SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:  Affirmed, 233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LEINENWEBER, J.

BACKGROUND

[*1]  The essential facts of this case are not in dispute. The Society of Lloyds provides the facilities for and is the regulator of an English insurance market which is one of the largest in the world. Its origins date back to 1688 and it takes its name from the owner of a coffee house which was the site where underwriters and merchants first gathered to do business. Initially, Lloyd’s was a voluntary association and was largely limited to insuring marine risks but in 1871 it was incorporated and over the years the scope of risks has broadened so that now there is scarcely any risk that cannot be insured against, including a movie star’s legs. Couch on Insurance 2d. Rev. Ed. § 18:9.

Lloyd’s does not itself underwrite insurance but is a “society” of individuals, called “Names”, who do the actual underwriting of the insured risks. Names are not allowed to take an active role in the conduct of the insurance business. Each Name accepts underwriting risks for his own profit or loss through a managing agent. The Names normally group themselves into syndicates in order to underwrite larger risks. The syndicates are administered by the managing agents. Most syndicates specialize in the underwriting of a particular kind of insurance. Insurance business is placed with the syndicate through a world-wide system of insurance brokers, who for the most part are approved by Lloyd’s. A Name’s individual liability is several and not joint, i.e., the Name is responsible for his own undertakings only. However, and this is a big however, a member’s losses are unlimited except to the extent that the underwriting is limited. Bonny v. Society of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156, 158 (7th Cir.1993). The syndicates obtain reinsurance to avoid the prospect of such open-ended liabilities. A syndicate normally ceases to do business after one year. The outstanding liabilities of the syndicate are then reinsured, usually with the participants in the following year’s syndicate. The managing agent arranges for the reinsurance.

Profits come from two sources: underwriting profits, i.e., the amount by which the premiums exceeds the claims, and investment profits on the premium trust fund. Lloyd’s generally operates on a three-year accounting system. The final results of the underwriting, i.e., the determination of profits or losses, is normally not known until two years after the close of business. Profits are distributed at that time, assuming the managing agent has successfully placed final reinsurance. If reinsurance has not been placed, the account is termed “in run-off” and cannot be closed and profits cannot be taken. The tighter the risk is defined the earlier the account can be closed. For example a syndicate insuring Betty Grabel’s legs can close its books immediately at the end of the year if her legs make it through the year unscathed, while a syndicate issuing a general liability policy will in all probability need reinsurance to close.

[*2]  Originally managing agents, in addition to managing the Names’ affairs, served the recruitment function of introducing new Names to the market. However since t he 1960s, a new agent, called a “Member’s Agent,” has come into existence whose duty it is to recruit new members, assist them on syndicate selection, and provide administrative services, such as accounting, tax, and investments. In addition to investing money, the Names sign a General Undertaking under which they make promises with respect to the underwriting business, such as agreeing to comply with the Lloyd’s Act and any by-laws or regulations promulgated in connection with membership and underwriting. The undertaking also included a forum selection and choice of law clause that was considered in Ashenden v. Lloyd’s of London, 1996 WL 717464 (N.D.Ill., Dec. 9, 1996).

Prior to 1982 the power to adopt by-laws and regulations was vested in the members themselves acting at a general meeting of the membership. In 1982, legislation known as the Lloyd’s Act 1982, transferred the power to enact by-laws and regulations to the Council of Lloyd’s, a governing body created by the Act. The transfer was due to the escalating number of Names, especially the number residing outside of the United Kingdom, which made it no longer practical for them to meet. The Council is made up of managing agents elected by managing agents and members elected by members, with the former having the controlling vote. The Act also provided for the nomination and appointment of “substitute agents” to act on behalf of members for the proper regulation of the business of insurance at Lloyd’s.

Beginning in the 1980’s and continuing into the early 1990’s the Names in the Lloyd’s market incurred aggregate underwriting losses of over $12 billion mainly as a result of reinsuring contingent liabilities of so-called “long tail” cases, such as those involving asbestos and pollution claims, without adequate reserves. In order to deal with this problem the Council enacted a by-law creating a “Central Fund” which was to be used to cover underwriting deficiencies. Names were required to contribute to the fund each year based on a percentage of their capacity.

As losses continued to mount the Society was faced with two major problems that threatened its survival. First there was the immensity of the outstanding liabilities of the Names as a result of unprotected underwriting losses and the inability of many of them to pay their proportionate losses already incurred and to provide for unreported, although anticipated, additional claims. Second, there was a proliferation of litigation resulting from collection activities of the Central fund to recover monies used to cover underwriting losses of Names. and of litigation brought by Names against Lloyd’s and the Names’ agents seeking to recover damages for negligent underwriting and for fraud. In order to resolve these problems and to ensure Lloyd’s survival, the Council adopted a proposed settlement plan under which Lloyd’s and settling Names were to exchange mutual releases and an entity was to be created to provide reinsurance for the problem risks for the years prior to 1992. In return the members would agree to pay all outstanding obligations for years of account after 1992 and their share of the Equitas reinsurance premium. This plan, called “Reconstruction and Renewal,” was submitted to the members in June 1996 and was accepted by large percentage of them.

[*3]  The foundation of the agreement was the creation of Equitas, an independent entity that was to provide reinsurance protection to the problem syndicates. Funding was to be provided by payments from the Lloyd’s Central Fund and from premiums Paid by the members who were to receive the reinsurance protection. A key feature of the agreement was that the reinsurance coverage would extend to all Names, including those who did not accept the settlement offer. Non-settling Names would however not participate in the mutual waiver of claims. Further features of the plan, designed to prevent it from being tied up in litigation, were provisions barring a Name from claiming a set-off against Lloyd’s and from disputing the amount of his reinsurance premium except in a very cursory manner. Non settling names were also expected to pay all outstanding underwriting liabilities not reinsured by Equitas. On September 3, 1996 the council appointed a substitute agent for the Names to do all things necessary to put into effect the reinsurance plan, including execution of the Equitas Reinsurance contract on their behalf. The individual Name’s share of the Equitas premium was calculated by Lloyd’s depending on the exposure of a Name’s syndicates to pre-1992 risks. Lloyd’s relied upon expert actuarial and accounting advice to make the calculations.

A fundamental question was whether Lloyd’s had the power to impose the reinsurance contract on non-accepting members through the office of the substitute agent. In 1983 the Council had enacted a bylaw that empowered the council to appoint substitute agents. In 1995, a bylaw was enacted, at the same time the Reconstruction and Renewal Plan was adopted, which specifically authorizing the substitute agents to enter into the reinsurance contract with Equitas on the Names’ behalf. Lloyd’s claimed the power to enact such bylaws under the 1982 act that authorized the Council “to make such bylaws as from time to time seem requisite or expedient” to further the objects of the Society, and to appoint substitute agents.

Test cases were brought in the English courts which affirmed Lloyd’s power to enact the Plan and bind the Names in three separate rulings. The first test case held that Lloyd’s did have authority to create Equitas, and that the substitute agents had authority to bind the Names to the reinsurance contract. The second test case concerned the issue of whether the Names could raise defenses and set-offs to Lloyd’s claims. This required the court to consider the validity of the so-called “pay now, sue later” clause, paragraph 5 .5 of the Reinsurance contract, which barred the Names from claiming any set-offs, including damages for fraud, to the Equitas premium amount. The court held the clause valid. The third ruling involved the so-called “conclusive evidence” clause, paragraph 5.10 of the Reinsurance contract, which stated that Lloyd’s calculation of the Equitas premium amount “shall be conclusive evidence as between the Name and [Equitas] in the absence of manifest error.” This provision was likewise upheld. The first two rulings were affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Leave to appeal was denied as to the third ruling.

[*4]  The defendants, James and Mary Jane Ashenden, are residents of Illinois. James, a lawyer, and Mary Jane, his wife, became Names on January 1, 1977 and January 1, 1984 respectively, as a result of recruitment efforts of a senior underwriter with R.W. Sturge & Co., a managing agent. They were assured that Sturge was one of the oldest and most prestigious underwriting agencies at Lloyd’s, and only underwrote conservative risks. As required by the applicable regulations, the Ashendens lodged two letters of credit with Lloyd’s of a value of £70,000 each as security for their underwriting liabilities. The Ashendens were presented with a list of syndicates recommended by Sturge. No information, other than the syndicate type, was given to them. In reliance on Sturge they agreed to participate in the syndicates recommended. Over the years the Ashendens were assured by Sturge that their investments were completely safe. They were never told that they faced losses from asbestos claims. In fact they were urged by Sturge to increase their investments, which they did in 1982, to £200,000 each.

Starting in 1991, the Ashendens began receiving cash calls from Lloyd’s to pay for steadily increasing underwriting losses that their syndicates were sustaining, largely as a result of general liability policies, without aggregation limits, written as far back as the 1930’s, and which had been successively reinsured without adequate reserves. Because of the cash calls the Ashendens tendered their resignations in the summer of 1991. Between 1992 and 1995 Lloyd’s drew upon the Ashendens’ letters of credit to fund their continuing underwriting liabilities. In 1995, the Ashendens, along with 43 Illinois Names, filed suit against Lloyd’s and several member’s agents in Illinois alleging violations of the Illinois Securities Act and Consumer Fraud and Deception Practices Act. After removal to this court, the case was dismissed due to the choice of law and forum clauses of the general undertakings signed by the Names. Ashenden v. Lloyd’s, 1996 WL 717464 (N.D.Ill.Dec. 9, 1996).

In 1996, the Ashendens received the proposed settlement plan from the Chairman of Lloyd’s. The proposed plan was accompanied by “finality statements” setting forth the amounts demanded from each of them for the balance owed as a result of their underwriting liabilities and their portions of the Equitas premium. The demand on James was for £179,430 and the demand on Mary Jane was for £ 222,668. Against these amounts, as part of the settlement offer, Lloyd’s proposed to credit them with amounts which would have reduced their individual liabilities to £100,000 in return for the mutual releases. However the Ashendens rejected the settlement offers, and ordered their member’s agent not to execute the reinsurance contract on their behalf. Lloyd’s continued to demand £179,430 and £>>222,668 respectively, which the Ashendens refused to pay. Lloyd’s paid the reinsurance premium on behalf of all non-paying Names and received an assignment from Equitas of its claims against the Ashendens and other non-paying Names. Thereafter Lloyd’s brought suit against these Names in the courts in England. Summons was served on the Ashendens and they were represented by counsel. Because of the pay now, sue later and the conclusive evidence clauses, Lloyd’s easily obtained summary judgments against the Ashendens and other non-paying Names for the amounts claimed. The amount of the judgments were £186,826 against James and £ 231,144 against Mary Jane. The Ashendens and other Names sought leave to appeal which was denied, making the judgments final, conclusive and fully enforceable in England.

[*5]  The Ashendens contend that the assurances and promises of Surge were not true and constituted fraud. They also contend that Lloyd’s deliberately and fraudulently hid the asbestos and pollution problems from them. Three Names have brought separate actions in English courts for fraud against Lloyd’s, based on similar allegations which have been consolidated and presently pending. Lloyd’s does not contend in those suits, or here, that the Names are barred by Clause 5.5, by the test case decisions, or by any other British law, from pursuing any claims they may have against Lloyd’s in England, including a claim for fraud. The Ashendens have declined to join these suits even though there apparently is no legal impediment preventing them from doing so.

Lloyd’s is now seeking by this case recognition of these judgments under the Illinois Uniform Foreign Judgments Recognition Act, 735 ILCS 5/12-618, et seq. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Neither party suggests that there are any disputed material facts.

The Ashendens contend that the court should refuse recognition of the judgments for two reasons. First, they claim that the judgments cannot be recognized under Section 621(a)(1) of the Illinois Act because they were rendered under a court system that allowed procedures incompatible with our requirements of due process. Second, they claim that judgments cannot be recognized under Section 621(b) of the Act because the contractual provisions on which the judgments are based is repugnant to the public policy of Illinois.

The Ashendens’ due process argument is based on the “pay now, sue later, and the conclusive evidence clauses of the Plan, which, they claim, effectively denied them a meaningful opportunity to defend themselves in the English court. Their public policy argument is that the procedure that allowed the substitute agent to bind them to the plan is “the functional equivalent of an elaborate cognovit,” i.e., a device by which one party purports to authorize the other to confess judgment without notice on its behalf should a dispute arise between them. They claim that Illinois considers such arrangements “highly suspect” and against its public policy.

Lloyd’s argues that the judgments are to be recognized because the Ashendens signed the general undertaking which subjected them to English law and jurisdiction of the English Courts, and to all regulation and by-laws adopted by the Council. They were allowed to present their substantive defenses in the test cases, albeit unsuccessfully. Specifically the objecting Names were allowed to raise the substantive merits of the mandatory nature of the Equitas Reinsurance Contract, the substitute agent issue, and the validity of the pay now, sue later and the conclusive evidence clauses. The Ashendens received due notice of the collection suits and were in fact represented in those cases by English counsel. The judgments entered against them are final and enforceable in England and their arguments in this case constitute a collateral attack against judgments that are final and non-appealable. Lloyd’s also points out that the Ashendens may pursue their fraud claims in England in separate actions such as some of the other non-consenting Names are now doing.

[*6]  Some of the Ashendens’ arguments have been previously considered by this court’s colleague, Judge Castillo, in Ashenden v. Lloyd’s, 1996 WL 717464 (N.D.Ill.Dec. 9, 1996) and by the Seventh Circuit, in Bonny V. Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir.1993). Both cases considered the validity of the forum selection clause of the general undertaking which bound the Ashendens (and other Illinois Names) to litigate in England pursuant to English law. These courts found the forum selection and choice of law clauses valid and enforceable on the authority of M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.1, 10 (1972), in the face of some of the same public policy arguments presented by the Ashendens here. M/S Bremen held that such clauses were to be considered prima facie valid and enforceable unless “unreasonable under the circumstances.” They are unreasonable under the circumstances only if (1) incorporation was a result of fraud, undue influence or overweening bargaining power; (2) the selected forum is so “gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the complaining party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of its day in court”; or (3) if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum state. Bonny, considered public policy arguments similar to those presented by the Ashendens, but nevertheless found that English law “vindicated plaintiffs’ substantive rights while not subverting the United States’ policies of insuring full and fair disclosure by issuers and deterring the exploitation of United States investors.” Ashenden extended this finding to include not subverting the Illinois public policy of protecting investors and consumers.

The Ashendens contend that the way English law has treated them in the collection suits resulting in these judgments has proved that the Seventh Circuit and this Court were wrong, when they held that English law could vindicate their substantive rights. The gist of their argument is that “pay now, sue later” allows their property to be taken in violation of the due process rulings of these decisions. The Ashendens cite a number of Supreme Court decisions which hold that the requirements of due process include at a minimum the “opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” ’ They cite Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S.Ct. 775 (1972) and U.S. v. James Daniel Good Realty, 114 S.Ct. 492 (1993) in support of their position. These cases hold that in the absence of exigent circumstances, due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before property is seized. Fuentes involved the constitutionality of replevin statutes that permitted the seizing of personal property without prior notice or hearing. James Daniel Good involved the ex parte seizure of real estate subject to forfeiture without prior notice or right to a hearing..

Lloyd’s points out that due process does not require that foreign procedures be identical to those employed in the United States to pass constitutional muster. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 687 (7th Cir.1987). Thus the procedural requirement that the Ashendens satisfy their Equitas premium obligation prior to a determination of their claim for fraud damages, although perhaps different from what might happen in the United States, is not so different as to render its judgments unenforceable here. In fact, says Lloyd’s, they did have their day in court in the test cases but lost on the merits.

[*7]  Although Lloyd’s argues that the Ashendens were allowed to present their defenses in the test cases under the presumption for the purposes of those cases, that Lloyd’s in fact defrauded them, nevertheless, the holding of the test cases was that English law under these circumstances does allow property to be taken without the right to present these defenses. Lloyd’s was allowed to obtain a judgment for the Equitas reinsurance premium from the Ashendens without them having the right to obtain a set-off or to contest the amount claimed except in a cursory manner. It is clear that the Ashendens have been denied a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing in the English court that entered summary judgments against them, due to the pay now, sue later, and the conclusive evidence clauses. They were not allowed seriously to challenge the claims brought against them by Lloyd’s. However, neither English law nor the Plan prevents the Ashendens from bringing separate suits in England to contest the amount claimed and to present any other claims they fell they have against Lloyd’s, such as their claim of fraud.

Denial of a pre-deprivation hearing or remedy does not automatically render procedures violative of the due process clause if there is a provision for an effective post-deprivation remedy and there is a good reason to put off the hearing. As stated by the Supreme Court in Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596 (1931), quoted in Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519 (1944), “[d]elay in the judicial determination of property rights is not uncommon where it is essential that governmental needs be immediately satisfied.” Phillips approved as constitutional an Internal Revenue procedure that allows the United States to collect disputed tax revenues from a tax payer without a hearing, and forces the taxpayer to a file a lawsuit to recover the money previously collected. The cases cited by the Ashendens are no different. Fuentes says that there are “ ‘extraordinary situations’ that justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing,” quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 91 S.Ct., at 786, a case involving waiver of court costs. One of the cases cited in support of this statement in Fuentes is Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 48 S.Ct. 422, which held that attachment could be had without notice to protect the public from a bank failure. The court similarly stated in James Daniel Good that “[w]e tolerate some exceptions to the general rule requiring pre-deprivation notice and hearing, but only in ‘extraordinary situations where some valid government interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event,” ’ the court again quoting Boddie. The Supreme Court has also held in Parrett v. Taylor, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1917 (1981), that property can be tortiously taken by the state without violation of due process if the tort is not deliberate and if the government provides a post-deprivation remedy in the form of a tort claims procedure.

[*8]  Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976), a case also relied upon by the Ashendens, provides the frame work to analyze the adequacy of post-deprivation procedures where a pre-deprivation procedure is not allowed. A court must consider the private interest affected by the official action; the risk of erroneous deprivation of that a interest through the procedures used, as well as the probable value of additional safeguards; and the Government’s interest, including administrative burden, that different procedural requirements would impose. Id., at 903.

The private interest at risk through the English procedure is of course the Ashendens’ right to a judgment based on an accurate claim by Lloyd’s and their right to offset from the judgment any damage done to them as a result of fraud. The risk of erroneous deprivation through the English procedure is of course the chance that the Ashendens will be faced with a judgment in excess of what they rightfully owe, considering the accuracy of the claim against them and the amount of set-off they may be entitled to. However English law provides these remedies (See Bonny, 3 F.2d at 161), but they are available only after the Lloyd’s collection actions are concluded. Since the court procedures to determine the amount actually owed and the setoff are essentially the same, whether in the collection suit, or later in a separate suit, there would be no greater risk to an ultimately correct resolution of the Ashendens’ rights vis ‡ vis Lloyds, if they are required to wait to resolve these rights in a post-deprivation lawsuit, as opposed to presenting them defensively in the collection actions. Of course the Ashendens may well be forced to pay Lloyd’s the entire amount claimed prior to a determination of their rights against Lloyd’s. But this is not greatly different from what could happen under the procedures approved in the Phillips case.

It is the third Mathews factor however that tips the balance in favor of Lloyd’s. Why did Lloyd’s adopted the Reconstruction and Renewal Plan in the first place? To prevent the Names from continuing to burden Lloyd’s with the quantity of litigation that was threatening to destroy it as a viable institution. The Council deemed it necessary to come up with a plan that would effectively deal with this problem. As the Ashendens recognized, Lloyd’s is a 300 year-old institution of such importance to the British economy that “… the success of Lloyd’s [is] important to the success of Britain….” Defendants’ Memorandum of Law at p. 40. No recovery plan to eliminate the litigation that was seriously affecting the ability of the Lloyd’s market to function would possibly work if the plan itself could be effectively tied up in litigation until such time as each Name has had an opportunity to resolve all of his outstanding claims.

A second reason for adoption of the Plan was to safeguard the Lloyd’s insureds, who paid premiums to Lloyd’s syndicates for insurance protection, by providing reinsurance protection. During the course of membership in Lloyd’s, the Ashendens and other Names have, through a host of syndicates, issued insurance and reinsurance contracts to third parties, through agents and brokers, in return for insurance and reinsurance premiums paid in consideration for accepting these risks. See Society of Lloyd’s v. Lyons, Defendants’ Ex. 25 at pp. 9-15. Should the Names tie up the bailout plan through litigation, the ability of the syndicates to continue to pay claims and to provide insurance coverage and the ability of Lloyd’s itself to continue to function as an insurance market would be called into question. Lloyd’s success depends on its reputation and the security of it policies. Lloyd’s has never failed to pay a valid claim which is part and parcel of its great competitive strength. The Council was well aware that these third party rights--those of the Lloyd’s insureds--were in grave danger of having valid claims dishonored because of the inability of some of the syndicates to obtain reinsurance protection and the inability of some of the names to cover their underwriting losses. See Society of Lloyd’s v. Clementson. Defendant’s Ex. 7 at Para. 11.30.

[*9]  A third reason for the plan and the other side of the protection coin was to provide reinsurance protection to the Ashendens and the other names who have found themselves with heavy long tail exposure. A syndicate’s failure to obtain reinsurance protection can lead to disastrous results to the Names themselves, because without reinsurance protection there is nothing standing between a name and massive underwriting losses that may result from asbestos and pollution risks and other long tail exposures that are still outstanding and unknown.

The “conclusive evidence” clause in the Equitas agreement refers to the amount of the premium to be assessed to a Name, and does not necessarily reflect a final statement of account between the Name and Lloyd’s. The Equitas premium was based on the collaborative work of the best actuarial and accounting expertise to Lloyd’s. The Ashendens do not offer any evidence that their portion of the premium is too high. Nor do they disparage the work of those who set the premium. Their complaint is that they have been denied any meaningful way to evaluate it. Admittedly they have not been allowed to conduct discovery in the collection actions because of the conclusive evidence clause. But they will be entitled to discovery in a post-deprivation lawsuit if they care to participate. The purpose of the conclusive evidence clause was to enable Lloyd’s to put the Plan into effect immediately. If each Name had the right to conduct discovery and to contest his individual assessment of the Equitas premium prior to payment, it could be years before the plan would go into effect. The same right that a Name has to sue Lloyd’s (or any one else, such as the member’s agent or managing agent) for fraud or for money due is retained by the Name under the same pay now, sue later provision. While the Ashendens are skeptical of whether they will get a fair shake if they join the other Names in bringing their claims in England, they have not presented any evidence, other than mere speculation, that Lloyd’s controls the English courts.

The Ashendens’ final argument is that their contractual obligations, which are based on the fiction that they have agreed to them through acceptance on their behalf by the substitute agent appointed by Lloyd’s, amounts to an elaborate cognovit and is therefore against Illinois public policy. However, assuming that this arrangement is a cognovit, only consumer cognovits are not allowed in Illinois. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(c). The contract between Equitas and the Ashendens cannot be a consumer cognovit, which is limited to an obligation whose primary purpose is personal, family or household. Id.; Herget National Bank v. Theede, 130 Ill.Dec. 780, 782 (3d Dist.1989). As the Ashendens concede in their brief, cognovits are permitted in non-consumer transactions. They further argue that Illinois law permits the opening up of a judgment by confession if a debtor can demonstrate a meritorious defense, such as fraud. The contractual arrangement here in question is not a cognovit. A cognovit is an “ancient legal device” by which a debtor agrees in advance to the entry of a judgment against him without notice or hearing, with an appearance of an attorney, selected by the creditor, on the debtor’s behalf. D.H. Overmeyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Co., 92 S.Ct. 775, 777 (1992). In this case the Ashendens received notice of the suit, were entitled to and did appear and defend, prior to the entry of the judgments. What they are really complaining about is the perceived lack of due process after they received notice under which the judgments were entered, which has been discussed above.

[*10]  The Ashendens also argue that the judgments offends Illinois’ protective legislation for investors in securities and consumers. They point out that the objective of the Illinois Securities Act is to protect innocent investors who are induced to invest in highly speculative securities. However these same arguments were made before Judge Castillo. He ruled that English law does not offend the purposes of Illinois Securities law and this ruling was not appealed by the Ashendens. Consequently this argument is foreclosed.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, there being no disputed issues of fact, the Motion of the Society of Lloyd’s for summary judgment recognizing the English judgments is granted. The motion for summary judgment of the Ashendens is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.