Traduction en cours.
In this bulletin, we highlight two recent federal court cases in
which U.S. taxpayers won major victories against the United States with
respect to their obligations to report non-U.S. accounts on FinCEN Form 114 – Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts,
more commonly referred to as the FBAR. An individual U.S. taxpayer must
file an FBAR for each year in which the taxpayer has a financial
interest in, or signature authority over, foreign financial accounts if
the aggregate value of the foreign financial accounts exceeds $10,000 at
any time during the calendar year. In Bittner v United States,
the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) addressed the extent to
which the IRS can impose penalties for the failure to timely file
complete and accurate FBARs. In Aroeste v United States, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of California
issued a decision interpreting a relatively new provision of the United
States Internal Revenue Code (Code) that, under the Court’s
interpretation, allows certain resident aliens not to file FBARs for
years in which they qualify for certain treaty benefits. We discuss each
of these important decisions in turn.
Bittner v United States
In Bittner v United States, SCOTUS settled the question of
the appropriate method of calculating strict liability penalties for the
failure to timely disclose reportable accounts on an FBAR. Specifically
at issue in Bittner was whether the $10,000 penalty for nonwillful failure to timely report accounts on an FBAR applies on a per form basis or on a per account
basis. The difference can be enormous, as the litigant Alexandru
Bittner discovered. Mr. Bittner is a dual resident of the United States
and Romania and a successful businessman who had reportable interests in
up to 61 accounts in Romania from the time when he lived and worked
there before returning to the United States. His case did not involve
any allegation of willful misconduct (which would have entailed a
different set of much harsher penalties). Rather, upon his return to the
United States, he consulted accountants to get himself up to date with
his U.S. tax filings, which he did not keep up with while living abroad.
As part of his effort to comply, he filed FBARs for each of the years
from 2007 to 2011, but they were deemed deficient by the IRS for failing
to disclose all accounts. Mr. Bittner filed corrected FBARs reporting
all his accounts for each of the years 2007 to 2011 and found himself
hit with $2.72 million of strict liability FBAR penalties for his
trouble ($10,000 each for his collective 272 failures to timely report a
foreign account).
The U.S. circuit courts that had ruled on this issue had split on how
FBAR penalties should be calculated. The Ninth Circuit had endorsed the
per form approach, which would result in the imposition of an aggregate
$50,000 penalty in Mr. Bittner’s circumstances. However, the Fifth
Circuit, from which Mr. Bittner’s appeal was heard, had endorsed the per
account approach the IRS took in assessing $2.72 million in penalties
against Mr. Bittner.
SCOTUS Decision
In a 5-4 decision featuring some unusual alliances among the
justices, the Court endorsed the per form approach taken by the Ninth
Circuit. The majority’s opinion was penned by Justice Gorsuch and was
joined in full by Justice Jackson and in part by Justices Roberts, Alito
and Kavanaugh. The majority anchored its analysis in the wording of the
penalty provision at issue, which uses different language from that in
the provision of the law that clearly provides for per account penalties
in the case of willful failures to report. IRS publications in which
the service had repeatedly suggested FBAR penalties would not exceed
$10,000 per form were also highlighted by the majority as support for
their interpretation of the statute. In addition, the Court injected a
healthy degree of common sense into its analysis by inspecting the
incongruities that would be caused in certain circumstances were the
government’s position adopted:
Consider someone who has a $10 million balance in a single account
who nonwillfully fails to report that account. Everyone agrees he is
subject to a single penalty of $10,000. Yet under the government’s
theory, another person engaging in the same nonwillful conduct with
respect to a dozen foreign accounts with an aggregate balance of $10,001
would be subject to a penalty of $120,000.
On the government’s view, too, those who willfully violate the law may face lower penalties than those who violate the law nonwillfully.
For example, an individual who holds $1 million in a foreign account
during the course of a year but withdraws it before the filing deadline
and then willfully fails to file an FBAR faces a maximum penalty of
$100,000. But a person who errs nonwillfully in listing 20 accounts with
an aggregate balance of $50,000 can face a penalty of up to $200,000.
Reading the law to apply nonwillful penalties per report invites none of
these curiosities; the government’s per-account theory invites them all
[internal citations omitted].
A section of the majority opinion also invoked the principle that
statutes imposing penalties are to be strictly construed with any
ambiguity resolved against the government and in favour of individuals.
However, this section of the majority opinion was joined only by
Justices Gorsuch and Jackson, indicating that the rest of the majority
understood the statute to be clear on its face and were satisfied by the
statutory interpretation or, perhaps, that they were unwilling to
further endorse such principle in the context of a tax-penalty case.
A rather unlikely group of four justices, led by Justice Barrett who
was joined by Justices Thomas, Sotomayor and Kagan, disagreed with the
majority’s analysis and filed a dissent. In the dissent, Justice Barrett
notes that the law requires U.S. citizens and residents to file
“reports” on each of their foreign bank accounts in a manner prescribed
by the Secretary and also allows the Secretary to impose a $10,000
penalty for failing to file a report. According to the dissent’s
interpretation of the statutory provisions at issue, the FBAR is not a
single “report,” but rather a “form” that may include many reports.
Luckily for Mr. Bittner, however, this analysis did not prevail.
The decision is certainly a major relief for Mr. Bittner, but is also
a major victory for U.S. taxpayers with financial ties to other
countries. Most taxpayers do their best to comply with their FBAR
reporting obligations, but can do so only if they are aware of the need
to make such reports. Further, even if a person is aware of the need to
file an FBAR, they do not always have all the information necessary to
timely disclose each account – whether because the account was
unknowingly inherited by them or they were signatories over accounts of
which they were not aware, neither situation being all that uncommon.
The Court’s approach is a welcome limit to the government’s authority to
penalize taxpayers for such nonwillful failures. While $10,000 is still
a stiff penalty, it is far better than the draconian penalties,
potentially many multiples of $10,000, that taxpayers previously faced
for unwittingly failing to timely disclose foreign accounts on an FBAR.
Aroeste v United States
Aroeste v United States addressed the question whether tax
treaty residency affects whether a person who is otherwise a U.S. person
for federal tax purposes has an FBAR filing obligation. Only U.S.
persons (i.e., U.S. citizens and residents) are required to file an
FBAR, a requirement imposed by the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and
codified separately from the tax law. However, regulations under the BSA
define a “resident of the United States” by reference to section
7701(b) of the Code and the regulations thereunder defining a “resident
alien.” Under section 7701(b), a “resident alien” includes a lawful
permanent resident of the United States (more commonly referred to as a
“green card holder”). Section 7701(b)(6), however, provides that a
person will not be treated as a permanent resident (and thus a resident
alien) in any year in which the person “commences to be treated as a
resident of a foreign country under provisions of a tax treaty between
the United States and the foreign country, the individual does not waive
the benefits of such treaty applicable to residents of the foreign
country, and the individual notifies the Secretary of the commencement
of such treatment.” This section of the Code was intended to cause the
U.S. departure tax to apply to long-term green card holders who claim
such treaty benefits. This case is the first in which a court has ruled
on the section’s application in the context of being a U.S. person for
purposes of the FBAR.
The United States argued that the plain language of section
7701(b)(6) should be disregarded for purposes of imposing FBAR
penalties. The government argued that “Mr. Aroeste’s status under the
Treaty [was] irrelevant because the Treaty solely concerns residency for
purposes of income tax and excise tax assessments under Title 26 of the
United States Code, whereas FBAR penalties are assessed under Title
31.” However, Mr. Aroeste asserted that “if [he] was treated as a
Mexican resident under the Treaty, that fact would disqualify him from
being counted as a ‘United States person’ under the FBAR regulations”
because section 7701(b)(6) would cause him not be a resident alien under
the Code and thus the FBAR regulations.
The District Court did not decide that Mr. Aroeste was in
fact not required to file an FBAR in any given year. Its ruling was
limited to concluding that he would not be a lawful permanent resident
or resident alien within the meaning of section 7701(b) if he
was treated as a resident of Mexico under the treaty (and met the other
requirements of section 7701(b)(6)) in a given year, and, accordingly,
would not have been required to file FBARs for those years.
Specifically, the Court held that “Mr. Aroeste’s tax residency under the
Treaty is directly relevant to – indeed is outcome determinative of –
the issue whether he was required to file the FBARs at issue.”
Although the United States may yet appeal the decision and ultimately succeed, the Court’s analysis in Aroeste
is persuasive and seemingly apparent from a plain reading of the
relevant statutes and regulations. So, while the outcome of the case is
promising for affected taxpayers and provides authority for them to
potentially claim relief from FBAR filing, taxpayers should tread
cautiously in relying on the case to forgo filing their FBARs because
other districts could endorse the government’s interpretation. In
addition, the regulations under section 7701(b) provide that claiming
residency under a tax treaty results in a person treated as not a
resident alien only for purposes of computing the person’s U.S. income
tax (i.e., not for other information reporting required under the Code).
Green card holders who claim non-U.S. residency under a treaty should
consult their advisers to determine the applicability of the Aroeste ruling to their particular situations.
Conclusion
While these cases provide valuable relief, U.S. taxpayers with
international ties still have a heavy compliance burden, with
significant penalties associated with any failures. Failure to file a
timely and accurate FBAR still carries a $10,000 penalty. In addition,
dual-resident taxpayers who claim treaty residency in a foreign country
may still have an obligation to file other international information
reports, including Form 5471, Information Return of U.S. Persons With Respect To Certain Foreign Corporations,
which carries $10,000 penalties if not timely and accurately filed with
the IRS. Accordingly, taxpayers should continue (or begin) working with
their advisers to comply with their U.S. international
information-reporting obligations or risk significant penalties.