CHANCERY DIVISION NUTTING AND OTHERS
v. BALDWIN AND OTHERS See Law Reports
version at [1995] 1 W.L.R. 201 [1993 N. No. 2891] COUNSEL: Michael Hart Q.C. and Brian Green for the plaintiffs. John Lockey for the defendants represented other than the fourth. Mark Dencer for the fourth defendant. SOLICITORS: Richards Butler; Berwin Leighton; Lawrence Graham; D. J.
Freeman; Baker & McKenzie; Lane & Partners; Epstein Grower & Co.;
Michael Freeman & Co.; Strain Keville & Co. JUDGE: Rattee J. DATES: 1994 Oct. 27, 28; Nov. 18 [*204] Cur. adv. vult. 18 November. RATTEE J. handed down the following judgment. The
plaintiffs are the members of the committee of the Outhwaite 1982 Names
Association (the association). The association was formed
for the purpose of co-ordinating and financing the prosecution by members of
Lloyds syndicates 317 and 661 of claims against the managing agent of
the syndicates (R.H.M. Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd.) and 81 members
agents in respect of those agents activities on their behalf relating
to the syndicates 1982 year of account, which activities the members
alleged had caused them loss. The defendants [*205] are some of the members of the
association. There were 986 Lloyds Names who joined the association,
which, in their names, prosecuted two actions against the managing agent and
the 81 members agents. The two actions were tried together between 7
October 1991 and 30 January 1992. They were eventually compromised by an
agreement under which the defendants to the two actions collectively agreed to
pay £116m. to the plaintiffs solicitors. The rules of the association as amended contain the following
relevant provisions. Rule 2.1 declares the objects of the association to be: the co-ordination financing and
prosecution of claims common to members of the association for compensation for
losses suffered as a result of being members of the syndicate –
defined as Lloyds syndicates 317 and 661 – for
the 1982 year of account and to make provision for the apportionment of such
compensation between the members of the association and its subsequent
distribution to them. Rule 2.2 provides: the association by its committee
shall have power to do anything which in the opinion of the committee is
calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the achievement of
the objects of the association. Rule 3.1 provides that any person alleged to be liable as a member
of the syndicate in respect of the 1982 year of account is eligible for
membership of the association. Rule 3.2 provides that any applicant for
membership shall pay the subscriptions provided for by the rules and shall sign
an application in a form set out in schedule 2 to the rules. That form includes
a declaration that the applicant has read and understood the rules and agrees
to be bound by their terms. By rule 4.1 each member (a) gives authority to the
association and its solicitors to commence, carry on and compromise proceedings
in his name for the purpose of achieving the objects of the association and to
give a receipt for the fruits of any such proceedings and to apply them in the
manner provided for by the rules and (b) agrees to indemnify the committee of
the association against all liability incurred in the exercise or purported exercise
of their powers under the rules. Rule 6.1 provides that the subscriptions
payable by each member shall be (a) an initial subscription of £250
and (b) a litigation subscription of £40 per £1,000
of line written by the member on the syndicate in the year of account, which
was defined as the syndicates year of account for 1982. Rule 6.2
provides: If in the opinion of the committee
it is desirable that further sums be raised for any purposes the committee may
subject to rule 6.3 below raise the same by levying an additional subscription
or subscriptions. Rule 6.3 provides that the levying of any additional subscription
under rule 6.2 shall be supported by a resolution passed by two-thirds of the
members present and voting at a general meeting or by a majority on a postal
ballot. Rule 6.4 provides that subscriptions shall always be calculated as a
sum per £1,000 of line written on the syndicate in the year of
account. Rule 6.5 is in these terms: All additional subscriptions shall
become due in full within 60 days of written notice to that effect being given
to members provided that: (1) the committee may in its discretion defer
collection of all or [*206] any part of any subscription upon such terms as to security as it
thinks fit (including but not limited to requiring members to lodge with the
association within the said period of 60 days post-dated cheques or other
instruments) in which case any amount or amounts so deferred shall become due
within 60 days of written notice to that effect being given to members; and (2)
where the collection of any additional subscription or any part or parts
thereof has been deferred in accordance with this rule and any member wishes to
pay any deferred amount or amounts prior to their due date or dates the committee
may in its absolute discretion accept from such member a lesser sum in full
settlement of such amount or amounts. Rule 6.6 provides that if a member fails to satisfy any
requirement of rule 6.5 above the committee may declare him to be a defaulting
member. Rule 9 provides that recoveries, which
are defined as, in effect, the fruits of any proceedings brought in the names
of members, shall be held by the association upon trust to apply them firstly
in paying or providing for the payment of any outstanding liabilities of the
association, and then by distributing the balance among the members of the
association other than defaulting members in the proportions inter se in which such members
have been liable to subscribe to the funds of the association. Rule 10 contains
provisions for the election of the members of the committee by the members of
the association. Rule 11.1 provides: So far as not otherwise provided in
these rules and subject to any directions which may be given by a resolution of
the association in general meeting the affairs of the association shall be
controlled and directed by the committee which shall have an absolute
discretion as to the manner of exercise of the powers vested in it on behalf of
the association. . . . Rule 21 provides that any written notice shall be deemed to be
given to a member if it has been sent by post or delivered to the last address
notified by him to the secretary of the association. At the annual general meeting of the association held on 31 October
1990 unanimous approval was given to the committees proposal to levy
the following additional subscriptions under rule 6.2: (a) a subscription of £30
per £1,000 of line to be payable within 60 days of written notice
being given to members; and (b) a subscription of £100 per £1,000
of line to be deferred in full, but secured by each member lodging within 60
days of written notice a United Kingdom bank or building society cheque in the
required sum post-dated to 1 April 1992, or other appropriate security. Notices of the additional subscriptions were sent to members at
their last notified addresses on 30 November 1990 requiring payment and
lodgment of the appropriate sums and securities as required by the resolution
of the annual general meeting to which I have referred by 1 February 1991.
Reminders were sent on either 19 or 22 April to those who failed to respond to
the original notice. By 5 July only the 19 defendants had failed to provide the
additional subscriptions due from them, and the committee alleges that it
declared them defaulting members pursuant to rule 6.6. Two of the defendants,
that is the fourth and twelfth defendants, do not admit that the committee did
declare them to be defaulting members. The remaining defendants have by
pleadings delivered in the action admitted that the committee has in fact
declared them to be defaulting members. [*207] Under rule 9 such persons as have been declared defaulting members
are not entitled to share in the distribution under that rule of the proceeds
of the compromise of the actions brought by the association to which I have
referred earlier in this judgment. The defendants or some of them have raised
various arguments to the effect that they should not be treated as defaulting
members even though they admittedly failed to pay the additional subscriptions
due from them within the time allowed by the rules. Accordingly the plaintiffs,
the members of the committee, commenced the present action against the
defendants seeking declarations that the association is entitled to distribute
recoveries as defined in the rules on the footing that no person who has been
declared a defaulting member is entitled to share in such distribution, and
that each of the defendants is a defaulting member for the purposes of the
rules. The writ commencing the action was issued on 22 April 1993. All
those defendants who have delivered defences in the action raise the following
two defences: (1) the power purportedly conferred on the committee by rule 6.6
to declare a member who fails to pay an additional subscription a defaulting
member, in conjunction with the exclusion by rule 9 of defaulting members from
sharing in recoveries, is a penalty and therefore unenforceable; (2) the court
has and should exercise an equitable jurisdiction to relieve a member who has
failed to pay his additional subscription in time from what is said by the
defendants to amount to forfeiture of his right to share in the proceeds of,
inter alia, his own cause of action against the underwriting agents. Those defendants sought leave at the hearing before me to amend
their respective defences to plead in addition that the power to declare a
member who fails to pay his additional subscription on time a defaulting member
and thereby exclude him from sharing in recoveries is so onerous a term of the
rules that it is ineffective or unenforceable against a member unless it was
drawn fairly to the [members] attention at the
time he joined the association, and that it was not so drawn to the attention
of the defendants. The fourth defendant alone also pleads in his defence a fourth
point, namely that there is to be implied into the rules a term that, before
declaring a member who has failed to pay his subscription on time a defaulting
member, the committee must conduct a detailed investigation into the members
financial means, which the committee did not do in the case of the fourth
defendant. In an understandable attempt to bring the four arguments raised on
behalf of the defendants or some of them to as speedy a resolution as possible
the plaintiffs, on 2 June 1994, issued the summons now before me seeking their
determination as points of law under R.S.C., Ord. 14A. I turn, then, to
consider each of the four points in turn. 1. Penalty The defendants submitted that the rules constitute a contract
between the members, and that the failure by the defendants to pay their
additional subscriptions as required by the rules was a breach of contract. The
power in rule 6.6 for the committee to exclude the members in breach from their
shares in the fruits of, inter alia, their own causes of action against the
agents amounts to an unenforceable penalty on the well established principle
expounded in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [1915] A.C. 79. The
amount of a defaulting members [*208] forfeited share of recoveries does not
represent a genuine pre-estimate of damage caused by the breach of contract. Its
forteiture is a penalty. It does not cease to be a penalty because it is not a
provision for payment of a sum of money by the party in breach of contract. For
this last proposition the defendants rely on, inter alia, Jobson v. Johnson [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1026. In my judgment, this argument is, as the plaintiffs submitted,
misconceived. True it is that the rules of the association constitute a
contract between the members, and true it is that by failing to pay their
additional subscriptions in accordance with the rules the defendants are in
breach of that contract. However, I accept the plaintiffs submission
that it would be wrong to regard rule 6.6 as a penalty for breach of contract.
In my judgment the essence of the contract between the members of the
association is that the burden and benefit of enforcement of the members
claims against the agents should be shared between all the members. There is a
pooling of all such claims and a pooling of contributions in the form of
subscriptions for the purpose of financing the enforcement of such claims. It
is an essential part of the arrangement that if a member ceases to contribute
to the pool of financial contributions to the cost of pursuing the claims there
should be power for the committee on behalf of all the members to determine
that he shall cease to share in the pool of benefit represented by the proceeds
of such claims. In other words a member who fails to shoulder his share of the
burden of this essentially multilateral arrangement runs the risk of being
excluded from his share of the benefit of the arrangement. This is not a
penalty for breach of contract. It is an essential part of the pooling
arrangement thereby effected. Thus, in my judgment, the defence based on the penalty argument is
bad in law. 2. Relief from forfeiture The case put by the defendants under this head, as refined in
argument by Mr. Lockey of counsel, is as follows. The combined effect of the
power for the committee to declare a member who fails to pay his additional
subscription on time a defaulting member and the exclusion of defaulting members
from sharing in the recoveries under rule 9 is a forfeiture provision
forfeiting the defaulting members beneficial interest in
the recoveries. The court has power to relieve against such forfeiture on such
terms as the court thinks fit. Whether it should exercise such power in the
case of any of the defendants will depend on the circumstances prayed in aid by
each individual defendant. Between them the defendants plead a variety of
reasons why the court should exercise its power to grant relief in his or her
case. Some plead that they did not have actual notice of the demand for
additional subscriptions, some that illness or financial hardship prevented
their complying with such demand. It is common ground between the parties that
I cannot on this summons determine whether it would be appropriate to grant
relief in the case of particular defendants. I am asked only to decide whether
the court has power to consider the grant of relief in the case of any of the
defendants. The defendants, of course, say it has, the plaintiffs that it has
not. Mr. Hart, for the plaintiffs, argued that the relevant provisions
of the rules do not constitute a forteiture provision within the equitable
doctrine, because the doctrine applies only to proprietary or certain
possessory rights. For this proposition he relied on Scandinavian Trading
Tanker Co. [*209] A.B. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana [1983] 2 A.C. 694 and
Sport International Bussum B.V. v. Inter-Footwear Ltd. [1984] 1 W.L.R. 776.
Mr. Hart submitted that the effect of a member joining the association was an
equitable assignment to all the members of his right of action against the
Lloyds agents, leaving the individual member with only the right to
future performance of the contract between him and all other members
constituted by the rules. I do not accept this submission. In my judgment, by virtue of rule
9 each member was left with a proprietary interest in the form of his
beneficial interest under the trust declared by that rule. It seems to me that,
if the rules had provided for automatic loss of this beneficial interest by a
member who failed to pay his subscription on time, that would have been a
forfeiture provision for the purposes of the doctrine of relief against
forfeiture. The fact that forfeiture only takes place on a determination being
made by the committee to that effect in my judgment makes no difference. A classic statement of the nature of the courts equitable
jurisdiction to grant relief against forfeiture is to be found in the speech of
Lord Wilberforce in Shiloh Spinners Ltd. v. Harding [1973] A.C. 691,
723-724: it remains true today that equity
expects men to carry out their bargains and will not let them buy their way out
by uncovenanted payment. But it is consistent with these principles that we
should reaffirm the right of courts of equity in appropriate and limited cases
to relieve against forfeiture for breach of covenant or condition where the
primary object of the bargain is to secure a stated result which can effectively
be attained when the matter comes before the court, and where the forfeiture
provision is added by way of security for the production of that result. The word appropriate
involves consideration of the conduct of the applicant for relief, in particular
whether his default was wilful, of the gravity of the breaches, and of the
disparity between the value of the property of which forfeiture is claimed as
compared with the damage caused by the breach. (Emphasis added.) Mr. Hart, on behalf of the plaintiffs, stresses the words from
Lord Wilberforces speech which I have italicised. He submits that
even if – as I find it does – rule 6.6 constitutes a
forfeiture provision, the doctrine of relief as stated by Lord Wilberforce is
not available to relieve the defendants or any of them, because the result
which was the primary object of rule 6.6 can no longer be effectively attained
if relief is granted. The object of rule 6.6 was to give the committee on
behalf of all the members of the association power to ensure that all those who
were going to share in the fruits of the litigation against the Lloyds
agents should share in the risks inherent in the litigation by requiring the
payment of additional subscriptions towards the financing of the litigation
within a strictly limited period. Far from being attained, submitted Mr. Hart,
that object would be entirely defeated by the court granting relief from the
effect of rule 6.6 after the litigation has been completed. For to allow a
defaulting member to share in the fruits of the litigation now, even on terms
that he pays the additional subscriptions with interest, would allow him to
share the fruits of the litigation without having borne his share of the risk
of its prosecution. Mr. Lockey, with the support of Mr. Dencer, on behalf of the
defendants sought to counter this argument by submitting that the object of the
rules relating to subscriptions was to ensure that each member bore [*210] a pro rata share of
the costs of the litigation. That can be attained by the defendants now being
allowed to pay up their overdue subscriptions with interest. I prefer the submission of Mr. Hart on this point. I agree that
the object of the rules of the association was to achieve a situation in which
the rights of action of all the members against the Lloyds agents
were enforced together for the benefit of all the members at the shared risk of
all the members, the risk being borne by the members inter se in proportion to
their interests in the fruits of such enforcement. To allow a member who has
not undertaken his share of the risk by paying his subscriptions on time to
come in after the litigation has been successfully concluded, so that there is
no longer any risk, and still share in the fruits of the litigation on payment
of his overdue subscription would, in my judgment, undermine rather than attain
the object of the forfeiture provision against which relief is sought, and
indeed one of the fundamental objectives of the constitution of the
association. This being so, whatever the individual circumstances of the
defendants, and whatever the reasons for their default, it would in principle
be wrong for the court to grant relief against forfeiture. However hard the
result may bear on individual defaulting members they must, in my judgment, be
held to the arrangement constituted by the rules of the association to which
they expressly agreed when they signed their application to join the association. 3. Onerous nature of rule 6.6 This is the new point sought to be introduced by an amendment to
the defences of the defendants. The submission of Mr. Lockey on the point was
and I quote from his very helpful skeleton argument that where clauses incorporated into a
contract contain particularly onerous or unusual terms, the party seeking to
enforce those terms must show that the onerous terms have been brought
reasonably and fairly to the attention of that other party. For this proposition Mr. Lockey relied, he said, on a decision of
the Court of Appeal in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual
Programmes Ltd. [1989] Q.B. 433. In that case the plaintiff carried on the
business of lending photographic transparencies. It delivered to the defendant
47 transparencies with a delivery note containing nine printed conditions, one
of which provided that unless all the transparencies were returned within 14
days a fee of £5 per day would be charged on each transparency
returned thereafter. The defendant had not dealt with the plaintiff before and
did not read the conditions. It returned the transparencies four weeks later
and was presented with a bill for over £3,000. The Court of Appeal
held the defendant not bound by the condition to which I have referred, and
which was described by Bingham L.J., at p. 445, as an unreasonable
and extortionate clause. Dillon L.J. expressed the principle the
court was applying as follows, at p. 439: if one condition in a set of printed conditions is
particularly onerous or unusual, the party seeking to enforce it must show that
that particular condition was fairly brought to the attention of the other
party. In my judgment that principle can have no application in the
present case. As I have already said, the power in rule 6.6 for the committee
to [*211] deprive a member who
failed to pay his share of the financing of the litigation brought on behalf of
all the members of the right to share in the fruits of that litigation was an
essential part of the scheme of pooling of the benefits and burdens of the
contemplated litigation which was the whole object of the association. It
cannot be characterised, as could the relevant condition in Interfoto
Picture Library Ltd. v. Stilletto Visual Programmes Ltd., as an unusual term
included in usual terms in a contract. The whole constitution of the
association was unusual in the sense that it was conceived and drafted to deal
with a particular situation. In the context of the essential purpose of the
constitution as I have described it, in my judgment the provisions of rule 6.6
were neither onerous nor unusual, save to the extent that the whole nature of
the association was unusual. Because I consider the proposed new defence bad in law I refuse
leave to make the suggested amendment to the defendants pleadings. 4. Implied term As I indicated earlier in this judgment, only the fourth defendant
seeks to raise this defence. It is pleaded in the fourth defendants amended
defence as follows: It was an implied term of [the
Rules] that in the event of the committee believing, or having good reason to
believe that a members circumstances were such that not to waive or
postpone payment of the whole or part of a subscription (including any
additional subscriptions) would cause extreme financial hardship to the
applicant the committee would take all reasonable steps to conduct a detailed
investigation into the applicants means before declaring him to be a
defaulting member and that in such circumstances, it was a condition precedent
to the exercise of the said power to declare a member to be a defaulting member
that such reasonable steps had been taken. It is not disputed by the plaintiffs that the fourth defendant
notified the committee before any decision was taken to declare him a
defaulting member that he was in financial difficulties. The only basis on
which Mr. Dencer, for the fourth defendant, submitted that the implication for
which he contended fell to be made was the officious bystander
test formulated by MacKinnon L.J. in Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries (1926)
Ltd. [1939]
2 K.B. 206, 227. In other words, submitted Mr. Dencer, the term for which he
contends is something so obvious that it goes without saying. I cannot accept this submission. It seems to me far from obvious
that the members who adhered to the rules of the association must have intended
that, despite the provision in rule 11.1 that the committee should have an
absolute discretion as to the manner of exercise of the powers vested in it by
the rules, the committee should be bound to carry out some such investigation
into the means of defaulting members as if alleged by the fourth defendant,
particularly since the purpose of the discretion conferred on the committee by
rule 6.6 was, in my judgment, to enable it to further the object of the
association, namely to prosecute the causes of action of members against the
Lloyds agents for the common benefit of those members who shouldered
their shares of the burden of such prosecution. [*212] Thus, in my judgment, the defendants fail on all four of the
points of law or construction raised or sought to be raised by them or some one
or more of them by way of defence to the plaintiffs claim in the
action. I shall therefore answer the questions raised by sub-paragraphs (1),
(2) and (3) of paragraph 1 of the plaintiffs summons dated 2 June
1994 in the negative, and will consider with counsel the form of declaration
which I should now make under paragraph 2 of that summons. Declaration accordingly. |