Greek–Turkish Dilemmas and the Cyprus EU Accession Process

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This article compares the processes of foreign policymaking in Greece and Turkey in order to examine why the incentives and pressures of the enlargement process have failed until now to initiate a settlement in the Cyprus bicommunal negotiations. While most studies on the Cyprus problem have focused on the two communities of the island, little attention has been paid to the policies of the two 'motherlands', namely Greece and Turkey. Yet their leverage on the two Cypriot communities and their conflicting expectations with regard to an enlarged Europe in the Eastern Mediterranean constitute a complex security puzzle. The Republic of Cyprus stands as a champion candidate member for the next enlargement, amid fears of Turkish reprisals and hopes for a political settlement on the island. With the benefits of settlement overwhelming the benefits of any other alternative, it is paradoxical that the parties seem to be about to fail to reach a last-minute, mutually beneficial compromise. I try to resolve this paradox by supplementing rational choice theory with cognitivist theories of international relations. While rational choice predicts a direct relationship between external environment and foreign policy shifts, the case of Cyprus suggests that this relationship is actually indirect. Without understanding how the external environment is framed in the domestic political discourse of Greece and Turkey, it is impossible to demonstrate how outside pressure and incentives affect foreign policy shifts.

Introduction

IN 2002, GREECE AND TURKEY, as well as the two communities of Cyprus, faced a stark dilemma. They either had to engage further in cooperative policies in their foreign policy agendas or lose the opportunities and benefits accompanying EU enlargement in the region. This dilemma is becoming increasingly pressing, with the EU's invitation to prospective members due to be finalized by the end of 2002 and the process of ratification to start subsequently in the parliaments of the current members. Cyprus continues to be a prime candidate for the next round of enlargement, amid fears of Turkish reprisals as well as hopes for a political settlement. A particularly worrisome

scenario in the absence of such a settlement is the threat of Turkish reprisals in Cyprus and possible Greek reactions to these reprisals or any other potential obstacles to EU membership for Cyprus.[1] A comparison of foreign policymaking in Greece and Turkey demonstrates why the incentives and pressures of the enlargement process have failed until now to initiate a settlement in the Cyprus bicommunal negotiations. It also illustrates that whether EU policy could promote a settlement depends not only on the incentives offered to the various sides but also on how these incentives and challenges are framed in the mainstream political discourse of Greece and Turkey.

While most studies on Cyprus focus on the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, there have been very few studies of the policies of the two 'motherlands',[2] yet political and legal aspects of their relationships to Cyprus necessitate their inclusion in a comparative study. First, the policies of the two communities in Cyprus develop not only in interaction with each other, but also through communication with Greece and Turkey. Second, both Turkey and Greece have considerable leverage over their kin communities in Cyprus, and although the methods and legality of their influences differ, their policy preferences and actions to a large extent determine any eventual outcome.[3] Furthermore, in contrast with previous negotiations over the island, the stakes are now not limited simply to Cyprus itself but also include the benefits the two countries expect to gain from EU enlargement in the region. Third, as a part of a chain of interrelated issues in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus is directly affected by the manner in which Greece and Turkey either confront or cooperate with each other.[4] Fourth, and finally, focus on the two 'motherlands' is increasingly important for legal reasons, in particular since the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkey, rather than the Turkish Cypriot authorities, is responsible for violations of human rights in the northern part of Cyprus.[5] To examine how Turkey and Greece relate to the various aspects of EU engagement in the region, I draw support from two distinct but often complementary traditions within the field of International Relations, namely rational choice and cognitivism.

In their attempts to demonstrate the conditions for cooperative play, rational choice theorists provide conceptual approaches, theories, and models that shed light on the outcomes of interactions among the goal-directed, rational behaviors of actors.[6] Cooperation will occur when the rewards for cooperating are high, when penalties for non-cooperation are steep, and when it is not beneficial to cross an adversary with whom one expects to deal over a prolonged period. Although it provides interesting cues, rational choice might not address the major puzzle in Cyprus, where the parties seem to be about to fail in their attempts to reach a last-minute, mutually beneficial compromise. I argue below that the logic of EU engagement in Cyprus, and more specifically the decisions taken at the 1999 Helsinki Summit in regard to Cyprus and Turkey, appear to be grounded on this reasoning. Yet, if the current impasse

in the negotiations continues until the admission of Cyprus into the EU, rational choice will fail to adequately resolve the central paradox, namely, that rational actors should have reached a settlement rather than maintain or even escalate a costly and risky conflict. More importantly, it could be pointed out that not only is a settlement desirable for the two communities in the case of Cyprus, but international bodies such as NATO and the EU are also well-placed to promote and guarantee such a settlement.

I would resolve this paradox by supplementing rational choice with cognitivist approaches. Cognitivism focuses on frames, or simplified mental representations of reality that decisionmakers use to interpret events and to choose among multiple courses of action.[7] By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individually or collectively. Framing is a process, according to Bert Klandermans, in which social actors, media, and members of a society jointly interpret, define, and redefine states of affairs.[8] The evolution of new cognitive habits determines what is to be considered possible or impossible, natural or unnatural, problematic or inevitable.[9] Frames correspond roughly to existing public perceptions of reality and rely heavily on the use of analogies from the past. Robert Jervis maintains that analogies provide a useful shortcut to rationality by making insights derived from previous events accessible.[10] In the study of nationalism and ethnic conflict, one can identify cognitive frames that support either cooperative or confrontational policies.[11] While in some cases these two frames might be seen as a part of a continuum, often multiple equilibrium analysis offers a better understanding of sudden shifts in policymaking.[12] On the one hand, confrontational frames maintain that a nation (or any other group) should be, and is, in a position to avoid what is perceived to be an illegitimate situation. On the other hand, cooperative frames identify the lack of opportunities for confrontational policies, the presence of social, economic, and political alternatives, and the importance of reconciliation. Through framing, divergent groupings in a society compete on the importance, efficacy, and legitimacy of the policies they prescribe, whether confrontational or cooperative.

A failure of confrontational frames in foreign policy outcomes creates an opportunity for the introduction of cooperative frames in the domestic political discourse. The new cooperative frames rely heavily on analogies, learning experience from recent crises, and possible discontent resulting from the consequences and cost of confrontational politics. Cooperative frames prevail first by legitimizing public discussion of cooperative alternatives as a credible and sensible option and then by eliminating from public debate threats to regime stability and incumbency if cooperative shifts in foreign policy take place.[13] Learning experience, particularly knowledge of cause-and-effect relationships, is the key to assessing the expected consequences of alternative courses of action prescribed by conflicting confrontational and cooperative frames.[14] Along

with learning experience, internal group competition and the individual preferences of leaders and coalitions might have a strong effect on the framing of certain policy issues.[15] Finally, scholars arguing within the cognitivist paradigm often stress that the focus should be on the patterns of interaction between cognition and external environment rather than on the reduction of state actions to cognitivist theories.[16]

The External Environment in Cyprus

EU engagement in Cyprus is based on the expectation that Greece and the Greek Cypriots on the one hand and Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots on the other will cooperate in reaching a settlement without one side being held hostage by the intransigence of the other. For instance, although it is extremely important, a settlement is not a precondition for admitting Cyprus into the EU, since such a precondition empowers the Turkish side with a veto right and makes the Greek Cypriot community pay the cost of possible Turkish intransigence. Likewise, although the cooperation of Ankara is necessary, the solution of the Cyprus problem per se is not a precondition for Turkey's accession. In accordance with this logic, as codified in Helsinki, all parties should have enough incentives to cooperate.[17] More importantly, any party which blocks the UN Secretary-General's efforts to broker a solution should be the one to exclusively suffer the negative consequences.

In Table 1, I summarize the four possible outcomes of this process:

1. At the top left of the table, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides cooperate in the negotiations. A settlement improves the economic, social, and political environment for both communities in Cyprus, decreases the security burden for Greece and Turkey, facilitates the accession of Cyprus to the EU, and paves the way for Turkey's own accession process.
2. At the top right, negotiations fail, with the Turkish Cypriot side seen as responsible. Greece is in a better position to support the admission of Cyprus into the EU and to rally EU solidarity against possible Turkish reprisals. Greek Cypriot expectations of a last-minute compromise (a major objective) fail.
3. At the bottom left, negotiations fail, with the Greek Cypriot side seen as responsible. Greece fails to support Cyprus's accession and receives negative reactions as it tries to veto the enlargement process. With Greece isolated, Turkey finds a window of opportunity to integrate or annex the northern part of Cyprus. Annexation or any other reprisal might automatically put an end to Turkey's own expectations of full membership (a major objective).

Table 1. Possible outcomes of cooperative and non-cooperative policies

	T & T/C cooperate	T & T/C do not cooperate
G & G/C cooperate	1. Settlement in Cyprus: Improvement in human rights conditions. A united Cyprus enters the EU (benefits for T/C). Decreased G–T tensions and military spending. T closer to its EU goal.	2. Non-settlement (T & T/C responsible): Cyprus joins the EU (not as 'Greek Cyprus'). EU prevents reprisals. G/C & T/C lose momentum for settlement.
G & G/C do not cooperate	3. Non-settlement (G & G/C responsible): G in a possible conflict with the EU on Cyprus. T might increase its threats for reprisals but might also end its own accession process.	4. All sides responsible for a non-settlement: Lower EU interest in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus accession might still be possible, but so will Turkish reprisals.

Note: G & G/C refers to Greece and the Greek Cypriot community respectively, while T & T/C refers to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community.

4. At the bottom right of the table, all sides are responsible for the failure of the negotiations. Enlargement in the Eastern Mediterranean becomes hard to justify. Even if it manages to get Cyprus into the EU (through the use of its veto and not through a consensual decision acknowledging the merits of the Cyprus candidacy), Greece will probably exhaust its diplomatic resources and fail to rally EU solidarity against possible Turkish reprisals.

External Environment and Discourse in Greece

In understanding the conditions for cooperative play in the above scenarios for Greece, it is important to examine how international factors are played out in the political discourse of the country. The question of whether or not the EU logic is grounded on a promising opportunity structure might prove to be irrelevant if one of the two sides does not perceive the structure as promising. In other words, the way the EU frames the incentives and challenges of enlargement has to be compatible with the way in which these are framed in the political discourse of Greece and Turkey. More specifically for Greece, the framing of current policies depends largely on learning experiences from previous crises, either with Turkey or within the European Union. I argue below that, despite the prevalence of confrontational politics in Greece through the 1990s, current political discourse seems be increasingly in line with the shared norms of fellow EU members. Moreover, this tendency seems to positively affect the Greek Cypriot discourse at a time when Greece is increasingly influential in Cyprus.

Despite its early European membership, Greece could not translate its political advantage into successful negotiation outcomes in its Turkish or Balkan affairs. Rather, in the years following its accession to the EU, Greece was

confronted with a hardened Turkish position over Cyprus (from federation to confederation) and a number of hitherto unknown issues in the Aegean, such as the question of ownership of certain uninhabited islets.[18] In the mainstream Greek political discourse, this paradox was resolved until recently by pointing out the 'preferential' position Turkey enjoyed in 'Western' eyes.[19] Greek policies also minimized EU solidarity and helped polarize Ankara, but this point was rarely argued before the mid-1990s. In line with this cognitive frame, Greece followed policies that limited Greek cooperation, isolated the country in the Balkans on the Macedonian issue, and challenged Turkey on the Kurdish question.[20] Until recently, the presence of a vibrant nationalist constituency in Greece, the maintenance of victimization narratives, and confidence in the efficacy of nationalist politics helped maintain this confrontational frame.[21]

This cognitive frame finally reached its demise when Greece failed to achieve positive results in a number of crises. Two episodes from the 1990s demonstrated the dangers, inconsistencies, and counterproductive nature of confrontational framing. In the first episode, Greece failed to prevail in its dispute with the young Macedonian republic, which was relatively less important than Turkey or Greece for the West. In this instance, despite its advantageous position in the European Union and NATO, Greece received only short-term support from its allies and partners and, more importantly, was subject to intense criticism over its lack of flexibility. Along with initial frustration, however, there was a realization that preferential treatment or superiority of the opponent could not account for all disappointing outcomes and that a new paradigm was needed to explain cause–effect relationships in Greek foreign policy. In the second episode, the attempt and failure by certain circles in the Greek state to protect Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), in 1998–99 showed the dangers of confrontational politics for Greece. Antagonizing Turkey at a moment of widespread public outcry over what was perceived as outside European or Greek support for terrorism proved to be extremely risky. This crisis forced Prime Minister Costas Simitis to fire three of his ministers in order to ease international and national embarrassment, while the Macedonian dispute was one of the major reasons for the collapse of the Mitsotakis New Democracy government in 1993. Ironically, these episodes helped discredit nationalist frames, as they proved to be threatening not only for the national interests of Greece but also for the incumbency of existing political actors. Notably, politicians who played the nationalist card initially gained high percentages in the polls but disappeared politically shortly afterwards in subsequent elections.[22]

With the legitimization of the public debate on the advantages of disengagement from confrontational politics, a new cognitive paradigm of cooperative politics emerged in Greece. There was a realization that unless Greece cooperated and coordinated its policies with fellow EU members' principles and interests, it would never enjoy the political advantages of being a member-

state. Soon after the Ocalan crisis, George Papandreou, an advocate of Greek–Turkish cooperation, was appointed as foreign minister and has since enjoyed continuously high levels of popular support in Greek polls.[23] Moreover, the shift towards cooperative politics received the support of New Democracy, the main opposition party.[24] Cooperative frames legitimized the historic decision to support Turkey as an applicant member in Helsinki, the improvement of minority relations in Greece, and the ongoing rapprochement between the Greek and Turkish governments.

The evolution of political discourse in Greece matched and reinforced similar tendencies among the Greek Cypriot community. In the decades following the Turkish invasion of 1974, the Greek Cypriot community managed to consolidate a strong economy and democratic institutions while actively trying to seek reconciliation with the Turkish Cypriot community within the framework of the 1978 agreements.[25] Despite the fact that a general conceptual framework of federalizing the republic has gradually won the consent of all major political parties, there are still disagreements on how exactly this federation will be established. The shift towards cooperative politics in Greece particularly favors the reconciliatory forces in the Greek Cypriot community, as all political parties recognize the importance of reaching a consensus with Greece. This need for a consensus will be maintained and even reinforced in the coming months because of increased reliance on Greece amid fears of Turkish reprisals, dependency on Greek support within the EU, and the political vacuum created by the presidential election in Cyprus early in 2003.

With the realization of the importance of securing EU solidarity, cooperative politics will probably shift attention in Greece in two directions. First, Greece may promote proposals that are more attractive for the Turkish side and may lobby hard to support Turkey's own accession process: the more possible and attractive its entry, the more likely Turkey will accede to its Cyprus-related obligations. Second, Greece may do whatever it sees as necessary to rally international support against possible Turkish reprisals, particularly annexation of the northern part of Cyprus by Turkey. Similarly, with the admission of Cyprus into the EU, the Greek Cypriot community will be in a better position to engage further in cooperative politics in order to sustain and maximize international support for a settlement. This twofold strategy will create a new dilemma for Turkey: whether to exploit the opportunities of cooperation or to face the increased consequences of non-cooperation within the EU. By cooperating, Turkey can reverse the same dilemma (whether to engage further in compromises or risk losing international support) for Greece and the Greek Cypriots and thus initiate a cycle of cooperation and constructive politics in the Eastern Mediterranean.

External Environment and Discourse in Turkey

The situation in Turkey, however, seems to be more complicated than in Greece. After months of negotiations, the general perception is that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership are ambivalent about making constructive moves in the negotiation process.[26] With the benefits of the accession process so important for the political and socio-economic progress of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community, the lack of Turkish cooperation is a puzzle. What is more puzzling in Cyprus is that, over time, the Turkish Cypriot side – with Ankara's support – has hardened its position in Cyprus from federation to confederation in violation of the already agreed-upon frameworks and parameters set by the international community. Moreover, before (and even during) the negotiations, Turkey continued to threaten to annex the northern part of Cyprus.[27] The rhetoric over annexation appears to be a negotiation tool. However, if by any chance Turkey annexes (or integrates) the northern part of Cyprus, then the Cyprus problem and Turkish–EU relations will reach a point of no return.[28]

What explains the prevalence of non-cooperative policies in Turkey? First, it is not clear yet whether there is a consensus in Turkey on the price of confrontational policymaking. In fact, because of a number of 'successful' engagements with confrontational politics, the use of escalatory rhetoric regarding Cyprus (or elsewhere) remains part of the country's mainstream political discourse. On several occasions, Turkey has successfully employed a confrontational stance with both friends and foes.[29] For instance, in 1998, a Turkish ultimatum forced Syria to give up its decade-old support for the PKK and its leader Abdullah Ocalan. On other occasions, Turkey effectively prevented US Senate resolutions on the Armenian genocide issue (2000) and Italian support for the PKK leadership (1998) by triggering popular nationalist mobilizations. Moreover, over the past few years, it has 'successfully' communicated to Greece that actions such as the deployment of Russian-made missiles in Cyprus (1998) or the extension of Greek territorial waters could provoke or justify war. Furthermore, in the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis, Turkey managed for the first time to challenge the Greek ownership of two uninhabited Aegean islets. The annexation threat for the northern part of Cyprus follows the line of these episodes and demonstrates the prevalence of a cognitive frame within which Turkish reprisals against the Greek Cypriot community are seen as natural, legitimate, and possible.

Leaders' legacies, party preferences, and the political structure in Turkey favor the maintenance of this frame. First, while the political system in Greece allows for stable single-party governments, forming a government in Turkey might involve as many as three parties and requires the consent of the military. A disengagement from confrontational politics would entail a consensus

among all relevant actors in the country's current administration, since even a single partner can obstruct constructive shifts in policymaking. Second, contingent factors such as leaders' legacies and preferences explain why a new consensus could not be reached before the elections in Turkey in November 2002. The ailing prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, owed his personal political legacy to the events of 1974 on the island.[30] His coalition partner the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which epitomizes confrontational politics in Turkey, was inflexible over reforms on any of the 'nationally sensitive' issues, including Cyprus.[31] Third, the military seems to vacillate between its desire to 'make' the country more Western and European and its perception of Cyprus as vital for the security of the Turkish mainland.[32] Finally, veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash has been consistent in rejecting EU incentives for a settlement, transforming even moderate EU pressure into a resource for anti-EU suspicion and protest.[33]

Despite these constraints in decisionmaking, a shift towards cooperative politics in Turkey is still possible. In contrast with previous crises, there is no evidence that Turkey can lean on the United States or any major European country for support.[34] On the contrary, with the current leadership in Greece being the most cooperative for decades, and with fellow EU members acknowledging this, any crisis in Cyprus will be attributed exclusively to Turkey. Moreover, since Turkey's cooperation on Cyprus has been elevated to a priority for its EU accession path, some civic and political groups have suggested that the major orientation of the country cannot be subordinated to a single issue. These groups enjoy the backing of a large part of the establishment, as well as the overwhelming support of a pro-European Turkish public.[35] They criticize confrontational policies in ways similar to those employed in Greece, pointing out the current cost and lack of efficacy of these policies in Cyprus.[36] For instance, Turkish opinion-makers have argued that, besides delaying Turkey's own accession, Turkey's lack of cooperation over Cyprus helped Greece make Cyprus's accession to the EU irreversible.[37] Finally, after the earthquake catastrophe of August 1999, media and civil society networks have played a crucial role in improving the image of Greece in Turkey and in creating a warm climate between the two nations. [38] These critiques and developments might encourage a shift towards cooperative politics after the elections in Turkey on 3 November 2002.

Finally, critiques in Turkey match similar protests in the Turkish Cypriot community. The majority have strong reservations about possible annexation by Turkey.[39] Over the past few years, a significant part of the Turkish Cypriot community has distanced itself from Turkey as a reaction to the settlement of mainland Turks in the northern part of Cyprus and the dismal performance of Ankara's economic policies in the area. These two elements have alienated the Turkish Cypriot community, helping create a strong pro-unification and pro-European platform. The *Bu Memleket Bizim* ('This [i.e. Cyprus] Is Our Own

Country') platform has successfully mobilized thousands of Turkish Cypriots to protest Denktash's policies and to support the moderate stance of the opposition parties.[40] The possibility of annexation might create friction between Turkey and a large part of the Turkish Cypriot community, while the existence of a common pro-European cleavage in Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community might help initiate a cycle of cooperation in the region.

Conclusion

When examining the possibilities for a settlement in Cyprus, it is important to identify the incentives for such a settlement and to note how these are framed by the political discourse in Greece and Turkey. With the benefits of a settlement overwhelming the benefits of any other alternative, it is paradoxical that the parties are still ambivalent about reaching a last-minute, mutually beneficial compromise. I resolve this paradox by supplementing rational choice with cognitivist theories. In Greece, the failure and cost of confrontational politics in the 1990s have triggered a shift towards cooperative politics, while in Turkey there is evidence that civil actors might be in a position to initiate a similar shift in the future. In Greece, confrontational policies declined as the efficacy of these policies was increasingly questioned. However, in Turkey, the 'success' of confrontational politics has prevented the development of a new consensus on the consequences and costs of such policies. Confrontational frames are still dominant, as illustrated by the use of annexation rhetoric and the absence of cooperative initiatives in the negotiations. In addition, leaders' legacies, party preferences, and the political structure in the country have prevented a policy shift from taking place. The possible accession of Cyprus to the EU before a settlement will demonstrate the limits of Turkish confrontational policies on the island, and this might even encourage a shift towards cooperative politics in Ankara, if the EU simultaneously makes a stronger commitment to Turkey's own accession process. This comparison of foreign policy processes in Greece and Turkey reveals that EU incentives might still catalyze a solution in Cyprus, but only in the long term and only when all relevant parties experience negative consequences of maintaining confrontational policies.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

*   Neophytos G. Loizides is a PhD candidate at the University of Toronto. The author
     would like to thank Tom Deligiannis, Jeffrey Kopstein, Andrew Rossos, George Stefanovic,

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4 Data on crises and issues collected from the region suggest that, with the exception of the Middle East crisis and the status of the Northern Iraq Kurds, there has been some improvement on all issues. We can see improvements in the major Balkan crises (Kosovo, Bosnia, and the Macedonian republic), state capacity to deal with terrorism in both Greece and Turkey, the Aegean issues, Turkish–Bulgarian minority issues, Greek–Albanian relations, Greek–Turkish minorities, Ocalan's death penalty, Turkish–Syrian relations, the Macedonian issue in Greece, negotiations for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Turkish–Armenian relations, and the rights of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. Therefore, any complications in Cyprus will be against a general tendency of détente in the region and may even reverse this tendency. For more details on my event and issue dataset, see http://www.utoronto.ca/ethnicstudies/data.pdf.

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22 Antonis Samaras, the foreign minister in Mitsotakis's government, was one of the protagonists in the mobilization effort on the Macedonian issue. Although he became one of the most popular Greek politicians at the time, his efforts to create a new political party have not been successful.

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those in opposition to Denktash. More importantly, Turkish Cypriots are still entitled to their properties in the south, citizenship rights in the Republic of Cyprus, and pensions, even if they are residents in the north.

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28 There is a possibility that if the northern part of Cyprus becomes an 'unalienable component' of the Turkish motherland, all the political and psychological resources of the Turkish nation will be diverted to Cyprus and political division will be maintained regardless of the cost to Turkey itself.

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33 Denktash has maintained that the 'carrot' of Europe is being used as a trap; see Agence France Presse, 'Turkish Cypriot Leader Threatens Definitive Partition', 11 June 2002.

34 For a critical assessment of why the USA might not support Turkey despite its importance in a military operation in Iraq, see Henri J. Barkey & Philip H. Gordon, *Avoiding a Cyprus Crisis*, Brookings Institution, Policy Brief #102, July 2002; available at http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb102.htm.

35 The Turkish Union of Industrialists is probably the best example of a civic organization thinking and acting in this direction. For popular attitudes in Turkey towards the EU, see the European Commission Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/cceb/cceb20011_en.pdf; and Sukru Elekdag, 'Attention Turned to Europe', *Milliyet*, 21 September 2000 (retrieved from FBIS).

36 Yet, in contrast with the situation for EU member Greece, doubts on the authenticity and commitment of the EU to Turkey's own European perspective damage these forces in the domestic political arena.

37 Greece managed to win the support of countries, such as France, that previously expressed their hesitation over the Cyprus accession prospect. For the counterproductive nature of Turkish politics, see Cyprus-related articles during the past few months by Sami Kohen and Mehmet Ali Birand. For example, Mehmet Ali Birand, 'Lack of a Solution Would Do Harm to All of Us', *Turkish Daily News*, 13 December 2001; Sami Kohen,

'The Price is High for Everyone', *Milliyet*, November 7 (retrieved from Turkish Press Review, 7 November 2001). See also the analysis of the European Parliament report on Cyprus by Sami Kohen, 'What Would Come Out of This Report', *Turkish Daily News*, 7 September 2001.

38 According to Nikitas Lionarakis, the president of the Greek foreign ministry's liaison committee for NGOs, activities between Greek and Turkish civil society expanded to include more than 800 organizations, and it is currently impossible for either Greece or Turkey to control or follow these activities; Nikitas Lionarakis, personal interview, November 2001.

39 Only a tiny portion (8.2%) of the current inhabitants of northern Cyprus (settlers and indigenous Turkish Cypriots) support annexation by Turkey. According to a survey performed by Comar and published in the Turkish Cypriot daily *Kibris* (27–29 December 1999), 38.5% consider the creation of two independent states as a suitable solution; 28.2% support bizonal federation; 14.5% support confederation; 8.2% favor annexation by Turkey; 6.6% favor the creation of a unified Cyprus state; while 3.4% expressed no opinion. The same survey suggests that the overwhelming majority of the Turkish Cypriot people want to join the EU even before Turkey's accession (74.6%). A translated version of the survey can be found at the Press Information Office page at http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/1999/99-12-30.tcpr.html#02. Also, on Turkish Cypriot youth reactions to annexation, see Mehmet Ali Birand, 'Listen to the Turkish Youth Tonight', *Turkish Daily News*, 15 November 2001.

40 Michael Jansen, 'Turkish Cypriots Protest over Dominant Role of the Military', *Irish Times*, 19 July 2000, p. 1; Helena Smith, 'Northern Cypriots Turn against Turkey', *The Guardian*, 25 September 2001, p. 16. See, for example, the new wave of literature in the Turkish Cypriot community: Mehmet Yashin, 'Three Generations, Three Identities, Three "Parties" Within Twentieth-Century Poetry', in Vangelis Calotychos, ed., *Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity and Experience in an Unimaginable Community 1955–1997* (Oxford: Westview, 1998), pp. 223–237; 'Interview of Alpay Durduran to Josef Payadas' (in Greek), *Ex Iparhis*, November 1999, pp. 16–20.