|
Equitas
as a party to suit in the United States |
|
|
|
|
|
Case
Name |
Cite |
Federal
/ State |
Date |
Abstract
of Points |
|
Archdiocese
of Milwaukee v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London |
No.
96-CV-006626, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee Cty., Wis. July 13, 1999) |
State |
July 13,
1999 |
|
|
B.F.
Goodrich v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. |
No. CV
9902 0410, slip op. (Ct. Common Pleas, Summit Cty., Ohio Oct. 14, 1999) |
State |
Oct. 14,
1999 |
|
|
Boeing
Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's |
No.
99-2-03873 SEA, Slip op. (Sup. Ct., King Cty., Wash. Nov. 23, 1999, and Dec.
16, 1999) |
State |
Nov. 23,
1999 |
|
|
Central
Maine Power Co. v. Ernest A. Moore |
No.
CV093-489 (Me. Super., Kennebec Co. Jan 11, 2000) |
State |
Jan. 11,
2000 |
|
|
Central
Vermont Public Serv. Co. v. Adriatic Ins. Co. |
No.
I:96-CV-252 (D.Vt.Feb. 11, 1998 |
State |
February
11, 1998 |
|
|
Employer's
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Owens Insurance, Ltd. |
No.
MRS-C-51-96 slip op. (N.J. App. Div. Apr. 12, 1999) |
State |
Apr. 12,
1999 |
|
|
Employers
Insurance of Wausau v. Certain London Market Companies, et al. |
Federal |
Oct. 27,
1997 |
Insureds
sued for payment under the policies and the issue before the court was
whether Equitas could be held to the forum clauses in the policies. The court applied the rule that non-parties
may be bound if closely related and found that the obligations Equitas took
on in performance of the policies was enough to bind them to the
contracts. Therefore,
pursuant to the forum selection clauses, the court had personal jurisdiction
over Equitas. The court
relied on the language of the Reinsurance and Run off contract. The Plaintiffs argued that it is not
merely a reinsurance contract because of the great extent that Equitas
assumed control of the management of the outstanding policies. Equitas responded that the contract
was for reinsurance only. They
also argue that the contract cannot give rights to a third party without a
novation. The court
concentrated on, not the Reinsurance Contract, but the policy made between
Insureds and the Names and the forum selection clauses contained
therein. The rule to bind a
close party is whether it would be foreseeable that the party would be bound
by the terms. The court looked
to the relationship between Equitas and the Names and determined that there
was a close relationship for it to be foreseeable that they would be bound,
particularly since they took over the litigation of the claims. |
|
|
Employers
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Owens Ins., Ltd. |
No.
MRS-C-51-96 (N.J. Super. Nov. 10, 1999) |
State |
Nov. 10, 1999 |
|
|
Equitas
Reinsurance Ltd. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. |
State |
Apr. 26,
2001 |
Equitas
appealed the trial court's denial of a special appearance. The Court of Appeals found that
Equitas did not meet "their burden of negating all bases of asserting
specific jurisdiction." Plaintiff
brought this action against Equitas for breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing in violation of the Texas Insurance Code. Equitas filed a special appearance to
assert that the court had no personal jurisdiction over it and the trial
court denied the special appearance.
Equitas
argued against general jurisdiction because it does not "conduct continuous
and systematic business activities in the forum state." Equitas argued against specific
jurisdiction because the claims-handling activities are not actionable as to
Equitas and that subjecting them to a Texas court violates the concept of
fair play. In general,
the long arm statute reaches any nonresident "doing business" in the state,
and a tort committed in the state is enough for jurisdiction up to the due
process limitations. For due
process, the nonresident must have minimum contacts and if so the exercise of
jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice. The court
does not address general jurisdiction.
For specific jurisdiction, the cause of action must relate to
defendant's contacts with the state.
Equitas does not argue that it lacks contacts for specific
jurisdiction, but only that the claims handling activities are not
actionable, the Insurance Code does not provide a cause of action against a
reinsurer, and reinsurance is not "the business of insurance" under the Code. Equitas
argued that the claim is not actionable because a duty of good faith only
exists between the insured and the insurer, not the reinsurer. However, the court found that the
claim existed not in common law duty of good faith, but actions in violation
of the Insurance Code. The Code
does not require privity. The court
then acknowledges the dispute as to whether Equitas is a mere reinsurer or a
successor in interest. Looking
to the contract, the court states that Equitas assumed claims handling duties
from the original underwriters and that makes them potentially liable under
the Insurance Code's settlement practices. Further, the Code does not give immunity to reinsurers for
deceptive practices. With
regard to fair play, Equitas claims first that Texas has no interest in the
dispute, which the court immediately dispensed with the causes of action
based on the Insurance Code.
Next, Equitas argues that all relief can be found with the
underwriters and their presence is not needed. However, the deceptive claims
are against Equitas itself, so the court dispensed with that argument. Last, Equitas claimed excessive
burden of defending in a foreign jurisdiction. The court found that this did not present a
hardship. |
|
|
GAF Corp.
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. |
No.
L-980-97 (N.J. Super. Mar. 31, 2000) |
State |
March 31,
2000 |
|
|
Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Equitas Reinsurance, Ltd. |
Federal |
March 5,
2002 |
This case
is brought by insurance companies suing for breach of reinsurance contracts
and seeking indemnification.
"Certain Lloyd's Underwriters" moved to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The issue
is whether the plaintiff must show that defendants failed to arbitrate in a
motion to compel arbitration.
The court found it is necessary to show this and that plaintiffs did
not. The court granted the motion to dismiss. Equitas
was a separate defendant and this motion did not apply to them. There is no other history reported
for this case. |
|
|
Idaho
Power Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London |
Civ. No.
97-0203-S-BLW, slip. op. (D. Idaho, Mar. 31, 1999) |
State |
Mar. 31,
1999 |
|
|
Long
Island Lighting Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. |
Federal |
Sept. 10,
1997 |
Plaintiff
sued for declaratory judgment for payment under insurance policies. Lloyd's argues that the court lacked
jurisdiction because of incomplete diversity between the parties. The court
held that more discovery had to be conducted to determine jurisdiction. Plaintiffs
argue that Lloyd's and Equitas are British citizens for the sake of
diversity. The court however
points to recent decisions that state that the citizenship of each Name must
be determined for jurisdiction because they are the real parties in controversy. The
Plaintiffs argue that Equitas has assumed Names' responsibility and therefore
are the real parties in controversy.
The court disagreed stating that despite the reinsurance, the Names
remain the real parties in controversy under Navarro. In this
matter, not enough is known about the Names to determine jurisdiction,
including the percentage of each Name's liability to meet the dollar amount
requirements for federal jurisdiction.
The court ordered that the domicile and the percentage share of
liability of each Name be presented before ruling on jurisdiction. |
|
|
Malone v.
Equitas Reinsurance Ltd. |
State |
November
2, 2000 |
This is a
suit by a Name against Equitas.
Equitas moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and the
trial court granted it. This
appellate court affirmed. The
Plaintiffs were trying to assert a defense against a claim that Equitas
claimed set-off from paying claims because of amounts owed to them under the
Reinsurance contract to which the Names were not a party. Equitas moved to dismiss. Under
California law, the plaintiff must establish sufficient contacts by the
defendant for jurisdiction. For
whether it is foreseeable to anticipate litigation in another court, the
court uses the "purposeful availment" test. Since the court held that Equitas did not have the minimum
contacts necessary, they do not reach the question of whether jurisdiction
would comport with fair play and substantial justice. The court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that their business was solicited in
California creating jurisdiction under McGee. The court said McGee is not
that expansive. Besides, Lloyd's
argues that their agents solicited business, not them. Hence, there is no connection with
California sufficiently shown for jurisdiction. |
|
|
Millennium
Petrochemicals v. C.G. Jago |
Federal |
|
Insured
sued Equitas for payment on policies regarding litigation expenses. Equitas moved to dismiss citing lack
of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court held that "1) reinsurer had
not assumed liabilities of Names; 2) reinsurance agreement did not make
reinsurer "closely related" to Names; 3) reinsurance agreement did not
convert reinsurer into "successor in interest" or constitute sale of Names'
business." With
regard to personal jurisdiction, Equitas argued that it had a lack of
sufficient contacts. Insured
argued that Equitas was bound, like Names, to the jurisdiction consent clause
in the insurance policy contract.
Plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Insured argues here that Equitas is a
successor in interest to the Names which makes it subject to the jurisdiction
clause. Insured used the wording
of the Renewal and Reconstruction contract to show that Equitas assumed
liability. The court found that
by the contract, Equitas assumed the defense of claims, but not the liability
of claims. The court found that
the part of the contract where Equitas assumed the "run-off" merely meant
that it assumed responsibility for payment and is only evidence of Equitas'
indemnity to Names. Last,
the contract expressly states that the contract is for reinsurance only. The court
then addressed the insured's argument that Equitas is a "closely related" to
the Names such that it is bound by the policy. Insureds cited Employer's Ins. Of Wassau for
support. This court rejects the
application of the closely related analysis. In Wassau, the court focused on the forum selection
clause, not the relationship between Equitas and the Names. Here the relationship is one of
reinsurance by the express terms of the contract. With
regard to the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Equitas argued
that a policyholder cannot sue the reinsurer. Insured argues that Equitas is a successor in interest and
deals directly with policyholders in its claims handling capacity. Again, the court relies on the
contract wording itself and holds that it was for reinsurance only and that
Equitas did not assume Names' liability. Insureds
then argue that it was not reinsurance, but reinsurance to close, that
Equitas offered and that it assumed liabilities in order to close the
syndicates. The court cited Long
Island Lighting in holding that this does not change the fact that Names
are ultimately liable on the policy.
Finally,
insureds argue that the Names were released from liability by the Settlement
Offer, but the court rejected this outright as contradictory to the plain
language of the Settlement Offer contract which stated that Names retain
liability on policies they have written. |
|
|
Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Equitas, Ltd. |
State |
|
Insured
brought suit for policies covering environmental clean up costs. Equitas moved to quash service or
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Colorado Court of Appeals held that "1) reinsurer did
not bind itself to forum selection clause in underlying liability policy by
entering into reinsurance contract, and 2) reinsurer did not purposefully
avail itself of doing business in Colorado or establish minimum contacts
necessary for assertion of personal jurisdiction by entering into reinsurance
contract." Plaintiff
argues that Equitas consented to jurisdiction by entering into the
reinsurance contract with Colorado Names. They argue that Equitas is a successor in interest by
virtue of the contract. The court found that the contract was merely
indemnification of the Names by Equitas and did not relieve Names' liability
on the policies nor did it make Equitas liable. The court also found plaintiff's argument that it was
reinsurance to close irrelevant. Therefore, the reinsurance contract did not bind Equitas to
the forum selection clauses in the policies. Plaintiff
then argued that Equitas did have minimum contacts with Colorado. The trial court found no agents or
businesses of Equitas in the state.
The court found that Equitas did not purposefully avail itself of
doing business there. |
|
|
Unisys
Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. |
No.
L-1431-94S (N.J. Super., Middlesex co. Dec. 7, 1999) |
State |
Dec. 7,
1999 |
|
|
USX Corp.
v. Adriatic Ins. Co. |
Federal |
|
Insured
sued for breach of insurance contract then moved to amend their complaint to
include Equitas. The court found
that the reinsurance contract is not an assignment and denied the motion. Insured
argued under the doctrine of assignment that Equitas assumed the liability of
Names with its direct control of the claims handling and settlement of the
policies. Equitas argues that it
is only a contract for reinsurance and insureds therefore have no right to
sue. The court then describes
the structure of business at Lloyd's. The court
quotes the Reinsurance and Run-off contract extensively. Plaintiffs argue the inclusion of
Equitas under FRCP Rule 15(a) for the furtherance of the ends of justice. Equitas argues the intent of the
parties under the contract was to create reinsurance only regardless of
Equitas' involvement in litigation.
The court
held that the reinsurance relationship gives no privity to the
plaintiffs. Merely handling
claims is not enough for assumption of the contracts for an action against
the reinsurer by the policyholder.
Last, the court relied on the plain language of the contract of
reinsurance to hold against the argument that Equitas assumed the liability. In addition, the contract
is clear that no third party rights were being given. |
|
|
Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Corp. v. Am. Ins. Co., et al. |
Federal |
September
27, 2001 |
Plaintiffs
sued various insurers for indemnification for environmental clean-up. After filing, plaintiffs filed for
bankruptcy. Insurers moved for
change of venue and removal because the policies were now part of the
bankruptcy estate. Plaintiffs
argued that this was forum shopping and wanted the state court proceeding to
continue. The court
ruled that mandatory abstention under Section 1334 applies, even to removed
actions. The court held it would
abstain from hearing the case.
Because of this, it remanded the case to state court. |