed IA voters, who believed that IA had moved too much towards the centre of Greenlandic politics, established the radical left-wing and separatist Inuit Party (*Partii Inuit*, PI) in 2013. PI was immediately elected to the *Landsting*, but dissolved again after it did not win any seats in the 2014 elections. Following disagreement about Siumut's fisheries policy, Greenland's former Prime Minister Hans Enoksen left Siumut and founded *Partii Naleraq* (PN, »Point of Orientation Party«), which was also able to be immediately elected to the *Landsting*.

Like in the Faroes, the analysis also partly accounts for the position of important economic interest groups, social movements and other societal actors in Greenland. These are most importantly the Royal Greenland Trading Department (*Den Kongelige Grønlandske Handel*, KGH)⁸⁹, KNAPK and SIK. Moreover, the debate about Greenland's withdrawal in the early 1980s also led to the establishment of two social movements for and against withdrawal, which are also dealt with in this analysis. EC opponents in Siumut, IA, SP, KNAPK and SIK, joined forces in ANISA (Greenlandic for »Let's get out«), while EU supporters, mostly from Atassut, established the EAS (*EF-imut Atáinarnigssamik Sulekatigígífik*).

2.3. The interplay of economic and political interests

In this book, the congruence method is applied in order to test whether liberal intergovernmentalism can explain the European policy choices of Faroese and Greenlandic governments.⁹⁰ As outlined in chapter 1, Andrew Moravcsik assumes that national leaders

89 The Royal Greenland Trading Department was a Danish state company, which had a trade monopoly in Greenland until 1950. Greenland's Home Rule government took control of the company in 1986 and split it up into the companies KNI (trade), Royal Greenland (fishing), Royal Arctic Line (shipping) and Pisiffik (retail).

90 Cf. GEORGE and BENNETT (2004): *Case Studies and Theory Development*, pp. 181-204.

consistently pursued economic interests – primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers and secondarily the macroeconomic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions

in their European policy decisions.⁹¹ Thus, the correspondence between economic interests and the varying European policy choices of Faroese and Greenlandic governments is examined in each of the seven different inter-cases. Were economic interests in fact sufficient to explain European policy in the Faroes and in Greenland?

»Economic interests« are defined as the response of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments to the aggregate economic aspects of EU membership. The most important economic aspects are access to the internal market, consisting of the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons, and participation in the CFP and the various funding schemes of the EU after 1970. The response to the aggregate economic aspects of EU membership is divided along a continuum into five main positions: (1) a strong economic interest to support EU membership, (2) a medium economic interest to support EU membership, (3) a weak, diffuse or indeterminate economic interest, (4) a medium economic interest to reject EU membership and (5) a strong economic interest to reject EU membership.

Table 3: Continuum of economic and political interests in EU membership

Strong interest to support EU membership	Medium interest to support EU membership	Weak, diffuse or indeterminate interests	Medium interest to reject EU membership	Strong interest to reject EU membership
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According to LI, economic interests should only have been a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for explaining the varying European policy choices of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments. That means that political interests should also have been able to play a leading role for the Home Rule governments, but only if their economic interest had been »weak, diffuse or indeterminate«.

In this book, »political interests« are defined as the response of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments to the aggregate political aspects of EU membership. The most important political aspects are the transfer of national sovereignty to the EU, most importantly over fisheries resources since 1977 (formalised in 1983), and the European policy choices of Denmark, which always affected the debate in the Faroes and in Greenland due to their integration within the Danish Realm. The response to the aggregate political-related aspects of EU membership is divided along the same continuum into five main positions: (1) a strong political interest to support EU membership, (2) a medium political interest to support EU membership, (3) a weak, diffuse or indeterminate political interest,

91 MORAVCSIK (1998): *The Choice for Europe*, p. 3.

(4) a medium political interest to reject EU membership and (5) a strong political interest to reject EU membership.

Government officials (prime ministers, ministers and their administrative staff), MPs and leaders of the parties in government are considered to have a *strong economic interest to support EU membership* if a great majority of them refer to the same interest to support membership while at the same time hardly mentioning economic interests to reject membership. They are considered to have a *medium economic interest to support EU membership* if a majority of them refer to the same interest to support membership while a considerable number of them do not or also emphasise economic interests to reject membership. If political actors do not mention any particular economic interest to support or to reject membership, if they equally refer to economic interests to support and to reject membership or if their economic interests repeatedly change within short time periods, their economic interest will be considered *weak, diffuse or indeterminate*. They are considered to have a *medium economic interest to reject EU membership* if a majority refer to the same interest to reject membership while a considerable number do not or also emphasise economic interests to support EU membership. They are considered to have a *strong economic interest to reject EU membership* if a great majority refer to the same interest to reject membership while hardly mentioning any economic interests to support EU membership at the same time. This evaluation will equally apply to political interests in all seven inter-cases.

This classification will reveal different constellations of economic and political interests, which resulted in different European policy outcomes. If LI was right, one should expect consistency between the different constellations of economic and political interests and European policy choices, as outlined in table 4.

Table 4: Liberal intergovernmentalism's expected European policy outcomes for constellations of economic and political interests

Political interests Economic interests	Strong interest to support EU membership	Medium interest to support EU membership	Weak, diffuse or indeterminate interests	Medium interest to reject EU membership	Strong interest to reject EU membership
Strong interest to support EU membership	SUPPORT	SUPPORT	SUPPORT	SUPPORT	SUPPORT
Medium interest to support EU membership	SUPPORT	SUPPORT	SUPPORT	SUPPORT	SUPPORT
Weak, diffuse or indeterminate interests	SUPPORT	SUPPORT	?	REJECTION	REJECTION
Medium interest to reject EU membership	REJECTION	REJECTION	REJECTION	REJECTION	REJECTION
Strong interest to reject EU membership	REJECTION	REJECTION	REJECTION	REJECTION	REJECTION

Both a strong and a medium economic interest to support EU membership should always result in support for EU membership of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments, irrespective of their political interests. In return, both a strong and medium economic interest to reject EU membership should always result in the rejection of membership of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments, also here irrespective of their political interests. Only if their economic interests were weak, diffuse or indeterminate, would the European policy outcome depend on their political interests. Only then should a strong and medium political interest in supporting EU membership result in support for membership, while a strong and medium political interest to reject EU membership should lead to the rejection of membership. If both their political and economic interests were weak, diffuse or indeterminate, it would be impossible to explain the European policy outcome.

However, mere consistency between the different constellations of economic and political interests and European policy choices will not automatically imply a significant causal relationship and thus confirm LI. As opposed to what LI claims, a strong economic interest to support membership could only have made the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments support membership because they had a strong political interest to do so as well. The same can be said about a strong economic interest to reject membership. Consistency therefore does not automatically tell us whether a strong or medium economic interest was in fact a sufficient condition for certain European policy choices. Therefore, the congruence method is supplemented in this book with process-tracing in order to assess whether the consistency noted was actually causal or merely spurious.

Process-tracing is a useful supplementary tool to assess whether economic interests were *casually* linked to every change in the European policy choices of Faroese or Greenlandic governments.⁹² Only then can economic interests be considered to be a sufficient condition for European policy choices. Process-tracing means establishing causal chains between the independent variables – economic and political interests – and the dependent variable – the European policy choices. If European policy changed from one time period to another, but economic interests did not, economic interests cannot be sufficient to explain European policy. Thus, it is very helpful to divide Faroese and Greenlandic European policy into inter-cases in this book, which can be analysed on a »before/after« basis over time. To give an example: Assuming that Greenland's political elite had an economic interest to reject EC membership both in the 1960s and in the early 1970s, why then did it support EEC membership in the 1960s, but reject it in the 1970s? If its European policy changed, but its economic interest did not, process-tracing would raise significant doubt as to whether there actually is a causal relationship between the strong economic interest to remain outside and the rejection of membership in the 1970s, although the outcome is consistent with LI assumptions. Of course,

92 This book follows the suggestion of Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett to apply process-tracing in order to assess whether the consistency noted was spurious or causal. See GEORGE and BENNETT (2004): *Case Studies and Theory Development*, pp. 181-232.

process-tracing will not be able to help much if both economic and political interests changed.

If the economic interests of the Faroese and Greenlandic governments were not sufficient to explain their European policy choices in one of the inter-cases, LI's assumptions would have to be rejected with regard to this case. In each such case, possible reasons for its failure to apply and alternative explanations will be discussed. The three inter-cases after 1977 will also include a discussion of the hypothesis that preserving national sovereignty was so important for the Faroe Islands and for Greenland because it meant retaining control over their fisheries resources. Process-tracing will help with assessing the significance of this argument. If LI is able to explain the four inter-cases before 1977, but not the three inter-cases after 1977, this might provide strong evidence for confirming this hypothesis.

2.4. Source material

In order to study the underlying preferences of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments towards their position on EU membership, this book relies on their own accounts for their motivation – as contained predominantly in parliamentary proceedings, newspaper articles and other forms of publications. The main sources are the annual parliamentary proceedings of the *Løgting* (*Løgtingstiðindi*, LT) from 1959 until 2015 in the case of the Faroe Islands and of the *Landsråd* (*Grønlands landsråds forhandlinger*, GLRF) from 1959 until 1979 and the *Landsting* (*Grønlands landstings forhandlinger*, GLTF) from 1979 until 2015 in the case of Greenland. In order to account for the position of Faroese and Greenlandic *Folketing* MPs, the source material also includes some of the annual parliamentary proceedings of the *Folketing* (*Folketingstidende*, FT) between 1959 and 2015.

Løgtingstiðindi contains an overview of all European policy proposals, the majority and minority positions of MPs and political parties on these proposals and voting procedures. Moreover, it also includes the annual state of the nation addresses of the Faroese Prime Minister (*Ólavsøkurøða*)⁹³ as well as appendixes with additional speeches of government officials, government reports or statements of interest groups and social movements. All hardback editions of LT until 1997 could be accessed online through the website of the *Løgting*.⁹⁴ From 1998 onward, parliamentary proceedings could be accessed through direct links on the same website. Therefore, there are no page numbers after 1997. GLRF and GLTF also include an overview of all European policy proposals with relevant appendixes and voting procedures. In contrast to LT, they also transcribe the speeches of MPs, mainly in indirect speech. For the analysis of both Greenlandic parliamentary proceedings, hardback editions were used until 1992. After 1992, the annual editions of GLTF

93 The annual opening of a new parliamentary session of the *Løgting* always takes place on the Faroese national holiday, *Ólavsøka*, on 29 July. Since 1956, it has become a tradition that the Prime Minister holds a speech on that day (*løgmansrøðan*) about the general state of the nation. See SØLVARÁ (2002): *Løgtingið*, p. 300.

94 LØGTINGIÐ (2013): »Løgtingstiðindi« (<http://www.logting.fo/page/view.gebs?page.id=26>, 3 February 2014).

could be accessed online, however with some limitations.⁹⁵ With regard to FT, the hardback editions of *Folketingets forhandlinger* were used, which reproduced the exact wording of all speeches of *Folketing* MPs.

In addition, the source material includes articles from the main Faroese and Greenlandic newspapers. Members of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments most often expressed the motivation for their European policies with articles in national newspapers. Moreover, these papers also reprinted or summarised the speeches of individual MPs and are thus a valuable supplement to the annual parliamentary proceedings.

In the Faroes, nearly all newspapers were party papers until at least the middle of the 1970s. According to the historian and JF politician Jóannes Dalsgaard, the absence of any party archives makes them the »most central source with regard to political history« alongside LT.⁹⁶ The journalist and TF politician Finnboði Ísakson believes that the coverage of political events in these papers was rarely objective, which meant that »there has been very little difference between the leading article and the rest of the paper. The newspapers have in fact been one great leader in their whole.«⁹⁷ Party leaders were often editors-in-chief after the end of their careers; sometimes they were editors-in-chief before their party career and sometimes they were both editors-in-chief and high-ranking party politicians at the same time. Thus, the sources also include the articles of editors-in-chief of these party papers at times in order to clarify a political party's position. This does not mean that the position of a political party and its paper had to be identical, but it was always reasonably close enough to allow for this kind of analysis.

The most important Faroese newspapers included in the analysis are *Dagblaðið* (FF), *Dimmalætting* (SB), *14. September* (TF), *Sosialurin* (JF) and *Tingakrossur* (SF). *Dimmalætting* traditionally had the greatest circulation, about twice as much as the other papers before 1990.⁹⁸ From the middle of the 1970s onward, *Dimmalætting* and *Sosialurin* gradually turned into non-affiliated newspapers, opening up for articles from candidates of all political parties.⁹⁹ After the Faroese economic crisis in the early 1990s, all papers except for *Dimmalætting* and *Sosialurin* eventually shut down. All papers were accessed by microfilm. Moreover, the online archive of *Sosialurin* was used for access to its articles after 1997.

In Greenland, the two nationwide Greenlandic papers, *Atuagagdliutit / Grønlandsposten* (A/G) and *Sermitsiaq*, already existed long before the foundation of the

95 The online editions of GLTF sometimes only provided agendas without any further information. See INATSIARTUT (2013): »Oversigt over samlinger« (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/samlingerhome/oversigt-over-samlinger.aspx>, 3 February 2014).

96 Arnbjørn Ólavsson DALSGARD (1998): *De færøske aviser: Som kulturfænomen og historisk kilde*, MA thesis. Copenhagen: Royal School of Library and Information Science, p. 53.

97 Ibid, p. 55: »[Noget der er specielt for de færøske aviser indtil nu er, at] der har været meget lidt forskel på hvad der har stået i lederen, og hvad der har stået i resten af avisen. Aviserne har faktisk været én stor leder hele vejen igennem.«

98 Ibid, p. 32.

99 Ibid, pp. 37, 41.

political parties and remained unaffiliated to them from the beginning.¹⁰⁰ However, *Sermitsiaq* only turned from being a local newspaper for Greenland's capital Nuuk to a nationwide newspaper in 1980. Both newspapers gave political actors a lot of space to express their motivations for their European policy choices and are therefore included in the analysis. Greenland's two major parties also established their own party papers after their foundation in the 1970s and 1980s. The analysis therefore also includes articles in party papers such as *Siumut*, *Nuggit (A)* and *ANISA*.¹⁰¹ *A/G* and *Sermitsiaq* were accessed by microfilm. Moreover, the online archive *timarit.is* was also used for access to *A/G* articles until 1999.¹⁰² In 2010, *A/G* and *Sermitsiaq* merged. They continued to be published as independent papers, but had a common news platform, *sermitsiaq.gl*. Articles from this news platform are also included in the analysis.

Beyond the annual parliamentary proceedings and Faroese and Greenlandic papers, the analysis also includes contributions from important political actors at conferences, in academic papers and in other publications. Moreover, this book refers to official sources such as European Commission documents, Faroese committee reports on EU relations, statistical data from the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule authorities and direct information from (mostly the websites of) government ministries and political parties.

Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of Danish, Faroese and Icelandic quotations are by the author. The translations have attempted to stay as close to the original wording as possible. However, this was not always possible. Therefore, the original text for each of the quotations is included in the footnotes. Readers who can master these languages will be able to retrace the translations. For translations of official institutions from Denmark, the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Iceland, the English terms were used that have been chosen by the institutions themselves, if available. Otherwise, the translations are by the author.

2.5. Achieving »trustworthiness«

In order to define from the source material whether the economic and political interest of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments to support or to reject membership was strong, medium or weak, diffuse or indeterminate, this analysis is based on qualitative document analysis (QDA).¹⁰³ Contrary to quantitative research,

100 See for this paragraph: Karina FLEISCHER (2008): *Den grønlandske presse – en undersøgelse af presens betydning i forhold til den grønlandske nationsdannelsesproces 1979-2008*, MA thesis. Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, Section for Eskimology and Arctic Studies, pp. 29-39. Cf. Hanne EDELSEN and Kristine KORSGAARD (2004): *Politisk kultur i Grønland* (= Projekt- & Karrierevejledningens Rapportserie 104). Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Social Sciences, pp. 31-33.

101 In Greenland, the names of the party papers were often identical with the names of the parties. If the names appear in italics in this book, it is referred to the paper. If the names appear without italics, it is referred to the parties.

102 TÍMARIT.IS (2013): »Atuagagdlitit« (<http://timarit.is/details.jsp?pubId=314&lang=en>, 3 February 2014).

103 Cf. for this paragraph: Jared J. WESLEY (2014): »The Qualitative Analysis of Political Documents«, in: Bertie Kaal, Isa Maks and Annemarie van Elfrinkhof (eds.): *From Text to Political Positions. Text Analysis Across Disciplines* (= Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture 55). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, pp. 135-159.

there are no objective tools to assess the validity of QDA. QDA is not convincing when it meets statistical tests, but is so when it presents a clear description and a strong argument for one particular interpretation of events. However, this leaves readers with little choice but to »trust« that the interpretation of the data will be accurate and legitimate. Achieving trustworthiness is even harder in the case of this analysis, as it must rely on political actors' own accounts for their motivation.

It is a well-known problem for studies of elites that the underlying motives for certain policies tend to be very different from the arguments used to legitimise these policies in public. Public statements might be misleading or incomplete and even intentionally so, if to the advantage of members of the political elite.¹⁰⁴ A member of the government might support a certain European policy by one argument in public, but in fact be motivated by another. He might be unwilling to disguise his true intention, as it would be much harder to »sell« this intention to the electorate. Unfortunately, the extensive scope of this book makes it impossible to rely to a great extent on – what Andrew Moravcsik calls – »hard« primary resources,

internal government reports, contemporary records of confidential deliberations among key decision-makers, verbatim diary entries, corroborated memoirs by participants who appear to lack an ulterior motive for misrepresentation, and lengthy interviews with numerous policy-makers in which the interviewer challenged or sought to corroborate the ex post claims of policy-makers.

In order to increase the trustworthiness of the analysis of the motivations of Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments, three different strategies are employed. First of all, it is rather the statements of high-ranking party members that are generalised to the position of the whole party, and the position of the leading coalition party that is generalised to the position of the government in order to decide whether a government's economic and political interest to support or reject a particular European policy was strong, medium or weak, diffuse or indeterminate. Their positions are more likely to reflect the European policy strategy of the whole party or the whole government than evidence generated for example from statements of the parliamentary backbenchers of a small coalition partner.

Moreover, two forms of methodological triangulation are employed in this book. The first is to »seek complementary information from different angles« in the analysis.¹⁰⁵ This means that the strength of the economic and political interests of Faroese and Greenlandic governments is not only assessed by analysing the statements of the parties in government. Their statements are also related to the economic and political interests of the parties in opposition, which – by their very nature – tend to assess government policy critically. In addition, they are related to the interests of the most important economic interest groups, which – accord-

104 See for this paragraph: MORAVCSIK (1998): *The Choice for Europe*, pp. 82-85.

105 See for this paragraph: Martyn HAMMERSLEY (2008): »Troubles with Triangulation«, in: Manred Max Bergman (ed.): *Advances in Mixed Methods Research*. Los Angeles et. al.: Sage, pp. 22-36, here: p. 27.

ing to Ingebritsen's version of LI – should correspond to the economic interest of governments.¹⁰⁶ The position of opposition parties and interest groups puts a government's alleged economic and political interest into perspective and thus yields a more complete picture of its actual interest. This facilitates making a qualified judgment about whether its economic and political interest to support or to reject a certain European policy was strong, medium or weak, diffuse or indeterminate.

The second form of methodological triangulation which is applied in this analysis is to check the validity of the interpretation »by recourse to at least one further source of a strategically different type«. ¹⁰⁷ Moravcsik suggests comparing as much of the evidence from political statements to patterns of »objective facts«. ¹⁰⁸ Such patterns can be the simple chronological order of events, quantitative data such as trade statistics or when policy decisions speak for themselves. They can give important insights into the »real« motivations for European policy choices because, in contrast to public statements, it is more difficult for political elites to falsify or manipulate them. In this analysis, the strength of the economic and political interests of the Faroese and Greenlandic governments is therefore related to objective facts. If a government claims to have a strong economic interest in EU membership because of its benefits for the export sector, but if trade statistics reveal that only a tiny fraction of exports goes to the EU market, this would raise strong doubts that its economic interest was actually that strong. Thus, it is possible to find out at least where there is a striking difference between the statements of political elites and their actual motivation.

106 INGEBRITSEN (1998): *The Nordic States*, pp. 36-41.

107 HAMMERSLEY (2008): »Troubles with Triangulation«, pp. 23-25.

108 MORAVCSIK (1998): *The Choice for Europe*, p. 82.

The Faroe Islands (1959-63): To follow or not to follow Denmark into the EEC?¹⁰⁹

Denmark's decision to co-found EFTA in 1959 and to apply for EEC membership in 1961 provoked the first ever debates on European integration in the Faroe Islands. Due to its Home Rule status, the Danish government left the decision about whether or not the Faroes should be included in Denmark's membership in these European trade communities to the Faroese Home Rule institutions. In February 1961, a unionist government in the Faroes, consisting of JF, SB and SF (see table 5), proposed that the Faroes should follow Denmark into EFTA and not join the EEC. However, after Denmark's EEC membership application, the same government also supported Faroese membership in the EEC in November 1961. In June 1962, the accession negotiations between Denmark and the EEC focused for the first time on the legal problems and economic considerations with regard to the Faroe Islands.¹¹⁰ But Faroese membership plans ended abruptly when French President Charles De Gaulle vetoed British membership in the EEC in January 1963. Denmark subsequently adjourned its membership application and the Faroe Islands joined EFTA instead in 1968.

109 Some of the insights from this chapter have been published in Christian REBHAN (2014): »Postcolonial Politics and the Debates on Membership in the European Communities in the Faroe Islands (1959-1974)«, in: Lill-Ann Körber and Ebbe Volquardsen (eds.): *The Postcolonial North Atlantic: Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands* (= Berliner Beiträge zur Skandinavistik 20). Berlin: Humboldt University, Department for Northern European Studies, pp. 213-239.

110 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010): »Introduction to the Fonds of the Central Archives relating to the First Enlargement of the European Economic Community, 1961-73«, SN 4143/10 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/archives-Report_Enlargement.pdf, 3 February 2014), p. 26.

Table 5: Coalition governments in the Faroe Islands (1959-79)¹¹¹

<i>Løgting elections</i>	<i>Faroese Home Rule governments (Føroya landsstýri)</i>		<i>Faroese Prime Ministers (løgmann)</i>
1958	1959-63	JF – SB – SF	Petur Mohr Dam (JF)
1962	1963-67	TF – FF – SF – FB	Hákun Djurhuus (FF)
1966	1967-68	JF – SB – SF	Petur Mohr Dam (JF)
	1968-70	JF – SB – SF	Kristian Djurhuus (SB)
1970	1970-75	JF – SB – SF	Atli P. Dam (JF)
1974	1975-79	JF – TF – FF	

Chapter 3 explains the initial support for EEC membership in the Faroe Islands in 1961. It tests LI's assumption that the Faroese Home Rule government supported EEC membership because it had a strong or medium economic interest to do so. Moreover, it analyses the role of political interests in its European policy choice. According to LI, the Faroese Home Rule government could also have supported EEC membership in 1961 due to a strong or medium political interest in membership if its economic interest had been weak, diffuse or indeterminate. The EEC debate between 1959 and 1963 promises interesting insights into the driving forces behind the European policy choices of Faroese Home Rule governments. It has remained the only time so far that the Faroe Islands supported membership of the European Communities. This difference between the initial and later European policy choices makes it possible to apply process-tracing between the support for EEC membership in 1961 and the rejection of EC membership in 1974. This will make it easier to test the actual relevance of economic and political interests for the European policy choices of Faroese Home Rule governments (see chapter 5).

3.1. Support for EFTA and then EEC membership

In July 1959, *Folketing* MP Johan Martin Frederik Poulsen (SB) asked the Danish government to exclude the Faroe Islands from Denmark's potential membership in EFTA or the EEC.¹¹² Prime Minister Petur Mohr Dam (JF) explained in his state of the nation address during the same year that choosing the right European policy for the Faroes was »decisive for our life and fate« so that the government would first need to investigate it in depth.¹¹³ The Faroe Islands were thus excluded from Denmark's EFTA membership, which came into effect in May 1960.

Annex F of the EFTA Convention mentioned the Faroe Islands together with Greenland, Gibraltar and Malta as territories to which the Convention should not

111 Own table based on LØGTINGIÐ (2002): *Løgtingið 150 – Hátiðarrit 3: Val og valtöl, leitorð og yvirlit*. Tórshavn: Løgtingið, pp. 184-188. Cf. WANG (1989): *Stjórn málafrøði*, Doc. 2. The parties in government are arranged according to their percentage of the vote in the preceding *Løgting* elections. The parties in bold held the Prime Minister's office.

112 FT (1958-59): »Folketingets forhandlingar«, col. 5664. Cf. LT (1959): »Frágreiðing frá lögmanni á lögtingi 29. juli 1959«, pp. 3-11, here: p. 7.

113 LT (1959): »Frágreiðing frá lögmanni á lögtingi 29. juli 1959«, pp. 3-11, here: p. 7.

apply.¹¹⁴ However, according to Article 43 (2), the Convention would »apply to the territories listed in Annex F, if the Member State which is responsible for their international relations so declare[d] [...] at any time thereafter«. If the Faroes requested to join EFTA at any later point of time, the Danish government could make use of this legal safeguard. Already in June 1960, the Danish government decided to include Greenland in its EFTA membership. It subsequently also increased its pressure on the Faroese Home Rule government to take a final position with regard to EFTA membership.¹¹⁵

In February 1961, Prime Minister Petur Mohr Dam (JF) proposed to the *Løgting* that the Faroe Islands should join EFTA.¹¹⁶ He stated that he preferred EFTA membership to EEC membership. Remaining outside of both organisations would be the worst option. However, the *Løgting* postponed the EFTA matter in May, as a number of EFTA members, including Denmark, had started to consider EEC membership. In August 1961, the Danish government applied for EEC membership and made a reservation with regard to the inclusion of the Faroe Islands in it.¹¹⁷ In November 1961, Dam proposed that the *Løgting* should approve in principle

that Faroese interests under the changed circumstances, which will result from Denmark and maybe the other Nordic countries and the UK joining the EEC as members or associating themselves with it in one or the other way, are best preserved within this community.¹¹⁸

Thus, the position of the Faroese government changed. In November 1961, it supported Faroese membership in the EEC, after having rejected it only seven months earlier. However, the government's principal support for EEC membership was subject to a number of reservations. In negotiations with the EEC, the Faroe Islands should put greatest emphasis on the economic dependency on the fisheries sector and on the special situation of the Faroes in general, »nationally, historically and constitutionally«. Moreover, the *Løgting* reaffirmed that an exclusive fishing limit of twelve miles would be in effect in the Faroe Islands for all foreign fishermen from April 1963 onward. Denmark had already established a twelve-mile fishing

114 See for this paragraph: EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (1960): »Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association (with annexes and schedules). Signed at Stockholm, on 4 January 1960«, *Treaties and international agreements registered or filed and recorded with the United Nations Secretariat* 370, L 5266 (<http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20370/v370.pdf>, 3 February 2014), pp. 26, 40.

115 This was at least claimed by TF. See N.N. (1960): »Skulu vit í blindum fylgja Danmørk í marknaðarmálinum?« In: *14. September*, 23 September 1960, pp. 1-2.

116 LT (1960): »Föroyar uppí EFTA-samgonguna«, *40/1960*, pp. 185-187.

117 N.N. (1961): »Felagsmarknaðarlondini vilja ikki vita av føroyskum sjómarki«, in: *14. September*, 22 December 1961, p. 1.

118 See for the following paragraph: LT (1961): »Föroya stöðað til tann europeiska vinnuliga felagsskapin«, *22/1961*, pp. 81-91, here: p. 81: »[Løgtingið ynskir sum sína principiellu stöðu at úttala,] at Föroya áhugamál undir broyttu viðurskiftunum, sum fara at standast av, um so verður, at Danmark og kanska hini norðurlondini eins og Stóra Bretland fara uppí sum limir ella á annan hátt knýst til tann europeiska vinnuliga felagsskapin, best verða varðveitt innanfyri henda felagsskapin.«

limit on behalf of the Faroe Islands in 1959. However, it had also made a special arrangement with the UK during the same year, which gave UK fishermen continuous catching rights in the outer six miles of the limit until April 1963. In 1961, the *Løgting* had unanimously decided not to renew this arrangement.¹¹⁹ It did not want EEC membership to revoke this decision. Another reservation was that the Faroes should attain the right to delegate representatives to the European institutions. The Council and Parliament were mentioned in particular.

All MPs of the unionist government, consisting of JF, SB and SF, voted in favour of the government's proposal.¹²⁰ FF also supported the government. Only TF voted against the proposal. One TF MP abstained together with the FB MP. However, the supporters of EEC membership made it clear that their principal support for Faroese membership in the EEC should not be interpreted as a premature decision to join the EEC.¹²¹ The Faroes would only take up negotiations on the conditions of membership. They could still decide to reject membership if the negotiation result was unfavourable.

The end of Denmark's EEC membership plans after De Gaulle's veto in 1963 also put an end to the EEC debate in the Faroe Islands. Instead, Hákun Djurhuus (FF), Prime Minister of the first separatist coalition government in Faroese history, proposed in 1965 that the Faroes should join EFTA.¹²² But the *Løgting's* market committee did not recommend EFTA membership.¹²³ Consequently, the government further postponed its European policy choice. However, when the unionist government returned to power in 1967, it put EFTA membership high on the political agenda. In February 1967, Prime Minister Petur Mohr Dam (JF) asked the *Løgting* to support EFTA membership.¹²⁴ All Faroese parties subsequently agreed that the Faroes should join EFTA if they could preserve protectionist measures for their fisheries and industrial sectors. In 1968 after the negotiations' positive outcome, the Faroe Islands joined EFTA. However, the future of Faroese EFTA membership was characterised by a high degree of uncertainty from the beginning, as Denmark had re-applied for EEC membership in 1967.

3.2. Arbitrary, weak and premature economic interests

The unionist government based its initial support for EFTA membership and later change of preferences to EEC membership on economic interests:¹²⁵ Fish exports were the greatest trade interest of the Faroes. So far, the Faroes had enjoyed

119 LT (1960): »Uppskot til samtyktar í fiskimarksmálinum«, 55/1960, pp. 223-225.

120 See for the following: LT (1961): »Föroya stöða til tann europeiska vinnuliga felagsskapin«, 22/1961, pp. 81-91, here: pp. 90-91.

121 N.N. (1961): »Felagsmarknaðurin«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 10 October 1961, p. 2; N.N. (1961): »Sambandsflokurin og felagsmarknaðurin – Helst hættisligari at vera uttanfyri tá stóru handilssamgonguna enn uppi í«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 8 November 1961, p. 1.

122 LT (1964): »Limaskapurin í EFTA«, 40/1964, pp. 109-110.

123 LT (1964): »Limaskapur EFTA«, 77/1964, pp. 361-374.

124 LT (1966): »Föroyar gerast partur í EFTA«, 8/1966, pp. 104-108.

125 See for this and the following paragraph: LT (1960): »Föroyar uppi EFTA-samgonguna«, 40/1960, pp. 185-187. Cf. N.N. (1961): »Tey Seks ella Sjey«, in: *Tingakrossur*, 23 February 1961, pp. 2, 4.

custom-free access for their fish to their most important trading partners in Italy, Spain and Greece. But the establishment of a Common Customs Tariff (CCT) in the EEC meant that Faroese imports to the EEC member state Italy would soon be tariffed with 13 per cent for salt- and clipfish and 18 per cent for frozen fish filets. Moreover, Spain also considered EEC membership and Greece an association with the EEC. Joining the EEC, the Faroes would remain unaffected by the introduction of the CCT in these countries. In contrast to EEC membership, fish products were to a great extent excluded from the EFTA Convention. Thus, EFTA membership would only remove the ten per cent tariff for Faroese exports of frozen fish filets to another of its major trading partners, the UK. However, the unionist government expected the EFTA market to become more important in the future. It also emphasised that Italy had negotiated a temporary exemption from the CCT so that until January 1962 it would be able to continue to import 50,000 tons of salt- and clipfish custom-free or without higher tariffs than at present.

The unionist government explicitly stated that the high significance of custom-free trade in salt- and clipfish would already have made EEC membership the preferred option in February 1961. But the problem with EEC membership was that the Rome Treaty might allow countries such as Germany, France and Italy to fish in Faroese waters in the future. This would contradict all attempts to establish an exclusive fishing limit of twelve miles in the Faroe Islands after 1963. *Dimmalætting* therefore criticised those who wanted to investigate EEC membership for rendering the struggle of the Faroe Islands for a fishing limit meaningless.¹²⁶ Moreover, JF, SB and SF also believed that it would be a disadvantage for the Faroe Islands if people from other EEC member states were able to move to and work freely in the Faroes. Therefore, they opted for EFTA membership, which provided less economic benefits, but neither threatened the exclusive fishing limit nor the protection of the Faroese workforce.

Later in 1961, the unionist government allegedly changed its view because of new economic incentives.¹²⁷ It argued that the membership applications of Denmark and the UK made it necessary for Faroese fish exporters to gain access to the EEC market. Moreover, Norway and Iceland would also consider membership in the EEC and Sweden and Austria an association with it. *Løgting* MP Trygvi Samuelsen (SB) emphasised that EFTA membership would no longer be a realistic option if the great core of European countries, to which the Faroes sold fish, became members of the EEC.¹²⁸ Since Faroese fish exports to an extended EEC made up more than 50 per cent (see table 6), it would be more dangerous to remain outside than to join the EEC.

126 N.N. (1960): »Vil Fólkaflakkurin avtaka føroyskt sjómark?« In: *Dimmalætting*, 12 November 1960, p. 1.

127 LT (1961): »Føroya stóða til tann europeiska vinnuliga felagsskapin«, 22/1961, pp. 81-91, here: p. 82.

128 N.N. (1961): »Sambandsflokkurin og felagsmarknaðurin – Helst hættisligari at vera uttanfyri tá stóru handilssamgonguna enn uppi í«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 8 November 1961, p. 1.

Table 6: Destination of Faroese fish exports in per cent (1960-71)¹²⁹

	1960		1965		1969		1970		1971	
EEC w/applicants	61.4		58.1		47.6		61.4		57.9	
Current EEC		15.6		23.0		19.9		25.9		21.9
Remaining EFTA	5.2		6.4		18.3		10.9		8.1	
Current EFTA		51.0		41.5		46.0		46.4		44.1
Third states	33.3	33.3	35.5	35.5	34.2	34.2	27.6	27.6	33.9	33.9

Prime Minister Petur Mohr Dam (JF) also argued that the economic benefits of EEC membership would weigh enough to speak for membership now.¹³⁰ EEC membership would now reduce both the tariffs of 13 per cent on salt- and clipfish and of 18 per cent on frozen fish filets to Italy and ten per cent on frozen fish filets to the British market. *Folketing* MP Poulsen (SB) therefore considered it »hardly credible that the Faroe Islands could remain outside the EEC in the long run«. ¹³¹ *Dimmalætting* stressed that this would account in particular for the Faroe Islands, which were dependent on being able to sell its fish due to their one-dimensional economy:

A society such as the Faroese, whose whole existence rises and falls with proper export possibilities, will hardly be able to find a secure basis of existence by standing alone and relying on random export possibilities. For our part, therefore, the choice is between an uncertain commercial future and a secure commercial basis within the EEC, which, however, cannot be attained for free.¹³²

The last words of the *Dimmalætting* article directly addressed a problem of the sudden economic necessity of EEC membership: what about its economic costs, which had allegedly caused the government to reject EEC membership only seven months earlier? Nothing had changed with regard to the fact that EEC membership would in principle give EEC member states the right to move to and work freely in the Faroe Islands. But unlike before, Prime Minister Petur Mohr Dam (JF) could no longer imagine that foreigners would see a handsome profit in the Faroe Islands and be anxious to invest millions in new companies.¹³³ This made

129 Own table based on DANISH COMMITTEE ON EC RELATIONS [Udvalget vedrørende Danmarks forhold til De europæiske Fællesskaber] (1972): *Danmark og De europæiske Fællesskaber*, 4. supplerende redegørelse, Udviklingen I 1971. Copenhagen: Folketinget, p. 275.

130 Petur Mohr DAM (1961): »Røða lögmannsins undir viðgerðini av felagsmarknaðinum«, in: *Sosialurin*, 11 November 1961, pp. 1-2, 18 November 1961, pp. 1-2, 25 November 1961, p. 2.

131 FT (1961-62): »Folketingets forhandling«, col. 229.

132 N.N. (1961): »Enten eller«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 11 November 1961, p. 1: »Et samfund som det færøske, hvis hele eksistens staar og falder med ordnede eksportmuligheder, vil vanskelig kunne finde et betryggende eksistensgrundlag i at staa alene og sætte sin lid til tilfældelige afsætningsmuligheder. Valget for vort vedkommende bliver da mellem en usikker handelsmæssig fremtid og et trygt handelsmæssigt grundlag indenfor Fællesmarkedet, som dog ikke erhverves ganske gratis.«

133 Petur Mohr DAM (1961): »Røða lögmannsins undir viðgerðini av felagsmarknaðinum«, in: *Sosialurin*, 25 November 1961, p. 2.

the economic rationale of the unionist government to be first in favour of EFTA and then in favour of EEC membership look quite arbitrary.

On the contrary, the parties in government still believed that free access of EEC member states to the exclusive fishing limit was a major obstacle to a potential Faroese membership in the EEC. Prime Minister Dam (JF) emphasised that none of the fishing nations that were considering membership of the EEC would do so »without doubt«. ¹³⁴ Iceland and Norway would hardly accept EEC membership if the UK, Germany and Belgium were granted the same catching rights in their waters as their own fishermen. Dam asserted that it was pre-eminent that the Faroes succeeded in having the Faroese waters for themselves »to the greatest extent possible«. Samuelsen (SB) also argued that the Faroe Islands needed to ensure that the fishing limit would remain twelve miles in the future. ¹³⁵ *Dimmalætting* feared that EEC fishermen would enter Faroese waters again after 1963 and establish fisheries outposts on the Faroese coast, capable of depleting the Faroese stocks. ¹³⁶ The unionist paper stated that it would remain to be seen whether the Faroe Islands would be able to join the EEC without its basis of existence »going all haywire«. Yet, concerns with regard to the protection of the fishing limit were no longer strong enough to prevent the government from approving Faroese membership in the EEC in principle.

This was the case despite the most important economic interest groups in the Faroe Islands, among them the Faroese Association of Shipbuilders and Navigators (*Føroya Skipara- og Navigatørfelag*), the Faroese Fishermen's Association, the Faroese Workers' Association (*Føroya Arbeiðarafelag*) and the Federation of Faroese Industries (*Føroya Ídnaðarafelag*) heavily criticising the government's early support for EEC membership. In October 1961, they sent a letter to the *Løgting* in which they demanded that no decision should be made before the consequences of membership or non-membership had been thoroughly investigated and before they had been able to deal with the matter. ¹³⁷ Contrary to the assumptions of Ingebritsen's version of LI, the unionist government ignored this statement. It did not base its European policy decisions on the commercial interests of powerful economic producers, but its interests differed strikingly from the position of some of the Faroes' most important economic interest groups.

Comparing the Faroese Home Rule government's rejection of EEC membership in February 1961 to its support for EEC membership in November 1961, its economic arguments appear quite arbitrary. In February 1961, the unionist government voiced its concerns with the right to establishment. In November 1961, the right to establishment was not a problem anymore. Process-tracing illuminates how

134 Petur Mohr DAM (1961): »Røða løgmannsins undir viðgerðini av felagsmarknaðinum«, in: *Sosialurin*, 25 November 1961, p. 2.

135 N.N. (1961): »Sambandsflokkurin og felagsmarknaðurin – Helst hættisligari at vera uttanfyri tá stóru handilssamgonguna enn uppi í«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 8 November 1961, p. 1.

136 N.N. (1961): »Fællesmarkedet og vi«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 16 August 1961, p. 1.

137 LT (1961): »Føroya stöða til tann europeiska vinnuliga felagsskapin«, 22/1961, pp. 81-91, here: pp. 89-90.

the government devalued the role that the right to establishment had played in its earlier rejection of EEC membership. The same accounts for the preservation of an exclusive fishing limit, albeit to a lesser extent. In February 1961, the government identified the preservation of the twelve-mile limit as one of the main problems with EEC membership. In November 1961, this problem was no longer a sufficient reason to prevent it from supporting EEC membership in principle.

In retrospect, the government's sudden change of preferences from EFTA to EEC membership also made its decision to support EFTA membership look premature. In October 1959, the *Løgting* had established a committee in order to examine Faroese membership in both of the European market organisations.¹³⁸ But the committee had only met a couple of times in 1960 before the unionist government already declared its support for EFTA membership. The opposition parties wondered why it had not waited at least until the committee had finished its investigation and delivered a recommendation.¹³⁹ The separatist paper *14. September* was convinced that the committee did not support EFTA membership and that the government ignored its concerns.¹⁴⁰ Opposition to the government's procedure in the matter even arose from within the unionist coalition. SF paper *Tingakrossur* criticised Prime Minister Petur Mohr Dam (JF) for having negotiated EFTA membership with the Danish government mostly by himself.¹⁴¹ It complained that the special market committee had not been able to deliver its recommendation. Thus, it clearly followed the line of the opposition parties in the EFTA matter:

We believe that this matter is so serious that there should not be a decision on it in the *Løgting* before it has been investigated deeper and generally discussed so that those who work in the Faroese industry get the opportunity to state their views.¹⁴²

A closer investigation of EFTA membership should have seemed even more necessary, as the *Løgting's* market committee later identified so many costs with EFTA membership that it did not recommend it in 1966 (see above). This was at a time where EEC membership was no longer an option and where the choice was merely between EFTA membership and remaining outside of all European trade organisations. This further supports the suspicion that the government's support for EFTA membership in 1961 had been premature.

In addition, the unionist government's economic rationale in favour of EFTA membership had also been weak. Since the unionist government had stated explicitly

138 LT (1959): »Marknaðarættlanir«, 21/1959, p. 68.

139 N.N. (1961): »Vanvirðing og háð móti tinginum«, in: *14. September*, 18 February 1961, p. 1; N.N. (1961): »Grønland uppí E.F.T.A.«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 21 February 1961, p. 2.

140 N.N. (1960): »Skulu vit í blindum fylgja Danmørk í marknaðarmálinum?« In: *14. September*, 23 September 1960, pp. 1-2.

141 N.N. (1961): »Tey Seks«, in: *Tingakrossur*, 23 February 1961, pp. 2, 4.

142 N.N. (1961): »Føroyar og felagsmarknaðurin«, in: *Tingakrossur*, 2 March 1961, p. 1: »Vit halda, at hesin spurningur er so álvarsamur, at hann eigur ikki at vera viðtikin á tingi, fyrr enn hann er gjølligari kannaður og alment umrøddur, soleiðis at teir, ið starvast við føroyskan idnað, fáa høvi til at siga sína hugsan.«

that EEC membership was economically more attractive than EFTA membership in February 1961, it was easy for TF chairman Erlendur Patursson to claim that the government had overestimated the costs of EEC membership and underestimated the costs of remaining outside the EEC.¹⁴³ He considered it implausible of the unionist government to believe that the Italian exemption from the CCT would reduce the economic necessity of EEC membership when it was only temporary until the beginning of 1962. Moreover, there was still a lot of uncertainty about the future fisheries policy of both EEC and EFTA, so the government could not claim that EEC membership would eventually lead to free access of foreign fishermen to the Faroese fishing limit. Patursson also believed that the financial benefits of exporting frozen fish filets custom-free to the UK were insignificant. Besides, he expected the UK to make a reservation to this EFTA regulation anyway because the Faroes had asked Denmark not to renew the fisheries arrangement with the UK from 1959.

All in all, the economic interest of the unionist government to support EEC membership must be considered weak and diffuse. Process-tracing between the change of preferences from EFTA to EEC membership shows that economic interests cannot have played a leading role for the motivation of European policy choices of the Faroese Home Rule government. It was relatively unproblematic for the unionist government to adapt its economic interests to different European policy choices because it did not seem to make an essential economic difference for the Faroes at the time if they eventually ended up in EFTA, the EEC or remained outside.

3.3. European policy dominated by postcolonial agendas

There is a lot of evidence that its postcolonial struggle to preserve the union with Denmark was the determining motivation for the Faroese Home Rule government to support EEC membership. In their proposal for EFTA membership, the unionist parties explicitly referred to the constitutional status of the Faroe Islands as a factor that spoke against EEC membership in February 1961:

Irrespective of whether or not the Faroese people will have benefits from [EEC] membership, it is more than doubtful whether one part of the Realm will be legally able to join if the [Danish] state does not join as a whole, and it is also very doubtful whether the EEC countries will allow the Faroe Islands to become a member in their institution under such circumstances.¹⁴⁴

Prime Minister Petur Mohr Dam (JF) made the relevance of the union in the

143 See for this paragraph: Erlendur PATURSSON (1961): »Hin pinkultli fyrimumur – hinar strongu treytir«, in: *14. September*, 25 February 1961, pp. 2, 4.

144 LT (1960): »Föroyar uppi EFTA-samgonguna«, 40/1960, pp. 185-187, here: p. 186: »Men uttan mun til, um föroyingar koma at hava fyrimumir ella ikki við hesum limaskapi, er tað vist meira enn ivingarsamt, um ein partur av ríkinum lógliga sæð yfirhóvur kundi gjörst limur, tá ið ikki alt ríkið var limur, og tað er eisini ógvuliga ivingarsamt, um C.E.E. londini vildu loyvt Föroyum at gjörst limur hjá teimum undir tilíkkum umstøðum.«

government's approach towards EFTA and EEC membership even more explicit. In his state of the nation address in 1960, he stated that the choice was between the Danish Realm, which linked the Faroe Islands to EFTA, and the Faroes' most important trading partners in Europe for salt- and clipfish, which were members of or might become associated with the EEC.¹⁴⁵ In February 1961, the unionist government subsequently chose EFTA and thus the Danish Realm over the economic benefits of EEC membership.

Just as in February 1961, JF, SB and SF also admitted that the constitutional question played a decisive role in their changed position on EEC membership in November 1961:

[EFTA] was not the market for salt- and clipfish, but rather the [EEC]. To remain outside of the latter would, therefore, sooner or later have implied that the [EEC]'s tariffs on [salt- and clipfish] imports would have made us uncompetitive with for example West Germany on the Italian and now also on the Greek market. But the problem in the constitutional relationship between Denmark and the Faroe Islands is that the Faroes could not become a member in the EEC if Denmark was a member in EFTA, and it is also questionable whether the [EEC] would have accepted the Faroe Islands as a member alone [without Denmark].¹⁴⁶

The statement implied quite directly that the government would have already opted for EEC membership earlier in 1961 if it had not been for the Faroes' constitutional relationship with Denmark. Once the constitutional problem was out of the way, with Denmark's application for EEC membership, the government was able to follow Denmark's suit. None of the major parties in the government considered the transfer of sovereignty to the EEC to be a major problem because they attached a lot of importance to the Realm. Prime Minister Petur Mohr Dam (JF) stated that there was no need to be afraid of missing something of value and significance:

All freedom-loving countries have accepted to lose a part of their sovereignty in order to win something else, which is [...] more worth than unrestricted sovereignty. This is to work as a group towards [...] making life better and richer, happier and more secure for each single country and for the whole group.¹⁴⁷

145 LT (1960): »Frágreiðing frá lögmanni á lögtungi 29. juli 1960«, pp. 15-33, here: p. 18.

146 LT (1961): »Føroya stöð á tann europeiska vinnuliga felagsskapin«, 22/1961, pp. 81-91, here: p. 82: »Saltfiska- og klippfiskamarkaðurin var ikki hjá teimum 7, men heldur hjá teimum 6; at standa uttanfyri hesi fœrði tí fyrr ella seinri við sær, at tann felagstollur, tey lögdu á henda innflutning, gjörði okkum ikki kappingarfœrar við t. d. Vestur-Týskaland á ítalska og nú eisini grikska marknaðinum. Tey ríkisrættarlígu viðurskiftini Danmark-Føroyar eru tó so, at Føroyar kundu ikki gerast limur, tá Danmark var limur í hinum felagsskapinum, og er tað eisini ein spurningur, um tey 6 vildu tikið við Føroyum sum lim einsamallar.«

147 Petur Mohr DAM (1961): »Røða lögmannsins undir viðgerðini av felagsmarknaðinum«, in: *Sosialurin*, 25 November, p. 2: »Øll frælsiselskandi lond hava gingið við til at avluta ein part av suveriniteti sínum fyri at vinna nakað, sum [...] er meiri vert enn oskerdi suveriniteturin tað at lyfta í flokki móti tí [...] at gera lívið betri og ríkari, lukkuligari og tryggari fyri hvørt einstaka landið sum fyri heildina.«

Samuelsen (SB) was not afraid either that the Faroe Islands would have to give away parts of its sovereignty, »when countries such as for example England, Germany and Denmark were not afraid either«. ¹⁴⁸

In part, following Denmark's European policy choices was also in the economic interest of the Faroes. *Dimmalætting* argued that remaining outside the EEC, while Denmark joined, would technically be possible according to the Home Rule Act, but hard to exercise in practice. ¹⁴⁹ In such a case, the Faroes should not expect that Denmark would be tolerated as free gateway for Faroese exports to the EEC market by the other EEC member states. Moreover, Greenland's accession to the EEC without the Faroe Islands could result in EEC member states being prioritised with regard to fisheries rights in Greenlandic waters vis-à-vis Faroese fishermen, although the Faroes and Greenland were part of the same state.

From the beginning of the membership debate, the opposition parties were convinced that the unionist government's real intention was »to blindly follow Denmark«, irrespective of whether Faroese membership in EFTA was economically beneficial for the Faroe Islands or not. ¹⁵⁰ TF emphasised in 1960 that the constitutional question should not tip the scales in favour of EFTA membership when the most important trading partners of the Faroe Islands joined the EEC and not EFTA. ¹⁵¹ However, its own position on EFTA and EEC membership was equally two-faced. TF's stance on EEC membership was the exact opposite to the government's position on membership, based on its opposing stance on the desirability of the Union. When Denmark applied for EFTA membership, TF defended the possibility of Faroese membership of the EEC. It pledged for an in-depth investigation of EEC membership, criticising the government's one-sided arguments in favour of EFTA membership. Quoting an official in the Danish Ministry of Fisheries, TF chairman Patursson then even rejected the argument that joining the EEC would lead to unrestricted access of foreign fishermen to the exclusive fishing limit of the Faroes (see above)!

However, when Denmark applied for EEC membership, TF suddenly rejected EEC membership and argued that the *Løgting* should not take any position in this matter for the time being. ¹⁵² In its minority opinion on the government's proposal for EEC membership, TF provided numerous arguments against Faroese membership of the EEC, both economic and political. Based on the experience of the UK in the negotiations on the Rome Treaty, TF ruled out beforehand that the Faroe Islands should be granted any meaningful exemptions from the EEC's fisheries

148 N.N. (1961): »Sambandsflokkurin og felagsmarknaðurin – Helst hættisligari at vera uttanfyri tá stóru handilssamgonguna enn uppi í«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 8 November 1961, p. 1.

149 See for this paragraph: N.N. (1962): »Dagens problem«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 20 June 1962, p. 1.

150 N.N. (1960): »Skulu vit í blindum fylgja Danmørk í marknaðarmálinum?« In: *14. September*, 23 September 1960, pp. 1-2. Cf. N.N. (1961): »Føroyar fáa ongan sjálvstøðuga limaskap í »TEIM 7««, in: *Dagblaðið*, 17 February 1961, p. 1.

151 N.N. (1960): »Skulu vit í blindum fylgja Danmørk í marknaðarmálinum?« In: *14. September*, 23 September 1960, pp. 1-2.

152 See for this paragraph: LT (1961): »Føroya støða til tann europeiska vinnuliga felagsskapin«, 22/1961, pp. 81-91, here: pp. 84-89.

policy. *14. September* presented a distorted image of a Faroese future in which Faroese companies and the Faroese fishing fleet were outcompeted by bigger fishing companies from the UK and Germany.¹⁵³ These would establish their own companies in the Faroes and import their own workforce if there was unemployment in their home countries. Moreover, TF also complained about the removal of import tariffs on EEC products. An unprotected Faroese industrial and agricultural sector would not be able to compete with foreign companies. It claimed that import prices would rise by 30 per cent and therefore lead to a great increase in production and living costs, which would not be balanced out by the removal of export tariffs. Most strikingly, TF now made use of the government's former argument in favour of EFTA membership, stating that it was likely that Faroese salt- and clipfish exports to the EEC would decrease in relative importance vis-à-vis the export of frozen fish filets.

TF also worried about the loss of sovereignty involved in EEC membership.¹⁵⁴ For the editor-in-chief of *14. September*, Ólavur Michelsen, the consequences of joining the EEC as a part of Denmark would be disastrous:

We will disappear as a nation – both economically and culturally. Everything that our struggle for independence has been able to create [...] will be wiped out on the day that the Faroese Løgting gives in to the Danish wish that the Faroes become a member in the EEC with an equal status as [the Danish island] Bornholm.¹⁵⁵

The *Løgting* MPs Jógvan Høgenesen (TF) and Erlendur Patursson (TF) complained that the Faroes would no longer be able to conduct a sovereign trade and fisheries policy.¹⁵⁶ Instead, the EEC authorities would be authorised to make trade agreements with third countries and decide on fishing quotas and other fisheries policies on behalf of all member states. They were particularly worried that the Faroe Islands would only be represented in the EEC through Danish representatives. Moreover, they believed that the Treaty of Rome was irrevocable, which would make it impossible to withdraw from the EEC in the future.

Nevertheless, despite these numerous economic and political arguments against EEC membership, *14. September* emphasised only a few weeks before the *Løgting* debate on EEC membership that TF would support Faroese membership in the EEC »as a sovereign state«:

153 N.N. (1961): »Ein ólukka«, in: *14. September*, 16 September 1961, p. 3; N.N. (1962): »Felagsmarknaðurin og fiskivinnan«, in: *14. September*, 17 February 1962, p. 2.

154 E.g. N.N. (1961): »Støðutakanin til felagsmarknaðin«, in: *14. September*, 6 September 1961, p. 3; N.N. (1961): »Ein ólukka«, in: *14. September*, 16 September 1961, p. 3; N.N. (1961): »Støða okkara til felagsmarknaðin«, in: *14. September*, 23 September 1961, p. 3.

155 Ólavur MICHELSEN (1961): »Sláið manngarð um føroyskt sjálvstýri á lagnustundini«, in: *14. September*, 1 November 1961, p. 3: »Vit verða at hvørva sum tjóð – bæði vinnuliga og mentunarlaga. Alt tað, ið sjálfstýrissrørslan hevur fingið skapað [...] fer at verða útturkað tann dag, ið Føroya løgting samtykkir danska ynskið um, at Føroyar verða limur í felagsmarknaðinum á jøvnum fœti við Bornholm.«

156 LT (1961): »Føroya stóða til tann europeiska vinnuliga felagsskapin«, 22/1961, pp. 81-91, here: pp. 84-85.

If the Faroe Islands [free themselves from Denmark] and join the EEC directly, [...] the whole [TF] will support Faroese membership. [...] We have many advantages to join the EEC as a sovereign country. [...] In short: we do not want to join the EEC as a part of Denmark, but we have nothing against joining as a sovereign state.¹⁵⁷

Another 14. *September* article confirmed that the question of whether the Faroes could afford to remain outside the EEC was secondary to the question, whether they should join the EEC as part of Denmark.¹⁵⁸

The fact that TF was prepared to join the EEC as a sovereign state revealed that its arguments against EEC membership at the end of 1961 were arbitrary and chosen tactically in order to further its struggle for separation. TF explicitly stated that it would have approved EEC membership if the Faroe Islands had not been part of the Danish Realm. Thus, it clearly based its European policy on its postcolonial agenda. At the beginning of 1961, TF had hoped that Denmark joining EFTA and the Faroe Islands the EEC would represent a first step towards separation from Denmark. When Denmark applied for EEC membership later in the year, TF rejected EEC membership, as it believed that a common membership of Denmark and the Faroe Islands would cement the union with Denmark. Consequently, TF twice supported the European policy for the Faroe Islands that would provide the strongest challenge to the constitutional link with Denmark.

Only FF supported EEC membership in November 1961 despite its political interest in increased sovereignty of the Faroe Islands from Denmark. FF chairman Hákun Djurhuus stated that the EEC would affect the Faroe Islands economically, even if they remained outside of it.¹⁵⁹ Price increases within the EEC would also lead to price increases in the Faroe Islands. But outside the EEC, the additional custom tariffs on fish exports would add up on those price increases. *Dagblaðið* believed that the tariffs on fish exports would delay the industrial development of the Faroese fisheries sector vis-à-vis those fishing nations, which joined the EEC.¹⁶⁰ According to Djurhuus, the Faroese people needed to be aware that nearly 100 per cent of its imports came from countries which, sooner or later, would become members in or associated with the EEC.¹⁶¹ Dánjal P. Danielsen (FF) also stressed that one of the main reasons for the applications of Denmark and the UK had been to attract foreign capital.¹⁶² Certainly, this would be just as necessary »in a penniless country such as ours«.

157 N.N. (1961): »Støða okkara til felagsmarknaðin«, in: 14. *September*, 23 September 1961, p. 3: »Um Føroyar fáa eina frælsa støðu og gerast beinleiðis limur í felagsmarknaðinum, [...] man tjóðveldisflokkurin sum heild taka undir við føroyskum limaskapi. [...] [V]it hava mangar fyrimumir í at koma upp í felagsmarknaðin sum eitt sjálvstøðugt land. [...] Í stuttum sagt: Vit vilja ikki fara upp í felagsmarknaðin sum danskur landslutur, men hava einki ímóti at fara upp í sum eitt sjálvstøðugt land.«

158 N.N. (1961): »Kravið um fólkaatkvøðu verður tagt burtur!« In: 14. *September*, 29 November 1961, p. 1.

159 N.N. (1961): »Líkindi til at Danmark fylgir Bretland eftir uppí felagsmarknaðin um semja fæst – og hvussu tá við Føroyum?« In: *Dagblaðið*, 20 June 1961, p. 1.

160 N.N. (1961): »Føroya støða til marknaðarsamgonguna«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 8 September 1961, p. 1.

161 Hákun DJURHUUS (1962): »Fólkaflokkurin og Felagsmarknaðurin: Útvarpsrøða Hákunar«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 30 January 1962, pp. 1, 4.

162 Dánjal P. DANIELSEN (1961): »Føroyar og europeiski felagsmarknaðurin«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 7 November 1961, p. 1.

Dagblaðið outlined that a common fisheries policy was still under development.¹⁶³ There was neither a regulation with regard to a fishing limit nor with regard to a right to free establishment in the fisheries sector yet. But it was likely that detailed regulations would be determined in the accession negotiations.¹⁶⁴ Therefore, it would be important for the Faroes to be included in them. Thus, the Faroes would be able to exercise influence on the development of a common fisheries policy together with Norway and Iceland. On the contrary, Faroese influence would be minimal if the Faroes decided to join later.

Yet, FF also felt that it had to position itself in relation to the postcolonial debate by trying to demarcate its own approach from those of the other parties:

There may be different opinions on what is right to do in the Faroe Islands. But we are afraid that [...] the question about EEC [membership] will not be about the willingness to transfer parts of the national right to self-determination to the [EEC] like in other countries, but on whether the bonds with Denmark should be tightened or fought against.¹⁶⁵

This supports the assumption that political interests were in fact the determining factor for all other political parties. FF maintained that the unionist parties would support EEC membership because Denmark did, while TF would reject EEC membership because Denmark supported it.¹⁶⁶ Both, they argued, would be equally wrong. The decision should be based on Faroese and on economic interests.

Although attacked by TF as a traitor to the separatist cause, FF did not consider EC membership to be against its separatist principles. *Dagblaðið* stated that it would prefer that the Faroes joined the EEC as a sovereign state and not as a part of Denmark, but it considered such a position unrealistic.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, it emphasised that transfers of sovereignty to the EEC were still limited to some policy areas at present.¹⁶⁸ The FF paper also argued that it would not be »worse for a Faroese to be European rather than Danish.«¹⁶⁹ On the contrary, EEC membership could be seen as a chance »to escape the chains, which the Danish capital market had created on the Faroe Islands.«¹⁷⁰ Danish businessmen would continue to dominate Faroese

163 N.N. (1962): »Fiskivinnupolitikkurin hjá felagsmarknaðinum er enn ikki fastsettur«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 12 January 1962, p. 1.

164 See for this paragraph: N.N. (1961): »Føroyar og felagsmarknaðurin«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 10 October 1961, p. 2.

165 N.N. (1961): »Føroyar og felagsmarknaðurin«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 27 October 1961, p. 2: »Tað kunnu vera fleiri meinigar um, hvat rættast er at gera hjá Føroyum, men vit óttast, [at júst hetta stóra mál prógvar vanmátt føroyinga,] at felagsmarknaðurin ikki sum hjá øðrum londum verður spurningurin um, hvussu nógv av tjóðskaparligum avgerðarrætti skal verða latið til stóra felagið, men hjá okkum hvussu bondini til Danmarkar skulu styrkjast og tottast.«

166 Dánjal P. DANIELSEN (1961): »Føroyar og europeiski felagsmarknaðurin«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 7 November 1961, p. 1; N.N. (1961): »Dimmalætting slær seg sjálvan frammaná í felagsmarknaðarspurninginum«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 7 November 1961, p. 2.

167 N.N. (1961): »Felagsmarknaðurin«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 10 October 1961, p. 2.

168 N.N. (1961): »Kanningar viðvíkjandi felagsmarknaðinum«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 9 January 1962, p. 1.

169 N.N. (1961): »Felagsmarknaðurin«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 31 October 1961, p. 2.

170 N.N. (1961): »Felagsmarknaðurin«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 3 November 1961, p. 2.

trade, as they had a monopoly in the Realm. But EEC membership could provide an end to such preferential treatment of Danish imports. Thus, certain goods, which the Faroes were buying at a higher cost from Denmark, might become cheaper.¹⁷¹

In summary, the Faroese government's support for EEC membership in the early 1960s was motivated by political interest. The unionist parties were no great proponents of the principle of European integration, but they considered transferring sovereignty to the EEC unproblematic. Moreover, they had a strong interest in preserving the union with Denmark, which – as they believed – was only possible by following Denmark into the EEC. Thus, the unionist government had a medium political interest to support EEC membership. This postcolonial reading of the government's European policy choices is supported by the fact that its postcolonial agenda played a major role for TF, too. Moreover, FF also felt that it had to position itself on this matter.

LI maintains that its political interest only became the determining factor for the first European policy choice of the Faroese Home Rule government in the early 1960s because its economic interest was weak and diffuse. However, it is impossible to decide at this stage whether there was a causal relationship between the government's weak and diffuse economic interest, its medium political interest to support EEC membership and the final European policy outcome. Would the Faroes have rejected EEC membership despite its medium political interest to support it if they had had a strong or medium economic interest to do so? In order to answer this question, chapter 5 will employ process-tracing between the support for EEC membership of the Faroese Home Rule government in 1961 and its rejection of EC membership in 1974.

171 N.N. (1961): »Føroyski handilin og felagsmarknaðurin«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 5 December 1961, p. 1.

Greenland (1959-67): Denmark decides its European policy

Denmark's decision to co-found EFTA in 1959 and to apply for EEC membership in 1961 also confronted Greenland's political elite – consisting of Greenland's *Landsråd* and *Folketing* MPs – with the European integration process for the first time. Greenland was a fully integrated part of the Danish Realm between 1959 and 1967. Thus, the ultimate decision about its inclusion in Denmark's EFTA and EEC membership rested with the Danish government. Nevertheless, Greenland's regional parliament, the *Landsråd*, had the right to be consulted on Denmark's European policy for Greenland. Denmark first decided to exclude Greenland from its EFTA membership in 1959, but changed its opinion just one year later in 1960. From 1961 onward, Greenland was encompassed by Denmark's EFTA membership. The Danish government subsequently also included Greenland in its applications for EEC membership in 1961 and for EC membership in 1967. Both the *Landsråd* and Greenland's two *Folketing* MPs supported Greenland's membership in EFTA and the EEC. But their support for EEC membership as a part of Denmark remained without consequences. French President Charles De Gaulle vetoed both British EEC membership applications in 1963 and 1967 and thus also the concurrent Danish ones.

Chapter 4 explains the initial support for EEC membership in Greenland. It tests LI's assumption that Greenland's political elite supported EEC membership because it had a strong or medium economic interest to do so. Moreover, it analyses the role of political interests in its European policy choice. According to LI, Greenland's elite could also have supported EEC membership in 1961 and 1967 due to a strong or medium political interest in membership if its economic interest had been weak, diffuse or indeterminate. Just as in the Faroe Islands, the Greenlandic EEC debate between 1959 and 1967 promises interesting insights into the driving forces behind the European policy choices of Greenland's political elite. It has remained the only time so far that Greenland supported membership of the European Communities. The difference between this first and later European policy choices makes it possible to apply process-tracing between the support for EEC membership in 1961 and 1967 and the rejection of EC membership in 1972. This will make it easier to test the actual relevance of

economic and political interests for the European policy choices of Greenland's elite (see chapter 6).

4.1. Support for EFTA and then EEC membership

In 1959, at first the Danish government did not include Greenland in Denmark's EFTA membership.¹⁷² Consequently, Annex F of the EFTA Convention listed Greenland, like the Faroe Islands, among the territories to which the Convention should not apply.¹⁷³ The Danish government believed that Greenland's economy was incompatible with the regulations of the EFTA Convention. In order to protect the Greenlandic economy, the right to establishment and economic activity in Greenland were dependent on Danish citizenship and six months of prior permanent residence in Greenland. The KGH had a monopoly on trade in tobacco, alcohol and sweets. Economic activity was regulated by an economic development fund based on direct state subsidies, import taxes and a price support system. It was uncertain whether all these special conditions could continue unchanged within EFTA.

However, by 1960 the Danish government had already changed its mind regarding Greenland's EFTA membership.¹⁷⁴ It believed that Greenland's exclusion from EFTA had been »very unfortunate for Greenlandic exports«. Greenland's competitors would soon achieve significant custom-related advantages vis-à-vis Greenland and thus gain a better position on the European market. KGH director Hans C. Christiansen argued that Greenland naturally had a »positive interest in joining EFTA directly« because of the removal of tariffs on shrimps, frozen fish and skins.¹⁷⁵ 33 per cent of shrimp exports and 50 per cent of skin exports went to EFTA member states.¹⁷⁶ The Danish government hoped that it would be able to secure special regulations for the Greenlandic economy in negotiations with the other EFTA member states.

In July 1960, the Ministry for Greenland asked the *Landsråd* to »approve membership in EFTA in principle, under the condition that all present regulations in Greenland can be preserved unchanged«. ¹⁷⁷ In August 1960, the *Landsråd* approved the Ministry's proposal. In the negotiations on the conditions for Greenland's accession, the Danish government was able to preserve the right to introduce in Greenland those custom duties and quantitative restrictions which were already

172 See for this paragraph: GLRF (1960): »Frihandelskonventionen«, 9/1960, pp. 108-111, here: pp. 109-110; K. Budde LUND (1960): »Grønland og den europæiske frihandelssammenslutning«, in: *Tidsskriftet Grønland* 8 (11), pp. 418-424.

173 EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (1960): »Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association«, pp. 26, 40.

174 GREENLAND COMMITTEE [Grønlandsudvalget] (1964): »Betænkning fra Grønlandsudvalget af 1960«, Betænkning No. 323. Copenhagen: S. L. Møllers Bogtrykkeri, pp. 128-129; Hans C. CHRISTIANSEN (1962): »Grønland og Fællesmarkedet: Grønlandske problemer ved Danmarks eventuelle indtræden i fællesmarkedet«, in: *Tidsskriftet Grønland* 10 (10), pp. 375-392, here: p. 376.

175 N.N. (1960): »Problemer for Grønland i frihandels-sammenslutningen«, in: *A/G*, 4 June 1960, pp. 1, 23-24.

176 LUND (1960): »Grønland«, pp. 418-419; GLRF (1960): »Frihandelskonventionen«, 9/1960, pp. 108-111, here: p. 110.

177 GLRF (1960): »Frihandelskonventionen«, 9/1960, pp. 108-111, here: pp. 108-109.

in place in Denmark at any time in the future until 1970.¹⁷⁸ Based on the »limited extent and special character of economic activity in Greenland«, it also succeeded in preserving the existence of Greenland's economic development fund and the citizenship and six-months residence requirements prior to establishment and economic activity in Greenland. Greenland subsequently joined EFTA in July 1961.

Only one month later, Denmark applied for EEC membership. However, this time the Danish government wanted Greenland in from the start. *Landsråd* chairman Niels Otto Christensen proposed in September 1961 that the *Landsråd* should declare its support for EEC membership in principle, »provided that all existing regulations in Greenland can be preserved unchanged to the greatest extent as possible«. ¹⁷⁹ He stated that EEC membership would provide increased export possibilities for Greenlandic products. Moreover, the existence of a European Investment Bank (EIB) would also be useful for Greenland because it could finance projects and thus lead to increased employment. Christensen stressed that Greenland's initial exclusion from EFTA had shown the problems that could arise if Greenland did not join a European market organisation, in which Denmark was a member. Market areas would develop which would no longer be accessible for Greenlandic exporters.

Nevertheless, the *Landsråd* chairman also emphasised that an unconditional accession to the EEC would be impossible for Greenland. A complete removal of the fishing limit would encounter strong opposition. It would be uncertain whether the Greenlandic people could cope with the right to free establishment and free access of foreign capital. The prohibition of state subsidies would also create problems. Therefore, Christensen's proposal for EEC membership included a reference to »Greenland's special climatic and geographical conditions in connection with its complete dependency on fisheries«. Due to these conditions, a regulation that allowed citizens from EEC member states to fish within the Greenlandic fishing limit would cause great concern in Greenland. The *Landsråd* eventually supported EEC membership, based on this reservation.

In the membership negotiations, the Danish government prioritised the free right to establishment and fisheries within Greenland's exclusive fishing limit as Greenland's main problems with EEC membership.¹⁸⁰ Mikael Gam, an ethnic Dane who was *Folketing* MP for Northern Greenland and Danish Minister for Greenland from 1960 to 1963, was aware that Denmark would not be able to uphold the requirement that economic activity in Greenland was dependent on Danish citizenship. However, he was optimistic that the six-months residence requirement could be preserved, as it did not discriminate against nationality. Moreover, he emphasised that concrete regulations about a common fisheries policy would

178 See for this paragraph: GLRF (1962): »Frihandelskonventionen«, 9/1960, Bilag 2: Redegørelse for tidligere Landsrådssager, p. 194.

179 See for this and the following paragraph: GLRF (1961): »Forslag om drøftelse vedrørende Danmarks tilslutning til Det Europæiske Fællesmarked«, 10/1961, pp. 145-149.

180 See for this and the following paragraph: GLRF (1962): »Landsrådssamlingens åbning: Møde med Ministeren for Grønland, Mikael Gam«, 1/1962, pp. 11-13.

not be implemented until the candidate countries had joined. As an EEC member, Denmark would itself be able to participate in the decision-making and thus be able to negotiate a favourable solution for Greenland.

Gam believed that these minor disadvantages of EEC membership for Greenland would be outbalanced by its advantages for Greenland's exports. If Greenland remained outside, the introduction of custom tariffs on Greenlandic goods would expose Greenlandic producers to strong competition. Moreover, the EEC would turn from a net importer into a net exporter of fish if the UK, Denmark and Norway joined. Thus, it would no longer be such a favourable market area for Greenland's fishing industry. Sooner or later, Greenland would be forced to export to countries outside the EEC, with unfavourable consequences for export prices. Gam emphasised that he had

no doubt that if England and Denmark join the EEC, Greenland has hardly any choice. It cannot serve Greenland's interests if Greenland remains outside in such a situation.¹⁸¹

KGH director H. C. Christiansen also concluded that EEC membership could become »decisive for the existence of the small Greenlandic industries«. ¹⁸² Custom tariffs of 15 per cent on cod, 18 per cent on frozen fish and 20 per cent on crabs and shellfish would be an enormous burden for Greenland's most important export sector.

However, due to De Gaulle's first veto, Denmark's membership application was off the agenda until May 1967 when the Danish government reapplied for EEC membership. Once again, it wanted to include Greenland under Denmark's EEC membership. Greenland was a part of the Danish Realm and its economy allegedly depended to a great extent on exports to EEC member states.¹⁸³ But the Danish government also recognised that »in particular with regard to the common fisheries policy and with regard to establishment« there were special problems, which needed to be solved by giving Greenland »a special position«. ¹⁸⁴

By 1967, it was clear that the future common fisheries policy and the right to free establishment would not be easily compatible with Denmark's development policy for Greenland. During the 1960s, fisheries made up 85-90 per cent of Greenland's

181 GLRF (1962): »Landsrådsamlingens åbning: Møde med Ministeren for Grønland, Mikael Gam«, 1/1962, p. 13: »[På denne baggrund er der for mig] ingen tvivl om, at såfremt England og Danmark tilslutter sig til fællesmarkedet, har Grønland næppe noget valg. Det kan ikke tjene Grønlands interesser, at Grønland i en sådan situation holder sig udenfor.«

182 CHRISTIANSEN (1962): »Grønland og Fællesmarkedet«, p. 380.

183 GLRF (1967): »Ministeriet for Grønland: Grønland og de europæiske fællesskaber«, Annex 47/1967, pp. 363-365, here: p. 364.

184 See for the following two paragraphs: DANISH COMMITTEE ON EC RELATIONS [Udvalget vedrørende Danmarks forhold til De europæiske Fællesskaber] (1968): *Danmark og De europæiske Fællesskaber II*. Copenhagen: Folketinget, pp. 1019-1030. Cf. DANISH MINISTRY FOR GREENLAND (1967): »Grønlands stilling ved dansk indtræden i Fællesskaberne«, J.nr. 1505-01-10, pp. 1-23, here: p. 18; GLRF (1967): »Ekstraktafskrift af redegørelse vedrørende Danmark og De europæiske Fællesskaber«, Annex 46/1967, pp. 359-363.

exports. In 1963, the Danish government had given in to Greenland's demands for an extension of the Greenlandic fishing limit and established a twelve-mile exclusive limit. However, foreign trawlers still caught 90 per cent of the fish in Greenlandic waters beyond this limit. Moreover, Iceland, Norway, the UK, West Germany, Spain and Portugal had also been granted transitional rights until 1973 to continue fisheries within the area between six and twelve miles from Greenlandic coastlines.

According to the Commission's 1966 memorandum, EEC member states should soon attain the right to fish within the fishing limits of other member states. But opening Greenland's waters further to the highly developed fishing fleets of EC member states would make the recent establishment of the twelve-mile exclusive limit redundant and the development of a Greenlandic fishing industry difficult. Moreover, the Danish government considered the preservation of the residence requirement of six months in Greenland prior to the establishment of a company as pre-eminent in order to ensure that it was the Greenlandic people who were to benefit from the development policy. Furthermore, as a developing region, Greenland would continue to be dependent on Danish state subsidies for its economy. Therefore, there needed to be exemptions from Article 92 of the Rome Treaty, which prohibited state subsidies.

The result was that Denmark made a reservation for Greenland with regard to a future common fisheries policy, the preservation of the six-months residence requirement prior to establishment in Greenland and Danish state subsidies. Granted that these conditions would be met, both Greenlandic *Folketing* MPs, Knud Hertling and Nikolaj Rosing (see table 7), approved Denmark's (and Greenland's) EEC membership application in May 1967.¹⁸⁵ The Danish government subsequently also requested the *Landsråd* to state whether it could approve EEC membership again in principle on the basis of these reservations or whether it requested additional reservations.¹⁸⁶ In September 1967, the *Landsråd* approved EEC membership and did not demand any additional reservations.¹⁸⁷

185 N.N. (1967): »Krav om særligt hensyn til Grønlands interesser«, in: *A/G*, 25 May 1967, p. 4.

186 GLRF (1967): »Ministeriet for Grønland: Grønland og de europæiske fællesskaber«, Annex 47/1967, pp. 363-365, here: p. 365.

187 GLRF (1967): »Forslag om redegørelse vedr. Grønland og De europæiske Fællesskaber«, 11/1967, pp. 90-92.

Table 7: Folketing MPs elected in Greenland (1960-87)¹⁸⁸

<i>Folketing term</i>	<i>Greenlandic Folketing MPs</i>	
1960-63	Nikolaj Rosing	Mikael Gam
1964-66		Knud Hertling
1966-68		
1968-71		
1971-73	Moses Olsen (S)	
1973-76	Lars Emil Johansen (S)	Nikolaj Rosing
1976-77		Ole Berglund (A)
1977-79		Otto Steenholdt (A)
1979-81		
1981-84	Preben Lange (S)	
1984-87		

4.2. No economic interest in EEC membership

For the Danish government, the economic advantages of EEC membership for Greenland outbalanced the potential costs of a common fisheries policy or the right to free establishment within Greenland's economy. However, Greenland's political elite had a very different economic assessment of the costs and benefits of EEC membership. *Folketing* MP Nikolaj Rosing acknowledged the benefits of EFTA and EEC membership for Greenland's exports.¹⁸⁹ In 1961, he welcomed that Greenland's exports would be able to profit from the removal of custom tariffs. In 1963, he reaffirmed that Greenland could »not exist without international trade«. ¹⁹⁰ Trade with foreign nations would be vital, as long as Greenland's economy was dependent on fish. Production in Greenland had doubled between 1957 and 1963, but Greenland would only be able to sell its products if the world market remained open.

Yet, Rosing also stated in 1961 that the benefits of EEC membership for Greenlandic exporters were small.¹⁹¹ Throughout the 1960s, Greenland only exported a marginal (and decreasing) part of its most important products to the EEC (see table 8). The Greenland Council, an advisory committee of the Danish government consisting of Danish and Greenlandic *Folketing* and *Landsråd* MPs, therefore rejected the government's argument that EC membership was significant for Greenlandic exports, claiming that the percentage of exports to EEC countries was »modest«

188 Own table based on SØRENSEN (2007): *Denmark-Greenland*, p. 186. Although Atassut and Siumut were only formally established between 1977 and 1979, some of the individual Greenlandic *Folketing* MPs showed clear allegiance to both party movements before that date. In that case, the party abbreviation can be found in brackets also before 1977 and 1979.

189 FT (1961-62): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, cl. 4560.

190 FT (1962-63): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, cl. 2796; N.N. (1963): »Grønland kan græde tørre tårer over de afbrudte fællesmarkedsforhandlinger«, in: *A/G*, 28 February 1963, pp. 12-14.

191 FT (1961-62): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, cl. 211.

at best.¹⁹² Greenland would just need to secure continued custom-free access of its products to the Danish mainland.

On the contrary, EEC membership could even harm Greenland's export interests. Adoption of the CCT could lead to an equivalent introduction of custom tariffs on Greenlandic products in the US. Throughout the 1960s, the US imported between one fifth and one third of Greenland's products (see table 8). The Greenland Council was sceptical that EEC membership would result in such a significant increase in exports to EEC member states that it would justify the membership decision from an export perspective in the long run.

Table 8: Destination of Greenlandic exports in per cent (1963-69)¹⁹³

	1963	1965	1967	1968	1969
Denmark	21.3	29.0	51.0	61.3	73.0
EFTA w/o Denmark	9.8	19.5	4.1	3.1	1.6
EEC	11.3	8.5	0.1	0.0	0.0
USA	23.1	28.3	34.2	31.8	20.6
Greece	11.8	4.9	7.4	2.5	2.9
Third states	22.7	9.8	3.2	1.4	1.9

Greenland's political elite also had great concerns about the consequences of EEC membership for Greenlandic fisheries. Fisheries were the backbone for Greenland's future economic development. But instead of preserving a fishing limit for the Greenlandic people as a basis for developing a domestic fishing industry, EEC membership would further increase the number of foreign fishermen in Greenlandic waters. *Folketing* MP Nikolaj Rosing stressed in 1961 and 1962 that Greenlandic fishermen would never be able to compete with experienced foreign fishermen and their well-equipped trawlers.¹⁹⁴ West Germany alone had increased its catch in Greenlandic waters in only one year from 47,000 tons in 1960 to 142,000 tons in 1961, which was double the amount of Greenland's total catch that same year. Moreover, judging from the amount of unlawful fishing before Greenland's coast, foreign fishermen's respect for the current fishing limit of three miles would be »at rock-bottom«. Rosing therefore urged the Danish government in 1962 to create a twelve-mile exclusive fishing limit for Greenland, »even if this question was

192 See for this and the following paragraph: GREENLAND COUNCIL [Grønlandsrådet] (1967): *Grønland og Fællesmarkedet*, Dok. No. 50/67 (Resumé), 15 November 1967, pp. 1-3, here: p. 2. Cf. MINISTRY FOR GREENLAND (1967): »Grønlands stilling«.

193 Own table based on DANISH COMMITTEE (1968): *De europæiske Fællesskaber*, p. 1023; DANISH COMMITTEE ON EC RELATIONS [Udvalget vedrørende Danmarks forhold til De europæiske Fællesskaber] (1971): *Danmark og De europæiske Fællesskaber*, 3. supplerende redegørelse, Udviklingen I 1970. Copenhagen: Folketinget, p. 346.

194 See for this paragraph: FT (1961-62): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, cl. 211-213; FT (1962-63): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, cl. 2796-2797.

unpopular within EEC member states«. ¹⁹⁵ In order to justify this demand, *Landsråd* MP Erling Høegh pledged to further develop the Greenlandic fishing industry so that it would actually be able to exploit the resources within a twelve-mile fishing limit. ¹⁹⁶

In 1963, the Danish government established a twelve-mile limit for Greenland. But this decision would become redundant if the Commission's proposals for a common fisheries policy were implemented. Therefore, the Greenland Council stressed that a common fisheries policy would »limit or totally preclude the planned industrial development of Greenlandic fisheries, on which Greenland's economy was primarily based«. ¹⁹⁷ For the Greenland Council, raising the living standard in Greenland was inextricably bound to expansion of the fisheries sector. Therefore, it was pre-eminent to restrict the exploitation of the limited fisheries resources to the Greenlandic people. *Landsråd* MP Alibak Josefsen also mentioned that Greenland's fishermen would already discuss the need to extend the fishing limit further, even if this was difficult because of the position of other nations. ¹⁹⁸

In addition, Greenland's political elite was also concerned with the liberalisation of the Greenlandic economy. With regard to EEC membership, *Folketing* MP Nikolaj Rosing argued in 1962 that the Danish policy to work towards an active participation of the Greenlandic people in the economy (»Greenland for Greenlanders«) would contradict membership in the EEC. ¹⁹⁹ The problem would be that Greenland's economy needed to be protected during the ongoing development process as long as Greenlanders were not able to take an active role in it. In 1967, the Greenland Council reiterated that the upcoming negotiations needed to achieve as far-reaching reservations for Greenland as possible. ²⁰⁰ Otherwise, accession to the EEC would be incompatible with the development policy for Greenland. *Landsråd* MPs Jørgen C. F. Olsen and Niels Holm both emphasised the need for the *Landsråd* to preserve the six-months residence requirement for foreigners prior to economic establishment in Greenland. ²⁰¹ For *Landsråd* MP Kaj Narup, even this exemption was not far-reaching enough.

Thus, for Greenland's political elite, the benefits of EEC membership for Greenland's exports did not outbalance concerns about the fishing limit and the protection of the Greenlandic economy. On the contrary, it considered these economic benefits minimal in comparison to the huge cost membership would entail if the Danish government was not able to achieve far-reaching exemptions from it

195 FT (1962-63): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, cl. 221.

196 GLRF (1962): »Forslag til Landsrådsudtalelse angående manglende boligstøttemidler«, 18/1962, pp. 180-183, here: p. 181.

197 GREENLAND COUNCIL (1967): »Grønland«, p. 2.

198 GLRF (1968): »Drøftelse af Danmarks forhold til Fællesmarkedet«, 13/1968, pp. 110-113, here: p. 112.

199 FT (1962-63): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, cl. 221.

200 GREENLAND COUNCIL (1967): »Grønland«, p. 3.

201 GLRF (1967): »Forslag om redegørelse vedr. Grønland og De europæiske Fællesskaber«, 11/1967, pp. 90-92, here: p. 92; GLRF (1968): »Drøftelse af Danmarks forhold til Fællesmarkedet«, 13/1968, pp. 110-113, here: pp. 111-113. Cf. N.N. (1968): »Grønland og Fællesmarkedet«, in: *A/G*, 26 September 1968, p. 18.

for Greenland. Thus, in 1961, *Landsråd* MPs Jørgen C. F. Olsen and Hans Lyngge were already very hesitant to declare their support for EEC membership.²⁰² *Folketing* MP Nikolaj Rosing also considered it »bold« of the *Landsråd* to have voted in favour of EEC membership without a prior investigation into the matter.²⁰³ He concluded:

Of course, I can see that there are advantages of being an EEC member. But with regard to Greenland, the disadvantages will, in my opinion, be more and greater than we can guess at the moment: a new transformation on top of the current one – a further intensification of the development, in which we already participate far too less within too many areas.²⁰⁴

As soon as first doubts arose in the accession negotiations of 1962 that Greenland could achieve the same far-reaching exemptions from EEC membership as from EFTA membership, Rosing demanded a transition period for Greenland.²⁰⁵ He argued that Denmark would otherwise »do the Greenlanders a disservice«. In the end, he considered the temporary impasse in the Danish membership plans in 1963 to be »very regrettable« for Denmark. However, if Greenland was considered independently this would be different:

We can certainly use a pause in order to investigate and to precisely determine what EEC membership will mean for Greenland. And we can use this time in order to achieve more clarity over what kind of special regulations will be necessary if our development shall not take the wrong direction.²⁰⁶

The position of the Danish KGH director H. C. Christiansen shows that scepticism about the alleged economic benefits of EEC membership for Greenland was also strong among those Danes who were more familiar with the living conditions in Greenland. As early as in 1957, Christiansen warned that

Denmark's possible accession to the EEC can have far-reaching and very serious consequences with regard to foreign fishermen fishing in Greenlandic waters, which [...] could reduce the already limited economic possibilities of Greenlandic fishermen to a significant extent.²⁰⁷

202 GLRF (1961): »Det Europæiske Fællesmarked«, 10/1961, pp. 145-149, here: p. 148.

203 FT (1961-62): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, cl. 210.

204 FT (1962-63): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, cl. 221: »Selvfølgelig kan jeg se, at der er fordele ved at være med i fællesskabet, men for Grønlands vedkommende vil ulemperne efter min mening være flere og større, end vi kan ane det i øjeblikket; en ny omstilling oven på den løbende – en yderlige forcering af den udvikling, som vi på mange områder allerede deltager alt for lidt i.«

205 See for this paragraph: FT (1962-63): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, cl. 2795-2798.

206 Ibid, cl. 2796: »Vi kan have god brug for en pause til at undersøge og præcist fastlægge, hvad fællesmarkedet vil betyde for Grønland, og vi kan bruge tiden til at få bedre klarhed over, hvilke særordninger der vil være nødvendige, hvis ikke vor udvikling skal ledes ind i gale baner.«

207 GLRF (1961): »Det Europæiske Fællesmarked«, 10/1961, pp. 145-149, here: p. 146: »Danmarks eventuelle tilslutning til fællesmarkedet vil kunne få vidtrækkende og meget alvorlige konsekvenser for

In 1961, he reiterated his concern that a common fisheries policy in the EEC could be »detrimental for the development of the Greenlandic society and economy«. ²⁰⁸ Christiansen believed that it would be nearly impossible for the Greenlandic people to one day take control over the development of Greenland's society and economy if Greenland joined the EEC. He argued that the right to free establishment would lead to a powerful intensification of the development process, based on foreign companies and foreign capital. It would require great adaptability on behalf of the Greenlandic people and »create even more human problems«, of which Greenland would have enough already. He also feared that foreign fishing companies might abuse the right to establishment in order to fish within Greenlandic waters. ²⁰⁹ In contrast, remaining outside the EEC would give Greenland the possibility »to grow into the new time and grow with the tasks«. In the end, Christiansen demanded a transition period for Greenland with regard to EEC membership just as Nikolaj Rosing did. ²¹⁰ It should be at least 25 years long so that a whole new generation could adapt to membership. Just like Rosing, he argued that one should »look dry-eyed« on the end of Denmark's accession plans – from a Greenlandic point of view – because it would give Greenlandic society the transition and adaptation period necessary. ²¹¹

To sum up, Greenland's political elite had many economic reasons to reject EEC membership because it considered a future common fisheries policy, the right to free establishment and the prohibition of state subsidies to be incompatible with the development of a domestic fishing industry. Moreover, EEC membership also contradicted the objective of educating the local Greenlandic workforce so that it could take an active part in Greenland's economy in the years to come. EEC membership would have required Greenland to open up its economy to foreign fishermen, foreign companies and foreign capital at a time when the Greenlandic economy was not yet competitive. Moreover, in order for Denmark's development policy to continue, Danish state subsidies continued to be desperately needed to finance Greenland's economy and, in particular, the housing sector.

Greenland's political elite must therefore be considered to have had at least a medium economic interest to reject EC membership. There is no economic reason, why it should have supported negotiations on EEC membership in the first place. EEC membership did not offer anything in economic value for Greenland in the late 1960s, even if the economic concerns of Greenland's elite had been accommodated. Greenland's exports to the EEC market were marginal. LI can

udøvelse af fremmede fiskeri i grønlandske farvande, hvilket [...] i væsentlig grad vil kunne reducere grønlandske fiskeres i forvejen begrænsede erhvervs muligheder.«

208 See for this paragraph: CHRISTIANSEN (1962): »Grønland og Fællesmarkedet«, pp. 381-388.

209 Apart from the EEC's fisheries policy and the right to free establishment, KGH director Christiansen also named a number of other economic problems speaking against EEC membership, hereunder the need to introduce custom tariffs, the increase of the general price level, increased production costs and doubts whether the price equalisation scheme and the KGH monopoly could continue.

210 CHRISTIANSEN (1962): »Grønland og Fællesmarkedet«, p. 391.

211 N.N. (1963): »Grønland kan græde tørre tårer over de afbrudte fællesmarkedsforhandlinger«, in: *A/G*, 28 February 1963, pp. 12-14.

therefore not explain why Greenland's *Landsråd* and *Folketing* MPs supported EEC membership in the early 1960s. The Greenlandic case clearly challenges the view that there was a correlation between the economic interest of Greenland's political elite and its European policy choices.

4.3. The colonial setting of Greenlandic politics

A strong political interest to support EEC membership could have explained why Greenland's elite did not act on its economic interest to reject EEC membership in the 1960s. In fact, Greenland's *Landsråd* and *Folketing* MPs did not see themselves as political actors, who should be in charge of making European policy in the first place. In 1960, *Landsråd* MP Erling Høegh argued that the *Landsråd* was not in a position to decide about Greenland's European policy.²¹² It would have no idea what to do and should therefore listen to »the politicians and experts« (in Denmark). If they supported Greenland's EFTA membership, the *Landsråd* should do so as well. Høegh also supported Greenlandic membership in the EEC in 1961 and 1967 because he trusted the Danish experts to make the right decision on behalf of the Greenlandic people.²¹³

Consequently, Greenland's elite did not have a strong political interest to support EEC membership. But it considered it to be natural for Greenland to follow Denmark into EFTA and the EEC if the Danish government so requested. This was irrespective of whether membership would have been beneficial for Greenland's economy or not. This also explains why Greenland's *Landsråd* and *Folketing* MPs only asked for reservations and adaptation times, while none of them actually dared to speak out against EEC membership. Addressing the *Folketing* in 1967, Knud Hertling reiterated that the question of joining the EEC was quite simple from a constitutional point of view:

If Denmark's application for membership is accepted by the EC countries, [...] Greenland will be very automatically affected by it. This is a very natural consequence of Greenland's constitutional status in relation to Denmark as an integrated part of the Danish Realm.²¹⁴

The roles were clearly defined: Denmark made European policy decisions on behalf of Greenland and should be trusted to make the right ones. The task for Greenland's elite was merely to make the Danish authorities aware of the special problems for Greenland with membership and to pray that they would adequately address these problems in the accession negotiations.

212 GLRF (1960): »Frihandelskonventionen«, 9/1960, pp. 108-111, here: p. 110.

213 GLRF (1961): »Det Europæiske Fællesmarked«, 10/1961, pp. 145-149, here: p. 148; GLRF (1967): »Forslag om redegørelse vedr. Grønland og De europæiske Fællesskaber«, 11/1967, pp. 90-92, here: pp. 91-92.

214 FT (1966-67): »Folketingets forhandlinger« (second session), cl. 4138: »Såfremt Danmarks ansøgning om medlemskab godkendes af EEC-landene [...] vil Grønland ganske automatisk blive berørt heraf. Dette følger ganske naturligt af Grønlands statsretlige status i forhold til Danmark som en integrerende del af riget.«

It was hardly surprising that this view was also dominant among the EEC-sceptical Danish elite in Greenland. KGH director H. C. Christiansen avoided drawing any far-reaching conclusions from his criticism of the Danish government's decision to include Greenland in its membership application because

accession to the EEC is a necessity for Denmark. Besides, it has already been decided – at least in principle. Therefore, what remains to do is just to recognise the problems [of membership] and adapt our actions to them.²¹⁵

It was completely clear to him that »Greenland must and will follow Denmark because one cannot do otherwise as a part of the Danish Realm«. ²¹⁶ Thus, Greenland would have to accept that Denmark's agricultural interests would always weigh more than Greenland's fisheries interests, although Denmark's political parties would certainly try to preserve Greenland's interests nevertheless.

Consequently, *Folketing* MP Nikolaj Rosing had reason to believe that the *Landsråd's* principal support for EEC membership should rather be understood »as a declaration of trust and loyalty to the [Danish] government and the *Folketing*«, rather than as a declaration of support for EEC membership.²¹⁷ The *Landsråd* would have been aware of Denmark's strong interest in EEC membership and would therefore have set aside its own economic interests. But Denmark would have a huge responsibility to respect Greenland's interests in the accession negotiations.

The reason why Greenland's *Landsråd* MPs did not consider themselves capable of taking responsibility for Greenlandic affairs into their own hands had to do with their own perceived lack of education and inferiority to the Danish elites.²¹⁸ However, by the 1960s there were already the first signs that this perceived inferiority was about to make way for an increased sense of national self-confidence.²¹⁹ SIK employee Seth Lennert wondered in a letter to *A/G* in 1963, whether the *Landsråd* had voted for EEC membership because the majority of its members was employed by the Danish state itself and therefore did not dare to raise their voice.²²⁰ At one stage, *Landsråd* MP Jørgen C. F. Olsen even criticised his colleagues for being afraid to oppose the *Landsråd* chairman, who was appointed by the Danish government until 1967, as a consequence of the »dictatorship of the colonial era«. ²²¹

215 CHRISTIANSEN (1962): »Grønland og Fællesmarkedet«, p. 392: »Tilslutning til Fællesmarkedet er en nødvendighed for Danmark. Desuden er den jo allerede besluttet – i al fald i princippet. Tilbage står derfor kun erkendelse af problemerne og tilpasning af vore handlinger til den nye problemstilling.«

216 N.N. (1963): »Grønland kan græde tørre tårer over de afbrudte fællesmarkedsforhandlinger«, in: *A/G*, 28 February 1963, pp. 12-14.

217 FT (1961-62): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, cl. 210-211.

218 Ditte Bentzen GOLDSCHMIDT (1976): *Fra integration til hjemmestyre: Holdningsudvikling i de(t) grønlandske Landsråd: Tiden 1945-1972 og holdning hos de grønlandske folketingsmedlemmer vedrørende spørgsmål af betydning for Grønlands stilling indenfor det danske rige*, MA thesis, Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, p. 77.

219 Jørgen VIEMOSE (1977): *Dansk kolonipolitik i Grønland*. Copenhagen: Demos, pp. 156-159.

220 Seth LENNERT (1963): »Imod Grønlands tilslutning«, in: *A/G*, 17 January 1963, p. 10.

221 GOLDSCHMIDT (1976): *Fra integration*, pp. 19-20.

When EEC membership came back on Greenland's agenda in 1971, Greenland's elite was no longer willing to follow Denmark.

The Faroe Islands (1970-74): Rejection of EC membership²²²

In May 1967, the *Folketing* voted in favour of Denmark taking up negotiations on EC membership for a second time. Once again, the Danish government did not only make a reservation with regard to the inclusion of Greenland in its prospective EC membership, but also with regard to the Faroe Islands.²²³ After De Gaulle's resignation as President of France in 1969, the first enlargement of the EC became a realistic prospect. In June 1970, the EC was able to open accession negotiations with Denmark and the three other applicant states, Ireland, Norway and the UK. In his opening speech, Poul Nyboe Andersen, Denmark's Economic and Market Minister, stated that it would be necessary to discuss possibilities for a special regulation for the Faroe Islands and Greenland in the same way as for current member states' overseas territories.²²⁴ He also expressed his clear preference for »a solution within the framework of Danish membership« to a mere association of the Faroe Islands and Greenland with the EC. Moreover, he asked for the EC's goodwill to find a solution to the Faroese and Greenlandic problems, which – »although of marginal significance, seen from the point of view of the EEC – were of utmost significance for the population in the Faroe Islands and Greenland«.

Denmark's membership application meant that the Faroe Islands had to deal with EC membership for a second time after the early 1960s. Other than in Greenland, the Faroese Home Rule authorities were able to decide for themselves whether the Faroe Islands should join the EC together with Denmark or not. Once again, it was a unionist government, consisting of JF, SB and SF, which contemplated this decision for three and a half years between August 1970 and January 1974. Judging from the first European policy debate between 1959 and 1963, it could have been expected to renew its support for EC membership, based on its political interest to follow Denmark into the EC. Only this time, it did not. In January 1974, a unanimous *Løgting* rejected EC membership. Instead, the unionist government

222 Some of the insights from this chapter have been published in REBHAN (2014): »Postcolonial Politics«.

223 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010): »The First Enlargement«, p. 57.

224 LT (1970): »Føroyar og europeiski felagsskapurin (Løgtingsmál nr. 6/1970 (vetrarting)): Økonomi- og markedsminister P. Nyboe Andersons tale på det første møde mellem De europæiske Fællesskaber og de fire kandidatlande i Luxembourg den 30. Juni 1970«, Doc. 4d/1970, pp. 45-51, here: p. 49.

negotiated a bilateral trade agreement with the EC, which came into effect in September 1974. Thus, its European policy decision differed remarkably from its earlier support for EEC membership, although the political setting appeared to be similar.

Chapter 5 explains the change of preferences in the Faroe Islands from support to rejection of EC membership between 1970 and 1974. The change of preference from support to rejection of membership makes it possible to apply process-tracing in this chapter in order to scrutinise the main factors identified in chapter 3 as constitutive for the motivation of the Faroese Home Rule government. LI supposes that only its weak and diffuse economic interest made it possible for the unionist government in 1961 to focus on its political interest to support membership. According to LI, the unionist government should have developed a strong economic interest to reject EC membership until 1974, which could have outbalanced its political interest to support membership. However, the political interest of the unionist government could also have changed from support to rejection of EC membership. Then, its economic interest could have continued to be weak and diffuse.

5.1. Consideration and rejection of EC membership

The beginning of accession negotiations between the EC and Denmark in July 1970 coincided with the Faroese political parties' campaign for the *Løgting* elections later that year. Only TF rejected the inclusion of the Faroes in Denmark's potential EC membership from the outset and made rejection of membership its main election topic for the campaign.²²⁵ The other parties were hesitant at first. SB chairman Trygvi Samuelsen emphasised that SB had not yet taken a position on whether the Faroes should or should not join the EC.²²⁶ The position of JF was to win maximum rights in the accession negotiations in order to be able to make a sensible choice later.²²⁷ SF stressed that it would not campaign in favour of or against EC membership before the matter had been fully investigated.²²⁸ FF stated that »all possible relationships and the influence of EC membership on the Faroe Islands should be investigated«, before making a final decision.²²⁹

Following the position of the great majority of the political parties, the unionist government therefore established a committee in August 1970 consisting of Faroese and Danish government officials, which would gather information about the costs and benefits of a potential Faroese membership in the EC.²³⁰ In December 1970,

225 TF (1970): »Áheitan á Føroya fólk: Stevnumið Tjóðveldisflokksins«, in: *14. September*, 14 March 1970, p. 7.

226 Trygvi SAMUELSEN (1970): »Tjóðveldisflokkurin og Felagsmarknaðurin«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 3 November 1970, p. 1; Trygvi SAMUELSEN (1970): »Tað nyttar ikki Tjóðveldisflokkinum at ræða við Felagsmarknaðinum«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 7 November 1970, p. 1.

227 N.N. (1970): »Hvor er nú einsamallur ...?« In: *Sosialurin*, 28 July 1970, p. 2.

228 N.N. (1970): »Nokur orð aftrat um felagsmarknaðin«, in: *Tingakrossur*, 30 October 1970, p. 3.

229 N.N. (1970): »Stevnuskrá fólkaflokksins«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 21 October 1970, p. 3.

230 LT (1970): »Føroyar og Europeiski felagsmarknaðurin (EEC)«, 6/1970, pp. 105-115, here: p. 105. Cf. N.N. (1970): »EEC avmarkar fíggarligu hjálpina«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 15 August 1970, p. 1.

the Faroese-Danish Committee recommended including the Faroes in Denmark's membership negotiations with the EC in order to be able to make a final estimation of the costs and benefits of membership.

The unionist government of JF, SB and SF was re-elected in the *Løgting* elections (see table 9). In December 1970, it asked the *Løgting* to approve the start of negotiations between the Danish government and the Faroese Home Rule government on the one hand and the EC on the other »about the conditions, under which the Faroe Islands could possibly participate or cooperate with the Community«. ²³¹ In February 1971, the 14 MPs of the government parties approved negotiations with the EC. The delegates of FF and FB abstained. In his minority proposal, FF chairman Hákun Djurhuus supported negotiations, but stressed that they should be about an »association« (*tilknýti*) of the Faroe Islands with the EC and not about full membership. The TF MPs rejected both EC membership and an association with the EC. Formal negotiations on Faroese EC membership started in March 1971.

Table 9: Percentage of votes in the *Løgting* elections (1958-74)²³²

	<i>FF</i>	<i>SB</i>	<i>JF</i>	<i>SF</i>	<i>TF</i>	<i>FB</i>
1958	17.8	23.7	25.8	5.9	23.9	2.9
1962	20.2	20.3	27.5	5.9	21.6	4.4
1966	21.6	23.7	27.0	4.9	20.0	2.8
1970	20.0	21.7	27.2	5.6	21.9	3.5
1974	20.5	19.1	25.8	7.2	22.5	2.5

When the EC presented its proposal for Faroese membership in November 1971, the Faroese government declared that it could not accept it for the time being. ²³³ Nevertheless, it did not want to reject Faroese membership right away and agreed on a time of three years, from 1 January 1973 until 31 December 1975, in which it would consider the terms and conditions of the negotiation result and take a final position on membership. In January 1972, Prime Minister Atli P. Dam (JF) asked the *Løgting* to approve the proposal for such consideration period. ²³⁴ The parties in government and FB approved the proposal, but only in an amended form. The government should not only negotiate the conditions for full EC membership during the consideration period, but also investigate alternative forms of membership. Moreover, a vote of the *Løgting* in favour of EC membership should be referred to a binding referendum. The MPs of FF and TF abstained.

231 See for this paragraph: LT (1970): »Føroyar og Europeiski felagsmarknaðurin (EEC)«, 6/1970, pp. 105-115.

232 Own table based on LØGTINGIÐ (2002): *Løgtingið 150 – Hátíðarrit 3*, pp. 78-79. Cf. WANG (1989): *Stjórn málafrøði*, Doc. 1. The parties are arranged according to their list letters.

233 LT (1971): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið við undirskjøtum 1-6 (Løgtingsmál nr. 37/1971): Gongdin í EF-samráðingunum«, B Doc. 10/1971, pp. 3-16, here: pp. 3-5.

234 See for the following: LT (1971): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið«, A 37/1971, pp. 211-217.

Consequently, the Faroe Islands were excluded from the Treaty of Rome and from the referendum on Danish membership, which took place in October 1972.²³⁵ Articles 25-27 of the Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK amended the Treaty of Rome (Article 227 (5)), the Treaty establishing the ECSC (Article 79), and the EURATOM Treaty (Article 198) so that it included the Faroese consideration period. Neither of the treaties should »apply to the Faroe Islands«. However, the Danish government could »give notice, by a declaration deposited by 31 December 1975, [...] that this Treaty shall apply to those Islands.« The Treaty of Accession also included a special Protocol 2 concerning the Faroe Islands. Article 1 of the Protocol stated that the Faroe Islands would not be treated differently than any other non-EC state during the consideration period. However, the present rules for import and export with Denmark would remain unchanged despite Danish EC membership. Thus, there would neither be any tariffs on Faroese exports to Denmark nor on Danish exports to the Faroe Islands. When Denmark joined the EC on 1 January 1973, the Faroe Islands were not included in its membership. The same day also marked the automatic end of Faroese EFTA membership (because Denmark's membership ended) and the beginning of the consideration period.

Fifteen months into the consideration period, in March 1973, Prime Minister Atli P. Dam (JF) decided that Faroese membership in the EC could not be recommended on the basis of the negotiation result, »especially with regard to fisheries«. ²³⁶ But again, the unionist government was hesitant to reject membership at this stage. Instead, it asked the *Løgting* to authorise the Faroese government

to do all in its power to bring about a change to the CFP so that it better corresponds to the needs of regions and states where fisheries are of utmost importance and other employment possibilities non-existent.

The government should also investigate possibilities for a special agreement with the EC for Faroese exports, irrespective of membership. In April 1973, the government proposal was accepted with the votes of the 14 MPs of the government parties, while TF, FF and FB voted against it. Thus, the Faroese government rejected EC membership on the conditions of the negotiation result of 1971, but left a back door open for Faroese EC membership if it was able to change the conditions for it.

However, the Faroese government was not successful. In November 1973, the Prime Minister therefore stated that the Faroe Islands should opt for a bilateral trade agreement with the EC, which would at least give Faroese exports the same conditions as in Norway and Iceland.²³⁷ On 25 January 1974, the MPs of all parties

235 See for this paragraph: EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1972): »Actes relatifs à l'adhésion aux Communautés européennes du Royaume de Danemark, de l'Irlande, du Royaume de Norvège et du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord«, OJ L 73, 27 March 1972 (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1972:073:FULL:FR:PDF>, 3 February 2014), pp. 18-19, 163-164.

236 See for this paragraph: LT (1972): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið«, A 63/1972, pp. 255-266.

237 Atli P. DAM (1973): »Skulu vit laga til Føroya framtíð ella Felagsmarknaðarins«, in: *Sosialurin*, 24 November 1973, pp. 4-5.

represented in the *Løgting* unanimously rejected EC membership and supported negotiations for a bilateral trade agreement instead.²³⁸ Little more than a week after the Faroese rejection of EC membership, the EC Council declared its willingness to gradually decrease tariffs on Faroese imports, which were of significance for the Faroe Islands' future economic and social development.²³⁹ The Council also recognised the utmost significance of the fisheries sector and of industries linked to the fisheries sector for the Faroe Islands. Moreover, the Council took up the request of Danish Foreign Minister Ove Guldberg and declared its readiness to offer the Faroes membership again under changed circumstances.

A trade agreement was reached in July 1974.²⁴⁰ The agreement ensured that the export of goods produced on the Faroe Islands to Denmark would remain custom-free. Custom tariffs on all industrial exports of the Faroe Islands and most fish exports to other EC countries would be removed by 80 per cent in gradual steps until 1976, starting on 1 September 1974. These regulations would not apply to Faroese exports to the UK. However, the UK agreed not to introduce any new custom tariffs in addition to the existing ones. This meant that not only would the export of frozen fish to the UK continue to remain custom-free, just as under EFTA membership, but also the export of all other Faroese fish products. In return, the Faroe Islands agreed to lower import tariffs on vegetables, fruits and all products derived from vegetables and fruits or other plants from the EC member states in gradual steps by 40 per cent until 1976. All political parties in the Faroe Islands were content with the negotiation result and unanimously voted in favour of the trade agreement in August 1974.

5.2. Equal access of foreign fishermen to Faroese waters

In June 1970, the six founding EC member states adopted their first regulations for a common fisheries policy, based (among other factors) on the principle of equal access of all member states to the fishing grounds of other member states. In comparison to the debate on EEC membership between 1959 and 1963, the adoption of the CFP radically changed the nature of the Faroese EC debate between 1970 and 1974. Equal access meant that the Faroe Islands would have to grant EC fishermen access to its exclusive fishing limit. This happened at a time in which the international trend was increasingly moving towards an extension of exclusive fishing limits. Like other nations, the Faroese government had extended its exclusive fishing limit to twelve miles only recently in two subsequent steps in 1959 and 1963. They were unwilling to open it up again for other EC member states.

The report by the Faroese-Danish committee in December 1970 already regarded the preservation of the twelve-mile fishing limit for Faroese fishermen as »paramount«.²⁴¹ The reasons were that, as a consequence of the extension of

238 LT (1973): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið«, A 44/1973, pp. 184-194.

239 See for this paragraph: LT (1974): »Rættleiðing til løgtingsmál nr. 11/1974 (ólavsøkutingsetan): Felagsmarknaðarmálið«, B Doc. 6b/1971, pp. 387-412, here: p. 390.

240 See for this paragraph: LT (1974): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið«, A 11/1974, pp. 42-50.

241 See for this paragraph: LT (1970): »Føroyar og europeiski felagsskapurin (Løgtingsmál nr. 6/1970 (vetrar-

the fishing limit to twelve miles, coastal fisheries had nearly doubled in size. The sector was significant for the further development of the fishing industry, as it provided the raw material for the industrial development of the fish-processing sector. The fish-processing sector had tripled in size since the extension of the fishing limit. Moreover, Faroese fishermen were hugely in favour of this new organisation of fisheries on the islands. Coastal fisheries were far more attractive to them than traditional distant-water fisheries, where they had to be away from home for an extended period of time. Due to the vital role of coastal fisheries and the fish-processing sector for the Faroese economy (even more so in the future), the Committee emphasised that the Faroes were »forced« to negotiate an exemption from the CFP. Equal access for member states fishermen would increase the risk of overfishing and decrease catching possibilities for Faroese fishermen in the limited and concentrated fisheries resources around the Faroes.

Of course, EU membership would also have economic advantages for the Faroes. The committee report concluded in 1970 that access to the EC market, the market components of the CFP, access to foreign capital and increased industrial development would speak for membership. Prime Minister Kristian Djurhuus (SB) emphasised

that our existence is bound to export and rises and falls with our export possibilities, and that it is of no use what our fishermen catch if we cannot export this catch at a profitable price.²⁴²

Vilhelm Johannesen (JF) also considered export possibilities to be the primary advantage of membership.²⁴³ He argued that it would cause unforeseeable problems for the Faroese economy if Denmark and the other Nordic states joined the EC. 62 per cent of Faroese exports, which went to the EEC and its applicant states in 1970, would then have to be sold to other markets (see table 6). Moreover, if the Faroes remained outside, while their neighbours joined, they would also lose catching rights in the North Sea, in Shetland, in Denmark and most importantly in Greenland.

For *Dimmalætting* it was clear that EC membership could only strengthen the Faroese export sector:

ting)): Rapport fra Embedsudvalget vedrørende Færøernes stilling til De europæiske Fællesskaber«, Doc. 4b/1970, pp. 7-42. The report also identified other problems with membership, such as the right to free establishment and the transfer of sovereignty to the EC. Moreover, Danish state subsidies, the Faroese systems of price and wage support, the hitherto custom-free imports of salt from Spain and the monopoly for state-owned insurance companies were incompatible with the Treaty of Rome. However, in comparison to the fisheries issue, these problems were marginal.

242 LT (1970): »Frágreiðing frá lögmanni«, pp. 3-11, here: p. 6: »[Tað er øllum kunnugt, at Føroyar hava bert fiskivinnuna at liva av, men tað má samstundis ásannast,] at okkara tilvera er bundin til export, ja, stendur og fellur við okkara exportmøguleikum, og at tað nyttar lítið, hvat okkara fiskimenn veiða, um vit ikki fáa exporterað hesa veiðu til rentablan pris.«

243 See for this paragraph: Vilhelm JOHANNESSEN (1971): »Vit megu finna hóskaði plasering«, in: *Sosialurin*, 27 January 1971, pp. 2, 4.

A country such as ours [...] can under no circumstances have disadvantages from the extension of export markets, the removal of import tariffs and quantitative restrictions. Nor can it harm our export capabilities if catching possibilities are explored for our fishing fleet in the territorial waters of other countries.²⁴⁴

The unionist paper also believed that the Faroe Islands should not simply reject EC membership before the final decision of their most important trade partners was known.²⁴⁵ As long as commercial alternatives to EC membership were uncertain and did not secure the same or better trade possibilities than membership, rejecting EC membership would be premature.²⁴⁶ *Dimmalætting* was convinced that if the equal access principle was not part of the deal, »there should not be any legitimate reason not to decide to join the EC with the greatest confidence«.²⁴⁷

However, the equal access principle was part of the deal and EC membership not an option for any of the political parties in the Faroe Islands if the twelve-mile fishing limit for Faroese fishermen could not be preserved. Prime Minister Atli P. Dam (JF) made it very clear when the negotiations on Faroese membership started that a temporary exclusive fishing limit would be »insufficient« to meet the Faroese demands.²⁴⁸ The problem in the Faroes would not be temporary. It would not just be »difficult« to find other employment, but there were simply no other alternatives to fisheries »than emigration«. The modest fish processing industry, which had developed during the 1960s, would be »entirely dependent« on coastal fisheries. The relative importance of coastal fisheries would grow steadily due to the decline of fisheries resources in other parts of the North Atlantic. Moreover, it would get increasingly difficult to recruit fishermen for distant-water fisheries because they would no longer be willing to be away from home for several months at a time. Thus, according to Dam, it would be

no exaggeration to say that not only the present standard of living, but the whole Faroese economy will be significantly affected if coastal fisheries were to be seriously reduced, which would be the case if territorial waters were opened to the fishing vessels of other nations. In that case, there would no longer be a basis for maintaining a population of the present size, and depopulation would be the inevitable result.

244 N.N. (1971): »Umskiftilig«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 13 May 1971, p. 1: »Eitt land sum okkara [...] kann undir ongum umstøðum vera illa fyri av, sølumarknaðurin verður víðkaður sum mest, leysur av innflutningstolli og influtningsavmarkingum, og heldur ikki kann tað koma útflutningsmøguleikum okkara til skaða, at latnir vera upp veiðmøguleikar fyri veiðiflota okkara á havsøkjum annara landa.«

245 N.N. (1972): »Interregnum«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 1 February 1972, p. 1.

246 N.N. (1971): »Fremtidig handel«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 23 December 1971, p. 1.

247 N.N. (1971): »Faktorernes orden«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 24 October 1971, p. 1.

248 See for this paragraph: LT (1970): »Føroyar og europeiski felagsskapurin (Løgtingsmál nr. 6/1971 (vetrarting)): Røða hildin í Brüssel«, Doc. 4a/1970, pp. 3-7; N.N. (1971): »Um tað frammanundan avgjörda er treytin, so er EEC einki fyri Føroyar«, in: *Sosialurin*, 21 August 1971, p. 4.

According to Árni Ólafsson, director of the Faroese Prime Minister's office in 1983, the Faroes could simply not be compared with other fishing nations in Europe.²⁴⁹ The UK, France and Germany would certainly have some areas that were highly dependent on fisheries as well in the short run. However, in the long run, they could develop alternative industries. In the Faroe Islands, there were no »viable alternative industries«. For the same reasons, Kjartan Hoydal, a fisheries biologist at the Faroe Islands Marine Research Institute, considered Faroese membership in the EC to be »catastrophic for the Faroese economy«.²⁵⁰

In their campaigns for the *Løgting* elections 1970, the government parties therefore rejected EC membership if access to the twelve-mile fishing limit of the Faroe Islands was no longer restricted to Faroese fishermen. SB emphasised that it would »not yield one inch on the current fishing limit of twelve miles for Faroese fishermen«.²⁵¹ For JF, it was essential that the Faroe Islands preserved the twelve-mile fishing limit and that this preservation also included restrictions to the right of free establishment so that foreign fishermen would not be able to take advantage of these regulations in order to fish within Faroese waters.²⁵² SF emphasised that the Faroe Islands had achieved the fishing limit after a long struggle and would not let it slip out of its hands again.²⁵³

The opposition parties, consisting of FF, TF and FB, equally opposed EC membership because of its consequences for the Faroese fisheries sector. Knút Wang, editor-in-chief of *Dagblaðið*, commented on the adoption of the CFP in 1970 that the Faroe Islands would »have nothing to do in the EC« if this policy was implemented.²⁵⁴ FF chairman Hákun Djurhuus subsequently stressed that it was »of utmost significance that [...] we [...] preserve the exclusive right to fisheries in Faroese waters«.²⁵⁵ TF chairman Erlendur Patursson emphasised that, »if we join the EC, there will be nothing, which can be called a Faroese fishing limit anymore. It will be removed completely«.²⁵⁶ Patursson did not only insist on the preservation of the fishing limit at twelve miles, but also on its extension. The prerequisite for both preservation and extension of the fishing limit would be »that we keep ourselves outside the EC«. Consequently, *Dimmalætting* pointed out that it would be

249 ÓLAFSSON (1983): »The Faroe Islands«, p. 57.

250 Kjartan HOYDAL (1972): »Færøerne – fiskeri og fællesmarked«, in: *Fisk og Hav: Skrifter fra Danmarks fiskeri- og havundersøgelser* 32, pp. 31-36, here: p. 31.

251 N.N. (1970): »Sambandsflokkurin vil hava sjómarkið um Føroyar víðkað«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 3 November 1970, p. 1.

252 N.N. (1970): »Ikki upp í Felagsmarknaðurin uttan so at fiskimarkið í minsta lagi verður varðveitt óskert 12 fjórðingar«, in: *Sosialurin*, 21 October 1970, p. 1.

253 N.N. (1970): »Felagsmarknaðurin«, in: *Tingakrossur*, 27 October 1970, p. 1; N.N. (1971): »Hann er ikki illur, ið ilt ræðist.« In: *Tingakrossur*, 5 February 1971, p. 3.

254 Knút WANG (1970): »Samtyktu broytingarnar í heimastýrslógini høvdu verið hentar, nú spurningurin um felagsmarknaðin kemur fyrri«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 24 October 1970, p. 1.

255 LT (1970): »Føroyar og Europeiski felagsmarknaðurin (EEC)«, 6/1970, pp. 105-115, here: p. 114.

256 Erlendur PATURSSON (1970): »Fiskimarkið 24 fjórðingar«, in: *14. September*, 12 September 1970, p. 4: »Fara vit upp í henda felagsmarknaðin, verður mótvegis londunum har einki sum eitur føroyskt fiskimark longur. Tað verður heilt strikað út.«

self-evident that [no] political party on the Faroe Islands will be able to raise a majority for a voluntary accession to the Community if the price is unlimited fisheries by foreigners. [...] No responsible Faroese politician, irrespective of which political party he belongs to, will be in favour of joining the EC under such circumstances.²⁵⁷

The EC's negotiation offer of November 1971 was unable to meet the demands of the Faroe Islands with regard to fisheries policy.²⁵⁸ First, EC member states refused to make any permanent exception for the Faroe Islands from its fisheries policy and thus from the principle of equal access. They believed that such an exception would contradict the principle of non-discrimination, which did not allow any EC member state to make different regulations for its own citizens than for the citizens of other member states. They only agreed on an exception for regions in which fisheries were of utmost importance and in which there were no other employment possibilities than in the fisheries sector. This included the Faroe Islands. While all EC member states would preserve an exclusive fishing limit of six miles, regions dependent on fisheries within these states would preserve an exclusive right to fish within twelve miles. However, this regulation would only be temporary and subject to re-evaluation after ten years.

For the Faroese government, it was simply not enough that the EC asserted that there would hardly be any doubt that the twelve-mile exception would continue after ten years if the Faroese economy did not change completely. And it was not enough either that changes to this exception would only be made unanimously so that they could be vetoed by Denmark on behalf of the Faroe Islands. The bottom line was that the negotiation outcome did not give final certainty about whether the temporary exception would continue unchanged.

Dagblaðið emphasised that the Faroes would be dependent on the goodwill of the EC in the future if they approved the negotiation result.²⁵⁹ But they would have no judicial guarantees for the preservation of their fishing limit. Nothing would prevent UK fishermen in the future from abusing the right to free establishment in order to fish in Faroese waters. Zakarias Wang, political scientist and TF politician, believed that it was »more than blue-eyed« to imagine that Denmark would use its veto right to extend the temporary exception for a twelve-mile fishing limit in the Faroe Islands in 1982.²⁶⁰ Denmark would have more important interests in

257 N.N. (1970): »Grundlig overvejelse«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 15 September 1970, p. 1: »Det er imidlertid givet, at [ikke] noget politisk parti paa Færøerne vil kunne mønstre flertal for frivillig tilslutning til Fællesmarkedet, hvis prisen er ubegrænset fremmedfiskeri. [...] Ingen ansvarlig færøsk politiker, uanset hvilket politisk parti han end tilhører, vil under saadanne forhold tiltræde indmeldelse i Fællesmarkedet.«

258 See for this and the following paragraph: LT (1971): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið við undirskjølum 1-6 (Løgtingsmál nr. 37/1971): Gongdin í EF-samráðingunum«, B Doc. 10/1971, pp. 3-16; LT (1971): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið við undirskjølum 1-6 (Løgtingsmál nr. 37/1971): Røða hjá lögmanni á ráðharrafundi millum Danmark og europeiska felagsskapin tann 9. november 1971«, B Doc. 10 (4)/1971, p. 24; LT (1971): »Røða hjá lögmanni á fundi við EF kommissionina 24. november 1971«, B Doc. 10 (5)/1971, pp. 24-27.

259 N.N. (1972): »Føroykska livsøki«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 8 January 1972, p. 2.

260 Zakarias WANG (1972): »Det færøske folk siger nej til EEC«, in: Jens-Peter Bonde (ed.): *Ja/nej EEC? Bogen om Fællesmarkedet*. Copenhagen: Radikal Ungdom [Social-Liberal Youth of Denmark], pp. 79-81, here: p. 81.

the EC than preserving the Faroese fishing limit and would most certainly rather compromise the Faroese position than its own interests in the EC's traditional package deals. TF leader Patursson concluded that EC membership would violate the agreement of all political parties to preserve the twelve-mile fishing limit.²⁶¹ He emphasised that membership would lose the Faroes its »most valuable property, the fishing grounds, the existence of the nation«.²⁶²

5.3. The need to extend the Faroese fishing limit

The second problem with the negotiation result was that the EC also prohibited its member states from excluding other member states from their extended fishing limits in the future if UNCLOS III opted for such an extension.²⁶³ The EC would not prohibit its members from extending their fishing limits, but it would not allow them to restrict access to trawlers from other EC member states. Prime Minister Atli P. Dam (JF) considered the possibility of restricting access of EU fishermen to an extended Faroese fishing limit to be absolutely vital for the Faroe Islands. The more states decided to extend their fishing limits and to restrict the traditional access to these distant-water fishing areas for Faroese fishermen, the more an extension of the Faroes' own exclusive fishing limit would become necessary:

Those countries, which have fishing banks in front of their coasts, will to an increasing degree exploit these fisheries resources themselves, while countries, which exercise distant-water fisheries, will be forced to withdraw [from these areas] and probably to abandon these fisheries in the end. The latter countries will for the same reason look to compensate for these restrictions in distant-water fisheries by developing and expanding their coastal fishing industries.²⁶⁴

Sosialurin also stressed that the Faroes would eventually need to extend their fishing limit if other nations did so as well, whether they wanted to or not.²⁶⁵

The reason why the unionist government decided not to reject EC membership already at that stage was that an extension of its fishing limit would not come without costs. On the one hand, the Faroes needed to protect its fishing limit in order to accommodate the growing coastal fisheries sector. But on the other hand, the Faroes could not tolerate a retreat of distant-water catching rights for their fisher-

261 Erlendur PATURSSON (1972): »Uttan fyri felagsmarknaðin«, in: *14. September*, 15 January 1972, p. 1.

262 Erlendur PATURSSON (1972): »Einki vennið – bert tapt«, in: *14. September*, 14 January 1972, p. 1.

263 See for this paragraph: LT (1971): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið við undirskjølum 1-6 (Løgtingsmál nr. 37/1971): Gongdin í EF-samráðingunum«, B Doc. 10/1971, pp. 3-16; LT (1971): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið við undirskjølum 1-6 (Løgtingsmál nr. 37/1971): Røða hjá løgmanni á ráðharrafundi millum Danmark og europeiska felagsskapin tann 9. november 1971«, B Doc. 10 (4)/1971, p. 24; LT (1971): »Røða hjá løgmanni á fundi við EF kommissionina 24. november 1971«, B Doc. 10 (5)/1971, pp. 24-27.

264 N.N. (1973): »Færøernes særlige stilling«, in: *Sosialurin*, 14 November 1973, pp. 3-4: »[D]e lande, der har fiskebanker ud for deres kyster, i stadig stigende grad selv vil udnytte disse fiskeforekomster, medens lande, som udøver fjernfiskeri, vil blive nødt til at foretage en nedtrapning og til sidst formentlig helt at indstille dette fiskeri. Disse lande vil af samme årsag søge at kompensere indskrænkninger i fjernfiskeriet ved at udvide og udbygge deres kystnære fiskeri.«

265 N.N. (1972): »Vandamikið«, in: *Sosialurin*, 22 March 1972, p. 2.

men either. A unilateral extension of the Faroese fishing limit would have harmed the fisheries interests of the Faroese distant-water fishing industry at the coasts of Greenland, Iceland, Labrador, New Foundland, Northern Norway and in the North Sea. In the 1970s, it was still a lot more important to Faroese exports than the coastal fisheries sector (see table 10). Thus, the Faroese distant-water fishing industry was more reluctant with regard to an extension of the fishing limit and more open to consider EC membership as a potential policy option.

Table 10: Origin and value of Faroese fish catches in per cent (1965-75)²⁶⁶

	1965	1975	
	<i>origin</i>	<i>origin</i>	<i>value</i>
Faroe Islands	13.9	14.1	24.0
Iceland	5.9	5.6	9.0
Greenland	45.6	3.5	17.0
New Foundland	10.7	3.6	7.0
North Sea	2.1	63.9	36.0
Barents Sea	21.8	9.5	7.0

In the beginning of 1972, it was still unclear whether Iceland would adhere to its plan to unilaterally extend its exclusive fishing limit to 50 miles.²⁶⁷ Moreover, it was unclear, which direction the future management of international fisheries would take after UNCLOS III, which was supposed to take place before the end of the consideration period in 1975. The government assumed that a rejection of the extension of fishing limits by UN member states would make it easier for the Faroes to accept the conditions of EC membership. Then, the Faroes would face less pressure to extend their fishing limit, as they would not lose catching rights in the territorial waters of other states. On the other hand, an approval of the extension of fishing limits by the UN member states could also provide the impetus for a change of the EU's CFP closer towards the Faroese position.

The unionist government rejected two TF proposals in 1972 and 1973 to unilaterally extend the exclusive fishing limit to 70 miles, which would in effect have put an end to the option of Faroese membership in the EC.²⁶⁸ In his state of the nation address in 1973, Prime Minister Atli P. Dam (JF) explained his rationale as follows:

If we extend our fishing limit unilaterally – without trying any other solution – it must be clear for other countries that we consider this to be the only and the right

266 Bjarne BIRKBAK et. al. (1979): *Færøerne mellem afhængighed og selvstændighed*, MA thesis. Aalborg: Aalborg University, p. 66.

267 See for this paragraph: LT (1971): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið við undirskjølum 1-6 (Løgtingsmál nr. 37/1971): Gongdin í EF-samráðingunum«, B Doc. 10/1971, pp. 3-16, here: p. 5.

268 LT (1971): »Landleiðin«, A 11/1971, pp. 122-128; LT (1972): »Landleiðin«, A 6/1972, pp. 39-48.

way to proceed. Consequently, they can restrict access to their extended catching areas for our distant-water fishing fleet with good conscience.²⁶⁹

Dimmalætting stressed that the Faroe Islands could either abstain from extending their fishing limit in order to attain the advantages of EC membership or extend the fishing limit and renounce the advantages of membership.²⁷⁰ Both solutions would have a high price to pay, but nobody could predict at the moment which was higher. The government also emphasised that the consideration period would make it possible for the Faroe Islands to wait and see whether Denmark, Greenland and Norway would actually join the EC.²⁷¹ The Faroes would also see how they would cope with the CFP if they joined, and what kind of association arrangements they and other states such as Iceland or Sweden would be able to negotiate if they did not.²⁷²

It was rational from an economic perspective that the unionist government decided to reject EC membership only after these questions had been clarified towards the end of 1973.²⁷³ First, Iceland's unilateral extension of its exclusive fishing limit to 50 miles in September 1972 and the increasing extension of fishing limits elsewhere made it inevitable for the Faroe Islands »to win larger rights to fisheries beyond the existing twelve-mile limit«. The extension of fishing limits increasingly excluded the Faroese distant-water fishing fleet from its traditional catching areas. But, by remaining outside the EC, the Faroes could at least secure an exclusive fishing limit of 200 miles for its coastal fishermen. This was not least necessary because they would have to compete with the returning distant-water fishing fleet from now on.

Second, the narrow rejection of EC membership in Norway during the same month meant that there was less economic pressure for the Faroe Islands to join the EC.²⁷⁴ Norwegian fishermen would not gain favourable market access for their fish exports to the EC. Third, all EFTA countries were successful in negotiating favourable bilateral trade agreements with the EC. The agreements of Iceland and Norway even applied to trade in fish and agricultural goods. Prime Minister Atli P. Dam (JF) therefore considered it to be »completely clear that the Faroe Islands would get at least an equivalent agreement as Norway« because the EU would also need to buy Faroese fish in the future.

Fourth, the government's hopes of achieving a change of the CFP in 1973 were

269 LT (1973): »Frágreiðing frá lögmanni 1973«, B Doc. 3/1973, pp. 139-162, here: p. 161: »Flyta vit einvíst út – uttan at roynd aðra loysn – má øðrum londum standa greitt, at vit meta hetta vera einastu og røttu leiðina at ganga. Tey kunnu tá við betri samvitsku steingja viðkaðu veiðuøki síni fyrri fjarfiskiflota okkara.«

270 N.N. (1971): »Konsekvens«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 15 November 1971, p. 1.

271 LT (1971): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið við undirskjølum 1-6 (Løgtingsmál nr. 37/1971): Gongdin í EF-samráðingunum«, B Doc. 10/1971, pp. 3-16, here: pp. 5-6.

272 N.N. (1972): »Nýársrøða«, in: *Sosialurin*, 8 January 1972, p. 7.

273 See for this and the following paragraph: LT (1972): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið«, A 63/1972, pp. 255-266, here: pp. 259-262. Cf. LT (1973): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið«, A 44/1973, pp. 184-194, here: p. 190; Atli P. DAM (1973): »Føroya framtíð«, in: *Sosialurin*, 24 November 1973, pp. 4-5.

274 Cf. the statement of *Løgting* MP Jákup Frederik Øregaard (JF) in N.N. (1972): »EF-prát á tingi: Sum seyður í rætt«, in: *Sosialurin*, 20 December 1972, p. 4.

disappointed.²⁷⁵ In March 1973, the Danish government introduced a memorandum to the EC Council concerning the future of the CFP. It stated that it did not consider the current fisheries policy of the EC to be satisfactory for Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Northern Norway, Shetland and the Orkney Islands, due to their dependency on fisheries and due to their lack of other income possibilities. However, when the EC Council took up the matter in autumn 1973, all member states except for Denmark opposed a change of the CFP. Their main argument was that they did not want to bind themselves to any policy before the results of UNCLOS III were known. The conference was unlikely to take place before the end of the consideration period. But it was impossible for the Faroe Islands to join the EC before its termination, since its participants might possibly agree on an extended fishing limit for each UN member state. The Faroes would only benefit from this decision if they remained outside the EC.

In summary, the Faroese Home Rule government had a strong economic interest to reject EC membership after the adoption of the CFP in 1970. The unionist government wanted to permanently preserve the twelve-mile exclusive fishing limit for Faroese fishermen. It also wanted to leave the door open for a possible extension of this limit that would exclude other EC member states from it. Both demands were essential for the Faroese economy, but unacceptable to the EC. The consistency between a strong economic interest to reject EC membership and the corresponding policy choice confirms LI's assumption that economic interests motivated the Faroese government in its rejection of EC membership in the early 1970s. This interpretation is supported by the fact that all political parties in the Faroe Islands rejected EC membership because of the CFP. It was uncontroversial for *Dimmalætting* to conclude that if

the EC does not radically change its principal attitude towards free fisheries in member countries, then the Faroes will not join the EC under any circumstances. This is the position of all Faroese people from the right to the left, irrespective of what it costs to remain outside, because foreign fisheries in Faroese waters must be rejected for vital reasons.²⁷⁶

But what happened to the political interest of the unionist government to preserve the union with Denmark, which had been so decisive for its European policy choice in the 1960s? If it still played an important role for the Faroese government, but was outbalanced by the strong economic interest to reject EC membership, this would strongly confirm that there was indeed a causal rela-

275 See for this paragraph: LT (1973): »Viðv. Løgtingsmáli 44/1973: Felagsmarknaðarmálið: Memorandum og Beretning fra kommissionen«, B Doc. 9/1973, pp. 229-240, here: pp. 229-231; LT (1973): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið«, A 44/1973, pp. 184-194, here: pp. 185-192.

276 N.N. (1973): »Billigt blikfang«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 15 December 1973, p. 1: »[H]vis Fællesmarkedet ikke radikalt ændrer sit principelle standpunkt om fri fiskerierøring i medlemslandenes indre farvande, saa træder Færøerne under ingen omstændigheder ind i Fællesmarkedet. Dette synspunkt tiltræder alle færinger fra højre til venstre, uanset hvad det i øvrigt maatte koste at forblive udenfor, fordi fremmedfiskeri i indre færøske farvande af livsvigtige grunde maa afvises.«

tionship between the economic interest of the Faroese government and its EC membership decision.

5.4. The diminished influence of postcolonial politics

Its postcolonial agenda to preserve the union with Denmark definitely played a less significant role for the unionist government in the 1970s than it did in the 1960s. In fact, JF, SB and SF hardly ever mentioned their willingness to preserve the union with Denmark as an argument in favour of EC membership. *Dimmalætting* once pointed out that Denmark could face a serious conflict of interest between its support for the Faroe Islands and its support for EC policies if the Faroes did not join the EC.²⁷⁷ SF wondered what would happen to custom-free trade with Denmark and the special rights of Faroese fishermen in Greenlandic waters.²⁷⁸ But in contrast to 1961, Denmark's decision to join the EC was no longer an incentive *per se* for the unionist government to follow suit.

One major reason is that the constitutional question was settled at the beginning of the debate. In January 1971, the members of the *Løgting's* market committee met with the Danish Prime Minister, Hilmar Baunsgaard, and with the Danish Economic and Market Minister, Paul Nyboe Andersen.²⁷⁹ They wanted to know whether the Faroes could actually remain outside the EC if Denmark joined, despite their constitutional connection with Denmark. Moreover, they wanted to know whether this decision would have any consequences for the Union. Both ministers stated that EC membership would not affect the constitutional relationship between Denmark and the Faroes. The Danish Realm would hold as long as the Faroes were in favour of it, irrespective of which decision both parts of the Realm would take with regard to EC membership.

This reassurance eased controversy over the constitutional question to a great extent. One can argue that it further opened the possibility for the unionist government to focus on the economic costs and benefits of membership. It subsequently trusted the Danish government to ensure that Denmark's EC membership would not have any damaging consequences for the Union. Nevertheless, FF and TF still doubted that the unionist parties would actually risk loosening the union with Denmark in order to preserve and extend the Faroes' fishing limit.²⁸⁰

The opposition parties did not conceal that their separatist agendas were still relevant for their own position on EC membership. FF and TF feared that membership would put an end to »the little bit of sovereignty« that the Faroe Islands

277 N.N. (1971): »Og hvad saa?« In: *Dimmalætting*, 3 July 1971, p. 1.

278 N.N. (1971): »Hann er ikki illur, ið ilt ræðist.« In: *Tingakrossur*, 5 February 1971, p. 3.

279 See for this paragraph: LT (1970): »Føroyar og Europeiski felagsmarknaðurin (EEC)«, 6/1970, pp. 105-115, here: p. 107. Cf. N.N. (1971): »Vónandi ikki ovseint«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 2 February 1971, p. 1.

280 N.N. (1970): »Týdningarmikið val«, in: *14. September*, 4 November 1970, p. 1; Ólavur MICHELSEN (1970): »Orðavavstur«, in: *14. September*, 4 November 1970, p. 5; Finnboði ÍSAKSON (1970): »Eitt val um liv ella deyð«, in: *14. September*, 6 November 1970, p. 1; N.N. (1971): »Dimmalætting vil treytaleysan limskap í EC«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 16 January 1971, p. 2.

had received through the Home Rule Act.²⁸¹ *Løgting* MP Jógvan Sundstein (FF) emphasised that the Faroes were a small, isolated and unsovereign country with a one-dimensional and not very diversified economy.²⁸² Thus, there was great danger that they would not have a lot of influence among larger member states, particularly because the Faroes were only represented by Denmark. According to TF, Faroese membership in the EC would mean that – in the future – its right to self-determination would not be transferred from Copenhagen to Tórshavn, but from Copenhagen to Brussels.²⁸³ The problem would be that the Faroe Islands were not even a small state, but only »a small, unsovereign part of one of those small states«. TF believed that the Faroes would never be able to change its constitutional status once they had joined the EC:

If we join this Community, then our entire struggle for freedom will be enchained. This is something, all our freedom-loving and freedom-wanting people should think of, but also those who do not support us today, because nobody can know what the Faroese nation will want in the next generations. It would be wrong of us, who now live, to close this door forever for all generations.

Løgting MP Jógvan Djurhuus (TF) therefore stated that TF would not only oppose membership because of the fishing limit, but also because it would impair the possibility for Faroese separation.²⁸⁴ It was hardly surprising that *Dimmalætting* suspected that the outright rejection of negotiations by FF and TF could be explained by their hope

that if Denmark joins, while the Faroe Islands do not, then the union between Denmark and the Faroe Islands will split and the Faroes become an independent country.²⁸⁵

However, the CFP was also now the most relevant factor to reject EC membership for the opposition parties. This is clear from a statement of TF chairman Erlendur Patursson.²⁸⁶ Confronted with his willingness to investigate EC membership in 1961, he concealed that TF's support for EC membership »as a sovereign state«

281 LT (1970): »Føroyar og Europeiski felagsmarknaðurin (EEC)«, 6/1970, pp. 105-115, here: pp. 108-113; N.N. (1972): »Føroyska lívsøki«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 8 January 1972, p. 2.

282 Jógvan SUNDSTEIN (1972): »Fólkaflokkurin og EEC«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 7 June 1972, p. 2.

283 See for this paragraph: LT (1970): »Føroyar og Europeiski felagsmarknaðurin (EEC)«, 6/1970, pp. 105-115, here: pp. 108-113: »Fara vit so ella so upp í henda felagsskap, so er læst og bundið fyri alt okkara frælsisstríð í framtíðini. Hetta er vert at umhuga hjá øllum frælsishugsandi og frælsisviljandi fólki okkara í dag, men eisini hjá teimum, sum ikki eru tað í dag, tí eingin kann vita, hvørji ynki tjóðarinnar verða í komandi ættarliðum. Tað er skeivt hjá okkum, sum nú liva, at steingja hesar dyr um allar ævir.«

284 Jógvan DJURHUUS (1971): »EEC = Onki sjálvstýri«, in: *14. September*, 12 November 1971, pp. 1-2.

285 N.N. (1971): »Tað ið umræður«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 21 January 1971, p. 1: »[T]jóðveldisflokkurin og partvist eisini fólkaflokkurin hópa undan móguleikanum fyri at leita upp í Felagsmarknaðin fyrst og fremst tí, at teir vóna,] at fer Danmark upp í, meðan Føroyar ikki gera tað, so fer sambandið millum Danmark og Føroya av um tvøra, og Føroyar vera sjálvstøðugt land.«

286 Erlendur PATURSSON (1970): »Felagsmarknaðurin«, in: *14. September*, 7 November 1970, p. 1.

in 1961 had been based on the misunderstanding that fishermen from EC member states would not be allowed to catch in each other's territorial waters. Now, TF would neither support membership as a sovereign state nor as a part of Denmark.

5.5. Postcolonial debate and consideration period

Political interest still explained in part why the unionist government hesitated for so long to reject membership. The economic rationale of the unionist government in favour of a consideration period was not always self-evident. FF and TF strongly doubted the benefits of a consideration period. FF believed that the conditions of the negotiation result would not change a lot during it.²⁸⁷ If they could not be approved now, they could not be approved in three years either.

Dagblaðið did not see any logic in waiting for the results of UNCLOS III.²⁸⁸ Even if the conference supported an extension of fishing limits, the Faroe Islands would not benefit from this extension as an EC member, as they would not be able to exclude EC fishermen from Faroese waters. The FF paper did not think that such a decision would make the EC change the basic guidelines of its CFP. FF chairman Hákon Djurhuus and *Løgting* MP Finnbogi Ísakson (TF) therefore already called on the government to make a final decision at the beginning of 1972, as it was clear that the Faroes would maybe be able to preserve its twelve-mile fishing limit under EC membership, but would never be able to extend it.²⁸⁹ The two MPs also wondered why the government refused to investigate other forms of trade associations than membership, although it had been explicitly authorised by the *Løgting* to do so in 1972.

FF and TF also believed that it would be irresponsible with regard to the Faroese economy to keep the membership question open for three further years. *Løgting* MP Jógvan Sundstein (FF) stressed that if the Faroes joined the EC after three years, they would already have lost out in the competition with Norway with regard to fish exports to the EC.²⁹⁰ But if the final solution was a bilateral trade agreement with the EC, the Faroes would also be handicapped, as all other states outside the EC would have negotiated similar agreements far earlier. Sundstein emphasised that the Faroes would be in a »market no man's land« if they continued to wait and see while other states were members in the EC, EFTA and/or had bilateral agreements with the EC.²⁹¹

In March 1973, TF chairman Erlendur Patursson emphasised that it would cost the Faroe Islands dearly if the consideration period lasted any longer:

All other Nordic countries have already taken a position on EC membership and there is no reason why we on the Faroe Islands as the only Nordic country should

287 N.N. (1972): »Teir fingu sín vilja«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 22 January 1972, p. 2.

288 N.N. (1972): »Rættarreglur á havinum«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 26 January 1972, p. 2.

289 N.N. (1972): »Felagsmarknaðurin á tingi«, in: *Sosialurin*, 19 January 1972, pp. 1, 6; N.N. (1972): »Avgerðin er tikin«, in: *14. September*, 19 January 1972, p. 1.

290 Jógvan SUNDSTEIN (1972): »EF – nú og í framtíðini«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 5 February 1972, p. 2.

291 N.N. (1972): »Fiskimarkið, EF og lögmannsrøðan«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 18 November 1972, p. 2.

continue to have no position in this matter. This wait-and-see approach [...] creates such uncertainty and insecurity not only for our economy, but for all of our relations, which our society cannot bear.²⁹²

Consequently, the opposition parties wondered, why the unionist government continued to postpone a final decision against membership: »Maybe to find a rat run through which we can become a member through the backdoor«, as *Dagblaðið* provocatively wondered.²⁹³ For FF, it was clear »that a tactic is implemented, whose objective is that we slide into the EEC all by ourselves«. ²⁹⁴ Zakarias Wang claimed that the unionist government certainly hoped that there would be a majority for EC membership after the end of the consideration period.²⁹⁵ *Løgting* MP Hanus við Høgadalsá (TF) could not understand the government's proposal for a consideration period unless the Faroe Islands were going to join the EC once the period was over.²⁹⁶ It would be nothing else than an adaptation period. *14. September* also claimed that the Faroe Islands would have become so firmly connected to the EC by then that they would have no other possibility than to do what Denmark wanted.²⁹⁷ The government's postponement of the consideration period in 1973 confirmed *Dagblaðið* in its scepticism that

today's government prefers the Faroe Islands to join the EC together with Denmark, probably for the most part in order not to affect the relationship with Denmark at present.²⁹⁸

Thus, the unionist government increasingly had to defend itself against claims that it wanted to get the Faroe Islands into the EC due to its position on the Realm. In 1973, Prime Minister Atli P. Dam (JF) rejected any claims that his decision to work towards a change of the CFP was an expression of his support for EC membership.²⁹⁹ *Dimmalætting* emphasised that there would be no indication whatsoever that the consideration period would lead to a gradual annexation of the Faroe Islands to the EC against the will of the Faroese people.³⁰⁰ Nevertheless, doubts remained

292 LT (1972): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið«, A 63/1972, pp. 255-266, here: p. 262: »[Her skal somuleiðis vera bent á, at] øll hini Norðurlond longu hava tikið sína støðu í felagsmarknaðarmálinum og at ikki fer at bera til hjá okkum føroyingum einsamøllum av øllum Norðurlandtjóðum framvegis onga støðu at hava í hesum máli. Henda millumbilsstøða [...] skapar slíka óvissu og ótryggleika, ikki bert í vinnulívsmálum, heldur í øllum viðurskiptum yfirhøvdur, ið samfelag okkara ikki tolir.«

293 N.N. (1972): »Danska fólkaatkvøðan og Føroyar«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 4 October 1972, p. 1.

294 LT (1972): »Uppskot til samtyktar viðv. EF-málinum«, A 30/1972, pp. 129-130.

295 WANG (1972): »Nej til EEC«, p. 80.

296 LT (1971): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið«, A 37/1971, pp. 211-217, here: p. 213.

297 N.N. (1972): »Gekkaskorturin av«, in: *14. September*, 15 January 1972, p. 2; N.N. (1972): »Eingin støða«, in: *14. September*, 18 January 1972, p. 2.

298 N.N. (1972): »Føroyska lívsøki«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 8 January 1972, p. 2: »Tað er einki ivamál, at tann landsstýrismeiriluti, sum situr í dag, helst vildi, at Føroyar gerast limur í EF (EEC) saman við Danmark – hetta kanska eina mest fyri ikki at ørkymla galdandi viðurskipti við Danmark.«

299 N.N. (1973): »Hvat hesum máli viðvíkir er andstøðan so tannleys sum nakar«, in: *Sosialurin*, 21 March 1973, p. 3.

300 N.N. (1972): »Aflørende«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 22 January 1972, p. 1.

as to whether the government's assessment of the membership option was based only on economic interests.

In the end, the unionist government also admitted that the opposition's economic arguments against a further consideration period had not been completely unfounded. Justifying his rejection of EC membership, Prime Minister Atli P. Dam (JF) stated that Norwegian and Icelandic fishermen might soon gain competitive advantages vis-à-vis Faroese fishermen if the Faroes did not negotiate similar trade agreements as Norway and Iceland as soon as possible.³⁰¹ This was a conclusion that he could have come to more than one year earlier. Therefore – even if less significant – the postcolonial agendas of the unionist government still played some role in the debate.

5.6. The indirect influence of political interests

There is also evidence that the government eventually bowed to some extent to inner-party critics and the pressure of the opposition in its final rejection of membership. Since criticism of the government's European policy was not only based on the CFP, but also on the idea of protecting the Faroe Islands from negative foreign influence and to preserve Faroese sovereignty, these political arguments contributed indirectly to the rejection of EC membership.³⁰² In several *Sosialurin* articles, Axel Skoubo (JF) portrayed EC membership as the greatest misfortune that could happen to the Faroe Islands, not because it was based on the CFP, but because it would be irreconcilable with the objective of JF to build a socialist welfare society.³⁰³ The EC would neither be a democratic nor a socialist community, and thus simply not a social democratic idea. In April 1973, he stated that the government should have rejected EC membership long ago because of the EC's undemocratic and big capitalist characteristics and because of its denial of a sovereign economic, financial, industrial, fisheries, regional and social policy.³⁰⁴ Just as the arguments of the opposition, Skoubo's assessment of EC membership clearly went beyond an economic rationale.

The government had to listen to these political arguments to an increasing extent because a majority of the Faroese people supported the European policy position of the opposition parties. By the summer of 1971, a poll on EC membership already showed that 41.7 per cent of the Faroese were opposed to membership.³⁰⁵ Only 2.2 per cent were in favour. 56.1 per cent had not taken any position yet. One year later, in September 1972, rejection of EC membership was even more widespread.³⁰⁶ Another poll showed that 61.0 per cent of the Faroese people believed that the

301 LT (1973): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið«, A 44/1973, pp. 184-194, here: p. 190.

302 Cf. JOHANNESSEN (1980): *Færøsk fiskeri- og markedsolitik*, p. 98.

303 Axel SKOUBO (1971): »Eru grundsjónarmiðini til sølu?« In: *Sosialurin*, 8 September 1971, p. 4; Axel SKOUBO (1971): »Hví harmast um at javnaðarmenn eru ímóti EEC«, in: *Sosialurin*, 29 September 1971, pp. 1-2; Axel SKOUBO (1972): »Hvørs vilji?« In: *Sosialurin*, 10 June 1972, p. 5.

304 Axel SKOUBO (1973): »Metan um og viðmerkingar til nýggja samráðingarpulegg landstýrisins«, in: *Sosialurin*, 28 April 1973, pp. 5-6.

305 Villi HANSEN (1971): »Føroyingar í iva um Felagsmarknaðin«, in: *Sosialurin*, 3 July 1971, p. 8.

306 N.N. (1972): »Eitt EF-kanningarúrslit«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 30 September 1972, p. 1.

Faroese should reject EC membership, even if Denmark joined. Only 19.5 per cent were in favour of membership, 19.5 per cent had no position. Also, 75.5 per cent supported a unilateral extension of the fishing limit. Only 6.9 per cent opposed it and 17.6 per cent had no position. Moreover, on *Ólavssøka* in 1971, a number of people organised themselves in the People's Movement against the EEC, which condemned the consideration period as deceitful.³⁰⁷ That year, Zakarias Wang only narrowly failed to gain a seat in the *Folketing* as an independent candidate, after having campaigned nearly exclusively on his opposition to EC membership.³⁰⁸ Thus, *Løgting* MP Hánus við Høgadalásá (TF) could rightfully claim that the Faroese people neither supported the negotiation result nor a consideration period.³⁰⁹

In the *Folketing* elections 1973, TF achieved a great victory. Since its campaign had been based on its opposition to EC membership,³¹⁰ the election outcome provided a strong incentive for the unionist government to follow suit and finally reject EC membership. A *Dimmalætting* article shows the increased extent to which political arguments found their way into the EC debate some days before the final rejection of membership:

If the Faroese people choose to remain outside upon their own request [...], this gives reason to worry that the nationally dictated isolation tendencies, which are currently taking place in the country, will do damage to the Faroe Islands and [its] material, economic and social progress overall.³¹¹

It is very likely that the coastal fishing industry actively used the general political opposition against a transfer of sovereignty to the EC in order to further its economic interest to preserve and extend the Faroese fishing limit against the economic interest of the more financially lucrative distant-water fishing industry.³¹² Until 1970, TF chairman Erlendur Patursson did not only chair the most radical opposition party to EC membership, but also the Faroese Fishermen's Association, which was the main association for the coastal fisheries sector until 1975.³¹³ Most of the coastal fishermen voted for TF. Moreover, most of the 400 members of the People's Movement against the EEC were coastal fishermen.³¹⁴ With the general

307 For the allegations of the People's Movement against the Faroese government and the response of Prime Minister Atli P. Dam (JF) to them see Atli P. DAM (1971): »Løgtingið ella Fólka­fylkingin?« In: *Sosialurin*, 23 December 1971, pp. 1, 8.

308 WANG (1972): »Nej til EEC«, p. 79.

309 LT (1971): »Felagsmarknaðarmálið«, A 37/1971, pp. 211-217, here: p. 213.

310 N.N. (1973): »Kunna ikki velja annan«, in: *14. September*, 11 December 1973, p. 2.

311 N.N. (1974): »Forlænging indmeldelsesfrist«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 22 January 1974, p. 1: »Hvis færinger paa egen tilskyndelse vælger at stænge sig ude [...] er der al grund til at befrygte, at de nationalt dikterede isolationstendenser, som er i gang her i landet, stiler imod at ramme først og fremmest Færøerne og hvad øerne staar for af materiel fremgang og af økonomisk og social fremgang i det hele taget.«

312 See for this paragraph: MØRKØRE (1993): »Interessegrupper og strategier«, pp. 71-74.

313 JOHANNESSEN (1980): *Færøsk fiskeri- og markeds­politik*, p. 48. With its foundation in 1975, the Association of Faroese Coastal Fishermen (*Meginfelag Útróðrarmanna*) replaced the Faroese Fishermen's Association as main association for the coastal fisheries sector. See NEYSTABØ (1984): *Færøerne og EF*, pp. 51-52.

314 BIRKBAK et. al. (1979): *Afhængighed og selvstændighed*, p. 83.

political opposition against EC membership on the side of the coastal fishermen, it was difficult for the distant-water fishing industry to voice its reluctance with regard to extending the Faroese fishing limit and a rejection of EC membership. Thus, the general political opposition against EC membership in order to preserve Faroese sovereignty clearly contributed to the eventual rejection of EC membership in the Faroe Islands in 1974.

Despite this, the Faroese case in the early 1970s overall clearly supports LI's assumptions that the Faroese Home Rule government rejected EU membership because of its strong economic interest to remain outside. The unionist parties in government still had a medium political interest to support EU membership due to their willingness to preserve the union with Denmark unchanged. But, in contrast to the 1960s, their strong economic interest to permanently preserve the twelve-mile exclusive fishing limit for Faroese fishermen, and to leave the door open for the possible extension of this limit, outbalanced their medium political interest to support EU membership, which had been so influential in the first European policy debate in the early 1960s. This strengthens LI's argument substantially that governments can only indulge the temptation to base their European policy on political interests if their economic interests are weak, diffuse or indeterminate.

The application of process-tracing also confirms LI's assumptions for the first Faroese European policy case. The unionist government had only been able to base its membership decision on its unionist concerns in the early 1960s because its economic interest had been weak and diffuse. At the time, preserving the exclusive fishing limit had already played some role in the debate, but this role had still been limited due to the fact that the EEC had not yet agreed on a common fisheries policy, which would threaten the fishing limit. Before the first Commission proposals from 1966 there was only speculation that the CFP could be based on the principle of equal access of member states to the fishing limits of other member states. But a legal necessity of the equal access principle did not arise automatically from the Treaty of Rome.³¹⁵

The adoption of the CFP, with its explicit focus on the principle of equal access, therefore radically changed the nature of the second EC debate in the early 1970s. Suddenly, the unionist government was ready to reject EC membership despite its medium political interest to support EC membership in order to secure the union with Denmark. Its strong economic interest to remain outside the EC now outbalanced its medium political interest in membership. However, Denmark's reassurance that the Danish Realm would remain unchanged, irrespective of the Faroese decision on EC membership, certainly made it easier for the unionist government to focus on the economic costs and benefits of membership.

LI's arguments are further confirmed by the fact that the Faroese government explicitly stated several times that it only rejected EC membership because of its economic consequences for the fisheries sector. The unionist government did not reject membership until all options to provoke a change of the CFP had been

315 LEIGH (1983): *Common Fisheries Policy*, pp. 30f.

explored. And even then, its decision to reject membership was clearly more a reluctant rejection than a principled decision against membership. Prime Minister Atli P. Dam (JF) concluded in 1973 that

our recommendation to reject the conditions [for membership] and our estimation [...] that membership is off the agenda are only based on purely practical concerns [...] and therefore not characterised by a principal position of anyone of us on the EC's policies.³¹⁶

He argued that the Faroese position might change if the EC agreed on special regulations for the regions on the edge of the North Atlantic, as proposed by Denmark to the Council in 1973. He considered this to be a policy, »which did not recommend membership, but would not close the doors for all times«. Pauli Ellefsen, who became SB chairman in 1974, reaffirmed that fisheries were the essential problem for the Faroe Islands.³¹⁷ *Dimmalætting* also stated that if UNCLOS III was in favour of an extension of exclusive fishing limits and if the EC supported such an outcome, there might be a majority for EC membership even in states such as Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands.³¹⁸ For Axel Skoubo (JF), who strongly opposed his own party's European policy, it was completely clear that JF and the government would have opted for membership long ago »with a solution to the fisheries question«.³¹⁹

316 See for the following: Atli P. DAM (1973): »Skulu vit laga til Føroya framtíð ella Felagsmarknaðarins«, in: *Sosialurin*, 24 November 1973, pp. 4-5: »Tilmæli okkara [...] um at vraka treytirnar og metan okkara av, [...] at limaskapur ikki er aktuellur, eru bert grundað á tey reint praktisku viðurskifti [...] og eru soleiðis ikki merkt av teirri principiellu stöðutakan, hvør einstakur av okkum hevur til politikk EFs.«

317 N.N. (1974): »Úr «Kristeligt Dagblad»: Færingerne siger sikkert nej til at være med som EF-medlem«, in: *Sosialurin*, 25 January 1974, p. 8.

318 N.N. (1974): »Koster å være kar'«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 2 February 1974, p. 1.

319 Axel SKOUBO (1973): »Metan um og viðmerkingar til nýggja samráðingarupplegg landstýrisins«, in: *Sosialurin*, 28 April 1973, pp. 5-6.

Greenland (1971-72): EC membership against its will

The beginning of accession negotiations with Denmark in June 1970 made Greenland's inclusion into the EEC as a part of the Danish Realm increasingly realistic. In 1967, Greenland's political elite had supported Greenland's EC membership under the condition that Denmark would be able to achieve a reservation for Greenland with regard to the preservation of the exclusive fishing limit of twelve miles, the six-months residence requirement prior to economic activity in Greenland and Danish state subsidies. In December 1971, the negotiations ended successfully. The EC approved all reservations that the Danish government had requested in 1967 and on whose fulfilment the *Landsråd* had based its support for EC membership.³²⁰

First, Greenland – as one of the member state regions particularly dependent on fisheries – was allowed to preserve an exclusive fishing limit of twelve miles. Just as in the Faroe Islands, this regulation was temporary and subject to re-evaluation after a period of ten years. However, the Commission stated that it would take into account if Greenland continued to be dependent on fisheries to a significant extent. The Danish Committee on EC Relations therefore concluded that

there is hardly any doubt that the – formally seen – temporary exclusive right for Greenlandic fishermen to fish within the Greenlandic fishing limit will represent a lasting arrangement in practice.³²¹

Only Danish and Faroese fishermen were allowed to continue to fish within Greenland's twelve-mile fishing limit for a maximum period of five years from 1973 onward. But, after 1978, nobody except for Greenlandic fishermen would fish within Greenland's fishing limit. Moreover, the Accession Treaty also contained a special Protocol 4 concerning Greenland, in which the EC committed itself in

320 See for this and the following paragraphs: GLRF (1972): »Redegørelse vedrørende Grønlands eventuelle optagelse i Fællesmarkedet«, B Annex 19a/1972 (autumn), pp. 271-274; DANISH COMMITTEE (1972): *De europæiske Fællesskaber*, pp. 267-269; EC (1972): »Actes relatifs à l'adhésion aux Communautés européennes«.

321 DANISH COMMITTEE (1972): *De europæiske Fællesskaber*, p. 268: [På denne baggrund] »er der næppe tvivl om, at den formelt set tidsbegrænsede eneret for Grønlandske fiskere til fiskeri på det Grønlandske fiskeriterritorium i praksis vil svare til en varig ordning.«

Article 2 »to find adequate solutions to the specific Greenlandic problems« with regard to fisheries.

Second, Article 1 of the special Protocol on Greenland authorised Denmark to preserve the six-months residence requirement prior to economic activity in Greenland. However, the article also reserved the right for the Council to remove this requirement at a later point in time. As expected by the Danish authorities before the negotiations, they were unable to uphold Danish citizenship as requirement for economic activity in Greenland under EC membership. Third, the EC agreed on the preservation of existing forms of Danish state subsidies. Moreover, it left the decision about the implementation of the CCT in Greenland to the Danish government. The Danish government later decided that the introduction of the CCT should happen in one stage on 1 January 1978.³²² Until then, Greenland should remain a custom-free zone.

Despite this series of reservations from EC membership, strong opposition emerged in Greenland against Denmark's policy of including it in its prospective EC membership. In 1972, a clear majority of Greenland's political elite and a clear majority of the Greenlandic people rejected EC membership. But Greenland was forced to join the EC anyway in 1973, with the total »Danish« vote being in favour of membership.

Chapter 6 explains why Greenland's European policy preferences changed from support to rejection between 1971 and 1972. Just as in the Faroes, this change of preferences makes it possible to apply process-tracing. Greenland's support for EEC membership in the 1960s had strongly disconfirmed LI because Greenland's political elite had decided not to act on its medium economic interest to reject EEC membership. In order to confirm LI's assumptions, Greenland's political elite should still have had a medium or strong economic interest to reject EC membership in 1972. Only, this time, there should have been a casual relationship between it and the expected European policy choice. However, according to LI, Greenland's elite could also have rejected EC membership in 1971 due to a strong or medium political interest to do so if its economic interest had become weak, diffuse or indeterminate.

6.1. From support to rejection of EC membership

Based on the satisfactory negotiation outcome, the executive committee of the *Landsråd* supported Greenland's membership of the EC in December 1971.³²³ It consisted of the MPs Lars Chemnitz, Nikolaj Karlsen, Jonathan Motzfeldt and Jørgen C. F. Olsen and had participated in the negotiations with regard to Greenland in late 1971. In the final round of negotiations, Moses Olsen, the new *Folketing* MP for Southern Greenland, also joined them. Olsen was a lot more critical of the outcome than the *Landsråd* MPs. By December, he had already stated that the Greenlandic delegation in Brussels had not been able to remove all doubts about

322 GLRF (1972): »Landshøvdingen over Grønland«, B Annex 19d/1972 (autumn), p. 283.

323 GLRF (1972): »Redegørelse for situationen vedrørende Grønlands eventuelle indtræden i Fællesmarkedet«, A 19/1972 (spring), pp. 33-49, here: p. 33.

the consequences of membership for Greenland.³²⁴ Only a short time later, he expressed his strong dissatisfaction with the negotiation outcome.³²⁵ Consequently, he refused to vote in favour of EC membership in the *Folketing*.

Instead, Olsen called on the Danish authorities to investigate whether there was a constitutional basis for having a separate (and binding) referendum in Greenland on EC membership (independent from the Danish one), and, if not, whether it was possible to create the necessary basis for such a referendum if so requested by the Greenlandic authorities.³²⁶ The reason for his demand was that the *Folketing* had decided in May 1971 to include Denmark and Greenland in a single constituency for a referendum on EC membership on 2 October 1972. Thus, even if the results were very different in Greenland and Denmark, they would have the same consequences for both parts of the Realm because the votes in Greenland and Denmark would be counted together. However, Knud Hertling, Greenland's other *Folketing* MP (for Northern Greenland) and first-ever Greenlandic Minister for Greenland (1971-73), believed that a separate referendum was not constitutionally possible.³²⁷ First, Greenland's constitutional status would have to be changed. Second, negotiations with the EC would have to be re-opened, as the current accession treaty with Denmark had been negotiated on a different legal basis.

Despite the rejection of a separate referendum by the Danish government, Jonathan Motzfeldt proposed to the *Landsråd* in April 1972 that Greenland should hold a separate referendum on EC membership.³²⁸ His version of »separate«, however, only concerned the timing of the referendum, not the fact that both Denmark and Greenland were included in a single constituency. A narrow majority of eight MPs supported his proposal, while seven MPs opposed it and two MPs abstained. But Greenland Minister Hertling stressed that such a postponement was likely to make the Greenlandic referendum redundant, as a few Greenlandic votes could not change the outcome as long as the Danish vote was not very close.³²⁹ And in the latter case, it would impose an insensible burden on the Greenlandic people to decide such an important matter on behalf of Denmark.³³⁰ Consequently, Hertling refused to act upon the request of the *Landsråd*.

In July 1972, Moses Olsen recommended the Greenlandic people to vote no in the upcoming referendum.³³¹ Jonathan Motzfeldt supported him, as long as Greenland

324 FT (1971-72): »Folketingets forhandling«, col. 1193.

325 Ibid, col. 1730-1733.

326 Ibid, col. 1733.

327 Knud Hertling in FT (1971-72): »Folketingets forhandling«, col. 5486-5488. Cf. also the argument of Lars Chemnitz in GLRF (1972): »Redegørelse for situationen vedrørende Grønlands eventuelle indtræden i Fællesmarkedet«, A 19/1972 (spring), pp. 33-49, here: p. 44.

328 See for the following: GLRF (1972): »Redegørelse for situationen vedrørende Grønlands eventuelle indtræden i Fællesmarkedet«, A 19/1972 (spring), pp. 33-49, here: pp. 44-49.

329 GLRF (1972): »Knud Hertling«, B Annex 19c/1972 (autumn), p. 282.

330 This statement is an interesting evidence of Knud Hertling's thinking in colonial terms. For him, it was an insensible burden on the Greenlandic people to decide such an important matter on behalf of Denmark, but quite natural that the Danish people could decide such an important matter on behalf of Greenland.

331 Moses OLSEN (1972): »Moses Olsens bidrag«, in: Greenland Committee [Grønlandskomiteen] (ed.): *Grønland og EF*. Copenhagen: Demos, pp. 22-25, here: p. 25.

was not given a consideration period until 1975, as the Faroe Islands had been.³³² An unofficial vote among the 24 participants of an EC conference in Sisimiut at the end of June showed that only two participants supported membership, while 22 participants opposed it.³³³ In September 1972, ten days before the referendum, the *Landsråd* rejected membership in a guiding vote.³³⁴ Twelve *Landsråd* MPs rejected membership, while four MPs voted in favour of it. *A/G* editor-in-chief Jørgen Fleischer also argued that voting against membership would be »the most sensible thing to do«.³³⁵

On 2 October 1972, the Greenlandic people rejected membership with a clear margin. 9,594 people or 70.2 per cent of the voters rejected EC membership, while 4,062 people or 29.8 per cent of the voters supported it.³³⁶ The turnout of 56 per cent seemed relatively low, but was comparable to the usual turnout in *Landsråd* or *Folketing* elections. Taken on its own, the Greenlandic people would have rejected EC membership. However, after the Greenlandic result had been added to the rest of the »Danish« vote, a majority of 63.4 per cent of Danish/Greenlanders supported EC membership, while only a minority of 36.6 per cent wanted Denmark/Greenland to remain outside. On 1 January 1973, Greenland subsequently joined the EC together with Denmark.

6.2. Unchanged economic interests – changed European policy

Just as in the 1960s, there was a clear mismatch between Greenland's political elite and the Danish authorities with regard to their assessment of the economic aspects of Greenland's membership in the EC.

Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag emphasised that Greenland would continue to be able to export its fish products custom-free to Denmark and from now on also to all other EC member states.³³⁷ The same would account for re-exports from Denmark, which were a large percentage of Greenland's exports. He also stated that Greenland would now have the possibility of attaining development aid from EC funds. Poul Dalsager, *Folketing* MP and chairman of the Danish Committee on EC Relations, concluded that EC membership would bring the investment and jobs Greenland »desperately needed«.³³⁸

But many members of Greenland's political elite were critical of the economic consequences of EC membership. *Landsråd* MP Niels Carlo Heilmann emphasised

332 Jonathan MOTZFELDT (1972): »Derfor må vi have en tænkepause!« In: *A/G*, 3 August 1972, p. 8.

333 SØRENSEN (2007): *Denmark-Greenland*, p. 145.

334 N.N. (1972): »Landsrådets flertal imod fællesmarkedet«, in: *A/G*, 28 September 1972, p. 9. David Broberg, Niels Carlo Heilmann, Elisabeth Johansen, Lars Emil Johansen, Erinarteq Jonathansen, Alibak Josefsen, Johan Knudsen, Kissúnguaq Kristiansen, Knud Kristiansen, Jonathan Motzfeldt, Jørgen C. F. Olsen and Andreas Sanimuinaq rejected membership. Ole Berglund, Lars Chemnitz, Nikolaj Karlsen and Otto Steenholdt voted in favour. Jørgen Paulsen, a substitute candidate, who was not allowed to participate in the vote, stated that he would have voted in favour of membership.

335 Jørgen FLEISCHER (1972): »Et nej er det fornuftigste«, in: *A/G*, 28 September 1972, p. 2.

336 N.N. (1972): »Grønland i EF med et klart nej«, in: *A/G*, 12 October 1972, pp. 1, 3.

337 Jens POULSEN (1972): »EF-debat i folketinget«, in: *A/G*, 8 June 1972, pp. 8-9.

338 FT (1971-72): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 7510.

that it was hard to identify advantages of EC membership for Greenland.³³⁹ Its benefits for Greenlandic exports were negligible because a lot of fish were sold to countries outside the EC. Moreover, the eventual introduction of the CCT on Greenlandic imports from the US could lead to the complementary introduction of custom duties on Greenlandic exports to the US. Heilmann was also chairman of Greenland's fishermen's organisation KNAPK and therefore very concerned about the consequences of EC membership for Greenland's fisheries sector. In 1971, the *Landsråd* had unanimously approved his proposal that the Danish government should extend Greenland's exclusive fishing limit to 50 miles. EC membership would render this decision meaningless because the CFP would make it impossible for Greenland to exclude EC member states fishermen from an extended fishing limit. Heilmann considered it to be likely that the EC would also remove the twelve-mile limit after ten years.

Moses Olsen took Heilmann's concerns up in the *Folketing*, emphasising that Greenland demanded a permanent exclusive fishing limit of twelve miles and the possibility of extending this limit with regard to potential extension of fishing limits elsewhere.³⁴⁰ Emil Abelsen, later a prominent Siumut politician, emphasised that an extension of Greenland's fishing limit would soon be necessary after Iceland's extension to 50 miles in September 1972 because German and UK fishermen were increasingly likely to fish in Greenlandic waters.³⁴¹ However, the chances to do so would be »minimal, if not even zero«, as an EC member. On the basis of the results, Greenland could do nothing other than reject membership. Olsen and Abelsen also believed that the preservation of the six-months residence requirement prior to economic establishment and activity in Greenland was not satisfactory.³⁴² 85 per cent of Greenland's private sector was in the hands of Danish investors – despite such requirement – because of their access to seed capital, business networks and the nature of Greenland's economic system, which was based on Danish and not Greenlandic conditions. Moreover, according to Article 1 of the Protocol on Greenland, the Council would even be able to terminate this unsatisfactory exemption in a couple of years.

Among the *Landsråd* MPs, only Lars Chemnitz and Ole Berglund clearly took positions in favour of EC membership. According to *Landsråd* chairman Lars Chemnitz, remaining outside would lead to economic regression.³⁴³ Moreover, Berglund believed that the potential introduction of custom duties on Greenlandic exports to the US would have nothing to do with EC membership, because the US could do

339 See for this paragraph: GLRF (1972): »Redegørelse for situationen vedrørende Grønlands eventuelle indtræden i Fællesmarkedet«, A 19/1972 (spring), pp. 33-49, here: pp. 36, 46; N.N. (1972): »En forskudt afstemning«, in: *A/G*, 27 April 1972, p. 23.

340 FT (1971-72): »Folketingets forhandlingler«, col. 1192-1193, 1730-1733, 5355-5358.

341 Emil ABELSEN (1972): »Kun een vej for Grønland – det er at sige nej til EF«, in: *A/G*, 28 September 1972, p. 20.

342 See for this paragraph: Emil ABELSEN (1972): »Kun een vej for Grønland – det er at sige nej til EF«, in: *A/G*, 28 September 1972, p. 20; FT (1971-72): »Folketingets forhandlingler«, col. 1730-1731, 5355-5356.

343 Lars CHEMNITZ (1972): »Derfor bør vi stemme JA til EF«, in: *A/G*, 14 September 1972, p. 14.

the same if Greenland remained outside.³⁴⁴ Greenland would be able to more than compensate potential losses through US tariffs through the EC's export subsidies.

Greenland's political elite therefore had a clear economic interest to reject EC membership. However, it must be considered only medium, because the negotiation result secured reservations for Greenland with regard to the preservation of an exclusive fishing limit of twelve miles, the residence requirement of six months and Danish state subsidies. The Danish government considered Greenland's demands to have been »fulfilled«.³⁴⁵ Ivar Nørgaard, Denmark's Minister for External Economic Affairs, repeatedly stressed that Greenland would be able to keep its twelve-mile fishing limit at the end of the ten-year transition period because of its continued dependency on fish.³⁴⁶ Danish Prime Minister Krag and *Landsråd* chairman Chemnitz also believed that the exclusive fishing limit would be better protected under EC membership than before.³⁴⁷ Chemnitz was optimistic that, in case UNCLOS III led to an extension of exclusive fishing limits, it would result in a complementary change of the CFP. Moreover, he believed that Greenland would have more influence to affect such change if it joined the EC than if it remained outside it.

The consistency between the medium economic interest of Greenland's elite to reject EC membership and its subsequent European policy choice seems to confirm LI. However, process-tracing shows that it is more than doubtful that there actually was a causal relationship between the economic interests of Greenland's political elite and its European policy choice. The reason is that the majority of its economic arguments against membership were nothing new: They were the same concerns that had been addressed repeatedly by the Danish government and Greenlandic *Folketing* and *Landsråd* MPs in European policy debates since 1960. Moreover, they were accommodated relatively successfully in the accession treaty.

Accordingly, the Danish authorities were perplexed at the sudden outbreak of opposition to EC membership in Greenland. Poul Dalsager, chairman of the Danish Committee on EC Relations, stressed that the *Landsråd* had been consulted about EC membership no less than three times and had always supported membership under conditions, which the Danish government had fulfilled.³⁴⁸ Moreover, the *Landsråd's* executive committee had approved the negotiation result as late as in December 1971, with Moses Olsen, one of the main opponents of EC membership, himself taking part in the negotiations.³⁴⁹ No Greenlandic *Landsråd* or *Folketing* MP had expressed any request for additional reservations, neither in 1967 nor in

344 GLRF (1972): »Redegørelse for situationen vedrørende Grønlands eventuelle indtræden i Fællesmarkedet«, A 19/1972 (spring), pp. 33-49, here: p. 46.

345 DANISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND MINISTRY FOR GREENLAND (1972): *Grønland og EF*. Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry for Greenland, ch. 1.

346 FT (1971-72): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 1483-1484, 7537.

347 See for the following: Lars CHEMNITZ (1972): »Derfor bør vi stemme JA til EF«, in: *A/G*, 14 September 1972, p. 14; Jens POULSEN (1972): »EF-debat i folketinget«, in: *A/G*, 8 June 1972, pp. 8-9.

348 FT (1971-72): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 7539.

349 GLRF (1972): »Redegørelse for situationen vedrørende Grønlands eventuelle indtræden i Fællesmarkedet«, A 19/1972 (spring), pp. 33-49, here: p. 33.

1971, when the *Landsråd* had debated the negotiation result. The *Landsråd* got exactly what it had requested in 1967.

Moses Olsen admitted in the *Folketing* in 1972 that his dissatisfaction with EC membership came »a little late«. ³⁵⁰ It was also difficult for him to justify Greenland's change of preference in economic terms. For example, he argued that Greenland had never agreed to transitional rights for Danish and Faroese fishermen to fish within Greenland's exclusive fishing limit in the negotiations. ³⁵¹ Even if he was right, this argument hardly created »a completely new situation for Greenland«, as Olsen claimed. *Landsråd* MP Lars Emil Johansen also tried to modify the *Landsråd's* initial support for EC membership in 1971:

I believe [...] that the Landsråd – due to its incomplete knowledge about the EC – has expressed its distrust in the benefits of EC membership for Greenland, but was forced to set up some minimum demands in order not to be completely unprepared if we were forced in because of a Danish majority for membership. These demands have [...] been fulfilled, but in the meantime we have become a lot wiser. ³⁵²

According to Johansen, the *Landsråd* had therefore merely responded to the political decision of Denmark that Greenland should join the EC together with it. This had happened irrespective of whether or not the *Landsråd* MPs actually opposed or supported Greenland's accession to the EC. Only in 1972, the *Landsråd* had finally made up its mind and decided to oppose membership. However, Johansen could not tell which economic factor exactly had created such a new situation after the outcome of the negotiations to justify the U-turn in the position of Greenland's elite. Unlike in the Faroe Islands, the potential need to extend the exclusive fishing limit in the future did not create a completely new situation in Greenland. Greenland's fishing industry was still under-developed and would not have the capacity to catch all fish within a 50- or 200-mile limit for some time to come. In contrast to the Faroes, it is unlikely that the need to extend the fishing limit became so strong that it alone resulted in a change of preference in Greenland's elite from support to rejection of EC membership.

In summary, the medium economic interest of Greenland's political elite to reject EC membership in 1972 does not provide sufficient cause to explain the change of European policy preferences. If a medium economic interest to reject EC membership actually turned the majority of Greenland's elite into EC opponents in 1972, why did it happen then and not much earlier? In the Greenlandic case, it is not very convincing to blame the introduction of the equal access principle

350 FT (1971-72): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 5356.

351 Ibid, col. 1732.

352 Lars Emil JOHANSEN (1972): »Derfor bør vi stemme NEI til EF: EF interesserer sig ikke for grøn-lænderne«, in: *A/G*, 14 September 1972, p. 15: »Jeg opfatter [landsrådets behandling af EF-spørgsmålet] [...] sådan, at landsrådet på grund af sit ufuldstændige kendskab til EF udtrykte sin mistillid til fællesskabets nytte for Grønland, men var nødt til – for ikke at stå helt uforberedt, hvis vi blev tvunget ind af et dansk ja-flertal – at opstille nogle mindstekrav. Disse opstillede betingelser er [...] blev[et] godkendt, men i mellemtiden er vi nogle stykker, der er blevet klogere!«

and the potential need to extend the fishing limit in the future, as with the Faroe Islands, for the rejection of EC membership. On the contrary, Greenland actually achieved a good negotiation result in comparison with the demands of the *Landsråd* in 1967. Therefore, political interests must have played a considerable role in Greenland's rejection of EC membership.

6.3. The year 1971: Turning point in Greenland's political history

Political interests could explain why the European policy choice of Greenland's elite changed in the early 1970s, although its economic interests remained the same. Indeed, the year 1971 was a turning point in Greenland's political history.

By the 1960s, the policies of the older generation of *Landsråd* MPs had increasingly been in direct opposition with the objectives of the so-called »Young Greenlanders«.³⁵³ This new generation of Greenlanders entered Greenland's political institutions for the first time after the *Landsråd* and *Folketing* elections in 1971. Jonathan Motzfeldt and Lars Emil Johansen, who were to become the most influential Greenlandic politicians in the twentieth century, were elected to the *Landsråd* at the expense of the renowned MPs Erling Høegh and Nikolaj Rosing. Rosing also lost his *Folketing* seat for Southern Greenland to another young Greenlandic, Moses Olsen. Motzfeldt, Johansen and Olsen were the leading proponents of the Siumut movement, which had a very different self-conception than its predecessors. For the first time, members of the political elite in Greenland developed a Greenlandic self-consciousness, which was based on the peculiar Greenlandic language, culture and living conditions.

Differences between Greenland and Denmark were of course nothing new. But in contrast to previous decades, this new generation of Greenlanders no longer perceived itself to be inferior to Denmark. Thus, they no longer felt the need to negate the differences between Greenland and Denmark and to adapt Greenland's living conditions to the Danish mainland, so that Greenlanders would one day become »good Danish citizens«.³⁵⁴ Instead, they began to proudly emphasise these differences in language, culture and living conditions.

Thus, Greenland's political elite in its new composition became increasingly suspicious of Denmark's decision to include Greenland in its EC membership application. Jonathan Motzfeldt stated that it was no longer enough to simply tell Greenland »that everything will be okay after we have joined the EC«.³⁵⁵ Lars Emil Johansen emphasised that EC membership was only the tip of the many new things, which Greenland had been forced to adapt to throughout the last twenty years, without being aware of what they actually meant and could bring with them.³⁵⁶ Moses Olsen believed that Greenland had been brought »out of balance« through

353 GOLDSCHMIDT (1976): *Fra integration*, p. 2.

354 This famous expression was made by Greenland's first *Folketing* MP Augo LYNGE (1945): »Omkring »det nationale«, in: *Grønlandsposten*, 1 November 1945, pp. 223-225, here: p. 225. Cf. Knud HERTLING (1977): *Grønlandske paradokser: Træk af Grønlands politiske udvikling fra 2. verdenskrig til i dag*. Copenhagen: Fremad, pp. 14-16, 40.

355 Jonathan MOTZFELDT (1972): »Derfor må vi have en tænkepause!« In: *A/G*, 3 August 1972, p. 8.

356 GLRF (1972): »Redegørelse for situationen vedrørende Grønlands eventuelle indtræden i Fællesmarkedet«, A 19/1972 (spring), pp. 33-49, here: pp. 38-39.

the psychologically failed and remotely controlled integration policy, characterised by an in many ways inappropriate Danification process, which only benefitted a privileged minority of Greenlanders, but was detrimental for the majority of common Greenlanders.³⁵⁷

Johansen believed that Denmark once again pretended to know what was good for the »poor Greenlander« and what was not.³⁵⁸ These times would have to change. Greenland's citizens would need to develop into citizens just as in any other democratic country, who demanded to know and to decide upon what was introduced in their society.

Moses Olsen therefore felt that Greenland should have gotten the same consideration period as the Faroe Islands.³⁵⁹ As outlined above, the Danish government refused to grant Greenland the same consideration period as the Faroe Islands and a separate binding referendum for constitutional reasons. It argued that Greenland – in contrast to the Faroe Islands – had no Home Rule system in 1972, which delegated control over economic matters to Greenlandic institutions.³⁶⁰ Thus, it was not possible to grant Greenland a consideration period or a separate referendum. However, for Olsen, the legal implications of Greenland's constitutional status were subordinate to the natural right of Greenland to be treated differently from Denmark because Greenland and Denmark were different:

Even if we formally on the paper are a group of Danes in line with Copenhageners or others, nobody can explain away that we are a people with its own language and its own character and that our living conditions are closer to the Norwegian, Faroese and Icelandic ones than to the Danish [...]. And it is very clear that there is a democratic Greenlandic wish that Greenland's association with the EC shall not correspond to the Danish one. As responsible politicians, it must now be our task to make a policy for Greenland, which is in harmony with [the Greenlandic] people's request.³⁶¹

Legitimising the proposal for a separate referendum, Olsen added that Greenland and Denmark had nothing in common from an economic or societal point of view,

357 FT (1971-72): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 7239: »[Vi har i dag i Grønland et samfund, som på mange måder er blevet bragt ud af balance, især gennem de sidste 20 års] psykologisk forfejlede og fjernstyrede integrationspolitik, som bl. a. har været præget af en i flere henseender uhensigtsmæssig fordanskningsproces, som har været til gavn for et privilegeret mindretal af grønlandere, men til skade for flertallet af de menige grønlandere.«

358 GLRF (1972): »Redegørelse for situationen vedrørende Grønlands eventuelle indtræden i Fællesmarkedet«, A 19/1972 (spring), pp. 33-49, here: pp. 38-39.

359 FT (1971-72): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 1731.

360 Ibid, col. 1484; DANISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND MINISTRY FOR GREENLAND (1972): *Grønland og EF*, ch. 1.

361 FT (1972-73): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 271: »Selv om vi formelt på papiret er en gruppe danskere på lignende med københavnerne og andre, kan ingen nemlig bortforklare, at vi er et folk med eget sprog og eget særpræg, og at vore levevilkår og livsbetingelser mere svarer til de norske, færøske og islandske, end de svarer til de danske. [...] Og det er altså helt klart, at dette er et demokratisk grønlandsk ønske, at Grønlands tilknytning til EF ikke skal svare til den danske. Som ansvarlige politikere må det nu være vor opgave at føre en grønlandsk politik, der er i harmoni med dette folkets ønske.«

even if Greenland was a part of the Danish Realm.³⁶² He considered it to be »absolutely incompatible with Greenlandic conditions« if Greenland's and Denmark's votes made up one pool. Just like Moses Olsen, *Landsråd* MP Johan Knudsen emphasised that it was a Greenlander's right to vote out from Greenlandic interests and not out from the interests of Denmark.³⁶³

Landsråd MP Jørgen Olsen believed that even the legal argument of the Danish government to deny Greenland a European policy *sonderweg* was questionable.³⁶⁴ If the constitution made it impossible for Denmark to exclude Greenland from its EC membership in 1972, why had Denmark then been able to exclude Greenland from its EFTA membership in 1959? Arnold Christian Normann, Minister for Greenland from 1968 to 1971, had explicitly considered excluding Greenland permanently from Denmark's EC membership as late as in September 1971.³⁶⁵

Since these arguments were unable to persuade the Danish government, Greenland's political elite became painfully aware that its changed awareness of its difference to Denmark would not automatically materialise in a different European policy for Greenland from the Danish authorities. Aqqaluk Lynge, chairman of the Young Greenlanders' Association and later founding member of IA, believed that Greenlanders would now »face what [they] did when [they] said yes to being incorporated as an »equal part of the Danish Realm««. ³⁶⁶ Therefore to a significant extent, the emergence of opposition to EC membership in Greenland was a form of anti-colonial resistance against Danish rule, which imposed EC membership on the Greenlandic people against its will. EC membership was an indirect problem for Greenland's elite at first, a prime example for its dissatisfaction with Danish rule.

The only remedy to this untenable situation was increased Greenlandic self-determination. If the Danish government refused to make a European policy that was in line with the requests of the Greenlandic people, then the Greenlandic people would need to determine Greenlandic policy themselves in the future. Thus, the unwillingness of the Danish government to meet the Greenlandic demands fuelled the struggle for increased self-determination in Greenland. But this also meant that EC membership went from being an indirect problem into a direct problem for Greenland's political elite because Greenland would not be able to gain increased decision-making powers from Denmark as an EC member. If Greenland joined the EC with Denmark, decision-making rights over Greenlandic matters would not be transferred from Copenhagen to Nuuk, but end up in Brussels.

Lars Emil Johansen therefore believed that EC membership was diametrically

362 FT (1971-72): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 5473.

363 GLRF (1972): »Redegørelse for situationen vedrørende Grønlands eventuelle indtræden i Fællesmarkedet«, A 19/1972 (spring), pp. 33-49, here: p. 48.

364 Ibid, pp. 40-41.

365 N.N. (1971): »Lykkes det at holde Grønland uden for?« In: *A/G*, 16 September 1971, p. 6.

366 Aqqaluk LYNGE (1972): »Pubertetsalder og senilitet«, in: *A/G*, 25 May 1972, p. 4.

opposed to Greenland's struggle for self-determination.³⁶⁷ EC membership would merely be a continuation of foreign rule, with the EC replacing Denmark as colonial power. Greenland's elite wanted to work hard in order to increase its influence, responsibilities and thus its right to self-determination. But there would be no realistic possibility for influence within the EC because – as a part of Denmark – Greenland would never be represented in its institutions. It was already hard to make Greenland's voice heard in Denmark, but it would be even harder once decision-making power had moved to Brussels. However, if Greenland stayed outside the EC, Greenlanders could have the possibility of influencing the conditions for their own development in the future. Moses Olsen also believed that it would make no sense to replace the Danish with EC membership:

We have been dissatisfied with central governance of a country, which has about 5 million inhabitants. If we say yes to EC membership, we say yes to central governance of a collective of states, which counts 300 million inhabitants!³⁶⁸

Not all Greenlandic politicians shared the EC opponents' dissatisfaction with the union with Denmark, though. As in the 1960s, some long-standing *Landsråd* MPs saw no need to question Denmark's decision to include Greenland as part of its EC membership. *Landsråd* chairman Lars Chemnitz argued that, while Denmark's Greenland policy of the 1950s and 1960s should of course be criticised, one should not forget what Denmark had done for Greenland with regard to healthcare, education and a higher living standard in general.³⁶⁹ For him, »the most important thing with voting yes or no was that we must follow Denmark«. Due to the close connection between Denmark and Greenland, anything other than Greenland's inclusion in the EC would result in problems for the Danish Realm.³⁷⁰ *Folketing* MP Knud Hertling still maintained in 1971 that the main motivation for Greenland's *Folketing* MPs to follow Denmark into the EC was that they wanted to preserve the Realm.³⁷¹ And *Landsråd* MP Ole Berglund believed that Danish membership alongside Greenlandic non-membership would simply be »unmanageable«. ³⁷² In an advertisement for *A/G*'s last edition before the referendum, both Chemnitz and Hertling recommended that the Greenlandic people vote yes to EC membership

367 See for this paragraph: N.N. (1972): »Landsrådets flertal imod fællesmarkedet«, in: *A/G*, 28 September 1972, p. 9; Lars Emil JOHANSEN (1972): »Derfor bør vi stemme NEI til EF: EF interesserer sig ikke for grønlønderne«, in: *A/G*, 14 September 1972, p. 15.

368 OLSEN (1972): »Moses Olsens bidrag«, p. 25: »Vi har været utilfredse med centralstyringen fra et land, der tæller knapt 5 mill. indbyggere. Hvis vi siger ja til EF, siger vi ja til en centralstyring fra en samling af stater, der tæller 300 mill. indbyggere!«

369 Lars CHEMNITZ (1972): »Vi må fare med lempe«, in: *A/G*, 28 September 1972, p. 4.

370 Lars CHEMNITZ (1972): »Jonathan Motzfeldts forslag er urealistisk«, in: *A/G*, 3 August 1972, p. 28.

371 FT (1970-71): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 6727. He referred to his own position and to the position of his colleague Nikolaj Rosing, before Moses Olsen replaced Rosing in the upcoming *Folketing* elections.

372 GLRF (1972): »Redegørelse for situationen vedrørende Grønlands eventuelle indtræden i Fællesmarkedet«, A 19/1972 (spring), pp. 33-49, here: p. 47.

in order to secure »the necessary affiliation with Denmark«. ³⁷³ However, by 1972, the proponents of this old political discourse had become a minority.

The Greenlandic rejection of EC membership in 1972 was therefore a consequence of the strong political interest of Greenland's new generation of young politicians to reject EC membership, and their ability to rally the great majority of *Landsråds* MPs behind this new course. In the 1960s, Greenland's elite had not been willing to challenge Denmark's European policy choices on behalf of Greenland and therefore supported EEC membership despite a medium economic interest to reject it. With the emergence of a national movement at the end of the 1960s, Greenland's new political elite emphasised that Greenland and Denmark had to be treated differently with regard to EC membership. Since the Danish government would not listen, Greenland's elite increasingly felt that it had to take responsibility over Greenlandic affairs themselves. This made EC membership even more problematic because it was diametrically opposed to the struggle for increased Greenlandic self-determination.

Both in 1961 and in 1972, Greenland's elite had a medium economic interest to reject EC membership. Since this economic interest remained stable, it was unable to explain the change of Greenland's European policy choice. However, the change of European policy preferences was consistent with the change of political interests between Greenland's old and new elite. Moses Olsen himself explicitly referred to the »personal changes within Greenlandic politics« that had resulted in the emergence of opposition. ³⁷⁴ Process-tracing therefore reveals that it was its strong political interest, and not its medium economic interest to remain outside, which made Greenland's political elite reject EC membership in 1972. This clearly disproves LI's assumption that economic interests are sufficient to explain the European policy choices of national governments.

373 Lars CHEMNITZ and Knud HERTLING (1972): »Ja til EF«, in: *A/G*, 28 September 1972, p. 8.

374 FT (1971-72): »Folketingets forhandling«, col. 5356.

Greenland's long way towards withdrawal from the EC (1973-85)

In 1973, Greenland joined the EC together with Denmark, although Greenland's elite and the Greenlandic people had strongly rejected EC membership. The glaring discrepancy between the request of the Greenlandic people and the Danish European policy on their behalf triggered Greenland's struggle for increased self-determination. In 1979, Home Rule was established in Greenland with a promise from the Danish government that Greenland's new Home Rule authorities would be able to take the question of EC membership up for revision. Greenland's first Home Rule government, a Siumut government, was in favour of Greenland's withdrawal and enforced a second referendum on EC membership in 1982, in which the Greenlandic people narrowly voted for Greenland's withdrawal. In February 1985, Greenland withdrew from the EC.

Chapter 7 explains the withdrawal from EC membership in Greenland. It tests LI's assumption that Greenland's political elite and its first Home Rule governments wanted to withdraw from EC membership because they had a strong or medium economic interest do so. However, according to LI, withdrawal from EC membership could also have been based on the strong or medium political interest of Greenland's political elite and first Home Rule governments to reject EC membership, but only if their economic interest had been weak, diffuse and indeterminate.

7.1. Home Rule and withdrawal from EC membership

After the referendum on EC membership in October 1972, Moses Olsen stressed in the *Folketing* that if the Greenlandic people continued to wish another form of association with the EC than full membership, Greenland would need to change its constitutional status and have a new referendum.³⁷⁵ The *Landsråd* therefore voted unanimously in favour of a proposal by Jonathan Motzfeldt, which asked the Ministry for Greenland to establish a commission in order to work towards a Home Rule arrangement for Greenland.³⁷⁶ Olsen later stated that

375 FT (1972-73): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 271-272.

376 GLRF (1972): »Forslag om nedsættelse af en kommission til undersøgelse af, på hvilken måde en hjemmestyreordning i Grønland kan indføres«, 11/1972 (autumn), p. 7.

it was exactly this right to determine by ourselves, whether to become a member of the Community or not, [...] that triggered the request for Home Rule, in consequence of which we [later] decided to leave the Community.³⁷⁷

Negotiations concluded in 1978 and the Home Rule Act came into effect in 1979, after Greenland's people had approved it with 73 per cent in a referendum.

The Home Rule Act gave Greenland's Home Rule government the possibility of attaining control over essential policy areas, including administration, finance, economy, fisheries, hunting, agriculture, social and employment matters, education and culture.³⁷⁸ It did not contain a special Greenlandic power to change its association with the EC. However, throughout the 1970s the Danish government had repeatedly promised Greenland's political elite that it would not prevent Greenland's withdrawal from the EC if there was a public majority supportive of it after Home Rule.³⁷⁹ The EC had also emphasised that the door was open for Greenland if it wanted to withdraw.³⁸⁰ Roy Jenkins, President of the Commission from 1977 to 1981, had stated on a visit to Greenland in 1978 that the EC would not keep Greenland as a member »against its will«.³⁸¹

The EC question became the main cleavage in the emerging Greenlandic party system.³⁸² On the one hand, seven *Landsråd* MPs supported the Siumut movement and subsequently joined Siumut when it became Greenland's first established party in 1977.³⁸³ In the first elections to the *Landsting*, Greenland's new parliament, and to Greenland's seat in the European Parliament in 1979, Siumut campaigned for Greenland's withdrawal from the EC. It demanded another referendum about Greenland's continued EC membership before the phase-out of the special regulations in 1982.³⁸⁴ IA and SP, two smaller left-wing parties, also declared their support for Siumut's EC policy after their foundation in the late 1970s.³⁸⁵ On the other hand,

377 Moses OLSEN (1983): »Perspectives beyond Greenland's Secession from the EEC«, in: Hjalte Rasmussen (ed.): *Greenland in the Process of Leaving the European Communities*, Report from the Conference organized by the Danish Society for European Studies held on Kollekolle, Copenhagen, on January 14-15, 1983. Copenhagen: Forlaget Europa, pp. 23-29, here: p. 25.

378 DANISH PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (1978): »Lov om Grønlands hjemmestyre«.

379 N.N. (1972): »Grønland kan måske holdes uden for EF«, in: *A/G*, 26 October 1972, p. 20; N.N. (1973): »Markedsminister Ivar Nørgaard: Ingen dansk modstand mod grønlandsk udmeldelse af EF«, in: *A/G*, 13 September 1973, p. 5; EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1981): *Grønland og Europa: Oversigt over Grønlands status i EF*. Brussels: EC Press and Information Centre, p. 8; GLRF (1977): »Drøftelse af vilkårene for Grønlands medlemskab af EF«, 12/1977 (autumn), pp. 145-158, here: p. 145.

380 GLRF (1975): »Drøftelse af Grønlands stilling som medlem [sic!] af EF«, 5/1975 (autumn), pp. 44-53, here: p. 48; FT (1981): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 9125-9127; GLTF (1981): »Møde i Grønlands Landsting med medlem af EF-Kommissionen, Kommissær Poul Dalsager« (autumn), pp. 419-444, here: p. 427.

381 FT (1981): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 9127.

382 Jonathan MOTZFELDT (2003): »Grønland og EU«, in: Anne Mette Palm (ed.): *Danmark 30 år i EU: Et festskrift*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, pp. 105-124, here: p. 106.

383 These *Landsråd* MPs were Anders Andreasen, Jonathan Motzfeldt, Lamik Møller, Hendrik Nielsen, Knud Kristiansen, Asiajuk Sadorana and SIK chairman Odaq Olsen.

384 SIUMUT (1979): »Siumut ajugaule siumúkormiumik kinersít«, in: *A/G*, 22 March 1979, p. 17; SIUMUT (1979): »Stem på Finn Lyngge til EF-parlamentet«, in: *A/G*, 17 May 1979, Annex, p. 3.

385 MICHELSEN (1979): »Grønland – et partisystem«, p. 65.

the group around *Landsråd* chairman Lars Chemnitz and the MPs Otto Steenholdt and Ole Berglund gathered in the new party Atassut, which was in favour of Greenland's continued EC membership, provided that certain preconditions were met.³⁸⁶

Siumut won the first *Landsting* elections in 1979 and was able to form the first Home Rule government on its own, as Atassut was the only other party to gain seats in the new parliament (see table 17). Moreover, Siumut candidate Finn Lynge also won one of the 16 Danish seats in the European Parliament, which the Danish authorities had granted to Greenland, with 52.4 per cent of the vote, while Atassut's candidate Jørgen Hertling gained 42.4 per cent. Although Siumut was in favour of leaving the EC as soon as possible, the party believed that it was necessary to focus on the implementation of Home Rule and look for an alternative solution to EC membership at first.³⁸⁷ It took until March 1981 for the *Landsting* to unanimously approve a referendum on Greenland's continued membership of the EC, to take place in February 1982.³⁸⁸ It would only be guiding for the position of Greenland's government vis-à-vis the Danish authorities because Greenland's relationship with the EC was a matter of the Realm. But Danish approval of the Greenlandic vote was considered to be a formality, due to repeated Danish reassurances that they would leave the decision to the Greenlandic people.

During its party committee meeting in August 1981, Siumut declared its intention to remain associated with the EC as an Overseas Country and Territory (OCT) if the referendum resulted in withdrawal.³⁸⁹ Association as OCT was designed to small and remote island regions with a low population that were constitutionally connected to any of the EC member states. Most of the OCTs had been former colonies. OCT status offered these regions exemption of duties and quantitative restrictions, financial support, stable export incomes and transfer of know-how and technology, based on their remoteness, their narrow economic basis and their subsequent vulnerability to economic shocks. As OCT, Greenland would keep its custom-free access to the EC market and qualify for export subsidies and favourable loan conditions through the EIB and the European Development Fund (EDF). However, Poul Dalsager, who had been appointed EC Commissioner for Agriculture by the Danish government in 1981, expected »significant problems« for Greenland to achieve OCT status, »if it was possible at all«.³⁹⁰ Nevertheless,

386 FT (1977-78): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 147-148.

387 Finn LYNGE (1979): »EF, Grønland – og at have posten som radiofonichef«, in: *A/G*, 31 May 1979, p. 24.

388 GLTF (1981): »Forslag til landstingslov vedrørende vejledende folkeafstemning om Grønlands tilhørsforhold til De europæiske Fællesskaber«, 5/1981 (spring), pp. 112-127, 282-290, 339-341. Atassut later suggested to postpone the referendum until after the next *Landsting* elections in 1983 – however without success. See GLTF (1981): »Redegørelse om Grønlands forhold til EF«, 11/1981 (autumn), pp. 520-557.

389 Jonathan MOTZFELDT (1981): »Siumut foreslår: Grønland får en EF associeret status«, in: *A/G*, 26 August 1981, p. 37; GLTF (1981): »Redegørelse om Grønlands forhold til EF«, 11/1981 (autumn), pp. 520-557, here: pp. 522-526.

390 GLTF (1981): »Møde i Grønlands Landsting med medlem af EF-Kommissionen, Kommissær Poul Dalsager« (autumn), pp. 419-444, here: p. 427.

IA, SP, KNAPK and SIK all supported Siumut's campaign for withdrawal and OCT status through their joint movement ANISA.³⁹¹

The referendum on 23 February 1982 resulted in a slight majority of 12,624 people or 52.0 per cent of the voters for withdrawal, while 11,174 people or 46.1 per cent of the voters supported Greenland's continued EC membership. The turnout was 74.9 per cent. The Siumut government interpreted the result as a wish for withdrawal, which was also recognised by Atassut.³⁹² Thus, Atassut voted alongside Siumut for the start of negotiations on the conditions for a potential withdrawal of Greenland from the EC. However, Atassut chairman Lars Chemnitz also stressed that Atassut's support for withdrawal was dependent on whether Greenland would be able to negotiate an acceptable economic association with the EC such as OCT status – as claimed by Siumut prior to the referendum.

It is likely that the modest margin of the referendum result and the hope of many EC member states for an Atassut victory in the next *Landsting* elections (see table 17) contributed to the faltering start of Greenland's withdrawal negotiations.³⁹³ Moreover, about 1,600 presumably pro-EC employees at the US bases in Thule and Kangerlussuaq had not been allowed to participate in the referendum, but would be eligible to vote for the first time in the upcoming *Landsting* elections in 1983.³⁹⁴ While the Danish government loyally supported the Greenlandic government in its efforts to withdraw from the EC, other EC member states – in particular Italy – feared that Greenland's withdrawal would create precedence for separatist movements within their own territories.³⁹⁵ Moreover, there was a fear that Greenland's withdrawal from the EC would eventually also lead to its withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Association (NATO).³⁹⁶ In addition, Greenland's withdrawal could also unbalance the CFP, which had finally been agreed upon in 1983. West Germany in particular, the country with the most important economic interest in Greenlandic fisheries, was not interested in driving the withdrawal process forward. Fisheries in Greenland were essential for the German distant-water fishing fleet. More than 60 per cent of the total value of its fish catches came from the Greenlandic EEZ.

391 N.N. (1981): »Anisa: En enig front mod EF«, in: *A/G*, 9 September 1981, p. 21.

392 See for this paragraph: GLTF (1982): »Redegørelse om Grønlands forhold til EF – ved formanden«, 14/1982 (spring), pp. 150-168.

393 See for this paragraph: KRÅMER (1982): »Greenland's EC-Referendum«, pp. 281-282; MOTZFELDT (2003): »Grønland og EU«, pp. 108-109; Jonathan MOTZFELDT (2006): »Hjemmestyre og udenrigspolitik«, in: Hanne Petersen (ed.): *Grønland i Verdenssamfundet: Udvikling og forandring af normer og praksis*. Nuuk: Forlaget Atuagkat, pp. 117-129, here: pp. 118-120.

394 N.N. (1982): »Grønland tidligst ud af EF om to år«, in: *A/G*, 3 March 1982, p. 15.

395 See for the following: UNGERER (1984): »Der »Austritt« Grønlands«, pp. 348-349.

396 Cf. Finn LYNGE (1981): »Rollespillet EF-Grønland«, in: *Tidsskriftet Grønland* 29 (3), pp. 95-104, here: pp. 97-98. However, Denmark never accepted interference of the Home Rule institutions in decisions on traditional foreign and security policy. With regard to the military presence of NATO in the Faroe Islands and Greenland, Denmark repeatedly overruled recommendations of the Home Rule governments. Cf. Hans Jacob DEBES (1988): »Reflections on the Position, Participation and Co-Operation of Small Nations in International Politics – Case: The Faroe Islands«, in: *Nordic Journal of International Law* 57 (3), pp. 365-368, here: pp. 366f.

In February 1983, the Commission confirmed that Greenland could judicially withdraw from the EC and

that the new relationship between the Community and Greenland could be partly based on the general principles covering the Community's relationship with the OCTs.³⁹⁷

However, it also stated that, in the case of Greenland, OCT status could not come without a specific complementary arrangement in the field of fisheries, which assured the EC about the »continuation of its fisheries interests in Greenland waters«. The EC requested continued quotas in Greenlandic waters, taking into account the traditional fishing activities of the fleets of EC member states on the one hand and the development of Greenland's fishing fleet and its processing and marketing industries on the other. To this end, the EC would provide for full liberalisation of imports of fish products into the EC, originating in and coming from Greenland.

The Council supported the Commission's proposal in September 1983, but demanded further concessions from Greenland with regard to the proposed fisheries agreement.³⁹⁸ The EC should be included in prior consultations on TACs and Greenland's decision should be made on the basis of biological recommendations and other objective criteria. Moreover, the Council demanded a similar quota for EC fishermen as under the current CFP, a quota increase in case of increasing TACs and priority rights for EC fishermen if Greenland's fishermen did not catch the total quota allocated to them. In addition, the Council also wished to continue to administer TACs in Greenlandic waters for Norway and the Faroe Islands as part of the EC quota.

The Greenlandic government opposed the EC's position that the price for custom-free access to the EC market was continued EC fisheries.³⁹⁹ Instead, it demanded compensation payments from the EC for fisheries in Greenlandic waters. Moreover, it believed that the proposed quotas were too high and refused to grant the EC any right to negotiate about the fisheries rights of third-party states in Greenlandic waters. In October 1983, Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt (S) declared that Greenland would not try to achieve OCT status at any cost and also withdraw from the EC unilaterally and accept a third-state regulation as the Faroe Islands did. The *Landsting* passed an according proposal in December 1983, with

397 See for this paragraph: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1983): *Status of Greenland*, Commission Opinion: Commission Communication Presented to the Council on 2 February 1983, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/83. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, pp. 9-12.

398 See for this paragraph: GLTF (1983): »Beretning til Grønlands Hjemmestyre vedrørende forhandlingerne om Grønlands udtræden af EF«, Annex 5 (1)/1983 (autumn), pp. 238-245; GLTF (1983): »Note af 15. september 1983 fra formandskabet til Rådet«, Annex 5 (2)/1983 (autumn), pp. 246-251; GLTF (1983): »Kommissionens erklæring til rådsprotokollen afgivet af Kommissær Burke på rådsmødet den 19. september 1983«, Annex 5 (3)/1983 (autumn), pp. 252-257; GLTF (1983): »EF-forhandlingerne om en fiskeriaftale«, Annex 4 (1)/1983 (extraordinary session), pp. 91-94.

399 See for this paragraph: GLTF (1983): »Redegørelse om Grønlands udmeldelse af EF«, 5/1983 (autumn), pp. 593-614.

Siumut and IA voting in its favour.⁴⁰⁰ Atassut declared itself opposed to unilateral withdrawal and demanded OCT status for Greenland at least, or a similar form of association.

In February 1984, the negotiations ended with a compromise package, consisting of four different parts: the Greenland Treaty, a special protocol attached to it, a complementary fisheries agreement and a fisheries protocol.⁴⁰¹ The Greenland Treaty foresaw that Greenland would withdraw from the EC at the beginning of 1985. The special protocol granted Greenland OCT status and guaranteed custom-free exports to the EC. However, this was bound to EC member states' »satisfactory access possibilities to the Greenlandic fisheries zones«, regulated with the fisheries agreement.

The fisheries agreement was valid for ten years and regulated the TACs for Greenlandic and EC fishermen in Greenlandic waters. Greenland was to decide the TACs and the measures for conservation and control, but was obliged to respect the scientific recommendations and regulations of UNCLOS in its decisions. Moreover, Greenland received a compensation payment for the fishing licences handed to the EC. If the maximum TAC was lower than the total quota for Greenlandic fishermen, the EC would lose fisheries rights in Greenlandic waters without the EC stopping its payments. On the other hand, if Greenland was not able to fish its TAC itself, the EC would enjoy special priority rights to negotiate the increased catch possibilities. Greenland would be in charge of negotiating the TACs for Faroese fishermen in its waters, while Norwegian fisheries in Greenlandic waters would continue to be regulated by the EC as part of its TAC.

The concrete numbers for TACs and the compensation payments were regulated in the fisheries protocol, which was to be renegotiated every five years. For the period from 1985 until 1989, the EC gained the right to fish about 105,000 tons in Greenlandic waters, which was similar to the quotas the EC had given itself under the CFP before.⁴⁰² On the other hand, Greenland received a compensation payment of ECU 26.5 million at the time, which was more than the total amount of subsidies and grants that Greenland had received from the EC in 1981.⁴⁰³ Due to the compensation payment, Greenland was denied access to development aid from the EDF, unlike other OCTs.

400 GLTF (1983): »Redegørelse om Grønlands udmeldelse af De Europæiske Fællesskaber«, 4/1983 (extraordinary session), pp. 49-64.

401 See for the rest of this subchapter: GLTF (1984): »Redegørelse om forløbet af forhandlingerne med De europæiske Fællesskaber«, 5/1984 (spring), pp. 8-29; GLTF (1984): »Redegørelse om det foreliggende aftalekompleks om Grønlands udtræden af EF«, Annex 5 (1)/1984 (spring), pp. 63-67; GLTF (1984): »Notat: Aftalekomplekset om Grønlands udtræden af EF«, Annex 5 (2)/1984 (spring), pp. 68-75; GLTF (1984): »Traktat om Ændring af Traktaterne om oprettelse af De Europæiske Fællesskaber for så vidt angår Grønland«, Annex 5 (3)/1984 (spring), pp. 76-82; GLTF (1984): »Protokol om den særlige ordning for Grønland«, Annex 5 (4)/1984 (spring), pp. 83-84; GLTF (1984): »Fiskeriaftale mellem Det Europæiske Økonomiske Fællesskab på den ene side og Den Danske Regering og Det Grønlandske Landsstyre på den anden side«, Annex 5 (5)/1983, pp. 85-93; GLTF (1984): »Protokol vedrørende betingelserne for fiskeri mellem Det Europæiske Økonomiske Fællesskab på den ene side og Den Danske Regering og Det Grønlandske Landsstyre på den anden side«, Annex 5 (6)/1984, pp. 94-97.

402 Cf. MOTZFELDT (2003): »Grønland og EU«, p. 111.

403 UNGERER (1984): »Der »Austritt« Grønlands«, p. 351.

In March 1984, Prime Minister Motzfeldt (S) asked the *Landsting* to accept Greenland's withdrawal from the EC and its future OCT status on the negotiated conditions. However, the two IA MPs, who had supported Siumut's minority government since 1983, were deeply disappointed with the outcome because Greenland had not been accepted as a regular OCT member and would not receive development aid. IA therefore suggested that Greenland should withdraw from the EC without being associated with it as OCT and without implementing the fisheries agreement and protocol. Nevertheless, thanks to Atassut's support, the *Landsting* was able to approve withdrawal from the EC, in March 1984, with 24 votes for and two against. In May, the *Folketing* approved Greenland's withdrawal and, on 1 February 1985, Greenland withdrew from the EC, after all EC member states had ratified the various withdrawal agreements.

7.2. Foreign fishermen in Greenlandic waters

Throughout the 1970s, Greenland's elite had a growing economic interest to secure the catch from its waters for Greenlandic fishermen. Greenland's fishing fleet expanded significantly throughout the 1970s and was able to catch an ever-increasing amount of fish.⁴⁰⁴ At the same time, the extension of fishing limits all over the North Atlantic in 1977 meant that EC fishermen were increasingly locked out from waters in which they had previously fished, and had started looking for other areas, one of them being Greenland. Thus, dividing the TACs in Greenlandic waters became increasingly controversial. The EC had also extended its fishing limit to 200 miles in 1977, but member states had to accept fishermen from other member states up to six miles away from their coasts, or twelve miles if they were particularly dependent on fisheries. This meant that Greenland did not benefit from the general extension of fishing limits to 200 miles for coastal states worldwide, which took place after the conclusion of UNCLOS III on 1 January 1977. Greenland's fishing limit was extended to 200 miles, but EC fishermen continued to be allowed to fish up to twelve miles away from Greenland's coast.

Predating Greenland's accession to the EC, the *Landsråd* had demanded an exclusive fishing limit of 50 miles (see chapter 6). As starting point for the negotiations within UNCLOS III, the *Landsråd* even asked for a 200-mile limit for coastal states, which could also be allowed to determine and keep 100 per cent of the TACs for themselves if they had the capacity to catch them.⁴⁰⁵ Throughout 1975 and 1976, *Landsråd* chairman Lars Chemnitz (A) lobbied for Greenland's exclusion from the CFP and an exclusive 200-mile fishing limit, which would also account for EC member states.⁴⁰⁶ However, a change of the CFP, as proposed by the Danish government to the EC Council in 1973, remained unsuccessful (see chapter 5).

The EC's refusal to accommodate Greenland's requests meant that opposition to

404 See for this paragraph: Hans Jakob HELMS (1981): »EF holder hånden over torskeyvene«, in: Benthe Hjorth Christiansen and Finn Bønnelykke (eds.): *Grønland på vej*. Copenhagen: People's Movement Against the EC [Folkebevægelsen mod EF], pp. 18-23, here: pp. 18-20.

405 GLRF (1974): »FN-Konferencen om retsordenen på havet«, 8/1974 (autumn), pp. 23-34, here: pp. 23-26.

406 GLRF (1976): »Grønlands Landsråd«, Annex 7(4)/1976 (autumn), pp. 245-246.

Greenland's EC membership remained high. In their campaigns for the *Folketing* elections in December 1973, Lars Emil Johansen (S) and Moses Olsen (S) both stated that Greenland's fisheries interests were a major reason for their continued rejection of EC membership.⁴⁰⁷ After the extension of Greenland's fishing limit to 200 miles in 1977, Johansen (S) stressed that Greenland would now need to achieve a »real« fishing limit, which also locked out EC fishermen from Greenland's 200-mile EEZ.⁴⁰⁸ Even *Landsråds* chairman Lars Chemnitz (A), a staunch EC supporter, acknowledged that the benefits of an exclusive twelve-mile fishing limit were »limited«.⁴⁰⁹ He was convinced that the EC's failed fisheries policy and the way it was imposed over the head of the *Landsråds* further increased opposition to EC membership in Greenland.⁴¹⁰ On a visit to Brussels in May 1977, he stated that no Greenlandic politician could guarantee Greenland's continued EC membership if there was no acceptable fisheries regulation.⁴¹¹

The Council tried to accommodate Greenland's concerns somewhat with two statements on 2 February 1974 and 3 November 1976.⁴¹² They provided the basis for allocating Greenland's quotas within the TAC in accordance with its catching capacities (the so-called »Hague Preferences«).⁴¹³ First, the requirements of Greenlandic fishermen were given priority. Second, some quotas were reserved for third countries such as Norway, the Faroes and Canada in order for the EC to be able to trade access to its »own« Greenlandic waters against EC access to their waters. Third, the rest of the quotas were allocated to EC fishermen according to their traditional catches in Greenlandic waters. Thus, Greenland's fishermen could in general fish as much as they wanted, while the rest of the fish went to EC member states or to third states, which allowed EC fishermen to fish in their waters in exchange. The new Home Rule government was also allowed to negotiate directly with the Commission after 1979 and to participate in the Commission's negotiations with regard to third states' fisheries in Greenlandic waters. EC Commissioner Poul Dalsager maintained in 1981 that these special regulations had made it possible for Greenland to increase its fish catches as only EC member region throughout the 1970s (see table 11).⁴¹⁴

407 Lars Emil JOHANSEN (1973): »En politik, baseret på vort nej til EF«, in: *A/G*, 22 November 1973, pp. 3-4; Moses OLSEN (1973): »Grønlandsk politik på grønlandske vilkår«, in: *A/G*, 22 November 1973, pp. 3-4.

408 Lars Emil JOHANSEN (1976): »Intet folk kan eksistere uden retten til landet«, in: *A/G*, 28 December 1976, p. 11.

409 GLRF (1975): »Drøftelse af Grønlands stilling som medlem [sic!] af EF«, 5/1975 (autumn), pp. 44-53, here: p. 45.

410 GLRF (1977): »Drøftelse af vilkårene for Grønlands medlemskab af EF«, 12/1977 (autumn), pp. 145-158, here: p. 146.

411 N.N. (1977): »EF uddeler grønlandsk fiskeri til tredje lande«, in: *A/G*, 4 August 1977, p. 30.

412 See for this paragraph: GLTF (1980): »Redegørelse for EF's generelle fiskerierordning«, 45/1980 (autumn), pp. 480-503, here: pp. 482-483.

413 Cf. KRÄMER (1982): »Greenland's EC-Referendum«, p. 274.

414 GLTF (1981): »Møde i Grønlands Landsting med medlem af EF-Kommissionen, Kommissær Poul Dalsager« (autumn), pp. 419-444, here: p. 423.

Table 11: Fish catches in West Greenlandic waters (1972-80)⁴¹⁵

	1972		1974		1976	
	<i>tons</i>	<i>pct</i>	<i>tons</i>	<i>pct</i>	<i>tons</i>	<i>pct</i>
Greenland	41,000	29.5	51,000	44.3	44,000	49.7
Other states	98,000	70.5	64,000	55.7	88,000	50.3
Total	139,000	100.0	115,000	100.0	132,000	100.0

	1978		1979		1980	
	<i>tons</i>	<i>pct</i>	<i>tons</i>	<i>pct</i>	<i>tons</i>	<i>pct</i>
Greenland	67,000	52.3	82,000	49.7	101,000	80.8
Other states	61,000	47.7	83,000	50.3	24,000	19.2
Total	128,000	100.0	165,000	100.0	125,000	100.0

However, the greater Greenland's catching capacities became towards the end of the 1970s, the more controversial became the division of TACs in the Council. EC member states with fisheries interests in Greenlandic waters were more and more opposed to the continued implementation of the Hague preferences in order to keep their quotas unchanged despite the steady increase in Greenland's catching capacities.⁴¹⁶ KNAPK chairman Nikolaj Heinrich (A) therefore believed that the huge interest of EC member states in fisheries in Greenlandic waters threatened the further development of the fisheries sector.⁴¹⁷ Nevertheless, by 1980, Greenlandic fishermen still were unable to fish the total quota allocated to them by the EC.⁴¹⁸

Another problem was unlawful West German cod fisheries in Greenlandic waters. By 1978, West German trawlers were suspected of catching more cod in Greenlandic waters than they were allowed to according to their TAC.⁴¹⁹ In 1979, twelve West German trawlers were discovered unlawfully fishing cod near Greenland for the first time, which was followed by a protest note to West Germany on behalf of Denmark.⁴²⁰ One year later, three West German ships were boarded by the Danish coast guard and later charged for unlawful fisheries.⁴²¹ SP chairman Kristian Poulsen expressed the view of the great majority of Greenland's elite when

415 Own table based on EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1981): *Grønland og Europa*, p. 13; KRÄMER (1983): *Grønland und die Europäische Gemeinschaft*, p. 11.

416 HELMS (1981): »Torsketyvene«, p. 5.

417 N.N. (1981): »Indhandlingspriser og for små kvoter«, in: *A/G fiskeriavis*, 12 August 1981, p. 18.

418 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1981): *Grønland, EF og dokumenterne*. Brussels: EC Press and Information Centre, p. 16.

419 N.N. (1978): »Udenrigsministeriet søger at stoppe tysk fiskeri ved Grønland«, in: *A/G*, 11 May 1978, p. 9.

420 Jørgen FLEISCHER (1979): »Ulovligt torskefiskeri«, in: *A/G*, 15 February 1979, p. 3.

421 N.N. (1980): »Det vesttyske torskefiskeri er ikke kun gement tyveri«, in: *A/G*, 21 February 1980, pp. 1-2.

he referred to these acts as thievery from a people for whom fish was the basis of their economy and existence.⁴²²

7.3. A massive amount of EU grants

Taken in itself, the added economic value of keeping the TACs in Greenlandic waters for Greenlandic fishermen or at least receiving financial compensation for EC catches in them would have represented a strong economic incentive for Greenland's political elite to reject EC membership. However, Greenland's elite had an even stronger incentive to remain inside the EC. Economically, it profited a lot from EC membership by being included in a series of the EC's funding schemes.

EC grants became the foundation of Greenland's economic development in the 1970s. Virtually every larger village in Greenland received EC grants between 1973 and 1982 (see table 12).⁴²³ In total, Greenland received DKK 624 million in grants from the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) (mainly for infrastructure projects) and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) (mainly for the construction of trawlers), the amounts increasing annually on average. In addition, Greenland also received DKK 370.4 million in credit from the EIB. Moreover, the EC promoted more specific projects such as giving DKK 64.8 million for a sheep-breeding programme, DKK 79.0 million for fisheries inspections and DKK 30.1 million for the exploration of potential resources in the Greenlandic soil.

422 N.N. (1980): »Ingen respekt for aftaler: Sulissartut Partiát kræver udmeldelse af EF«, in: *A/G*, 28 February 1980, p. 12.

423 See for this paragraph: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1981): *Grønland og Europa*, pp. 18-23, 36-39. In total, more than 200 projects were financed by EC grants in close to 50 Greenlandic villages. It must be noted, though, that these grants did not simply supplement Danish state subsidies. Only grants from the ERDF were added up completely to the Danish subsidies. Greenland profited only from 50 per cent of the ESF grants and to an even minor percentage from EIB credits, since the Danish government reduced its subsidies to Greenland in accordance. See GLTF (1979): »Forslag om at alle henvendelser til EF først forelægges Landstinget«, 47/1979 (autumn), pp. 157-160, here: p. 159.

Table 12: Grants and loans to Greenland in million DKK (1973-81)⁴²⁴

	<i>ESF</i>	<i>ERDF</i>	<i>EAGGF</i>	<i>Total grants</i>	<i>EIB credits</i>
1973	6.4	-	-	6.4	51.2
1974	4.7	-	-	4.7	38.0
1975	11.6	24.9	-	36.5	N/A
1976	16.1	33.9	2.8	52.8	N/A
1977	21.2	40.9	2.9	65.0	50.0
1978	26.7	37.9	1.9	66.5	80.0
1979	53.0	70.6	5.6	129.2	74.0
1980	44.8	64.8	2.3	111.9	36.0
1981	43.5	112.4	0.1	156.0	41.2
Total	223.0	385.4	15.6	624.0	370.4

Greenland was the region within the EC that received most subsidies per capita over the years – DKK 1,169 per inhabitant every year – 39 times the EC average.⁴²⁵ Denmark's Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen made it very clear to the *Landsting* that Denmark would not offer compensation for the loss of EC grants after Greenland's withdrawal.⁴²⁶

It was therefore not surprising that Atassut and the EAS – the pro-EU movement and counterpart to ANISA – made these grants an important part of their campaigns for Greenland's continued EC membership. On Danish TV, Atassut chairman Lars Chemnitz stated that the grants were the main reason why Atassut wanted to remain in the EC.⁴²⁷ He believed that the »significant economic grants« from the various EC funds showed that Greenland was being »treated well within the EC«.⁴²⁸ *Folketing* MP Otto Steenholdt (A) repeatedly emphasised that Greenland would not be able to do without them, as 20-25 per cent of the expenses for construction projects and 50 per cent of the expenses for education would disappear.⁴²⁹ If they could only be replaced by tax increases, this would put an increased burden on Greenland's population.⁴³⁰ Therefore, according to Chemnitz (A), withdrawal would reduce the living standard in Greenland, irrespective of whether the grants were replaced or not. He emphasised that Greenland needed the grants now in order to become independent from them later:

424 Own table based on EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1981): *Grønland og Europa*, p. 23; FT (1981-82): »Folketingets forhandlinger« (second session), col. 1653-1654.

425 N.N. (1981): »Uden EF – flere udsendte«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 5 June 1981, p. 4.

426 FT (1980-81): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 12934.

427 N.N. (1981): »Politisk krydsild på Christiansborg«, in: *A/G*, 18 November 1981, p. 3.

428 Lars CHEMNITZ (1979): »EF har behandlet Grønland godt«, in: Jørgen Knudsen (ed.): *Lille land – hvad nu? – en antologi om Danmark og EF i dag*. Odense: Informations Forlag, pp. 107-110, here: p. 107.

429 FT (1981-82): »Folketingets forhandlinger« (first session), col. 273.

430 GLTF (1981): »Redegørelse om Grønlands forhold til EF«, 11/1981 (autumn), pp. 520-557, here: p. 531.

We do not seek dependence, [...] [but] a situation in which we are more self-reliant. Once this situation is a fact, we will be better-equipped and no longer dependent on grants from the outside.⁴³¹

In addition to the grants, Greenland also benefitted increasingly from custom-free access for its fish exports to the EC market. The more Greenland's fishing industry developed, the more crucial access to the EC market became (see table 13). The Commission calculated that the absence of custom tariffs on Greenlandic exports brought Greenland an additional income of DKK 12 million per year.⁴³² Moreover, EC membership also implied custom-free access to the EFTA market for Greenland, since all EFTA member states had free trade agreements (FTA) with the EC. Chemnitz (A) therefore emphasised that it was more than uncertain that Greenland would continue to be able to export nearly 85 per cent of its fish products custom-free to the EC/EFTA market after its withdrawal.⁴³³

Table 13: Origin and destination of Greenlandic exports in million DKK (1979)⁴³⁴

	<i>Fish</i>	<i>Minerals</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Total (pct)</i>
Denmark	152	8	14	174	18.9
EC w/o Denmark	225	222	3	450	48.9
EFTA	60	85	0	145	15.8
USA	74	0	2	76	8.2
Third states	8	45	22	75	8.1
<i>Total</i>	519	360	41	920	100.0
<i>Total (pct)</i>	56.4	39.1	4.5	100.0	

EC Commissioner Dalsager explained to the *Landsting* in 1981 that it was unlikely that the EC member states would be willing to grant Greenland custom-free

431 N.N. (1982): »Hvis vi kommer ud af EF: Begyndelsen til enden på rigsfællesskabet«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 19 February 1982, p. 14: »Vi søger ikke efter afhængighed, [...] [men] en situation, hvor vi er mere selvhjulpne. Når denne situation er en kendsgerning, er vi også bedre rustede og ikke mere afhængige af tilskud udefra.«

432 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1981): *Grønland og Europa*, pp. 16-17. Cf. also KRÄMER (1983): *Grönland und die Europäische Gemeinschaft*, pp. 16-18. He estimates that custom-free access to the EC markets brought Greenland an additional DKK 11 million per year.

433 N.N. (1982): »Hvis vi kommer ud af EF: Begyndelsen til enden på rigsfællesskabet«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 19 February 1982, p. 14.

434 Own table based on EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1981): *Grønland og Europa*, p. 16; FT (1981-82): »Folketingets forhandlinger« (first session), col. 1283. Greenland may seem less dependent on fish exports at first sight due to the significant income from mining. However, although mining made up a large percentage of Greenland's exports, it was nearly completely detached from Greenland's economy. Isolated from Greenland's villages, the extraction of marble, zinc, iron and silver at the Maamorilik mine was undertaken by Danish, Canadian and Swedish companies. Thus, the end of custom-free access of minerals to the EEC would hardly affect Greenland's economy. See JOHANSEN and SØRENSEN (1982): *Grønlands vej*, p. 5. Hans R. KRÄMER emphasises though that 124 of the 320 employees in the mining companies were ethnic Greenlanders in 1981. See KRÄMER (1983): *Grönland und die Europäische Gemeinschaft*, pp. 20-21.

access for its fish as part of an OCT association.⁴³⁵ The EC had only accepted such a deal for other OCTs because their fish exports to the EC were insignificant. This was not the case with regard to Greenland. Moreover, Greenland allegedly had a much higher living standard than other OCTs.⁴³⁶ It was therefore hardly surprising that the European Parliament's Research Committee concluded that Greenland had

economically a lot to lose and little, or maybe even nothing, to win by withdrawing from the EC. [...] One will forever be dependent on the EC countries' greater or lesser good-will, and in addition rely on a very insecure world market. One waives any right to judicial protection of the export possibilities for Greenlandic hunters, without getting anything in return. [...] Moreover, one will waive yearly loans and credits of about DKK 150 million, without guarantee for getting anything in return and without greater likelihood that Denmark will replace them.⁴³⁷

It was difficult for the Siumut government to challenge this interpretation of Greenland's economic options. Lars Emil Johansen (S), Minister for Industry and Economy since 1979, stressed that one needed to adjust the profit from EC grants to the loss of profit from the fish the EC was taking every year from Greenlandic waters.⁴³⁸ According to his Ministry, the value of Greenlandic fish caught and resold by EC member states amounted to DKK 585 million in 1980 as opposed to the DKK 112 million the EC had granted Greenland during the same year. Moreover, these numbers did not even include West Germany's unlawful cod fisheries. However, Johansen did not mention that it was the DKK 79.0 million granted by the European Commission for fisheries inspections that made the discovery of these violations possible in the first place.⁴³⁹ The Greenlandic Home Rule government could hardly afford to manage an effective fisheries control system on its own and whether the Danish government was willing to compensate the European money was more than questionable (see above).

435 See for this paragraph: GLTF (1981): »Møde i Grønlands Landsting med medlem af EF-Kommissionen, Kommissær Poul Dalsager« (autumn), pp. 419-444, here: p. 426.

436 Frederik Harhoff rejects this argument: Brunei had an even higher GNP per capita. The GNP levels of other OCTs were comparable to Greenland's. Moreover, without the large transfers of capital from Denmark, Greenland's GNP per capita would drop below half of its present level. Cf. HARHOFF (1983): »Greenland's Withdrawal«, p. 25.

437 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1982): *EF-medlemskabets konsekvenser for de grønlandske erhverv*. European Parliament: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, p. 34: »[En gennemgang af de forskellige grønlandske erhvervs situation i relation til EF viser således, at Grønland] økonomisk har meget at tabe og lidt, eller måske intet, at vinde ved at forlade EF-samarbejdet. [...] Man vil her i al fremtid være afhængig af EF-landenes større eller mindre velvilje og i øvrigt være henvist til et meget usikkert verdensmarked. Man giver afkald på retsbeskyttelsen af de grønlandske fangeres afsætningsmuligheder, uden at få noget til gengæld. [...] Herudover vil man uden garanti for at få noget som helst til gengæld give afkald på årlige lån og tilskud på ca. 150 millioner kr. og uden større sandsynlighed for, at Danmark vil erstatte dem.«

438 Lars Emil JOHANSEN (1981): »Vi kan og vil selv«, in: Bente Hjorth Christiansen and Finn Bønnelykke (eds.): *Grønland på vej*. Copenhagen: People's Movement Against the EC [Følgebevægelsen mod EF], pp. 5-12, here pp. 7-9.

439 KRÄMER (1982): »Greenland's EC-Referendum«, p. 280.

Nevertheless, Siumut felt that it had good reason to believe that withdrawal would come at a profit at least as large as the grants Greenland was receiving from the EC.⁴⁴⁰ MEP Finn Lyngé (S) spoke of at least DKK 33-62 million and Moses Olsen (S), Minister for Social Welfare since 1979, even quoted DKK 400 million, which could be gained by selling fishing licences to EC fishermen.⁴⁴¹ The Danish government only estimated an extra DKK 9-11 million per year for fishing licences.⁴⁴² Later it corrected the amount to DKK 15 million.⁴⁴³ It also confirmed that Greenland's withdrawal from the CCT would result in a 18-24 per cent decrease in import prices.⁴⁴⁴ However, these calculations clearly relativised the amounts envisaged by the Siumut politicians.

Judging from their own statements, the Siumut politicians were quite aware that their arguments for withdrawal were not convincing from an economic perspective. *Folketing* MP Preben Lange (S) admitted that withdrawal could result in »some economic loss« for Greenland, but Greenland would be able to cope with that.⁴⁴⁵ Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt (S) even claimed at one stage that Greenland's people would be willing to accept a lower standard of life in order to withdraw from the EC.⁴⁴⁶ In the *Landsting*'s autumn session in 1981, he explicitly stated that it would be better to remain in the EC from a purely economic perspective.⁴⁴⁷ MEP Finn Lyngé (S) also believed that some voters would probably not want to pay the »economic price« for withdrawal.⁴⁴⁸ The very narrow margin between the yes and no votes in the 1982 referendum – compared to the clear result in 1972 – shows that the economic arguments for continued membership did not go unnoticed by Greenland's voters.

In summary, Greenland's political elite and first Home Rule governments clearly had a medium economic interest to remain within the EC. EC member states' partly unlawful fisheries in Greenlandic waters continued to give an economic incentive to withdraw from the EC due to the growing importance of fisheries for the Greenlandic economy. However, Greenland also received custom-free access to the EC market in return, which was growing in importance at the same time because Greenlandic fishermen caught more and more fish and sold it to other countries. Even more important were the grants with which the EC financed Greenland's economic development. Thus, the Siumut government and ANISA had a difficult time presenting withdrawal as a good business deal for Greenland. High-ranking

440 N.N. (1980): »Nej til fortsat EF-medlemskab«, in: *A/G*, 25 September 1980, p. 18.

441 N.N. (1981): »EF-parlamentsmedlem Finn Lyngé: Indtægter på 33-62 mill. kr. ved fiskeriafgifter«, in: *A/G*, 9 April 1981, p. 9; OLSEN (1983): »Greenland's Secession«, p. 23.

442 FT (1980-81): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 2414.

443 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1981): *Grønland, EF og dokumenterne*, p. 17.

444 FT (1981-82): »Folketingets forhandlinger« (second session), col. 741-742.

445 FT (1981-82): »Folketingets forhandlinger« (first session), col. 269.

446 Kaj ROHMANN JANSEN (1981): »EF-medlemskab og levestandard«, in: *A/G*, 27 May 1981, p. 27.

447 GLTF (1981): »Redegørelse om Grønlands forhold til EF«, 11/1981 (autumn), pp. 520-557, here: p. 553.

448 Finn LYNGE (1982): »Greenland and the European Community«, in: Yvo J. D. Peeters (ed.): *Greenland and Europe: Report of a Seminar Organised at La Crau du Sapt*. Antwerpen: International Association for the Defence of Threatened Languages and Cultures, pp. 103-108, p. 107.

members of the government even conceded that it would have been more rational from an economic perspective to remain in the EC.

LI provides no answer to the question of why Greenland's government and the parties and interest groups organised in ANISA paved the way for Greenland's withdrawal from the EC, although – judging from their own statements – they were only too aware that it would have been in their economic interest to remain a member. Once again, the Greenlandic case disconfirms that there should have been a correlation between the economic interest of Greenland's elite and its European policy choice. Once again, it looked as if political interests tipped the scales in favour of withdrawal from the EC, although economic interests pointed into a different direction.

7.4. The struggle for self-determination

Greenland's withdrawal from the EC in the early 1980s provides the clearest instance of a rejection of LI's assumption that governments only base their European policy decisions on political interests when their economic interests are weak, diffuse or indeterminate. The struggle for self-determination remained the primary motivation for the first Greenlandic government and its cooperation partners in ANISA to leave the EC, although EC membership became increasingly beneficial from an economic perspective.

Just as in 1972, the Siumut movement had a strong political interest to reject EC membership because it considered it to be diametrically opposed to the European integration process. Lars Emil Johansen (S), Minister for Industry and Economy, summed this view up in a nutshell:

Home Rule is a process, which is directed towards political independence. EC cooperation is a process, which is directed towards integration and an increasing fusion between the member states. It is self-evident that these two matters are incompatible. We in Greenland have made our decision. We choose Home Rule over EC assimilation.⁴⁴⁹

Thue Christiansen (S), Minister for Culture and Education since 1979, also considered it to be »a paradox« that Greenland had been forced to join the EC in the middle of its liberalisation process from Danish rule.⁴⁵⁰ MEP Finn Lynge (S) believed that the centralisation process within the EC would empty the delegation of powers to Greenlandic institutions of much practical significance:

449 Lars Emil JOHANSEN (1979): »Vi siger NEJ til EF«, in: *Siumut*, 8 October 1979, pp. 8-9, here: p. 8: »Hjemmestyre er en proces, der peger hen imod politisk selvstændighed, EF-samarbejdet er en proces, der peger hen imod integration og stadig mere sammensmeltning medlemslandene imellem. Det siger sig selv, at disse to mål ikke kan forenes. Vi har truffet vort valg i Grønland. Vi vælger hjemmestyre frem for EF-assimilation.«

450 Thue CHRISTIANSEN (1981): »Nu vinder vi det tabte terræn tilbage«, in: Benthe Hjorth Christiansen and Finn Bønnelykke (eds.): *Grønland på vej*. Copenhagen: People's Movement Against the EC [Folkebevægelsen mod EF], pp. 29-34, here: p. 29.

If we stay in the EEC, a new type of colonial set-up will be cemented, and the political process, which is the very idea of the Home Rule legislation, will be frustrated of its aim.⁴⁵¹

Lynge believed that Greenland had not fought for Home Rule »in order to be governed by Belgium, [...] France or Luxembourg«. ⁴⁵² But as an EC member, there would always be the feeling that each step out of Danish bureaucracy would be taken into the EC's. ⁴⁵³ *Folketing* MP Preben Lange (S) also stressed that distant rule from Copenhagen should not be replaced by distant rule from Brussels. ⁴⁵⁴ Johansen (S) believed that now the time had come »where this country is to be steered by us – by us who live in this country«. ⁴⁵⁵ According to Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt (S), Greenland should have the possibility of developing its right to self-determination outside the EC instead of working according to directives given out by the EC. ⁴⁵⁶ He stressed that everybody who had voted for Home Rule needed to vote against EC membership. ⁴⁵⁷ Otherwise, the expression Home Rule would not have any meaning.

The Siumut party group endorsed these interpretations in an official statement in autumn 1980, in which it unanimously opposed continued EC membership because »Greenlandic Home Rule and Greenlandic membership in the EC are [...] two opposing movements«. ⁴⁵⁸ IA wished »to throw the EC out of Greenland in order to fight for Greenland's sovereignty as a people«. ⁴⁵⁹ ANISA also emphasised in its founding meeting in 1981 that Greenland should first of all be governed by its own elected representatives and not from far away, as in colonial times. ⁴⁶⁰

Just as in 1972, the need for self-determination arose from the feeling of a special Greenlandic identity. Moses Olsen (S) and Sofus Joelsen, Siumut's parliamentary speaker (*ordfører*), emphasised that Greenlanders would never become Europeans or feel part of the EC, as they were fundamentally different from Europe with regard to their history, nature, culture, ethnicity, language and social, economic and industrial patterns. ⁴⁶¹ EC supporters such as *Landsråd* chairman Lars Chemnitz

451 LYNGE (1982): »Greenland and the European Community«, p. 106.

452 Finn LYNGE (1980): »Krokodiller i Europaparlamentet«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 7 November 1980, p. 30.

453 Finn LYNGE (1981): »Vi vil ikke fjernstyres fra Bruxelles«, in: Bente Hjorth Christiansen and Finn Bønnelykke (eds.): *Grønland på vej*. Copenhagen: People's Movement Against the EC [Folkebevægelsen mod EF], pp. 13-23, here: p. 16-17.

454 FT (1982-83): »Folketingets forhandlinger«, col. 216.

455 Lars Emil JOHANSEN (1982): »Det gælder din fremtid«, in: *ANISA* 4/1982, 20 February 1982, p. 10.

456 GLTF (1981): »Redegørelse om Grønlands forhold til EF«, 11/1981 (autumn), pp. 520-557, here: p. 553; Jonathan MOTZFELDT (1982): »Vi vil ud af EF – men blive i Danmark«, in: *A/G*, 6 January 1982, p. 24.

457 Jonathan MOTZFELDT (1982): »Vi kan klare os uden EF«, in: *A/G*, 3 February 1982, p. 20.

458 N.N. (1980): »Nej til fortsat EF-medlemskab«, in: *A/G*, 25 September 1980, p. 18.

459 N.N. (1981): »Vi smider nogen ud af Grønland«, in: *A/G*, Annex to No. 39, 23 September 1981, p. 1.

460 N.N. (1981): »Anisa: En enig front mod EF«, in: *A/G*, 9 September 1981, p. 21.

461 OLSEN (1983): »Greenland's Secession«, p. 26; GLTF (1981): »Forslag til landstingslov vedrørende vejledende folkeafstemning om Grønlands tilhørsforhold til De europæiske Fællesskaber«, 5/1981 (spring), pp. 112-127, 282-290, 339-341, here: p. 115; GLTF (1981): »Redegørelse om Grønlands forhold til EF«, 11/1981 (autumn), pp. 520-557, here: p. 527.

(A) also admitted that it would be difficult for Greenland to adapt to common European policies.⁴⁶² Greenland's geography and nature would create conditions that were totally different from the conditions in Europe. At a university conference in Copenhagen, MEP Finn Lynge (S) addressed the »European« audience directly:

You are laying the foundations to a new and integrated European identity. We understand and respect that. But please do not attempt to stretch this integration and identification beyond its natural boundaries. Other peoples in other parts of the world have a non-European identity, an identity of their own. We in Greenland are laying the foundations for [a] new and integrated Greenlandic identity, different from the European one. That is our right, and that we are doing. As a community of democratic nations, we feel sure that ultimately, you will understand and respect our choice.⁴⁶³

Other than in the early 1970s, the Danish government no longer objected to Greenland's right to self-determination. While the rejection of membership in 1972 had also constituted a form of anti-colonial resistance against Denmark, the continued rejection of membership in the late 1970s and early 1980s was directed exclusively against the EC, with Greenland's authorities considering Denmark more as an ally against it than as an enemy within it.

For the EC and supporters of the European integration process in general, it was hard to follow the logic behind the Greenlandic Home Rule government's strive for self-determination.⁴⁶⁴ After all, Greenlandic representatives were allowed to participate in the Danish delegation in Council meetings, in which Greenlandic interests were concerned. Moreover, with one seat in the European Parliament, no member state region was proportionally better represented than Greenland. Where the EC authorities saw no logic at all was that Greenland's most important political actors considered this right to self-determination to weigh more strongly than their economic interest in continued membership.

As outlined above, Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt (S) explicitly stated that it was an economic benefit for Greenland to remain in the EC. However, »from a political assessment«, it would be »decisive to withdraw from the EC«. ⁴⁶⁵ ANISA also stated that EC supporters wanted to turn the referendum into an economic question, whereas the »main questions« were in fact:

Do you want our daily life to be decided by our own Home Rule or should we leave the decisions to the bureaucrats in Brussels? Should Greenlandic laws be able to

462 CHEMNITZ (1979): »EF har behandlet Grønland godt«, p. 108.

463 Finn LYNGE (1983): »The Cultural-Technological Contrast«, in: Hjalte Rasmussen (ed.): *Greenland in the Process of Leaving the European Communities*, Report from the Conference organized by the Danish Society for European Studies held on Kollokole, Copenhagen, on January 14-15, 1983. Copenhagen: Forlaget Europa, pp. 17-22, here: p. 22.

464 This lack of understanding is nicely illustrated in and by KRÄMER (1983): *Grønland und die Europäische Gemeinschaft*, pp. 7-8.

465 GLTF (1981): »Redegørelse om Grønlands forhold til EF«, 11/1981 (autumn), pp. 520-557, here: p. 553.

be changed and banned by the EC? Do you dare to unconditionally support more than 5,000 EC laws, which are not even translated into Greenlandic?⁴⁶⁶

Lars Emil Johansen (S), Minister for Industry and Economy, complained that

the EC supporters are ready to sell our national sovereignty for suitable compensation in ECUs. They ignore the risk that our country becomes »Europe's reservation« in the future, whose population only receives directives from the Commission and the Council on what they may and must not do.⁴⁶⁷

According to Prime Minister Motzfeldt (S), Siumut wanted the freedom to govern Greenland on its own so much that it would accept, even if the price to achieve this freedom was unilateral withdrawal with economic costs and no OCT association.⁴⁶⁸

Towards the end of the campaign for withdrawal in late 1981, even the supporters of EC membership in Atassut and EAS realised that economic arguments would not be enough to counter the demand for self-determination. Therefore, they began to resort increasingly to political arguments for continued EC membership. Atassut chairman Lars Chemnitz believed that the first three years as an EC member had shown that Greenland had been able to develop Home Rule within the EC despite Siumut's claims that Home Rule and EC membership were incompatible.⁴⁶⁹ Greenland's national characteristics were not in danger, as Greenland had »become more Greenlandic« since 1972.⁴⁷⁰ Four days before the referendum, Chemnitz rejected the charge that Atassut only campaigned on the economic advantages of EC membership, emphasising that Atassut's first argument had always been that withdrawal would threaten the Danish Realm.⁴⁷¹ *Folketing* MP Otto Steenholdt (A) also argued that withdrawal would be the beginning of a serious distortion in the relationship between Greenland and Denmark.⁴⁷²

However, for Greenland's first Home Rule governments, the request for self-determination was stronger than the wish to preserve the relationship between Greenland and Denmark or the economic benefits of EC membership. Contrary to

466 N.N. (1982): »Tirsdag den 23. februar skal du vælge mellem EF og Grønland«, in: ANISA, 4/1982, 20 February 1982, p. 5: »Vil du have, at vor hverdag skal afgøres af vort eget hjemmestyre, eller skal vi overlade beslutninger til bureaukraterne i Bruxelles? Skal grønlandske love kunne ændres og forbydes af EF? Tør du sige ubetinget ja til over 5000 EF-love, som ikke engang er oversat til grønlandsk?«

467 N.N. (1981): »Vi står stærkt fordi vi er samlet«, in: *A/G*, 18 November 1981, p. 19: »EF-tilhængerne er således parate til at sælge vor nationale selvstændighed mod en passende kompensation i europæiske regningsenheder. De lukker deres øjne for risikoen for, at vort land i fremtiden udvikles til »Europas reservat«, hvis befolkning kun tager imod nogle direktiver fra EF-kommissionen og ministerrådet om, hvad de må og ikke må.«

468 GLTF (1983): »Redegørelse om Grønlands udmeldelse af De Europæiske Fællesskaber«, 4/1983 (extraordinary session), pp. 49-64, here: p. 60.

469 GLTF (1982): »Åbningsdebat«, 1/1982 (spring), pp. 18-30, here: p. 24. Cf. CHEMNITZ (1979): »EF har behandlet Grønland godt«, p. 107.

470 GLTF (1981): »Redegørelse om Grønlands forhold til EF«, 11/1981 (autumn), pp. 520-557, here: p. 548.

471 N.N. (1982): »Hvis vi kommer ud af EF: Begyndelsen til enden på rigsfællesskabet«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 19 February 1982, p. 14.

472 FT (1981-82): »Folketingets forhandlinger« (first session), col. 273.

LI's assumptions, the strong political interest in self-determination of Greenland's first Home Rule governments and its cooperation partners in the ANISA movement was able to outbalance its economic interest to remain inside the EC.

7.5. Self-determination and sovereignty over fisheries resources

The question remains of why Greenland's elite considered its right to self-determination so important that it was ready to sacrifice the economic benefits of EC membership. This could have been the case because national sovereignty implied control over Greenland's single most important resource, its fish. An analysis of Greenland's withdrawal supports the assumption that Greenland's elite had predominantly a *political* interest to gain sovereignty over its fisheries resources rather than an *economic* interest to secure the catch from its waters for Greenlandic fishermen.

Moses Olsen (S), Minister for Social Welfare, explained in 1983 that self-determination was inextricably connected with control over one's most important resource: »Home Rule would not be worth much if it lacked power to master its own fishery«. ⁴⁷³ In a situation where fisheries were the basis for Greenland's economic existence, it would be »intolerable to ask permission in Brussels to catch our own fish«. Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt (S) also stated that it was frustrating that fisheries competences were in Brussels and not in Nuuk. ⁴⁷⁴ The EC would have no right to decide on Greenland's fish and to divide it on Greenland's behalf amongst others and even less so without asking Greenland's political authorities for their opinion. ⁴⁷⁵ This was also the primary reason why Greenland's fishermen were so strongly opposed to EC membership. ⁴⁷⁶ It was unacceptable for KNAPK to accept that decisions about the fish on its doorstep were to be taken 4,000 kilometres away in Brussels. Therefore, it was no coincidence that KNAPK declared its opposition to EC membership exactly in 1977 when the Commission first implemented a common management policy for the extended Community pond. ⁴⁷⁷

What made matters worse was that the EC started to discuss further integration-ist attempts concerning Greenland's resources at the beginning of the 1980s. In 1980, it declared its wish to take sovereignty over all animals of the sea and to be granted a seat of its own in the International Whaling Commission (IWC), with the ultimate goal of obtaining a mandate to negotiate whaling on behalf of all EC member states. MEP Finn Lynge (S) stated that he did not want a more restrictive whaling quota in Greenland to be dictated by the Commission. ⁴⁷⁸ He also feared that if Greenland remained in the EC, the day would come when the EC would

473 OLSSEN (1983): »Greenland's Secession«, p. 23.

474 N.N. (1982): »Grønland ud af rollen som den evige modtager«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 19 February 1982, p. 18.

475 GLRF (1977): »Åbningsdebat«, 1/1977 (autumn), pp. 8-15, here: p. 9.

476 N.N. (1981): »Indhandlingspriser og for små kvoter«, in: *A/G fiskeriavis*, 12 August 1981, p. 18; N.N. (1981): »De vil ud: Fra EF-modstandernes dag«, in: *A/G*, 14 October 1981, p. 12; LYNGE (1982): »Greenland and the European Community«, p. 104.

477 N.N. (1977): »KNAPP: Grønland skal ud af EF«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 24 June 1977, p. 19.

478 Finn LYNGE (1980): »EF vil have hvalerne«, in: *A/G*, 24 July 1980, p. 9.

get the power to rule over all living resources in the sea.⁴⁷⁹ From that day onward, Greenlanders might also need to travel to Brussels to obtain the permission to hunt seals. Lyngé saw his concerns confirmed by the infamous campaign for a prohibition of sealskin imports to the EC at the beginning of the 1980s. He therefore declared:

Among European politicians, hunting is not accepted as a way of life. They are far more concerned with the well-being of the seals than of that of the seal hunters. In other words, the Inuit (eskimo) way of life seems incompatible with European policies. [...] Logically, this leads us to the conclusion that the Greenlandic hunter has nothing to do in the company of European decision makers.⁴⁸⁰

It was not only intolerable in principle, but also in practice that Greenland's most important resources were controlled by the EC. As long as this was the case, Greenland's decision-making authorities were powerless to prevent decisions that went against its own fisheries interests. And they felt that there were many of this kind.⁴⁸¹

In 1977, criticism focused on the EC's prerogative to give quotas in Greenlandic waters to Portugal.⁴⁸² In 1980, Greenland's government was furious about the EC refusing to increase Greenland's salmon quota and granting Norway access to shrimp fisheries in East Greenland in exchange for EC fishermen's access to its own waters.⁴⁸³ TACs exceeded the recommendations of fishery biologists to an increasing extent in order to accommodate both the increasing catch capacities of Greenland's fishing industry and the fisheries interests of EC member states in Greenlandic waters.⁴⁸⁴ Moreover, EC member states also tried to compensate increased quotas for Greenland with a reduction of Danish catches in other EC waters, thus playing Danish against Greenlandic fisheries interests.

Every incident confirmed the Siumut government in its opposition to EC membership. After the salmon incident in 1980, Siumut's parliamentary speaker Hendrik Nielsen stated that Siumut could no longer accept »that the living resources around our sea are administered by totally different states«. ⁴⁸⁵ *A/G* editor-in-chief Jørgen Fleischer described Norway's access to fisheries in East Greenland as »a slap in the face« for EC supporters.⁴⁸⁶ Their claims that the EC would treat Greenland as

479 Finn LYNGE (1981): »Sælfangst – noget helt ueuropæisk«, in: Benthe Hjorth Christiansen and Finn Bønnelykke (eds.): *Grønland på vej*. Copenhagen: People's Movement against the EC [Folkebevægelsen mod EF], pp. 55-59, here: p. 59.

480 LYNGE (1982): »Greenland and the European Community«, p. 105.

481 See for this paragraph: LYNGE (1981): »Rollespillet EF-Grønland«, p. 97.

482 N.N. (1977): »EF uddeler grønlandsk fiskeri til tredje lande«, in: *A/G*, 4 August 1977, p. 30.

483 GLTF (1981): »Redegørelse for forløbet af fiskeriforhandlingerne med EF«, 10/1981 (spring), pp. 185-200, here: pp. 185-192; N.N. (1980): »Regeringen følger EF trods protester fra Grønlands Landsstyre«, in: *A/G*, 28 August 1980, p. 2; Lars Emil JOHANSEN (1981): »Situasjonen omkring fiskeriforhandlingerne i EF«, in: *Siumut*, 22 January 1981, pp. 19-20, 32.

484 GLTF (1981): »Redegørelse for forløbet af fiskeriforhandlingerne med EF«, 10/1981 (spring), pp. 185-200, here: p. 187.

485 GLTF (1980): »Åbningsdebat«, 1/1980 (autumn), p. 18.

486 Jørgen FLEISCHER (1980): »Et klart aftalebrud«, in: *A/G*, 18 December 1980, p. 3.

a development country with regard to fisheries matters had obviously been unfounded. On its party convention in 1980, Siumut emphasised that it could »not continue to look on passively while a cooperation of old European colonial powers [...] grabs our most important resources«.⁴⁸⁷

Therefore, a lot of evidence supports the argument that rejection of the CFP in Greenland was predominantly based on political and not on economic concerns. What repeatedly caused outrage among Greenlandic politicians was not that EC member states were fishing in Greenlandic waters. The outrage was about the EC presuming to *decide*, how much Greenlandic fishermen and other fishermen were allowed to fish in their own waters and that these decisions did not take Greenland's interests satisfactorily into account.⁴⁸⁸ For example, in 1981, Greenland's Home Rule government was furious about an additional fishing quota for West Germany in East Greenlandic waters, although Greenlandic fishermen did not even catch fish there.⁴⁸⁹ Siumut's party paper cut to the chase in 1979:

We have nothing against sharing our fisheries resources with other countries, to the extent that we have resources in abundance. But it shall be our own sovereign decision whether we can give away resources. We want to decide ourselves [...], how much and according to which patterns foreign fishermen can work in the fisheries territory around Greenland.⁴⁹⁰

For Siumut and ANISA, the question was not whether it was a good or bad economic deal that Greenland received grants from EC funds in exchange for EC fisheries in its waters. Even if it was a good deal economically, this set-up was still a political catastrophe. MEP Finn Lyng (S) explained how »unhealthy« it was for Greenland that an »overseas power centre« possessed the formal right to take its part in Greenland's riches without paying for it, while Greenland at the same time ate – what appeared to be free gifts – out of the hands of these same authorities.⁴⁹¹

As early as in 1974, Lars Emil Johansen (S) had stated that Greenland's independence should not be sacrificed in order to receive economic support from the EC.⁴⁹² And even if the Siumut movement and government later accepted grants to an increasing degree, they only did so grudgingly. In 1982, the feeling was still – as Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt (S) expressed it – that it was wrong »to let our children live in this country as disempowered citizens at the cost of today's greed«.⁴⁹³ Greenland should not accept EU decision-making about its own

487 N.N. (1980): »Nej til fortsat EF-medlemskab«, in: *A/G*, 25 September 1980, p. 18.

488 Cf. HARHOFF (1982): »Grønland, Danmark og EF«, p. 123.

489 KRÄMER (1982): »Greenland's EC-Referendum«, p. 279.

490 N.N. (1979): »Om at sætte tingene på hovedet«, in: *Siumut*, 19 February 1979, p. 2: »Vi har ikke noget imod at dele vore fiskeressourcer med andre lande i det omfang, vi har ressourcer i overskud, men det skal være vores egen suveræne afgørelse, om vi kan give bort af ressourcerne. Vi vil selv [...] afgøre, hvor meget og efter hvilket mønster fremmede fiskere kan arbejde i fiskeriterritoriet omkring Grønland.«

491 LYNGE (1983): »The Cultural-Technological Contrast«, p. 21.

492 N.N. (1974): »EF-goderne må ikke betales med Grønlands frihed«, in: *A/G*, 7 February 1974, p. 2.

493 GLTF (1981): »Redegørelse om Grønlands forhold til EF«, 11/1981 (autumn), pp. 520-557, here: p. 529.

resources and be granted presents in return. Therefore, Josef Ertl, West Germany's Minister for Fisheries, touched a raw nerve with the Siumut government when he commented on Greenland's opposition to the additional West German quota in 1981 that »those who take, also must yield«, referring to the grants Greenland received from the EC.⁴⁹⁴

Lyngé believed that Greenland's economic set-up would need to be reversed in order for Greenlanders to become politically mature and independent. Greenland should gain control of decision-making powers and grant the EC rights for fisheries in its waters against financial compensation:

In a clear cultural-technological/political contrast to the system offered by the EEC membership, we want a different type of set-up where our authorities are under no pressure to push the pace with which all the other elements, human, educational and so on, are developed. And the money for this type of policy, we want to have **not** as a gift from an overseas benefactor and former colonial continent. [...] What we want is clear payment for access to those of our resources which we ourselves responsibly can share with other nations [Orig. Emph.].⁴⁹⁵

Therefore, Siumut's candidates for the *Folketing* elections in 1981 – Preben Lange, Knud Hertling and Kunuk Lyngé – also rejected the idea of looking for EC grants in order to support Greenland's seal hunters: once they received money from the EC, they would probably have to travel to Brussels in order to get permission to shoot their seals.⁴⁹⁶

Thus, the fact that the EC wanted to keep its decision-making authority over Norwegian and Faroese TACs in Greenlandic waters even after Greenland's withdrawal was only a minor administrative issue for the EC, while it presented a major stumbling block for Greenland. It was, for example, completely unacceptable for IA to concede this point, as it had to be the competence of the Home Rule government to negotiate and make fisheries agreements with other North Atlantic nations after withdrawal.⁴⁹⁷ Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt (S) also made it very clear in a *Landsting* debate in October 1983 that – after withdrawal – fisheries in Greenlandic waters should no longer be

a right, which the EC exercises, but a possibility we offer. [...] Let me state again that we do not wish to drive EC fishermen out of our waters at any price. They can feel free to fish up here and we will gladly make an agreement with the EC about

494 N.N. (1981): »Vesttyskland tiltvinger sig retten til 3.000 tons torsk ved Østgrønland«, in: *A/G*, 5 February 1981, p. 12.

495 LYNGE (1983): »The Cultural-Technological Contrast«, p. 22.

496 Preben LANGE, Knud HERTLING and Kunuk LYNGE (1981): »Vi må stole på egne kræfter i EF-spørgsmålet«, in: *A/G*, 2 December 1981, p. 26.

497 GLTF (1983): »Redegørelse om Grønlands udmeldelse af EF«, 5/1983 (autumn), pp. 593-614, here: p. 613.

continued fisheries and the sale of fish. But in the future, this will be on our conditions, and not on theirs. This is exactly what withdrawal is about [Orig. Emph.].⁴⁹⁸

Had Greenland's elite based its European policy decisions on its economic interest only, it would have likely been able to accept that EC fishermen could continue to catch fish in Greenlandic waters, while Greenland received a huge number of grants and custom-free access to the EU market in return.⁴⁹⁹ However, Greenland's elite preferred to cut the rights of EC fishermen in Greenlandic waters and only grant them access to Greenlandic waters against financial compensation. It was ready to pass on grants, development aid and custom-free access to the EC. This was hardly a rational assessment from an economic perspective, but a quite rational one from a political perspective, based on a struggle for self-determination. Greenland should be in control of its most important resource and decide whether it wanted to offer the EC fish in its waters against financial compensation, not the other way round. To continue to let the EC decide about Greenland's fisheries in exchange for financial gifts was undesirable from a political perspective, even if it could have been economically more beneficial. It was impossible for Greenland's political elite to accept that the decision-making power about fishing quotas in Greenlandic waters, fisheries agreements with other nations and conservation measures should be located in Brussels rather than in Nuuk. After withdrawal, it was no longer foreign institutions in Denmark and Brussels that controlled Greenland's most important resource, but Greenlanders themselves.

498 Ibid, pp. 600-602: »[Fiskeri i grønlandske farvande er med andre ord efter udmeldelsen ikke længere] nogen ret EF har, men en mulighed vi tilbyder. [...] Lad mig igen slå fast, at vi ikke for enhver pris ønsker at drive EF's fiskere ud af vores farvande. De må gerne fiske heroppe, og vi vil gerne indgå en aftale med EF om fortsat fiskeri og salg af fisk. Men det bliver for fremtiden på vores betingelser, og ikke på deres. Det er jo netop dét selve udmeldelsen drejer sig om.«

499 Cf. for this paragraph: KRÄMER (1983): *Grönland und die Europäische Gemeinschaft*, pp. 29-30.

The Faroe Islands in a European policy deadlock (1989-)

At the beginning of the 1990s, EU membership entered Faroese politics once again. The gradual establishment of a single EU market from 1986 onward made EU membership more attractive for all Nordic states outside the EU. Moreover, the end of the Cold War also opened up the possibility of EU membership for Finland and Sweden. They had so far rejected EU membership predominantly for geopolitical reasons.⁵⁰⁰ In 1991, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden joined the EEA. Still in the same year, Sweden applied for EU membership. In 1992, Finland and Norway followed suit. In 1995, Finland and Sweden joined the EU, while Norway remained outside, after EU membership was narrowly rejected in a second referendum.

For the Faroe Islands, the plans to establish a single market had immediate consequences. Since their rejection of membership in 1974, relations between the Faroe Islands and the EU had been regulated by two bilateral agreements: a trade agreement from 1974 and a fisheries framework agreement from 1977, which had taken effect in 1981.⁵⁰¹ The trade agreement ensured custom-free access of all industrial goods to the EU market and reduced tariffs for most fish exports. Exempt from this provision were exports to Denmark, which were all custom-free, and exports to the UK and Ireland, which were handled on bilateral basis, as they were before 1974. The fisheries framework agreement regulated the mutual access of Faroese and EU fishermen to each other's EEZs after the extension of exclusive fishing limits in Europe to 200 miles in 1977. Catching rights were negotiated for one year at a time.

However, in late 1988, the European Commission announced that it wanted to renegotiate the trade agreement.⁵⁰² It argued that the differential customs treat-

500 INGEBRITSEN (1998): *The Nordic States*, pp. 93-102.

501 See for the following paragraphs: LT (1989): »Løgmansrøðan 1989«, C, pp. 4-21, here: pp. 19-20; LT (1991): »Handilssáttmáli við Europeiska Búskaparliga Felagsskapin«, D 13/1991, pp. 41-52, here: pp. 41-42; FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP I [EF-arbeidsbolkurin] (1991): *Føroyar og EF: Útlit fyri samvinnu*, Frágreiðing latin Føroya landsstýri 14. Juni 1991 (= »Pink Report«). Tórshavn: Faroese Home Rule government, Part I, pp. 11-13.

502 See for the following: FAGERLUND (1996): »Autonomous European Regions«, pp. 96-97.

ment of Faroese exports on the EU market was incompatible with the principles of a single market. Moreover, the Commission also argued that the custom-free access of Faroese products to Denmark had lacked a legal basis since the end of the consideration period in 1975. In 1991, the Faroe Islands and the EU agreed on a FTA to replace the old trade agreement. Subject to minor changes, it has become the cornerstone in the relationship between the Faroe Islands and the EU until today. However, all succeeding Faroese Home Rule governments have been dissatisfied with the low extent of cooperation with the EU and have looked for possible alternative forms of association. Despite this, only one political party, SB, has brought EU membership forward as an alternative. The other parties have continued to reject EU membership. Thus, the Faroe Islands neither joined the EU, like Finland and Sweden, nor began any attempts to do so, as Norway or Iceland did.

Chapter 8 explains the continued rejection of EU membership in the Faroe Islands since 1989. It tests LI's assumption that the Faroese Home Rule governments continued to reject EU membership because they had a strong or medium economic interest to do so. Moreover, it analyses the role of political interests in their European policy choices. According to LI, the Faroese Home Rule governments could also have continued to reject EU membership since 1989 due to a strong or medium political interest in membership if their economic interest had been weak, diffuse or indeterminate. The rejection of EC membership in the Faroes in the 1970s was a model case for LI's assumptions. By the early 1990s, the dependent variable had not changed: the Faroe Islands still rejected EU membership. Did its strong economic interest to preserve the fish in Faroese waters for Faroese fishermen still sideline the political interest of Faroese Home Rule governments to support EU membership?

8.1. Free trade agreement instead of EU membership

Negotiations on the future relationship between the Faroe Islands and the EU started in 1989. The Faroese government under the leadership of Prime Minister Jógvan Sundstein (FF) (see table 14) wanted to negotiate a FTA, which guaranteed Faroese products full custom-free access to the EC market.⁵⁰³ In return, he declared that the Faroes were ready to accept more obligations with regard to removing tariffs on imports from the EU. An EU working group was established, which for the first time investigated the Faroese relationship with the EU in depth, in the so-called »Pink Report« from 1991.⁵⁰⁴ However, the negotiations were complicated, since the EU considered its fishing industry to be so sensitive with regard to some fish species that it wanted to preserve tariffs on some Faroese fish products.

503 LT (1989): »Løgmansrøðan 1989«, C, pp. 4-21, here: pp. 19-20; LT (1991): »Handilssáttmáli við Euro-peiska Búskaparliga Felagsskapin«, D 13/1991, pp. 41-52, here: p. 42.

504 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP I (1991): *Føroyar og EF*.

Table 14: Coalition governments in the Faroe Islands (1989-2015)⁵⁰⁵

<i>Løgting elections</i>	<i>Faroese Home Rule governments (Føroya landsstýri)</i>		<i>Faroese Prime Ministers (løgmann)</i>
1988	1989	FF – TF – SF – KrF	Jógvan Sundstein (FF)
	1989-91	FF – SB – TF	
1990	1991-93	JF – FF	Atli P. Dam (JF)
	1993-94	JF – TF – SF	Marita Petersen (JF)
1994	1994-96	SB – JF – VF – SF	Edmund Joensen (SB)
	1996-97	SB – FF – VF – SF	
	1997-98	SB – FF – VF	
1998	1998-2002	TF – FF – SF	Anfinn Kallsberg (FF)
2002	2002-04	TF – FF – SF – MF	
2004	2004-08	SB – JF – FF	Jóannes Eidesgaard (JF)
2008	2008	TF – JF – MF	
	2008-11	SB – FF – JF	Kaj Leo Holm Johannesen (SB)
	2011	SB – JF	
2011	2011-13	SB – FF – MF – SF	
	2013-15	SB – FF – MF	
2015	2015-	JF – TF – F	
			Aksel V. Johannesen (JF)

The complicated negotiations brought EU membership back on the political agenda. In their campaign for a *Løgting* seat in December 1990, a small minority of SB and FF candidates were willing to reconsider EU membership.⁵⁰⁶ In a TV debate in February 1991, SB leader Edmund Joensen became the first and most prominent Faroese politician at the time to support membership.⁵⁰⁷ FF vice chairman and former chairman of Faroe Seafood, Birgir Danielsen, also declared himself willing to consider this option. In June 1991, the SB parliamentary group and steering committee endorsed negotiations on EU membership.⁵⁰⁸

Negotiations on a FTA ended successfully in 1991. Taking effect in 1992, the FTA abandoned custom-free access to Denmark and harmonised access conditions

505 Own table based on LØGTINGIÐ (2002): *Løgtingið 150 – Hátíðarrit 3*, pp. 194-205; FAROESE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (2015): »Føroya landsstýrið síðan 1948« (<http://www.lms.fo/arbeidsoki/stjornarsamskipan/landsstýrið/foroya-landsstýrið-síðan-1948/>), 29 December 2015). The parties in government are arranged according to their percentage of the vote in the preceding *Løgting* elections. The parties in bold held the Prime Minister's office.

506 E.g. Poul Kjartan BÆRENSEN (1990): »Hví Sambandsflokkinn?« In: *Dimmalætting*, 6 December 1990, p. 4; Birgir DANIELSEN (1990): »Ódjórið ella neyðugi vegurin til framburð«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 31 October 1990, p. 6.

507 N.N. (1991): »Edmund Joensen um EF í Sjóнварpinum: – Hatta var mín persónliga støða«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 26 February 1991, p. 1. Cf. Finnboi ÍSAKSON (1991): »Framvegis ongin greið flokkastøða til EF«, in: *14. September*, 2 March 1991, p. 3.

508 N.N. (1991): »Vilja samráðingar við EF um treytir fyri limaskapi«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 2 July 1991, p. 7.

for Faroese products on the whole EU market.⁵⁰⁹ The Faroes received custom-free access for many fish exports, while some exports remained subject to quotas and restrictions. The agreement contained a clause, according to which the Faroes could ask for the removal of certain quotas and restrictions put on fish species if they restricted development possibilities for the Faroese fishing industry. Moreover, the Faroes could also ask for a renegotiation of the FTA if EFTA member states got better access to the EU market for produced fish than the Faroes.

However, the FTA did not settle the restarted EU debate. It was unable to ease the burden on the Faroese economy, which had increasingly run into debt during the late 1980s.⁵¹⁰ Reduced fish catches and fish prices on the European market made fisheries in the Faroe Islands increasingly non-profitable. However, instead of reducing the overcapacity of fishing boats, the Faroese Home Rule authorities kept the fisheries sector alive with subsidies and indebted themselves to a substantial degree. This system collapsed in October 1992 when the economic crisis turned into a banking crisis and the two largest banks on the islands, *Sjóvinnubankin* and *Føroya Banki*, were threatened by bankruptcy. Denmark intervened with financial assistance, but demanded far-reaching reforms to the Faroese economy in return, involving among other things the closure of fishing factories and the reduction of TACs. Before the crisis, unemployment on the Faroes had been so insignificant that Faroese Statistics had not even bothered to document it.⁵¹¹ But, in 1995, the first unemployment statistics showed that about 13 per cent of the population were unemployed. Between 1990 and 1996, the Faroese population decreased by ten per cent because of emigration and only reached the level of 1990 again in 2004.⁵¹²

For SB, EU membership was the way out of the crisis. In June 1992, the party stated that it wanted to start negotiations on EU membership.⁵¹³ In February 1992, Bjarti Mohr, chairman of Faroe Seafood, also declared his support for EU membership, arguing that in order for the Faroe Islands to survive as a fishing nation, there was only one thing to do: to apply for EU membership.⁵¹⁴ In May 1992, the Faroese Shipowners' Association followed suit.⁵¹⁵ However, all Faroese Home Rule governments at that time were unwilling to reconsider EU membership, irrespective

509 See for this paragraph: LT (1991): »Handilssáttmáli við Europeiska Búskaparliga Felagsskapin«, D 13/1991, pp. 41-52, here: pp. 42-45.

510 See for this paragraph: MØRKØRE (1993): »Interessegrupper og strategier«, pp. 79-83; MØRKØRE (1996): »The Faroese Home Rule Model«, pp. 179-188; Jóan Pauli JOENSEN (1996): »The Fisheries of the Faroe Islands. An Overview«, in: Poul Holm, David J. Starkey and Jón Th. Thór (eds.): *The North Atlantic Fisheries, 1100-1976: National Perspectives on a Common Resource* (= *Studia Atlantica* 1). Esbjerg: North Atlantic Fisheries History Association, pp. 27-47, here: pp. 41-43.

511 STATISTICS FAROE ISLANDS (2015): »Arbeidsloysið í tali og prosent, skift á mánaðir og kyn« (<http://www.hagstova.fo/fo/hagtalsgrunnur/arbeidsloysid-i-tali-og-skift-a-manadir-og-kyn-1995->, 29 December 2015).

512 STATISTICS FAROE ISLANDS (2015): »Fólkið skift á kyn, 1 ára aldur og bygd 1. januar 1985-2015« (<http://www.hagstova.fo/fo/hagtalsgrunnur/folkid-skift-a-kyn-1-ara-aldur-og-bygd-1-januar-1985->, 29 December 2015).

513 N.N. (1992): »Landsfundur Sambandsflokksins 1992: Fjølmentur, sakligur og upplýsandi«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 24 March 1992, p. 4.

514 Finnboði ARGE (1992): »EF eigur lívið í føroyingum«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 4 March 1992, p. 4.

515 N.N. (1992): »Føroya Reidarafelag: Mælir til limaskap í EF nú«, in: *Sosialurin*, 7 May 1992, pp. 18-19.

of their composition. The grand coalitions of FF-TF-SB and JF-FF reaffirmed at the beginning of the 1990s that EU membership was not on the agenda.⁵¹⁶

In March 1993, SB chairman Joensen proposed in the *Løgting* that the Faroes should start negotiations with the EU.⁵¹⁷ Two FF MPs, Birgir Danielsen and Olaf Olsen, welcomed the proposal but stated that the Faroes should consider other association alternatives as well. However, the left-wing government of JF, TF and SF under the leadership of Prime Minister Marita Petersen (JF) vetoed the proposals.⁵¹⁸ Events repeated themselves when Joensen re-entered his proposal in December 1993.⁵¹⁹ SB supported membership negotiations, FF wanted to consider alternative forms of association, but the left-wing government rejected any negotiations. In the 1994 elections, SB achieved a landslide victory (see table 15). However, it was unable to use its position as leading party of the next government for its EU course, as – except for some scattered FF MPs – no other party wanted to investigate EU membership.

Table 15: Percentage of votes in the *Løgting* elections (1988-2015)⁵²⁰

	<i>FF</i>	<i>SB</i>	<i>JF</i>	<i>SF</i>	<i>TF</i>	<i>KrF</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>VF</i>	<i>F</i>
1988	23.2	21.2	21.6	7.1	19.2	5.5	-	-	-
1990	21.9	18.9	27.5	8.8	14.7	5.9	-	-	-
1994	16.0	23.4	15.3	5.6	13.7	6.3	5.8	9.5	-
1998	21.3	18.1	21.9	7.6	23.8	2.5	4.1	0.8	-
2002	20.8	26.0	20.9	4.4	23.7	-	4.2	-	-
2004	20.6	23.7	21.8	4.6	21.7	-	5.2	-	-
2008	20.1	21.0	19.3	7.2	23.3	-	8.4	-	-
2011	22.5	24.7	17.8	4.2	18.3	-	6.2	-	6.3
2015	18.9	18.8	25.1	4.0	20.8	-	5.5	-	7.5

8.2. Seeking alternative forms of association

Since EU membership has been out of question for all but one Faroese party, Faroese Home Rule governments have focused on improving the Faroese relationship with the EU through alternative forms of cooperation since the mid-1990s. Since

516 LT (1989): »Løgsmansrøðan 1989«, C, pp. 4-21, here: pp. 19-20; N.N. (1990): »Valkrá Javnaðarflokksins«, in: *Sosialurin*, 2 November 1990, pp. 12-14, here: p. 14; Jógvan SUNDSTEIN (1992): »Leypió ikki framav í EF-málinum«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 27 March 1992, p. 6.

517 LT (1992): »Samráðingar við EF um treytir fyri limaskapi«, D 145/1992, pp. 745-748; LT (1992): »Málsavgreiðsluyvirlit«, B 145/1992, pp. 1-15, here: p. 9.

518 For the position of the Faroese left-wing government (1993-94) on EU membership cf. N.N. (1993): »Bara Sambandið fyri«, in: *Sosialurin*, 27 March 1993, p. 6; N.N. (1994): »Marita Petersen, løgmaður: ES má bíða«, in: *Sosialurin*, 30 June 1994, p. 5.

519 LT (1993): »Samráðingar við ES um treytir fyri limaskapi«, C 57/1993, pp. 461-467.

520 Own table based on STATISTICS FAROE ISLANDS (2015): »Løgtingsval skift á flokkar, atkvøður og tingmenn (1978-2011)« (<http://www.hagstova.fo/fo/hagtalsgrunnur/logtingsval-skift-a-flokkar-atkvodur-og-tingmenn-1978-2011>), 29 December 2015); KRINGVARP FØROYA (2015): »Løgtingsval 1. september 2015« (<http://kvf.fo/val/2015>), 29 December 2015). The parties are arranged according to their list letters.

1995, there has hardly been an association alternative that Faroese Home Rule governments have not considered – except for full EU membership.

In 1994, the unionist government assigned the second EU working group. It published the »Blue Report« in 1995, which recommended that the Faroese government should seek EU membership with far-reaching exemptions from the CFP, or enter an »EEA-like agreement together with a customs union«.⁵²¹ EEA membership would make the Faroes an integrated part of the EU's common market. Thus, the free movement of goods, capital, services and people would also encompass the Faroe Islands. A customs union would give Faroese fishing companies the same market conditions as EU companies. In 1997, the government assigned yet another EU working group to look exactly into how the Faroes could achieve an »EEA-like agreement together with a customs union«, the second option of the Blue Report.⁵²² The results were published in the so-called »Red Report« in 1998. The report named two possibilities: either the current FTA would be extended to an EEA-like agreement or the Faroes would accede to EFTA at first and through EFTA membership to the EEA.

The »independence coalition« (*fullveldislandsstýrið*) of FF, TF and SF, which governed the Faroes between 1998 and 2004, was in favour of the first option.⁵²³ It hoped that – by extending the FTA through supplementary agreements – the Faroes would eventually be encompassed by the four freedoms. In 2000, the first supplementary agreement of this kind took effect – a veterinary protocol, which facilitated access of Faroese fish products to the EU market.⁵²⁴ Also in 2000, the Faroes were included in the European Commission's Northern Periphery Programme (NPP), which aimed at supporting peripheral and remote communities. Since then, inhabitants of the Faroe Islands have been eligible to apply for programme grants. In 2001, the Faroes were integrated in the Schengen Convention.⁵²⁵

The grand coalition of JF, FF and SB also took up the second option from the

521 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP II [Nevnd at kanna gagnligastu marknaðaratgongd til ES] (1995): *Møguleikar fyri samvinnu við Evropeiska Samveldið*. Frágreiðing latin Føroya Landsstýri 30. august 1995 (= »Blue Report«). Tórshavn: University of the Faroe Islands on behalf of the Faroese Home Rule government, pp. 19-23.

522 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP III [Nevndin, ið varð sett at gera tilmæli um samráðingar við Evropeiska Samveldið] (1998): *Frágreiðing um samráðingar við Evropeiska Samveldið*, Frágreiðing latin Føroya løgmanni í júni 1998 (= »Red Report«). Tórshavn: Faroese Home Rule government, pp. 14-15.

523 LT (1999): »Frágreiðing sambært § 51, stk. 4, í tingskipanini, um uttanlandsmál 1999/2000«, 101-5/1999 (<http://logting.fo/files/casequest/44/101-05%20Fragreiding%20um%20uttanlandsmal.pdf>, 26 February 2016).

524 LT (2000): »Frágreiðing sambært § 51, stk. 4, í tingskipanini um uttanlandsmál 2000-2001«, 101-3/2000 (<http://logting.fo/files/casequest/50/101-03%20%20Fragreiding%20uttanlandsmal%202000-2001.pdf>, 26 February 2016).

525 With regard to the Schengen Convention, Denmark's external frontier also encompasses the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Persons travelling between the two nations and Schengen member states are therefore not subject of a border check. The Faroes and Greenland are obliged to check persons from third countries in the same way as Schengen member states. The traditional free movement of persons *acquis* is not applicable. Cf. LT (2000): »Uppskot til ríkislógartilmæli um at seta í gildi fyri Føroyar »Anordning om ikrafttræden for Færøerne af lov om Danmarks tiltrædelse af Schengen-konventionen««, 41/2000 (<http://logting.fo/files/casestate/7363/041.00%20um%20Schengen.pdf>, 26 February 2016).

»Red Report« when it came to power in 2004. In August 2005, Prime Minister Jóannes Eidesgaard (JF) declared that the Faroes should join EFTA in order to achieve an EEA-like agreement, but at the same time continue to extend the FTA by supplementary agreements.⁵²⁶ Until today, all successive Faroese Home Rule governments have followed this course more or less. However, the Faroes have not gotten any closer to EFTA/EEA membership since then. A fourth report on Faroese-EU relations, the so-called »Yellow Report«, therefore concluded in 2010 that political and legal preconditions only existed »for either continuing to expand the current framework of cooperation on a case-by-case basis or by creating a new bilateral agreement«.⁵²⁷

Since 2010, the FTA has therefore been further extended by supplementary agreements. In 2010, the Faroes were associated with the EU's Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7).⁵²⁸ This association was renewed for HORIZON 2020 – the EU's new framework programme for research and innovation from 2014 to 2020.⁵²⁹ Negotiations about Faroese membership in the European Common Aviation Area were still ongoing in 2015. In 2015, Prime Minister Kaj Leo Holm Johannessen (SB) also announced that his centre-right government would start negotiations with the EU about a »modernised FTA« in order to improve market access for the Faroe Islands without becoming an EU member.⁵³⁰ The left-wing government of JF, TF and *Framsókn* that came into power later that year pledged to continue these negotiations, while also seeking an independent Faroese membership in EFTA.⁵³¹ Figure 3 illustrates the contractual relationship of the Faroe Islands with the EU since their rejection of EC membership.

526 LT (2005): »Frágreiðing løgmans á Ólavsøku 2005«, 101-1/2005 (<http://logting.fo/files/casequest/27/101-01.05%20Logmansrodan%202005.pdf>, 26 February 2016).

527 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP IV [Expert committee, which has examined the prerequisites for the most beneficial relationship between the Faroes and the EU] (2010): *The Faroes and the EU. Possibilities and Challenges in a Future Relationship*, Handed over to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 2010 (= »Yellow Report«). Tórshavn: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Faroes, p. 11.

528 GOVERNMENT OF THE FAROE ISLANDS (2016): »Faroe Islands in Europe« (<http://www.government.fo/foreign-relations/faroe-islands-in-europe/>, 3 January 2016).

529 FAROESE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND CULTURE (2014): »The Faroe Islands and the EU sign agreement on Faroese association to Horizon 2020« (<http://www.mmr.fo/arbeidsoki/altjoda-samstarv/es-samstarv/horizon-2020/>, 31 December 2015).

530 LT (2014): »Frágreiðing sambært § 51, stk. 4 í tingskipanini um uttanríkismál«, F-4/2004 (<http://logting.fo/files/casequest/78/F-004.14%20framloguskriv%20-%20uttanrikispolitikk.pdf>, 3 January 2016)

531 GOVERNMENT OF THE FAROE ISLANDS (2015): »Annex to the Coalition Agreement between the Social Democratic Party (Javnaðarflokkurin), Republican Party (Tjóðveldi) and Progressive Party (Framsókn)« (<http://www.government.fo/the-government/coalition-agreement/annex/>, 3 January 2016).

Figure 3: Faroese/EU relations since the Faroese rejection of EC membership in 1974

1974	1977	1992	1997	2001	2005	2010	2014
Bilateral Trade Agreement		FTA I	Free Trade Agreement II (amended in 1999 and 2008)				
		Fisheries Agreement (in effect since 1981, annual renegotiations)					
		Veterinary Protocol					
		Addition to the Pan-Euro-Med System of Cumulation of Origin					
						FP7	Horizon 2020

SB has remained the only Faroese party to occasionally bring EU membership back onto the political agenda since the mid-1990s. In November 2002, *Løgting* MP Kaj Leo Holm Johannesen (SB) proposed that the government should investigate the costs and benefits of Faroese membership in the EU.⁵³² However, with Johannesen being absent on the day of the vote, there was not one single vote in favour of his proposal. A united Foreign Affairs Committee argued that a conference on the Faroes and the EU should take place before the *Løgting* dealt with the matter. However, when another *Løgting* MP, Lisbeth M. Petersen (SB), proposed to hold such a conference, which would involve all major interest groups, her proposal was voted down by the MPs of the »independence coalition«.

Although SB formally supported the EFTA/EEA course as a nearly constant member in coalition governments since 2004, some of its most high-ranking party members preferred EU membership to EFTA's »dying community«.⁵³³ In March 2006, SB once again declared its support for negotiations on EU membership.⁵³⁴ But it was unable to persuade any other political party to follow its course, although a poll showed a majority for Faroese membership in the EU for the first time in Faroese history, with 40 per cent in favour of membership and 36.5 per

532 See for this paragraph: LT (2002): »Uppskot til samtyktar um aðalorðaskifti viðvíkjandi fyrimumum og vansom við ES-limaskapi«, 37/2002 (<http://logting.fo/files/casestate/5407/037.02%20Um%20ES-limaskap%20adalordaskifti.pdf>, 26 February 2016).

533 E.g. Johan DAHL (2005): »Hví umhugsa ES heldur enn ein EFTA limaskap?« In: *Dimmalætting*, 31 August 2005, p. 20; Johan DAHL (2005): »Altjóðagerðin, Føroyar, EFTA mótvegis ES – heimsins eksklusiva felagsskapi«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 27 December 2005, p. 10; Áki BERTHOLDSSEN (2006): »Johan Dahl: Vandí fyri at vit detta niður ímillum tveir stólar«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 24 May 2006; Edmund JOENSEN (2008): »Áðrenn vit drukna í EFTA-retorikkinum«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 17 October 2008.

534 Áki BERTHOLDSSEN (2006): »Sambandsfólk vilja hava fólkaatkvøðu um ES«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 27 March 2006.

cent opposed to it.⁵³⁵ In 2008, *Folketing* MP and former Prime Minister Edmund Joensen (SB) reported that Olli Rehn, the EU's Commissioner for Enlargement, had signalled him in informal talks that the Faroes would be able to get far-reaching exemptions from the CFP as EU member.⁵³⁶ However, he was unable to initiate another debate on EU membership.

The JF group in the *Folketing*, led by *Folketing* MP Sjørður Skaale (JF), suffered the same fate in 2013.⁵³⁷ It published a report on Faroese-EU relations, stating that it was a sign of »political slothfulness and lack of responsibility« to pigeonhole each of the reports on Faroese-EU relations without taking a position on it. But Skaale was also unable to break the EU membership taboo in Faroese politics.

8.3. Increased economic importance of EU membership

In the early 1970s, there had been great unanimity in the Faroe Islands about preserving an exclusive fishing limit of 200 miles.⁵³⁸ It was so strong that even a unionist government was ready to remain outside the EU, although it had had a medium political interest to join the EC together with Denmark. This unanimity disintegrated when SB and important economic interest groups went in for EU membership at the beginning of the 1990s. For SB, preserving the fish in Faroese waters for Faroese fishermen became less important than securing access to other catching areas and being able to export produced fish to the European market.⁵³⁹

The extension of fishing limits to 200-mile EEZs worldwide had led to a huge restructuring of the Faroese fishing industry. By 1979, Birgir Danielsen, then director of Faroe Seafood, had called the introduction of a 200-mile fishing limit in the Faroes everything other than a »gold mine« for the Faroe Islands because 71 per cent of the total Faroese catch were caught in distant waters, which were now increasingly closed for Faroese fishermen.⁵⁴⁰ In the following years, the Faroese distant-water fishing industry adapted to fisheries within the Faroese EEZ.⁵⁴¹ But the consequence was an overcapacity of trawlers within Faroese waters, which

535 Theodor E. D. OLSEN (2006): »Meiriluti fyri ES-limaskapi fyri fyrstu ferð«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 20 December 2006.

536 Sveinur TRÓNDARSON (2008): »Edmund Joensen: – Bara fyrimunir ongar avleiðingar«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 23 October 2008, p. 7.

537 JAVNAÐARFLOKKURIN Á FÓLKATINGI [JF in the *Folketing*] (2013): *Ja til Evropa: Avbygging er hættislig – vit mugu finna okkara pláss í evropeiska samstarvinum*. Copenhagen: Javnaðarflokkurin á Fólkingi.

538 See for this paragraph: MØRKØRE (1993): »Interessegrupper og strategier«, pp. 84-90; MØRKØRE (1996): »The Faroese Home Rule Model«, pp. 175-179.

539 The argument is nicely outlined in N.N. (1990): »Tað sum umræður«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 1 November 1990, p. 1.

540 BIRKBAK et. al. (1979): *Afhængighed og selvstændighed*, p. 86.

541 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP I (1991): *Føroyar og EF*, Part I, p. 15; N.N. (1992): »Jógvan Mørkøre, samfelagsfræðingur: Samsenjan í EF-andstöðuni er burtur«, in: *14. September*, 15-16 December 1992, p. 7; MØRKØRE (1993): »Interessegrupper og strategier«, pp. 84-90; Jesper JESPERSEN (1995): »Økonomisk genopretning af Færøerne? – et politisk spørgsmål«, in: Sámal T. F. Johansen (ed.): *Nordiske fiskersamfund i fremtiden 2: Små samfund under europæisk integration* (= TemaNord 1995:585). Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, pp. 125-139, here: pp. 127-128; MØRKØRE (1996): »The Faroese Home Rule Model«, pp. 175-190.

was economically sustainable only by subsidisation and the surpassing of recommended quotas, which again resulted in severe overfishing.

Dimmalætting therefore stated in 1990 that potential access of EU fishermen to the Faroese fishing limit »was no longer so important« because the resources had disappeared anyway.⁵⁴² Gunnar Kallsberg (FF) also believed that the Faroes should not focus so much on the potential loss of fish by EU member states' fisheries in Faroese waters.⁵⁴³ Instead, they should focus on the potential loss of fish by having only limited access to other fishing grounds, including EU waters. The Faroese Shipowners' Association believed that it had hardly been beneficial for the Faroes to compensate losing access to other foreign waters by overfishing the resources within the Faroese EEZ.⁵⁴⁴ If the other Nordic states joined the EU, even more Faroese distant-water fishermen would have to return to the Faroese EEZ and fish in the already overfished zone.

Moreover, SB chairman Edmund Joensen added that – no matter who caught them – more fish would be landed in the Faroe Islands if the Faroes were part of the EU.⁵⁴⁵ For him, this was the decisive factor for future employment in the Faroes. He argued that the Faroes should join the EU in order to be able to buy fish and other raw materials from third countries and produce and export them custom-free on the EU market. Otherwise, the economy would not become competitive. It would be too »unsecure to look only at our coastal waters if we want to have a solid industry«. FF vice chairman Birgir Danielsen also believed that, with increasing competition within the EU, the Faroes would find it increasingly difficult to sell their goods at competitive prices.⁵⁴⁶ The number of exports to the EU had increased from about 50 per cent in the 1970s to 80 per cent in 1990 (see table 16).⁵⁴⁷ Fish products made up 97 per cent of these exports.

542 N.N. (1990): »Skuldir og skyldur«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 15 November 1990, p. 1.

543 Gunnar KALLSBERG (1991): »Føroyar og EF«, in: *Áræðið: Málagn fyri fólkafloksungdóm*, June 1991, p. 5.

544 N.N. (1992): »Føroya Reiðarafelag: Mælin til limaskap í EF nú«, in: *Sosialurin*, 7 May 1992, pp. 18-19.

545 See for this paragraph: N.N. (1991): »Edmund Joensen, formaður Sambandsflokksins: EF-sáttmálin hoyrir fortíðini til«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 2 November 1991; N.N. (1992): »Formaður Sambandsflokksins, Edmund Joensen: Ikki nóg mikið við heimabeitispólitikki«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 25 April 1992, p. 1; N.N. (1992): »Alt verður betri innan fyri EF«, in: *14. September*, 31 March-1 April 1992, p. 7; LT (1992): »Samráðingar við EF um treytir fyri limaskapi«, D 145/1992, pp. 745-748, here: pp. 745-747; LT (1993): »Samráðingar við ES um treytir fyri limaskapi«, C 57/1993, pp. 461-467, here: pp. 461-464.

546 Birgir DANIELSEN (1990): »Kann tað ikki vera eitt feitt at lumpa og lirka móti EF sum frá EF?« In: *Dagblaðið*, 9 November 1990.

547 LT (1991): »Handilssáttmáli við Europeiska Búskaparlíga Felagsskapin«, D 13/1991, pp. 41-52, here: p. 42.

Table 16: Destination of Faroese fish exports in per cent (1975-90)⁵⁴⁸

	1975	1980	1985	1988	1989	1990
EU	48.7	71.9	70.3	64.5	70.9	78.5
Denmark	19.5	21.3	17.3	18.6	17.1	21.1
West Germany	1.8	12.4	14.6	9.7	13.3	17.7
UK	13.1	13.4	14.4	11.5	13.5	13.6
France	3.3	7.5	8.9	7.6	9.1	10.9
Italy	8.7	9.7	8.0	7.2	7.0	4.6
Spain				6.7	7.2	7.6
Other EU members	2.3	7.6	7.1	3.2	3.7	3.0
Outside the EU	51.2	28.2	29.5	35.5	29.1	21.5
US	14.7	11.7	16.9	9.1	9.6	4.3
Norway	2.2	4.1	2.0	8.0	3.4	4.2
Sweden	4.0	3.1	1.7	1.9	3.1	3.0
Finland	0.3	0.0	2.5	2.0	1.5	0.8
Japan	-	0.0	1.1	4.9	5.2	2.9
Other non-EU members	30.0	9.3	5.3	9.6	6.3	6.3

Thus, for SB and some FF politicians, EU membership went from being a problem into a solution for the future of the Faroese economy. The rejection of EU membership in the 1970s had been a consequence of the need to adapt Faroese fisheries from distant-water to coastal fisheries and the establishment of domestic fishing factories. Now, the overfished fishing limit made it necessary – according to SB at least – to look again for other fishing grounds and to focus on custom-free access to the EU market for the already developed fishing industry. Joensen summed it up in the *Løgting*: »Our fishing grounds are empty, but we can sell our fish for a good price on the EU market.« However, this would only be possible with the best possible market access.

The FTA did not provide satisfactory access to the EU market for Faroese exports. It only offered custom-free access for all raw fish from the Faroes, while it set tight restrictions and quotas on fish products.⁵⁴⁹ Faroese fish products would only qualify for custom-free access to the EU if they were produced from fish caught by Faroese fishermen. This meant that the possibilities for the Faroese fishing industry to buy fish from third states in order to produce it in the Faroes and

548 Own table based on Kjartan HOYDAL (1992): »Konsekvenserne for Færøernes fiskeri- og strukturpolitik af handelsaftalerne med EF og EFTA og udvikling i retning mod EØS«, in: Louise Brincker and Jóhán H. Williams (eds.): *EF's fiskeripolitikk – Strukturordninger og Sektorstøtte – rapport fra Nordisk konference, Vedbæk 28. og 29. september 1992* [= Nordiske Seminar- og Arbejdsrapporter 1992:593]. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, pp. 33-42, here: p. 41; Kjartan HOYDAL (1993): »Marine Resources and the Future of the Faroe Islands Community«, in: *North Atlantic Studies* 3 (2), pp. 5-13, here: p. 13.

549 See for this paragraph: N.N. (1991): »Ivasom skipan«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 3 October 1991, p. 1.

sell it on the EU market were restricted. On the contrary, Faroese fishermen had a clear incentive to land their catch directly in EU harbours, instead of bringing it home to the Faroes to produce it. The authors of the Pink Report (1991) therefore concluded that the FTA only secured »restricted possibilities« with regard to the development of the Faroese fishing industry.⁵⁵⁰ The authors even wondered whether the old trade agreement would not give better conditions for Faroese development than the new proposal.

Accordingly, no political party in the Faroe Islands was particularly enthusiastic about the FTA. Prime Minister Atli P. Dam (JF) admitted that the possibility of custom-free export to the EU was limited with regard to some products.⁵⁵¹ TF and KrF supported the FTA, although neither of them believed that it brought many advantages with it.⁵⁵² A number of economic interest groups believed that the new agreement would make 500 people in the Faroese fishing industry unemployed because fishermen would no longer land their catch in Faroese factories, but in EU harbours.⁵⁵³ *Sosialurin* subsequently argued that the Faroe Islands could not accept that billions of DKK, which had been invested into the establishment of a Faroese fishing industry, would »go to the dogs«.⁵⁵⁴ SF even proposed in the *Løgting* cancelling the trade agreement altogether and negotiating again.⁵⁵⁵

Still, in 1994 the unionist government stated that there was »broad unanimity that the current FTA with the EU does not satisfy our needs«.⁵⁵⁶ A KrF proposal in the *Løgting* in 1995 – though unsuccessful – also nicely illustrates the extent of dissatisfaction:⁵⁵⁷ The Christian party called on the government to cancel the FTA and to demand repayment by the EU for having enjoyed greater advantages from the FTA than the Faroe Islands. The Blue Report therefore concluded that the current FTA could not be improved »in a way that it satisfies the needs of our economy in the long-run«.⁵⁵⁸

Remaining outside the EU's common market meant that the Faroes did not profit from the other three freedoms of capital, services and people and were excluded from extended cooperation in a number of policy areas at EU level. *Løgting* MP Kaj Leo Holm Johannesen (SB) emphasised in 2002 that the longer the Faroes remained outside, while the EU continued to develop, the more they would become the »laggard« among European nations.⁵⁵⁹ According to Johannesen, globalisation

550 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP I (1991): *Føroyar og EF*, Part I, pp. 3, 18.

551 N.N. (1991): »Avtalan leggur trýst á vinnulívið«, in: *Sosialurin*, 26 June 1991, p. 4.

552 LT (1991): »Handilssáttmáli við Europeiska Búskaparliga Felagsskapin«, D 13/1991, pp. 41-52, here: pp. 46-49; KrF (1991): »Viðmerkingar til avtaluna við EF«, in: *Sosialurin*, 22 June 1991, p. 15.

553 LT (1991): »Handilssáttmáli við Europeiska Búskaparliga Felagsskapin«, D 13/1991, pp. 41-52, here: p. 45; N.N. (1991): »Eitt vegamót«, in: *Sosialurin*, 12 October 1991, p. 2.

554 N.N. (1991): »Eitt vegamót«, in: *Sosialurin*, 12 October 1991, p. 2.

555 LT (1991): »Handilssáttmáli við Europeiska Búskaparliga Felagsskapin«, D 13/1991, pp. 41-52, here: pp. 50-52.

556 LT (1994): »Kanningar av marknaðarviðurskiftum Føroya móttvegis ES«, C 15/1994, pp. 59-64, here: pp. 61-62.

557 LT (1994): »Uppsøgn av ES sáttmálanum grundað á § 1, stk. a og b«, C 122/1994, pp. 601-604.

558 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP II (1995): *Møguleikar fyri samvinnu*, p. 15.

559 LT (2002): »Uppskot til samtyktar um aðalorðaskifti viðvíkjandi fyrimum og vansom við ES-limaskapi«,

was a reality and countries were bound to each other to an ever-increasing extent. Therefore, the Faroes needed to participate in the free movements.

Prime Minister Jóannes Eidesgaard (JF) confirmed in 2005 that EU membership could give the Faroe Islands worthwhile advantages, »in particular the inclusion in the four freedoms«. ⁵⁶⁰ Johan Dahl (SB), *Løgting* MP and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, stated in 2004 that competitiveness would also mean cooperating with the EU on employment matters, services, research and education. ⁵⁶¹ The editor-in-chief of *Sosialurin*, Jan Müller, therefore wondered in 2006 whether the time had come to investigate membership:

We do not cooperate in education, research and development matters. Our neighbours Norway and Iceland cooperate significantly with the EU exactly in these matters and this cooperation is of invaluable benefit for these countries. Why should the Faroes as only Nordic country not have a close relationship with the EU in these significant matters?⁵⁶²

Sosialurin complained again in 2008 that the »old-fashioned FTA« would not give development possibilities for such extended cooperation. ⁵⁶³ And for Prime Minister Johannesen (SB) it remained »an unacceptable situation« in 2009

that our formal relations with the vast majority of European nations, namely those in the European Union, are based on an old fashioned trade agreement covering little more than trade in goods. ⁵⁶⁴

Johannesen referred to the Faroe Islands as »a banana republic«, since it had the »worst agreement« of all European states. ⁵⁶⁵ The Faroes were not included in any of the four freedoms, did not cooperate in education and research matters and did not have free trade for all of its products, although 95 per cent of all fish exports went to the EU market.

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- 37/2002 (<http://logting.fo/files/casestate/5407/037.02%20Um%20ES-limaskap%20adalordaskifti.pdf>, 26 February 2016); N.N. (2002): »ES-limaskapur til viðgerðar«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 3 December 2002, p. 6.
- 560 Hans Kárason MIKKELSEN (2005): »Løgmaður: Ikki sannfórður um ES-limaskap«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 19 May 2005.
- 561 Johan DAHL (2004): »ES – Fyrimunir og vansar«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 13 May 2004.
- 562 Jan MÜLLER (2006): »Oddagrein: Hol í ES sjógvin!« In: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 28 March 2006: »[Hinvegin] hava vit einki samstarv á útbúgvingar-, granskingar[-] og mentan[a]røkinum. Okkara grannar Noreg og Ísland hava heilt nógv samstarv við ES á júst hesum økjum og er hetta samstarv til ómetaligt gagn fyrri londini. Hví skulu Føroyar sum einasta Norðurland ikki hava eitt tætt samstarv [v]ið ES á hesum týðningarmiklu økjum?«
- 563 N.N. (2008): »Eldur í koluni: Oddagrein«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 24 October 2008.
- 564 FAROESE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (2009): »The Faroes in a Globalized World – Opportunities and Challenges«, Lecture held by the Prime Minister, Kaj Leo Holm Johannesen, at the University of Iceland on 16 October 2009 (<http://www.government.fo/news/news/the-faroes-in-a-globalized-world-opportunities-and-challenges/>, 26 February 2016).
- 565 Kaj Leo Holm JOHANNESSEN (2002): »Fullveldi og hvat so?« In: *Dimmalætting*, 11 December 2002, p. 6; Hans Kárason MIKKELSEN (2005): »Sambandsformaðurin: Vit eru ein bananrepublikk«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 18 May 2005.

In the Yellow Report (2010), Faroese interest groups, among them the Faroese Employers Association, the Federation of Faroese Industries, the Faroe Fish Farmers' Association, the Faroese Fish Producers Association and the Faroese Shipowners' Association named several economic benefits that could only be achieved by EU membership:⁵⁶⁶ Access to foreign workers through the free movement of persons, which would increase competitiveness; better and facilitated market access for Faroese fish; access to the various EU funds for peripheral regions; continued certainty with regard to the trade relationship with the EU. The Faroese fish farming industry would no longer have to fear anti-dumping charges for its salmon and trout exports, which might reoccur in the near future. Domestic fishing factories would be able to buy fish from third countries and export it custom-free to the EU. Faroese banks and insurance companies would be able to establish themselves in EU member states.

8.4. Failure to secure an alternative to EU membership

Why did none of the other parties support SB's demand for an EU membership application? *Dimmalætting* wondered in 1990 why the government travelled to Brussels again and again in order to negotiate a FTA, which would only remove some tariffs on Faroese fish exports. EU membership would do so »automatically« and for all exports.⁵⁶⁷ *Løgting* MP Hergeir Nielsen (TF) agreed with SB that only as EU members would the Faroes get its products on the EU market at the best possible price.⁵⁶⁸ He believed nevertheless that there was no other option than to accept the dissatisfactory FTA. The only economic argument of the Faroese Home Rule government to block an EU membership application in the early 1990s was that the FTA had been in effect for only about a year. They argued they should try to work with it for the time being.⁵⁶⁹

The accessions of Austria, Sweden and Finland to the EU in 1995 presented an opportunity for the Faroes to renegotiate the terms and conditions of the FTA.⁵⁷⁰ Since the Faroe Islands had FTAs with each of the acceding states, they needed to be incorporated into a revised FTA with the EU. In the negotiations, the unionist SB-JF-VF-SF government was able to raise the amount of goods that could be exported custom-free to the EU market. The »independence coalition« achieved an even more significant adaptation of the FTA in the Faroes' favour in 1998.⁵⁷¹ It was able to persuade the EU that the amount of quota restrictions within the current FTA was in contradiction with the regulations of the World Trade Organization

566 See for this paragraph: FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP IV (2010): *The Faroes and the EU*, Annex 2: Views of the Faroese Industry on Closer Relations with the EU, pp. 63-71.

567 N.N. (1990): »Tað sum umræður«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 1 November 1990, p. 1.

568 Hergeir NIELSEN (1993): »Limaskapur er ikki fyri hvønn sum helst«, in: *14. September*, 14-15 January 1993, p. 3.

569 LT (1992): »Samráðingar við EF um treytir fyri limaskapi«, D 145/1992, pp. 745-748, here: p. 748.

570 LT (1996): »Handilssáttmáli við Europeiska Felagsskapin«, A 30/1996, pp. 282-285.

571 See for the following: LT (1998): »Frágreiðing frá løgmanni um uttanlandsmál 1998/99«, 101-2/1998 (<http://logting.fo/files/casequest/35/101-2%20Fragreiðing%20fra%20logmanni%20um%20uttanlandsmal%201998-99.pdf>, 26 February 2016).

(WTO). Both the Faroes (through Denmark) and the EU had joined the WTO when it had been established in 1995. WTO regulations implied that free trade should apply to at least 95 per cent of all products in each FTA. In the end, the EU agreed to remove tariffs and restrictions so that 97 per cent of Faroese exports to the EU became custom-free. This was enough improvement for Faroese interest groups to conclude in 2010 that they had

limited need for closer relations with the EU at present, [...] apart from improvements in market access in certain areas and importance for the aquaculture sector of avoiding possible anti-dumping charges.⁵⁷²

However, new developments in international fisheries always made Faroese fishing companies again feel the limitations of the FTA. For example, the migration of mackerel stocks into Faroese waters resulted in an unprecedented amount of mackerel catches since 2011. But ensuring a profitable mackerel production directly on the Faroe Islands proved difficult for Faroese companies, because – under the current FTA – mackerel products were tarified with 25 per cent upon entry to the EU market. Therefore, instead of establishing a fish factory on the Faroes, the Faroese fishing company Christian í Grótinum bought two fish factories in Germany in 2015 with more than 200 employees, to which it could export raw Faroese mackerel custom-free and then produce it directly on EU territory.⁵⁷³ Many people on the Faroe Islands subsequently wondered whether the FTA had cost more than 200 jobs on the islands. As a consequence, fishing companies in the Faroe Islands again demanded better market access for their fisheries products in 2015.⁵⁷⁴

Prime Minister Kaj Leo Holm Johannesen (SB) explained in 2015 that continued dissatisfaction with the FTA was the main reason, why his centre-right SB-FF-MF government wanted to start negotiations with the EU about a new free trade agreement:

The trade agreement with the EU from 1997 is no longer up-to-date. It reflects a period of time, in which Faroese companies primarily exported demersal fish to the EU market. Our export has significantly changed in recent years. Pelagic fish and fish farming have made up the biggest percentage of Faroese export in the last years, while the export of demersal fish has significantly decreased. This new export pattern requires a modernised trade agreement with the EU. The current

572 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP IV (2010): *The Faroes and the EU*, pp. 63, 71.

573 Brynhild THOMSEN (2015): »200 føroysk arbeiðspáss [sic!] í Týsklandi«, in: *Kringvarp Føroya*, 6 February 2015 (<http://kvf.fo/netvarp/uv/2015/02/06/200-froysk-arbeispass-tsklandi#>.VoZhQry-SRN, 3 January 2016).

574 N.N. (2015): »Færøerne ønsker ændringer i handelsaftale med EU«, in: *Føroyska Tíðindastovan*, 13 February 2015 (<http://www.ft-news.com/faeroerne-onsker-aendringer-i-handelsaftale-med-eu/>, 3 January 2016).

framework confines us to the role of raw food exporters to the EU market. We cannot accept that.⁵⁷⁵

Improving cooperation with the EU consequently remained an integral part of all but one coalition agreement since 1998.⁵⁷⁶ This was evident in the attempts of all Faroese governments to achieve an »EEA-like agreement« by supplementary agreements to the existing FTA or by negotiating Faroese EFTA membership. However, by 2015, the Faroe Islands were far from having achieved anything close to an EEA-like agreement. Extended cooperation only existed in the form of the veterinary protocol, participation in the Pan-Euro-Med System of Cumulation of Origin and association with FP7 and Horizon 2020. Since 2005, the Takeover Act has regulated the participation of the Faroese Home Rule government in foreign policy decision-making.⁵⁷⁷ Its adoption restricted the possibility of the Faroes entering into bilateral agreements with the EU in areas in which both the Faroes and the EU had assumed exclusive competence from Denmark.⁵⁷⁸ However, most matters such as, for example, education or the free movement of persons are categorised as areas of shared competence between the EU and its member states. This meant that it was questionable whether the Faroes would be able to extend cooperation with the EU in these matters at all in the future.

Faroese EFTA and subsequent EEA membership also proved highly controversial. Prime Minister Anfinn Kallsberg (FF) rejected this way of achieving an »EEA-like agreement« in the late 1990s, arguing that the EEA had always been intended to be a »provisional step« for EFTA members on their way towards full EU membership.⁵⁷⁹ It would likely be dissolved if Norway or Iceland joined the EU. Moreover, EEA membership would be cost-intensive and would strain administrative resources. In addition, there would be no certainty whether its constitutional status would allow the Faroe Islands to join in the first place. When the JF-SB-FF government put EFTA and EEA membership on its political agenda in 2005, it proved that Kallsberg had been right with his concerns. Since membership in both institutions was reserved for independent states, the Faroes were forced to enter

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- 575 LT (2014): »Frágreiðing sambært § 51, stk. 4 í tingskipanini um uttanríkismál«, F-4/2014 (<http://logting.fo/files/casequest/78/F-004.14%20Fragreiðing%20um%20uttanríkispólitikk.pdf>, 26 February 2016): »Handilssáttmálin við ES frá 1997 er ikki longur tíðarhóskandi. Hann endurspeglar eitt tíðarskeið, tá ið føroyskir útflytarar fyrst og fremst útfluttu botnfisk til ES-marknaðin. Seinnu árin er útflutningurin broyttur grundleggjandi. Stórsti partur av føroyska útflutninginum seinastu árin hevur verið uppsjóvarfiskur og alifiskur, og útflutningurin av botnfiski er nógv minkaður. Nýggja útflutningsmynstrið krevur ein dagfórdan handilssáttmála við ES. Verandi karmar halda okkum fóst í einum leikluti sum rávóruútflytari til ES-marknaðin. Tað kunnu vit ikki góðtaka.«
- 576 LØGTINGIÐ [The Faroese Parliament] (2013): »Samgonguskjøl« (<http://logting.elektron.fo/Ymiskt/Samgonguskjol/yvirlit.htm>, 3 February 2014).
- 577 DANISH PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (2005): »Overtagelsesloven«.
- 578 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP IV (2010): *The Faroes and the EU*, pp. 29-32.
- 579 LT (1998): »Frágreiðing frá lögmanni um uttanlandsmál 1998/99«, 101-2/1998 (<http://logting.fo/files/casequest/35/101-2%20Fragreiðing%20fra%20lögmanni%20um%20uttanlandsmal%201998-99.pdf>, 26 February 2016); LT (1999): »Frágreiðing sambært § 51, stk. 4, í tingskipanini, um uttanlandsmál 1999/2000«, 101-5/1999 (<http://logting.fo/files/casequest/44/101-05%20Fragreiðing%20um%20uttanlandsmal.pdf>, 26 February 2016).

into negotiations with the other EFTA member states on changing the statute at first.⁵⁸⁰ But only Iceland supported the Faroese efforts wholeheartedly. Norway's position was ambiguous. Switzerland and Liechtenstein were sceptical.

Moreover, the Danish government emphasised that the Faroese Home Rule institutions would need to take control over all matters covered by the EFTA agreement.⁵⁸¹ This meant that the Home Rule authorities would need to take over not less than twelve extra policy matters, including, for example, air traffic or financial supervision, before EFTA membership could become a realistic option. In addition, the Danish government claimed that the Faroe Islands would not be able to subsequently join the EEA for constitutional reasons. According to Denmark's interpretation of the Takeover Act, Faroese EEA membership was impossible, as long as the Faroes were part of the Danish Realm. Denmark was a single entity under international law and already a member of the EEA. It could not be represented both as »Kingdom of Denmark« and »Kingdom of Denmark on behalf of the Faroe Islands« twice in the same institution.⁵⁸² Therefore, it is not surprising that the Faroes have not applied for EFTA membership yet. Nevertheless, an independent Faroese membership in EFTA also remained on the agenda of the left-wing government elected in 2015.⁵⁸³

Despite this, an »EEA-like agreement« is still more realistic than other forms of association with the EU apart from full membership. Both the Blue and the Yellow Report mentioned that legal preconditions existed for a customs union with the EU.⁵⁸⁴ However, both reports considered it politically unlikely that the EU would be willing to conclude a customs union with the Faroes that also covered fish products, as the EU considered its fisheries sector to be very sensitive. Moreover, no other third state had been granted a customs union with the EU so far. Still, Niklas Fagerlund wondered in 1995 why the Faroes had never attempted

580 Eiríkur LINDENSKOV (2007): »EFTA – lovaða landið ella oyðimørk?« In: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 20 January 2007; Rógvi NYBO (2008): »Viljin er ikki nokk til limaskap«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 16 October 2008.

581 See for this paragraph: LT (2005): »Fyrirspurningur til Jóannes Eidesgaard, løgmann, viðvíkjandi EFTA«, 100-7/2005 (<http://logting.fo/casewritten/view.gebs?caseWritten.id=182&menuChanged=17>), 26 February 2016); LT (2005): »Fyrirspurningur til Jóannes Eidesgaard, løgmann, viðvíkjandi føroyskum EFTA limaskapi og frihandilsavtalam«, 100-19/2005 (<http://logting.fo/casewritten/view.gebs?caseWritten.id=202&menuChanged=17>), 26 February 2016).

582 In 2008, the North Atlantic Group in the *Folketing* [DNAG] asked constitutional expert Ole Spiermann to evaluate the legal conditions for Faroese membership in EFTA, EEA and EU. He came to a different conclusion than the Danish government and did not consider it constitutionally impossible that Denmark could be part of the same international organisation under international law as one state with different representatives. See Ole SPIERMANN (2008): »Responsum om muligheder for Færøernes tilknytning til EFTA samt for Færøernes og Grønlands tilknytning til EU«. Copenhagen: The North Atlantic Group in the *Folketing* (<http://www.ft.dk/samling/20081/almDEL/ugf/bilag/74/657075.pdf>), 3 February 2014), pp. 9-10.

583 GOVERNMENT OF THE FAROE ISLANDS (2015): »Annex to the Coalition Agreement between the Social Democratic Party (Javnaðarflokkurin), Republican Party (Tjóðveldi) and Progressive Party (Framsókn)« (<http://www.government.fo/the-government/coalition-agreement/annex/>), 3 January 2016).

584 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP II (1995): *Møguleikar fyri samvinnu*, pp. 19-23; FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP IV (2010): *The Faroes and the EU*, p. 13.

to negotiate such a relationship at least.⁵⁸⁵ OCT status would have automatically involved a customs union with the EU. But for the authors of the Blue Report, it was not a realistic alternative.⁵⁸⁶ They considered the economic conditions in the Faroe Islands to be very different from those in other OCTs and Greenland. The Faroes were neither a developing country nor a former colony. In order to prevent continued EU accusations of dumping against the Faroese fish farming industry, the centre-right SB-FF-MF-SF government put a customs union on its agenda in 2011 – however without any results.⁵⁸⁷

The continued interest in the economic aspects of EU membership and the continued failure to negotiate satisfactory alternative forms of association make it surprising that none of the Faroese Home Rule governments after 1989 wanted to reconsider EU membership. *Løgting* MP Johan Dahl (SB) wondered why SB's coalition partners JF and FF wasted all of their energy trying to join EFTA and then the EEA, instead of investigating the costs and benefits of EU membership.⁵⁸⁸ That the Faroes were refused EEA membership under its current constitutional status made it clear for *Folketing* MP Edmund Joensen (SB) that EU membership was the only chance of extending cooperation to such policy areas.⁵⁸⁹

After Iceland applied for EU membership in 2009, Joensen felt sure that there was no future in EEA membership.⁵⁹⁰ Iceland was obviously not satisfied with it; why should the Faroes be? Moreover, each discussion of EU membership in any of the institution's member states would threaten the EEA's continued existence. Joensen also feared for the competitiveness of Faroese fish exports once Iceland, as one of the biggest competitors of the Faroe Islands on the EU market, had joined the EU. The JF's *Folketing* group worried that the Hoyvík Agreement, which had established a free trade area between Iceland and the Faroe Islands in 2004, and the bilateral fisheries agreements with Iceland would cease.⁵⁹¹ EFTA membership would no longer be as attractive and the closest ally for the Faroes on their EFTA/EEA course would disappear. According to Prime Minister Kaj Leo Holm Johannesen (SB), Iceland's membership application therefore seriously questioned »the wisdom of our preferred plan of action«.⁵⁹²

585 FAGERLUND (1996): »Autonomous European Regions«, p. 99.

586 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP II (1995): *Møguleikar fyri samvinnu*, p. 17.

587 LT (2011): »Samgonguskjal millum Sambandsflokkin, Fólkaflokkinn, Miðflokkinn og Sjálvstýrisflokkinn« (<http://logting.elektron.fo/Ymiskt/Samgonguskjol/Samgonguskjal%20ABDH%2014.11.2011.pdf>, 3 February 2014). Cf. Jørgen NICLASSEN (2011): »Tollsamgongu við ES« (<http://folkaflokkurin.fo/xa.asp?fnk=grn&bnr=1&unr=3&gnr=2986>, 3 February 2014).

588 Johan DAHL (2005): »Altjóðagerðin, Føroyar, EFTA mótvegis ES – heimsins eksklusiva felagsskapi«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 27 December 2005, p. 10.

589 Edmund JOENSEN (2008): »Áðrenn vit drukna í EFTA-retorikkinum«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 17 October 2008.

590 See for the following: Edmund JOENSEN (2008): »Ísland nærkast ES og Føroyar sova«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 19 December 2008.

591 JAVNAÐARFLOKKURIN Á FÓLKATINGI (2013): *Ja til Evropa*, p. 82. Cf. N.N. (2009): »Kynstrið at flyta eitt komma«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 21 July 2009.

592 FAROESE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (2009): »The Faroes in a Globalized World«.

8.5. The reduced economic significance of the 200-mile limit

For TF, preserving the exclusive fishing limit for Faroese fishermen was still pre-eminent. *14. September* wrote in 1991 that the supporters of EU membership in the Faroes had forgotten that »if we have no fishing limit, we have no fish to sell«. ⁵⁹³ This would happen if ships from all EU member states received unrestricted access to the Faroese EEZ. Spanish and Portuguese trawlers would deplete Faroese fish stocks even more than the Faroese themselves and certainly would not sell raw fish to Faroese fishing factories:

Our fishing grounds will become a cheap raw food area for fishing companies on the Continent. With little or no work on the Islands, nobody will continue to live here on the cliffs eventually.

Dan Nielsen (TF) claimed in 1994 that it would only take 14 days for the EU fleet to empty the Faroese grounds. ⁵⁹⁴ *Løgting* MP Hans Tausen Olsen (TF) believed that the EU would also take away the other riches in the Faroese underground, »before the Faroes had only seen one single drop of oil«. ⁵⁹⁵

However, at the beginning of the 1990s *Løgting* MP Finnbogi Arge (SB) outlined how preserving the EEZ for Faroese fishermen was a schizophrenic argument – from an economic point of view. ⁵⁹⁶ Why should the Faroes fear overfishing by EC fishermen when Faroese fishermen had long done so themselves? *Løgting* MP Johan Dahl (SB) wondered why emphasis in the Faroe Islands was still so much on preserving the Faroese fishing limit:

Who says that we would not get more out of both our coastal and distant-water fisheries if we were members in the EU? Look at how the EU member states organise their fisheries – most of the large shipping companies are engaged in distant-water fisheries, buy quotas and rights, subsidised by the EU – and live well from that. Why do we as a society and economy not for one time think bigger? Why are we not for example in Morocco, Mauritania, Angola, Chile, Malaysia and other places to fish? ⁵⁹⁷

593 See for this paragraph: N.N. (1991): »Fundurin í Norðurlandahúsinum, um EF, var botnleysur frekleiki«, in: *14. September*, 2 March 1991, pp. 10, 12: »Okkara grunnar koma at gerast biligt rávørðki fyri fiskakonsernirnar inni á meginlandinum, og við lítlum og ongum arbeiði á landi, verður ikki livandi her á klettunum.«

594 Dan NIELSEN (1994): »Tjóðveldisflokkurin sigur nei til felagsmarknaðin«, in: *14. September*, 23-24 June 1994, p. 11.

595 Hans Tausen OLSEN (1994): »ES-limaskapur førir til stórri stættarmun«, in: *14. September*, 20-21 January 1994, p. 11.

596 Finnbogi ARGE (1992): »EF eigur lívið í føroyingum«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 4 March 1992, p. 4.

597 Johan DAHL (2005): »Hví umhugsa ES heldur enn ein EFTA limaskap?« In: *Dimmalætting*, 31 August 2005, p. 20: »Hvør sigur, at vit ikki vildu fingið meira burtúr okkara fiskivinnu bæði á nær- og fjarleiðum um vit vóru limir í ES? Hyggj at hvussu limalondini í ES virkað innan fiskivinnuna – tey flestu av teimum stóru reiðaríunum eru á fjarleiðum, keypa sær kvotur og rættindi, stuðlað av ES, – og tey liva væl av hesum. Hví hugsa vit sum samfelag og vinnulív ikki eitt sindur stórri? Hví eru vit t.d ikki í Marokko, Mauritania, Angola, Chile, Malaysia og aðrastaðni og veiða?«

Analysing the catch of foreign fishermen in Faroese waters, Hermann Oskarsson, Director General of Statistics Faroe Islands, concluded in 2007 that Faroese waters had already turned into international waters a long time ago.⁵⁹⁸ In 2007, Faroese fishermen had fished 230,000 tons of the total catch in Faroese waters and foreign fishermen 390,000 tons. The Faroes had reciprocal fisheries agreements not only with the EU, but also with Iceland, Greenland, Norway and Russia. According to *Løgting* MP Johan Dahl (SB), the Faroes would therefore not need to fear giving EU fishermen a share in their fisheries resources.⁵⁹⁹

In summary, it was economically much less significant to limit fisheries in Faroese waters to Faroese fishermen than it had been in the 1970s. On the contrary, the Faroese fisheries sector needed better access to EU waters and Faroese fishing factories to the EU market. All political parties in the Faroe Islands recognised that. Consequently, all Faroese Home Rule governments had a medium economic interest to support EU membership. Should they have acted according to it, parties other than SB should have been willing to investigate EU membership. Instead, all Faroese Home Rule governments only looked for alternative associations to EU membership. They refused to consider EU membership when it was clear that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate an satisfactory alternative to it.

LI can no longer explain why none of the Faroese Home Rule governments wanted to apply for EU membership since the early 1990s, although they had a medium economic interest to do so. The Faroese case in the early 1990s therefore disproves the idea of there being a correlation between the economic interest of national governments and their European policy choices. Other than assumed by LI, the political interest of the Faroese Home Rule governments to reject EU membership must have outbalanced their economic interest to support it.

8.6. The preservation of national sovereignty

Everything points to the fact that the Faroese Home Rule governments no longer had a political interest to support EU membership when the question re-entered the political agenda in the early 1990s.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the unionist parties had been interested in Faroese EC membership because they wanted to preserve close ties with Denmark. They did not mind whether Faroese sovereignty was exercised in Copenhagen or in Brussels. This situation had changed by the 1990s. JF, the major governing party in the Faroe Islands between the 1960s and early 1990s, gradually took a more positive stance on the devolution of matters to the Home Rule government. JF-led coalition governments had taken over important policy matters since 1975, including health and social policies.⁶⁰⁰ Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, all parties except

598 Quoted in Eli THORSTEINSSON (2008): »Dreymurin um ES«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 8 January 2008.

599 Páll Holm JOHANNESSEN (2005): »ES-limaskapur ein treyt fyri visjón 2015«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 4 August 2005.

600 On the increased transfer of sovereignty from Denmark to the Faroe Islands see: JOHANNESSEN (1980): *Færøsk fiskeri- og markedspolitik*, p. 29; SØLVARÁ (2002): *Løgtingið*, pp. 329-337.

for SB were sceptical about transferring control of devolved policy areas to the EU, which had only been recently taken back from Danish rule. Moreover, from the early 1990s onward, this problem became more acute than ever, as the EU was developing into a political union on top of an economic one. The Treaty of Maastricht opened European integration to further important policy matters such as foreign policy, security and currency policy.

In the early 1990s, JF and TF were the parties that were most opposed to a transfer of national sovereignty. In case of TF, whose main objective had always been full Faroese independence and sovereignty over all matters, the radical opposition to any transfer of sovereignty from the Faroe Islands was nothing new. *Løgting* MP Finnbogi Ísakson (TF) believed that EU membership meant that »the little bit of sovereignty, which the Danes had given us, will be taken from us and moved south to Brussels«.⁶⁰¹

100 years of fighting for national freedom would go to the dogs. In the long run, all decisions will be taken in Brussels. We should neither expect to be able to catch all the fish in Faroese waters, nor to decide, who should produce, buy and sell it. We have no chance to prevent big foreign business from buying all our companies and from moving countless foreign workers into the country. [...] We should not expect either, in the long run, to have the possibility to make our own taxes and tariffs. The bureaucrats in Brussels will do that for us.⁶⁰²

Judging by the EU's development into a political union in 1992, Ísakson believed that the centralisation process in the EU was more likely to continue than to stop.⁶⁰³ All power would come to rest in Brussels, while the parliaments of the EU member states would become disempowered. *14. September* believed that the Faroes were simply too few to make themselves heard as 1/70,000 of a community of 350 million inhabitants at the time.⁶⁰⁴ However, outside the EU, they would remain an equal negotiation partner.

The position of JF on the transfer of national sovereignty to the EU was a clear sign of how far it had moved away from its unionist stance to embrace Faroese Home Rule. In the campaign for the 1990 *Løgting* elections, *Sosialurin* wrote that the Faroes were »small and therefore very sensitive with regard to coming under

601 Finnbogi ÍSAKSON (1990): »Nú lumpa og lirka teir okkum inn í EF«, in: *14. September*, 3 November 1990, p. 3.

602 Finnbogi ÍSAKSON (1990): »Ikki ringt at taka støðu til EF-málið«, in: *14. September*, 7 November 1990, p. 3: »100 ára stríð fyri tjóðarfrælsi fer fyri bakka. Sum frálíður verða allar avgerðir tiknar í Brussel. Vit skulu ikki rokna við, at vit ótarnaðir sleppa at veiða tann fisk, sum fæst undir Føroyum. Heldur ikki at avgera, hvør skal virka hann, keypa og selja hann. Vit kunnu onki siga til, at útlenskur stórkapitalur keypir alt okkara vinnulív, og at útlenski arbeiðsmegi verður flutt inn í landið ótálmað. [...] Vit skulu heldur ikki, sum frálíður, rokna við at hava møguleika til at áseta okkara egna skatt og avgjöld. Tað gera skrivstofumenninir í Brussel fyri okkum.«

603 Finnbogi ÍSAKSON (1991): »Framvegis ongin greið flokkastøða til EF«, in: *14. September*, 2 March 1991, p. 3.

604 N.N. (1990): »Vit fara ongantíð upp í EF!« In: *14. September*, 31 October 1990, p. 7.

foreign control from Brussels«. ⁶⁰⁵ In 1992, Jóannes Eidesgaard (JF), Minister for the Interior, stated that the great problem was that the Faroes would be nothing more than a »grain of sand« in the EU. ⁶⁰⁶ *Sosialurin* added that if the Faroes joined, they would play the same role in the EU as Greenland during its EC membership or as Shetland and Brittany today:

Our legislation would follow [EU] legislation. On top of that, we should give away from us the little bit of control on our own matters, which we have won after a hard struggle, to institutions in Brussels, which are without democratic control. [...] There is therefore nothing, which indicates that [EU] membership is an advantage for small nations. It is quite the contrary. ⁶⁰⁷

Just as with the case of Greenland's withdrawal, the political interest of Faroese Home Rule governments to preserve national sovereignty appears to have been stronger since the early 1990s than the economic benefits of EU membership. But, from the statements above, it is not clear why this should have been the case. Only JF and TF rejected a transfer of sovereignty to the EU in general. SB and many of the more pragmatic separatists within FF were not so much concerned about the loss of Faroese sovereignty. One of the potential reasons for FF's lack of concern was that it had close connections with interest groups in the fisheries and business sectors, which were in favour of membership for economic reasons. ⁶⁰⁸ In addition, national sovereignty had only played a minor role in the first European policy debates in the 1960s and 1970s. The only thing which had changed since then was the political interest of JF and the EU's development into a political union. Were these two factors really sufficient for political interest to reject membership to now outbalance economic interests to support membership in the early 1990s? This must be considered unlikely.

However, there were two other political factors which explained why the political interest of all political parties, in part even that of SB, to preserve national sovereignty had become so strong and made the transfer of sovereignty to the EU so controversial. Prime Minister Anfinn Kallsberg (FF) summed them up in a nutshell in 1999: »the constitutional status of the Faroe Islands and the CFP«. ⁶⁰⁹

605 N.N. (1990): »Eina góða avtalu við EF«, in: *Sosialurin*, 3 November 1990, p. 4.

606 Jóannes EIDESGAARD (1992): »Lítla sandkornið í europeiska felagsskapinum«, in: *Sosialurin*, 29 April 1992, p. 14.

607 N.N. (1992): »Útjaðaraøkini fólna í EF«, in: *Sosialurin*, 24 April 1992, p. 2: »Okkara lóggáva hevði fylgt EF lóggávu. Oman á alt hetta skuldu vit latið frá okkum tað sindrið av ræði, vit við tógvið stríð hava vunnið okkum á okkara egnu viðurskiftum, til stovnar í Bruxelles, ið eru uttan demokratiskt eftirlit. [...] Tað er tí einki, ið talar fyri, at EF-limaskapur er ein fyrimunur fyri smátjóðir.«

608 This is implied by TF *Løgting* MP Finnboji ÍSAKSON (1994): »Eftir valið«, in: *14. September*, 28-29 June 1994, p. 20. Cf. MØRKØRE (1991): »Faroese Politics«, p. 63. FF's problem to find a compromise between its emphasis on Faroese sovereignty and the economic interest of distant-water fishing industries, whose interest FF primarily represented, already surfaced in the 1970s. See NEYSTABØ (1984): *Færøerne og EF*, pp. 54, 79-85.

609 LT (1999): »Frágreiðing sambært § 51, stk. 4, í tingskipanini, um uttanlandsmál 1999/2000«, 101-5/1999 (<http://logting.fo/files/casequest/44/101-05%20Frageiðing%20um%20uttanlandsmal.pdf>, 26 February 2016).

8.7. Independence as precondition for EU membership

The first factor was that the Faroe Islands were not an independent state. Since the Faroes were still integrated into the Danish Realm, they would only be able to join the EU as part of the Danish membership. In the early 1960s, this had only been a problem for TF. But in the early 1990s, it became a no-go for all parties except for SB. The Danish Foreign Ministry outlined in the Pink Report that the Faroes would only be able to influence decisions at an EU level through Danish decision-making procedures.⁶¹⁰ They would have no formal right to be represented in the European Commission, the European Council or the European Parliament. Instead, they would be dependent on Denmark's goodwill to involve the Faroese Home Rule authorities whenever possible.

It was likely that the Faroes would receive one of the 16 Danish seats in the European Parliament. The two Faroese *Folketing* MPs could possibly also gain a seat in the *Folketing*'s Market Committee, which dealt with EU matters. However, the Danish Foreign Ministry emphasised that there would be no possibility for Faroese MPs to participate directly in the Danish government's EU decision-making. The Danish Prime Minister – who was Minister for Faroese Affairs at the same time – would have a »particular responsibility« to ensure that Faroese interests were taken into consideration. But it was doubtful that he would prioritise Faroese fisheries interests over the interests of Danish fishermen or other Danish stakeholders.

Both the Pink Report and the Blue Report therefore concluded that the possibilities for an independent Faroese influence on EU decisions were »legally restricted«.⁶¹¹ As part of Denmark's membership in the EU, the Faroes would not only have to transfer national sovereignty over certain policy areas to the EU's institutions. They would also have to accept that they – other than independent EU member states – would not be granted direct influence on these matters in return. EU membership as an independent state was already problematic for those who cherished national sovereignty over their own matters. EU membership as part of another state was even more difficult because of the lack of direct influence. The argument that EU membership invoked a »loss« of sovereignty therefore took on a very different dimension in the Faroes than in other EU member states.

14. *September* repeatedly emphasised in the early 1990s that it was wrong to speak of »Faroese membership in the EU« in the first place:

The Faroe Islands cannot join the EU, as long as we are part of the Danish Realm. It is purely impossible because the EU is a community of independent countries. The Faroes cannot become a member any more than a Danish or Portuguese municipality. We will miss all sovereignty and can just as well dissolve the Løgting.⁶¹²

610 See for this and the following paragraph: FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP I (1991): *Føroyar og EF*, Part III, pp. 3-4.

611 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP I (1991): *Føroyar og EF*, Part I, p. 5; FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP II (1995): *Møguleikar fyri samvinnu*, pp. 56-59.

612 N.N. (1990): »Vit fara ongantíð upp í EF!« In: 14. *September*, 31 October 1990, p. 7: »Føroyar kunnu

Tórbjørn Jacobsen (TF), Minister of Fisheries in 2008, emphasised that what SB wanted was in fact not »Faroese membership in the EU, but Danish membership in the EU on behalf of the Faroes«. ⁶¹³ *Sosialurin* was also appalled at SB's support for membership. SB would not tell the Faroese people what »investigating the conditions for EU membership« actually meant. ⁶¹⁴ Either the Faroes would have to separate from Denmark immediately and then investigate the conditions for EU membership or they would have to ask the Danish government to remove the reservation in place for the Faroes. In the latter case, the Faroes would be automatically included in the Danish membership, without even having to apply. *Sosialurin* did not believe that SB was in favour of separation. But this meant that it did not dare tell the Faroese people that the Faroes would become a Danish municipality again when it joined the EU under the current constitutional status.

Folketing MP and former Prime Minister Atli P. Dam (JF) emphasised in 1994 that the Faroes would have no influence in the EU. ⁶¹⁵ *Løgting* MP Finnboði Ísakson (TF) stressed that even if the Faroes received one of the 16 Danish seats in the European Parliament, this would only be one seat out of 381 (in 1990). ⁶¹⁶ A better representation could not be expected. Dan Nielsen (TF) called it the »politics of surrender« (*uppgávupolitikkur*) if the Faroes were to knowingly join a community, in which they would have no influence whatsoever. ⁶¹⁷ EU membership as »a little peripheral part of Denmark« was also unacceptable for FF. ⁶¹⁸ Jógvan Sundstein, FF chairman and Minister of Finance, called such a step »economic and national self-murder«:

We will not be represented in the Council. We will not receive any Commissioner. Maybe one MP in a parliament, which – as it is – will not have much to say for a long time. ⁶¹⁹

For Faroese politicians, it did not make much sense to compare the Faroe Islands to independent small states in Europe who had joined the EU. Prime Minister Jóannes Eidesgaard (JF) argued in 2005 that the Faroes were already small in

ikki gerast limur í EF, so leingi, vit eru í danska ríkinum. Tað er púra ógjørligt, tí EF er ein felagsskapur av sjálvstøðugum londum. Føroyar kunnu ikki gerast limir meir enn einhvør dansk ella portugisisk kommuna. Tá missa vit alt sjálvsræði og kunnu eins væl avtaka Løgtingið.«

613 Tórbjørn JACOBSEN (2008): »Tá ið spinnið kámar útsýnið, ella?« In: *Dimmalætting*, 24 October 2008, p. 20.

614 N.N. (1994): »Sambandið: Føroyar eitt danskt amt í ES«, in: *Sosialurin*, 21 June 1994, p. 2.

615 N.N. (1994): »Atli Dam, fyrrverandi lögmaður um norsku fólkaatkvøðuna: Ikki á leistum aftaná norðmonnum«, in: *Sosialurin*, 29 November 1994, p. 3.

616 Finnboði ÍSAKSON (1990): »Ikki ringt at taka støðu til EF-málið«, in: *14. September*, 7 November 1990, p. 3.

617 Dan NIELSEN (1994): »Tjóðveldisflokkurin sigur nei til felagsmarknaðin«, in: *14. September*, 23-24 June 1994, p. 11.

618 N.N. (1991): »Jógvan Sundstein, figgjarmálaráðharri, um limaskap í EF: Tjóðskaparligt og vinnuligt sjálvmorð«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 26 June 1991, p. 3.

619 Jógvan SUNDSTEIN (1992): »Leypið ikki framav í EF-málinum«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 27 March 1992, p. 6: »Í ráðharrastovninum hoyra vit ikki heima. Vit fáa ongan [komm]jissær. Kanska eina parlamentslim í einum parlamenti, sum í hvussu so er í langa tíð einki hevur at siga.«

comparison with Denmark, but Denmark was also small in comparison to the EU.⁶²⁰ This meant that the Faroes would »disappear completely« as a part of Denmark in the EU. SF chairman Kári P. Højgaard also believed that joining the EU as a part of Denmark was maybe the easiest option, but then the Faroes would only be a small minority within a small member state.⁶²¹ Høgni Hoydal, TF chairman since 2000, emphasised that the Faroes would become an isolated outpost without any influence either in Denmark or in the EU if they joined the EU under their current constitutional status.⁶²² John Johannessen (JF), *Løgting* MP and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in 2008, summarised that it would be

irresponsible of the Faroes to join the EU through Denmark and thereby to sell the power of the *Løgting* and the landsstýri to Danish ministers, who will be those, who represent the Faroes in Brussels. With such an arrangement, the *Løgting* [...] could be compared to [a municipal committee]. It can protest whatever it wants, but nobody has any use of listening to it.⁶²³

Thus, *Løgting* MP Poul Michelsen (FF) was convinced that the Faroes had a lot more influence on the EU by remaining outside it.⁶²⁴

Dimmalætting, which was traditionally close to SB and had even been more open for EU membership than SB in the 1970s, also became increasingly sceptical of the idea of Faroese membership in the EU as a part of Denmark. In 2002, the editors stated that

the problem with EU membership was that countries give away part of their right to self-determination to the technocrats in Brussels. This is of course nothing, we in the Faroe Islands are happy about, especially after having fought for winning sovereignty back from Copenhagen for so many years.⁶²⁵

Consequently, there was relative unanimity in the Faroe Islands that joining the

620 Sonja J. JÓGVANSDÓTTIR (2005): »Møguligur føroyskur EFTA-limaskapur«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 27 July 2005, p. 11.

621 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2009): »Iceland, Other Nordic States Cast an Eye Towards EU«, External Relations, 2 March 2009 (<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-PR-ESS&reference=20090302STO50540>, 3 February 2014).

622 Hans Kárason MIKKELSEN (2005): »Hoydal: Ríkisrættarlíga stöðan má avklárust, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 18 May 2005.

623 John JOHANNESSEN (2008): »Ørkymland í útmeldingum órógva uttanríkispolitikkin«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 24 October 2008, p. 12: »[Harnæst er tað] ábyrgdarleyst av Føroyum at fara inn í ES umvegis Danmark og harvið avreiða valdið hjá løgtinginum og landsstýrinum til í staðin at liggja hjá donskum ráðharrum, sum verða teir, ið umboða Føroyar í Brüssel. Við slíkari skipan verður Føroya Løgting [...] at meta saman við Kollfjarðarnevndina, ið kann mótmæla sum hon vil, men sum ongum nýtist at lurta eftir.«

624 Poul MICHELSEN (2002): »Tað kann kallast nógv – men frælsi og ES hongur ikki saman«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 6 December 2002, p. 6.

625 N.N. (2002): »ES-limaskapur til viðgerðar«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 3 December 2002, p. 6: »Vansin við ES-limaskapi er sjálvandi, at londini lata frá sær ein part av sjálvsræðinum til teknokratarnar í Brüssel, og hetta er sjálvandi ikki nakað, vit føroyingar eru fegnir um, serliga nú vit í mong ár hava stríðst fyri at vinna sjálvsræði úr Keypmannahavn.«

EU as a part of Denmark was undesirable. The Yellow Report stated in 2010 that »the political preconditions for the Faroes joining the EU as a part of the Danish EU membership do not appear to be present« because the Faroes would not be represented in the decision-making processes.⁶²⁶

14. *September* wrote in 1991 that in order to discuss Faroese membership in the EU in earnest, the Faroes would first need to become independent from Denmark.⁶²⁷ *Løgting* MP Jákup Mikkelsen (FF) reconfirmed in 2009 that as long as the Faroes were not independent, »we do not speak about EU membership«. ⁶²⁸ Sjúrdur Skaale even supported EU membership during his time as *Løgting* MP for TF in 2009, but not as a part of Denmark:

Independence is the key [...] We will not join EFTA, we cannot become a part of the EEA agreement and we will not join the EU in any other form as a part of Denmark. [...] We sit in a no man's land. And there is only one reason for that: we are not independent. [...] Independence is the precondition for the Faroes to get a firm, secure seat at the European table.⁶²⁹

There was only one problem. If independence was the precondition for Faroese EU membership, there would not be any progress on EU membership until the Faroes had finally made up their mind about their future constitutional status. However, unionists and separatists had not been able to solve this question in more than 60 years since the introduction of Home Rule in 1948. The latest attempts of the »independence coalition« to establish an independent Faroese state between 1998 and 2004 had come to nothing. This meant that Faroese EU politics were in a deadlock. It was unlikely that Faroese Home Rule governments would take up EU membership as a policy option anytime soon.

Overcoming this deadlock was certainly one of the reasons, why Sjúrdur Skaale changed his view on the way of joining the EU. In 2011, he shifted allegiance from TF to JF and was elected to the *Folketing* for his new party. In 2013, his *Folketing* group argued that EU membership as a part of Denmark would always be a »second-best solution«, but it would not be impossible to have at least some influence on the EU.⁶³⁰ EU membership as an independent state would also be problematic for the Faroes because of their small size. It would be doubtful whether the EU would accept the Faroes as an independent member state because the Faroese people

626 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP IV (2010): *The Faroes and the EU*, p. 10.

627 N.N. (1991): »Fundurin í Norðurlandahúsinum, um EF, var botnleysur frekileiki«, in: *14. September*, 2 March 1991, pp. 10, 12.

628 Vilmond JACOBSEN (2009): »Vit tosa ikki um ES sum partur av ríkisfelagsskapi«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 5 August 2009.

629 Sjúrdur SKAALÉ (2009): »Innast inni er Laksáfoss tjóðveldismaður«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 20 March 2009: »[Men eisini her] er fullveldi lykilin. [...] [V]it sleppa ikki inn í EFTA, vit kunnu ikki gerast partur av EBS-avtaluni, og vit sleppa ikki í ES sum annað enn ein danskur landslutur. [...] Vit sita í ongamannalandi. Og orsøkin er ein: vit hava ikki fullveldi. [...] Fullveldi er fortreytin fyri, at Føroyar fáa sín fasta, tryggja sess við tað europeiska borðið.«

630 See for this paragraph: JAVNAÐARFLOKKURIN Á FÓLKATINGI (2013): *Ja til Evropa*, pp. 36-37, 44-45.

would be extremely overrepresented in the EU's institutions. Moreover, he was sceptical whether the Faroese administration would be able to master the huge administrative cost and workload of implementing EU legislation into Faroese law. Skaale also believed that separatists should not reject EU membership only in order to preserve Faroese independence. EU membership could also make it easier to separate from Denmark and embark towards Faroese independence.⁶³¹ However, he was clearly in a minority with his position.

8.8. National sovereignty over fisheries resources

The fact that the Faroe Islands would lose direct influence over its most important policy matters as a part of Denmark's EU membership was one of the reasons why all Faroese Home Rule governments had such a strong political interest to preserve national sovereignty in the early 1990s. The other reason was similar to that which Eiríkur Bergmann observed in Iceland. National sovereignty implied control over the most important resource of the Faroe Islands, their fish. But in 1983, the EU had agreed to place control over the extended 200-mile fishing limit of each member state at the Commission. Thus, even if political parties in the Faroe Islands one day agreed on how to join the EU, it would be uncertain whether they would be willing to do so, as long as the EU did not change its CFP. EU membership would mean transferring control over the nearly only source of income for the Faroes to the EU. *Løgmaður* Anfinn Kallsberg (FF) stated in 1999 that

the interest of countries, which have a similar economic structure as the Faroe Islands, is not secured within the framework of the current fisheries policy of the EU, irrespective of whether the Faroes join as an independent state or as a part of Denmark.⁶³²

All European policy debates in the Faroes since the early 1990s show that the Faroese Home Rule governments emphasised national sovereignty so strongly because they wanted to remain in control of their fisheries resources. This was the case, although – in contrast to the early 1970s – EU membership became economically attractive for Faroese fishing companies.

Ólavur Klakk (TF) emphasised that EU membership would contradict the long Faroese fight for sovereignty over its territorial waters.⁶³³ In the EU, it would no longer be up to the Faroes to decide who should fish in the Faroes and how much,

631 Separatist movements in Catalonia, Flanders and Scotland have embraced EU membership as an alternative to integration into the mother states Spain, Belgium and the UK respectively. Cf. Seth Kincaid JOLLY (2007): »The Europhile Fringe? Regionalist Party Support for European Integration«, in: *European Union Politics* 8 (1), pp. 109-130.

632 LT (1998): »Frágreiðing frá lögmanni um uttanlandsmál 1998/99«, 101-2/1998 (<http://logting.fo/files/casequest/35/101-2%20Fragreiðing%20fra%20lögmanni%20um%20uttanlandsmal%201998-99.pdf>, 26 February 2016): »Landsstýrið er av teirri áskoðan, at áhugamálini hjá londum, sum eru búskaparliga skipaði sum Føroyar, ikki eru tryggjaði innan kamarnar av verandi fiskivinnupolitikki hjá ES, uttan mun til um limaskapurin er danskur ella føroyskur.«

633 Ólavur KLAKK (1990): »Nei til EF«, in: *14. September*, 10 November 1990, p. 12.

but to »the bureaucrats in Brussels«. John Petersen (FF), Minister for Fisheries and Agriculture from 1991 to 1993, argued that the Faroes would »no longer exist« if the right to decision-making on their natural resources was taken away.⁶³⁴ According to Heini O. Heinesen, TF chairman from 1990 to 1994, the Faroes would then end like the Shetlands, which were depopulated because the UK destroyed their fishing grounds and thus the basis of their existence.⁶³⁵ *Løgting* MP Poul Michelsen (FF) commented in 2002 that sovereignty over fisheries resources was »crucial« for a fishing nation such as the Faroes.⁶³⁶ Everywhere where the EU had received sovereignty over natural resources, central administration in Brussels had succeeded in »destroying all life«. According to TF chairman Høgni Hoydal, this also applied to seal hunt and whaling.⁶³⁷

Løgting MP Jørgen Niclasen (FF) therefore stated in 2005 that FF would be against Faroese EU membership, »as long as the CFP will be controlled from Brussels«. ⁶³⁸ He believed that the new fisheries management system based on fishing days, which had been implemented in the Faroe Islands after the economic crisis in 1994, was superior to the EU quota system.⁶³⁹ Moreover, the Faroes could not risk transferring control over its most important resource to European politicians who were steered by environmental organisations and thought of fish as an animal to be protected rather than as an economic product. Jógvan Sundstein, FF chairman and Minister of Finance in 1992, outlined that the problems of joining the EU as a part of Denmark and transferring control over fisheries resources to the EU interplayed with each other and made matters even worse.⁶⁴⁰ EU institutions would not only take over decision-making rights with regard to fisheries policy. The Faroe Islands would not even be represented in them.

Transferring sovereignty over fisheries resources to the EU was also unacceptable for most unionist politicians and the centre parties. Thomas Arabo (JF), Minister for Fisheries and Industries from 1993 to 1994, and Helena Dam á Neystabø, SF chairwoman from 1994 to 2001, also believed that the Faroes would lose all influence on their natural resources and would no longer be able to decide their own fisheries policy as an EU member.⁶⁴¹ Prime Minister Jóannes Eidesgaard (JF) stated in 2006 that EU membership was not an option because it would mean »giving

634 John PETERSEN (1994): »Eins og fyri 100 árum síðan«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 3 June 1994, p. 2.

635 Heini Ó. HEINESEN (1994): »Okkara einasta bjarging er, at vit taka ábyrgd av hesum landi og fólki«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 31 May 1994, p. 14.

636 Poul MICHELSEN (2002): »Tað kann kallast nógv – men frælsi og ES hongur ikki saman«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 6 December 2002, p. 6.

637 NORDIC COUNCIL (2009): »Høgni Hoydal (T) (Hovedindlæg)«, 61st Session 2009, Dagsordenspunkt 8: Arktisk politik og naturresurser (<http://www.norden.org/da/nordisk-raad/sessioner-og-moeder/nordisk-raads-sessioner/tidligere-sessioner/sessioner-2006-2010/61.-session-2009/taler/8.-arktisk-politik-og-naturresurser/hoegni-hoydal-t-hovedindlaeg>, 26 February 2016).

638 Heri á RÓGVI (2005): »Aftur á slóðina«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 10 August 2005.

639 Cf. Áki BERTHOLDSEN (2006): »Eg orki ikki tankan um føroyskan limaskap í ES«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 19 May 2006.

640 Jógvan SUNDSTEIN (1992): »Leypið ikki framav í EF-málinum«, in: *Dagblaðið*, 27 March 1992, p. 6.

641 N.N. (1994): »Bert sambandið vil tingast um ES-limaskap«, in: *Sosialurin*, 20 January 1994, p. 2.

up national control of our fisheries«. ⁶⁴² SF chairman Kári P. Højgaard explained in 2009 that the Faroes feared the consequences of decisions on fisheries policy being made »in another country [the EU!], as fisheries represented 90 per cent of Faroese exports. ⁶⁴³

Also SB perceived the transfer of control over fisheries resources as the main stumbling block for potential Faroese membership in the EU. This is clear from its repeated attempts to relativise the matter. *Dimmalætting* stated in 1994 that it was of course significant to be in control over the resource, which created employment in the Faroes. ⁶⁴⁴ But it was just as significant to be able to sell one's resource at the best possible price. SB chairman Edmund Joensen argued in 1992 that the Commission would certainly take care that Faroese fisheries rights would not diminish under EU membership. ⁶⁴⁵ *Løgting* MP and former Prime Minister Pauli Ellefsen (SB) believed that Norway's accession treaty in 1994 disproved the argument that Spanish, Portuguese and other fishermen would be granted unrestricted access to Faroese waters. ⁶⁴⁶ The principle of relative stability would keep them outside Faroese waters. Moreover, there was broad agreement among *Løgting* MPs from SB to TF in the early 1990s that Faroese control had not made Faroese fisheries management more sustainable than the EU's. ⁶⁴⁷

However, these arguments did not address the core problem with the CFP. Of course, the Faroese sector faced significant and largely self-inflicted problems in the early 1990s. But – as Heini Holm (TF) argued – these problems would not be solved »in an office in Brussels, where they have no idea about fisheries policy and do not even know the needs of the people in the region«. ⁶⁴⁸ The Faroes would need to make a sensible fisheries policy themselves »without involving totally irrelevant persons from Brussels«. National fisheries inspector Kjartan Hoydal (a former TF politician) argued that – despite the current problems in fisheries management – »nobody was better suited to manage Faroese fisheries resources than the Faroese themselves«:

The CFP has completely failed. The reason is that decision-making procedures are ill-conceived and that all decisions are taken centrally by ignorant people. [...] Faroese fisheries policy is calculated a long time ahead. Many interest groups are

642 FAROESE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (2006): »Speech by the Prime Minister of the Faroes, Mr Jóannes Eidesgaard, at the official reception on the 25th of April, the Faroese Flag Day, 2006, the Arts Club in London« (<http://www.tinganes.fo/Default.aspx?cyar=2013&cmonth=5&ID=10768&PID=23570&NewsID=318&M=NewsV2&Action=1>, 3 February 2014).

643 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2009): »Iceland«.

644 N.N. (1994): »Noreg uttanfyri«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 1 December 1994, p. 2.

645 N.N. (1992): »Formaður Sambandsflokksins, Edmund Joensen: Ikki nóg mikið við heimabeitispolitikki«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 25 April 1992, p. 1.

646 Pauli ELLEFSEN (1994): »Ov seint at ræðast ES: Føroyar og ES – annar partur«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 30 June 1994, p. 1.

647 Heini HOLM (1994): »Sambandsflokkurin og ES«, in: *14. September*, 21-22 June 1994, p. 17; Poul Martin RASMUSSEN (1994): »Hinar flokkarnir og ES-skrímlið«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 14 June 1994, p. 6. Cf. FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP I (1991): *Føroyar og EF*, Part I, p. 15.

648 Heini HOLM (1994): »Sambandsflokkurin og ES«, in: *14. September*, 21-22 June 1994, p. 17.

included in the decision-making process. In the EU, all big matters – for example quotas, conservation and price policy – are decided in one day in one meeting, where all states are represented. [...] We control our resources best ourselves and shall continue to do so in the future.⁶⁴⁹

Only SB would have accepted a transfer of sovereignty over fisheries resources because of the importance of market access. But even among high-ranking SB members there was opposition to the transfer of sovereignty over fisheries resources. Bjørn Kalsø (SB), Minister for Fisheries in 2005, believed that no one other than the Faroese themselves should ever manage the Faroese fisheries resources.⁶⁵⁰ In 2006, he reiterated that fisheries were such an important part of the Faroese society that decision-making on fisheries policy could not be sacrificed for potential EU membership.⁶⁵¹ He maintained that – despite its support for investigating the costs and benefits of EU membership – SB had always emphasised that the Faroes would have to take a reservation with regard to the CFP and the management of the resources of the sea.

Kalsø's party colleagues were optimistic that this would be possible. SB chairman Kaj Leo Holm Johannesen did not consider it to be far-fetched in 2006 that the EU would adopt a new fisheries policy, which was more in accordance with the Faroese fisheries management system.⁶⁵² He believed that the Faroes might even be able to contribute to shape it as an EU member. *Løgting* MP Johan Dahl (SB) wanted to try to persuade the EU that it was to its political and financial advantage if some areas and regions kept the sovereignty over their fisheries resources.⁶⁵³

But the majority of Faroese politicians and interest groups were sceptical that the Faroes would be able to negotiate anything other than a temporary derogation from the CFP.⁶⁵⁴ The Pink Report stated that it would »weigh heavily on the scale against EU membership« that national sovereignty over fisheries resources would not be moved back from Brussels to the EU member states anytime soon.⁶⁵⁵ The Yellow Report concluded in 2010 that there was »general political concern« about the introduction of the CFP in the Faroes, as it would »require the Faroes to relin-

649 N.N. (1992): »EF dugir ikki at umsita fiskastovnar«, in: *14. September*, 31 March – 1 April 1992, p. 9: »Tilfeingispolitikkurin innan fiskivinnuna hjá EF er fullkomuliga miseydnaður. Orsøkin er, at sjálv avgerðarprosessin er skeiv, og at allar avgerðir verða tiknar sentralt av óvitandi fólki. [...] Tær politisku avgerðirnar, sum verða tiknar innan fiskivinnuna í Føroyum, verða fyrireikaðar í longri tíð, og nógvir áhugabólkar verða hoyrdir. Í EF verða øll stórmál – td. kvótur, friðing og prisáseting – loyst eftir einum degi á einum fundi, har øll limalondini eru umboðað. [...] Tilfeingið umsita vit best sjálvir og skulu framhaldandi gera tað.«

650 Bjørn KALSØ (2005): »Fiskivinnan og ES«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 18 February 2005.

651 Vilmund JACOBSEN (2006): »Bjørn Kalsø, landsstýrismaður: Avgerðarrætturin varðveitast á føroyskum hondum«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 20 December 2006.

652 Kaj Leo Holm JOHANNESSEN (2006): »Hvørki fiskiríkidømi ella oljuríkidømi skulu gevast burtur«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 24 May 2006.

653 Johan DAHL (2005): »Hví umhuga ES heldur enn ein EFTA limaskap?« In: *Dimmalætting*, 31 August 2005, p. 20.

654 E.g. John JOHANNESSEN (2008): »Ørkymlandi útmeldingar órógva uttanríkispolitikkinn«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 24 October 2008, p. 12.

655 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP I (1991): *Føroyar og EF*, Part I, pp. 3-5.

quish exclusive competence over their fundamental economic source of income in favour of an uncertain measure of influence within the EU«. ⁶⁵⁶ Moreover, there was also a danger that EU membership would restrict Faroese traditions such as whaling, bird hunting and sheep farming. Based on the results of the report, Jacob Vestergaard (FF), Faroese Minister for Foreign Affairs, concluded in 2010 that the Faroe Islands could not accept the EU having full sovereignty over fisheries resources, since 95 per cent of Faroese exports were fish products. ⁶⁵⁷

In the end, all Faroese parties and even some members of SB agreed with Finnboði Ísakson (TF) that

the right to govern in our own country, over ourselves, over land and waters is and will always be more worth than these [economic] »advantages«, we could get by selling ourselves, the country and our sea to the technocratic and undemocratic bureaucrats in Brussels. ⁶⁵⁸

Tórbjørn Jacobsen (TF), Minister of Fisheries in 2008, also stated that joining the EU could be an economic advantage and »get things moving economically«. ⁶⁵⁹ But it would be »politically impossible«. These statements clearly show that all Faroese Home Rule governments since the early 1990s prioritised their strong political interest to preserve Faroese sovereignty over their medium economic interest to join the EU. While the outcome of Faroese European policy did not change between the early 1970s and early 1990s, the motivation of the Faroese Home Rule governments did so to a great extent.

In comparison to the 1970s, the economic need for the Faroes to keep an exclusive fishing limit trumped market access. However, the Faroese Home Rule governments now no longer supported the inclusion of the Faroe Islands in Denmark's EU membership. At the same time, there was no majority for Faroese independence. Moreover, the Faroese Home Rule governments considered it essential to preserve national control over their fisheries resources. For these two reasons, their political interest was strong enough to outbalance a medium economic interest to support EU membership. The Yellow Report (2010) therefore concluded that,

considering the political landscape in the Faroes, the only membership that seems politically possible is an independent membership, with permanent opt outs in the fisheries sector. ⁶⁶⁰

656 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP IV (2010): *The Faroes and the EU*, p. 10.

657 LT (2010): »Uppskot til samtyktar um framtíðar evropapolitikk Føroya«, 135/2010 (<http://logting.fo/files/casestate/11011/135.10%20Evropapolitikk%20endaligt.pdf>, 26 February 2016).

658 Finnboði ÍSAKSON (1991): »Framvegis ongin greið flokkastøða til EF«, in: *14. September*, 2 March 1991, p. 3: »Rætturin at ráða í okkara egnu landi, yvir okkum sjálvum, yfir land- og sjóki er og fer altíð at verða meira [...] enn teir »fyrimuminir«, vit kunnu fáa við at avreiða okkum sjálvi, land og hav okkara til teir teknokratisku, ódemokratisku embætismenninar í Brussel.«

659 Tórbjørn JACOBSEN (2005): »Herostratos ella profetur?« In: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 29 December 2005.

660 FAROESE EU WORKING GROUP IV (2010): *The Faroes and the EU*, p. 48.

The Faroese rejection of EU membership in the early 1990s thus clearly disproves LI's assumption that governments only base their European policy decisions on political interests when their economic interests are weak, diffuse or indeterminate. Contrary to LI's assumptions, the Faroese case also confirms the hypothesis that Faroese Home Rule governments put a particular emphasis on national sovereignty because it was inextricably linked to control over their most important resource: fish.

Greenland (1989-): No need for EU membership

Greenland's relationship with the EU remained unaffected by the groundbreaking changes in Europe at the beginning of the 1990s. This was perhaps not so surprising, since Greenland had only withdrawn from the EC in 1985. Since then, relations between Greenland and the EU had been regulated by the Special Protocol, which granted Greenland OCT status. In contrast to the other OCTs, Greenland only received custom-free access to the EU market in exchange for the satisfactory access of EU fishermen to its fishing grounds, for which the EU provided financial compensation. This also meant that Greenland did not qualify for development aid from the EDF. The concrete modalities of this framework were contained in ten-year fisheries agreements, which automatically extended for further six-year periods if they were not cancelled by any of the parties. Fisheries protocols with durations of five years regulated the exact quotas for Greenlandic and EU fishermen and the EU's compensation payment for these quotas in return.

Since 1989, there were attempts at times by political parties from the margins of Greenland's political spectrum to reopen the debate on EU membership. Atassut brought EU membership onto the political agenda in its campaign for the *Landsting* elections in 1991. Later, there were other attempts by *Landsting* MPs from Atassut, KP and the Democrats. However, all Siumut- and IA-led Home Rule Governments continuously blocked any discussion of the matter.

Chapter 9 looks in detail into the continued rejection of EU membership by Greenlandic Home Rule governments since 1989. It tests LI's assumption that the Greenlandic Home Rule governments continued to reject EU membership because they had a strong or medium economic interest to do so. Moreover, it analyses the role of political interests in their European policy choices. According to LI, the Greenlandic Home Rule governments could also have continued to reject EU membership since 1989 due to a strong or medium political interest to reject membership if their economic interest had been weak, diffuse or indeterminate. Chapter 7 disproved LI's assumptions for Greenland. Moreover, from the early 1990s Greenland's European policy did not change. There was not even a real debate about EU membership. Does this mean that all Home Rule governments still had a strong political interest to reject EU membership in order to preserve Greenland's national sovereignty? Did this strong political interest continue to outbalance economic interests to support EU membership?

9.1. Defeat of Atassut's plans for renewed EU membership

When the first fisheries protocol was due to expire at the end of 1989, the *Landsting* dealt with Greenland's relationship with the EU for the first time after its withdrawal.⁶⁶¹ It voted in favour of the terms of the second fisheries protocol. However, following the EU's plans for a political union, Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt (S) raised doubts as to whether Greenland's relations with the EU could continue unchanged.⁶⁶² He believed that Greenland should remain outside the EU and try to achieve the best possible association agreement with it.⁶⁶³ Atassut, on the contrary, brought Greenland's EU membership back on the political agenda in its campaign for the *Landsting* elections in 1991.⁶⁶⁴ It wanted another referendum on Greenland's EU membership in 1994 so that Greenland could re-accede to the EU, after the fisheries agreement had run out. IP and AP, two centre parties represented in the *Landsting* in the early 1990s, were open to investigating Atassut's membership plans.⁶⁶⁵ However, Siumut and IA rejected any reconsideration of EU membership. Siumut chairman Lars Emil Johansen found Atassut's proposal in total contradiction to Siumut's policy.⁶⁶⁶ Both Siumut and IA excluded the possibility of a coalition government with Atassut after the elections if it continued to have this position on EU membership.⁶⁶⁷

661 GLTF (1989): »Gennemførelsesprotokol vedrørende betingelserne for EF-fiskeri i grønlandske farvande fra 1. januar 1990 til 31. december 1994«, 7/1989 (autumn), pp. 281-303.

662 GLTF (1990): »Redegørelse vedr. EF's indre marked«, 7/1990 (spring), pp. 11-36, here: pp. 12-13.

663 N.N. (1991): »Valget: – Vi vil have ansvaret for råstofferne. Det siger en kampberedt landsstyreformand Jonathan Motzfeldt«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 18 January 1991, p. 6.

664 N.N. (1991): »Atassut lover tilskud fra EF«, in: *A/G*, 6 February 1991, p. 9; ATASSUT (1991): »Derfor skal vi ind i EF i 1994 – men først efter en ny folkeafstemning«, in: *A/G*, 8 February 1991, p. 16; N.N. (1991): »EF – vejen ud af krisen«, in: *Nuggit*, 15 February 1991, p. 2.

665 N.N. (1991): »Valgguide: EF«, in: *A/G*, Supplement to No. 25, 1 March 1991, p. 3; N.N. (1991): »EF & valget«, in: *A/G*, 4 March 1991, p. 4.

666 N.N. (1990): »Siumut eller EF: Atassut ønsker at forblive i varmen«, in: *A/G*, 3 October 1990, p. 3.

667 N.N. (1991): »EF-misinformation«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 15 February 1991, p. 9; N.N. (1991): »EF & valget«, in: *A/G*, 4 March 1991, p. 4.

Table 17: Percentage of votes in the Landsting elections (1979-2014)⁶⁶⁸

	<i>A</i>	<i>IA</i>	<i>IP</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>AP</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>KP</i>	<i>PI</i>	<i>PN</i>
1979	41.7	4.4	-	46.1	-	-		-	-
1983	46.6	10.6	-	42.3	-	-		-	-
1984	43.8	12.1	-	44.1	-	-		-	-
1987	40.1	15.3	4.4	39.8	-	-	0.4	-	-
1991	30.1	19.4	2.8	37.3	9.5	-	0.9	-	-
1995	30.1	20.3	0.4	38.4	6.1	-	4.7	-	-
1999	25.2	22.1	-	35.2	-	-	12.3	-	-
2002	20.2	25.3	-	28.5	-	15.9	5.3	-	-
2005	19.0	22.4	-	30.4	-	22.6	4.0	-	-
2009	10.9	43.7	-	26.5	-	12.7	3.8	-	-
2013	8.1	34.4	-	42.8	-	6.2	1.1	6.4	-
2014	6.5	33.2	-	34.3	-	11.8	-	1.6	11.6

Atassut's membership course was resoundingly defeated in the 1991 elections (see table 17). The party retreated by ten per cent from 40.2 per cent to 30.2 per cent. Instead of continuing as a minority government tolerated by Atassut, Siumut formed a coalition government with IA (see table 18). Johansen (S) became new Prime Minister and explicitly stated that Atassut's position on EU membership had been one of the main reasons for excluding it from government.⁶⁶⁹ Atassut subsequently suspended all membership plans for the time being.⁶⁷⁰ But the establishment of the EU, the intensive debates in Denmark about its participation in the Treaty of Maastricht and the membership applications of all other Nordic states except for Iceland meant that Greenland's new government had to follow the developments in Europe during the next legislative term closely.

668 Own table based on STATISTICS GREENLAND (2015): »Valg til Inatsisartut« (<http://www.stat.gl/dialog/main.asp?lang=da&version=201401&sc=SA&subthemecode=o6&colcode=o>, 29 December 2015).

669 N.N. (1991): »Min mest ensomme beslutning«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 18 March 1991, p. 4.

670 N.N. (1991): »Atassut dropper EF«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 8 March 1991, p. 7.

Table 18: Coalition governments in Greenland (1979-2015)⁶⁷¹

<i>Landsting elections</i>	<i>Greenlandic Home Rule governments (Grønlands landsstyret)</i>		<i>Greenlandic Prime Ministers (landsstyreformænd)</i>
1979	1979-83	S	Jonathan Motzfeldt (S)
1983	1983-84	S – (IA)	
1984	1984-87	S – IA	
1987	1987-88	S – IA	
	1988-91	S – (A)	
1991	1991-95	S – IA	Lars Emil Johansen (S)
1995	1995-99	S – A	
1999	1999-2001	S – IA	Jonathan Motzfeldt (S)
	2001-02	S – A	
2002	2002-03	S – IA	Hans Enoksen (S)
	2003	S – A	
	2003-05	S – IA	
2005	2005-07	S – IA – A	
	2007-09	S – A	
2009	2009-13	IA – D – KP	Kuupik Kleist (IA)
2013	2013	S – A – PI	Aleqa Hammond (S)
	2013-14	S – A	
2014	2014-	S – D – A	Kim Kielsen (S)

In May 1993, Siumut's former Prime Minister Motzfeldt proposed extending cooperation with the EU to the mining and other sectors as alternative to the current association agreement, which only covered fish.⁶⁷² In the *Landsting* debate, regional cooperation, research and education were named as other possible areas for extended cooperation. In general, all parties in the *Landsting* welcomed Motzfeldt's proposal. However, they differed in their willingness to work actively for such an extension. While Atassut, AP and IP were open to an immediate extension of Greenland's current agreements with the EU, Motzfeldt's own party Siumut and IA

671 Own table based on STATISTICS GREENLAND (2015): »Grønlands Selvstyre« (<http://www.stat.gl/dialog/main.asp?lang=da&version=201401&sc=SA&subthemecode=01&colcode=0>, 29 December 2015). The parties in government are arranged according to their percentage of the vote in the preceding *Landsting* elections. The parties in bold held the Prime Minister's office. Parties in brackets are supporting parties in a minority government.

672 See for this paragraph: GLTF (1993): »Forslag til debat om et udvidet samarbejde med EF«, 42/1993 (spring) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/FM-1993/Dagsordenens%20punkt%2042-1.htm>, 3 February 2014).

emphasised that the fisheries agreement provided the best basis for EU relations at that time. Despite their different emphasis on future cooperation with the EU, all parties agreed to the automatic extension of the fisheries agreement with the EU for another six years from 1995 until 2000. In October 1994, the *Landsting* also approved the terms of a new fisheries protocol to be in place during the same time.⁶⁷³

During 1994, Atassut was still the most vocal supporter of increased cooperation with the EU. In February, vice chairman Lars Chemnitz (A) demanded that the government investigate alternative forms of association with the EU.⁶⁷⁴ In October, he confirmed that Atassut still supported EU membership.⁶⁷⁵ However, in contrast to 1991, EU membership did not play an important role in Atassut's campaign for the *Landsting* elections in 1995.⁶⁷⁶ For the first time in Greenland's history, the party entered a coalition government with Siumut after the elections. The coalition agreement stated that »throughout the next legislative term none of the parties can take steps in order to change Greenland's contractual relationship with the EU.«⁶⁷⁷

9.2. Enhanced cooperation with the EU

Greenland's cooperation with the EU intensified remarkably at the start of the new millennium.⁶⁷⁸ At its own request, Greenland was included in the EU's Northern Dimension Initiative – a framework for enhanced cooperation between the EU and its member states, Russia, Iceland and Norway, from 1999 onward.⁶⁷⁹ An EU conference on the exact contents of the cooperation with Greenland, referred to as the »Arctic Window«, took place in Ilulissat in 2002. In 2000, the *Landsting* approved the extension of Greenland's fisheries agreement with the EU and the supplementary fisheries protocol for another six-year period from 2001 to 2006.⁶⁸⁰ However, the EU came under increasing pressure from its Court of Auditors to revise the agreement.⁶⁸¹ The problem was that EU member states made less and less use of their fishing licences in Greenlandic waters, while the EU kept paying the fix amount of quotas for these fish. These fish the EU paid for, but never caught became known as »paperfish«. In the agreement's mid-term negotiations in 2002, Greenland and the EU agreed to reduce the yearly compensation payments

673 GLTF (1994): »Gennemførelsesprotokol vedr. betingelserne for EU-fiskeri i grønlandske farvande fra 1. januar 1995 til 31. december 2000«, 12/1994 (autumn) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/EM-1994/dagsordenens%20punkt%2012-1.htm>, 3 February 2014).

674 N.N. (1994): »Atassut er ikke færdig med EU«, in: *A/G*, 22 February 1994, p. 8.

675 GLTF (1994): »Gennemførelsesprotokol vedr. betingelserne for EU-fiskeri i grønlandske farvande fra 1. januar 1995 til 31. december 2000«, 12/1994 (autumn) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/EM-1994/dagsordenens%20punkt%2012-1.htm>, 3 February 2014).

676 N.N. (1995): »Daniel: – Vi er ikke gået tilbage«, in: *A/G*, 14 March 1995, p. 10.

677 N.N. (1995): »Her er samarbejdsaftalen mellem Siumut og Atassut«, in: *A/G*, 14 March 1995, p. 4.

678 See for this subchapter: Lars VESTERBIRK (2006): »Grønlands diplomati i Bruxelles«, in: Hanne Petersen (ed.): *Grønland i verdenssamfundet: Udvikling og forandring af normer og praksis*. Nuuk: Forlaget Atuagkat, pp. 131-160, here: pp. 146-160.

679 GLTF (2000): »Udenrigspolitisk Redegørelse«, 13/2000 (autumn) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/EM-2000/Dagsordenspunkt%2013-1.htm>, 3 February 2014).

680 Ibid.

681 See for the following: GLTF (2003): »Udenrigspolitisk Redegørelse«, 12/2003 (spring) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/FM-2003/Dagsordenspunkt%2012-1.htm>, 3 February 2014).

for fishing licences by the EU to Greenland to 50 per cent from 2004 onward. The other 50 per cent of the agreed amount should run into development projects.

This new regulation was institutionalised with the adoption of three agreements in 2006: a seven-year partnership agreement with the EU from 2007 until 2013, which dealt with cooperation in areas other than fisheries, a traditional six-year fisheries partnership agreement from 2007 until 2012, and a common declaration that bound both agreements together.⁶⁸² Greenland received the same financial support from the EU as during the period from 2001 to 2006. However, the EU no longer paid this amount exclusively for fishing licences it did not use. Now, it paid both for fishing licences under the fisheries partnership agreement and for the economic development of Greenlandic sectors defined in the partnership agreement. These were education and training, mineral resources, energy, tourism and culture, research and food safety. Both payments were financed directly from the EU's general budget and not from the EDF as in the case of the other OCTs. In order to qualify for support within the framework of the partnership agreement, the EU called on the Greenlandic Home Rule authorities to set up objectives and indicators. But it remained up to the Greenlandic governments to decide where the money went. For the seven years of the first partnership agreement, EU payments were earmarked for the Greenland Education Programme, which aimed for the entire reform of Greenland's education sector.⁶⁸³

Through its continued OCT status, Greenland also received access to FP7 and the Programmes for Life-Long Learning, Competition and Innovation, Culture and the Media.⁶⁸⁴ Moreover, it has been part of the EU's NPP since 2000. In addition, Greenland and the EU reached agreement on a veterinary protocol in 2011. Since 2014, veterinary inspections of fisheries and shrimps exports to the EU have taken place directly at border control stations in Greenland, which has facilitated their access to the EU market.⁶⁸⁵

In 2014, relations between the EU and Greenland further deepened. In March

682 This contractual framework is often referred to as »Kajak Agreement«. See for this paragraph: GLTF (2006): »Forslag til landstingsbeslutning om Landstingets godkendelse af forhandlingsresultatet mellem Grønland og EU om en ny fiskeriaftale og anneks til protokol til fiskeriaftalen«, 38/2006 (autumn) (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/groenlands_landsting/Landstingssamlinger/Efteraarsamling_2006/dagsordenspunkter_behandlingsdato_2006/Beslutningsforslag_fra_landstyremedl/pkt38.aspx, 27 February 2016); GLTF (2006): »Redegørelse til landstinget om nyt partnerskab mellem Grønland og den Europæiske Union«, 40/2006 (autumn): Forelæggelsesnotat (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/upload/labu/em2006/pkt40_eupartnerskab_fn_dk.doc, 27 February 2016).

683 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2007): »Programming Document for the Sustainable Development of Greenland« (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/programming-document-sustainable-development-greenland-2007_en_1.pdf, 27 February 2016).

684 See for this paragraph: GLTF (2012): »Udenrigspolitisk redegørelse ved Formanden for Naalakkersuisut«, 14/2012 (autumn) (<http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Udenrigsdirektoratet/DK/Udenrigspolitiske%20redogørelser/Udenrigspolitiske%20redogørelse%202012.pdf>, 3 February 2014).

685 GOVERNMENT OF GREENLAND (2016): »Veterinary Agreement« (<http://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/Greenland-Representation-to-the-EU/European-Union-and-Greenland/Veterinary-Agreement>, 4 January 2016); Rosa THORSEN (2014): »Fødevareminister åbner EU's grænsekontrolsted i Nuuk«, in: *Sermitsiaq (online)*, 11 August 2014 (<http://sermitsiaq.ag/foedevareminister-aabner-eus-graensekontrolsted-i-nuuk>, 4 January 2016).

2014, the EU defined its rules for cooperating with Greenland in areas other than fisheries in a special Council decision.⁶⁸⁶ The EU declared to support Greenland in addressing its major economic challenges and to contribute to the capacity of the Greenlandic administration to formulating and implementing national policies in areas of mutual interest. In September 2014, the EU agreed on a new partnership agreement with Greenland for the period from 2014 until 2020, in which it further increased the annual payments to Greenland, which continued to be earmarked for the Greenland Education Programme.⁶⁸⁷ In March 2015, the EU, Denmark and Greenland signed a new joint declaration. It noted that a strengthening of the relations between the EU and Greenland had recently taken place.⁶⁸⁸ The intent of the declaration was to »signal a new cycle in the relations«. It defined seven areas for cooperation: fisheries, education, natural resources, energy, arctic issues, the social sector and research and innovation. Together with the automatic extension of the fisheries partnership agreement in 2013, these agreements illustrated Greenland's increasing significance for the EU.

One of the EU's main interests in an enhanced cooperation was access for European companies to Greenland's raw materials. In 2012, Greenland's Prime Minister Kuupik Kleist (IA), Commission Vice President Antonio Tajani and the Commissioner for Development Cooperation, Andris Piebalgs, had signed a letter of intent on cooperation in joint infrastructures and investments and capacity building in exploration and exploitation of raw materials.⁶⁸⁹ This represented the first step towards potential cooperation with the EU in the mining sector. In February 2014, the EU also enabled Greenland to participate in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Certification by the EU authorities meant that Greenland could now export rough diamonds to third states.⁶⁹⁰

The EU's rapprochement with Greenland was not one-sided. Greenland's Home Rule governments gradually overcame their reservations towards the EU. Since

686 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014): »Council Decision 2014/137/EU of 14 March 2014 on Relations between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other«, OJ L 76/1, 15 March 2014 (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2014:076:FULL&from=GA>, 4 January 2016).

687 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014): »Programming Document for the Sustainable Development of Greenland 2014-2020«, 28 October 2014 (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/signed_programming_document_for_sustainable_development_of_greenland_2014-2020_colour.pdf, 4 January 2016).

688 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2015): »Joint Declaration by the European Union, on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other, on Relations between the European Union and Greenland«, 19 March 2015 (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/signed-joint-declaration-eu-greenland-denmark_en.pdf, 27 February 2016).

689 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2012): »Greenland's Raw Materials Potential and the EU Strategic Needs«, MEMO/12/428 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-428_en.htm?locale=en, 3 February 2014).

690 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014): »Regulation (EU) No 257/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2368/2002 as regards the Inclusion of Greenland in Implementing the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme«, OJ L 84/69, 20 March 2014 (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0257&from=EN>, 29 December 2015).

the introduction of Self Rule in 2009, all Siumut- and IA-led governments have wanted to extend Greenland's cooperation with the EU.⁶⁹¹ Greenland's government, consisting of Siumut, Atassut and the Democrats, that came into power in 2014, mentioned »trade, business and industry, mineral resources and the energy sector« as possible areas for increased cooperation.⁶⁹² Vittus Qujaukitsoq (S), Minister for Industry, Labour, Trade and Foreign Affairs in 2014, even went so far as to say that the »Government of Greenland is of the opinion that the EU should be much more present in Greenland«. ⁶⁹³ Figure 4 illustrates Greenland's contractual relationship with the EU since its withdrawal.

Figure 4: Greenlandic/EU relations since Greenland's withdrawal in 1985 (including the payment for fishing licences and development aid)

1985	1990	1995	2001	2007	2013	2014	2016
OCT Association I			OCT Association II (amended in 2007)			OCT Assoc. III (OAD)	
Fisheries Agreement (extended 1995, 2001)				Fisheries Partnership Agreement (extended 2013)			
Fisheries Prot. I €26.5m p.a.	Fisheries Prot. II €34.3m p.a.	Fisheries Prot. III €37.7m p.a.	Fisheries Prot. IV €42.8m p.a.	Fisheries Prot. V €17.8m p.a.	Fisheries Prot. VI €17.8m p.a.	Fisheries Prot. VII €17.8m p.a.	
				Partnership Agreement I €25.0m p.a.		Partnership Agreement II €31.1m p.a.	

However, despite this clear intensification of relations, there were only scattered attempts in Greenland to start another debate about EU membership. Towards the end of the 1990s, proposals of such kind still came for the most part from within Atassut. In 1999, Aqqaluk Petersen (A) demanded another referendum on EU membership.⁶⁹⁴ During the same year, Atassut's parliamentary speaker Otto Steenholdt urged the new Siumut-IA coalition government to reconsider EU membership.⁶⁹⁵

691 GOVERNMENT OF GREENLAND (2009): »Landsstyrekoalitionsaftale for perioden 2009-2013« (<http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Naalakkersuisut/DK/Koalitionsaftaler/Koalitionsaftale%202009-2013.pdf>, 27 February 2016); GOVERNMENT OF GREENLAND (2013): »Unified Country – Unified People: Coalition Agreement 2013- 2017« (http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Naalakkersuisut/DK/Koalitionsaftaler/Coalition%20Agreement%202013_2017%20ENG.pdf, 3 February 2014).

692 GOVERNMENT OF GREENLAND (2014): »Coalition Agreement 2014-2018: Fellowship – Security – Development« (<http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Naalakkersuisut/DK/Koalitionsaftaler/Koalitionsaftale%202014-2018%20engelsk.pdf>, 2 January 2016).

693 GOVERNMENT OF GREENLAND (2015): »Report on the Greenland Representation's Seminar on: »Greenland in the Arctic – Economic Diversification and Sustainable Development«, June 23, 2015, Brussels«, 3 July 2015 (<http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Bruxelles/EU%20and%20Greenland/National%20Day%20Seminar%20June%202015/Report%20on%20the%20National%20Day%20Seminar%202015.pdf>, 4 January 2016).

694 Aqqaluk PETERSEN (1999): »Hvem tegner fremtiden«, in: *A/G*, 2 February 1999, p. 16.

695 Otto STEENHOLDT (1999): »Vi er klar til at samarbejde«, in: *A/G*, 7 December 1999, p. 14.

Before the *Landsting* elections in 2002, the party was also »open« to another referendum on EU membership, but did not make it part of its campaign.⁶⁹⁶ Atassut gradually lost ground in Greenlandic politics. With one exception only, its share of the vote decreased with every *Landsting* election since 1983, dropping from 46.6 per cent at the time to 6.5 per cent 31 years later. Thus, it was no longer very meaningful when Atassut demanded, for example, an investigation of EU membership in its unsuccessful bid for a *Folketing* seat in 2011.⁶⁹⁷

The representation of other EU-friendly centre parties in the *Landsting* also proved short-lived. IP and AK failed to win re-election to the *Landsting* in 1995 and 1999 respectively and disappeared from Greenlandic politics. *Landsting* MP Mads Peter Grønvold (KP) demanded an investigation into the costs and benefits of a potential Greenlandic membership in the EU in 2001 and 2002.⁶⁹⁸ However, he failed to win re-election after 2002, while KP's remaining *Landsting* MP was an opponent of EU membership.

The most important party keeping the membership option alive in Greenlandic politics from the 2000s onward were the Democrats. With 15.9 per cent in the *Landsting* elections in 2002 and 22.8 per cent in 2005, the party became an important force in Greenlandic politics. It supported Greenland's membership in the EU, »however not at any cost«.⁶⁹⁹ In 2004, its parliamentary speaker Palle Christiansen (D) demanded an investigation of the costs and benefits of Greenland's potential membership in the EU in the *Landsting*.⁷⁰⁰ In February 2007, he proposed a renewed debate about Greenland's potential re-accession.⁷⁰¹ In March 2009 – influenced by the increasing likelihood of an EU membership application in Iceland – he called on the establishment of a working group in order to investigate Greenland's potential EU membership.⁷⁰² Due to the upcoming *Landsting*

696 Elna EGEDE (2002): »Atassut satser ikke alt på EU«, in: *A/G*, 28 November 2002, p. 3.

697 N.N. (2011): »Knud Kristiansen: Vi skal undersøge medlemskab af EU«, in: *Sermitsiaq (online)*, 28 August 2011 (<http://sermitsiaq.ag/node/106345>, 3 February 2014).

698 GLTF (2001): »Forslag til forespørgselsdebat om at undersøge mulighederne for samarbejde med andre lande vedrørende udvikling af Grønland«, 71/2001 (autumn) (<http://www.landstinget.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/EM-2001/Dagsordens%20punkt%2071-1.htm>, 3 February 2014); GLTF (2002): »Agtter Landsstyret af fremlægge en tilbundsående undersøgelse til debat i Landstinget, der belyser fordele og ulemper for Grønland, hvis Grønland skulle blive medlem af EU?« 156/2002 (autumn) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/EM-2002/Dagsordenens%20punkt%20156-1.htm>, 3 February 2014).

699 GLTF (2007): »Forslag til forespørgselsdebat om det fremtidige forhold til EU, herunder en eventuel genindmeldelse«, 59/2007 (spring), statement of the Democrats (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/upload/labu/fm2007/medl_fors_dk/pkt59_eu_genindmeldelse_pc_dk.pdf, 27 February 2016).

700 GLTF (2004): »Mødets åbning«, 1/2004 (autumn) (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/upload/labu/em2004/pkt1b_dk_2109.pdf, 27 February 2016).

701 GLTF (2007): »Forslag til forespørgselsdebat om det fremtidige forhold til EU, herunder en eventuel genindmeldelse«, 59/2007 (spring), statement of the Democrats (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/upload/labu/fm2007/medl_fors_dk/pkt59_eu_genindmeldelse_pc_dk.pdf, 27 February 2016).

702 GLTF (2009): »Forslag til Landstingsbeslutning om at Landsstyret pålægges at nedsætte en arbejdsgruppe, der skal vurdere fordele og ulemper ved et grønlandsk medlemskab af EU«, 78/2009 (spring), statement of the Democrats (http://www.landstinget.gl/upload/labu/fm2009/forslag/pkt78_dk.pdf, 3 February 2014).

elections in 2009, the proposal was not entertained. After the elections, *Landsting* MP Niels Thomsen (D) took it up again.⁷⁰³

However, Siumut and IA, Greenland's main governing parties, continued to block any proposals, which aimed at readdressing the membership issue. They had done so in all cases since Greenland's withdrawal in 1985. On the 25th anniversary of Greenland's withdrawal in February 2010, Prime Minister Kuupik Kleist (IA) stated that a debate on Greenland's membership in the EU was not on the agenda.⁷⁰⁴ This came shortly after he had rebuffed the Democrats' proposal for an investigation of EU membership in August 2009.⁷⁰⁵ The Democrats subsequently abandoned their proposal when they entered a coalition government with IA and KP in 2009. In February 2010, *Landsting* MP Thomsen (D), the initiator of the proposal, declared that the Democrats had changed their position on EU membership and now believed that Greenland's interests were best preserved outside the EU by its current relationship with it.⁷⁰⁶

In 2014, it was for the first time a member of Siumut that brought EU membership back into the political debate. In his campaign for becoming Siumut's chairman in October 2014, Nick Nielsen (S), Minister for Education, Culture, Church and Equality from 2013-14, stated that Greenland should start to »discuss the costs and benefits of a potential EU membership«.⁷⁰⁷ Nielsen's party colleagues Jens-Erik Kirkegaard (S), Minister of Industry and Mining from 2013-14, and Peter Davidsen (S) supported his campaign and stance on EU membership.⁷⁰⁸ In the vote, Nielsen had no chance against Kim Kielsen (S), who became Siumut's new party chairman and, after Siumut's election victory in November 2014, also Greenland's new Prime Minister. But some commentators saw in Nielsen and Kirkegaard the advent of a new generation in Greenlandic politics who had not been politically socialised during Greenland's withdrawal from the EU and were therefore more open to consider EU membership.⁷⁰⁹

703 GLTF (2009): »Forslag til Inatsisartut-beslutning om at Naalakkersuisut pålægges at nedsætte en arbejdsgruppe, der skal vurdere fordele og ulemper ved et grønlandsk medlemskab af EU«, 24/2009 (autumn), statement of the Democrats (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/documents/samlinger2009/pkt24_dk.pdf, 3 February 2014).

704 Kurt KRISTENSEN (2010): »25 år efter »Baj til EF«: Grønlands EU-politik ligger fast«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 22 January 2010, p. 9.

705 GLTF (2009): »Forslag til Inatsisartut-beslutning om at Naalakkersuisut pålægges at nedsætte en arbejdsgruppe, der skal vurdere fordele og ulemper ved et grønlandsk medlemskab af EU«, 24/2009 (autumn), statement of the government (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/documents/samlinger2009/pkt24_SN_dk.pdf, 3 February 2014).

706 Niels THOMSEN (2010): »Bedst at blive i EU«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 5 February 2010, p. 36.

707 Kathrine KRUSE (2014): »Nick Nielsen: Befolkningen bør drøfte fordelene og ulemperne ved EU«, in: *Sermitsiaq (online)*, 16 October 2014 (<http://sermitsiaq.ag/nick-nielsen-befolkningen-boer-droefte-fordelene-ulemperne-ved-eu>, 4 January 2016).

708 Søren Duran DUUS (2014): »Jens-Erik Kirkegaard støtter Nick Nielsen«, in: *Sermitsiaq (online)*, 16 October 2014 (<http://sermitsiaq.ag/jens-erik-kirkegaard-stoetter-nick-nielsen>, 4 January 2016); Kathrine KRUSE (2014): »Jens-Erik Kirkegaard hilser EU-debatten velkommen«, in: *Sermitsiaq (online)*, 17 October 2014 (<http://sermitsiaq.ag/jens-erik-kirkegaard-hilser-eu-debatten-velkommen>, 4 January 2016).

709 Mads ULLERUP (2015): »Damien Degeorges: Tid til fornyet EU-debat«, in: *Sermitsiaq (online)*, 5 April 2015 (<http://sermitsiaq.ag/damien-degeorges-tid-fornyet-eu-debat>, 4 January 2016).

Yet, in the most recent *Landsting* elections in 2014, EU membership did not play any role. Only Atassut stated that it was important to compare the costs and benefits of increased cooperation and EU membership.⁷¹⁰ The Democrats considered it to be »an open question whether full membership or the current OCT status was more beneficial«. ⁷¹¹ But after the 2014 elections, both parties held only six out of 31 seats in the *Landsting*. Greenland's largest party Siumut stated that it wanted increased cooperation with the EU »without the objective of becoming an EU member«. ⁷¹² The other parties did not take a stance on EU membership at all.

9.3. Greenland's satisfactory economic relationship with the EU

In 1982, Greenland's Siumut government rejected EC membership, although it was aware that withdrawal from the EC might result in severe economic problems. At the time, Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt (S) explicitly stated that the strong political interest to withdraw from the EC was worth the potential economic loss connected with withdrawal (see chapter 7). But in comparison to the prophecies of economic doomsday before the 1982 referendum, the Greenlandic Home Rule government was able to negotiate quite favourable terms for its future status outside the EU. Through its OCT status, Greenland kept custom-free access for its exports to the EU market also after its withdrawal. This meant that it was not necessary to negotiate better access for its products on the EU market through a special FTA other than in the Faroe Islands. The EU itself described the OCT-EU trade relationship as »one of the most favourable ever granted by the Community« to third states.⁷¹³ Unlike the other OCTs, Greenland did not qualify for development aid from the EDF, but the EU's payments for fishing licences in Greenlandic waters compensated for this loss more than enough. In 2010, they amounted to about 3 per cent of the total income of Greenland's Home Rule authorities.⁷¹⁴

In the beginning, it did not look like Greenland would be able to uphold this favourable contractual relationship with the EU for a long time after its withdrawal. Some months after agreement on Greenland's separation had been reached, cod began to disappear from Greenlandic waters.⁷¹⁵ As EU fishermen were more interested in cod than in other fish species, fisheries in Greenland increasingly lost

710 ATASSUT (2013): »Atassut princip prográm« (<http://atassut.gl/politikki/principprogram/?lang=da>, 2 January 2016).

711 DEMOKRAATIT [DEMOCRATS] (2016): »Partiprogram: Udenrigspolitik« (<http://www.demokraterne.gl/da-dk/politik/partiprogram/udenrigspolitik.aspx>, 27 February 2016).

712 SIUMUT (2014): »Målsætning« (http://siumut.gl/Portals/0/Pdf/dk/Siumuts%20Politiskprogram%202014-2017_dk_MP%20kontrol.pdf, 4 January 2016).

713 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2008): »Green Paper: Future Relations between the EU and the Overseas Countries and Territories« (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-green-paper-eu-and-overseas-countries-and-territories-relations-20080625_en.pdf, 27 February 2016).

714 STATISTICS GREENLAND (2015): »Realøkonomisk fordeling af offentlige indtægter efter sektor, transaktion og tid« (http://bank.stat.gl/pxweb/da/Greenland/Greenland_OF_OF30/OFXREAL.px?rxid=OFXREAL29-12-2015%2020:26:19, 29 December 2015).

715 MOTZFELDT (2003): »Grønland og EU«, p. 114. Cf. Peter FRIIS and Rasmus Ole RASMUSSEN (1989): *The Development of Greenland's Main Industry – the Fishing Industry* (= NORS-papers no. 6, Publications from the Institute of Geography, Socio-Economic Analyses and Computer Science, Research Report no. 67). Roskilde: Roskilde University Centre, p. 38.

attraction. For example, EU fishermen only made use of 37 per cent of the fishing quota allocated to it by the Greenlandic government under the terms of the second fisheries protocol.⁷¹⁶ Despite that, the EU was obliged to pay the fix yearly payments for the quotas it received on the paper. It was not surprising that the EU's Court of Auditors referred to the Greenlandic fisheries agreement as the »world's most expensive fisheries agreement«.

Greenland's Siumut governments therefore worried about every outstanding renegotiation of the fisheries protocol. Shortly after the negotiation of the second fisheries protocol in 1990, Prime Minister Motzfeldt (S) was uncertain whether Greenland would be similarly successful with a third one.⁷¹⁷ In 1993, Johan Lund Olsen, IA's parliamentary speaker, pointed out that the EU could not be satisfied with those »paperfish« for long.⁷¹⁸ Supporters of EU membership also tried to capitalise from these concerns when they demanded a reconsideration of membership in the early 1990s. In the campaign for the *Landsting* elections in 1991, Atassut chairman Konrad Steenholdt declared that his party had been informed on a visit to Strasbourg that Greenland could not count on getting a fisheries agreement as good as the one from 1990 again in 1995.⁷¹⁹ In the campaign for the *Landsting* elections in 2002, Atassut chairman Augusta Selling stated that her party was open to another referendum on EU membership if the fisheries agreement was in danger.⁷²⁰ Party veteran Lars Chemnitz (A) also repeatedly maintained over the years that the more states joined the EU, the more unlikely it would be that Greenland could keep its favourable agreement.⁷²¹ In 2011, Atassut's *Folketing* candidate Knud Kristiansen justified his demand for an investigation of EU membership by claiming that the EU's new and poorer member states would become »more and more irritated« about Greenland's favourable agreement as a non-EU member state.⁷²²

However, all fears that Greenland would not be able to uphold its favourable contractual relationship with the EU proved unnecessary. In every renegotiation of the fisheries protocol, Greenland's governments were able to increase the EU's compensation payments for fisheries in Greenlandic waters or at least keep them at a constant level. In 2000, 2012 and 2015, the Greenlandic governments even

716 See for this paragraph: GLTF (1994): »Gennemførselsprotokol vedr. betingelserne for EU-fiskeri i grønlandske farvande fra 1. januar 1995 til 31. december 2000«, 12/1994 (autumn) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/EM-1994/dagsordenens%20punkt%2012-1.htm>, 3 February 2014).

717 N.N. (1990): »Jonathan Motzfeldt klar til at søge associeringsaftale med EF«, in: *Killingusaaq – Grønlands Fiskeritidende*, 10 December 1990, p. 7.

718 GLTF (1993): »Forslag til debat om et udvidet samarbejde med EF«, 42/1993 (spring) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/FM-1993/Dagsordenens%20punkt%2042-1.htm>, 3 February 2014).

719 N.N. (1991): »Atassut vil kræve landsstyreposter«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 8 February 1991, p. 20.

720 Elna EGEDE (2002): »Atassut satser ikke alt på EU«, in: *A/G*, 28 November 2002, p. 3.

721 GLTF (1990): »Redegørelse vedr. EF's indre marked«, 7/1990 (spring), pp. 11-36, here: p. 19; GLTF (1994): »Gennemførselsprotokol vedr. betingelserne for EU-fiskeri i grønlandske farvande fra 1. januar 1995 til 31. december 2000«, 12/1994 (autumn) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/EM-1994/dagsordenens%20punkt%2012-1.htm>, 3 February 2014).

722 N.N. (2011): »Knud Kristiansen: Vi skal undersøge medlemskab af EU«, in: *Sermitsiaq (online)*, 28 August 2011 (<http://sermitsiaq.ag/node/106345>, 3 February 2014).

succeeded in doing so, despite the total EU quota for fisheries in Greenlandic waters being reduced at the same time.⁷²³ The EU did not even insist on reducing its payments when the fisheries agreement was finally revised in 2006. As described above, it simply divided the hitherto existing amount into compensation payments for fishing licences and development aid.

It is therefore not surprising that Greenland's Home Rule governments were overtly content with Greenland's economic relationship with the EU. After the first renegotiation of the fisheries protocol in 1989, Siumut chairman Lars Emil Johansen argued that the good 1984 agreement had become »even better«.⁷²⁴ In 1993, he concluded that Greenland's association with the EU was much better with regard to market access to the EU than the associations of Norway and Iceland: »We could not have negotiated a more beneficial arrangement with the EC and membership in the EC would not have been more beneficial either«.⁷²⁵ Siumut was also backed by, among others, Frederik Harhoff, academic expert on Greenlandic-Danish constitutional relations, who argued that it would »simply be a misfortune if Greenland decided to join the EC again«.⁷²⁶ The successful renegotiations clearly took the wind out of the sails of supporters for a renewed EU membership. Lars Chemnitz (A) recognised in 1994 that Atassut was »happy« with the result of the negotiations for the third fisheries protocol.⁷²⁷ It was better than one could have expected following the uncertainty about whether the EU would be willing to pay so much for unused quotas.

Satisfaction with Greenland's economic relations with the EU did not wane with time. Looking back at the 21-year long history of the fisheries agreement with the EU in 2006, Lars Emil Johansen (S) estimated that it had increased the revenue of Greenland's Home Rule authorities by about DKK 10 billion.⁷²⁸ Therefore, he did not see any reason, why Greenland's governments should welcome another debate on membership:

Seen with our eyes, the existing agreements [with the EU] must be considered extraordinarily satisfactory. [...] One can therefore note that Greenland's relations

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- 723 GLTF (2000): »Udenrigspolitisk Redegørelse«, 13/2000 (autumn) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/EM-2000/Dagsordenpunkt%2013-1.htm>, 3 February 2014); Søren Duran DUUS (2012): »Win-win-aftale mellem Grønland og EU«, in: *Sermitsiaq (online)*, 20 September 2012 (<http://sermitsiaq.ag/win-win-aftale-mellem-groenland-eu>, 27 January 2016); GOVERNMENT OF GREENLAND (2015): »Ny Fiskeriprotokol« (http://naalakkersuisut.gl/da/Naalakkersuisut/Nyheder/2015/03/230315_fiskeriprotokol, 7 January 2016).
- 724 GLTF (1989): »Gennemførelsesprotokol vedrørende betingelserne for EF-fiskeri i grønlandske farvande fra 1. januar 1990 til 31. december 1994«, 7/1989 (autumn), pp. 281-303, here: p. 285.
- 725 GLTF (1993): »Forslag til debat om et udvidet samarbejde med EF«, 42/1993 (spring) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/FM-1993/Dagsordenens%20punkt%2042-1.htm>, 3 February 2014): »[Det er også Landsstyrets klare opfattelse,] vi ikke kunne have forhandlet os til et mere fordelagtigt arrangement med EF og at medlemskab af EF heller ikke ville have været mere fordelagtigt.«
- 726 N.N. (1991): »Drop EF«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 11 January 1991, p. 10.
- 727 Lars CHEMNITZ (1994): »EU-overenskomst«, in: *A/G*, 12 July 1994, p. 16.
- 728 GLTF (2006): »Udenrigspolitisk Redegørelse«, 18/2006 (winter), statement of Siumut (<http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/upload/labu/vm2006/ordfoer/pkt18siumda.pdf>, 3 February 2014).

with the EU are particularly well-functioning so that there is no reason to work for changing something for the time being.⁷²⁹

Greenland's fishing companies were not always as enthusiastic about the various fisheries protocols. In 2015, Henrik Leth, chairman of the Greenlandic fishing company Polar Seafood, called the 7th fisheries protocol »not optimal« because it would give the EU too many fish at a too low price.⁷³⁰ Despite this, he also emphasised the »overall satisfaction« of Greenland's industry with the Greenland-EU partnership: All in all, the agreement would be the best Greenland could achieve.⁷³¹

9.4. EU membership compared to OCT status

Greenland's political parties in general all agreed that Greenland could be happy about its economic relationship with the EU. But – irrespective of their general satisfaction – did they also believe that remaining outside was economically more attractive than full membership? In its campaign for the *Landsting* elections in 1991, Atassut presented no less than »19 good reasons for joining again«.⁷³² Its primary concern was to enable Greenlandic access to the ERDF. The party calculated that Greenland would receive more than €60 million in grants instead of merely €34.3 million through the second fisheries protocol. This money could be used for modernising Greenland's fishing fleet, for infrastructure development, the exploitation of the underground and for providing Greenland's villages and outer districts with an economic basis. Moreover, EU membership would secure for Greenlandic fishermen guaranteed and long-standing access to the European market, stable prices for their fish exports and access to EC waters. In 1993 and 1994, IP chairman Nikolaj Heinrich and Atassut veterans Lars Chemnitz and Otto Steenholdt reiterated that EU grants would help Greenland to significantly reduce the cost of infrastructure projects.⁷³³

Landsting MPs Palle Christensen (D) and Per Berthelsen (D) stressed in 2007 and 2009 that Greenlanders should not be »blinded« by the payments they had

729 GLTF (2007): »Forslag til forespørgselsdebat om det fremtidige forhold til EU, herunder en eventuel genindmeldelse«, 59/2007 (spring), statement of Siumut (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/upload/labu/fm2007/ordf/250407/siumut/pkt59_dk.pdf, 5 March 2016): »Set med vore øjne må de eksisterende aftaler betegnes som overordentligt tilfredsstillende. [...] Man kan således konstatere, at Grønlands relationer til EU er særdeles velfungerende, og at der derfor ingen grund er til at arbejde for at ændre noget for indværende.«

730 GOVERNMENT OF GREENLAND (2015): »Report on the Greenland Representation's Seminar on: »Greenland in the Arctic – Economic diversification and sustainable development«, June 23, 2015, Brussels«, 3 July 2015 (<http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Bruxelles/EU%20and%20Greenland/National%20Day%20Seminar%20June%202015/Report%20on%20the%20National%20Day%20Seminar%202015.pdf>, 4 January 2016).

731 N.N. (2015): »Grønlands Erhverv: Fiskeriaftale med EU er ikke optimal«, in: *Sermitsiaq (online)*, 11 April 2015 (<http://sermitsiaq.ag/groenlands-erhverv-fiskeriaftale-eu-ikke-optimal>, 5 January 2016).

732 See for this paragraph: N.N. (1991): »EF – vejen ud af krisen«, in: *Nuggit*, 15 February 1991, p. 2.

733 GLTF (1993): »Forslag til debat om et udvidet samarbejde med EF«, 42/1993 (spring) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/FM-1993/Dagsordenens%20punkt%2042-1.htm>, 3 February 2014); N.N. (1994): »Atassut er ikke færdig med EU«, in: *A/G*, 22 February 1994, p. 8; N.N. (1994): »Skræmmekampagner præger valgkampen«, in: *A/G*, 20 September 1994, p. 3.

received from the EU.⁷³⁴ It was likely that Greenland had lost a far greater amount since its withdrawal, which could have been used for landing banes, water-power infrastructure development, housing and other infrastructure and renovation programmes. Christensen and Berthelsen argued that EU membership would give Greenland access to EU programmes for the social, educational and economic sector, a massive amount of grants for infrastructure development and permanent custom-free access to the EU market. Siumut's Minister for Education, Nick Nielsen (S), stated that he was completely certain that Greenland would have received more money for education if it had been an EU member.⁷³⁵ *Landsting* MP Mads Peter Grønvold (KP) believed that EU membership could be the key to increasing the competitiveness of Greenland's economy, through – for example – subsidies for fisheries and shrimp exports, and grants for infrastructure development.⁷³⁶

However, these arguments were unable to convince the Siumut- and IA-led governments. Josef Motzfeldt, IA chairman from 1994 until 2007 and Minister for Finance, External Affairs and Nordic Cooperation from 2003 until 2007 argued that Greenland could not count on receiving large amounts of grants as EU member, as its GDP was a lot higher than that of other EU member states.⁷³⁷ The Democrats also named the low probability of receiving a large number of grants as one of their main reasons why they turned from supporting to opposing a reinvestigation of membership in 2010.⁷³⁸ Jørgen Wæver Johansen (S), chairman of Siumut's youth organisation, concluded that OCT status and the fisheries agreement had secured Greenland far more economic gains than what the EU's regional funds could have done during the same time.⁷³⁹ And Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt (S) feared in 1990 that Greenland's fishermen would not be able to compete with

734 See for this paragraph: GLTF (2007): »Forslag til forespørgselsdebat om det fremtidige forhold til EU, herunder en eventuel genindmeldelse«, 59/2007 (spring), statement of the government (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/upload/labu/fm2007/svarnotat/anden/pkt59_sn_dk.pdf, 5 March 2016); GLTF (2009): »Forslag til Landstingsbeslutning om at Landsstyret pålægges at nedsætte en arbejdsgruppe, der skal vurdere fordele og ulemper ved et grønlandsk medlemskab af EU«, 78/2009 (spring), statement of the government (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/documents/samlinger2009/pkt24_SN_dk.pdf, 5 March 2016).

735 Kathrine KRUSE (2014): »Nick Nielsen: Befolkningen bør drøfte fordelene og ulemperne ved EU«, in: *Sermitsiaq (online)*, 16 October 2014 (<http://sermitsiaq.ag/nick-nielsen-befolkningen-boer-droefte-fordelene-ulemperne-ved-eu>, 4 January 2016).

736 GLTF (2001): »Forslag til forespørgselsdebat om at undersøge mulighederne for samarbejde med andre lande vedrørende udvikling af Grønland«, 71/2001 (autumn) (<http://www.landstinget.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/EM-2001/Dagsordens%20punkt%2071-1.htm>, 3 February 2014); GLTF (2002): »Agter Landsstyret af fremlægge en tilbundsgående undersøgelse til debat i Landstinget, der belyser fordele og ulemper for Grønland, hvis Grønland skulle blive medlem af EU?«, 156/2002 (autumn) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/EM-2002/Dagsordenens%20punkt%20156-1.htm>, 3 February 2014).

737 GLTF (2007): »Forslag til forespørgselsdebat om det fremtidige forhold til EU, herunder en eventuel genindmeldelse«, 59/2007 (spring), statement of the Democrats (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/upload/labu/fm2007/medl_fors_dk/pkt59_eu_genindmeldelse_pc_dk.pdf, 27 February 2016); Josef MOTZFELDT (2006): »Grønlands udenrigspolitik i forhold til rigsfællesskabet og verdenssamfundet«, in: Hanne Petersen (ed.): *Grønland i Verdenssamfundet: Udvikling og forandring af normer og praksis*. Nuuk: Forlaget Atuagkat/Ilisimatusarfik, pp. 65-73, here: p. 71.

738 Niels THOMSEN (2010): »Bedst at blive i EU«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 5 February 2010, p. 36.

739 Jørgen Wæver JOHANSEN (1998): »Har ikke respekt for den grønlandske dømmekraft«, in: *A/G*, 9 April 1998, p. 23.

EU fishermen if the latter had access to Greenland's EEZ again.⁷⁴⁰ In 2001, he recalled that continued membership in the CFP would have made the development of a fisheries sector impossible.⁷⁴¹ Then, Greenland would have had to respect the historic rights of other fishing nations and would not have achieved satisfactory quotas for its own fishermen.

However, the economic importance of preserving Greenland's EEZ to Greenlandic fishermen should be doubted. The potential economic loss through EC member states' fisheries in Greenlandic waters was far less significant than the problem of the EU presuming to decide who was allowed to catch what in Greenland's own waters (see chapter 7). In addition, Atassut believed that this argument was no longer valid, as Greenland's withdrawal had ousted the great majority of Community fishermen from Greenlandic waters.⁷⁴² Thus, by now, they had lost any historic fisheries rights in Greenland's EEZ and would not be able to oust Greenlandic fishermen from their catching grounds, even if Greenland re-acceded. Atassut also emphasised that the EU based the division of quotas on the recommendation of international biologists – just as the Greenlandic authorities did.⁷⁴³ Moreover, Lars Chemnitz (A) claimed in 1994 that Greenland's fishing fleet was fully developed by now so that it would be able to compete with EU fishermen, unlike in the 1970s and early 1980s.⁷⁴⁴

In this context, it is worth mentioning that IP and AP, the parties closely connected to the fisheries sector, were at the forefront of those willing to reinvestigate EU membership in the early 1990s. If the CFP actually threatened the economic basis for Greenland's most important sector, it should have been the other way round. In 1993, Nikolaj Heinrich (IP), who had been in the frontline of Greenland's campaign for withdrawal in 1982, stated that there were several signs that Greenland had assessed the costs and benefits of EU membership too early.⁷⁴⁵ Even if Greenland received a significant amount of compensation from the EU through the fisheries agreement and custom-free access to the EU market, the EU could cancel this agreement at any time in the future. Moreover, Hans Pavia Egede (AP), former chairman of Greenland's Distant-Water Fisheries Association APK (*Avataasiutininik Piginneqatigiiffiit Kattuffiat*) and now *Landsting* MP, was appalled at hearing EU opponents claim »that membership would not be more advantageous: who can say something like that if there have not been any renegotiations on membership?«⁷⁴⁶

740 N.N. (1990): »Jonathan Motzfeldt klar til at søge associeringsaftale med EF«, in: *Killingusaaq – Grønlands Fiskeritidende*, 10 December 1990, p. 7.

741 GLTF (2001): »Forslag til forespørgselsdebat om at undersøge mulighederne for samarbejde med andre lande vedrørende udvikling af Grønland«, 71/2001 (autumn) (<http://www.landstinget.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/EM-2001/Dagsordenens%20punkt%2071-1.htm>, 3 February 2014).

742 N.N. (1991): »Atassut vil i EF«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 1 February 1991, p. 14.

743 This argument is tricky though, as criticism of the CFP has often focused on the European Council ignoring the recommendations of fisheries biologists.

744 N.N. (1994): »Atassut er ikke færdig med EU«, in: *A/G*, 22 February 1994, p. 8.

745 GLTF (1993): »Forslag til debat om et udvidet samarbejde med EF«, 42/1993 (spring) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/FM-1993/Dagsordenens%20punkt%2042-1.htm>, 3 February 2014).

746 Ibid: »[Men det for os utilfredsstillende at høre samme EF-modstander sige,] at et medlemskab ikke ville

The Nuuk Hunters' and Fishermen's Association NAPP (*Nuummi Aalisartut Piniartullu Peqatigiit*) even declared its support for Greenland's re-accession to the EU in 2010, claiming that »one of the most serious arguments in favour of withdrawal«, namely that Greenland could better manage its fisheries resources on its own, had not come true.⁷⁴⁷ Consequently, it was not entirely self-evident that Greenland was better off economically outside the EU than within it.

Nevertheless, Greenland's Home Rule governments only had a weak economic interest to join the EU in the early 1990s, owing to their general satisfaction with Greenland's economic relationship with the EU. The EU offered Greenland continued custom-free access to the EU market through its OCT status and constantly increasing payments for fishing licences, while Greenland only had to deliver marginal and decreasing fishing quotas for EU fishermen in return: a good business deal. The EU even extended its financial assistance to other policy areas after 2007. There were not many other non-EU members that were able to achieve such a favourable agreement with the EU. A lot suggests that Greenland's geostrategic importance as the EU's gateway to the Arctic and potential future raw-material supplier for EU industries played an important role in that regard. Moreover, Greenland managed to exploit the complex division of European policy responsibilities between the Home Rule institutions, the Danish government and the EU to its favour.⁷⁴⁸ From an economic point of view, Greenland remaining outside therefore proved relatively unproblematic.

However, the great reluctance of Greenland's Home Rule governments to discuss re-accession to the EU as a potential policy option is surprising from a LI perspective because some of Greenland's fisheries interest groups and the parties connected to them verifiably became more open to membership – and this only a few years after Greenland's withdrawal from the EC. According to LI, their weak economic interest in EU membership should have enabled Greenland's Home Rule governments to base the membership decision on their political interest to reject membership. However, the application of process-tracing between Greenland's withdrawal from the EC in the early 1980s and its continued rejection of EU membership since the early 1990s makes it doubtful that it was only a weak interest in EU membership that enabled Greenland's Home Rule governments to prioritise its political interest to remain outside.

9.5. National sovereignty over fisheries resources

Chapter 7 showed that the main reason for Greenland's withdrawal in 1985 was the struggle for self-determination. Greenlanders should be in charge of Greenland's political and economic development, not the EC. Most importantly, Greenlanders

være mere fordelagtigt. Hvem kan sige sådanne ord, når der ikke igang har været ført genforhandlinger om medlemskab [...]?»

747 Noah MØLGAARD (2010): »Nuuks fiskere vil tilbage til EU«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 5 February 2010, p. 3.

748 Ulrik Pram GAD (2013): »Greenland Projecting Sovereignty – Denmark Projecting Sovereignty Away«, in: Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Ulrik Pram Gad (eds.): *European Integration and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games: The Overseas Countries and Territories*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 217-234.

should decide themselves about the management of their own fisheries resources. In 1982, their medium economic interest to remain within the EC was unable to argue Siumut's politicians out of leaving it because they deemed Greenland's struggle for self-determination more important. There is nothing that indicates that this changed in the early 1990s. The struggle for self-determination remained pre-eminent in Greenlandic politics.

Twenty years after the introduction of Home Rule, Greenland's governments had taken over nearly all matters contained in the Home Rule Act.⁷⁴⁹ Therefore, Greenland's Siumut-IA coalition government established a Greenlandic Self-Government Commission in 1999 in order to propose how further areas could be devolved to Greenland's institutions. The Commission's proposals formed the basis for a mixed Greenlandic-Danish Self-Government Commission, established in 2004. In 2008, its proposals culminated in Greenland's Self-Government Act. 75 per cent of Greenland's electorate voted in its favour in a referendum in 2008. Most importantly, the Self-Government Act recognised the right to self-determination of the Greenlandic people. It defined further policy areas that could be taken over by the Greenlandic Home Rule institutions. It dealt with the amount of Danish subsidies to Greenland and their reduction in case of income from the exploitation of Greenland's resources. And it outlined the process towards Greenland's potential independence.

All Greenlandic Home Rule governments continued to perceive EU membership as directly opposed to this struggle for national sovereignty and the preservation of this sovereignty over Greenland's fisheries resources. In 1989, Siumut chairman Lars Emil Johansen stated that the successful negotiations on the second fisheries protocol had shown

that it was good that we withdrew from the EC: if we had not taken up [withdrawal] negotiations with the EC, the EC would dictate us, how much we should catch in our own waters, as they had done under membership.⁷⁵⁰

In 1991, Siumut heavily criticised Atassut in its party paper for

underestimating the economic and political value of the sovereignty over Greenland's fisheries. [...] Today, it is us who control our development. In the EU, it is the EU who is in control. Even if coastal states in the EU have a priority right to catch their own fish, EU membership will mean that we – for example – can no longer sell or swap fishing quotas with others. Our freedom will be restricted. [...]

749 See for this paragraph: GOVERNMENT OF GREENLAND (2008): »Forslag til Lov om Grønlands Selvstyre« (<http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Naalakkersuisut/DK/Selvstyre/Lov%20om%20Grønlands%20Selvstyre%20med%20bemærkninger.pdf>, 3 February 2014).

750 GLTF (1989): »Gennemførelsesprotokol vedrørende betingelserne for EF-fiskeri i grønlandske farvande fra 1. januar 1990 til 31. december 1994«, 7/1989 (autumn), pp. 281-303, here: pp. 295-296: »[Vi vil oven i købet sige,] at det var godt, vi dengang sagde EF baaj. Hvis vi ikke havde taget forhandlinger op om EF, så ville det være sådan, at EF dikterer os, hvor meget vi skal fange i vores egne farvande, ligesom dengang de gjorde under medlemskabet.«

Siumut will fight for Greenland's continued independent development, and this can only happen outside the EU.⁷⁵¹

The statement proved again that Siumut's problem with the CFP was of political and not of economic nature. The Siumut government could live with EC fishermen in Greenlandic waters, but it would not accept that the right to decision-making over Greenlandic fisheries would be transferred back to the EU. The statement continued that, within the EC, Greenland would receive financial help, but that it was unacceptable that the EC would decide its purpose. Moreover, the accelerating »integration and centralisation« processes within the EC could only end in what was – for Greenland – an undesirable political union. Shortly before the *Landssting* elections in 1991, Johansen (S) therefore called it »political self-harm« and »political spanking« to reconsider EU membership at a time when even member states such as Denmark and the UK were losing influence.⁷⁵² In 1993, he reminded the *Landssting* that it might seem self-evident today that Greenland was in control of Greenland's EEZ and determined TACs and other fisheries regulations itself.⁷⁵³ However, these had been »the essential reasons for withdrawal« from the EU. Jørgen Wæver Johansen (S) stressed in 1998 that it remained »a Greenlandic reality that we cannot accept that there are people in Brussels who decide who, where and what can be caught and fished in Greenlandic waters.«⁷⁵⁴

It always remained pre-eminent for Greenland's Home Rule governments in the 2000s that Greenland's enhanced cooperation with the EU would »not undermine the FREEDOM [Orig. Emph.], which we achieved back in 1985 when we withdrew from the EC«. ⁷⁵⁵ IA chairman Josef Motzfeldt pointed out that Greenland would have to subject itself to significant control in exchange for qualifying for EU grants, which would »minimise the right to self-determination«. ⁷⁵⁶ He also believed that Greenland's growing foreign policy role would be reduced to that of a »supernumerary« once it joined the EU.

At the end of the 2000s, three more EU decisions on natural resources reconfirmed Greenland's first IA-led coalition government in its continued emphasis

751 See for the following: N.N. (1991): »Et PS om EF-spøgelset«, in: *Siumut*, 27 February 1991, p. 4: »[Mest farligt er måske at Atassut helt] undervurderer den økonomiske og politiske værdi af fiskerikompetencen. [...] I dag er det os, der styrer udviklingen. I EF er det EF, der styrer. Selvom kyststater i EF har en fortrinsret til deres eget fiskeri, så vil et EF-medlemskab betyde, at vi for eksempel ikke kan sælge eller bytte fiskekvoter med andre. Vores frihed begrænses. [...] Siumut vil kæmpe for Grønlands fortsatte selvstændige udvikling, og det kan kun ske uden for EF«.

752 N.N. (1991): »Atassut's hjemvæ til EF er politisk spanking«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 1 March 1991, p. 10.

753 GLTF (1993): »Forslag til debat om et udvidet samarbejde med EF«, 42/1993 (spring) (<http://www.inatsisartut.gl/dvd/cd-rom/samlinger/FM-1993/Dagsordenens%20punkt%2042-1.htm>, 3 February 2014).

754 Jørgen Wæver JOHANSEN (1998): »Har ikke respekt for den grønlandske dømmekraft«, in: *A/G*, 9 April 1998, p. 23: »[Det er og bliver] en grønlandsk realitet, at vi ikke godtager, at det er folk i Bruxelles, der bestemmer, hvem, hvor og hvad der kan fanges og fiskes i de grønlandske farvande«.

755 GLTF (2006): »Udenrigspolitisk Redegørelse«, 18/2006 (winter), statement of Siumut (<http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/upload/labu/vm2006/ordfoer/pkt18siumda.pdf>, 3 February 2014): »[Når det er sagt, skal vi imidlertid anmode landsstyret om på bedste vis at varetage – og] ikke underminere den FRIHED [Orig. Emph.] – som vi opnåede tilbage i 1985, da vi meldte os ud af EF«.

756 MOTZFELDT (2006): »Grønlands udenrigspolitik«, p. 71.

on self-determination. First, in 2010, the EU banned all imports of seal products. Although the Greenlandic government succeeded in negotiating an exemption for products from the Inuit community from this regulation, the ban ruined the market for seal products in general.⁷⁵⁷ Exports plummeted by 90 per cent until 2015.⁷⁵⁸ The basis of existence of hunters and their families in Greenlandic villages came under threat. Until 2014, the number of hunters decreased by 34 per cent.⁷⁵⁹

Second, Denmark, as Greenland's representative in the IWC, failed to bring Greenland's request for increased quotas for humpback whales through the International Whaling Commission (IWC) for four years in a row, between 2006 and 2009.⁷⁶⁰ In 2010, the IWC agreed to a quota increase only after Greenland had offered to lower its quota for other whale species. However, in 2012, the conflict re-escalated when the IWC rejected Greenland's proposal for another quota increase for fin and humpback whales.⁷⁶¹ To Greenland's dismay, EU member states were found at the forefront of opposition to Greenland's whaling policy. The Greenlandic government subsequently acted against the IWC decision and unilaterally increased its quota.⁷⁶² Third, the EU also devalued Greenland's custom-free access of shrimp to its market by gradually reducing the tariffs on shrimp from third states.⁷⁶³ Thus, Greenlandic shrimp producers increasingly had to compete with Canadian shrimp producers on the EU market.

Prime Minister Kuupik Kleist (IA) explained that his government was dissatisfied with the EU's »general lack of understanding for Greenlandic conditions« in these three policy areas, although this was hardly a surprise for him, as the EU consisted of »27 member states, of which the great majority have no connection with Arctic questions or living conditions«. ⁷⁶⁴ For IA and Siumut, it proved the

757 Sorlannguaq PETERSEN (2013): »Grønlandsk sælfangst støttes på modeshow«, in: *Sermitsiaq (online)*, 30 January 2012 (<http://sermitsiaq.ag/node/146659>, 3 February 2014).

758 Malcolm BRABANT (2015): »Inuit Hunters' Plea to the EU: Lift Ban Seal Cull or Our Lifestyle Will Be Doomed«, in: *The Guardian*, 16 May 2015 (<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/16/greenland-inuits-urge-eu-reverse-seal-ban-save-way-of-life>, 5 January 2016).

759 Søren Duran DUUS (2014): »KNAPK: Så mange sælfangere har opgivet kampen«, in: *Sermitsiaq (online)*, 13 March 2014 (<http://sermitsiaq.ag/knapk-saa-saelfangere-opgivet-kampen>, 5 January 2016).

760 Ane HANSEN (2010): »Grønland har endelig fået pukkelhvalkvoter fra IWC for årene 2010-2012 – eneste resultat i IWC!«, in: *Kamikposten*, 25 June 2010 (<http://www.kamikposten.dk/global/maskinrum/rutine/leksikon.aspx?tag=emne&folder=hvadermeningen&sprog=da&punkt=Hvaler&udvalgt=2010062520002605a>, 27 January 2016).

761 Ane HANSEN (2012): »Nej fra IWC«, in: *Kamikposten*, 5 July 2012 (<http://www.kamikposten.dk/global/maskinrum/rutine/leksikon.aspx?tag=emne&folder=hvadermeningen&sprog=da&punkt=Hvaler&soegestreg=&udvalgt=20120705223857587>, 27 January 2016).

762 Ane HANSEN (2013): »Nationale kvoter for fangst af store hvaler 2013«, in: *Kamikposten*, 2 January 2013 (<http://www.kamikposten.dk/global/maskinrum/rutine/leksikon.aspx?tag=emne&folder=hvadermeningen&sprog=da&punkt=Hvaler&soegestreg=&udvalgt=20130102122916814>, 27 February 2016).

763 N.N. (2009): »EU truer de grønlandske rejer«, in: *Sermitsiaq (online)*, 7 October 2009 (<http://sermitsiaq.ag/node/71279>, 3 February 2014).

764 GLTF (2009): »Forslag til Inatsisartut-beslutning om at Naalakkersuisut pålægges at nedsætte en arbejdsgruppe, der skal vurdere fordele og ulemper ved et grønlandsk medlemskab af EU«, 24/2009 (autumn), statement of the government (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/documents/samlinger2009/pkt24_SN_dk.pdf, 3 February 2014). Cf. Kurt KRISTENSEN (2010): »25 år efter »Baj til EF«: Grønlands EU-politik ligger fast«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 22 January 2010, p. 9.

vital and continued importance of being in control of one's own affairs. Politicians such as Jens-Erik Kirkegaard (S) thus had a hard time to argue that the EU of 1985 that Greenland withdrew from was different than the EU of today.⁷⁶⁵

Only the Democrats argued that independence and EU membership did not have to be »two opposing objectives«. ⁷⁶⁶ On the contrary, chairman Per Berthelsen (D) believed that EU membership could »speed up the process towards an independent Greenland«. *Landsting* MP Palle Christensen (D) emphasised that

the most important argument for re-accession to the EU is to take a seat at the table, which would increase our possibilities to influence matters that are important for our country. The EU's influence on laws and regulations in Denmark as well as in Greenland is already – irrespective of whether we want it or not – quite great. Therefore, it is the Democrats' view that we can just as well try to be present to influence the decision-making process as much as possible. And we can only do this through membership.⁷⁶⁷

For NAPP chairman Lars P. Mathæussen, the EU's policies with regard to whales, seals and shrimps did not present an argument against but for Greenland's renewed membership.⁷⁶⁸ He argued that the EU would not be interested in harming the interests of its own members. Therefore, these EU policies could have looked differently if Greenland had been a member in the EU.

However, proponents of EU membership had a hard time basing their support for EU membership on this argument. Greenland was not an independent state. As an EU member, it would not have the same influence on the decision-making process as other EU member states. Both long-standing IA chairmen, Josef Motzfeldt and Kuupik Kleist, explained that Greenland's current constitutional status – also after Self-Government – would lead to the same undesired form of EU membership as between 1973 and 1985 – as a part of the Danish Realm.⁷⁶⁹ Greenland would not be automatically represented in the Council and the Parliament, but only through agreement with the Danish government and as part of a Danish delegation. On the

765 Kathrine KRUSE (2014): »Jens-Erik Kirkegaard hilser EU-debatten velkommen«, in: *Sermitsiaq* (online), 17 October 2014 (<http://sermitsiaq.ag/jens-erik-kirkegaard-hilser-eu-debatten-velkommen>, 4 January 2016).

766 GLTF (2007): »Forslag til forespørgselsdebat om det fremtidige forhold til EU, herunder en eventuel genindmeldelse«, 59/2007 (spring), statement of the Democrats (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/upload/labu/fm2007/medl_fors_dk/pkt59_eu_genindmeldelse_pc_dk.pdf, 27 February 2016).

767 Ibid: »Det vægtigste argument for en genindtræden i EU er, at vi [...] kommer til at sidde med ved bordet – det øger vores muligheder for at gøre vores indflydelse gældende i sager, der er vigtige for vort land. [...] EU's indflydelse på gældende love og regler i Danmark såvel som i Grønland er allerede – hvad enten vi vil være ved det eller ej – ganske stor, og derfor er det Demokraternes opfattelse, at vi lige så godt kan forsøge at være med til at påvirke beslutningsprocessen mest muligt. Det kan vi kun gennem et medlemskab.«

768 Noah MØLGAARD (2010): »Nuks fiskere vil tilbage til EU«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 5 February 2010, p. 3.

769 See for this paragraph: GLTF (2007): »Forslag til forespørgselsdebat om det fremtidige forhold til EU, herunder en eventuel genindmeldelse«, 59/2007 (spring), statement of the government (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/upload/labu/fm2007/svarnotat/anden/pkt59_sn_dk.pdf, 3 February 2014); GLTF (2009): »Forslag til Inatsisartut-beslutning om at Naalakkersuisut pålægges at nedsætte en arbejdsgruppe, der skal vurdere fordele og ulemper ved et grønlandsk medlemskab af EU«, 24/2009 (autumn), statement of the government (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/documents/samlinger2009/pkt24_SN_dk.pdf, 5 March 2016).

other hand, more than 500 directives would need to be translated into Greenlandic and to be implemented into Greenlandic law. Moreover, various EU treaty reforms had gradually reduced the right to a veto in important policy matters. Therefore, instead of influence, the only thing that would increase with EU membership would be the bureaucratic burden for Greenland's small administration.⁷⁷⁰ The Greenlandic researcher Birger Poppel believed that it had proven effective for Greenland to lobby decision-makers in Brussels in specific cases without spending a lot of money on permanent employees in Brussels.⁷⁷¹

Both the Siumut-led government in 2007 and the IA-led government in 2009 therefore believed that Greenland's existing relationship with the EU, with direct meetings between Commission representatives and representatives of Greenland's government, served Greenland's interests better. Josef Motzfeldt emphasised that the government participated actively in those institutions, where it had real influence, such as in the OCT Association.⁷⁷² *Landsting* MP Niels Thomsen (D) also declared in 2010 that one of the main reasons why the Democrats had abandoned their support for membership had been that Greenland could only become a member via Denmark and would never be considered to be a »rightful member state«. ⁷⁷³

Consequently, in the early 1990s, the political discourse had not changed significantly. This was also the reason why it was so easy for Siumut and IA to block any new debates on EU membership. They simply referred to the fact that the Greenlandic people had already twice rejected EC membership in 1972 and 1982 – only a few years before.⁷⁷⁴ They had already declared their support for Siumut's course of increased self-determination. Therefore, Atassut's request for a reinvestigation of EU membership only showed – according to Siumut – that it had no trust in the democratic judgment of the Greenlandic people.⁷⁷⁵

The analysis of the fourth European policy debate in Greenland is consistent with LI's assumptions. A weak economic interest allegedly allowed Greenlandic Home Rule governments to focus on their strong political interest to reject EU membership after 1990. However, only a couple of years earlier, Greenland's Home Rule governments had explicitly prioritised the struggle for self-determination over the potential economic benefits of EU membership. There are no hints that

770 From the 2000s, Greenland's governments began to refer increasingly to the administrative burden of EU membership. This confirms Baldur Thorhallsson's hypothesis that a small administration must be considered an important obstacle to the participation of small states and microstates in international organisations. Cf. Baldur THORHALLSSON (2002): »Consequences of a Small Administration: The Case of Iceland«, in: *Current Politics and Economics of Europe* 11 (1), pp. 61-76; Baldur THORHALLSSON (2005): »Shackled by Smallness: A Weak Administration as a Determinant of Policy Choice«, in: Baldur Thorhallsson (ed.): *Iceland and European Integration: On the Edge*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 161-184.

771 Mads ULLERUP (2015): »Non-Membership Has Its Privileges«, in: *Arctic Journal*, 4 February 2015 (<http://arcticjournal.com/politics/1306/non-membership-has-its-privileges>, 5 January 2016).

772 GLTF (2007): »Forslag til forespørgselsdebat om det fremtidige forhold til EU, herunder en eventuel genindmeldelse«, 59/2007 (spring), statement of the government (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/upload/labu/fm2007/svarnotat/anden/pkt59_sn_dk.pdf, 5 March 2016).

773 Niels THOMSEN (2010): »Bedst at blive i EU«, in: *Sermitsiaq*, 5 February 2010, p. 36.

774 N.N. (1991): »Valgguide: EF«, in: *A/G*, Supplement to No. 25, 1 March 1991, p. 3.

775 N.N. (1991): »Et PS om EF-spøgelset«, in: *Siumut*, 27 February 1991, p. 4.

their strong political interest to preserve Greenland's national sovereignty should have diminished since then. Process-tracing therefore raises strong doubts that Greenland's Home Rule governments would have reconsidered EU membership in the early 1990s if they had had a strong or medium economic interest to support membership. The fact that Greenland's economic situation outside the EU was better than many had expected before its withdrawal only reduced the incentive to discuss EU membership in the first place.

Thus, Greenland's European policy choices after 1990 also disprove LI. Political interests were not able to become the determining factor for the European policy choices of Greenland's Home Rule governments only because their economic interests were weak. They continued to be the main explanatory factor for Greenland's European policy choices. And – just as in the Faroes – they were so strong because it was impossible for Greenland's Home Rule governments to transfer sovereignty over their most important resources to the EU while Greenland would not even get direct influence on the decision-making process in the EU in return as a part of Denmark. The EU's alleged ignorance towards Greenlandic interests as perceived in its whaling, sealing and shrimp policies reconfirmed Greenland's governments in its rejection. Once again, therefore, Greenland's rejection of EU membership was based on a unique emphasis on national sovereignty, inextricably connected to control over its fisheries resources.

The rejection of EU membership in the Faroe Islands and Greenland: Conclusions and outlook

This book has investigated the underlying preferences of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments regarding their position on membership in the EEC, EC and the EU since 1959, in order to explain what drives European policy in the Faroe Islands and in Greenland. It has taken LI as a theoretical starting point. According to the theory, both Home Rule governments should have based their European policy choices on the commercial interests of economic producers and their own macroeconomic preferences. They should only have indulged the temptation to consider political interests where their economic interests were weak, diffuse, or indeterminate. In order to test these assumptions, the congruence method has been applied to seven European policy choices of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments in the period under study. Thus, it has been compared whether there was in fact a causal relationship between the economic interests of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments and their European policy choices in each of their seven European policy choices.

10.1. The research findings

The initial support for EEC membership in the Faroe Islands in 1961 (case 1) was a consequence of the medium political interest of the Faroese Home Rule government to follow Denmark. The unionist government of JF, SB and SF explicitly admitted that the constitutional position of the Faroes played an important role for its European policy choice. It feared that taking a different European policy decision to Denmark would threaten the Realm. In the early 1960s, it did not make an essential economic difference for the Faroe Islands if they eventually joined EFTA, the EEC or remained outside. Therefore, the economic interest of the unionist government in either of these options was weak and arbitrary. It was unproblematic for the unionist government to adapt its European policy choice to its political interest. Thus, the first European policy choice of the Faroese Home Rule government was consistent with LI's assumptions. The application of process-tracing between the first and the second European policy choice of the Faroese Home Rule governments also revealed that there was a causal relationship between its weak economic interest and its ability to focus on its political interest.

The unionist government was able to base its membership decision on its unionist agenda in the early 1960s because its economic interest with regard to EEC membership was weak and diffuse. Hence, the initial support for EEC membership in the Faroe Islands fully supports LI's assumptions.

On the other hand, Greenland's initial support for EEC membership in 1961 and 1967 (case 2) is a clear outlier. Greenland's political elite considered it natural to follow Denmark into EFTA and the EEC because of its inclusion in the Danish Realm. Thus, it did not take a political position on the question of EEC membership, but only advised the Danish authorities on its concerns with it. In the best case, the Danish government would be able to accommodate them, but even if not, it would not change the fact that Greenland would join the EEC together with Denmark. In fact, the analysis reveals that Greenland's elite had a medium economic interest to reject EEC membership. EEC membership did not offer anything of economic value in the 1960s, but threatened Greenland's protected economy. It would have required Greenland to open up its economy to foreign fishermen, foreign companies and foreign capital at a time when the Greenlandic economy was not yet competitive. Consequently, there was neither consistency nor a causal relationship between the economic interest of Greenland's political elite and its European policy choice. The initial support for EEC membership in Greenland strongly disproves LI's assumptions.

On the contrary, the change from support to rejection of EC membership in the Faroe Islands between 1970 and 1974 (case 3) is a model case for LI's assumptions. The unionist government of JF, SB and SF now rejected Faroese membership in the EC, although it still had a medium political interest to follow Denmark's lead. The reason was that it strongly opposed the CFP, which was adopted in 1970 and based on the principle of equal access of member states to the fishing limits of other member states. The unionist government could not accept that it would only keep its twelve-mile fishing limit temporarily. Nor could it accept that it would not be able to extend this limit at a later point of time in order to exclude other EC fishermen from it. It feared that the trend towards extensions of fishing limits to 200 miles worldwide would increasingly exclude the Faroese distant-water fishing fleet from its traditional catching areas. At the same time, they would not be able to take up fisheries in Faroese waters instead, as the Faroes would not profit from an extended fishing limit if they joined the EC. In addition, EC membership would threaten the basis of existence of Faroese coastal fishermen. Remaining outside the EC was therefore the lesser of two evils for the unionist government. Its strong economic interest to reject EC membership now outbalanced its political interest in membership. The rejection of EEC membership in the Faroe Islands in the early 1970s fully supports LI's assumptions.

However, LI has trouble explaining the change from support to rejection of EC membership in Greenland between 1971 and 1972 (case 4). The rejection of EC membership by Greenland's political elite was now consistent with its medium economic interest to reject membership. But its economic interest had not changed since the 1960s. Moreover, Denmark's accession treaty with the EC satisfacto-

rily accommodated most of the economic concerns of Greenland's elite with EC membership. Only the political interest of Greenland's elite changed radically. With the emergence of a national movement for Greenlandic self-determination, the support for Greenland's inclusion in Denmark's EC membership came under scrutiny in 1972. For the Siumut movement, greater self-determination meant transferring sovereignty from Copenhagen to Nuuk. EC membership would have meant transferring it from Copenhagen to Brussels. Greenland's elite therefore had a strong political interest to reject EC membership. Although it had economic reasons to reject EC membership as well, the application of process-tracing between its first and second European policy choice reveals that only a change of its political interest motivated it to change its European policy. The rejection of EC membership in Greenland in the early 1970s disproves LI's assumptions.

Greenland's withdrawal from EC membership in 1985 (case 5) was a consequence of its struggle for self-determination, which emerged in 1972. Greenland's elite and first Home Rule governments after 1979 continued to have a strong political interest to withdraw from EC membership in order to be able to decide Greenland's future policy themselves. This strong political interest was able to outbalance the medium economic interest of Greenland's elite and first Home Rule governments to remain within the EC. Greenland received a huge amount of grants – more than any other EC member region at the time – which financed Greenland's economic development. This money was more significant than the money Greenland's economy lost through EC member states' partly unlawful fisheries in Greenlandic waters. Once again, there was neither consistency nor a causal relationship between the economic interest of Greenland's political elite and its European policy choice. Greenland's withdrawal from EC membership strongly disproves LI's assumptions. Similar to Eiríkur Bergmann's findings in the Icelandic case, national sovereignty was so important for Greenland's elite because it guaranteed continued control of its fisheries resources. This peculiar emphasis on sovereignty gives a valid explanation as to why the majority of Greenland's elite was ready to sacrifice the economic benefits of membership in favour of its political interest. From 1977 onward, the Commission took over decision-making about fishing quotas in Greenlandic waters, fisheries agreements with other nations and conservation measures over the EC pond. It was impossible for Greenland's political elite to accept that the decision-making on Greenland's most important resource and single source of income should be located in Brussels and not in Nuuk.

The continued rejection of EU membership in the Faroe Islands since the early 1990s (case 6) also disproves LI. This is the case, despite the fact that there was no change in policy regarding the rejection of EC membership by the unionist government in the early 1970s, which had been a model case for LI. In contrast to the 1970s, the industrialisation of the fisheries sector meant that access to the EU market became more important than limiting fisheries in the Faroese EEZ to Faroese fishermen. The new FTA did not live up to Faroese expectations and all Faroese Home Rule governments therefore had a medium economic interest to

support EU membership. The reason why they nevertheless rejected EU membership was that they no longer had a political interest to support membership. Except for SB, all political parties have emphasised the importance of preserving Faroese sovereignty since the 1990s. The transfer of decision-making rights over the management of their fisheries resources to the EC in 1977 was an unacceptable condition for EU membership for the Faroese Home Rule governments. The fact that the Faroes would be included in Denmark's membership made matters even worse because it meant that the Faroes would not be granted direct influence on decision-making within the EU in return. As opposed to LI's assumptions, their strong political interest to reject EU membership was able to outbalance the medium economic interest of all Faroese Home Rule governments since the early 1990s to join the EU. The position of the Faroese Home Rule governments thus began to resemble the position of the Greenlandic Home Rule governments at the beginning of the 1990s. The preservation of national sovereignty was so significant because it meant retaining control over Faroese fisheries resources.

Greenland's continued rejection of EU membership since the early 1990s (case 7) also provides problems for LI's assumptions. Due to their favourable economic partnership with the EU, after its withdrawal as OCT, Greenland's Home Rule governments only had a very weak economic interest to support EU membership since the early 1990s. Remaining outside was economically unproblematic. According to LI, this enabled Greenland's Home Rule governments to focus on their strong political interest to reject EU membership. However, process-tracing provides strong doubts that it was only its weak economic interest that allowed Greenlandic Home Rule governments to focus on their strong political interest to reject EU membership after 1990. In the 1980s, Greenland's Home Rule governments also followed their strong political interest to reject EC membership despite the latter's economic benefits. There are no hints as to why this situation should have changed in the meantime. Greenland's governments were still interested in preserving Greenlandic sovereignty over Greenlandic affairs. Resistance against a transfer of sovereignty continued to be great in Greenland EU because membership would imply the transfer of sovereignty over their most important natural resource. But Greenland's Home Rule governments also referred to the problem of joining the EU as a part of Denmark. Thus, Greenland's European policy choices after 1990 also disprove LI.

LI's assumptions must therefore be rejected in five of the seven different inter-cases (see table 19). LI only provides a sound explanation for Faroese European policy in the 1960s and 1970s. However, after the further development of the CFP between 1977 and 1982, LI can no longer explain Faroese European policy. In order to protect national sovereignty over their fisheries resources, the Faroese Home Rule governments acted against their clear economic interest in EU membership after 1990. The failure of LI to account for the European policy choices of Greenland's elite and Home Rule governments is even more striking. Economic interests were not the primary motivation for any Greenlandic European policy choice. Instead, Greenland's Home Rule government considered economic interests secondary to their overarching objective of achieving self-determination for Greenland after

1971. One of the reasons why this was possible was that after 1977, just as with the Faroes, Greenland's Home Rule governments considered sovereignty over their fisheries resources to be a precondition for exercising sovereignty over Greenlandic matters in general. Fisheries were the economic basis of the Greenlandic nation.

Table 19: Correlation of LI's theoretical assumptions with the seven European policy choices of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments

<i>Debates</i>	<i>Inter-cases</i>	<i>Economic interest</i>	<i>Political interest</i>	<i>European policy</i>	<i>LI</i>
1960s: EEC membership	- 1 - Faroe Islands (1959-63)	Weak and diffuse interest with regard to EEC membership	Medium interest to support EEC membership	Support for EEC membership	✓
	- 2 - Greenland (1959-68)	Medium interest to reject EEC membership	Indeterminate interest with regard to EEC membership	Support for EEC membership	✗
1970s and 1980s: EC membership	- 3 - Faroe Islands (1970-74)	Strong interest to reject EC membership	Medium interest to support EC membership	Rejection of EC membership	✓
	- 4 - Greenland (1971-72)	Medium interest to reject EC membership	Strong interest to reject EC membership	Rejection of EC membership	✗
	- 5 - Greenland (1972-85)	Medium interest to remain within the EC	Strong interest to withdraw from the EC	Withdrawal from EC membership	✗
Since the 1990s: EU membership	- 6 - Faroe Islands (1989-)	Medium interest to join the EU	Strong interest to reject EU membership	Rejection of EU membership	✗
	- 7 - Greenland (1989-)	Weak interest with regard to EU membership	Strong interest to reject EU membership	Rejection of EU membership	✗

The analysis clearly shows how the introduction of the different steps of the CFP affected the European policy choices of the Faroe Islands. At the beginning of the 1960s, the Faroese Home Rule government was still able to support EEC

membership. After the introduction of the equal access principle in 1970, EC membership became a threat to the Faroese economy and the Faroese Home Rule government subsequently changed its European policy. After the 1990s, the CFP was no longer an economic threat to the Faroese economy. But Faroese Home Rule governments were unable to come to terms with the transfer of sovereignty over decision-making on fisheries policy from the EC member states to supranational institutions, which had been introduced between 1977 and 1982.

In Greenland, the change of European policy from following Denmark into the EEC to opposing Greenlandic inclusion in Denmark's EC membership in 1971 also coincided with the introduction of the equal access principle. Yet, the CFP was not as decisive for Greenland's opposition to EC membership as for the Faroe Islands. The change of European policy was a consequence of the political awakening of the Greenlandic nation and its postcolonial resistance against any form of foreign rule. The struggle for self-determination and Greenlandic sovereignty was far more intense in Greenland since the 1970s and 1980s than in the Faroe Islands. Thus, it is likely to have resulted in opposition to EC membership even without the fisheries factor. However, the narrow majority for withdrawal from the EC among Greenland's elite in the early 1980s, which was also reflected in the narrow majority for Greenland's withdrawal in the 1982 referendum, makes it unlikely that Greenland would also have withdrawn from the EC if it had kept control over its fisheries resources.

The results suggest that Bergmann's assumption for Iceland finds its parallel in the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Neither the Faroese nor Greenlandic Home Rule governments were willing to transfer national sovereignty over their most important resource to the EU. They were even less willing to do so because – joining as a part of the Danish Realm – they would not be granted acceptable influence on the decision-making process in return. Thus, Faroese and Greenlandic governments put such a particular emphasis on national sovereignty that it was able to outbalance economic interests to support membership.

10.2. North Atlantic Euroscepticism

Supposing that Bergmann was right with regard to Iceland's rejection of EU membership, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland rejected EU membership for the same reason. This would justify speaking of a North Atlantic Euroscepticism, rooted in the reluctance of the political elites to transfer sovereignty over the nations' fisheries resources to the EU. The significance of sovereignty over their fisheries resources for Iceland's rejection of EU membership has already been demonstrated in the introductory chapter. The fact that fisheries also played some role in the eventual rejection of EU membership in Norway further hints at this assumption.

Contrary to its North Atlantic neighbours, the Norwegian government twice accepted Norway's membership in the CFP, based on a series of temporary derogations in 1994. But Norway's fishermen continued to reject EU membership and were able – together with Norway's peasants – to present themselves as the embodiment

of the nation« in the two membership referendums in 1972 and 1994.⁷⁷⁶ The political strength of the fisheries sector was one of the factors that made it possible for Norway's regions to twice turn down EU membership.⁷⁷⁷ German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel highlighted the significance of fisheries in the negotiations in 1994 when he told his Norwegian colleague, Bjørn Tore Godal: »By now I know every Norwegian fish by their first names and still you say no!«⁷⁷⁸

The reluctance to transfer sovereignty over their fisheries resources to the EU unites the North Atlantic nations and explains why Norway, Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands belong to the most reluctant Europeans. Except for Greenland in part, North Atlantic Euroscepticism is not a consequence of shared historical roots or a common North Atlantic anti-European culture. The reason why all North Atlantic nations eventually ended up outside the EU was that the EU's fisheries policy was designed for the interests of the fishing industries in the EU's founding nations and not for the interests of the small and fish-dependent North Atlantic.

In 2004, Icelandic Foreign Minister Halldór Ásgrímsson clearly recognised the importance of a common fisheries policy for Europe because states such as the UK, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands fished from the same stocks.⁷⁷⁹ It would make sense to have common rules on how to manage and share them. However, the CFP could not take for granted that all fish stocks in the EU pond were shared:

The creators of the CFP never imagined the possibility of fish stocks, which were exclusive to one country. But I put the question to you: is it reasonable to expect Iceland, or indeed other North Atlantic nations, to squeeze themselves into a policy which never had them in mind?

Ásgrímsson believed that the entire North West Atlantic flank of Europe was excluded from the EU because of the application of the CFP.

Euroscepticism in the Faroes and in Greenland is clearly the consequence of North Atlantic idiosyncracies. Nevertheless, although the Faroes and Greenland are clear outliers, they make explicit that the assumptions of an elite consensus in favour of European integration and of a primacy of economic interests for the

776 Iver B. NEUMANN (2001): »The Nordic States and European Unity«, in: *Cooperation and Conflict* 36 (1), pp. 87-94, here: pp. 91-92.

777 Clive ARCHER and Ingrid SOGNER (1998): *Norway, European Integration and Atlantic Security*. London and Thousand Oaks: Sage, pp. 31-36, 63-65.

778 Bjørn Tore GODAL (2004): »In Europa, aber (noch) nicht in der EU. Die Position Norwegens«, Lecture of the Norwegian Ambassador Bjørn Tore Godal on 2 December 2004 at the Humboldt University of Berlin (http://www.norwegen.no/News_and_events/germany/policy/europe/speechhumboldt/, 3 February 2014).

779 See for the following: Halldór ÁSGRÍMSSON (2002): »Iceland's Transatlantic Dilemma: Economic Ties with Europe – Defence Ties with the United States. Europe's Neglected North-Western Flank«, Address by Halldór Ásgrímsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland, at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) on 14 March 2002 (<http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/frettaefni/raedurHA/nr/1745>, 3 February 2014).

European policy choices of national governments should always be treated with caution. The outcome of the European policy choices of the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments proves that it is possible for political interests to outweigh economic interests. Economic interests do not have to be weak, indeterminate and diffuse in order for political interests to play a decisive role in European policy-making. Greenland's withdrawal shows that it is possible for a government to choose self-determination over EU membership, even if this might lead to lower living standards.

Despite the common roots of their rejection of EU membership, important differences exist between the four North Atlantic nations. Norway is Europe's greatest fishing nation, but far less dependent on fisheries than Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Thus, the loss of sovereignty over their fisheries resources was unable to prevent Norwegian governments from applying for EEC and EC membership in the 1960s and for EU membership in the 1990s. Iceland is also far less dependent on fisheries today than the Faroes and Greenland. Moreover, both Iceland and Norway are independent countries. EU supporters have therefore had a much simpler task to argue for EU membership than in the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Iceland and Norway would be granted direct access to the decision-making process in the CFP, while the Faroe Islands and Greenland would only be represented through Denmark. It is obvious why support for membership has been greatest among the political elites in Norway and least among the political elites in the Faroe Islands and in Greenland.

One of the consequences of North Atlantic Euroscepticism has been closer cooperation between the North Atlantic nations.⁷⁸⁰ In 1980, the West Nordic Fund was established in order to provide loans and guarantees for joint business development in Iceland, Greenland and the Faroes. In 1983, it was supplemented by the foundation of the West Nordic Council, consisting of six parliamentarians each from Iceland, Greenland and the Faroes. In the 1990s, the Nordic Atlantic Cooperation (NORA) was established as intergovernmental organisation under the Nordic Council of Ministers between the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland and coastal Norway (the nine coastal counties of Norway, from Finnmark in the north to Rogaland in the south, and Svalbard), supporting joint ventures between business and research and development organisations in the region.

For some politicians, closer cooperation has been key to responding to the integration process on the European continent. TF chairman Høgni Hoydal in particular has promoted »a North Atlantic OPEC« in order to further the common interests of the North Atlantic nations.⁷⁸¹ However, attempts to increase cooperation

780 See for this paragraph: Grétar Thór EYTHÓRSSON and Gestur HOVGAARD (2013): »Vestnorden. A functional region?« In: *Stjórnmal og stjórnsýsla* 9 (1), pp. 139-154 (http://www.irpa.is/article/view/916/pdf_62, 3 February 2014).

781 Hans KÁRASON MIKKELSEN (2005): »Hoydal: Ríkisrættarlaga stöðan má avklárast«, in: *Sosialurín* (online archive), 18 May 2005. Cf. also the TF manifesto for the *Løgting* elections in 2004 in Eiríkur LINDENSKOV (2004): »Valskrá Tjóðveldisfloksins: Eitt val millum heimastýri og at byggja land«, in: *Sosialurín* (online archive), 2 January 2004.

have remained limited. This might be a natural consequence of the importance of fisheries, which creates common interests but also makes them natural competitors on the same international markets.

10.3. Untenability of the current relationships with the EU

What will future European policy look like in the Faroe Islands and Greenland? In the short run, great European policy changes are unlikely. The Faroes are in a European policy deadlock. They have the most difficult relationship with the EU of all Nordic nations. Unlike Norway or Iceland, they are unable to join the EEA as a part of Denmark. Unlike Greenland, they are unable to qualify for OCT status. Thus, they are the only Nordic nation not granted automatic access to the EU's single market and must negotiate with the EU bilaterally. However, the fact that EU membership requires a transfer of sovereignty over their fisheries resources without giving them satisfying decision-making rights in return currently makes it politically impossible for the Faroes to join the EU as a part of Denmark. The Faroe Islands are therefore most likely to continue to foster its current relationship with the EU, regulated by the FTA and enhanced cooperation in other policy areas, on a bilateral basis. In the long run, Faroese Home Rule governments might be able to negotiate themselves into EFTA membership. But a subsequent membership in the EEA must be considered just as doubtful as plans for a customs union with the EU, which would cover fish products, as the EU considers its fisheries sector to be very sensitive.

Greenlandic European policy is likely to remain unchanged because Greenland is satisfied with its association with the EU as OCT and its partnership and fisheries arrangements. Due to the EU's geostrategic interest in the Arctic and in Greenland's mineral resources it is unlikely that Greenland will have to adapt its favourable relationship with the EU in the near future. Just as in the Faroes, Greenlandic Home Rule governments are unlikely to consider EU membership as long as it involves a transfer of sovereignty over Greenland's fisheries resources to the EU without giving them satisfying decision-making rights in return.

Despite this, there is potential for change in future Greenlandic and Faroese European policy. It is rooted in the long-term untenability of the Danish Realm being a member of the EU, while two self-governing regions within the Realm are not. According to the Faroese Takeover Act (2005) and the Greenlandic Self-Government Act (2009), constitutional matters, citizenship, highest jurisdiction, foreign policy, security and defence policy and currency and monetary policy will remain an exclusive competence of the Danish Realm, as long as the Realm between Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland holds.⁷⁸² However, through Denmark's increased integration into the EU, Denmark's political institutions are likely to increasingly transfer sovereignty to the EU in these policy areas. In the long run, this could mean that it will be the EU that determines Faroese and

782 DANISH PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (2005): »Overtagelsesloven«; DANISH PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (2009): »Selvstyreløven«.

Greenlandic policies in these areas and not the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments, although the Faroes and Greenland are not EU members. Both the Faroese and Greenlandic struggle for self-determination would be undermined by Denmark's simultaneous integration into the EU. Therefore, the more Denmark integrates, the more pressure will be put on all parts of the Realm – Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland – to re-evaluate their current relationships with the EU.

TF chairman Erlendur Patursson was the first to recognise this potential untenability. As early as 1974, he wondered what would happen now that the Faroes had come

in the odd situation with regard to the EC to be a third state and at the same time part of a country, which is within the EC. Will not the Faroe Islands, even if they are formally outside the EC, actually be inside anyway in many aspects?⁷⁸³

Patursson believed that this situation would require the Faroese Home Rule government to start overtaking sovereignty in foreign, economic and social policy from Denmark.⁷⁸⁴ However, in 1974, only TF perceived Denmark's EC membership as a threat to Faroese sovereignty. By 1979, the first practical problems of this special relationship had already arisen in connection with Faroese fisheries in Greenlandic waters.⁷⁸⁵ Before Denmark and Greenland's accession to the EC, the Faroe Islands had been granted fisheries rights in Greenlandic waters by the Danish government. Greenlandic fishermen did not demand any fisheries rights in Faroese waters in return, since they were not interested in distant-water fisheries. But after Greenlandic waters had become part of the Community pond in 1973, the Faroese Home Rule government had to negotiate fisheries rights in Greenlandic waters with the EC and it had to offer EC fishermen – not Greenlandic fishermen – fisheries rights in its own waters in return. According to Patursson, Faroese fishermen – as Danish citizens – should have obtained their fisheries rights in Greenlandic waters without providing the EC any form of compensation, since the Home Rule Act did not allow for discrimination between Faroese, Greenlandic and other Danish citizens.

Faroese academics also increasingly became aware of this untenability of Faroese-EU relations. The historian Hans Jacob Debes predicted in 1988 that »it will be Denmark's membership of the [EU] that will produce the most serious challenge to the future relations between the Faroe Islands and Denmark«. ⁷⁸⁶ The political scientist Jógvan Mørkøre stated that

783 FT (1973-74): »Folketingets forhandling«, col. 1406: »[Færøerne er der kommet i den] mærkelige situation i forhold EEC at være tredje land og samtidig en del af et land, der er inden for EEC [...] [V]il ikke Færøerne, selv om de formelt holdes uden for EEC, alligevel på mange måder reelt komme indenfor?«

784 LT (1973): »Føroyar og EEC«, A 82/1973, pp. 296-298.

785 See for this paragraph: Erlendur PATURSSON (1979): »Uholdbar situation«, in: Jørgen Knudsen (ed.): *Lille land – hvad nu? – en antologi om Danmark og EF i dag*. Odense: Informations Forlag, pp. 116-119, here: pp. 117-118.

786 DEBES (1988): »Small Nations in International Politics: The Faroe Islands«, p. 368.

it is one thing to transfer sovereignty to an international organisation, in which the Faroes are a member, but losing sovereignty to a community, of which the Faroes have remained outside in principle, is quite another.⁷⁸⁷

The adoption of the Maastricht Treaty made this problem more acute than before because European integration began to proceed to Faroese matters, in which Denmark still had exclusive control. TF subsequently demanded an investigation into the consequences of the Maastricht Treaty for the Faroes because it was not unthinkable that Faroese matters could end up in the EU if Denmark transferred further control to it.⁷⁸⁸ Although the majority of *Løgting* MPs rejected a more detailed investigation into the matter, the debate in parliament showed that also other parties shared TF's concern.⁷⁸⁹ Only the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in the Danish referendum in 1992 and Denmark's eventual opt-outs from the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Common Security and Defence Policy, Justice and Home Affairs and EU citizenship stopped the debate for the time being.

However, increased integrationist attempts brought the untenability of the Faroese and Greenlandic relationship with the EU up again and again. If Denmark had voted in favour of the adoption of the euro in 2000, both the Faroes and Greenland would have had to introduce it as their currency as well, because monetary policy was a matter of the Danish Realm. In case of the EMU, this was not perceived as a problem in the Faroe Islands because all Faroese parties except for MF welcomed the adoption of the euro.⁷⁹⁰ However, this was very different with regard to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. In 2004, Denmark signed the treaty together with the other EU member states and considered abolishing its opt-outs. Once again, Faroese Prime Minister Jóannes Eidesgaard (JF) believed that this would have affected the ability of the Faroese Home Rule authorities to influence Faroese matters, which were administered in Denmark and would be transferred to the EU.⁷⁹¹ The North Atlantic Group in the Folketing (DNAG), an alliance of Faroese and Greenlandic *Folketing* MPs between 2001 and 2011,⁷⁹² demanded

787 MØRKØRE (1993): »Interessegrupper og strategier«, p. 84: »En ting er, at det færøske lagting afstår suveræniteten til et rígsfællesskab, som man er medlem af, noget andet at miste suveræniteten til et fællesskab, som Færøerne i princippet står udenfor.«

788 LT (1991): »Ríkisráttarlígu viðurskipti Føroya«, A 108/1991, pp. 524-527, here: p. 525.

789 Prime Minister Atli P. Dam (JF) also took up the matter in his correspondence with the Danish Prime Minister. See N.N. (1992): »Brævið til forsætisráðharran: Vit stúra skrivar lögmaður«, in: *14. September*, 23-24 April 1992, p. 2.

790 Sveinur TRÓNDARSON (2000): »Danir atkvøðu um evruna«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 10 March 2000; N.N. (2005): »Sjálvandi evruna«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 2 February 2005, p. 6. In 2009, the *Løgting* even wanted to investigate the possibility for the Faroes to adopt the euro as their currency irrespective of the Danish position.

791 LT (2003): »Fyrispurningur til Jóannes Eidesgaard, løgmann, viðvíkjandi leikluti Føroya í nýggjari ES-grundlóg og møguligari fól[k]aatkvøðu í Føroyum«, 100-41/2003 (<http://logting.fo/casewritten/view.gebs?caseWritten.id=300&menuChanged=17>, 27 February 2016).

792 DNAG members in the Faroe Islands were Hogni Hoydal (TF, 2001-2011) and his substitutes Tórbjörn Jacobsen (TF, 2001-2004), Sjúrdur Skaale (TF, 2008) and Annita á Fríðriksmørk (TF, 2008). DNAG members in Greenland were Lars Emil Johansen (S, 2001-2009), Kuupik Kleist (IA, 2001-2007), Juliane Henningsen (IA, 2009-2011) and substitute MP Sofia Rossen (IA, 2007, 2009-2010).

an investigation into the matter in the *Folketing*.⁷⁹³ But its proposal was rejected, although both the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments supported it.

Also in Greenland, *Folketing* MP Kuupik Kleist (IA) worried about »the erosion of Denmark’s sovereignty« through the Constitutional Treaty, which would affect Greenland’s internal conditions more than at any time before.⁷⁹⁴ Helena Dam á Neystabø (JF) stated that it had »never been more necessary« that the Faroese *Folketing* MPs would use their influence in the *Folketing* to persuade the Danish government to transfer policy areas to the Faroes, in which Danish authorities exercised sovereignty on behalf of the Faroes, before it could transfer them to the EU.⁷⁹⁵ *Folketing* candidate Annika Olsen (FF) even demanded making it automatic that Denmark transfer its power on behalf of the Faroes in certain policy areas back to the Faroes, whenever it had transferred power in these policy areas to the EU.⁷⁹⁶ However, quite on the contrary, Denmark passed the Takeover Act in 2005, which made it impossible once and for all for the Faroes to overtake control over important policy areas. TF chairman Høgni Hoydal therefore believed that the Faroes and Greenland would get in the EU »through the back door« if Denmark voted in favour of the Constitutional Treaty.⁷⁹⁷

The failure of the Constitutional Treaty eased the debate on the tenability of the status quo for yet another time. But plans of the Danish government in 2015 to abolish the opt-out from the EU’s judicial cooperation by introducing the possibility of opt-ins on a case-by-case basis re-started the debate. Greenlandic *Folketing* MP Aaja Chemnitz Larsen (IA) worried that the EU would become able to make decisions that could indirectly affect Greenland without Greenland being able to participate itself in the decision-making.⁷⁹⁸ The Danish government believed that a transfer of policy areas to the EU, in which Denmark still exercised sovereignty over Greenland, would not affect Greenland. In this case, the *Folketing* would simply adopt legislation that would only be valid for Greenland.⁷⁹⁹ But Faroese *Folketing* MP Sjørður Skaale (JF) believed that it would create a »very special and precarious situation« if the EU decided about legislation in Denmark, while

793 FT (2004-05): »Forslag til vedtagelse om EU’s forfatningstraktat i forhold til Grønland og Færøerne«, V 27/2004-05 (second session) (<http://www.ft.dk/samling/20042/vedtagelse/V27/index.htm>, 3 February 2014).

794 GLTF (2004): »Udenrigspolitisk Redegørelse for 2004«, 18/2004 (spring session), statement of IA (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/groenlands_landsting/landstingssamlinger/fm_2004/dgopkt_behdato/rg_beretn/20/1_behandling/ordfoererindlaeg_ia?lang=da, 27 February 2016).

795 Helena DAM Á NEYSTABØ (2005): »Vald og politiskt hegni«, in: *Dimmalætting*, 4 February 2005, p. 7.

796 Annika OLSEN (2005): »Hví skulu Føroyar hava umboð á Fólkatingi?« In: *Dimmalætting*, 28 January 2005, p. 6.

797 Høgni HOYDAL (2006): »Danmarks geniale kolonipolitik«, in: *Politiken*, 8 April 2006 (<http://politiken.dk/debat/kroniken/ECE142813/danmarks-geniale-kolonipolitik/>, 3 February 2014).

798 Kim ROSENKILDE (2015): »Tilvalg kan føre til særlove for Grønland og Færøerne«, in: *Altinget*, 17 November 2015 (<http://www.altinget.dk/artikel/tilvalg-kan-foere-til-saerlove-for-groenland-og-faeroerne>, 5 January 2016).

799 FT (2014-15): »Spørgsmål nr. 17 (Alm. del) fra Folketingets Grønlandsudvalg« (second session) (<http://www.ft.dk/samling/20142/alm-del/gru/spm/17/svar/1265270/1549492.pdf>, 5 January 2016).

Danish politicians decided about legislation in Greenland and the Faroes.⁸⁰⁰ In December 2015, Denmark's electorate rejected the introduction of opt-ins with regard to judicial cooperation in a referendum. However, it was clear that each step towards the increased integration of Denmark into the EU, in particular another plan for the abolition of the Danish opt-outs, would restart it.

Moreover, Denmark's EU membership did not only affect Faroese and Greenlandic policies which were administered in Denmark. EU membership also made it difficult for Denmark to balance its foreign policy obligations as an EU member state with its foreign policy obligations as representative for the Faroe Islands and Greenland. In 1992, *Løgting* MP Hergeir Nielsen (TF) feared that, by integrating its foreign policy with the EU, Denmark would come into a position in which it would have to conduct EU policy against the interests of the Faroe Islands.⁸⁰¹ *Folketing* MP Lars Emil Johansen (S) also believed that it would be difficult for Denmark to make a choice between its loyalty towards Faroese and Greenlandic interests and its obligation to represent the EU's common interests in relation to external states.⁸⁰² TF chairman Hoydal wondered what would happen if Denmark had the EU Presidency and negotiated with the Faroes and Greenland about whaling: »Should Denmark negotiate with itself?«⁸⁰³ Hans Jacob Debes believed that it could only be »fully realized by personal experience«, how strange it was to have Danes sitting on both sides of the table in bilateral negotiations of the Faroe Islands with the EU Commission.⁸⁰⁴

Ane Hansen (IA), Greenlandic Minister for Fisheries, Hunting and Agriculture, emphasised how difficult the situation under a Danish EU presidency would be with regard to IWC negotiations:⁸⁰⁵

This extra dimension [...] can have severe consequences for Greenland and the relationship to Denmark. Denmark is obliged to take a position, which does not create problems for the EU. At the same time, Denmark is supposed to be able to

800 Kim ROSENKILDE (2015): »Tilvalg kan føre til særlove for Grønland og Færøerne«, in: *Altinget*, 17 November 2015 (<http://www.altinget.dk/artikel/tilvalg-kan-foere-til-saerlove-for-groenland-og-faeroerne>, 5 January 2016).

801 Hergeir NIELSEN (1992): »Er framtíðin týðningarleys?« In: *14. September*, 12-13 March 1992, p. 9.

802 FT (2004-05): »Forslag til lov om Danmarks tilslutning til EU's forfatningstraktat (Danmarks ratifikation m.v. af traktat om en forfatning for Europa)«, L 137/2004-05 (second session) (<http://www.ft.dk/samling/20042/lovforslag/L137/BEH1-22/forhandling.htm>, 27 February 2016).

803 Áki BERTHOLDSEN (2005): »Miðvísir taktikkur fyrri at binda færoyingar niður«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 1 June 2005.

804 DEBES (1988): »Small Nations in International Politics: The Faroe Islands«, p. 368.

805 GLTF (2009): »Forslag til forespørgselsdebat om evaluering af Grønlands medlemskab i IWC«, 38/2009 (autumn session) (http://cms.inatsisartut.gl/documents/samlinger2009/21_modedag_131109_dk.pdf, 3 February 2014): »Denne ekstra dimension [...] kan have svære konsekvenser for Grønland og relationen til Danmark, idet Danmark er nødt til at indtage en holdning, som ikke skaber problemer for EU. Samtidig skal Danmark også kunne varetage Grønlands interesser, og det er en svær balancegang, når EU har fællesholdning om IWC spørgsmål. [...] Danmark som EU-formand er forpligtet til at sikre tilslutning fra andre EU-lande til et forslag fra Kommissionen, som givetvis går imod Grønlands interesser. Når Danmark har udført dette hverv, så skal Danmark, som medlemsland, stemme imod dette samme resultat og forbeholde sig anvendelsen af undtagelsesbestemmelsen. En sådan optræden i EU er uden fortifælde.«

safeguard Greenland's interests and this is a difficult tightrope act when the EU has a common position in IWC questions. [...] Holding the EU presidency, Denmark is obliged to secure support from other EU countries to a Commission proposal, which undoubtedly goes against Greenlandic interests. When Denmark has fulfilled its duties, it is supposed [...] to vote against this same result and reserve itself the right to derogate. Such behaviour is without precedent.

When Denmark held the EU Presidency in 2012, it chose to support Greenland's demand of a unilateral raise of its whaling quota against the position of all other EU states in the IWC.⁸⁰⁶ However, the IWC rejected Greenland's demand. After that, Greenland decided to raise its whaling quota unilaterally. The Danish government considered this to be a breach of the IWC convention and threatened to withdraw from the IWC against the will of Greenland's Home Rule government.

In the Faroe Islands, the problem came to the forefront in the latest fisheries disputes with the EU. Assuming that mackerel stocks had moved increasingly from EU and Norwegian into Faroese waters, the Faroese Home Rule government unilaterally raised the Faroese quota for mackerel from 85,000 tons in 2010 to about 150,000 tons in 2011 and 2012.⁸⁰⁷ Negotiations on common mackerel quotas between the Faroes, Iceland, Norway and the EU were unable to resolve the conflict because the EU and Norway refused to accept the Faroese and Icelandic quota demands. In 2012, the EU adopted a sanctions instrument against third states that according to the EU's view did not conduct sustainable fisheries.⁸⁰⁸ Negotiations on this sanctions instrument coincided with Denmark holding the EU presidency.⁸⁰⁹ Thus, Denmark was obliged to win support for a proposal that was directed against the interests of its own (Faroese) citizens. The Danish government tried to accommodate Faroese interests somewhat by casting a blank vote when the Council adopted the proposal.

The problem escalated in 2013 when the Faroes unilaterally increased its quota for Atlanto-Scandian herring from 32,000 tons to 105,000 tons.⁸¹⁰ The Council sub-

806 See for this paragraph: Anders NILSSON (2013): »Grønland alene i verden«, in: *Kamikposten*, 24 June 2013 (<http://www.kamikposten.dk/global/maskinrum/rutine/tekstsamling.aspx?filnavn=2013062473a&emne=Juni+2013&menutekst=Nyhedsbreve&folder=nyhedsbrev50d&redaktoer&sprog=da&udvalg=t=2013062473a>, 3 February 2014).

807 FAROESE MINISTRY OF FISHERIES (2016): »Øll tíðindi« (<http://www.fisk.fo/kunning/tidindi/>, 27 February 2016).

808 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2012): »Regulation (EU) No 1026/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on Certain Measures for the Purpose of the Conservation of Fish Stocks in Relation to Countries Allowing Non-Sustainable Fishing«, OJ L 316/34, 14 November 2012 (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:316:0034:0037:EN:PDF>, 3 February 2014).

809 See for the following: JAVNAÐARFLOKKURIN Á FÓLKATINGI (2013): »Danska stjórnin stuðlar ikki makrel-tiltökum og fer mögulega at føra sak móti ES vegna Føroyar«, 15 April 2012 (<http://jaf.fo/danska+stjornin+gongur+makrelkrovunum+fra+sjurdi+skaale+a+moti.html>, 3 February 2014).

810 See for the following: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2013): »Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 793/2013 of 20 August 2013 Establishing Measures in Respect of the Faeroe Islands to Ensure the Conservation of the Atlanto-Scandian Herring Stock«, OJ L 223/1, 21 August 2013 (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:223:0001:0007:EN:PDF>, 3 February 2014).

sequently imposed coercive economic measures against the Faroe Islands. From August 2013 until August 2014, fishermen were prohibited to land and transport Faroese herring and mackerel in and through EU ports. Although the Danish government voted against the sanctions, Denmark's Minister of Fisheries considered Denmark to be bound to implement the sanctions against the Faroe Islands and thus against its own citizens as well.⁸¹¹ Again, the Danish government tried to accommodate Faroese interests somewhat by initiating legal proceedings against the EU on behalf of the Faroe Islands at the WTO and at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Nevertheless, for the JF group in the *Folketing*, the sanctions clearly showed, how Denmark's EU membership created problems for the Faroes. The Faroese Committee in the *Folketing* also wondered whether the sanctions contradicted the Danish constitution, which did not allow for discrimination between Danish citizens. Did EU membership weigh higher for the Danish government than the Danish Realm, which had been in existence for more than 600 years? For Prime Minister Kaj Leo Johannesen (SB), the herring war therefore provided a serious challenge to the continued existence of the Danish Realm.

10.4. Factor 1 for change: Independence from Denmark

The increasing untenability of their current relationships with the EU will continue to provide an incentive for the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments to change their European policies. Despite having remained outside, discussion about their future relationship with the EU will therefore not cease any time soon. Which are the factors that could facilitate a change in Faroese and Greenlandic European policy in the long run?

From a Faroese or Greenlandic perspective, one factor would be independence from Denmark. For the great majority of Faroese and Greenlandic politicians, EU membership equals a loss of sovereignty. But some politicians have not remained unaffected by the change in thinking on the European continent of what sovereignty means. There are politicians – with the former Faroese Prime Minister Kaj Leo Holm Johannesen (SB) at the forefront – who consider EU membership to be a means of strengthening national sovereignty. They believe that all European countries will be affected by EU decisions to an ever increasing extent, irrespective of whether they are an EU member or not. Therefore, the Faroes and Greenland would be better able to exercise their right to self-determination if they were represented in and able to influence the EU institutions in which important decisions were made. A statement from Johannesen (SB) serves as a good example for this change of thinking. The Faroes should join the EU because they would not have any influence otherwise:

As an EU member we are there where decisions are made. I believe that we should arrange our foreign policy differently so that we Faroese sit in the front

811 See for the following: THE FAROESE COMMITTEE IN THE FOLKETING [Færøudvalget] (2013): »Åbent samråd i Færøudvalget«, 20 August 2013 (<http://www.ft.dk/webtv/video/20121/fæu/td.1067452.asp?ti=Åbent+samråd+i+Færøudvalget&dsc=Dato%3A+&h=255&w=350>, 27 February 2016).

seat, where decisions are made, which could have the tiniest little bit to do with Faroese relations.⁸¹²

So far, their position has been undermined by the fact that the Faroes and Greenland would not have direct influence on the decision-making process in the EU. This would be different after Faroese independence. Independent EU membership would guarantee direct access to the decision-making institutions within the EU. Faroese and Greenlandic representatives would actually sit alongside other EU member states in the Council and in the Parliament. The Faroese and Greenlandic governments would be able to appoint one of the EU Commissioners. Moreover, they would be entitled to the right of veto where the unanimity requirement still exists.

Independence would also remove the economic safety net, which has existed in the Faroe Islands and Greenland since their integration into the Danish Realm. Denmark still finances 12 per cent of the Faroese budget, in addition to the areas that are still under Danish control, such as the police, the judicial system or banking supervision.⁸¹³ In Greenland, dependence on Danish subsidies is even more striking. Here Denmark still finances 43 per cent of the budget.⁸¹⁴ The independence coalition in the Faroe Islands was unable to promote Faroese independence in the early 2000s not least because the Danish government was unwilling to meet the Faroese demand of a gradual reduction of the subsidies within ten to 15 years.⁸¹⁵ Instead, the Danish government only offered an adaptation period of three to four years.

This book has not touched on the potential impact of the dependency on Danish state subsidies for the European policy choices of the Faroese and Greenlandic governments. The reason is that state subsidies were hardly ever part of the European policy debates in parliament and the media. Thus, it was impossible to assess their role in Faroese and Greenlandic policy. But it would be a worthwhile exercise for future research to analyse to what extent Danish state subsidies provided some sort of economic shelter for the Faroe Islands and Greenland.⁸¹⁶ This shelter could have

812 Kaj Leo HOLM JOHANNESEN (2002): »Fullveldi og hvat so?« In: *Dimmalætting*, 11 December 2002, p. 6: »Við at vera við í ES, eru vit samtíðis við, har avgerðir verða tiknar. Eg meini, at vit eiga at skipa okkara uttanrikispolitikk øðrvísi, soleiðis at vit føroyingar sita framman fyri í bilinum, tá ið avgerðir verða tiknar, sum hava tað minsta við føroysk viðurskifti at gera.«

813 STATISTICS FAROE ISLANDS (2015): »Almennar inntøkur og útreiðslur í mið. kr.« (<http://www.hagstova.fo/fo/hagtalsgrunnur/almennar-inntokur-og-utreislsur-1998->, 29 December 2015). The data is from 2013.

814 STATISTICS GREENLAND (2015): »Realøkonomisk fordeling af offentlige indtægter efter sektor, transaktion og tid« (http://bank.stat.gl/pxweb/da/Greenland/Greenland_OF_OF30/OFXREAL.px?rxid=OFXREAI29-12-2015%2020:26:19, 29 December 2015). The data is from 2014.

815 Dennis HOLM (2003): *Fullveldislandsstýrið 1998-2002*. Klaksvík: Centre for Local and Regional Development, pp. 17-20.

816 Baldur Thorhallsson claims that »small states need an external protector in order to survive, economically and politically«. He distinguishes between political and economic shelter and believes that the latter includes forms of »direct economic assistance, a currency union, help from an external Central Bank, beneficial loans, favourable market access, common market etc.« See Baldur THORHALLSSON (2011): »Domestic Buffer Versus External Shelter: Viability of Small States in the New Globalised Economy«, in: *European Political Science* 10, pp. 324-336, here: p. 327.

reduced the economic need for the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments to deal with EU membership and thus have contributed to their ability to base European policy on political interests. Such research could for example be carried out by conducting qualitative interviews with key decision-makers in the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule administrations.

The continued dependence on Danish state subsidies means in any case that independence is not a very realistic prospect in the Faroe Islands and Greenland in the short term. In Greenland, the Self-Government Act contains a detailed key of how to phase out Danish subsidies in line with increased revenues from the exploitation of Greenland's mineral resources.⁸¹⁷ Nevertheless, it might still take decades until the exploitation of Greenland's resources yields a profit.⁸¹⁸ The Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit of Society of the University of Greenland and the University of Copenhagen concluded in 2014 that Greenland would need 24 large-scale mining projects in order to even out Danish state subsidies.⁸¹⁹ In the Faroe Islands, the unionist-separatist divide means that independence is an even more distant prospect than in Greenland.

It also remains to be seen whether the EU would accept two independent microstates such as the Faroes and Greenland among its members. In 2012, the Commission stated that EU membership applications of microstates such as Andorra, Monaco and San Marino would »face two major difficulties«:⁸²⁰ They would require important changes to the institutional setup of the EU because these microstates would be greatly overrepresented. Moreover, their limited administrative capacity would have a significant impact on their ability to fulfil their obligations as EU member states. Thus, independence from Denmark is more a long-term than a short-term factor for change. But it would certainly open a new chapter in the Faroese and Greenlandic EU membership debate.

10.5. Factor 2 for change: Renationalisation of the CFP

Even as independent states, the Faroe Islands and Greenland would still have to cope with the CFP. This analysis has shown that the main reason for the current rejection of EU membership by Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments has been their unwillingness to transfer national sovereignty over their fisheries resources to the EU. This is how national sovereignty attained huge significance and was able to outbalance economic interests in membership. If the CFP was

817 DANISH PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (2009): »Selvstyreløven«.

818 N.N. (2013): »Grønlandsk(u)afhængighed«, in: *Berlingske*, 23 February 2013 (<http://www.b.dk/berlingske-mener/groenlandskuafhængighed-0>, 3 February 2014).

819 COMMITTEE FOR GREENLANDIC MINERAL RESOURCES TO THE BENEFIT OF SOCIETY (2014): *To the Benefit of Greenland* (http://news.ku.dk/greenland-natural-resources/rapportandbackgroundpapers/To_the_benefit_of_Greenland.pdf), 3 February 2014), p. 19.

820 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2012): »EU Relations with the Principality of Andorra, the Principality of Monaco and the Republic of San Marino: Options for Closer Integration with the EU«, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2012) 680 final, 20 November 2012 (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0680:FIN:EN:PDF>, 3 February 2014), pp. 17-18.

reformed in a way that allowed for a special fisheries zone under national control, this would not only raise the chances for a prospective Faroese and Greenlandic membership, but also for an Icelandic and Norwegian EU membership. Icelandic Foreign Minister Halldór Ásgrímsson outlined in 2004

that the special situation of the Icelandic fishing zone would need to be defined within the Common Fisheries Policy as a special sort of zone. It would not be derogation from the CFP but a special implementation of the policy adjusted to new circumstances, so that decisions on the utilisation of our natural resource, which is not shared with other member states of the EU, would be taken in Iceland.⁸²¹

In its general position on the opening of membership negotiations with the EU in 2010, the Icelandic government clearly stated that anything less than such a fisheries arrangement would be unacceptable for Iceland:

Icelandic control and sustainable utilisation of marine resources will have to be ensured. [...] This could be achieved, for example, by defining the Icelandic exclusive economic zone as a specific management area where Icelandic authorities continue to be responsible for fisheries management.⁸²²

In the Faroe Islands, today's FF chairman Jørgen Niclasen outlined in 2006 that the only thing that could make him change his opinion on EU membership, was the transfer of the management of natural resources back to member states.⁸²³ Jóannes Eidesgaard (JF), Faroese Prime Minister in 2006, expressed himself in a similar way:

The day Norway or Iceland join the EU, this will happen because the EU has given up on central control over fisheries policy in Brussels and has allowed member states to manage their fisheries resources on their own. And then it will also be time for the Faroes to think about EU membership.⁸²⁴

The Icelandic government believed that the accession negotiations presented an opportunity for the EU to show that the CFP was actually designed to serve common interests and was not merely an obstacle to EU membership for important fishing

821 ÁSGRÍMSSON (2002): »Iceland's Transatlantic Dilemma«.

822 ICELANDIC MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS: »General position of the Government of Iceland«, Ministerial meeting opening the Intergovernmental Conference on the Accession of Iceland to the European Union (Brussels, 27 July 2010) (<http://www.mfa.is/media/esb/27072010-Iceland-statement.pdf>, 3 February 2014).

823 Áki BERTHOLDSEN (2006): »Eg orki ikki tankan um føroyskan limaskap í ES«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 19 May 2006.

824 Áki BERTHOLDSEN (2006): »Vit skulu standa á tveimum beinum í Evropa«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 24 May 2006: »Tann dagin, Noreg ella Ísland verða limur í ES, er tað tí, at ES hevur slept sentralu stýringini av fiskivinnupolitikkinum í Brússell og letur londini sjálvi umsita síni fiskirikidømi. – Og tá er væl eisini stundin komin til at Føroyingar fara at hugsa um limaskap í ES.«

nations.⁸²⁵ However, the chapter on fisheries had not been opened in the accession negotiations when Iceland's new government in 2013 decided to stop negotiations.

What makes the renationalisation of the CFP a possibility is the general and widespread dissatisfaction with it throughout EU member states (see chapter 1). One of the main reform proposals throughout the past twenty years has been to regionalise the policy.⁸²⁶ It would be interesting to see what the EU would be able to offer the North Atlantic nations if they decided to (re-)enter into negotiations on membership. It would not suffice if they were merely granted continued control over their fisheries resources for a transitional period of three years and for a restricted fisheries zone north of 62 degrees as in the case of Norway in 1994.⁸²⁷ Reintroducing unanimity in the Agriculture and Fisheries Council could be another solution to facilitate North Atlantic EU membership. It would mean that no changes in fisheries policy could happen against the interests of the North Atlantic fishing nations.

So far, all reform attempts towards greater regionalisation have been watered down.⁸²⁸ One of the main obstacles has been the Commission's interest to preserve the EU acquis. Any form of regionalisation or renationalisation would constitute a threat to the EU's exclusive competence in fisheries policy. Some member states, especially those who have little or no direct interests in fisheries, have also been unwilling to consider far-reaching changes. Together with the Commission, these member states are hardly interested in setting precedence for any of the North Atlantic fishing nations. It would undermine the broader status quo and support the demands of dissatisfied fishermen in other EU member states, most importantly in the UK, to renationalise the common fisheries policy.⁸²⁹ However, increased opt-outs and differentiated integration within the EU have also meant that it has become more likely for the EU and the North Atlantic fishing nations to find common ground in the future. Membership of either Norway or Iceland could also initiate a domino effect with regard to membership of the other North Atlantic nations, especially if Norway or Iceland were able to negotiate a far-reaching compromise with regard to the CFP.

What would certainly facilitate a solution to the fisheries problem would be the diversification of the Faroese and Greenlandic economies. Diversification has been

825 ICELANDIC MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS: »General position of the Government of Iceland«.

826 David SYMES (2012): »Regionalising the Common Fisheries Policy: Context, Content and Controversy«, in: *Maritime Studies* 11 (6), pp. 1-21.

827 For the outcome of the membership negotiations between Norway and the EU in 1994 see EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1994): »Norway – Negotiations for Accession to the European Union (June 1994): An Overview of the Results« (http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2007/9/4/036c98df-a03f-43dd-b44a-9675cb41c7a8/publishable_en.pdf, 27 February 2016).

828 See for this paragraph: SYMES (2012): »Regionalising the Common Fisheries Policy«, pp. 1-21.

829 Struan Stevenson for example, a Scottish MEP and vice-chair of the European Parliament's Fisheries Committee, has stated that any concessions given to Iceland with regard to the CFP will also be demanded for Scotland and the rest of the UK. See Struan STEVENSON (2011): »Iceland must be welcomed but careful consideration given to negoti[at]ions on CFP« (http://www.struanstevenson.com/media/news-release/iceland_must_be_welcomed_but_careful_consideration_given_to_negotations_on_cf, 3 February 2014).

a major issue in the Faroe Islands and in Greenland for decades. However, until now, fisheries have retained their dominance. The Faroese economist Óli Samró maintains that, as long as this is the case, there will be

little or no need for extended cooperation with other countries: the Faroe Islands continue to be a country built on a fish-catching economy and a fish-catching culture! For most of the people, a stable eastern wind has greater significance than the free right to establishment or cumulation agreements. This is the reality. [...] The majority of the politicians knows that. Under the current political situation there will hardly happen anything. Maybe the best option [...] is to wait until a new generation comes, which has different needs: the need to be an actual part of the international community.⁸³⁰

So far, this generation has not arrived. This book has shown that, as long as fisheries remain the economic backbone of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, it will remain essential for the Faroese and Greenlandic Home Rule governments to remain in control of their fisheries resources. So far, the CFP has not been adapted in a way that it could guarantee that this would also be possible for them as EU members. Thus, the Faroe Islands and Greenland have not felt the need to reconsider their decisions to reject EU membership. On the contrary, they are likely to continue to safeguard their national sovereignty, even if they might have an economic interest to join the EU.

830 Óli SAMRÓ (2006): »«Spíski blýanturin«: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE«, in: *Sosialurin (online archive)*, 17 November 2006: »[Stóri trupulleikin hjá lögmanni er, at tað í Føroyum í lötuni] lítill og eingin tørvur á framkomnum avtalum við onnur lond. [...] Føroyar eru framvegis eitt land bygt á veiðubúskap og veiðumentan! Liggjandi eysturætt hevur fyri tey flestu størri týðning enn friur etableringsrættur ella kumuleringsavtalur. Soleiðis er bara veruleikin [...]. Tað vita hinir politikararnir. Við verandi politisku støðu gerst neyvan nakað. Kanska er besta svarið at [...] bíða, til eitt nýtt ættarlið kemur til, sum hevur ein annan tørv. Ein tørv at vera ein veruligur partur av altjóða samfelagnum.«

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