

Google translation of <https://www.oocities.org/turkishgreek/kibris.htm>

## KIBRIS SORUNU CYPRUS PROBLEM

After the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, Britain's de facto sovereignty over Cyprus was given a legal basis, Turkey and Greece behaved faithfully to this status. After the Second World War, with the Dodecanese Islands being given to Greece, some nationalist expectations regarding Cyprus came to the fore.

With the end of the war, discussions were held, especially within the Greek Cypriot community, about gaining independence from England and unifying with Greece. However, the chaos created by the civil war in Greece between 1946–49 and the dependency relationship created by Britain's economic, political and military aid on Greece prevented Greece from supporting such nationalist expectations. Indeed, Greece remained cold towards the demands made by the leaders of the Greek Cypriot community until the early 1950s. In fact, the Government of General Plastiras refrained from accepting the referendum held in Cyprus in 1950 and feared that this situation would disrupt the rapprochement between Greece and England. In June 1950, G. Papandreou said, "Today, Greece breathes with two lungs, one of which is England and the other is the USA. For this reason, he expressed a similar concern by saying, "He cannot bear to suffocate and suffocate because of the Cyprus issue." [i]

Within the framework of this approach, the attempts made by Makarios to bring the Cyprus issue to the UN in 1951 were not welcomed by Greece, and in the face of Makarios' insistent attitude, Greece declared that such an attempt would fail and that it might lose its respect before the Cypriots and other people. . [ii]

On the other hand, in 1951, public opinion in Greece began to put pressure on the government with increasing interest in the Cyprus issue, and eventually General Plastiras had to take some initiatives on this issue. While the preparations for taking the Cyprus issue to the UN are continuing, Greece's initiatives on the Cyprus issue have begun to accelerate with the UK wanting to hold talks on this issue. A statement made by S. Venizelos in Greece was an indication that official policies on this issue have now changed. S. Venizelos, in reaction to a British minister's statement that "no Greek government has ever made official claims on the Cyprus issue", said, "Since 1912, every Greek government in Greece has openly declared that Cyprus and Greece are expressed his desire for unification. The shortcomings in this regard resulted from the behavior of England and the tactics of the Greek governments to wait to resolve the problem peacefully when the time came. In order to eliminate possible doubts about the approach of the Greek governments to the Cyprus problem, (...) Like the Greek people, the Parliament has always had a desire for the unification of Cyprus with the motherland Greece, and this desire reflects the fervent desires of all Cypriots as well as the Greek people. It reflects." [iii]

With the change in Greece's policy regarding Cyprus, a negotiation process took place between this country and England that lasted until 1955. While negotiations on the Cyprus issue continued between the two countries, efforts were made to strengthen relations between Greece and Turkey within the defense and cooperation efforts of the United Kingdom and the United States in the Middle East.

Another factor that changed Greece's approach to its Cyprus policy was the encouraging environment created by Turkey's long-standing view of this problem as an internal problem of the United Kingdom. Indeed, between 1954-55, as Greece's demands on Cyprus became official and the possibility that Britain might give up its sovereignty over the island increased, Turkey began to take an interest in the problem. This interest was partly due to the pressure of the Turkish Cypriot community and the fact that the issue was met with interest by the national press and the public. Although Turkey generally follows a foreign policy to maintain British sovereignty on the island, gradually, as the future status of the island began to be discussed, it put forward that it should be accepted as a party in determining its future status, based on Article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

"In 1954, when Greece's efforts to bring the problem to the United Nations began to intensify, Turkey also began to feel the need to deal with the problem officially. Turkey's Ambassador to Athens told the Greek Government that Turkey is in favor of preserving the status on the island, that if they are to make any efforts regarding the future of the island, Turkey should be considered as a party on this issue, and that taking the issue to the United Nations will negatively affect Turkish-Greek relations. He expressed his belief that it would have a positive impact." [iv]

In 1954, the Greek government announced that it would take the Cyprus issue to the United Nations and ask for the recognition of the right to self-determination, which required Turkey to express its views clearly. As a matter of fact, according to F. Köprülü, who explained Turkey's views; "There were never discussions with Greek leaders on the issue of Cyprus under British rule and it would have been inappropriate to discuss the issue with Greece. There is no 'Cyprus problem' for Türkiye; However, if one day the future of the island emerges as an issue to be discussed with England, the presence of a large Turkish minority living on the island will give Turkey the right to express its views on the issue. However, in the opinion of the Turkish government, it is not appropriate to make any changes to the current status of the island." [v]

The fact that Greece took the issue to the UN on 16 August 1954 and subsequently failed to achieve the desired result revealed the international dimensions of the Cyprus issue and caused an anti-British public opinion to form in Cyprus and Greece. In 1955, England suggested that a meeting be held between the parties in London regarding the Cyprus problem, and a conference was held in London between Turkey, Greece and England. While this meeting, in

which the official views of the parties became clear, the events of September 6 took place, which would have very negative effects on Turkish-Greek relations.

The 1955-60 period created a chain of events in which, on the one hand, negotiations were held between the parties regarding the future of Cyprus, and on the other hand, differences of opinion began to occur among the communities on the island. The acts of violence that started against British rule on the island also began to target the Turkish community on the island, which began to be seen as the most important obstacle to the efforts to connect Cyprus to Greece.

"The bloody intercommunal conflicts that occurred in 1958 as a result of the intense tension in Cyprus completed the process of transforming the nature of the Cyprus problem from a colonial problem into a Turkish-Greek problem, by pushing the issue of removing the British from the Island, which was the aim of the Greek Cypriots' struggle, into the background." [vi]

In 1959, regional events in the international system required cooperation and solidarity efforts among the allies, and with the pressures of the USA and NATO; "Turkey and Greece entered into bilateral negotiations, and in the meetings held in Zurich between the prime ministers of the two states on 5-11 February 1959, it was decided to establish an independent 'Republic of Cyprus', guaranteeing the freedom and rights of the 'Turkish Cypriot Community' within this independent state. Constitutional principles and other relevant agreements have been determined. "These agreements were signed in London on February 19, 1959, by representatives of Turkey, Greece, England, and the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities." [vii]

In 1960, shortly after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the pressure that the Greek community began to put on the Turkish community on the island and their attempts to prevent them from benefiting from constitutional rights caused new tensions between the communities. In 1963 and 1964, intercommunal conflicts on the island accelerated and gradually turned into efforts to destroy the Turkish minority. The increase in attacks against Turkish society and the non-implementation of the rights brought by the constitutional order caused Turkey's reaction. In this context, 1964 was a very important year both in terms of the changes it brought to Turkish-Greek relations and the effects it had on Turkish foreign policy.

In 1963 and 1964, the pressures and attacks intensified on the Turkish Cypriot community forced Turkey to take initiatives to stop the attacks on the Turkish Cypriots, using its guarantor title. In December 1963, after the attacks against the Turkish Cypriot community turned into a massacre, Turkey felt the need to take deterrent military measures and Turkish warplanes began to fly over the island. In 1964, the states that signed the Treaty of Guarantee came together and discussed the situation, but it was not possible

to obtain a concrete result from the meetings held in London. Meanwhile, the Makarios administration's approach of not recognizing the Zurich and London Treaties, which established the balance and status between the Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus, with the support of the G. Papandreou government in Greece, and its annulment of the Alliance Agreement, started to create a new tension. The Makarios administration's efforts to change the status of the island, with the support of Greece, gradually led to the rapid armament of the Greek Cypriots. While this situation caused the relations between the Turkish and Greek communities on the island to become more tense, it also caused tensions between Turkey and Greece.

As these tensions increased, Türkiye felt obliged to decide to intervene militarily on the island in mid-1964. However, the USA, fearing that relations between Turkey and Greece might deteriorate as a result of a war over Cyprus and the negative effects this would have on Western-NATO interests in general and US interests in particular, blocked Turkey's decision by reacting very harshly. The USA's attempt to prevent Turkish intervention, which went down in history as the famous "Johnson Letter", not only prevented Turkey's intervention in Cyprus, but also led to a significant distrust and disappointment in Turkish-US relations and a change of direction in Turkish foreign policy.

After the USA prevented Turkey's intervention in Cyprus, a new approach emerged in bilateral relations between Türkiye and Greece. This situation, which was also affected by the change of power in Greece, was short-lived, and in 1967 the massacres and oppression against the Turkish community in Cyprus started again. Since 1964, the relations between the Makarios administration and Greece increased solidarity and cooperation towards Enosis, resulting in the rapid arming of Cyprus by Greece. As a matter of fact, as a result of this cooperation, Greece secretly sent 20,000 Greek soldiers to Cyprus under the command of General Grivas, and also strengthened the Greek Cypriot Guard Army in terms of weapons and military requirements.

With the military junta coming to power in Greece in 1967, negotiations on Cyprus were restarted between Turkey and Greece, but these negotiations failed. In reality, the negotiations initiated by the junta administration with Turkey on the Cyprus issue are a result of Greece wanting to achieve Enosis by making some concessions to Turkey; While the military administration was trying to ensure the unification of Cyprus with Greece by giving some minority rights to the Turkish community in Cyprus, providing military bases for Turkey and NATO on the island, and making some arrangements in favor of Turkey in Western Thrace, it was faced with the negative attitudes that began to emerge against the military administration in Greece. made an effort to gain national prestige. After Turkey maintained its determined stance and opposed Greece's Enosis requests during the meetings held between Turkey and Greece in Keşan on September 9 and in Dedeoğaç on September 10, new events took place in December that strained Turkish-Greek relations. In the

face of attacks such as mass murder against the Turkish Cypriot community, Turkey took action and announced to the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece that it would intervene militarily, using its rights arising from the agreements, unless the attacks against the Turkish community were stopped and the Greek forces secretly stationed on the island were not withdrawn. Following the mediator initiatives, the crisis that could lead to a war between Turkey and Greece was eased, and with the agreement reached in early December, the Greek forces that were secretly stationed in Cyprus and contrary to the agreements left the island, and Turkey stopped its preparations to intervene in Cyprus.

The new relations between Türkiye and Greece have led to a moderate optimism regarding Cyprus. While negotiations between the two countries started again in 1968, a period of silence began in Cyprus that would continue until 1974. The fact that the Turkish Cypriot community started to live together in order to resist the attacks after the attacks in 1963–64 and 1967, and that they started to develop their own administrative structure after the 1967 crisis played a major role in such a development.

The new process opened with the negotiations initiated after the tension between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus issue was reduced, left the attempts to connect Cyprus to Greece through "Enosis" suspended for a while. Towards the end of the 1960s, the Greek Cypriot Administration increasingly began to pursue an independent policy from Greece. The fact that the line followed by the military administration in domestic and foreign policy in Greece began to receive reactions both nationally and internationally, and that an administration disconnected from the people remained in power with pressure, was effective in bringing the Greek Cypriot administration's relations with Greece to a new level. The Makarios administration began to increasingly focus on the idea of Cyprus' independence and began to increase its relations with Non-Aligned countries.

The period after 1974 appears to be a period in which the most intense events took place in Turkish–Greek relations. On the one hand, there has been no progress that could lead to a clear result in the negotiations between the two countries on the Cyprus issue, and on the other hand, in parallel with the increasing distrust between the two countries, new problems and the tensions they have created have begun to occur in the Aegean Sea.

In the post-1974 period, the Cyprus issue began to form the basis of relations between the two countries. While Turkey is trying to raise its relations with Greece to the level of friendship and cooperation on a problem-free basis, it has endeavored to save its foreign policy from the influence of the Cyprus problem. Turkey's dependence on the USA and other leading NATO member countries, especially in military and economic terms, and the fact that the embargo that the US administration started to impose on Turkey was tied to the Cyprus condition, forced Turkey to carry out its international connections under very difficult conditions.

Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus resulted in the definitive separation of the two communities living on the island from each other, and the Turkish community established its own national administration and declared that they could not live together with the Greek Cypriot community again without Turkey's effective guarantee. During all the negotiations regarding the Cyprus problem in Turkish-Greek relations after 1974, the basic approach of the Turkish Cypriot community was to establish a bi-communal, bi-sectional federation in which the Turkish and Greek communities had equal rights and where Turkey had an effective guarantee. Greece and the Greek Cypriot community, on the other hand, followed policies during the negotiations in favor of the establishment of a unitary state in Cyprus where the minority rights of the Turks were guaranteed.

During the inter-communal negotiations between 1974 and 1980, no significant progress was achieved between the parties that would enable the fundamental solution of the problem. However, Denktaş and Makarios, who came together to determine the principles on which the intercommunal negotiations carried out under the supervision of the United Nations Secretary General, agreed on a four-article draft and started the intercommunal negotiations on February 12, 1977. However, while inter-communal talks were ongoing, the sudden death of Makarios in August caused these talks to be disrupted for a long time. The interrupted intercommunal talks were only put back on track in the meetings held between Kyprianou and Denktaş in May 1979, with the adoption of the ten-article memorandum prepared on the basis of the four articles agreed upon between Makarios and Denktaş in 1977. However, during the negotiations between the parties on this ten-article basis, differences of interpretation emerged and no progress was made, especially on the issue of security, which the Turkish side attaches great importance to.

Depending on the development of relations between Türkiye and Greece, the approaches of the parties to the Cyprus issue have changed significantly. Until the 1980s, Turkey and Greece kept the Cyprus issue of secondary importance in their relations and supported attempts to find a solution to this problem through intercommunal negotiations under the supervision of the UN Secretary-General. By insisting on this view, Turkey, in particular, has tried to eliminate the effect of the Cyprus issue that makes it difficult to find a solution to other problems between the two countries. In this context, the Montreux summit held between Turkey and Greece in March 1978 marked the beginning of a new era in the relations between Turkey and Greece, while at the same time providing a very important rapprochement in terms of changing the influence and expectations of other states in the relations between the two countries. Indeed, in the negotiations between Karamanlis and Ecevit, the parties were able to establish an atmosphere of mutual trust that would contribute positively to the negotiations.

However, as in other problems between the two countries, no progress has been made towards a solution to the Cyprus problem. This

deadlock is largely affected by the fact that both communities on the island maintain their mutual distrust and past bitter experiences within the framework of nationalist approaches. The sensitivity of the national and international public opinion on the Cyprus issue makes it difficult for the decision makers in Turkey and Greece, as well as representatives of both communities, to take courageous decisions towards a solution.

In the post-1980 period, the Cyprus issue, as a point of disagreement in Turkish-Greek relations, maintains its place on the agenda between the two countries, but is far from being a hot conflict point that will strain relations. On the one hand, the negotiations between the parties on other disputes between Turkey and Greece have been suspended for a long time, and on the other hand, no concrete results have emerged from the ongoing negotiations between the communities.

After Greece's transition back to democracy under the leadership of Karamanlis in 1974, there was a significant abstention in the relations between Greece and the Greek Cypriot leadership. During this period, Greece's basic approach to Cyprus can be summarized as "Cyprus decides, Greece supports"[xiii]. However, with the coming to power of PASOK led by Papandreou in the 1981 elections, a significant change was observed in Greece's policy regarding the Cyprus problem. Unlike the old one, the new Greek government prioritized the Cyprus issue over the Aegean issue in Turkish-Greek relations, and put forward the view that the problem could be resolved through an international conference, not through intercommunal negotiations. In this context, in order to improve relations with Turkey and find a solution to the Cyprus problem, the Papandreou government demanded the withdrawal of the Turkish military presence in Cyprus, which it described as "invading", all refugees should be allowed to return to their homeland, the immigrants settled on the island should be sent back to Turkey, all Cypriots should be allowed to live freely. He put forward as a prerequisite the provision of circulation and the guarantee of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unitarity of Cyprus.[xiv]

Despite all this, Turkey supports the intercommunal talks regarding the Cyprus issue, which are being carried out under the supervision of the UN Secretary-General and within the framework of goodwill initiatives. Accordingly, Turkey sees a bi-communal, bi-zonal, independent constitutional federative state system in which the fundamental rights and freedoms of the island Turks are guaranteed effectively in order to achieve a permanent and fair solution in Cyprus. The differences of opinion between Turkey and Greece in terms of the method of solution to the Cyprus problem also arise in terms of content. Greece, in particular, insists on a solution that excludes Turkey's effective guarantee of a possible solution to the Cyprus problem and proposes to the Turkish Cypriot community to be content with the rights granted to minorities.

In terms of the general trend of Turkish-Greek relations, the Cyprus

issue is no longer perceived as a sovereignty issue, but rather as a strategic and tactical factor for the realization of national foreign policy options, especially considering other disagreements between the two countries in the Aegean Sea. Under today's realities, both Türkiye and Greece do not find the initiatives aimed at owning the whole of Cyprus feasible. Neither Turkey nor Greece is now able or willing to establish their own national sovereignty over the island.

In its relations with Greece, Turkey gives priority to efforts to establish mutual balance on issues that cause disagreements in the Aegean Sea. In this context, the real problem for Turkey is not the annexation of Cyprus to Turkey and the oppression of the Greek community living on the island, but the fact that the ongoing tension in Cyprus makes it difficult to resolve other bilateral problems. For this reason, Turkey looks at the Cyprus problem from the perspective of the interests of the Turkish community on the island and follows a policy in line with their demands; It can be said that similar concerns are experienced in Greece. Unlike Turkey, the priority in relations for Greece depends on the success to be achieved in Cyprus. Therefore, the progress to be made in the Cyprus problem will also pave the way for the solution of other problems between Turkey and Greece. This difference of opinion arises regarding the nature of the new balance to be established in Cyprus. The doubts that arise on this issue are gaining intensity, especially as to whether the balance to be established on the island will lead to tensions with Turkey again in the future if it shows a tendency towards independence and unification with Greece, or whether Turkey will one day find the conditions favorable and occupy Cyprus entirely. .

Turkey and Greece, which have similar concerns, maintain their rigid stances on points that may endanger their own interests in the future due to their mutual distrust of each other, during the negotiations to find a permanent solution to the Cyprus problem, and this increases the deadlock.

Indeed, during the inter-communal talks held under the supervision of the UN Secretary-General and within the framework of goodwill initiatives, the most important disagreements emerged over the need for the Turkish community on the island to have equal rights with the Greek community, three freedoms and Turkey's effective guarantee of the status to be granted to the Turkish community. The Turkish community on the island is under the influence of the distrust between the Greek community and the Turkish community due to the bad experiences in the past, and they require Turkey's effective guarantee so that the Greeks do not pursue pressure and assimilation policies on the Turkish society again. The Greek community, on the other hand, is concerned that such a right granted to Turkey may be used by this country for occupation purposes.

The ongoing distrust between Turkey and Greece, in parallel with the mutual distrust between societies, causes all attempts for a solution to be inconclusive. As the de facto bi-sectional and bi-



communal situation in Cyprus shows, it is no longer possible for these two communities to live together under the umbrella of a unitary state in the future. For this reason, both the Turkish and Greek sides feel obliged to prepare themselves for a federation structure that is independent and based on the equality of societies. In fact, the draft framework agreement prepared by the UN Secretary General in 1985 was prepared taking into account similar concerns, but while this draft was found to be completely acceptable by the Turkish Cypriot community, the Greek Cypriot leadership, partly influenced by the pressures of Greece, rejected this draft.

It was decided to restart the intercommunal talks, which were interrupted after the 1985 draft framework agreement was rejected by the Greek Cypriot leadership, between Denktaş and Vassiliu in 1988, but in the 1990s, no concrete solution could be obtained from the intercommunal talks carried out within the framework of the goodwill initiatives and observation of the UN Secretary-General. This situation continues due to the deadlock in the relations between Türkiye and Greece and is becoming increasingly accustomed.

The second half of the 1990s was a period when discussions regarding Cyprus intensified. During this period, the TRNC started to work on the thesis that it was no longer possible to establish a federal structure in Cyprus, and instead put forward the confederation thesis. Although it is not recognized by the international community, TRNC's struggle to have equal rights and status in determining the future of Cyprus continues. The dialogue process, which is tried to be carried out within the framework of the goodwill efforts of the UN Secretary-General, is frequently interrupted by the Greek Cypriot Administration's reluctance to grant equal status to the Turkish Cypriots and their claims that they are the sole legal representatives of Cyprus.

In this context, in recent years, when it has not yet been possible to get a result from the negotiations carried out within the framework of the UN, the Greek Cypriot Administration has started to follow a policy of seeing the future of the island under the umbrella of the EU. On 3 July 1990, the Greek Cypriot Administration applied to the EU Council and expressed its desire for full membership, and the European Union Commission discussed the Greek Cypriot Administration's application in June 1993. At the meeting in Corfu in June 1994, the Heads of Government of the European Union agreed that it would be appropriate for Cyprus to take part in the future expansion of the Union, and this agreement was confirmed at the 1994 Essen Summit. In February 1995, the European Union Commission reconsidered whether Cyprus met the conditions for entry into the EU. According to the decision of the Council of Ministers of 6 March 1995, membership negotiations with Cyprus would begin 6 months after the intergovernmental conference at the end of 1996.

On the other hand, it is possible to talk about another development parallel to the Luxemburg Summit and the acceptance of the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the island and as a candidate country for full membership in the EU. This is the

Common Defense Area Doctrine that Greece signed with the Greek Cypriot Administration in 1994. Within the framework of this doctrine, Greece may increase its appropriate measures if the Turkish military presence on the island exceeds 30,000 and will consider any intervention against the Greek Cypriot Community as a cause of war. [xv] This situation required Turkey to increase its relations with the Turkish Cypriot Community.

This situation is especially important in two respects; The first of these is to be accepted by the EU as the sole legal representative and legitimate government of Cyprus, and therefore to reach a result that may lead to de facto Enosis within a Cyprus that will be integrated with the EU, and the other is to exclude the Turkish community in Cyprus from the union under this umbrella and become a minority. to force the EU to accept its status and the EU security umbrella[xvi]. In both cases, the actual aim is to eliminate Turkey's interests and responsibilities with Cyprus. On the other hand, the EU's membership talks with the Greek Cypriot Administration are continuing.

Indeed, during the inter-communal talks held under the supervision of the UN Secretary-General and within the framework of goodwill initiatives, the most important disagreements emerged over the need for the Turkish community on the island to have equal rights with the Greek community, three freedoms and Turkey's effective guarantee of the status to be granted to the Turkish community. The Turkish community on the island is under the influence of the distrust between the Greek community and the Turkish community due to the bad experiences in the past, and they require Turkey's effective guarantee so that the Greeks do not pursue pressure and assimilation policies on the Turkish society again. The Greek community, on the other hand, is concerned that such a right granted to Turkey may be used by this country for occupation purposes.

The ongoing distrust between Turkey and Greece, in parallel with the mutual distrust between societies, causes all attempts for a solution to be inconclusive. As the de facto bi-sectional and bi-communal situation in Cyprus shows, it is no longer possible for these two communities to live together under the umbrella of a unitary state in the future. For this reason, both the Turkish and Greek sides feel obliged to prepare themselves for a federation structure that is independent and based on the equality of societies. In fact, the draft framework agreement prepared by the UN Secretary General in 1985 was prepared taking into account similar concerns, but while this draft was found to be completely acceptable by the Turkish Cypriot community, the Greek Cypriot leadership, partly influenced by the pressures of Greece, rejected this draft.

It was decided to restart the intercommunal talks, which were interrupted after the 1985 draft framework agreement was rejected by the Greek Cypriot leadership, between Denktaş and Vassiliu in 1988, but in the 1990s, no concrete solution could be obtained from the intercommunal talks carried out within the framework of the goodwill initiatives and observation of the UN Secretary-General. This

situation continues due to the deadlock in the relations between Türkiye and Greece and is becoming increasingly accustomed.

The second half of the 1990s was a period when discussions regarding Cyprus intensified. During this period, the TRNC started to work on the thesis that it was no longer possible to establish a federal structure in Cyprus, and instead put forward the confederation thesis. Although it is not recognized by the international community, TRNC's struggle to have equal rights and status in determining the future of Cyprus continues. The dialogue process, which is tried to be carried out within the framework of the goodwill efforts of the UN Secretary-General, is frequently interrupted by the Greek Cypriot Administration's reluctance to grant equal status to the Turkish Cypriots and their claims that they are the sole legal representatives of Cyprus.

In this context, in recent years, when it has not yet been possible to get a result from the negotiations carried out within the framework of the UN, the Greek Cypriot Administration has started to follow a policy of seeing the future of the island under the umbrella of the EU. On 3 July 1990, the Greek Cypriot Administration applied to the EU Council and expressed its desire for full membership, and the European Union Commission discussed the Greek Cypriot Administration's application in June 1993. At the meeting in Corfu in June 1994, the Heads of Government of the European Union agreed that it would be appropriate for Cyprus to take part in the future expansion of the Union, and this agreement was confirmed at the 1994 Essen Summit. In February 1995, the European Union Commission reconsidered whether Cyprus met the conditions for entry into the EU. According to the decision of the Council of Ministers of 6 March 1995, membership negotiations with Cyprus would begin 6 months after the intergovernmental conference at the end of 1996.

On the other hand, it is possible to talk about another development parallel to the Luxemburg Summit and the acceptance of the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the island and as a candidate country for full membership in the EU. This is the Common Defense Area Doctrine that Greece signed with the Greek Cypriot Administration in 1994. Within the framework of this doctrine, Greece may increase its appropriate measures if the Turkish military presence on the island exceeds 30,000 and will consider any intervention against the Greek Cypriot Community as a cause of war. [xv] This situation required Turkey to increase its relations with the Turkish Cypriot Community.

This situation is especially important in two respects; The first of these is to be accepted by the EU as the sole legal representative and legitimate government of Cyprus, and therefore to reach a result that may lead to de facto Enosis within a Cyprus that will be integrated with the EU, and the other is to exclude the Turkish community in Cyprus from the union under this umbrella and become a minority. to force the EU to accept its status and the EU security umbrella[xvi]. In both cases, the actual aim is to eliminate Turkey's interests and responsibilities with Cyprus. On the other

hand, the EU's decision to initiate membership negotiations with the Greek Cypriot Administration required the TRNC to take a new orientation. In the plan prepared by Denktaş, the proposal for a bi-sectional, bi-communal confederation was expressed, and it was emphasized that it would be possible for both communities to establish close ties with their homeland within such a structure. Regarding integration with the EU; "The Cyprus Confederation will be able to pursue a policy of joining the EU if there is a common agreement between the two parties. "Until Turkey becomes a full member of the EU, all rights and obligations granted to EU member states regarding the Cyprus Confederation will be granted to Turkey with a special regulation."[xvii]

The evaluation of Cyprus' application for full membership in the EU and the recognition of its right to be a candidate country appear to be a practice that is completely contrary to the Zurich and London Agreements that regulate the status of Cyprus. Prof. In a report prepared by Mendelson (British Professor of International Law Prof. H. Mendelson Q.C.'s opinion on the legal aspects of the one-sided membership application of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus to the European Union) The fact that Cyprus started the full membership process to the EU by considering it as its sole legal representative was considered as a decision contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee, and this decision was presented to the UN Security Council in 1997 and 2001 (for the Turkish version of the Mendelson Report). As is known, according to these agreements, the Republic of Cyprus cannot be in any alliance relationship that the guarantor states are not members of and have not approved. Considered in this respect, Cyprus's membership in the EU cannot be possible without Turkey's full membership in the EU. [xviii] However, in order to eliminate the drawbacks arising from this situation, which is legally against the agreements, Greece and Turkey's membership in the EU. At the Helsinki Summit dated 11 December 1999, where it decided not to block the membership application, it consented to Turkey's invitation as a candidate country.[xix]

While the negotiations were continuing at the Helsinki Summit, where the negotiations for Turkey's invitation to the EU as a candidate country were carried out, simultaneously an indirect meeting process took place between the Greek Cypriot Administration leader Clerides and the TRNC President Denktaş, organized by the UN Secretary General. In this process, there was a search for a common ground between the parties that would facilitate the discussion of the problems, and during the meetings, pulse checks were made to equalize the status of the leaders and the people, as well as the confederation.

The text titled Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of The Cyprus Problem, sent to the parties by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in November 2002, indicates that the parties can make the other party accept whatever they want on some of the points they have put forward so far, but it seems to be capable of creating new problems and discussions. As a matter of fact, the second version of

the plan was presented to the parties in December, and the third revised version of the plan was presented to the parties on February 26, 2003, and they were asked to agree on the plan and submit it to a referendum. At the meeting held in The Hague on 10 March 2003 with the participation of the UN Secretary General, the meetings were interrupted after the parties could not agree on the text that was revised for the third time.

It has been observed that since March - April 2003, new confidence-building measures have been implemented by the TRNC on the island and in this context, arrangements have been made to allow daily visits and weekend stays between the two groups. It was stated that this initiative, which aimed to eliminate the distrust between the two groups, helped to eliminate some prejudices, and expectations for reconciliation increased. In this context, the general elections held in TRNC in December were of special importance. There is an intense conflict between the opposition, which says yes to a solution within the framework of the Annan Plan and intends to carry out full EU membership negotiations within the framework of the "United Cyprus Republic" to be established with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, and the ruling parties, who reject the process envisaged by the Annan Plan because it does not effectively guarantee the sensitivities and security of the Turkish Cypriot community. In the elections, both parties won equal seats in the parliament, forcing the parties to form a coalition aiming for reconciliation. As a result, with a coalition established between CTP and DP, a political structure emerged in Cyprus that took into account the sensitivities and interests of the Turkish community and Turkey and pursued a policy aimed at restarting the negotiation process within the framework of the Annan Plan.

In the first months of 2004, there were attempts to restart the search for a solution between the two communities that also took the Annan Plan into consideration, and negotiations were restarted within the framework of the good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General. In this context, during and after the negotiations between the parties, the Annan Plan was reviewed once again and another text, which was claimed to take into account the sensitivities of the parties, was prepared and submitted to the acceptance of the parties. It was not possible to say that the text in question had fully taken into account the sensitivities of the parties. The most important criticism put forward about the text is that Annan himself will fill in the issues that the parties cannot agree on within the stipulated timetable, what kind of effective and indestructible guarantee will be provided to the status to be created within the framework of the EU acquis, the guarantor states' prior acceptance that they will approve this text before the agreement is fully revealed, It has been observed that in simultaneous referendums, if either side says no, the possibility of repeating the referendum until both sides say yes is mentioned, etc.

It is possible to access the final text submitted to the parties on 31 March 2004 from the link below.

2,260 / 5,000

Translation results

Translation result

[i] Pantazis Terlexis, Greece's Policy and Attitude Towards the Problem of Cyprus, New York: N.Y. University, 1968, p. 91.

[ii] Pantazis Terlexis, Greece's Policy .., p. 91

[iii] Pantazis Terlexis, Greece's Policy .., pp. 96–97.

[iv] Faruk Sönmezoğlu, "Attitudes and Theses of the Parties in the Cyprus Problem," Problems in Turkish Foreign Policy, ed. Esat Çam, Ist. Der Yay. 1989, p. 96

[v] P. Terlexis, Greece's Policy .., pp. 159–160.

[vi] Andreas Mavroyiannis, "The Effect of the Cyprus Problem on Turkish–Greek Relations," Turkish–Greek Conflict, Ed. Semih Vaner, Istanbul: Metis Publications, 1989, p. 131.

[vii] Fahir Armaoğlu, 20th century Political History, Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1983, p. 533.

[viii] F. Sönmezoğlu, "On the Cyprus Problem..," pp. 109–110.

[ix] Van Coufoudakis, "Greek–Turkish Relations 1973–1983: the View from Athens," International Security, Vol.9, No. 4, Spring 1985, p. 197.

[x] See; Robert McDonald, The Cyprus Problem, London: IISS Adelphi Paper Series 234, Winter 1988/89, p. 85.

[xi] Mehmet Ali Birand, Diyet, Istanbul: Milliyet Yay. 1985, p. 22.

[xii] On the differences in the foreign policy behavior of the Karamanlis and Papandreou Governments regarding Turkey, see; V. Coufoudakis, "Greek–Turkish..," ; V. Coufoudakis, "Ideology and Pragmatism in Greek Foreign Policy," Current History, Vol. 81No. 479, December 1982, pp. 426–431; Jhon C. Loulis, "Papandreou's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol.63, No.2, Winter 1984/85, pp. 375–391; Marios Evriviades, "Greece After Dictatorship," Current History, November 1979, pp. 161–166; F. Stephen Larrabee, "Dateline Athens: Greece for Greeks," Foreign Policy, No. 45, Winter 1981/82, pp. 158–175.

[xiii] V. Coufoudakis, "Greek–Turkish..," p. 206

[xiv] For discussions on this subject, see; R. McDonald, The Problem..; A. J. Groom, "Cyprus: Back in Doldrums," (Photocopy);

A.J. Groom, "Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. A Treadmill for Diplomacy," (Photocopy, in French, see Ares, Vol.II 1984/85); A.J. Groom, "Cyprus: Light at the End of the Tunnel?" Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.9, No.3, 1981, pp. 245-257.

[xv] Thanos Dokos, "Greek Security Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era," Thesis, Summer 1998.

<http://www.mfa.gr/thesis/summer98/security.htm> B. Date: 02/03/1999

[xvi] While Erol Manisalı states that the approach in Turkey's Cyprus policy is now confederation, he also focuses on the reasons for this and says; "There is a rapprochement and a solution within the two-state structure. Those who do not accept this are instigating new and big problems, not peace on the island. The federation efforts carried out so far have already completely lost their meaning with the membership negotiations between the European Union and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus. On the other hand, while the Greeks 'appeared' to be discussing the federation, they were slowly shifting the ground under Turkey and the TRNC. Since 1993, a de facto military 'integration' has been implemented between Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus. Greek bases on the island, joint maneuvers, and Greek weapons piled up on the island are visible to everyone.

Today, there are two states and two separate sovereign administrations on the island from A to Z. ... Let's assume that the federation is established and the federation enters the EU. No matter what assurances are given to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, the following will happen after this federation enters the EU: 1) According to the EU legal order, the EU Parliament and the EU Council can now make a unilateral decision and say that we have changed this federation in such and such a way upon the request of the Greek Cypriots. Because now, this is an 'internal problem' of the EU, Turkey outside has no right to say or do anything. ... 2) A Cyprus Federation that has joined the EU is now a state whose ties with Turkey have been completely severed. Türkiye will be excluded from the island. 3) Turkish Cypriots, who are a pillar of the Federation, cannot have any rights within the EU. In order to have rights, the TRNC must be included in the EU as an independent state. At best, there would only be 'minority rights', just like the Turks in Western Thrace." Erol Manisalı, "Games Played in Cyprus", Cumhuriyet, 27 January 1999, p. 10.

[xvii] Baçın Yinanç - Akay Cemal, "Confederation Surprise", Milliyet, 1 September 2000, p. 14; Sami Kohen, "The Last Chance for a Solution is Gone", Milliyet, September 1, 1998, p.16. Reşat Akar - Alper Ballı, "Confederation in Cyprus", Cumhuriyet, 1 September 1998, p. 8.

[xviii] Included in the confederation plan proposed by Denktaş, "The Cyprus confederation will be able to follow the EU accession policy if there is a common agreement of the two parties. The proposal "All rights and obligations granted to EU member states regarding the

Cyprus federation will be granted to Turkey with a special regulation until its full membership to the EU" is reflected in Turkey's policy that Cyprus cannot become a full member of the EU before Turkey. showed that it has changed. In the proposal in question, Türkiye stated that confederal Cyprus could become a full member of the EU only under certain conditions. "The Last Step Before Integration", Cumhuriyet, 2 September 1999, p. 9.

[xix] As Erol Manisalı stated, Turkey has had the status of a candidate country since the Ankara Agreement, and in addition, it has removed its borders with the Union in this sense by accepting the Customs Union Agreement since 1995. Therefore, re-accepting Turkey as a "candidate country" is considered a forced interpretation that is contrary to the process and the agreements made.