2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29707, 233 F.3d 473 The Society of Lloyd's, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
James Frederick Ashenden, et al., Defendants-Appellants. Nos. 99-3195, 99-4064, 00-1066, 00-1371, 00-1430
& 00-1702 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT September 19, 2000, Argued November 27, 2000, Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [*1] Rehearing Denied
December 29, 2000, Reported at: 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33955. PRIOR HISTORY: Appeals from the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
Nos. 98 C 5335, 99 C 2651. Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge. DISPOSITION: Affirmed. COUNSEL: For SOCIETY OF LLOYD'S, Plaintiff -
Appellee (99-3195, 99-4064, 00-1066, 00-1371, 00-1430, 00-1702): Michael T.
Hannafan, HANNAFAN & ASSOCIATES, Chicago, IL USA. For JAMES F. ASHENDEN, MARY J. ASHENDEN,
Defendants - Appellants (99-3195): Theodore William Grippo, Jr., LINDENBAUM,
COFFMEN, KURLANDER, BRISKY & HAYES, Chicago, IL USA. For JAMES F. ASHENDEN, Defendant - Appellant
(99-3195): Robert W. Bennett, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Chicago,
IL. For EUGENE G. CALLAHN, JOHN C. DANLOE,
Defendants - Appellants (99-4064, 00-10430): Theodore William Grippo, Jr.,
LINDENBAUM, COFFMEN, KURLANDER, BRISKY & HAYES, Chicago, IL USA. Robert W.
Bennett, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Chicago, IL. For JOHN T. CALVELLO, PATRICIA A. DANLOE, ROBERT
D. FLESVIG, Defendants - Appellants (99-4064): Theodore William Grippo, Jr.,
LINDENBAUM, COFFMEN, KURLANDER, BRISKY & HAYES, Chicago, IL USA. Robert W.
Bennett, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Chicago, IL. For HENRY D. PASCHEN, JR., Defendant - Appellant (00-1066, 00-1430): Theodore William Grippo, Jr., LINDENBAUM, COFFMEN, KURLANDER, BRISKY & HAYES, Chicago, IL USA. Robert W. Bennett, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Chicago, IL. For PATRICK COLLINS, Defendant - Appellant
(00-1371, 00-1702): Theodore William Grippo, Jr., LINDENBAUM, COFFMEN,
KURLANDER, BRISKY & HAYES, Chicago, IL USA. Robert W. Bennett, NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Chicago, IL. For RICHARD A. RINELLA, BARBARA L. SCHORNACK,
Defendants - Appellants (00-1430): Theodore William Grippo, Jr., LINDENBAUM,
COFFMEN, KURLANDER, BRISKY & HAYES, Chicago, IL USA. Robert W. Bennett,
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Chicago, IL. JUDGES: Before Posner, Manion, and Kanne, Circuit
Judges. OPINIONBY: Posner OPINION: Posner, Circuit Judge. These are diversity
suits brought in the federal district court in Chicago by Lloyd's, a foreign
corporation (see Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 958 (5th
Cir. 1997)), against American members (names) of insurance
syndicates that Lloyd's manages. 28 U.S.C. ¤ 1332(a)(2). Lloyd's wanted to use
the Illinois Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 735 ILCS 5/12-618
to 626, to collect money judgments, each for several hundred thousand dollars,
that it had obtained against the defendants in an English court after the
names' repeated efforts in earlier litigation to knock out the forum-selection
clause in their contracts with Lloyd's had failed. Bonny v. Society of
Lloyd's, 3
F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir.
1998); Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998); [*2] Haynsworth
v. The Corporation, supra; Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir.
1996); Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993). Pursuant to
this strategy, Lloyd's filed the judgments in the district court and then
issued citations pursuant to the Illinois procedure for executing a
judgment. The filing of the judgments inaugurated this federal-court proceeding
to collect them; and state law, in this case the Illinois citations statute,
735 ILCS 5/2-1402, supplies the procedure for executing a federal-court
judgment. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 69(a); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th
Cir. 1993); 12 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal
Practice and Procedure ¤ 3012, p. 148 (1997). The statute allows the holder of a
judgment to depose the judgment debtor respecting the existence, amount, and
whereabouts of assets that can be seized to satisfy the judgment; to impose a
lien on those assets; and to command the debtor to turn over to the judgment
creditor as many of the seizable assets as may be necessary to satisfy the
judgment. See Bank of Aspen v. Fox Cartage, Inc., 126 Ill. 2d 307, 533
N.E.2d 1080, 1083, 127 Ill. Dec. 952 (Ill. 1989). [*3] The defendants ignored the citations and instead
asked the district court not to recognize the English judgments as being
enforceable in Illinois. They argued that those judgments had denied them due
process of law and therefore were not enforceable under the foreign money-judgments
recognition act, which makes a judgment rendered by a court outside the United
States unenforceable in Illinois if the judgment was rendered under a system
which
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law. 735 ILCS 5/12-621 (emphasis added);
see also 5/12-620. The district court rejected the argument and granted summary
judgment for Lloyd's, declaring the judgments enforceable and so the issuance
of citations proper. We have italicized the word that defeats the
defendants' argument. The judgments about which they complain were rendered by
the Queen's Bench Division of England's High Court, which corresponds to our
federal district courts; they were affirmed by the Court of Appeal, which
corresponds to the federal courts of appeals; and the Appellate Committee of
the House of Lords, which corresponds to the U.S. Supreme Court, denied
the [*4 ] defendants' petition for review. Any suggestion that this system
of courts does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible
with the requirements of due process of law borders on the risible.
The courts of England are fair and neutral forums. Riley v.
Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 958 (10th Cir. 1992); to same
effect see Haynsworth v. The Corporation, supra, 121 F.3d at 967; Roby
v. Corporation of Lloyd's, supra, 996 F.2d at 1363. The origins of our concept of
due process of law are English, Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123, 32 L.
Ed. 623, 9 S. Ct. 231 (1889); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-32, 28
L. Ed. 232, 4 S. Ct. 111 (1884); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman
Estates, 844
F.2d 461, 465 (7th Cir 1988); Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A
Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process of Law, 19 Am. J. Legal
Hist. 265
(1975), and the English courts, especially the Supreme Court of Judicature
(composed of the High Court and the Court of Appeal) and the Appellate
Committee of the House of Lords, the tribunals involved in the
Judgments [*5] challenged here, are highly regarded for impartiality,
professionalism, and scrupulous regard for procedural rights. The English
judicial system
is the very fount from which our system developed;
a system which has procedures and goals which closely parallel our own. In
re Hashim, 213 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Somportex Ltd. v.
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161, 166 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd,
453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971). United States courts which have inherited
major portions of their judicial traditions and procedure from the United
Kingdom are hardly in a position to call the Queen's Bench a kangaroo
court. British Midland Airways Ltd. v. International Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869, 871 (9th
Cir. 1974). Not that the English concept of fair procedure
is identical to ours; but we cannot believe that the Illinois statute is
intended to bar the enforcement of all judgments of any foreign legal system
that does not conform its procedural doctrines to the latest twist and turn of
our courts regarding, for example, the circumstances under which due process
requires an opportunity for a hearing in advance [*6] of the deprivation
of a substantive right rather than afterwards. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205, 40 L.
Ed. 95, 16 S. Ct. 139 (1895); Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 687-88
(7th Cir. 1987). It is a fair guess that no foreign nation has decided to
incorporate our due process doctrines into its own procedural law; and so we
interpret due process in the Illinois statute (which, remember, is
a uniform act, not one intended to reflect the idiosyncratic jurisprudence of a
particular state) to refer to a concept of fair procedure simple and basic
enough to describe the judicial processes of civilized nations, our peers. The
statute requires only that the foreign procedure be compatible with the requirements of
due process of law, and we have interpreted this to mean that the foreign
procedures are fundamentally fair and do not offend against
basic fairness. Id. at 687-88; see also Hilton v Guyot, supra, 159 U.S. at 202-03; Wilson
v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1997); Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 900-01
(4th Cir. 1992); Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711, 714-15 (Tex.
1915). [*7] We'll call this the international concept
of due process to distinguish it from the complex concept that has
emerged from American case law. We note that it is even less demanding than the
test the courts use to determine whether to enforce a foreign arbitral award
under the New York Convention, 9 U.S.C. ¤ 201 et seq., whose due process
defense (that a party lacked proper notice of the appointment of the
arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present
his case, Article V(1) (b), 9 U.S.C. ¤ 201) has been interpreted to mean
the enforcing jurisdiction's concept of due process, albeit a rather minimal
such concept. Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 145-46 (2d
Cir. 1992); see also Generica Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123, 1129-31
(7th Cir. 1997). It is true that no evidence was presented in the
district court on whether England has a civilized legal system, but that is
because the question is not open to doubt. We need not consider what kind of
evidence would suffice to show that a foreign legal system does not
provide impartial tribunals or [*8] procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law if the challenged judgment had been rendered
by Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Congo, or some other nation whose adherence
to the rule of law and commitment to the norm of due process are open to
serious question, see, e.g., Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1411-12
(9th Cir. 1995); Choi v. Kim, 50 F.3d 244, 249-50 (3d Cir. 1995); Banco
Minero v. Ross, supra, 172 S.W. at 715; Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276,
286-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), as England's are not. It is anyway not a question of
fact. It is not, strictly speaking, a question of law either, but it is a
question about the law of a foreign nation, and in answering such questions a
federal court is not limited to the consideration of evidence that would be
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence; any relevant material or source
may be consulted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1; Pittway Corp. v. United States, 88 F.3d 501, 504 (7th
Cir. 1996); 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure ¤ 2446 (1995). Rather than trying to impugn the English legal
system [*9] en gross, the defendants argue that the Illinois statute
requires us to determine whether the particular judgments that they are
challenging were issued in proceedings that conform to the requirements of due
process of law as it has come to be understood in the case law of Illinois and
other American jurisdictions. The statute, with its reference to
system, does not support such a retail approach, which would
moreover be inconsistent with providing a streamlined, expeditious method for
collecting money judgments rendered by courts in other jurisdictionswhich
would in effect give the judgment creditor a further appeal on the merits. The
process of collecting a judgment is not meant to require a second lawsuit, see Bank
of Aspen v. Fox Cartage, Inc., supra, 533 N.E.2d at 1083; Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Ruggiero, supra, 994 F.2d at 1226, thus converting every successful multinational
suit for damages into two suits (actually three, as we'll see at the end of
this opinion). But that is the implication of the defendants' argument. They
claim to be free to object in the collection phase of the case to the
procedures employed at the merits phase, even though [*10] they were free
to challenge those procedu res at that phase and indeed did so. Even if the retail approach is validand we
want to emphasize our belief that it is notit cannot possibly avail the
defendants here unless they are right that the approach requires subjecting the
foreign proceeding to the specifics of the American doctrine of due process.
They are not right. Just as no judgments of a foreign legal system would be
enforceable in Illinois if the system had to conform to the specifics of the
American doctrine of due process, so very few foreign judgments would be
enforceable in Illinois if the proceeding in which such a judgment was rendered
had to conform to those specifics. In a case decided by a foreign court system
that has not adopted every jot and tittle of American due process (and no
foreign court system has, to our knowledge, done that), it will be sheer
accident that a particular proceeding happened to conform in every particular
to our complex understanding of due process. So even the retail approach, in
order to get within miles of being reasonable, would have to content itself
with requiring foreign conformity to the international concept of due process. And [*11] now let us for the sake of
completeness apply that concept to the particulars of these judgments. A bit of background (much simplified): Lloyd's,
contrary to popular understanding, is not an insurer, but rather the overseer
of the London insurance market. The actual insurance is written by syndicates
of names. The syndicates do not have limited liability, and so the
personal assets of the names are at risk should an insured obtain a judgment
for more than the assets of the syndicate that insured him. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s the Lloyd's-supervised syndicates incurred huge underwriting
losses that threatened to destroy the London insurance market. To ward off this
disaster the governing body of Lloyd's, a Council elected primarily by the
managing agents of the syndicates, created a company called Equitas
to reinsure the risks underwritten by the syndicates. The reinsurance would
both protect the insureds against being unable to collect the proceeds of their
insurance policies from the syndicates and protect the names from unlimited
personal liability for the underwriting losses. To finance the new company,
Lloyd's levied an assessment (the reinsurance premium) against [*12] all
the names. Lloyd's offered a discount on the assessment to induce the names to
go along with this plan voluntarily, and 95 percent of them did. The defendants
are among those who did not, and Lloyd's sued them in the High Court to collect
the assessment. The suit was based on the contract with Equitas, Lloyd's
Council having (pursuant to a by-law that it had adopted) appointed
substitute agents for all the names, and these agents having signed
the contract on behalf of the defendants as of the other recusant names. In the English court the defendants opposed
Lloyd's suit on the basis of two clauses which they contend would, if enforced,
deny them due process of law; and they renew the contention here. The first
clause, the pay now sue later clause as the parties call it,
forbids names, in suits (such as the ones before us) by Lloyd's to collect the
assessment, to set off against the claim by Lloyd's any claim the names might
have against Lloyd's, such as a claim that the contract had been induced by
fraud. If they want to press such a claim they have to file a separate suit.
(Some have now done so, and lost. Society of Lloyd's v. Jaffray, 2000 WL 1629463
(Queen's [*13] Bench Division Commercial Court Nov. 3, 2000).) The second
clause, the conclusive evidence clause, makes Lloyds determination
of the amount of the assessment conclusive in the absence of
manifest error. The defendants claim that the High Court refused to order
Lloyds to provide them with enough information about how the assessment had
been calculated to enable them to prove manifest error. Both clauses therefore curtail the names
procedural rights. But due process is not a fixed menu of procedural rights.
How much process is due depends on the circumstances. For the principle, see Gilbert
v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930-31, 138 L. Ed. 2d 120, 117 S. Ct. 1807 (1997),
and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct.
893 (1976), and for applications see, e.g., United States v. All Assets
& Equipment of West Side Building Corp., 188 F.3d 440, 443-44 (7th Cir. 1999); Caldwell
v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Any
& All Radio Station Transmission Equipment, 218 F.3d 543, 550 (6th
Cir. 2000). Faced with looming disaster, Lloyds reasonably deemed it essential
to obtain [*14] adequate funding for Equitas. The only potential source
for such funding consisted of the names themselves. If they were entitled to
set off any claims they might have against Lloyds, the collection of the full
assessment would be deferred until those claims could be adjudicated. The pay
now sue later clause was designed to enable Equitas to be fully funded
immediately. That would work to the benefit of the names by giving them surer,
earlier, and fuller reinsurance. In exchange it was reasonable to ask them to
postpone the enforcement of any claims they might have against Lloyds. Instead
Lloyds has had to prosecute these suits and many like them to collect from the
names. Were it not for the pay now sue later clause, many other names might
have forced Lloyds into collection litigation as well. In these circumstances the clause did not
violate international due process or, we add unnecessarily, domestic due
process. It is the same procedure used by federal law when a firm withdraws
from a multiemployer pension planthe firm is required to pay the plan
administrators assessment of the firms share of vested but unfunded benefits
and to reserve any objections for a subsequent [*15] suit, Multiemployer
Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. ¤¤ 1399(c)(2), 1401(d); Robbins v.
Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co. , 800 F.2d 641, 642 (7th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam)and this procedure (pay now, dispute later, id. ) has survived due
process challenge, see, e.g., Debreceni v. Merchants Terminal Corp., 889 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st
Cir. 1989). Anyway the question is not whether Lloyds accorded due process to
the names, but whether the English courts did. All they did was enforce the
clause, and they did so on the basis of an interpretation of a provision of the
original contract between the names and Lloyds that authorized Lloyds to take
measures unilaterally to prevent the society from failing. Stated differently,
the courts held that the names had waived their procedural rights in advance,
thus bringing the case within the rule of D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 31 L. Ed.
2d 124, 92 S. Ct. 775 (1972). That case upheld against a due process challenge
similar to that mounted by the names in this case the enforcement of a cognovit
note, by which a debtor consents in advance to the creditors
obtaining [*16] a judgment against him on the note without notice or
hearing, and possibly evento make the analogy to the present case even
closerwith the appearance on the debtors behalf, to confess judgment, of an
attorney designated by the creditor. Id. at 176. The English courts
interpretation of the original contract with the names as authorizing the pay
now sue later clause could not be thought so unreasonable an interpretation of
that contract as to take the case out from under Overmyer by demonstrating the
absence of a genuine waiver. And this is to assume that reasonableness in
contract interpretation could ever be a component of due process, which we
greatly doubt, as we're about to explain. The rationale for the conclusive-evidence
clause, and for the denial of full discovery regarding the accuracy of the
assessment, is similar to the rationale for the pay now sue later clause. If
the names could resist ponying up the assessment until its accuracy was
determined by the normal process of litigation, with pretrial discovery
followed by pretrial motions and by trial, the funding of Equitas would be
delayed. But this clause does more than postpone claims by the names;
it [*17] extinguishes them by shrinking the names entitlement to a right
to the rectification of only those errors that leap out from the assessment
figure itself with no right to pretrial discovery to search out possible errors
in the actuverdana or other assumptions that generated the figure. This
extinction of rights could raise a question if what we are calling
international due process had a substantive component. But the defendants do
not argue that it does. Though we cannot find a case on the point, the cases
that deal with international due process talk only of procedural rights. See,
e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, supra, 127 F.3d at 811. The only substantive basis that
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act recognizes for not
enforcing a foreign judgment is that the cause of action on which the
judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of Illinois, 735 ILCS
5/12-621; see, e.g., Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger, supra, 833 F.2d at 686-88; cf. Loucks
v. Standard Oil of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918)
(Cardozo, J.), a claim the plaintiffs have abandoned in this court. If Parliament passed a law [*18] that the
Equitas premium was whatever Lloyds Council said it was, this would not be a
denial of a procedural right of any of the names, but rather a revision of the
substantive terms of the names relation to Lloyds. But if Parliament went
further and precluded the names from challenging in court the applicability of
the new law to them, that would be a curtailment of their procedural rights,
and doubtless a deprivation of their property without due process of law. But
this is not what happened. Lloyds appointed agents to negotiate a contract
binding the names that (they argue) was disadvantageous to them. It was
disadvantageous in part because it reserved to Lloyds a very broad discretion
to fix the premium for the new reinsurance. But a one-sided contract is a
substantive, not a procedural, offense. (Nor, to recur for a moment to the pay
now sue later clause, is an unreasonable contractual interpretation a
procedural violation.) The names were free both to challenge the clause and to
show if they could manifest error in the assessment of their
liability under it. They could not show this, but only because manifest error
is hard to prove. It would have to be an error that was [*19] obvious
because of the disproportion between the reinsurance premium levied by Lloyds
and the risk to which the particular name would be exposed if he lacked reinsurance.
Their real objection to the exclusive-evidence clause, moreover, is that it
curtails pretrial discovery, and the right to pretrial discovery is not a part
of the U.S. concept of due process, e.g., Midway Motor Lodge v. Innkeepers
Telemanagement & Equipment Corp., 54 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir. 1995); Silverman
v. CFTC, 549
F.2d 28, 33 (7th Cir. 1977); Alexander v. Pathfinder, Inc., 189 F.3d 735, 741 (8th
Cir. 1999), let alone of international due process. See, e.g., Hague
Convention, art. 23 (reprinted at 28 U.S.C. ¤ 1781); Panama Processes, S.A.
v. Cities Service Co., 500 F. Supp. 787, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 650 F.2d 408
(2d Cir. 1981); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse, [1978] A.C. 547 (H.L.);
Gary B. Born, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts 843-55 (1996). And again the key question is not the fairness
of Lloyds measures but the fairness of the English court in holding that
Lloyds was authorized [*20] by its contract with the names to appoint
agents to negotiate a contract that would bind the names without the names
consent. This interpretation of the original contract, like the interpretation
authorizing Lloyds to adopt the pay now sue later clause, is not so
unreasonable that it could be thought a denial of international due process
even if international due process had a substantive component. We conclude that the judgments are enforceable
under the foreign money-judgments statute, and we turn now to the other issues
presented by these appeals. Several of the appellants were defendants in a
separate suit brought by Lloyds against dissenting names that was reassigned
to the district judge (Judge Leinenweber) handling the other suits because it
was identical to those suits. He granted judgment on the pleadings for Lloyds in
the separate suit. The defendants in that suit argue that the grant was
erroneous, because Lloyds had submitted evidence in support of the motion and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) provides that when this is done the motion for judgment
on the pleadings is automatically converted to a motion for summary judgment
and the defendants argue that, so reconceived, the [*21] motion should not
have been granted until the defendants had a chance to put in their own
evidence. The issue is moot. The suits are identical, and the defendants have
not advised us of any evidence that would affect our determination that the
judgments obtained by Lloyds in England are enforceable under English law. The separate appeal by Collins is frivolous and
requires no discussion at all, and we proceed to the last issue, a challenge to
the citations issued by Lloyds in aid of its judgments. Since we are affirming
the district courts order allowing Lloyds to collect its judgments and hence
to issue citations in aid of that collection effort, the challenge to the
already issued citations may seem moot. But it is not, because Lloyds may seek
sanctions for contempt, the defendants having refused to comply with the
citations. The issue of the validity of the sanctions could be deferred to the
contempt proceeding, if any, but we think it best to try to wind up this
litigation by resolving the issue now. It is not difficult to resolve. The
defendants argument is that in the case of a foreign judgment, as distinct
from a judgment rendered by another jurisdiction within the United [*22]
States, citations may not be issued until a court has entered an order
recognizing (that is, declaring enforceable) the judgment that the citations
are in aid of. We cannot see any legal or practical basis for such a two-step,
and it is in tension with Ill. S. Ct. R. 277(a), which states that citation
proceedings may be commenced at any time with respect to a judgment which
is subject to enforcement. Proceedings are commenced simply
by an oral or written request to the clerk to issue citations. Ill. S. Ct. R.
277(b). The clerk does not investigate to see whether the judgment is truly
enforceable. The issue of the judgments enforceability is raised by way of
defense to compliance with, not commencement of, the citations
proceedingwhich is what happened here. There is no reason to make the
judgment creditor bring two separate proceedings, one to enforce the judgment
and the other to collect it. Any doubt on this score is dispelled by reading
in tandem the statutes governing enforcement of foreign-state and
foreign-nation judgments respectively. The Illinois Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act, which governs the enforcement in Illinois of judgments rendered
in the courts of other [*23] states of the United States, as distinct from
foreign nations, not only treats such judgments the same as Illinois judgments,
735 ILCS 5/12-652(a), which means that no separate step of
recognition is necessary before they can be enforced; the act also
makes the foreign judgment enforceable unless the judgment debtor
objects and invokes procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening,
vacating, or staying the judgment. This clearly implies that separate
recognition proceedings are not requiredan interpretation confirmed
in cases from other jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act. Redondo Construction Corp. v. United States, 157 F.3d 1060, 1065 (6th
Cir. 1998); Burchett v. Roncari, 181 Conn. 125, 434 A.2d 941, 943 (Conn. 1980).
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments Act, which governs judgments
of courts outside the United States, makes such judgments, if enforceable at
all, enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state
which is entitled to full faith and credit. 735 ILCS 5/12-620. Q.E.D. Affirmed. |